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NEWS AND THE POWER OF THE PRESS

ROBERT E. PARK

ABSTRACT

The relation of the news to public opinion and the power of the press is considered with reference to its function in the "political process." News columns are read more widely than the editorial pages. Generally speaking, the editorial is addressed to an intellectual and political élite. Its function is not to inform the public but to interpret the news in accordance with some political policy. Its function is to insure consistent political action. The function of the news is to orient the public in regard to events which affect not only public policy but the interests of individual readers. At times when party discipline is maintained the editorial is likely to be successful in directing political action. At times when party discipline is relaxed it is the news rather than the editorial that makes opinion. However, there can be no public opinion, except where there is some fundamental agreement and understanding as to what events, as they happen, are likely to mean, and events have meaning only as one knows what to do about them.

The power of the press is the influence that newspapers exercise in the formation of public opinion and in mobilizing the community for political action. It is obvious that the press has been everywhere an important instrument in the formulation of political policy and in various ways and at various stages has played an important role in the political process.

The political process, as here conceived, is the process by which a political society acts as in the case of war with an external enemy, but it includes, also, those internal and organic processes—legislative, administrative, and judicial—and the ferment and discussion that accompanies them by which new policies, new laws, and eventually new institutions come into existence. The political process may thus be said to begin with the rise of some sort of agitation or social

unrest and to end finally with some modification of the mores after new laws have been enacted, interpreted, and enforced over considerable periods of time. It is in the form of the mores that new norms and new rights are incorporated into the ethos of the society to which they appertain.¹

It is in this context and as an incident of the political process that public opinion functions. The opinion with which we are here concerned is not merely that which gets recorded on editorial pages, however. It is rather the opinion that emerges from the discussions of individuals attempting to formulate and rationalize their individual interpretations of the news, with or without the help of the editorial commentator. Public opinion, in this limited sense, is political opinion—the opinion that emerges when, in the presence of some emergency, some political action is in progress. It is rather opinion in process of making, before it has been capitalized and, so to speak, funded in the form of dogma, doctrine, or law. Public opinion, once it has been thus fixed and codified, is a stabilizing and conservative rather than an innovating force.

The role of the press in this situation is obviously not merely to orient the public in regard to the issues involved but to bring into existence a collective will and a political power which, as it mobilizes the community to act, tends to terminate discussion. It is this that constitutes the power of the press.

If now we inquire as to the ultimate sources of this power, they are

¹ The Greeks applied the term "ethos" to the sum of the characteristic usages, ideas, standards, and codes by which a group was differentiated and individualized in character from other groups. "Ethics" were things which pertained to the ethos, and, therefore, the things which were the standard of right. The Romans used "mores" for customs in the broadest and richest sense of the word, including the notion that customs served welfare and had traditional and mystic sanction, so that they were properly authoritative and sacred. It is a very surprising fact that modern nations should have lost these words and the significant suggestions which inhere in them. The English language has no derivative noun from "mores" and no equivalent for it. The French *mœurs* is trivial compared with "mores." The German *Sitte* renders "mores" but very imperfectly. The modern peoples have made morals and morality a separate domain, by the side of religion, philosophy, and politics. In that sense morals is an impossible and unreal category. It has no existence and can have none. The word "moral" means what belongs or appertains to the mores. Therefore the category of morals can never be defined without reference to something outside of itself. Cf. William Graham Sumner, *Folkways* (New York: Ginn & Co., 1907), pp. 36-37.

obviously many and varied; but they may be reduced to the following:

1. *Grievances*.—Politicians have invariably known how to capitalize upon the recognized grievances, public and private, of the communities they serve. A public grievance is, in fact, from the point of view of practical politics, a political asset. I have known politicians to create a public scandal over the question whether candidate A or B was entitled to exploit, in his contest for office, a particularly promising public grievance. I might add that the obvious and outstanding case of a politician exploiting a grievance to create political power is that of Herr Hitler and the German people. The grievances of the German people after World War I were undoubtedly intensified and embittered by the failure of the famous "Fourteen Points" and the good intentions of an idealistic American president to achieve what these points seemed to promise. This disillusionment of the German people has contributed, directly and indirectly, to create in Germany a political solidarity and a political power such as the world has never before known. The sources of political power are relatively obvious, but the workings of the collective mind are still obscure.

2. *News*.—A news editor and staff that are keenly alive to the nature and source of existing grievances, since grievances make news, and news makes opinion.

3. *Editorial policy*.—An editorial policy and an editorial writer who is able to rationalize grievances and give them finally the character of a cause. The Negro in the United States is a case in point. The Negro is united by a long-standing grievance, and, as the political, if not also the cultural, life of the Negro people has come to be organized about this grievance, it has assumed the form of a cause. It is an important event in the life of a racial or national minority when it is able to identify its claims with a cause. In doing so it makes itself the protagonist of all other minorities who trace their grievances to the same source or are seeking on the basis of the same principle redress for the injuries they suffer or think they suffer.

Other minorities, such as the French Canadians, have made their grievance the source of a relatively stable political party, but these grievances have not assumed as yet the character of a cause on the

basis of which French Canadians can or are disposed to appeal to the world outside the Dominion.

4. *Circulation.*—A newspaper, to make itself a source of political power, must circulate. In a stable and well-organized society, where political opinion is supported by parties that are disciplined and respond to leadership, a paper may exercise a considerable influence even when its circulation is limited to a political élite. But in a democracy where everyone reads, and particularly in a period of rapid change and revolution when political opinion and political power are in the making, it is news rather than the editorial that makes opinion.

This, in brief, is my thesis. What I shall have to say later is intended merely to elucidate and make explicit what is implicit in what has been said.

In the first place it is obvious now, after all that has been written about it in recent years, that public opinion is a more complicated thing than the analysts who have attempted to dissect and measure it have assumed. There is, for example, always an element of novelty and of news in all public opinion. Someone is attempting to do something about something, and the possibility that something may be done, even though it is generally recognized that something should be done, is disturbing to some sections of the social aggregate. There are always in every society and every situation vested interests which are likely to view with alarm any change of any sort. Something must be done, but what? The news which announces changes or merely indicates that changes are impending inevitably starts conversation, raises issues, making news and, incidentally, politics.

Another element in public opinion is public sentiment. Opinion may be merely academic, that is, it may be concerned mainly with the form or the accuracy of a statement rather than with its effects. But public opinion is never merely academic. It is always practical, always political, always relative to some specific action, and action that is immediate and pending. Thus public opinion is always more or less charged with sentiment. It is this fact that led President Lowell² of

² One man who holds his belief tenaciously counts for as much as several men who hold theirs weakly, because he is more aggressive and thereby compels and overawes others into apparent agreement with him, or at least into silence and inaction. This is perhaps especially true of moral questions. It is not improbable that a large part of

Harvard, in his treatise on *Public Opinion and Popular Government*, to call attention to the fact that public opinion has more than one dimension. It has not merely territorial extensivity, but, like a thunderstorm or a mere change in the weather, it has direction and intensity.

This means, for one thing, that a minority or an individual that is convinced is likely to be more effective in determining political action than a majority which is merely interested or moved to action by some passing incident or some moving orator; that is, aroused but not convinced. This is the reason political sects and so-called pressure groups have been able, particularly in times when party discipline has broken down and public opinion has been more or less apathetic, to exercise very great influence on legislation. On the other hand, when great constitutional issues have arisen—issues that have threatened the existence of the established social order or, as in the case of the Civil War, of the nation—the influence of the political sects and pressure groups, with their insistence upon local and minor issues, has declined. It is, generally speaking, when the public is preoccupied and public opinion is at a low ebb that reform legislation has been written on the statute-books. It is notorious that pressure groups seek to keep the measures they are promoting, as they sometimes put it, “out of politics” and even out of the news.

On the other hand, the power of the press, as here defined, has invariably reached the acme of its influence on political affairs in times of crisis, as in that of the Revolution in 1776 or in the Civil War. It was at such times that the great editors, men like Greeley, of the *New York Tribune*, and Raymond, of the *New York Times*, who knew how to interpret events in the light of the great issues involved, exercised a dominant influence on public opinion and public policy.

It has long been recognized, even if it were not obvious from the conditions under which it arises, that there can be no public opinion in which the masses of the people participate except in a free society.

the accepted moral code is maintained by the earnestness of a minority, while more than half of the community is indifferent or unconvinced. In short, public opinion is not strictly the opinion of the numerical majority, and no form of its expression measures the mere majority, for individual views are always to some extent weighed as well as counted. Cf. A. Lawrence Lowell, *Public Opinion and Popular Government* (Longmans, Green & Co., 1913).

There can be no public opinion in regard to any political action unless the people who constitute the public know, in a general way at least, what is actually going on. There are, of course, always ways in which the people can, even under the strictest censorship, know indirectly what is happening, but, if that knowledge gets into circulation only in indirect ways or takes form only in legends and myths which spring up and gain wide circulation in the absence of more direct and more accurate knowledge, then there can be nothing that corresponds to public opinion as we know it. For public opinion, as it functions ordinarily in a free society, is the product of discussion. In turn, discussion arises from the differing interpretations which different individuals, different political parties and groups give to events. But this again assumes the existence in any public of a general understanding and a community of interest among all parties sufficient to make discussion possible.

Whenever in any political society the diversity of interests and points of view from which the news is interpreted becomes so great that discussion is no longer possible, then there is no longer any public opinion, at least no effective public opinion. In that case nothing but force, in some form or other, is capable of maintaining sufficient order to permit, if not the normal, at least the necessary, social processes to go on. Under such circumstances it is vain to speak of freedom of speech or of the role of public opinion. In our modern world, where public opinion plays, or seems to play, so large a role in the settlement of disputes and controversies not otherwise justifiable, we have nowhere, it seems, achieved a rule of reason. Everywhere we must compromise or fight, and such government and law as we have are always backed finally by force. In fact one must recognize, it seems to me, that the most elementary form of political action is war, and discussion, when it takes place, is merely a substitute or surrogate for war. In fact, the elections by which in modern democratic states the sovereign power is transferred from one class or one party to another are merely a more or less complete substitute for civil war. That is the reason elections and transfers of political power are so frequently accompanied by civil war or by revolution, as, for example, in Mexico and some of the other less politically mature states in South America and elsewhere.

It is the reason why in a free society like our own we tolerate strikes and other limited forms of violence for the settlement of disputes in which the government and the general public do not want to intervene—except as arbitrators. It is in this sense that we must interpret Walter Bagehot's conception of an "Age of Discussion" which was to supersede, as it has in fact in most European states, civil and dynastic wars as a means not only of determining the succession in the governing body but of settling disputes of every sort. An age of discussion is an age of parliamentary government—a form of government which is at present, it is true, somewhat in abeyance in many parts of the world.

It is in this sense that Sumner's statement about rights—the right of free speech, for example, and other rights essential to a democracy such as ours—should be understood. After discussing what he calls the "dogma of rights," rights which are everywhere regarded as the opposite of force, Sumner says: "Might has made all the right which ever has existed or exists now," and he adds finally: "If we recognize the great extent to which force now enters into all which happens in society, we shall cease to be shocked to learn the extent to which it has been active in the entire history of civilization."³ This is not, as it may seem, a statement that might everywhere makes right but rather a statement that rights exist only in a political society, that is, a society that is capable of enforcing them.⁴

It may seem a far cry from public opinion to the "rights of man." As conceived here, however, both are products of the same political process or processes. Public opinion is the form which the collective will takes when it is in process of formation. Rights are public opinion in one of its ultimate forms, after it has been incorporated into the mores.

If observations of this sort do not seem to throw much light on the power of the press, they do suggest the context in which one must

³ *Op. cit.*, pp. 65-66.

⁴ Strictly speaking, in a society organized on a familial basis, no one has rights, but all have duties. In such a society every member has certain recognized claims on every other, but these claims are enforced by custom rather than by force or formal law. In China, for example, human relations are regulated less by law, in the occidental sense, than by the principle of *li*. Cf. Leonard S. Shu, *The Political Philosophy of Confucius* (London: Routledge, 1932).

look for light on public opinion and the press, as far as either of them can be profitably investigated, within the framework of a systematic science.

I have already indicated that the role of the editorial page in the political process, though intimately related to that of the news, is not identical with it. The editorial and the news are related not merely by the fact that they are published in the same paper, because sometimes they are not, but because the editorials are designed to supplement the news.

As a matter of fact, the editorial and the news have had historically different origins and, except where both were written by the same hands, they have always remained more or less independent of one another. The newspaper originated in the so-called newsletters, not unlike those letters some of us are now receiving from England—letters written by correspondents in the old country to friends or relatives in this country, giving them intimate and firsthand accounts of what has been going on at the centers where history is being made. Such was the origin of the newspaper. It was, first of all, merely a letter circulated to the members of a family or to a wider circle of friends. Later on those who could afford it, and particularly those engaged in foreign trade, hired correspondents to write to them regularly.

The editorial, on the other hand, had its origin in the letters to the editor, in which men interested in political matters sought to express their opinion in regard to debatable measures proposed or undertaken by the government. Usually the writers were in opposition. The publisher, in such cases, was usually an impecunious printer, like John Peter Zenker, whose prosecution and acquittal in 1735 or thereabouts for publishing one such letter established in this country the principle that the truth of a published statement is a sufficient defense in a suit for libel. In spite of all the agitation for free speech in that country, that principle is not yet recognized, I believe, in England.

The function of the editorial writer and of the editorial page is obviously to interpret the news, to tell us what it means, and what we should do about it. We never know what events mean until we know how to act in response to them, and, if we are to act effectively,

we must act consistently. The extent to which the editorial page contributes to consistent political action is related to the editor's ability to interpret events in accordance with some rational principle. It is only in this way that events become intelligible in any but the most elementary sense of that term. In the turmoil of political democracy, where government is carried on amidst the confusion of many conflicting voices, it is often difficult to steer a straight course. Success in doing so, however, is the difference between drift and mastery.

There is a rule of law which declares that it is more important that the law should be consistent than that it should be just. The same may be true of an editorial policy in some sense and in some degree. From time to time, however, courts and editors reverse themselves. When the editors flop, it is likely to be disconcerting to the paper's readers and sometimes disastrous to the publisher. As long, however, as the editorial page and the editorial policy are able to maintain contact with events as recorded in the news, the editor can exercise a very considerable influence on the movement of public opinion.

On the other hand, as soon as the editorial interpretation of the news assumes, as it always tends to, a doctrinaire character, so that we know that whatever happens the editorial page, like a cuckoo clock, will merely repeat the familiar note, the influence of the editorial page declines. It does not, of course, cease, but its influence is merely that of an oft-repeated political dogma and not the sort of influence we attribute to mobile public opinion, changing in response to events in an actual world.

In contrast with editorial writers, the news editor and his reporters are in a very different case. They are under no necessity of making one day's news consistent with that of the preceding day. For the news editor and his reporters every morning brings a new day, and the best that can happen is something that one did not yesterday expect.

At an earlier period in the history of the newspaper, when the news columns were subordinate to the editorial page, if something occurred that was not in accord with the policy of the paper, the editor might, as a matter of public policy, suppress it. In the modern newspaper, however, when the news covers almost every aspect of life

and the news columns quite overshadow the editorial in importance, the news editor and the reporter have achieved an independence they never before enjoyed, and newspapers, as Charles S. Dana puts it, print almost anything that God will let happen.

It is not that the news editor, as distinguished from the editorial writer, has no policy. On the contrary, he has. It is a policy, however, that is not determined by political considerations but rather by what in his estimation is news. The answer to that question may be different for every one of the different departments of the paper, including the first page, which is not a department at all, since it is addressed to the widest possible circle and the least-sophisticated.

One consequence of the expansion of the newspaper's conception of news has been to increase greatly the number of persons who read newspapers or read anything. But of this larger circle of readers, relatively few now read the editorial page.

The editorial column exists obviously for the intellectuals. The news, however, is for the great mass of mankind, and the public opinion formed on the basis of the news represents the interpretation of events which each individual makes for himself in accordance with his individual interests, prejudices, and predilections, qualified by the interpretation which other individuals with whom he has discussed the matter have made of the same events.

It is obvious that news, as it is interpreted differently by different individuals, tends to disperse attention and take discussion out of the realm of abstract and general ideas and bring it within the limits of the comprehension and the universe of discourse of the common man.

So far as this is true at all, the effect of news on public opinion is just the opposite of that of the editorial, which seeks to focus attention on a principle or program for political action. As a matter of fact, news tends to disintegrate political principles, doctrines, and dogmas that have been necessarily formulated out of the experience of an earlier time. In a society that is organized in such a way that every locality, every community, every profession, and every craft have their intellectual leaders, the opinions of editors will be mediated and eventually will be felt. But in times like the present, when great and rapid changes are taking place, it is difficult for editorial

programs and political policies to keep pace with events. In such periods it is the interpretation which the great mass of the readers finally agrees to put upon events that makes public opinion. In fact it seems to me that I have noticed a good deal of distress among the newspaper columnists, particularly in recent months, in their efforts to be consistent and at the same time keep up with the news.

It is this public opinion that emerges from the responses of the great mass of newspaper readers that the Gallup and other polls of public opinion seek to measure. It is this moving and fluctuating public opinion of which Lippmann was thinking when he published his notable essay on *Liberty and the News*. The point of that essay was that only as far as the sources of news are not fouled by propaganda is it possible for a people to preserve the liberties guaranteed them by the existence of a democratic society. Lippmann states it in more impressive language than I am capable of. He says:

Just as the most poisonous form of disorder is the mob incited from high places, the most immoral act the immorality of a government, so the most destructive form of untruth is sophistry and propaganda by those whose profession it is to report the news. The news columns are common carriers. When those who control them arrogate to themselves the right to determine by their own consciences what shall be reported and for what purpose, democracy is unworkable. Public opinion is blockaded. For when a people can no longer confidently repair "to the best fountains for their information," then, anyone's guess and anyone's rumor, each man's hope and each man's whim becomes the basis of government.⁵

This impresses me not merely as an accurate statement of the function of the news but likewise as a just statement of its importance in what I have described as the political process. It is, however, just as true that there is and there can be no such thing as news, in so far as concerns politics, except in a community in which there is a body of tradition and common understanding in terms of which events are ordinarily interpreted. This, however, involves considerations which Mr. Lippmann, in all that he has written about public opinion, has not yet adequately discussed. He seems nearer to it, perhaps, in his volume, *A Preface to Morals*, than in anything else he has written.

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⁵ Walter Lippmann, *Liberty and the News* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Howe, 1920), pp. 10-11.

A METHOD FOR STUDYING MORAL JUDGMENTS RELATING TO THE FAMILY

JOHN F. CUBER AND BETTY PELL

ABSTRACT

Numerous students have secured manifestations of attitudes and beliefs through the use of the "opinion poll." The informants usually are requested to indicate their reactions to statements which often appear not to convey the meaning to the subject that they are assumed to because the statements are so general and conceptual. A "different" type of situational and nonconceptualized questionnaire dealing with moral evaluations relating to the family and marriage was constructed and submitted to 217 college students. This paper summarizes the results and attempts to evaluate the procedure.

Numerous researches which have attempted to secure data reflecting the attitudes and beliefs of persons have employed what Day has termed the "opinion poll."¹ In this procedure the informant is usually requested to indicate his reaction to a generalized statement, such as, "Do you believe that common-law marriages should be declared null and void?" Then he may be given the opportunity to respond (a) in terms of "Yes," "No," or "Uncertain" or (b) in terms of a "scale" showing the intensity of his valuation. For some time it has appeared to the authors and others² that studies based on this method have two fundamental limitations. They assume, first, that an individual has already generalized his experience sufficiently well to state it in such an omnibus "opinion" and, second, that he can and will express this generalization of his experience so that it can be fitted into such an evaluative scheme. For example, the following generalization was submitted to a group of 117 informants: "Common-law marriage is always wrong, and every individual entering into such a relationship is to be morally condemned." Ninety-three per cent of the informants indicated an affirmative opinion. Thirty minutes later a short short-story was read to the group in

¹ Daniel Day, "Methods in Attitude Research," *American Sociological Review*, V, No. 3 (1940), 395-410, esp. 396-97.

² See, e.g., C. Kirkpatrick, "Inconsistency in Attitudinal Behavior with Reference to Attitudes toward Feminism," *Journal of Applied Psychology*, XX (1936), 535-52.

which the leading character, a woman who was obviously a "common-law" wife, was presented in a favorable manner by the author of the story. The informants were again requested to indicate their judgment as follows: "Was the behavior of this woman morally wrong?" Of the same group of informants, 91 per cent said "No." This group, which had voted a half-hour earlier that all common-law mates were to be "morally condemned," now reversed itself and was equally emphatic in refusing to condemn an obvious case of common-law wifehood. The inconsistency in their positions was then pointed out to about thirty of the informants selected at random. Responses to the alleged "inconsistency" were mainly that they "didn't intend to condemn cases like this one" or that "this didn't seem like common-law marriage," etc.³

Another instance may be cited. Frequently in both formal and informal attitude polls informants are requested to indicate their opinions on the "double standard" of morality. The same 117 informants referred to in the foregoing illustration were given such a question. Eighty-three per cent disclaimed all regard for the double standard; but, when asked to evaluate specific situations such as the relative wrongness of male and female prostitution or of adulterous behavior, over 56 per cent of those who thought themselves free of the double-standard ideology actually condemned identical moral "deviations" more severely for women than for men. Illustrations could, of course, be multiplied.⁴

It is not assumed here that attitudes either ought to be or can be consistent. The point to the illustrations and the criticism of generalized attitude polls is that the methodological assumption which inheres therein is of dubious soundness. Either the various specific situations which come under the generalized heading are assumed to be defined in a manner logically consistent with the generalized heading or the generalized statement is an utter fiction. If it can be demonstrated—and it frequently has been—that inform-

³ See Kirkpatrick, *op. cit.*, esp. p. 537, and his conclusion that "inconsistency and uncertainty are natural and inevitable aspects of human behavior" (p. 552).

⁴ Read Bain, "Our Schizoid Culture," *Sociology and Social Research*, XXIX (1935), 266-76, shows how inconsistencies and contradictions exist as part and parcel of the culture itself.

ants cannot or do not manifest definitions of specific situations which are consistent with their generalized abstract statements, then it would seem better to dispense with the more generalized procedure.⁵

In view of the foregoing considerations an improved observational device for studying moral ideas was sought. Folsom's suggestion that "a more intimate study of the love mores of different groups by asking persons to rank or rate the morality of various specific situations, rather than to pass judgment upon generalized values or alternatives" is a needed line of research appeared to be well taken.⁶ Ideally, it would seem that what a person's "mores" were could be best determined by his evaluations of concrete instances of behavior or *persons known to him*. This approach, however, involves the case-study and life-history methods and entails practical difficulties which perhaps are not immediately apparent. Since no large number of informants has had contact with the same persons and situations, standardization of the observations for purposes of comparing or even summarizing the results would be very difficult. Such a procedure would, however, appear to have possibilities, particularly in the determination of the more subtle ideologies (thought systems) serving as criteria for judging moral behavior. The case method, promising though it may be, was abandoned in favor of one which would seem (a) to approximate it in concreteness, (b) to produce comparable data from relatively large numbers of subjects, and (c) to be adapted to repeated observations either with the same or with different informants. The following procedure was accordingly followed.

First, an advanced student of sociology agreed to write a number of brief "cases" and "situations" involving what were thought to be somewhat controversial moral issues. These "cases" were selected from novels, dramas, and the personal observations of the writers. The person writing the cases did not know at the time the exact purpose for which they were to be employed. These cases were submitted to a few critics to correct ambiguities of statement and were

⁵ Cf. Kirkpatrick, "Assumptions and Methods in Attitudinal Measurement," *American Sociological Review*, I (1936), 75-88; cf. also R. T. LaPiere and P. R. Farnsworth, *Social Psychology* (New York, 1936), pp. 220-33.

⁶ J. K. Folsom, *The Family* (New York, 1934), p. 580.

then submitted to informants. Following each "case" a number of questions were asked. A typical one was: "Is this morally wrong for Helen?" Three choices—"Yes," "No," and "Uncertain"—were offered, informants being requested to indicate any additional comments if they felt that their position would be clarified by so doing. They were reminded that an "Uncertain" answer might be quite as significant as a definite affirmative or negative one.

Second, a group of Junior, Senior, and graduate students enrolled in a course on the family were then selected as informants, mostly because of administrative convenience. The group represented what could be regarded as a fair cross-section of the students of the university so far as age, sex, religion, and department of specialization were concerned. It could be considered atypical in that the informants were very largely urban. Participation in the study by the informants was voluntary, but no one in the group declined to take part. A copy of the opinionnaire follows.

MORAL EVALUATIONS QUESTIONNAIRE

Directions.—In each of the following cases you will be given a set of facts about someone, either a real person known to the writer or a character of fiction. After you have read the "case," answer the question or questions relating to it. Do not go on to later cases until you have answered or decided to omit the current one.

1. Glenna has been married almost a decade. There are two children. Her husband's work takes him away from home often during the evening. Glenna does not object to this but is annoyed by neighborhood gossip regarding a friend of hers and her husband's who often comes to spend the evening with her while her husband is away. This man has been a good friend of hers and of her husband. "In fact," she says, "my husband often asks me why I don't invite Dale to come over oftener. Dale seems just like one of the family. He's alone much of the time himself and seems to appreciate coming over. He writes a great deal and likes to read to me what he has written—says I can give him a great deal of much-needed criticism, understanding, and encouragement to go on. That's about all we ever do."
 - a) Is this wrong for Glenna? Yes..... No..... Uncertain.....
 - b) Is this wrong for Dale? Yes..... No..... Uncertain.....Any remarks?
2. Bob and Helen want to get married soon. They have been engaged for a year. So far as they can foresee, it will be impossible for the marriage to take place for another two years at least. Bob and Helen have already had

complete sexual relations upon a number of occasions. Helen says that she can see nothing wrong with this "as long as people marry eventually" and "do not feel guilty about it."

a) Is this wrong for Helen? Yes..... No..... Uncertain.....

b) Is this wrong for Bob? Yes..... No..... Uncertain.....

Any remarks?

3. Not long ago an article appeared in the *Cleveland Plain Dealer* telling about a prominent businessman in a near-by city who was married to a woman who recently became an invalid. He was a highly respected man in the city and lived with his family in a fashionable suburb. Elsewhere in this same city he had built and furnished another, more modest, home in which there lived another woman whom he loved and who loved him. She agreed to come here to live as "another woman having a bit of his life" after she had had full understanding of the case. For years she has been happy living this cloistered life—and he too.

a) Is this wrong for her? Yes..... No..... Uncertain.....

b) Is this wrong for him? Yes..... No..... Uncertain.....

Remarks:

4. Freddie and Ruth were only eighteen when they were married. They have been married seven years now and have a two-year-old daughter. They were childhood sweethearts, having dated since they were fourteen. The last year has been eventful in both their lives. Ruth has found her family doctor to be an admirable person. She had not known, however, that he was even aware of her except as a patient. But somehow it happened. They don't know just how, but they were suddenly in each other's arms. It has happened several times since—"just a few moments in an embrace, that is all." They say that they "have no regrets" and "have rationalized the thing as right." Freddie also has a "friend"—a quiet, refined girl with whom he works. Both Ruth and Freddie have told each other about the "second" affair. They wish their marriage to go on because they love each other and their child and because "divorce only makes more problems than it solves." All four persons concerned know the full details of the situation.

a) Is this wrong for Ruth? Yes..... No..... Uncertain.....

b) Is this wrong for Freddie? Yes..... No..... Uncertain.....

c) Is this wrong for the doctor? Yes..... No..... Uncertain.....

d) Is this wrong for Freddie's "girl friend?" Yes..... No..... Uncertain.....

Remarks:

5. "I know Larry's in love with another woman. Folks don't have to tell me that they see him here or there with her. Larry's been in love with other women before—for a little while now and then; it never lasts. He's just not the constant type of man, that's all. I know Louise quite well. She's a nice

girl and probably likes Larry a good deal. She and I are, in fact, good friends. . . . Some of my friends ask why I don't divorce Larry. Why should I? Larry, Louise, and I are all happy as things are. Why don't people leave me alone, so long as I am satisfied with the situation? I have my home, my friends, and more of Larry's time and attention than most people realize. He's good to me and goes out of his way to be considerate. . . ."

- a) Is this wrong for Larry? Yes..... No..... Uncertain.....
 b) Is this wrong for his wife? Yes..... No..... Uncertain.....
 c) Is this wrong for Louise? Yes..... No..... Uncertain.....

Remarks:

6. Those who have read Charlotte Brontë's novel *Jane Eyre* will recall that in that story a certain Mr. Rochester is wed to an insane wife who must be kept confined and under the care of strong guards. Mr. Rochester finds understanding and love for the governess of his ward. The governess, Jane Eyre, returns his love and adds to it respect—even adoration. It was apparently only Jane who could help Mr. Rochester in those moments of his life when nothing seemed to be worth while.

- a) Was this relationship wrong for Mr. Rochester? Yes..... No..... Uncertain.....
 b) Was this relationship wrong for Jane Eyre? Yes..... No..... Uncertain.....

Remarks:

7. Jerry and Donna have been married six years. They have no children. After the first year of marriage they agreed to spend their vacations apart. Jerry says of this plan: "It give us a chance to get away from each other, see new people, and have new and refreshing experiences. We both look forward to those vacations each year and look forward, too, to coming home again when they are over. Yes, we go out with others during those vacations. That's all in the game. Seldom do we have any very serious affairs, although it happens sometimes. I had one such serious affair once, and I think Donna did. We don't object to that either—it eventually wears off. For example, once I got lonesome for my 'summer love,' and Donna read my mind, I guess. Anyway, she suggested that I go where I might see this woman. I did, and that was all that there was to it. We both, Donna and I, feel that those vacations and 'loves' make us appreciate each other more. At least that is the way it has worked out for five years now."

- a) Is this wrong for Donna? Yes..... No..... Uncertain.....
 b) Is this wrong for Jerry? Yes..... No..... Uncertain.....

Remarks:

8. Over on the exclusive side of town is an impressive, luxurious house. In it live the Van Dorens. Mrs. Van Doren has servants, her own car, everything a woman could want in the way of material comforts, and the respect

and adoration of her husband. Mrs. Van Doren says she does not love her husband—never did. She says that she came from the “aristocracy” and that, when it came time to marry, she looked around for a man of her “class.” She found such a man in her present husband; so she married him. She says that “fulfilling all the duties of a wife is not unpleasant to me. I simply capitalized on my sex when I married. Why not?”

a) Is this wrong for Mrs. Van Doren? Yes..... No..... Uncertain.....

Remarks:

9. Paul is a college man. There are still four years of undergraduate and graduate work ahead, and then a couple of years of “starvation” before he can think of marriage. He says that he has not let himself fall in love because it would not be fair to the girl to ask her to wait that long. “And there would always be the temptation to a secret marriage or the guilt-creating subterfuge of sex relations outside of marriage. It would only be courting trouble for both of us and running the risk of ruining a career.” Paul goes on to say, however: “That doesn’t mean that I don’t have a sex life. I’m honest enough to know that a healthy man has natural desires—and I provide for them. You call it ‘prostitution,’ but I don’t. The girls are physically all right (a doctor friend of mine performs the regular examinations to determine that) and have pleasing personalities. Some of them are more courteous and genuinely intellectual than numerous coeds I know. I pay for a service which they perform for me. It is satisfying, creates no aversion to sex, and will, I am sure, in no way interfere with my future married life—if and when.”

a) Is this wrong? Yes..... No..... Uncertain.....

Remarks:

10. “I’m a career woman. My profession is supposed to be a noble one, and I believe it is. Public opinion apparently fails to note that we unmarried women in the professions are human beings, and so we are told that, as soon as we marry, our career must end. I love my career; it is life to me; so I cannot marry. . . . But I am human. I crave the affection and understanding which only a complete and frank man-woman relationship can give. I have found such a relationship with a man of my own age, a widower, who apparently finds the relationship mutually satisfactory. Legally, I realize that I am not even a common-law wife, but I have all that I want. And so does he. Is it anyone else’s concern? We think not.”

a) Is this wrong for the woman? Yes..... No..... Uncertain.....

b) Is this wrong for the man? Yes..... No..... Uncertain.....

Remarks:

11. “My husband and I both work. Not that we have to in order to keep the wolf from the door, but it is simply a case that we like it. I don’t work steadily, only intermittently. Many of my friends drop hints from time to

time that it is getting time for us to have children. Jack and I have talked it over. We agreed that neither of us wished to have any children. We feel that we can make a contribution to the world in other ways than biologically. It annoys me that people must assume that reproduction is a moral responsibility. I can't see it."

a) Is their childlessness wrong? Yes..... No..... Uncertain.....

12. Betty is suing Andrew for divorce. She says that he was a good husband, a good provider—in all, a model man. But she has fallen "out of love with him." Not that she has fallen in love with anyone else; just out of love with him. Several of her friends have tried to influence her to "go on" with Andrew and try to fall back in love with him. "Time may make a change," and all that. She is determined to get the divorce. She says that, if she isn't happy, sooner or later he'll become unhappy too, "and then he'll hate me. Before that happens I will just pass out of the picture as his wife. Soon he will forget. I'm sorry about the whole thing, but I made a mistake when I married him. I did it all in good faith at the time, however."

a) Is it wrong for Betty to secure a divorce for this reason? Yes.....
No..... Uncertain.....

b) Is it wrong for Andrew to try to dissuade her? Yes.....
No..... Uncertain.....

c) Would it be wrong for Andrew to try to contest the divorce? Yes.....
No..... Uncertain.....

Remarks:

Several methodological limitations are at once apparent. It may appear to some that, after a mountain of criticism leveled against the conventional opinion poll, we have brought forth an anthill of refinement. The device is still a linguistic one; situations are abstract to the informant and have "reality" only as he can vitalize the statement by his own imaginative ability and previous experience. The cases may be too brief. It has been suggested that in some instances they are written in a "persuasive" manner—"not neutral enough." The questions are "leading"; there may be a difference between asking, "Is this wrong for James?" and "Is this right for James?"

There is, however, another side. The "situations" admittedly are not so concrete as are those of persons known to the informants in "real life," but the pertinent comparison would seem to involve the method employed here and alternative devices of the form already criticized. The cases appear to be considerably more concrete and vivid than the usual generalized "Do you believe . . ." or "Is it

right" type of opinion polling. While the cases may seem to be too brief, it appears significant that in only two instances did the informants express difficulty in arriving at conclusions because of insufficient detail in the "case." The cases were, admittedly, in a few instances of the "persuasive" variety; but so are the "real-life situations" which are encountered. Persons usually attempt to persuade their peers, when given an audience, of their conception of (or rationalization of) the behavior in question. The real query here would seem to be, "Are the cases written in such a way as to be unduly persuasive or prejudicial as compared with the real-life situations for which they presumably substitute?"

Within the limitations stated, and others which will doubtless be supplied by critics, the following summary of findings may be of interest, particularly to those teaching courses in marriage or the family or those engaged in counseling and social work. To save space the data will be tabulated by question number as they appear in the questionnaire. The number refers to the "case"; the letters, to the questions pertaining to the given case. Although several breakdowns of the data were made, only the one on the basis of the sex of informant will be presented here in tabular form (Table 1).

That the situations selected were controversial ones is apparently established; on only one question, and then for only one sex, was there as high as 90 per cent agreement. Variation from 5.7 to 90.6 per cent was indicated in the degree of agreement on different questions, but no behavior was rated "wrong" by more than 70 per cent of the informants. Of the female informants, 69 per cent registered their belief in the wrongness of the case of premarital coitus for the woman. It seems significant that only 30.2 per cent of the men took the same view. It also seems significant that the instance of prostitution is apparently very much more condoned than is the case of premarital coitus between engaged partners; 66 per cent of the women defined premarital coitus with his fiancée wrong for the man, but only 59.4 per cent condemned the case of prostitution. Slightly more than majority agreement was reached by both men and women on the wrongness of postmarital "affairs" even though known to both spouses. There are those who would regard the bareness of the majority as a "serious" manifestation of the decline of the mos

of monogamous exclusiveness. It seems significant, though, that twice as many men thought the doctor's affair with his woman client

TABLE 1

PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSES OF 217 MALE AND FEMALE COLLEGE STUDENTS TO "MORAL EVALUATIONS" QUESTIONNAIRE, 1940

QUESTION*	MALE (106)			FEMALES (111)			TOTAL (217)		
	Yes	No	Un-certain	Yes	No	Un-certain	Yes	No	Un-certain
1a....	5.7	90.6	3.7	10.8	83.8	5.4	8.3	87.1	4.6
1b....	7.5	73.6	18.9	11.7	64.9	23.4	9.7	69.1	21.2
2a....	30.2	52.8	17.0	69.4	21.6	9.0	50.2	36.9	12.9
2b....	28.3	52.8	18.9	66.7	23.4	9.9	47.9	37.8	14.3
3a....	37.7	39.6	22.7	55.9	27.9	16.2	47.0	33.6	19.4
3b....	45.3	28.3	26.4	55.0	28.8	16.2	50.2	28.6	21.2
4a....	52.8	34.0	13.2	57.7	23.4	18.9	55.3	28.6	16.1
4b....	52.8	34.0	13.2	58.6	22.5	18.9	55.8	28.1	16.1
4c....	66.0	22.7	11.3	60.4	22.5	17.1	63.1	22.6	14.3
4d....	30.2	50.9	18.9	60.4	20.7	18.9	60.4	25.3	14.3
5a....	56.6	34.0	9.4	59.4	22.5	18.1	58.1	28.1	13.8
5b....	15.1	79.2	5.7	11.7	76.6	11.7	13.4	77.9	8.7
5c....	62.2	32.1	5.7	67.6	18.9	13.5	65.0	25.3	9.1
6a....	5.7	90.6	3.7	4.5	84.7	10.8	5.1	87.5	7.4
6b....	7.5	86.8	5.7	9.0	78.4	12.6	8.3	82.5	9.2
7a....	41.5	47.2	11.3	52.3	28.8	18.9	47.0	37.8	15.2
7b....	41.5	47.2	11.3	52.3	28.8	18.9	47.0	37.8	15.2
8.....	52.8	34.4	13.2	55.0	29.7	15.3	53.9	31.8	14.3
9.....	41.5	41.5	17.0	59.4	22.5	18.1	50.7	29.5	19.8
10a....	49.1	39.6	11.3	43.2	29.7	27.1	46.1	34.5	19.4
10b....	44.4	42.4	13.2	36.9	29.8	33.3	40.6	35.9	23.5
11.....	39.6	47.2	13.2	19.8	67.6	12.6	29.5	57.6	12.9
12a....	24.5	50.1	25.4	49.6	31.5	18.9	37.3	40.1	22.6
12b....	50.1	24.4	24.4	36.1	41.4	22.5	43.3	33.2	23.5
12c....	41.5	33.9	24.6	37.0	35.1	27.9	39.2	34.5	26.3

* See pp. 15-19 for questions to which these numbers refer.

to be wrong (66 per cent) than thought the husband's affair with his single, working companion to be wrong (30.2 per cent). Double-standard morality appeared at almost every point at which it could,

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although the magnitude of the differential was in most cases not greater than 10 per cent. A majority of both men and women agreed that the marriage not based on love was "wrong." Among the interactional patterns receiving high commendation by both men and women were: nonerotic friendship between married persons and "friends" of the opposite sex and a woman's tolerance of her husband's "affairs" if she so chooses. Opinion of the entire group of informants was divided about equally on the rightness of "vacation love affairs" and the rightness of the career women to have a "frank and complete" sex life without marriage, although the women were must less tolerant on the point (question 10a and b). Only half as many women condemned the case of childlessness as men did (39.6 per cent of the men and 19.8 per cent of the women).

Other "breakdowns" of the data not presented in Table 1 are revealing. (1) There is no appreciable difference between the evaluations by church members taken as a group and nonchurch members taken as a group. The same is true in comparing "regular church attendants" and nonattendants. The only point at which Catholics and Protestants failed to agree within at least 8 per cent was on the question involving divorce. (2) No appreciable differences were found between the 29 per cent of the total group of informants born before 1914 and the 71 per cent born since that date. (Both groups were equated as to sex.) Likewise, no appreciable difference was found to exist between the group born since 1919 and the group born before 1910. Not much conclusiveness should be attached to these data, but they are suggestive of lines of future research endeavor and cast doubt on some current stereotypes. In general, the study indicated that the sex of informant is a more consistent and greater differential in moral evaluations than are church affiliation, church attendance, or age.

For the person who still "feels" that he must have generalized moral evaluations of situations in terms of "double standard," "emancipation," "feminism," etc., these are still quite possible of attainment through the simple expedient of presenting informants with numerous concrete interactional instances which presumably embody the abstract principle sought and then totaling or averaging the specific evaluations. The findings of their study would seem to

indicate, however, that such generalizing of evaluations reflects a much too common error of "logical" categorizing of people's actual moral judgments; a more realistic approach would seem to be one which would permit an expression of illogic, inconsistency, and contradiction to be expressed in the findings if they exist in the informants.

The foregoing study is offered as an attempt at a more realistic mode of "opinion poll" relating to definitions of morality than is often employed. It yields, admittedly, less "vital," less complete, and less integrated attitude manifestations than do case studies; but, considering the advantage of repeatability and comparability of results, the method seems to have some merit. It may well be that the methodological basis of all such opinionnaire study is so dubious that even any "improved" technique fails to be sufficient to validate the procedure at all. The fundamental problems of "actions versus ideas" and of the reliability of questionnaire data, of course, remain.

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NORMATIVE COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR: A CLASSIFICATION OF SOCIETAL NORMS

JESSIE BERNARD

ABSTRACT

To the four factors offered by F. H. Allport as explaining the shape of conformity curves, the present article adds a fifth, namely, the nature of the norm regulating the conformity behavior. Some norms are stated in such a way that overconformity is impossible; other norms, however, are stated in such a way that overconformity is possible. The *J*-curve is characteristic in situations where overconformity is impossible and where the norm is not too difficult for most persons. In other situations skewed normal curves may be expected. For purposes of measuring conformity behavior, a classification of societal norms based on the susceptibility to measurement of deviations from the norms is presented. Suggestions with respect to measuring techniques are also presented.

The attempts of Allport and his students to measure collective behavior, particularly the studies bearing on the *J*-curve, seem to the present writer significant and illuminating.¹ But it also seems that much of this work is vitiated and even rendered fallacious because it disregards the influence on the form of the conformity curve of the nature of the norm from which deviations are measured. From the sociological point of view the nature of the norm itself is a fundamental factor influencing the shape of the curve of conformity behavior, as important indeed as the four which Allport specifies.²

¹ The first systematic statement of Allport's *J*-curve hypothesis is to be found in "The *J*-Curve Hypothesis of Conforming Behavior," *Journal of Social Psychology*, V (1934), 141-83. A more recent elaboration and modification of the hypothesis is presented in Allport's article on "Rule and Custom as Individual Variations of Behavior Distributed upon a Continuum of Conformity," *American Journal of Sociology*, XLIV (1939), 897-921. A summary of a number of the studies made by Allport and his students is available in Daniel Katz and R. L. Schanck, *Social Psychology* (New York, 1938), chap. iii. In brief, the hypothesis may be stated as follows. When collective behavior is telic or purposeful and regulated by established norms of some sort or other, a *J*-curve may be expected rather than the usual symmetrical distribution. This is due to (1) the presence of social controls such as punishment, education, propaganda, social approval of conformity and disapproval of nonconformity, as well as traditional, ecclesiastical, moral, and other sanctions; (2) a common biological organization reacting to these controls; (3) individual differences in personality; and (4) chance factors. In the 1939 article Allport points out that differences in the absolute and relative strength of the first three of these factors may also alter the form of the distribution ("Rule and Custom . . .," *op. cit.*, p. 917).

² See n. 1 for an enumeration of these four factors.

In order to illustrate the fallacies which may arise when we disregard the nature of the norm, we may compare the shape of the conformity curve arising from several kinds or types of norms. Some norms, particularly in the moral field, are stated in such a way that overconformity is impossible. Thus the rule is that we must *never* lie, steal, kill, bear false witness, commit adultery, worship false gods, covet our neighbors' possessions, etc. On the other hand, we must *always* observe the Sabbath, honor our parents, love our neighbor as ourself, and do unto others as we would have them do unto us. Obviously overconformity in such instances is impossible, and Allport's statement holds that "incomplete conformity admits of degree, but there are no degrees of conformity within full conformity itself."³ In fields where this kind of norm prevails the *J*-curve hypothesis finds its most literal application. Even in this type of case, however, if the norm is extremely difficult, we may find "skewed normal" rather than *J*-curves.⁴

But not all norms are stated in such a manner as to preclude overconformity, and hence cases on the left side of the mode of the conformity curve. Allport uses punctuality data to illustrate his analyses of conformity behavior. The opening time of the factory he observed was 7:20. All cases of men arriving before this time are telescoped by Allport into the category of complete conformity, on the theory that there can be no "degrees of conformity within full conformity itself." By this procedure the characteristic *J*-curve is achieved.

On the other hand, however, Allport inveighs, and rightly so, against attempts to telescope all degrees of nonconformity into a single category of nonconformity. Such a procedure, which gives us dichotomies of conformity-nonconformity, he insists, is scientifically fallacious and misrepresentative of the facts.⁵ If this is so, then why is it not equally fallacious and misrepresentative of the facts to telescope all degrees of overconformity into a single category of conformity? The same logic exactly governs both cases. Allport feels that too much is lost by disregarding degrees of nonconformity; the present writer feels equally strongly that too much is lost by disregarding degrees of overconformity, from the standpoint of both the student of individual behavior and the social technologist. There are certain people who habitually overdo the prescribed mark. They arrive ahead of time, pay their bills before they are due, relinquish

³ "Rule and Custom . . . , " *op. cit.*, p. 916.

⁴ When the norm is stated in such a difficult form that even conformity is beyond most people, we usually speak of it as an ideal.

⁵ "Rule and Custom . . . , " *op. cit.*, p. 904.


parking space before their time is up, etc. Where overconformity is possible, it is too important to be eliminated from the curve. The social engineer or technologist, charged with establishing norms, is as much interested in the overconformity portion of the curve as in the nonconformity portion in those cases where overconformity is possible. He must learn by experiment where is the best place to set the norm. In the case of Allport's factory, it would be possible to set the opening hour at such a time that there would be no overconformity, say at two o'clock in the morning. On the other hand, it might be set at such a late hour that overconformity would become the rule. Between these two limits the social technologist must determine what, under given circumstances, will produce the best results from his point of view. Without overconformity data, however, he is greatly handicapped—as handicapped as he would be without conformity data. The characteristic curve about norms which permit of overconformity may be said to be a "skewed normal" type of curve, although *J*-curves are not precluded.

In the first illustration above we found degrees of nonconformity possible, but overconformity impossible, because of the nature of the regulating norm. In the second illustration we found degrees of both nonconformity and overconformity possible, again because of the nature of the regulating norm. We come, then, to a type of norm which permits neither degrees of overconformity nor degrees of nonconformity, that is, to an all-or-none type of norm. The typical situation here is one in which a number of norms are competing with one another within the individual, and he must choose one or the other to conform to. So far as either norm is concerned we have a dichotomous situation, that is, conformity or nonconformity.⁶

⁶ Allport is convinced that wherever possible telic societal continua should be imposed upon such dichotomous statements, and the present writer concurs wholeheartedly in this. In fact, she goes even farther than Allport, as shown in the preceding discussion, by questioning the validity of telescoping overconformity behavior into the classification of complete conformity. Wherever it is possible because of the nature of the norm to impose a gradient upon the data this should by all means be done, and the gradient should include overconformity as well as nonconformity. But the present writer does not believe that all normative behavior can be subjected to continuum handling. Nor does she accept Allport's statement that dichotomous descriptions necessarily misrepresent the facts in all instances nor that they are lacking in scientific validity. Allport states that the phenomena of science are not of the "all-or-none" type but are matters of degree (*ibid.*, p. 903). This might well be challenged. In neurology we know that nerve cells do respond entirely or not at all. The quantum theory of physics posits behavior of ions of an all-or-none nature also; that is, the orbits of the ions change completely or not at all, not gradually or by degrees. We have likewise positive and nega-

Three concrete illustrations will be presented here in order to establish the validity of dichotomous classifications in conformity fields; but the discussion of methods of applying measuring techniques to such situations will be postponed to a later section of this paper. If an observer had stood on the corner of an American city street forty years ago and tallied the number of horse-drawn vehicles and power-driven vehicles, he would have found an overwhelming majority to be of the first type. The rule then was that, if families could afford private transportation, they should own horse-drawn vehicles. If our observer had repeated his tallies over a long period of years, he would have found a larger and larger proportion of power-driven vehicles and fewer horse-drawn ones. The rule now was that, if families could afford private transportation, they should own power-driven vehicles. It is difficult to see how one could impose a telic continuum on such data. Owning an automobile can scarcely be said to belong on the same gradient as owning a horse and buggy.

Even when the competing norms do belong on the same continuum, furthermore, all-or-none situations may arise. The present author once observed—unfortunately without formal tallying of results—the process by which a short cut was created across a lawn between two buildings on a college campus. At first most people followed the prescribed pattern, that is, the walk ABC , and only a few took the short cut AC (see Fig. 1). As this short cut became worn, however, an increasing number took it in preference to the regular route, until most persons chose AC rather than ABC . The important fact was that nonconformity to the norm ABC was not gradual in the sense that at first people took $A'C'$ and later $A''C''$ or



tive charges of electricity, a dichotomous classification upon which it would be futile to attempt to impose a continuum. More controversial, but still suggestive, examples are the dichotomies of male-female, acid-base, organic-inorganic. We do not wish to go into any elaborate defense of such dichotomies or to disregard the difficulties in determining the classification of border-line cases but simply to point out that dichotomies need not be ruled out of scientific treatment. Any discussion of societal telic behavior must leave room for certain instances which do not show degrees of nonconformity.

that some persons took $A'C'$ and still others $A''C''$. They either conformed completely to ABC or they took the route AC . What we have here essentially is competition between two norms, one established by authority and one established by usage or expediency. So far as fulfilling the "accepted common purpose" of the authorized norm—protection of the grass—is concerned, any deviation from the walk constituted nonconformity in the sense that it destroyed grass. One might, however, argue that $A'C'$ destroyed less grass than $A''C''$ and each destroyed less grass than AC . In this way one could establish a telic continuum. But the observed behavior as reported above did not bear out the J -curve hypothesis in this instance, as we should expect it to do. Because this is a case of competing norms, the dichotomous description seems to fit it better than gradient analysis.

Allport illustrates the difficulties in the way of an all-or-none evaluation of a conformity situation by reference to hat-tipping, veil-wearing, footgear, etc. With regard to the first of these, Allport found so little standardization or uniformity as to suggest to the present writer that hat-tipping has ceased, or is in process of ceasing, to be a custom in our culture. As to veils and footgear, Allport says:

Where veils are in fashion, to wear a veil is fashionable and to be without one is unfashionable. To wear shoes for ordinary street dress is approved: to go without shoes is disapproved. . . . Considered from the "pure" science standpoint these dichotomies, however useful for practical purposes, are misrepresentations of fact. . . . Variations of veils are numerous, so also of footgear; and it might be difficult at times to tell whether the objects worn on the feet are shoes or not, or whether or not a veil is being worn.⁷

The writer of the present paper has some observational data to set forth which are suggestive in this connection, but she wishes to point out, first, how the statement of the norm with regard to veils and shoes may influence the nature of the curve. If the norm, for example, merely requires that the person wear a veil, then the "accepted common purpose" is completely fulfilled by any gesture in the direction of wearing a veil, however small or insignificant it may be. The "proper" act is wearing a veil; the variations in the veil itself make no difference so far as fulfilling the requirements of the rule are concerned. The wearing of any sort of veil at all indicates the wearer's obedience to the fashion's "dictate" and represents conformity. Degrees of nonconformity cannot exist in such a case. On the other hand, if the norm states that veils of a certain length must be worn, then degrees of nonconformity are possible, and we may impose a telic continuum on the data. The "accepted common purpose"

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 904.

now is, let us say, to cover the face. Anyone who does not conform to this purpose may do so to a small degree or to a larger degree. In the first instance we have a dichotomous situation; in the second, a gradient one.

With respect to shoe-wearing a similar situation prevails. If the norm prescribes merely that shoes must be worn, then anything which may be called a shoe fulfils the requirements. If, on the other hand, the norm specifies that a certain proportion of the foot must be covered, then one might show degrees of nonconformity according as he met or failed to meet this requirement.

During the summer of 1939 a series of observations were made in Mexico, not on the wearing of veils, but on an analogous trait, namely, the outer garment of women; observations on the footgear of men were also made (see Table 1).⁸ In the case of women a total of 28 sets of observations were made of samples ranging in size from 30 to 180 in localities ranging in character from rural villages to the heart of Mexico City. Little difficulty—that is, only as much as one expects to find in any qualitative classification—was found in classifying all outer garments into four

⁸ The observations on the outer garments of women are summarized in Table 1. They were taken under as carefully controlled conditions as the circumstances permitted. The observer tallied every person who passed within a restricted area in front of her. It was noted that if any exceptions were allowed, that is, if any other persons than those within this circumscribed area were included, a selective bias inevitably slipped in. A larger proportion of unusual cases appeared when persons in a wider area were included than appeared in controlled samples immediately before and after. The classificatory difficulties were of the following nature: how to classify a tailored fur cape, obviously a trait of the cosmopolitan culture, but nevertheless strictly speaking a draped garment; how to distinguish between a heavy mantilla and a light *rebozo*; how to classify cases in which a mantilla was worn over a sleeved garment; what to do about American tourists; what to do about repeaters, etc. Fortunately, these problems were relatively infrequent so that, if the observer's judgment was wrong, it did not seriously invalidate the results. The time of day had something to do with whether or not the women wore outer garments; during the hot hours many of them wore none. In Oaxaca many of the women wore their *rebozos* as turbans, Turk-fashion during the middle of the day, and over their shoulders in the morning and evening. Sleeved garments could be the most expensive, including as they did costly Paris importations; but all types of garments could be had within the same price range, so that a Mexican woman who needed an outer garment could get a sweater, a shawl, or a *rebozo* within the same price limits. No doubt other than purely conformity factors were involved in her choice. The versatility and adaptability of the *rebozo* to a wide variety of uses unquestionably enters into its selection. The *rebozo* is a very primitive garment in the sense that it serves a wide variety of functions in an unspecialized way rather than any one function in a specialized way. Thus, in order to get specialized paraphernalia to take the *rebozo's* place, the Mexican woman would have to have a coat, hat, umbrella, carrying bag, awning, perambulator, pillow, napkin, etc. The *rebozo* serves in all these capacities.




TABLE 1
SUMMARY OF OBSERVATIONS ON OUTER GARMENT
OF WOMEN, MEXICO, 1939

SAMPLE	DATE	TIME	PLACE	TOTAL No.	No. WITH No OUTER GAR- MENT	No. WITH OUTER GAR- MENT	PERCENTAGE OUTER GAR- MENTS WHICH WERE—	
							Draped	Sleeved
1.....	9/12/39	P.M. 2:20- 2:40	Avenida Achilles Serdán	79	15	64	20	80
2.....	8/24/39	P.M. 12:25- 1:10	Calle Hidalgo, Alameda Park	102	33	69	28	72
3.....	8/26/39	P.M. 4:55- 6:00	Avenida Juarez, Alameda Park	180	46	134	29	71
4.....	8/26/39	P.M. 11:55- 12:25	Circle in Alameda Park	96	20	76	29	71
5.....	8/28/39	P.M. 2:35- 2:55	Avenida Juarez, Alameda Park	46	4	42	31	69
6.....	9/6/39	P.M. 3:50- 4:45	Plaza Rio Janeiro	130	49	81	32	68
7.....	9/6/39	P.M. 4:55- 5:10	Plaza Rio Janeiro	72	18	54	33	67
8.....	8/28/39	P.M. 6:05- 6:25	Calle Allende	61	2	59	37	63
9.....	8/28/39	A.M. 10:55- 11:15	West side, Ala- meda Park	31	7	24	42	58
10.....	9/8/39	A.M. 11:05- 11:30	Plaza del 23 de Mayo	49	14	35	45	55
11.....	9/1/39	P.M. 7:55- 8:25	Zocalo (east side), Oaxaca	30	17	13	46	54
12.....	9/9/39	A.M. 11:30- 11:40	Avenida Repú- blica de Brazil	113	37	76	47	53
13.....	9/12/39	P.M. 1:50- 2:20	Plaza Achilles Serdán	49	6	43	47	53
14.....	8/23/39	A.M. 9:15- 9:30	Alameda Park	107	17	90	47	53
15.....	8/23/39	A.M. 10:15- 10:30	San Juan Market	139	14	125	51	49

TABLE 1—*Continued*

SAMPLE	DATE	TIME	PLACE	TOTAL No.	No. WITH No OUTER GAR- MENT	No. WITH OUTER GAR- MENT	PERCENTAGE OUTER GAR- MENTS WHICH WERE—	
							Draped	Sleeved
16.....	9/3/39	P.M. 6:45– 6:55	Southeast corner, Zocalo, Puebla	66	25	41	64	36
17.....	9/3/39	P.M. 12:40– 12:50	Zocalo, Puebla	72	54	18	67	33
18.....	8/23/39	A.M. 11:15– 11:30	Lagunilla Market, Plaza Garibaldi	125	28	97	69	31
19.....	9/3/39	A.M. 7:45– 8:20	Hotel window, Puebla	45	5	40	70	30
20.....	9/3/39	P.M. 3:25– 4:00	Zocalo, Puebla	99	26	73	73	22
21.....	8/24/39	P.M. 4:50– 5:15	Juan José Bac Square	94	13	81	83	17
22.....	8/31/39	A.M. 9:00– 9:15	Plaza, Tehuacan	39	9	30	90	10
23.....	9/1/39	A.M. 9:15– 9:30	Northwest corner, Alameda Park, Oaxaca	90	15	75	96	4
24.....	9/3/39	A.M. 10:10– 10:50	Park, Puebla	39	11	28	96	4
25.....	8/22/39	A.M. 9:00– 9:30; 10:00– 10:45	Market (three sides), Tepozot- alan	126	21	105	97	3
26.....	9/1/39	P.M. 3:30– 4:00	Market, Mitla	55	1	54	100	0
27.....	9/1/39	P.M. 5:20– 5:30	Plaza, Tlascalulú	34	1	33	100	0
28.....	9/3/39	P.M. 2:05– 2:25	Park near a mar- ket, Puebla	45	8	37	100	0

general kinds, namely, sleeved garments (coats, jackets, sweaters), mantillas, shawls, and *rebozos*. The last three are draped garments. Does a conformity field exist here? There is a generally accepted though not necessarily explicitly stated rule that women should wear draped outer garments in certain of the localities or groups observed; in others the rule is that women should wear sleeved garments. At least half of the women in all the samples conform to one or the other of these rules. These are Allport's criteria for the existence of a conformity field.⁹

The next problem is this: Can a telic continuum be imposed upon these data? It is conceivable that some such line of reasoning as the following might lead to a telic continuum: the accepted common purpose, whether or not the women themselves know it, is the preservation of modesty by covering up so far as possible the suggestive contours of the body. The traditional garment in which the Virgin Mary is painted and the habit of nuns bear out this interpretation. The accepted common purpose is, then, best carried out by a full shawl which completely conceals the outlines of the body. The steps on the continuum would then relate to the manner of wearing the outer garment and would have to leave room for degrees of modesty or seductiveness in the style of wearing it as well as for kinds of garment.

However interesting such an analysis might be, it seems to the present writer farfetched; furthermore, it would blur rather than elucidate a very interesting cultural process now going on in Mexico, that is, the competition of norms or styles in clothing, one representing the cosmopolitan culture of the Western world—sleeved garments—and the other representing a local, Mexican culture—draped garments. The most meaningful analysis of collective behavior in this case seems to be one in terms of competing norms, in terms of dichotomous rather than graded statements.

Little difficulty was found in classifying the footgear of men into shoes and sandals. The sandals were of several kinds; some were built up and had heels, others were open and were kept on by thongs. Since the government was making a strong effort to see that its citizens had shoes—National Shoe Week was in progress during some of the observations—we may say definitely that a conformity field existed here. No doubt the accepted common purpose was, partially at least, to stimulate the shoe industry. Can we say that the wearing of homemade sandals fulfilled this purpose any better than wearing no footgear at all? Were degrees of non-conformity possible? The present writer thinks not. It is a dichotomous

⁹ "Rule and Custom . . .," *op. cit.*, p. 912.

situation; or, to be more accurate, a multi-type situation. Conformers wore shoes; wearing anything else constituted nonconformity as much as wearing nothing at all. Here again we have a set of competing norms or rules—shoes, sandals, bare feet. All are on an empirical continuum representing proportion of foot covered or amount of protection and support offered; but all are on different telic continua. Again we see that it is almost inherent in cases where competing norms exist that dichotomous conformity-nonconformity situations should arise.

We may summarize the discussion so far as follows: In addition to the four factors specified by Allport as determining the shape of curves of conformity behavior, we must add a fifth, namely, the nature of the regulating norm. Norms which are stated in such a way as to preclude overconformity will tend to give the typical *J*-curve except in cases where the norm is of extreme difficulty, when "skewed normal" curves may be expected. Other types of norms permit degrees of both overconformity and nonconformity; "skewed normal" curves tend to result in such instances. On the other hand, there are certain kinds or classes of norms—usually arising in a competitive situation—which permit degrees neither of overconformity nor of nonconformity but are of an all-or-none nature. Dichotomous statements of conformity-nonconformity tend to fit such cases. The fact that we have an all-or-none situation does not, however, preclude measurement, as we shall attempt to indicate below.

The above classification of societal norms, according to the general shape of the conformity curve which we might expect, was presented primarily to illustrate the way in which the nature of the norm affected the shape of the curve. But a classification of equal if not greater functional utility may be set up using the criterion of susceptibility to measurement of deviations from the norm. Still other criteria of classification are, of course, possible. One might, for example, classify norms according to the manner in which they were instituted. Some norms are created by law, fiat, order, ordinance, court ruling, etc. Certain norms were presumably instituted by Divinity for guiding human behavior. Others derive from custom or from convention. Others simply grow up as a collective adjustment to new inventions and are not imposed either by human or by divine will. Kant, it will be recalled, divided norms into two great classes—the unconditional or categorical imperatives and the conditional or technical imperatives. The first were absolute and referred to ethical behavior; the second were relative to the ends sought, and referred to the arts and sciences. We might classify norms according to whether they were "right"

or "wrong," "good" or "bad."¹⁰ The criterion used here—susceptibility to measurement of deviations—is not intended to preclude any other classification of norms which social analysts might find useful for other purposes.

The following classification is presented in a very tentative form. Improvements will doubtless suggest themselves to many readers.

A CLASSIFICATION OF NORMS OF COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR

- I. Norms stated in quantitative terms
- II. Norms of a nonquantitative nature
 - A. Degrees of conformity-nonconformity possible and susceptible to measurement
 - 1. Simple beliefs, creeds, pledges, school achievement, etc.
 - 2. Complex norms
 - B. Conformity-nonconformity not a matter of degree but an all-or-nothing matter
 - 1. Alternative of conformity-nonconformity occurs frequently
 - a) Standardized behavior, ritual, etc.
 - b) Nonstandardized behavior
 - 2. Alternative of conformity-nonconformity occurs infrequently

I. Illustrations of the first great class of norms are numerous. They include train and bus schedules; rules for the payment of bills and taxes; speed and traffic laws; all norms referring to limits—maxima or minima—such as crop limitation laws, laws regulating wages and hours, child labor, etc.; budgets; labor contracts, trade agreements relating to price; legal procedure, etc. In these cases the norms are stated in quantitative terms so that deviations may be truly measured in standard, interchangeable units. This type of norm is particularly important in analyzing industrial and legal institutions. The function of the researcher and of the social engineer in such cases, though difficult, is not impossible. They must determine from the law or agreement what the norm is, and then they must measure the degree of conformity-nonconformity characteristic of this particular institution.

II. Nonquantitative norms, although extremely important in collec-

¹⁰ It will be noted that no attempt is here made to evaluate the norms established for collective behavior in ethical terms. The existence and even the necessity for the existence of norms is taken for granted. Since we no longer live by instinct, we must have prescribed solutions for many of our problems, or we would be completely crushed in attempting to solve them. The solution set up by a culture in the form of a prescribed norm may be a "wrong" one—as many of those of preliterate peoples seem to us—but at least it serves the purpose of stabilizing behavior and saving the organism from conflict.

tive behavior, are more subtle, and certainly deviations from such norms are more difficult to measure than in the case of quantitatively stated norms. With respect to norms of the type II-A, although the norm itself is not stated in quantitative form, it is possible by applying techniques set forth by Thurstone to reduce deviations from the norm to quantitative form. In these instances the continuum along which we measure conformity-nonconformity is a statistically created one, and the units are sigma units. Theoretically such a continuum is as valid for measuring purposes as a meter stick, although it is not necessarily the same in all cultures. Nevertheless, we may grant that we have true measurement here on the basis of equal and interchangeable units. This class of norms includes all those which have to do with prescribed beliefs and creeds and other prescribed forms of attitudinal behavior. The norm is stated in terms of the prescribed beliefs, the deviations in terms of modifications or reservations, and we "match" the person with the statement he accepts. The Thurstone attitude scales illustrate how we measure deviations from norms of this type. Students of religious sects or denominations, political parties, schools of thought, lodges, fraternities, or any form of institution which prescribes the attitudes, behavior, or beliefs of its members will deal largely with this type of norm.

A very important type of norm in our society is a complex of behavior patterns summarized under such rubrics as "good father," "good mother," "good son," "good daughter," "good citizen," "good employer," "good friend," "good egg," "good sport," "good neighbor," "good wife," "good husband," "statesman," "Christian," etc. (type II-A-2). Although, as in the case of norms of type II-A-1, these norms are not stated in quantitative terms, it is possible to reduce deviations from them to quantitative form by the application of statistical techniques. This class of norms is, essentially, merely a more complex form of type II-A-1.¹¹

But not all qualitatively stated norms are of a type which permits degrees of conformity-nonconformity. It sometimes happens, as we attempted to show in the first part of this paper, that nonconformity is not a matter of degree but a matter of all or none. In such cases is it possible to measure conformity-nonconformity? If so, how?

If the occasion for a "choice" between conformity and nonconformity occurs very frequently, we may establish a gradient for measurement pur-

¹¹ For early crude attempts to measure deviations from norms of this type see Jessie Ravitch (Bernard), "Relative Rate of Change of Customs and Beliefs of Modern Jews," *Publications of the American Sociological Society*, XIX (1924), 171-76, and "An Instrument for the Measurement of Success in Marriage," *ibid.*, XXVII (1933), 94-106.

poses in terms of the number of "choices" per unit of time. Thus we may ask people whether they take the regular walk—or the short cut—in the illustration presented above, "never, rarely, sometimes, usually, always," defining each of these categories in terms of frequency per day or week if necessary, or in terms of percentage of all possible times, if that is preferable.

Frequency per unit of time is not, however, strictly speaking an unequivocal measuring device. If every single performance of the conforming act were identical with every other, we might consider "frequency of act per unit of time" or proportion of all choices which were conforming, about as good a measure as miles per hour or weight per cubic centimeter or other standardized measuring devices. Unfortunately, this is not always the case. In situations where the prescribed behavior or the norm is fairly standardized—as in highly stereotyped institutions such as manners and etiquette or ritual—the frequency per unit of time is approximately accurate and the gradient may be a roughly valid one for measuring purposes. At any rate, we may connive with the investigator who considers every saying of grace or every attendance at Sunday school or every saying of "Thank you" or "Excuse me" as of approximately equal significance and who therefore uses frequency per unit of time as a measuring gradient. Thus norms of type II-B-1-a are susceptible in a rough way to measurement.

However, an extremely important type of norm of the all-or-none conformity pattern and of frequent occurrence regulates behavior which cannot be considered standardized or of an interchangeable nature. In the case of the moral norms referred to above no one can suppose that all the acts of the same name which are prescribed or prohibited are even approximately of equal significance or are interchangeable units. A new dimension having to do with the relative seriousness with which the act is invested by the culture in which it occurs has been introduced. Stealing Pullman towels, for example, is not considered as equally significant with stealing \$10,000. Killing in self-defense is not considered as reprehensible as manslaughter or murder.

The school of jurisprudence which Bentham headed once attempted to grade criminal offenses—i.e., deviations from prescribed institutional (in this case legal) norms—in terms of utilitarian principles. Thurstone has suggested the gradation of crimes in terms of how seriously they are considered by the culture in which they occur.¹² This latter approach would

¹² L. L. Thurstone and E. J. Chave, *The Measurement of Attitude* (Chicago, 1929), pp. 94-95.

render possible the reduction of conformity-nonconformity in the field of moral behavior to true measurement units. Even, however, if theoretical units of conformity-nonconformity were possible in the field of moral norms, the difficulties in the way of applying them would be very great. It is doubtful if it is ever possible to secure complete or accurate measurements of deviant behavior so long as the standards are in the mores, regardless of the theoretical perfection of our techniques. Nonconformity to the mores produces shame or guilt and thus tends to be denied or hidden. Nevertheless, in spite of these practical difficulties, we may grant that deviations from norms of type II-B-1-a are technically measurable.

We come, finally, to a type of norm (II-B-2) presented in qualitative form, to which conformity is an all-or-none matter, but one for which the choice of conformity or nonconformity comes relatively seldom. In cases of type II-B-1 the choice of conformity or nonconformity occurred sufficiently often so that it was possible to count enough cases of both kinds of behavior to constitute an adequate sample of conformity or nonconformity behavior for each person and to plot these along a pseudo- or statistical continuum. But not all prescribed or institutional behavior occurs in regularly recurrent or even frequent intervals. Sometimes the choice of conformity or nonconformity, once made, determines behavior over a fairly long period of time. This is likely to be the case when the choice involves such things as clothes, houses, automobiles, or other fixed or durable goods. If we choose A instead of B, our behavior is determined for the duration of the life of A or B.

If the experimenter or observer feels that he must reduce data of this kind to regular curves, sigmas, means, etc., the present writer suggests that ordinary probability theory be applied. In any set of observations let p represent the proportion conforming and q represent the proportion not conforming; then apply the conventional formulas for this type of problem. When the conformists and the nonconformists are evenly divided, we will get a normal probability curve, and we conclude that a conformity field does not exist. But as p increases and q diminishes, we approach a J -curve, comparable to those secured in situations where telic continua are feasible. The use of probability formulas in situations of this type is not wholly lacking in logic. Usually, but not necessarily always, something will be done. Affluent families will own private transportation; persons will get from A to C; in certain weather conditions women will wear outer garments. This fact may be represented by unity. But not everyone will do the same thing, since a choice is open.¹³ The proportion

¹³ These cultural patterns which permit of choice are denominated "alternatives" by Ralph Linton in *The Study of Man* (New York, 1936), chap. xvi.

in any particular set of observations that observe rule or norm A may be represented by the probability symbol p . All the remaining cases, regardless of which of several norms they choose to conform to, are representatives of non- p , or q . The present writer does not wish to urge this far from universal analogy too insistently, but merely to suggest its possibilities for measurement purposes.¹⁴

The purpose of the present paper, stimulated by the failure of Allport and his students to give adequate recognition to the sociological aspects of normative behavior, is to suggest a classification of societal norms which can function in efforts to measure collective behavior. The classification here presented is not intended to supersede any other classification but merely to serve as a point of departure for sociometric analyses.

¹⁴ Illustrating this approach by data in Table 1, we find at least six universes probably represented. In the first (sample 1) at least four-fifths of the women conform to the cosmopolitan fashion or norm of sleeved garments; in the second (samples 2-8) between two-thirds and three-fourths conform to this norm; in the third (samples 9-15), only about half; in the fourth (samples 16-19), around a third; in the fifth (samples 20-21) about a fifth; and in the sixth (samples 22-28), a tenth or less. Inasmuch as the data here presented are illustrative rather than inherently significant, no attempt was made to apply chi-square tests to determine the actual limits of these separate universes. They were chosen purely by inspection. It is interesting to note, however, that p is largest in the cosmopolitan areas of Mexico City and that it is progressively smaller in the provincial cities and in the market areas of the capital, while in the smallest towns it is reduced to zero. The competition of the two norms—the cosmopolitan sleeved garment and the local draped garment—is overwhelmingly in favor of the latter in the out-of-the-way small towns; but it is equally in favor of the former in the more modern parts of the capital city. These data could be reduced to frequency distributions by the proper expansion of the respective binomials ($p + q$).

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THE USE OF THE CULTURE-AREA CONCEPT IN SOCIAL RESEARCH

GEORGE W. HILL

ABSTRACT

The culture-area concept has some limitations which have been overlooked by recent sociologists in employing the methodology which has been built around this concept. The chief limitation that is inherent in the concept is the one of spatial contiguity. The present article attempts to show a way in which the culture-type concept of the anthropologist can be combined with the culture-area concept and together be of more value in sociological research problems.

Whether one speaks of regions, subregions, sections, or culture areas, the same fundamental ideas underlie each. The sociologist places his emphasis upon people and culture; the land economist upon soil types and the relation of the land to the economic support it can afford; the administrator upon a program that can be administered effectively within given areas. All of them have at least one thing in common: all recognize a given area or region as being a homogeneous unit in respect to one or more characteristics. The delineation of type-of-farming areas represents an application of the regional technique, as do the natural areas of the human ecologist and the culture areas of the ethnologist.

Currently, we at the University of Wisconsin are engaged in a study of the nationality groups that make up the heterogeneous culture of our rural areas. Our primary interest is to classify areas of social behavior rather than material traits. The culture-area technique did not quite meet our needs, and so we cast about for a substitute or supplement. We have finally evolved a method which we label the culture-type classification. What this concept means, how it adds to the effectiveness of the culture-area classification, and makes the latter, in our opinion, a legitimate sociological tool is the subject of this paper. First, however, we wish to review the rise of the culture-area system and to discuss its assumptions and the shortcomings we see in it for our purposes.

A technique of classification is the cornerstone of scientific research. Prior to the development of such a system, a discipline remains speculative and has little objectivity. Following the evolutionary system, the culture area provided the much-needed classification in anthropology. Clark Wissler has been outstanding in its development. Others, principally

American ethnologists and anthropologists, followed him because it was thought that the American Indian cultures especially were diffused on an area basis.¹ The technique was first used to classify museum specimens, and, as such, it was highly successful. In these first stages it provided a geographic setting for material artifacts. In delineating their culture areas the American anthropologists posited the relationship between the spatial extent and temporal duration of traits. It is a matter of record now that this relationship is not as unilinear as it was originally conceived to be.

The culture-area concept is currently receiving considerable criticism at the hands of the anthropologists, which signifies that they have not yet arrived at a satisfactory classificatory system. Carter A. Woods lays his finger upon the main objection to the concept when he says that the non-material aspects of culture are not necessarily uniformly associated with the material. He charges Wissler with responsibility for this misuse of the culture-area device, pointing out:

. Whereas Wissler, in his original paper on culture areas, was concerned only with material culture areas, later he so gratuitously expanded the culture content of his areas as to give the impression that culture areas were regions with relative uniformity of total culture.²

In addition to this criticism, anthropologists are making light of sociologists for accepting the concept as though it offered unlimited possibilities. Ruth Benedict is especially severe in her condemnation of the sociologists for having adopted the concept with so little understanding of its true meaning:

The effort to apply the anthropological culture area in modern sociology can only be fruitful to a very limited degree, because different ways of living today are not primarily a matter of spatial distribution. There is a tendency among sociologists to waste time over the "culture area concept." There is properly no such "concept." When traits group themselves geographically, they must be handled geographically. When they do not, it is idle to make a principle out of what is at best a loose empirical category.³

To accept a few traits or trait complexes as sufficient criteria of total cultures has been, then, the error of recent anthropology.

It is with some misgiving, therefore, that we view both rural and general sociologists categorizing a few material traits and, upon their presence

¹ Ralph Linton, *The Study of Man* (New York: D. Appleton-Century Co., 1936), p. 383.

² "A Critical Examination of the Culture Area Concept," *American Anthropologist*, XXXVI, 518 ff.

³ *Patterns of Culture* (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Co.; Cambridge, Mass.: Riverside Press, 1934), p. 230.

or absence, suggesting variations in the total culture. From this angle we doubt some of the sociological usefulness of the "standard of living areas" now being constructed by sociologists on the presence or absence of a few traits. For example, it so happens that electricity in farm homes, one of the traits often used, is a direct function of population density. Running water, radios, and other improvements are, as a rule, in turn dependent upon power. The possession of any of these improvements, in itself, has little meaning to the sociologist unless he can understand their relationship to human values and attitudes and their corresponding effect upon social relations. Along Highway No. 27, from Augusta to Ladysmith (Wis.), one may observe the patrons of the new Rural Electrification Administration line that serves that territory. One notes the regularity with which the meanest-looking houses along the highway are connected with the power line and the frequency with which the better-looking farms fail to avail themselves of the service. On the basis of this trait complex, what statement can the sociologist make regarding the standards of living of the two groups of farmers?

Looking at the matter from the statistical approach, we again find ourselves in difficulty if we use the culture-area method in a study of social relations. In our attempt to delineate homogeneous subareas of contiguous townships, we discovered that it was not possible, even with so broad an interval as the quartile, to establish areas in respect to any available cultural factor, which were at once homogeneous, contiguous, and mutually exclusive.

It might be well to point out in passing that we are employing the township as the unit of observation; we tested the validity of using the counties of the state and found that there was more variance from township to township within counties than there was between counties. The selection of a local unit, of course, is a function of purpose. The county may be perfectly acceptable from the standpoint of the research man at Washington who must look at the nation as a whole, and it may be acceptable as a functional unit in an administrative program; whereas, from the standpoint of statistical research within a state, the township is found more acceptable. The ideal situation, of course, would be to ignore all political boundaries, for even the smallest are arbitrary and do not necessarily encompass sociological groups.

Since we are primarily interested in sampling the state of various sociological phenomena, we have to meet the basic conditions of representative sampling in establishing our classificatory system. In order to assure this representativeness, it is homogeneity that is important in stratified sampling rather than spatial contiguity. From a theoretical point of

view, the only advantage that can result from employing stratified rather than random sampling is that all strata are known to be represented. This results from the classification of heterogeneity into strata of homogeneity.

By way of illustration of the difficulties involved in setting up a system of homogeneous strata which are also contiguous when mapped, let us take, for example, the fertility⁴ ratio by counties. If we use three intervals, we find the seventy-one Wisconsin counties stratified into a series of strata with very little contiguity. If each contiguous group of counties that falls within a stratum be considered an area, we find eleven doubtful areas some consisting of but a single county. If it be insisted that all units of the stratum be contiguous before the culture-area concept can be applied, then it is obvious that the concept cannot apply in this instance.

It will have been observed that we have developed our criticism in terms of a single variable, but most of the sociologists who have recently attempted to delineate cultural areas have employed multiple rather than single-factor approaches. We followed this lead also but found that it, too, fell down when sampling was involved. The main difficulty was the fact that whenever we were able to set up an index or a combination of factors so as to yield contiguous areas, we destroyed the precise information we felt was essential in a sampling study within an area as small as a state. In producing contiguity, in other words, we covered up heterogeneity.

For our purpose culture refers to the mass of behavior handed to us from the past by means of which we are able to manage nature and ourselves. The forward movement in cultural anthropology is aptly stated by Dr. Benedict:

If we are interested in cultural processes, the only way in which we can know the significance of the selected detail of behavior is against the background of the motives and emotions and values that are institutionalized in that culture. The first essential, so it seems today, is to study the living culture, to know its habits of thought and the functions of its institutions, and such knowledge cannot come out of postmortem dissections and reconstructions.⁵

Configurations of culture, with which the anthropologist is concerned, include the teleological aspects of behavior, which is further than we wish to go. We are interested in the social processes or relations between individuals. Our locus of study is the culture type. We thus modify the geographic factor involved in the culture area with an emphasis upon the genetic factor in the culture type.⁶

The importance of culture types in shaping behavior, social and other-

⁴ The fertility ratio in this case is the number of children under five per 1,000 women, twenty to forty-four years of age, in the rural farm population as of 1930.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, pp. 49-50.

⁶ Linton, *op. cit.*, p. 392.

wise, in rural Wisconsin has been brought to our attention by workers in several fields. Farm-investment people have told us that one farm had a higher per acre loan value than another, even though the two were located side by side and apparently alike in every respect; crop people were stumped in giving an answer to the variability of crop cultivation in similar soil-type areas; economists found difficulty in explaining the extreme variation in tenancy patterns in single localities; and sociologists and welfare workers were perplexed with their dissimilar case-load distributions from town to town within counties. In all these fields differences in culture types help to explain the divergences in what appeared to be culture areas.

The culture-area concept serves its purpose in a homogeneous society where the majority of the adult members share a few universal traits. The concept must be used with caution, however, in our complex society, albeit, there may be limited areas, such as the lower Appalachian highlands and the Old South, to mention only two areas, where comparative homogeneity may be found. The culture type does not rule out the observed fact that many culture types show a fairly continuous distribution and are functionally related to particular environments.⁷ In culture areas the emphasis is upon contiguity; in the culture type the main emphasis must be upon likeness of social behavior. If contiguity happens to exist, it is well, but it is not to be expected. We may find similar social-behavior patterns in villages and neighborhoods scattered over a given area, with other communities and neighborhoods interspersed over the same area exhibiting entirely different patterns.

In our work, as well as in the related fields just enumerated, we observed how patterns of behavior—sociological and economic—differed from locality to locality, or within localities, as the dominating nationalities changed. Here then was a tangible bit of evidence of culture—not that nationality explains the whole complex configuration of culture, and certainly not that the two concepts can be taken as synonymous. Differing nationalities, however, develop certain social values and attitudes peculiarly their own. These values and attitudes tend to crystalize into social heritages and, as such, condition the behavior of nationality groups in their new cultural settings. Hence, to the soils map and to the type-of-farming map, we are going to add one more—a nationality map of the people, our culture types.⁸

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ We wish, specifically, to avoid calling these "social types." Our culture types have genetic content, but we do not wish them to be considered as encompassing a static pattern. They change with time, and it is not possible to arrive at a totality of culture by the mere addition of their number. Society is something more than a summation of types. Each of our types can be objectively verified.

The contemporary data of the United States Census were of little value for our purpose. All its published data regarding nationality were on the county level. The cost of a tabulation of the 1930 census schedules on a township basis was prohibitive. Furthermore, the federal census was primarily interested in the foreign born rather than the native born of foreign parentage when making its tabulations for nationality stock. With only 13.1 per cent of the state's population foreign born in 1930, a tabulation of this group would not have been of much help in our work. Fortunately, the original schedules from a state census of population of 1905 were available. We proceeded to tabulate the information we wanted from these schedules—a rather large order, since there were some 400,000 schedules, representing a population of approximately 2,000,000. We now have available, township by township, the geographic location of all our numerous nationality stocks, together with other pertinent socioeconomic data, as of 1905.⁹

In charting our data we found that some of the types were distributed over considerable areas. All the types, however, had a variety of locality concentrations. By employing a measure of dominance, core townships of heavy (80 per cent) concentration of given nationality stocks were discovered. By the use of a system of gradients, multiple-culture-type areas were also isolated, as were those where no single nationality was dominant—interstitial, we have called them.

At this point in the general study several questions presented themselves. First was the question of persistence. Is the current background the same as it was in 1905? For example, are the descendants of the Germans still dominant in their core townships? Also, how have cultural values changed in the space of the last generation? To some extent we have been able to answer this question by means of rather impressionistic field work. Outside of the northern cutover counties, a great deal of persistence does appear to exist. There is also a high degree of relationship between social isolation and culture fixation. Some groups, notably the Polish and Bohemian, have spread over much more territory in the passing generation.

The further question of the influence that ethnic values and attitudes have upon contemporary behavior is one that can be answered only by firsthand studies of the people of the state. One study under way is con-

⁹ These data have been tabulated under an Experiment Station project at the Wisconsin College of Agriculture in co-operation with the Works Progress Administration; the project is sponsored jointly by the Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology departments, under the direction of Professor George S. Wehrwein and the writer.

cerned with community life in its broad interactional phases. Communities will be selected on the basis of their culture types, and attempts will be made to get into the values and ideals motivating distinctive social-behavior patterns. We have in progress a study of the rural church in Wisconsin to evaluate the relative importance of both nationality and religion as culture types in determining social relationships. Recognizing that differences in social and mental mobility have had corresponding effects upon the general process of acculturation, our task will be to hold constant the factors of nationality, period of settlement, and urban-industrial proximity, to see whether on certain basic indices of social behavior and on the standards and values which lie behind the differences there is more or less difference between Roman Catholics of two differing nationalities than among Catholics, Lutherans, and Evangelicals of the same nationality. To accomplish this purpose, six rural areas, each dominated by a distinctive culture type, will be intensively studied. The five culture types are the Germans, Polish, Norwegian, native American, and the heterogeneous inhabitants of an interstitial area.

Social welfare, including some aspects of delinquency, will likewise be studied from this culture-type point of view. In studying the widespread welfare problems in northern Wisconsin's cutover area, we found that two-thirds of the population of the county being studied are of native stock, having their roots in several generations of existence in Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, and southern Wisconsin.¹⁰ These native born make up the relief rolls—three-fourths of the relief families have native-born heads; conversely, three-fourths of those who have never received relief in any form are foreign born. The values and attitudes making for self-sufficiency are to be found in the mores of the various culture types making up the county. The entire county lies in the problem area of the land economist. Most of the soil has been designated as poor or submarginal, or, at best, only fair for agricultural use. Yet, granting identical physiographic factors, different culture types have adjusted in remarkably differing degrees to the environment.

In a Polish group in the southern part of the county it was found that three organizations hold the group together: the Roman Catholic and Polish National churches and a Polish Farmers' Club. The Roman Catholic church is fast losing out to the National church. The locus of group mores and values seems to be the Polish Farmers' Club. The club is truly

¹⁰ George W. Hill and Ronald A. Smith, *Man in the "Cut-Over": A Study of Family-Farm Resources in Northern Wisconsin* (University of Wisconsin Agricultural Experiment Station Research Bull. 139 [Madison, 1941]).

a mutual-aid organization, organized solely for the purpose of helping its members in times of emergency and need and to provide a center for social activities. Although one out of every two families in the county as a whole is on relief, not a single member of the club has ever applied for public assistance, to say nothing of having accepted it. Some of the Poles in the community are on relief. They are referred to as the "smart" ones who have violated group mores by asking for and receiving outside assistance. They have estranged themselves from the group, and if the residential restrictions to relief were removed, they would better their lot by moving elsewhere in the county.

Finally, in order to show how we can make use of our culture-type classification in a sampling study of the state as a whole, with families as the unit of sampling, we will briefly present the technique of an additional proposed study in social patterns of living among farm families. The sample consists of one thousand farm families, so drawn that meaningful comparisons can be made and conclusions drawn regarding the statistical significance of differentials in culture within the strata delineated by the major culture-type classification.

Our general approach makes it essential to hold constant certain factors which comprise alternate systems of culture-type classification, and here we have had recourse to the experimental layouts of the agriculturists.¹¹ First we selected a number of townships which were dominated in 1905 by a specific nationality, taking care to include at least one township from the core of every contiguous locality. This was done on the theory that in the extremes we find a clear manifestation of behavior patterns and standards likely to be covered in a less dominant locality. We matched these townships according to type of farming, value of farm in 1930, and urban proximity, with other townships which varied in nationality background. Within townships families will be sampled at random from prepared lists of farm operators living in each of the townships in 1938. In further studies within this culture-type classification the townships might remain the same and new random samples of families selected. In choosing the particular controls we did, we had no a priori knowledge of their positive relationship with the variables to be studied. If they should happen to be correlated, then we are insuring against missing important strata.

The Department of Rural Sociology, Wisconsin Agricultural College, had made a previous attempt to study standards of living and social relationships among farm families in the state, sampling by type-of-farming

¹¹ H. C. Tippet, *Methods of Statistics* (rev. ed.; London: Williams & Norgate, Ltd., 1938).

areas. In this study, which reputedly was state-wide, more variance was found within type-of-farming areas than between them, and the conclusions had no bearing for the state as a whole, as had been desired. Obviously significant culture types were overlooked in drawing the sample. The social patterns were not functionally related to the factors making for different farm-type areas. Our present approach is designed to give proportional weight to the different components of our culture type and thus give us a representative sample of the entire state. A sample of 1,000 families out of a universe containing 200,000 is not large. Since we do not have the resources to get a more adequate sample in numbers, we must be more concerned with its representativeness.

By way of summary and conclusion, we have tried to develop a technique for sharpening the culture-area approach. In our suggestion of the culture type, we called attention to the need for recognizing sociological diversity in rather homogeneous physiographic and economic areas. The culture type lends itself to statistical manipulation in stratified sampling, and it guards against the danger of constructing artificial homogeneity when this factor does not prevail. On this latter point we think we are in pretty close agreement with those of the regionalists whose emphasis is upon cores of cultures, or sociological subregions,¹² rather than area contiguity, which others advocate. We believe that a recognition of these variances and a method of studying them will be of benefit to the administrator of education, social welfare, or credit, who has been assigned an area which is designated as such because of the political necessity of following state or county lines. In fact, we believe that a knowledge of these variances is of more importance than the extensive manipulation of traits a posteriori to rationalize the extent of the region.

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN

¹² C. E. Lively and R. B. Almack, "A Method of Determining Rural Social Sub-areas with Application to Ohio" (Ohio State University and Agricultural Experiment Station Bull. 106, January, 1938). (Mimeographed.)

[Since this article went to press, the author advises that he has available for distribution a limited number of full-color maps, size about 15"×18", showing all the principal culture types in Wisconsin. He will be glad to send a copy of the map to anyone on request and on payment of thirty-five cents to cover costs of mailing.—EDITOR.]

ALTERNATIVE HYPOTHESES FOR THE EXPLANATION OF SOME OF FARIS' AND DUNHAM'S RESULTS

MARY BESS OWEN

ABSTRACT

The interpretations Faris and Dunham have advanced for their data on the ecological distribution of mental disorders are based on the assumption that hospitalized cases are a representative sample of all cases. A study of 275 cases of mental disorder shows that the various types of psychosis are differentially apparent in different kinds of areas. The factors which make for the selection of cases for mental hospitals are not the same in all local areas of a city.

This paper raises certain objections to the hypotheses suggested by Faris and Dunham¹ to explain the variations in the ecological distribution of mental disorders and suggests an alternative hypothesis.

Faris and Dunham found that manic-depressive psychoses were scattered over the city at random and present the hypothesis that social factors either are unimportant in the genesis of this psychosis or else that the social factors which are important are relatively uniform in all parts of a city. They also found that schizophrenia was concentrated in the central area and decreased toward the periphery. The various types of schizophrenia showed differences in rates of distribution. The paranoids were most heavily concentrated in the rooming-house areas; their rates toward the periphery of the city were successively lower. Although the trend was less marked, the hebephrenics were distributed like the paranoids. The catatonic rates, however, differed strikingly from the other two. For catatonics the central hobo district had the lowest rates, and the gradations of the Negro area reversed the paranoid and hebephrenic rates. The paranoid rates correlated highly with mobility; the hebephrenic correlation was somewhat lower; and the catatonic correlation was low and negative. The hypothesis that extended isolation of the person produces the abnormal traits of behavior and mentality is suggested to account for the pattern of the total distribution of schizophrenia.

In any study in which the number of cases from different situations is the basis on which conclusions are drawn, all possibility of the differential selectivity of cases must be considered with extreme care. In criticism of

¹ Robert E. L. Faris and H. Warren Dunham, *Mental Disorders in Urban Areas* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1939). All page references are to this book.

Faris' and Dunham's hypotheses it may be pointed out that, although they assume for their explanations that the data represent all the cases in the local areas, actually these cases are only the ones which have been discovered. The assumption that there are no differentials operating to select certain types of cases from some local communities within a city and very different types of cases from others may be shown to be egregious.

For the most part, the first diagnosis of a person as insane comes from some associate of that person who refers him to a physician or to the police and obtains an insanity hearing in the courts. The first selection of cases for mental hospitals is therefore made on the basis of gross behavioral differences between the patient and his family or community patterns of behavior. The patient must have violated the standards of proper conduct of the group represented by the person who attempts to have him committed. It is unthinkable that there could be sufficient homogeneity with respect to what is considered improper or crazy behavior for the same sorts of people to be selected equally from all the local communities of a city. A kind of behavior which would be indefinitely tolerated in an area of social isolation could well be thought insane in an area of family dwelling and neighborhood participation. Other behaviors tolerated within a family or other primary group would be extremely annoying in an area of strangers. These gross behavioral characteristics for which the patient is first selected also play an important role in determining the diagnosis he will receive from the psychiatrists who eventually examine him. If the patient is seclusive, apathetic, untidy, and mute, he will probably receive the diagnosis of catatonic schizophrenia. The catatonic could easily be ignored if he lived alone in a rooming-house, but such behavior would certainly be recognized as queer if he lived in a family or other closely knit primary group. Here it is significant that Faris and Dunham found the highest rates of commitment for catatonics in areas of family dwelling and in areas in which the individuals whether or not psychotic were likely to be particularly conspicuous. "The rates for Negro, foreign-born, and native-born are all significantly higher in areas not primarily populated by their own members . . ." (p. 177).

On the other hand, the suspicious, quarrelsome patient receiving the diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia may escape being institutionalized if sheltered, humored, and apologized for by members of his family; whereas if he accuses and disturbs strangers who make no friendly allowance for his odd and perhaps persecutory ideas, he is a nuisance and must be removed from the community.

Cases which are diagnosed as hebephrenic present a behavioral picture of bizarre, silly, manneristic, and untidy conduct. While not often as annoying as the paranoids, hebephrenics may shout at people, call them obscene names, remove clothing, sing and yell on the streets, and otherwise conduct themselves in such a manner as to become intolerable in either a primary or secondary group.

The loud, explosive, elated behavior which is characteristic of the manic is apparent in practically any social context. The manic will seek an audience before which to display himself, and such behavior can hardly be concealed in areas of either primary or secondary contact. The depres-

TABLE 1
NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE OF CASES EXHIBITING
BEHAVIOR INTERPRETED AS BEING AP-
PARENT TO SECONDARY GROUPS

Type of Psychosis	Total Number	Number Apparent to Secondary Contacts	Percentage Apparent to Secondary Contacts
<i>Schizophrenia:</i>			
Hebephrenic.....	51	31	61
Paranoid.....	57	47	83
Catatonic.....	68	28	41
<i>Manic depressive:</i>			
Manic.....	50	43	86
Depressive.....	49	20	41
Total.....	275	169

sive may be as vocal in his wailing and self-degradation as is the manic in his elation. Also in the depressive group are by far the largest percentage of the attempted suicides of psychotic persons. These suicide attempts bring the case to the attention of a physician regardless of their urban distribution.

In an effort to provide some check on these speculations, the case records of a random selection of 275 patients at the Logansport (Ind.) State Hospital were examined. When sufficient data were given by the physicians who signed the commitment papers, a judgment was made in each case as to whether the patient's behavior was such as to have brought him to the attention of strangers. After this judgment had been made and recorded the diagnosis was examined. The possibility of the observer's bias was thus held to a minimum.

There are several possible criticisms of the technique used in obtaining these results. There was no single objective criterion for the act of judgment as to whether or not the conduct was apparent to strangers. The descriptions on commitment papers are brief and at best give only a second-hand knowledge of the actual behavior. The numbers in the sample are relatively small, and the patients come largely from small towns and rural areas rather than from cities. However, these data are presented only as evidence that the generally accepted principles of classification of mental disorder include factors which are not independent of those which make for differential visibility and selectivity in different urban areas.

The evidence and reasoning presented here are thought to make dubious Faris' and Dunham's interpretations of the relation between mental disorders and ecological processes. It must be understood in interpreting Faris' and Dunham's results that the actual incidence of certain behaviors may be quite different from the recognized incidence of such behaviors. Mental disorders from the social psychological point of view are queer or apparently idiosyncratic behaviors. The acquisition of these behaviors must be explained within the same scheme of thought as the acquisition of other behaviors and not in terms of a lack of acquisition such as is implied in the isolation hypothesis.

Logansport State Hospital

COMMENTS

The assumption that the hospitalized cases represent the entire incidence of mental disorder is, of course, not sound. Our use of rates implied only that there would probably be a general pattern revealed in spite of various statistical distortions. A number of types of distortion have been suggested, some of which would possibly be sufficient to destroy the pattern completely. The addition of all of those suggested would produce a spectacular reverse pattern. These many suggested bases of error were examined and discussed in the volume and in supplementary articles. It was not the intention to dismiss them, but since we had no means of measuring them we could not make the proper adjustment of rates. Miss Owen's ingenious suggestion is a step toward making possible an adjustment for the error she considers. It would be advisable to base the calculations on Chicago cases of the period in which the rates were computed, since policies of commitment probably vary to a significant extent. Before we know how much to adjust the rates in each area we must also have not only the ratios she presents but also some measure of the relative amounts of primary and secondary

contacts in each area. This is such a laborious and difficult matter that it might be easier to achieve the aim more directly by some complete surveys of sample areas to locate nonhospitalized persons with mental disorders.

Miss Owen's percentages suggest that the contrasts in high- and low-rate areas may be somewhat reduced, but they do not seem nearly sufficient to obliterate the pattern found in Chicago, although added to other sources of error it is possible that they might destroy the pattern. Perhaps it would be well to recommend that some such survey as mentioned above, or a study equally decisive, be attempted before much further effort is spent on computing rates.

It is undoubtedly our fault that the role of isolation was not made clear. The isolation was not intended as an explanation for any other symptom than the seclusiveness of the schizophrenic. Tentative suggestions for an explanation of some other symptoms are put forward in other of our writings. The case for isolation was not meant to rest on the pattern of rates in the city but on a convergence of evidence of several kinds.

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I find myself in substantial agreement with Faris' statement. Confining myself solely to the reasoning, implications, and facts of Miss Owen's criticism of our work, however, I would raise the following specific objections. (1) Miss Owen's reasoning that the behavior characteristics of the catatonic would be undetected in an area of secondary contacts may be sound, but I have some difficulty in recognizing the reverse, namely, that in an area of primary contacts the "suspicious" and "quarrelsome" paranoid would be "humored" and "apologized" for by the family members while the "seclusive," "apathetic," and "untidy" catatonic is, by inference, likely to be committed. One might rather infer that the paranoid would place a greater strain upon the family and hence would be more likely to be committed than the catatonic. (2) Miss Owen states that the behavior-forms of the hebephrenic would be intolerable in both primary and secondary groups. If true, this would tend to substantiate the pattern as found. (3) A map of the distribution of catatonically diagnosed patients (p. 168), aged thirty to forty-four years, shows that some of the highest rates are in some areas characterized by secondary contacts. Does this fact mean that the older catatonics are recognized in such areas while the younger ones are not?

Miss Owen's astute criticism, if it can be definitely substantiated, might serve to obliterate the differential areal distribution between the catatonic and the paranoid types but would probably not seriously affect the character of the general schizophrenic distribution pattern.

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SOCIOLOGY IN YUGOSLAVIA

DINKO TOMAŠIĆ

ABSTRACT

The sociology of Yugoslavia is divided according to the ethnic groupings in that country: Serbian, Croatian, and Slovenian. Each form is characterized by strong ethnocentrism and a close union with political activities. Jovan Cvijić, the outstanding theorist of Serbian expansionism, attempts to establish the superiority of the Dinaric race and the necessity of transforming other Yugoslav types into subordinate groups under the leadership of Serbia. These ideas are further developed by Stanojević, Popović, and Jovanović. Earlier, Marković criticized imperialist Serbia and expounded a theory of a "peasant revolution." Radić, leader of Croatian sociology, shows the need of a new, all-human civilization. Šufflay stresses the racial, cultural, and mental differences between Serbs and Croats and is impressed by their irreconcilability. One group of his followers argues for the German origin of Croats, and the other emphasizes their Roman Catholicism. In Slovenia we find a Catholic counterliberalist movement directed against an encroaching liberalism and pan-Germanism. Mahnič, Krek, and Ušeničnik are its leading exponents. Sociology should be based on the encyclic *Rerum novarum* and on Thomist philosophy. On its practical side, especially in the work of Gosar, it advocates a reform away from liberalism and socialism toward Christian solidarity and ecclesiastical authority.

I. SOCIOLOGY IN SERBIA

At the beginning of the seventeenth century, when the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire began, Austria penetrated into Serbia but later retreated, and Serbia became the border territory between the Austrian and Ottoman empires. In the course of this fight, lasting two centuries, both empires employed the local populations, mainly herders, for purposes of guerilla warfare. In consequence of a few wars in which Serbia engaged during the last century and owing to the disintegration and downfall of these two empires, Serbia in the course of forty years increased its territory to ten times the size of its first autonomous boundaries. This tremendous growth in such a short time impressed the leading classes of Serbia and led to the idea of their superiority over the rest of the Balkan and South Slav peoples and their right to rule them. In contrast with those educated at Russian universities, the majority of Serbia's intellectuals who were educated at German and French universities in the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries did not develop a contempt for western European civilization but felt instead that their country was inferior to western Europe in its cultural achievements and economic development. To compensate for this feeling they were very eager to idealize and exaggerate the "superior spiritual quali-

ties" of Serbians, to prove to western Europe the abilities of Serbians, the necessity for them to expand territorially and to rule over other peoples, some of whom were more westernized and generally recognized to be culturally and economically more advanced than they. The outstanding theorist of this Serbian imperialism was Jovan Cvijić.

Cvijić studied at the University of Vienna and became professor of geography at the University of Belgrade. In Vienna he was influenced both by geopolitical and by anthroporacial sociological theories which stressed the importance of geography and of the innate abilities of human groups in the formation of human societies. His point of departure was that the geographic are the most constant and therefore the most decisive of all influences on human beings and human societies. They influence the character of man, his inner abilities, his tendencies and feelings, and finally also his social and political organization. Cvijić applied this theory to his studies of Balkan and South Slav peoples and published his findings in his book *La Péninsule balkanique: géographie humaine*, the enlarged edition of which was published in the Serb language.¹

According to Cvijić, the best situated of all Balkan "natural regions" for geographic and geopolitical points of view is the region of the Morava and Vardar rivers, the region of contemporary Serbia and Yugoslav Macedonia. The dominating part of this central region is Šumadija, where the uprisings against Turkish domination started and where the Serb state of the nineteenth century originated. This region is the best in the Balkans not only from the geographical and economic points of view but—and this is most important—also because it is settled by the best type of southern Slav, the Šumadija variety of the Dinaric race.

There are, according to Cvijić, four main types of man among southern Slavs: the Dinaric, the Central, the East-Balkan, and the Pannonian. Each of these is subdivided into a few subtypes. Superior to all types is Dinaric man, and of his five subtypes the Šumadija variety is the best. These types and subtypes differ in their bodily and mental characteristics, in their social, economic, and political organization, and in their feelings, attitudes, and tendencies.

Dinaric man, Cvijić claims, was formed in the Dinaric mountains by a mixture of Slav and paleo-Balkan ethnic groups. But, owing to its great migrations, the Dinaric race spread toward the east, south, and northwest and practically imposed itself culturally, politically, and economically on the rest of the southern Slavs. The qualities of Dinaric man, as defined by Cvijić, are live spirit, sharp intelligence, deep feelings, rich fantasy,

¹ Jovan Cvijić, *Balkansko poluostrvo i južnoslovenske zemlje* (Beograd, 1922), Vol. I.

impulsiveness provoked by nonmaterial motives, national pride, and the ideas of honor, justice, and freedom. Dinaric man is a born statesman, and his main urge is to create a powerful state, to resurrect the "Czardom of Dušan," the medieval Serb political community abolished by the Turks in the battle of Kosovo.

How inferior does Cvijić find other racial types of southern Slavs as compared to Dinaric man? Most inferior of all seems to be the Pannonian type to which the majority of Croatians and some Serbs of the Pannonian plains belong. However, the Serb variety of the Pannonian type is somehow a little superior to the real Croatian or Zagreb variety. The Zagreb variety is very handicapped, says Cvijić, because for centuries the peasants there had no land of their own but were ordinary serfs. They did not play any role in politics. What nobility they had was of Dinaric origin which had degenerated nationally under German cultural influence. Peasants there are very separatistic culturally and politically; they are distrustful and suspicious, lack national consciousness, have no democratic feelings, and are greatly under the influence of the Catholic clergy. Only through the Catholic clergy, Cvijić thought, might Croatian peasants be educated and become loyal citizens in a Dinaric Yugoslavia.

The Macedonian is also much inferior to the Dinaric type, but he has some qualities which might be socially very useful and might be developed when he comes into contact with Dinaric man. This, in fact, happened when Serbia liberated Macedonia. It is a similar situation, according to Cvijić, with the Slovenes. Slovenes are greatly under the influence of German culture and of the Catholic clergy. But their enthusiasm for Serbia is great, and they consider Serbia to be the "Piedmont of Yugoslavia." In short, according to Cvijić's findings, all other inferior types in Yugoslavia are going to be transformed into useful subjected groups under the leadership of Serbia.

Cvijić's ideas greatly influenced Serbia's cultural and political life, and her historians, sociologists, and politicians undertook studies and political activities in accordance with them. They gave the ideological backbone to the dictatorial regime of King Alexander, and even after Alexander's death, the dictatorial and semi-Fascist regime of Belgrade was inspired with the same ideas.

The late Professor Stanojević, leading Serb historian, was also greatly influenced by Cvijić's ideas, with the exception that, even more than Cvijić, he stressed racial factors. According to him, of all tribes which in the early Middle Ages settled the Balkan Peninsula the Serb tribe excelled in "physical and moral qualities and became as early as that time

the representative of the Serb race and the bearer and propagator of all Serb racial qualities." Of all those qualities Stanojević studied and stressed the "state-making qualities of the Serb race." Owing to this innate state-making ability, he holds, Serb clans expanded from a small spot high in the Balkan Mountains and spread over all the Balkans, enlarging their territory and political influence and finally as a crown to their achievements founding Yugoslavia.²

Another sociologist and historian, D. J. Popović, professor of sociology at the University of Belgrade, was inspired in his studies by similar ideas. He was interested in the problem of *hajduk's*, or highway brigands, and in the problem of the formation of Serbia's upper classes, especially its merchant class. In his studies on *hajduk's* he admits their leading role in the formation of nineteenth-century Serbia, but he is reluctant to admit that ordinary highway robbers and mountain brigands could found a state. So he tries to make a clear distinction between "good *hajduk's*" and "bad *hajduk's*." "Good *hajduk's*" had high morals and statesman-like qualities and their role in the foundation and organization of the modern Serb state was very important.³ In his studies on the formation of Serbia's merchant class Popović admits the important role of Greek and Aroumanian herders and merchants, but here also he tries to make a distinction between the "good" and the "bad" qualities of these groups and claims that only the "good" qualities of these peoples remained when they became assimilated by Serbs and so only added to the high qualities which, according to Cvijić, the Dinaric race and especially the Serbs of pre-war Serbia possessed. His conclusion is that Yugoslavia might solve its internal troubles only if led by the "spirit of ideal honesty, broad-mindedness, and brotherly love of that part of our nation which created this country," that is, Serbia.⁴

Dragoljub Jovanović, former professor of economics at the University of Belgrade and a Serb politician, is also under the influence of Cvijić's ideas. According to his theory, Serbia is similar to America, being, like the United States, a country of immigrants and able to assimilate every newcomer. More than Cvijić he stresses the contradictions between the herders and agriculturists who settled Serbia. He claims that when herders and agriculturists intermixed in Serbia they lost all their negative qualities and retained only the positive qualities of both groups. In this way Serbians "represent the best human material which could be found

² St. Stanojević, *Postanak srpskog naroda* (Beograd, 1934).

³ Dušan Popović, *O hajducima* (Beograd, 1930).

⁴ Dušan Popović, *O cinarima* (Beograd, 1927).

on the Balkan Peninsula and some of the best in Europe"; they are wonder men, born to rule and to make history.⁵

It seems that these ideas and attitudes of Serb superiority were accepted and are still held today by many Serb intellectuals and other townspeople; they became a part of their common culture, so that even some of those intellectuals who otherwise profess leftist and socially radical ideas are strongly affected by them. It goes without saying that such a situation hampers tremendously the normalization of the relations between Serbs and other peoples of Yugoslavia.

Cvijić's school of thought, though dominant, is not, however, the only sociological school in Serbia. Much earlier than Cvijić another sociologist, Svetozar Marković, appeared in Serbia. His theories were opposed to those of Cvijić but have not as yet had such an influence as Cvijić's theories have had on the thought, action, and public opinion in Serbia. As a student in Petrograd and Zurich, Marković came under the influence of anarchist and socialist ideas and of the writings of Chernishevski, Bakunin, and Marx. He very early engaged in political and publicist activities and became the leading sociologist and revolutionist of nineteenth-century Serbia.

To understand the sociology of Marković it is necessary to have a general idea of the social and political conditions of Serbia in the second part of the nineteenth century. In the course of this century five distinct social layers were formed in Serbia: (1) The members of the ruling dynasty. These were both soldiers and merchants, two dynasties struggling to gain the power by means of intrigues, bribing, uprisings, and assassinations. (2) The army and police force. These institutions were combined in the hands of professional soldiers who were at the head of various districts and who controlled military, political, and judicial affairs. The officers were enthroning, dethroning, and assassinating the rulers of both dynasties according to the variations of their moods and the strength of foreign intrigue. (3) Townspeople. These were Serb, Greek, and Aroumanian merchants, state employees, priests, and some learned professionals. Both merchants and employees were very dependent upon the government because of the many restrictions of commerce and because the only source of income for most educated people was in the civil service. (4) Village merchants and usurers. These were also dependent upon the government and were recruited from better-off peasant families. From these the government would pick "peasant deputies" to get the "yes men" in parliament and to pretend that its

⁵ Dragoljub Jovanović, *Socijalna struktura Srbije* (Beograd, 1932).

policy was backed by the peasantry. (5) Peasantry. Here was the large layer of the economically and politically exploited toilers of the land who became economically dependent upon village and town merchants and usurers, which in a state without any civil liberties meant also complete political dependency on the ruling class. Exploited and demoralized, with a decreasing standard of living and increasing taxation, the peasantry was completely apart from any voice in the affairs of the state. Svetozar Marković with his Marxian and anarchist theoretical background clearly saw and analyzed the social and economic contradictions within Serbia and as a result of his studies developed his theory of the "peasant revolution."⁶

The starting-point of Marković's sociology is his study of the patriarchal society of Serbia at the end of the eighteenth century. He idealizes this society, its joint family organization, its autarchic economic system, its simplicity, and its lack of a horizontal social differentiation. As a contradiction to his ideal patriarchal and *zadruga*, or autarchic, society of Serb peasants Marković opposes the feudal society of the Ottoman Empire and gives a very dark picture of it. The result of this contradiction between patriarchal Serb society and feudal Moslem society, according to him, was the revolution of Serb peasants in the beginning of the nineteenth century to abolish the Ottoman rule and to establish a peasant state which was to have been organized on the pattern of the patriarchal and *zadruga* system.

The central point of Marković's theory is his assertion that the revolution failed. He tries to find the causes and results of its failure and the possibilities of another peasant revolution in Serbia and in the Balkans. It was the dynasts, former *hajduk*'s, and the bureaucracy, he said, which were to blame for the failure of the revolution. The dynasts and other leaders of the uprising, when relieved of the Turkish rule, took the place and the role of former *pasha*'s, *muselim*'s, and *kadija*'s, and their misrule was even more difficult for Serb peasants. They monopolized law and commerce, established a police terror, and exterminated all possible adversaries and competitors by mutilation and assassination and by the unlawful seizure of their property. Riches were the only means which brought prestige, justice, and power. The result was great partisanship, nepotism, general corruption, and a complete lack of political and economic security.

What meaning, then, had the idea of "Great Serbia," asked Marković. It meant only the extension of the unlimited and uncontrolled power of

⁶ *Srbija na Izluku* (Novi Sad, 1872).

Serbia's despots to Bosnia-Herzegovina and eventually to Montenegro and Macedonia. This was the same sort of dynastic imperialism, Marković believed, as that of the rulers of Sardinia and of Prussia. This trend was not only against the interests of the people and the progress of the Serb nation, but, if it ever succeeded, imperialist Great Serbia would be exactly like Austria-Hungary, which was certainly doomed to breakdown.

Marković next criticized Western European civilization and contrasted with this his ideal of Slav culture. Civilization, he believes, "gives man knowledge . . . [and] the means for material well-being; and both . . . give him the power to improve his spiritual culture. . . . In Western European civilization extensive knowledge, technical discoveries, great social principles formed only an *unemployed power*, because all these means remained in the possession of a minority." The introduction of western European institutions into Serbia had a much more deteriorating effect there, said Marković, because it provoked the breakdown of the old autarchic system of *zadruga* economy and the impoverishment of the peasants; while, on the other hand, it increased the riches of dynasts, merchants, and bureaucrats.

There is a basic difference, according to Marković, between western European and Slav civilizations, consisting in the lack of differentiation in the Slav civilization between "state" and "society." The Slav community, as represented in the Russian *mir* and in the South Slav *zadruga*, is the prototype of the Slav political and social organization. The basic principle of this organization is that "the whole community takes care that every single member has satisfied all his needs." According to Marković, the state should be organized on the principles of the Slav community but with the application of the technical and scientific knowledge of western Europe. In this way it would be possible not only to increase production but also to distribute equitably and justly the produced goods. This implies the exclusion of the capitalistic system and the socialization of the means of production. But such an organization of production and distribution should be left in the hands of small communities (*općina*) and small districts. The state should be only a co-ordinator of these socioeconomic units, a confederation of equal and free *općina*'s, in which everybody would work according to his abilities and get according to his needs and in which everybody would have a voice in the direction of common affairs.

The social and political structure of Serbia in the nineteenth century was such that it did not allow the spread of the ideas of Marković, for these were too critical of Serbia to have any appeal to its intellectuals

who were impregnated with ideas of the superiority of their nation. A possible influence of Marković's thought could be detected in the case of Slobodan Jovanović, professor at the school of law, University of Belgrade, who is far more critical and objective in his studies on Serbia's social and political development than other sociologists of Serbia. Jovanović's analysis of nineteenth-century Serbia is very similar to that of Marković, but unlike the latter, Jovanović tries to justify Serbia's ruling group by the necessity of Serbia's territorial expansion.⁷

There are two chairs of sociology at the University of Belgrade, one at the school of law and one at the school of philosophy. There is also the Society for Philosophy and Sociology, but there are not any special sociological periodicals in Serbia.⁸ Sociological problems are discussed in the form of lectures and in the form of material printed in separate publications or in periodicals and newspapers. Much sociological material could also be found in the ethnological publications of the Serb Academy of Science in Belgrade.⁹ These are largely under the influence of Cvijić's school of thought. Recently the Society for Philosophy and Sociology undertook a few excursions into Serbia's villages to collect sociological material with the aim of introducing into Serbia's sociology more objective and scientific methods.

II. SOCIOLOGY IN CROATIA

Since the days when Croats settled on the shores of the eastern Adriatic, they were in constant contact with Latin culture, the Roman Church, and western European civilization. These relations with the Western world, however, were more intensive and much more effective among the thin upper layers of the Croatian intelligentsia and townsfolk generally than among the peasantry, which retained many patterns of its original social organization, ways of living, beliefs, attitudes, and language. The cultural dualism of rural and urban life determined the two basic trends in Croatian sociology and political life: the "autochthonous culture" movement on the one hand and the tendency toward "Europeanization" on the other. The same dualism stimulated sociological research and brought sociology into close contact with politics, so that sociology could not remain a contemplative study only but was forced also to take a manipulative attitude toward the problems it encountered;

⁷ *Vlada Aleksandra Obrenovića* (Beograd, 1931).

⁸ After this article was submitted for publication, a sociological periodical appeared in Belgrade, *Sociološki Pregled*, of which one volume has been published so far (1939).

⁹ *Srpski etnografski zbornik* (Beograd, 1894-1938), Vols. I-XXXVII.

in this way the leading sociologists in Croatia also became the leading politicians. The two outstanding representatives of these two opposing schools of thought in Croatia, Antun Radić and Milan Šufflay, are fine examples of this combination.

Antun Radić (1868-1919), reared in a peasant home in a *zadruga*¹⁰ and educated at the University of Zagreb, noticed the discrepancies in the rural and urban life of Croatia and felt that these contradictions within his country were sharpening. In studying these conditions within Croatia, Radić found that behind them there was primarily a culture conflict between the Croatian autochthonous culture and western European civilization. This led him to study the development and the main traits both of western European civilization and of the native culture of his people.

His research on the development of western European civilization led him to the conclusion that there was also within this civilization a contradiction dating from its origins. Western European civilization, he said, was built on two different and opposing foundations: the Greco-Roman culture and Christianity. The result of this strange combination, he said, was that, on the one hand, western European civilization accepted from the Greco-Roman world the idea of superiority, imperialism, mechanization, megalomania, the idea of the state as an organization of power and force, the system of official and aristocratic Christianity, and, on the other hand, the constant spiritual and economic revolutions in the Western world: the Renaissance, Hussite wars, the Reformation, and the French Revolution.

The culture of *barbare*'s and of real Christians, said Radić, brought to European civilization the idea of equality, the consequence of which was the experimental and objective attitude in the sciences. The *barbare*'s of European civilization, however, he said, went only halfway in their revolt against the Greco-Roman world. Composed of renegades and therefore with a strong feeling of inferiority, this new élite of the Western world, said Radić, was not able to create anything new; its whole activity

¹⁰ The *zadruga* system of Croatia was a combination of economic and joint family organization based on the principle of self-sufficiency and collective ownership. In the days of Radić's youth this system of social organization was rapidly disintegrating under the pressure of the capitalistic system which was penetrating Croatia from western Europe. In order to promote commerce and industry and to develop towns after the pattern of western Europe, the Croatian upper classes sought to dissolve the system of collective ownership through legislation but imposed increasing taxes on newly created individual peasant holdings. Peasants had to market more of their products in order to pay taxes, and the result was that their home consumption and general standard of living decreased.

was spent in commenting on and embellishing the ideas and philosophy of the Greco-Roman world, and this led to the abstractness of Western thought.

Radić prophesied that the change in the attitudes of the Western world would come first from the study of the cultures of barbaric peoples, of the peoples who did not absorb western European civilization. Under the influence of ethnological studies, western European civilization would cease to be the only measure for cultural values; instead, it would be brought on "the bench of the accused."¹¹ Following this logic, Radić stressed the necessity of the creation of a new, all-human civilization to which all peoples and nations might contribute and which would reconcile differences among all cultures. To attain this goal, he thought, it would be necessary to stimulate the creative abilities of all peoples, so that each culture and each people might contribute its best to this new all-human civilization.

Faithful to his own ideas, Radić started to put them into practice. His first work was the study of the autochthonous culture of his own people, the folk culture of Croatian peasants. On the basis of a questionnaire of more than one thousand questions, this great work was started. One part of the material collected was published by the Academy of Sciences and Arts of Zagreb in thirty-six large volumes which appeared annually. The collecting of the material and its publication is still proceeding today.¹² A movement was also started to revive old Croatian folklore as manifested in old songs, dances, and costumes. But this peasant renaissance of Croatia had its most far-reaching effect in the field of politics. Based on the ideas of Antun Radić, a peasant political movement under the leadership of his brother, Stjepan Radić, was started. The basic political philosophy of this movement was that peasants, who are the original producers of material and spiritual goods, should have political power in their own hands in order to bring about a new all-human, equitable, and pacifistic world.¹³

¹¹ Antun Radić, *Sabrana djela* (Zagreb, 1936), Vol. I.

¹² *Zbornik za narodni život i običaje* (Zagreb: Jugoslavenska Akademija Znanosti i Umjetnosti (1896—), Vols. I-XXXVI.

¹³ Radić, *op. cit.*, Vol. VII; *Program hrvatske seljačke republikanske stranke* (Zagreb, 1923); see also Vladko Maček, *Biti hrvatskoga seljačkoga pokreta* (Zagreb, 1938), and R. Herceg, *Hrvatska politika mora biti seljačka* (Zagreb, 1928) and *Pangea* (Zagreb, 1932). In his writings and public lectures R. Herceg sponsors the idea of a world-government (*Pangea*) composed of the equal representatives of all peoples regardless of the state boundaries. *Pangea* would have to have sovereign rights, legislative and executive powers, control over the manufacture and distribution of arms, currency, etc. The policy would depend upon the initiative coming from the large strata of the population.

There were two sociologists, both French, who greatly influenced the work of Radić. One was J. Michelet (1798-1898) with his study *Le Peuple* (1848) and the other was A. Fouillée (1838-1912) with his work *Psychologie de peuple français* (1898). Both writers were critical of western European civilization and believed in the great creative abilities of the common people. Michelet, especially, idealized the French peasant. Radić also had some predecessors in Croatia. One was Juraj Križanić (1618-83) and the other was Baltazar Bogišić (1834-1908). Juraj Križanić, originator of the pan-Slav idea, influenced Radić with his conception of a separate Slavic world and Slavic civilization as contrasted to the Greco-Roman world and western European civilization. On the other hand, Baltazar Bogišić, the outstanding student of Slavic common laws, was first to discover the richness of South Slav folk culture. He taught Radić the technique and the method of approach in the study of folk culture, and his ideas and questionnaire were the basis on which Radić wrote his *Osnova za sabiranje i proučavanje gradje o narodnom životu* ("Project for Collecting and Studying Material on the Life of the People").¹⁴

The road which Radić opened did not remain without results in the field of sociology. The material which was collected on the basis of Radić's questionnaire was used for new researches and studies in the field of autochthonous culture. It was found that there were two main types of this culture: one whose typical unit of social organization was *skupčina*, the autarchic, democratic, and collectivistic organization of agricultural folk, and the other whose typical social organization was the clan system and patriarchal family organization of warriors and pastoral people.¹⁵ Research was also done on the influence of the two cultures on the formation of medieval Croatian political communities and on the formation of the towns and of the upper classes. It was discovered that the course of Croatian political and cultural history was greatly influenced by the constant conflict between these two main types of autochthonous cultures and that also today the main ideologies which dominate Croatian thought and political life are to a large extent a reflection of this past.¹⁶

Croatian towns in the past were being formed and settled largely by merchants and craftsmen from neighboring nations, mostly Swiss and Austrian Germans, and some Hungarians, Italians, Greeks, and Serbs. Later, under the pressure of the Austrian Germanization policy, many German-speaking state employees and army officers settled in Croatia's

¹⁴ Radić, *op. cit.*, I, 17-99.

¹⁵ Dinko Tomašić, *Društveni razvitak Hrvata* (Zagreb, 1937).

¹⁶ Dinko Tomašić, *Politički razvitak Hrvata* (Zagreb, 1938).

towns. So it happened that the German language was very common among the upper and middle layers of Croatia's town population. The immigrants and their descendants, however, were gradually becoming assimilated, and, in the course of the development of Croatian nationalism during the nineteenth century, those of Catholic faith identified themselves with Croats, and those of the Greek Orthodox religion identified themselves with Serbs. While Catholicism was dominant in Croatia Serb Orthodox merchants prospered, and Serb politicians backed the Austrian policy of destroying Croatia's autonomy. This was the beginning of the Serbo-Croatian conflict, which constantly intensified and which inspired the ideas, works, and activities of Milan Šufflay (1879-1932), Croatian historian, sociologist, and politician, born in Croatia in a family of Hungarian origin and educated at the universities of Zagreb, Vienna, and Budapest.

The basic thought in the sociology of Šufflay was the stressing of the racial, cultural, and mental differences between Serbs and Croats and a tendency to prove that a durable union between these two nations could not be expected.¹⁷ His point of departure was that the written history of humanity was too short to give us definite laws of development. This development was an organic growth determined not only by historical factors but also by blood, soil, culture, vitality, climate, and collective memory.

From this standpoint Šufflay analyzed the formation of the Croatian and Serb nations and drew conclusions regarding their relations in the future. As Catholics and Westerners, said Šufflay, Croats do not have anything in common with the Orthodox Balkans. The Orthodox Balkans is the domain of Serbs who adapted themselves to the Balkan culture by a long historical preparation. Even a Balkan federation would have a deteriorating effect on Croatian culture, because in such a federation Croats would lose the best they have: their sense for Western civilization and their sense for humaneness. Yugoslavia as it was organized in his day meant, said Šufflay, the Balkanization of Croatia, and there was no possibility of any collaboration of Croatian peasants with Serb, Bulgarian, and Macedonian peasants because those could not understand the ideology of the Croatian peasant movement and Radić's idea of an "all-human and pacifistic republic." Moreover, he thought, Radić's ideology was too weak an instrument for fighting the Serbs, because Serbs drew their strength from the past and one could not fight that with ideas of the future. The collective memory of a people, he said, was very

¹⁷ M. Šufflay, *Hrvatska u svijetu svjetske historije i politike* (Zagreb, 1928).

important from the point of view of its preservation, and the survival of the Croatian nation was not only important for Croatians but also for the whole Western world, because Croatians were still on the frontier line of the Mediterranean West. Croatian nationalism was necessary for the preservation of all that was good in western European civilization, he said; it meant more than any other nationalism: a bulwark against the East, a "loyal service to the white West."

These ideas, for which Šufflay was assassinated, became the backbone of the ideology of one part of the Croatian separatist movement. Today they are being elaborated by Šufflay's followers in two directions. Some are elaborating the idea that Croatians, unlike Serbs, are not of Slavic but of German origin and that those Croatian tribes which formed the first Croatian political community were Gothic tribes.¹⁸ The other group is stressing the Roman Catholicism of Croatians as against the Greek Orthodoxy of the Serbs and the necessity of an ever closer relation of Croatians with the Vatican as a means of self-preservation.¹⁹

There are no special sociological periodicals in Croatia, but sociological material is published either in the form of monographs or in historical, ethnological, legal, economic, theological, and literary periodicals and in daily or weekly newspapers. There are now three active chairs of sociology at the University of Zagreb: in the school of law, in the school of economics, and in the Catholic theological school (Christian sociology). Two chairs of sociology are now vacant: one in the school of philosophy and one in the school of agronomy (rural sociology). There is also a sociological society in Zagreb, organized in 1919. This society is affiliated with the Institut Internationale de Sociologie, Geneva, but in recent years it has become completely inactive because of the political animosities and great ideological differences which exist among its members. In 1937 the Institute for the Study of Economic and Social Relations was organized in the Croatian peasant movement. This Institute, among other activities, is organizing sociological research work to be conducted in the villages on a large scale. Sociological material is already being collected from all villages with the help of peasants and under the guidance of sociologists. This work is greatly influenced in its technique and method of approach by American ethnological and sociological schools. Recently, *Seljačka Sloga*, the Peasant party's cultural organization, undertook scientific analysis of the work of Radič and other ideologists of the Peasant movements in Croatia. One of these studies (D. Tomašić, *World*

¹⁸ Šegvić, *Die gotische Abstammung der Kroaten* (Berlin, 1936).

¹⁹ Ivšić, Perović, and Šćetinac, *Načela društvene obnove* (Zagreb, 1937).

Peace Based on New Social Principles [Zagreb, 1940]) was published also in English and some other European languages.

III. SOCIOLOGY IN SLOVENIA

Unlike Croats and Serbs, Slovenes never in their history succeeded in organizing an independent state of their own, although they preserved their ethnic unity as a result of the mutual rivalries of their neighbors. German feudal lords, in order to develop craft and commerce, had favored the settlement of German craftsmen and merchants around their castles in Slovene regions and thus laid the basis for the development of small towns. In this way feudal lords and townspeople became the channels through which the Reformation entered the Slovene country and in the course of half a century almost completely conquered both the German and the Slovene population. But by the end of the sixteenth century a strong Counter Reformation movement was launched, which in a few years completely exterminated Protestantism in Slovene regions. This religious struggle paved the way both for the centralization of political power in the hands of the king and for the cultural, political, and religious dominance of the Catholic clergy.

In the second part of the nineteenth century the beginnings of a Slovene bourgeoisie were formed, and from these ranks came students who frequented German universities in Austria and Germany where they were impressed by the strength of pan-Germanism and influenced by ideas of cultural, political, and economic liberalism. As a reaction to this liberal trend the Catholic clergy launched a strong counterliberalism movement which dominated Slovene cultural, political, and economic life until the end of the World War. The spiritual leaders of this counterliberalism were professors at the Slovene schools of theology: A. Mahnič, J. Krek, and A. Ušeničnik. Mahnič, a bishop and a philosopher, interested primarily in fighting cultural liberalism in Slovenia, introduced inquisitorial methods in fighting any freedom of expression in the fields of art, literature, and science which was not in accordance with the teachings of the Catholic church and its philosophy. Both Krek and Ušeničnik were influenced by the counterliberalism of German, French, and English Catholic writers (V. E. von Ketteler, De Mun, Manning, etc.) whose ideas found their definite and most authoritative expression in the encyclical of Pope Leo XIII, *Rerum novarum*, and which, when organized as a political movement, became known as "Christian socialism" or the "Christian social movement."

The ideas in the encyclical were elaborated by Krek in his books,

articles, speeches, and lectures.²⁰ In order to put these ideas into practice, Krek started a co-operative movement among Slovene peasants, organizing consumers' and producers' co-operatives in the villages and towns under the leadership of parish priests. This was a way to fight the development of capitalism in Slovenia but also a means of undermining the strength of the new Slovene bourgeoisie, the bearer of Slovene liberalism.

While the sociological ideas of Krek were disseminated in various ways, Ušeničnik undertook to give a more systematic form to his conceptions and so wrote his *Principles of Sociology*.²¹ Ušeničnik's attitude toward social change is not contemplative but manipulative. He asserts that sociology should be based on philosophy, but the only lasting philosophy from which sociology should take its basic views is the scholastic philosophy of the Middle Ages as elaborated by Thomas Aquinas. This philosophy gives us the ethics of laws which are "eternal and unchangeable." But besides these eternal and unchangeable principles which guide humanity there are other social laws which have a relative ethical value depending upon the social conditions and social organization of various periods in the history of humanity and at various levels of its culture. Such a relative principle, according to Ušeničnik is, for instance, the principle of democracy. Ušeničnik accepts the principle of democracy only as a temporary measure before the corporative system is organized. The same applies to the principle of personal freedom. Personal freedom should be limited by the extent of social authority and should depend upon social conditions. Contemporary social conditions, however, are such that they dictate the strengthening of authority unless the class struggle, unlimited capitalism, and unlimited cultural liberalism undermine the Christian basis of society. According to Ušeničnik, the greatest positive factor in the development of humanity was Christianity, while the negative factors were humanism, Protestantism, philosophical naturalism, and Judaism. The results of these negative factors were liberalism, financial capitalism, and socialism.

Contemporary society, therefore, should be reformed, and, according to Ušeničnik, this reform should consist in neither liberalism nor socialism but in the reorganization of society on the basis of Christian solidarity. Christian solidarity would bring workers and employers together in common industrial corporations according to the kind of work. All corporations together would form a common organism under the control of the

²⁰ Janez Krek, *Socijalni eseji, govori i nacrti* (Požega, 1920) (Croatian translation).

²¹ Aleksij Ušeničnik, *Principi sociologije* (Zagreb, 1920) (Croatian translation).

state, but each one of these organisms would retain its autonomy to decide about the production, conditions of work, salaries, insurance, and professional education of its members. Peasants also should be organized on a co-operative and professional basis. All these professional corporations might well in the course of time replace political parliaments.

It is impossible, however, to imagine perfect harmony in this new society without the interference of a certain social authority. Ušeničnik believes that the unchangeable nature of man is so egotistic that it will always be in need of social education. This social education could be given only by the church and the family. Therefore the family should remain the basic cell of the social organism, and the church should be that highest social authority upon which this new society would depend.

When the Slovene regions became an integral part of Yugoslavia, Catholics became a minority. The liberal bourgeoisie of Slovenia got strong support from the liberal bourgeoisie of the rest of Yugoslavia, and the increased industrialization of Slovenia resulted in the growth of the proletariat and in a rapid spread of the ideas of Marxian socialism. The control of the Catholic clergy over Slovenia was challenged, and this pointed toward the necessity of a reorientation of Slovene Catholic sociology. The representative of this new trend of sociology in Slovenia was Andrija Gosar, a laic and professor of economics at the University of Ljubljana. When he wrote his *Principles of the Sociological and Economic Reform of Society*,²² post-war Austria was already under the full control of the Catholic clergy, and in Germany Nazis were undertaking the reorganization of society on the principles of National Socialism. These facts should be kept in mind in order to understand a certain deviation in Gosar's sociology from that of Krek and Ušeničnik.

The main idea in Gosar's sociology is that of preventing the social revolution, and his chief criticism of the former Catholic sociologists is that they did not succeed in attracting to their sociology the larger layers of the proletariat. He accepts their idea of society as an organic unit, their attitude against class struggle, their antiliberalism and antidemocracy, but he criticizes their attitude against financial capitalism and their lack of activism. Like the former Catholic sociologists, Gosar accepts the idea of corporations as a principle of the organization of society as it was organized in the Middle Ages, but besides this he proposes planned economy and a centralized political and economic leadership. To attain this goal he believes that violence and even dictatorship of one "corporation" or of one layer over others might be necessary and justified, although a cer-

²² *Reforma društva: sociološki i ekonomski osnovi* (Beograd, 1933) (Serb translation).

tain limited degree of personal liberty, of private property, and of struggle between various groups should be allowed.

The period of cultural and political liberty and of freedom of expression was too short in Slovenia to allow for a systematic treatment of sociological problems from a more objective point of view and with the use of the more developed scientific methods of contemporary sociology. The Slovene university in Ljubljana was organized only after the World War and it did not have a chair of sociology until recently. On the other hand, owing to the lack of a political tradition and because of the late development of the Slovene bourgeoisie, Slovenes did not develop a nationalistic ideology of their own. This is why in Slovenia greater attention is paid to social problems, local and general. These are being discussed equally by "clericals," by "liberals," and by "leftists" in their respective periodicals and newspapers, and this general interest in social problems will undoubtedly pave the way for the development of a scientific sociology in that country.

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY

HIGHER DEGREES IN SOCIOLOGY CONFERRED IN 1940

According to reports received by the *Journal* from institutions offering graduate instruction, 50 doctoral degrees and 155 Masters' degrees in sociology were conferred in the calendar year 1940 by 49 institutions in the United States and Canada. The list includes only those institutions which require dissertations or theses. Because of lack of space, degrees, dissertations, and theses in the field of social work are not included.

DOCTORS' DEGREES

William Aldigs, B.A. Midland, 1923. "Pardons Granted in Wisconsin, 1901 to 1934, Inclusive." *Wisconsin*.

V. D. Annakin. "The Missionary as an Agent of Cultural Diffusion." *Ohio State*.

Gordon Baker, B.S., M.A. Northwestern, 1928, 1938. "Home Recreation." *Northwestern*.

Joel VanMeter Berreman, B.A. Willamette, 1927; M.A. Oregon, 1933. "Factors Affecting the Sale of Modern Books of Fiction: A Study in Social Psychology." *Stanford*.

Gordon Williams Blackwell, B.A. Furman University, 1932; M.A. North Carolina, 1933; M.A. Harvard, 1937. "The Significance of Structural Family Characteristics in the Lowest Economic Stratum of Southern Agriculture." *Harvard*.

Gust Gunnar Carlson, B.A. North State Teachers College, 1932; M.A. University of Michigan, 1934. "Numbers Gambling: A Study of a Culture Complex." *Michigan*.

Benicio T. Catapusan, B.A. California Christian, 1933; M.A. Southern California, 1934. "The Filipino's Social Adjustment in the United States." *Southern California*.

Hsueh-Yen Chang, B.A. Cheeloo University, 1930; B.D. Nanking University, 1934. "The Lunar Calendar as a Social Control Mechanism in Chinese Rural Life." *Cornell*.

William Richard Clark. "Emergency Education: A Social Study of the W.P.A. Education Project in Rhode Island." *Catholic University*.

Donald Olen Cowgill, B.A. Park College, 1933; M.A. Washington University, 1935. "Mobile Homes: A Study of Trailer Life." *Pennsylvania*.

Vattel Elbert Daniel, B.A. Virginia Union University, 1914; M.A. Colorado, 1924. "Ritual in Chicago's South Side Churches for Negroes." *Chicago*.

- Maurice B. Davies, B.A. Wooster, 1929; M.A. Wisconsin, 1933. "Some Factors Affecting Fertility Rates in the Intermountain Region—a Correlational Analysis." *Wisconsin*.
- Roy Durham, B.S. Kansas State Teachers College, 1924. "A History of Parole in Kansas with a Special Study in the Kansas State Penitentiary and Kansas State Industrial Reformatory from Riley County, Kansas, from 1920 to 1935." *Wisconsin*.
- Mary Alice Eaton, B.A. Wellesley College, 1934; M.A. University of Chicago, 1936. "Climate of the Southeast: A Preliminary Investigation of the Theoretical and Factual Problems of Southern Climate." *North Carolina*.
- Howard F. Forsyth, B.A. Brigham Young, 1935; M.S. Iowa State College, 1936. "The Construction of a Scale To Measure Attitude toward Relief." *Minnesota*.
- Duane L. Gibson, B.S. Cornell University, 1934. "Membership Relations of Farmers' Milk Marketing Organizations in New York State." *Cornell*.
- Stanley A. Ginsburgh, M.A. Johns Hopkins University, 1931. "Organized Jewish Youth Groups in America." *Massachusetts State College*.
- Abraham Wentworth Goldberg, B.A., M.A. Michigan, 1921, 1922. "The Chicago Crime Commission." *Northwestern*.
- Ruth Harris, M.A. Columbia. "How St. Louis Negro Elementary Schools Are Meeting the Social Needs of School Children in Three Areas." *Columbia*.
- Mildred Heiman, B.A. Illinois, 1937. "Prison Labor in the United States." *Wisconsin*.
- George W. Hill, B.A. Minnesota, 1932. "Man in the 'Cut-Over': A Culture Case Study of Social Relationships." *Wisconsin*.
- W. Arthur Hillman, B.A., M.A. University of Washington, 1931, 1934. "Urbanization and the Organization of Welfare Activities in the Metropolitan Community of Chicago." *Chicago*.
- Althea Hollowell, B.S., M.A. Pennsylvania, 1929, 1934. "Prosecutions and Treatment of Women Offenders and the Economic Crisis: Philadelphia, 1925-1934." *Pennsylvania*.
- David Ross Jenkins, M.A. University of New Zealand, 1934. "Growth and Decline of Agricultural Villages." *Columbia*.
- Mabel Wirth Johnson, B.E. Oshkosh State Teachers College, 1936. "Anti-Semitism in the United States." *Wisconsin*.
- Arthur Hosking Jones, B.S., M.A. Pennsylvania, 1931, 1934. "Cheltenham Township: A Sociological Analysis of a Residential Suburb." *Pennsylvania*.
- R. Willis Kerns, B.S. Ohio State, 1932; M.S. Cornell, 1934. "The Ecology of Rural Social Agencies in Pennsylvania." *Cornell*.
- Morton King, B.A., M.A. Vanderbilt, 1934, 1936. "Public Relief in Marshall County, Tennessee: A Case Study of an Enacted Institution." *Wisconsin*.
- John A. Kinneman, B.A. Dickinson, 1921; M.A. Pennsylvania, 1923. "The Delimitation of the Small Metropolitan Area." *Northwestern*.

- Frank Lewand, B.A., M.A. Pennsylvania, 1928, 1933. "The Formulation of a Federal Invalidity Insurance Program." *Pennsylvania*.
- Maude Clay Little, B.A., M.A. Alabama, 1934, 1935. "Youth and the Depression." *Virginia*.
- J. Edwin Losey, B.S., M.S. Iowa State, 1930, 1936. "Membership Relations of a Cooperative Purchasing Association." *Cornell*.
- John Paul McKinsey, B.A. Westminster, 1926; M.A. Missouri, 1930. "Transient Men in Missouri—a Descriptive Analysis of Transient Men and of the Activities of Agencies Dealing with Them." *Missouri*.
- Paul Meadows, B.A. McKendree, 1935; M.A. Washington University, 1936. "The Sociological Interpretation of Revolution: A Theoretical and Situational Analysis." *Northwestern*.
- Delbert C. Miller, B.S., M.A. Miami, 1934, 1937. "Psycho-social Factors in the Morale of College Trained Adults." *Minnesota*.
- Mildred R. Minter, B.A. Smith, 1930; M.S. Southern California, 1936. "The Concept of Collective Representations in French Sociology and Its Expression in the Literary Unanimism of Jules Romains." *Southern California*.
- Wilbert Ellis Moore, B.A. Linfield, 1935; M.S. University of Oregon, 1937; M.A. Harvard, 1939. "Slavery, Abolition, and the Ethical Valuation of the Individual." *Harvard*.
- Jack Morton, M.A. Texas, 1931. "Knowledge Necessary for a Free Man." *Columbia*.
- Theodore K. Noss, B.A. Princeton, 1925; B.D. Union Theological Seminary, 1929; M.A. Chicago, 1934. "Resistance to Social Inventions as Found in the Literature Regarding Innovations Which Have Proved Successful." *Chicago*.
- Sister Mary Corita O'Brien. "The Personalist Element in the Sociological Ideas of John Ruskin." *Catholic University*.
- Robert E. Ritzenthaler, D.D. Wisconsin, 1935. "The Cultural History of the Wisconsin Oneidas." *Wisconsin*.
- Bryce Finley Ryan, B.A. University of Washington, 1932; M.A. Texas, 1933; M.A. Harvard, 1938. "Boston High School Graduates in Periods of Prosperity and Depression." *Harvard*.
- Samuel M. Strong, B.A. Brown, 1938. "The Social Type Method: Social Types in the Negro Community of Chicago." *Chicago*.
- John Syrjamaki, B.A. Carleton, 1934. "Mesabi Communities: A Study of Their Development." *Yale*.
- Afif Ishak Tannous, B.A. American University of Beirut, 1929; M.A. St. Lawrence University, 1938. "Trends of Social and Cultural Change in Bishmizzeen, an Arab Village of North Lebanon." *Cornell*.
- Paul Tappan, B.A. Clark, 1934; M.A. Wisconsin, 1935. "Mormon-Gentile Conflict: A Study of the Influence of Public Opinion on In-Group versus Out-Group Interactions with Special Reference to Polygamy." *Wisconsin*.
- Susanne Thompson, B.S. Nebraska, 1913; M.A. Chicago, 1924. "A Comparative Study of Women Students in Home Economics, Arts and Sciences, and

- Education with Respect to Certain Social and Personality Characteristics." *Cornell*.
- Russell Edson Waitt, B.A. Cornell, 1920; S.T.B. Boston College, 1922; M.A. Colorado State, 1929. "A Sociological Analysis and Interpretation of the Collegiate Center Project in Central New York, 1933-1937." *Wisconsin*.
- Clarence J. Wittler. "Some Social Trends in W.P.A. Drama." *Catholic University*.
- Ibrahim Yasa, B.A., M.A. Missouri, 1937, 1937. "A Comparative Study of Selected Attitudes of Rural and Town High School Seniors." *Cornell*.

MASTERS' DEGREES

- Adele Adler. "An Analysis and Revision of the Classification of Juvenile Delinquents in New York City." *Columbia*.
- Philip James Alaimo, B.A. Ohio Northern, 1937; B.D. Garrett Biblical Institute, 1940. "Factors Influencing Ministers' Vocational Choice." *Northwestern*.
- Ruth Alexander, B.A. Mills College, 1933. "Racial Characteristics and Conditions of the Student Population at Watsonville (California) Union High School." *Stanford*.
- E. G. Ammons, B.A. A. & M. College of Texas, 1937. "A Study of the Rural Youth Migration in the Kurten Community." *A. & M. College of Texas*.
- William Samuel Banks, B.A. Dillard, 1937. "The Development of Labor Consciousness among Negro Longshoremen in New Orleans, Louisiana." *Fisk*.
- John Joseph Barron, B.A. Columbia, 1937. "Agency as Criterion in Analysis of the State." *Columbia*.
- Rachel Louise Bassette, B.A. Hampton Institute, 1938. "An Analysis of Social and Selected Personality Factors in the Expressed Vocational Interests of 133 Negro Adolescents." *Fisk*.
- Alan Philips Bates, B.A. University of Washington, 1938. "Parental Roles in Courtship." *Washington*.
- Dorothie Marrow Beasley, B.A. Fisk University, 1938. "A Study of the Underworld through the Medium of Literature." *Fisk*.
- John Daniel Beck, B.A. Heidelberg, 1933. "Acculturation and Religious Institutions: A Case Study of Acculturation in Sauk County, Wisconsin, by Special Reference to Religious Institutions." *Wisconsin*.
- Mary Beeley, B.A. Utah, 1939. "Personality Development of Freshman Women." *Utah*.
- Anthony I. Bentley, B.A. Brigham Young, 1930. "Social and Utopian Thought in the Writings of Joseph Smith and Other Mormons." *Southern California*.
- Stanley J. Beskind, B.A. Dartmouth, 1938. "Changing Institutional Patterns in Art Encouragement." *Columbia*.
- Marvin Betnun, B.S. Utah, 1939. "A Comparison of the Leisure-Time Activities of Delinquent and Nondelinquent Boys in Salt Lake City and Vicinity." *Utah*.

- George C. Betts, B.A. Louisiana State, 1939. "A Study of the Nature of Propaganda Based on the Present Publications of the National Association of Manufacturers." *Kent State*.
- Willard William Blaesser, B.A. Wisconsin, 1934. "Student Personnel Functions at the University of Wisconsin." *Wisconsin*.
- William Henry Boone, B.A. Virginia State, 1939. "A Study of the Problem of Adjustment of Negro Students Attending the University of Michigan." *Michigan*.
- Anna Vivian Brown, B.A. Oberlin, 1938. "The Negro Changes His Vote." *New York University*.
- Alline Campbell, B.A. Birmingham-Southern College, 1935. "Care of the Aged in the Piedmont Sub-region." *North Carolina*.
- Phyllis Brumm Cannon, B.A. Michigan, 1937. "Illustrations of How the Technicways in the Modern Community Modify the Folkways." *North Carolina*.
- Mabel Carrol, B.A. Cornell, 1937. "Social-economic Opinions of a Rural Population." *Cornell*.
- Vera Adrienne Chandler, B.A. Fisk, 1936. "A Study of One Hundred Adolescent Negro Children with Especial Reference to Family Situations." *Nebraska*.
- Louise Chang, B.A. Vassar, 1939. "Mutual Aid in the Chinese Family System." *Michigan*.
- Wen Hui Chung Chen, B.S. Yenching University, 1931. "A Study of Chinese Families in Los Angeles in Contrast with the Traditional Family Life in China." *Southern California*.
- Charles Wesley Churchill, B.A. Dana, 1934. "Economic Culture of the Pomo Indians of Northern California." *New York University*.
- A. Lee Coleman, B.A. Emory University, 1937. "What Is America? A Lexicographic Analysis of Alleged Characteristics, Traits and Ideals." *North Carolina*.
- Esther Victoria Cooper, B.A. Fisk, 1938. "The Negro Woman Domestic Worker in Relation to Labor Union Organization." *Fisk*.
- Mary Keller Cox, B.Ed. Southern Illinois Normal University, 1938. "A Study of the Attitudes of Young Mothers toward Having Children." *Chicago*.
- Ruth Crowell, B.A. North Carolina, 1937. "Administration of National Labor Relations Act in North Carolina." *North Carolina*.
- Margaret Day, B.A. Nebraska, 1932. "The Settlement Boys' and Girls' Work Job as Seen by Themselves." *Northwestern*.
- Kathryn Putnam DePuy, B.A. Carleton, 1928. "A Study of a Playground in Relation to the Area It Is Designed to Serve." *Northwestern*.
- Helen J. Doob, B.A. Cornell, 1933. "Some Social Factors in the Formation of a Public Welfare Workers' Union." *Columbia*.
- Bruce Downey, B.A. North Carolina, 1938. "Aspects of Roanoke Farm, Inc." *North Carolina*.

- Joseph Turpin Drake, B.S. Davidson, 1934. "Comparative Educational Advantages of Negroes and Whites in the Sub-region." *North Carolina*.
- Robert Dubin, B.A. Chicago, 1936. "Factors in the Variation of Urban Occupational Structure." *Chicago*.
- John George Dukas, B.A. Dartmouth, 1937. "An Estimate of the Adequacy of the Public Health Facilities in Keene, New Hampshire." *New Hampshire*.
- W. Woodard Dunlap, B.S. Kent State, 1938. "Correlative Relationships and Descriptive Comparison between Scholastic Proficiency and Extra-scholastic Employment of University Students." *Kent State*.
- Louis Eisenberg, B.S. City College of New York, 1938. "The Pullman Strike of 1894." *Columbia*.
- Audrey Engle, B.S. New College, 1939. "Class Appeals in Merchandising and in Advertising: An Analysis of Publications on Two Socioeconomic Levels." *Columbia*.
- Anita A. Epstein. "Court Treatment of the 'Wayward Minor' Girl." *Columbia*.
- S. Joseph Fauman, B.A. Michigan, 1939. "The Position of the Jews in the Waste Industry of Detroit." *Michigan*.
- Volney Faw, B.A. LaVerne College, 1935. "The *Chicago Tribune* and Its Control." *Chicago*.
- Ashton Gurneta Ferguson, B.A. West Virginia State College, 1938. "The Growth of Anti-Semitism from 1933-1939: A Study of a Social Epidemic." *Fish*.
- Walter Irving Firey, B.A. Washington, 1938. "Relation of Population Distribution and Redistribution to the Natural Resources of the Elma Service-Area." *Washington*.
- Man-hee Fong, B.A. Sun Yat-sen University, 1930. "A Comparative Study of Personal Names and Naming Systems among the Chinese and Certain American Indian Tribes." *Southern California*.
- Ethelyn M. Foote, B.A. Michigan State Normal, 1930. "Recreational Reading Habits of Junior High School Pupils." *Michigan State*.
- Morton F. Fosberg, B.S. City College of New York, 1939. "Interrupted College Careers: A Statistical Case Study." *Columbia*.
- Ronald Freedman, B.A. Michigan, 1939. "The Relation of Occupational Structure to Selected Social Characteristics in the Community." *Michigan*.
- Norman Harold Frisch, B.S. Northwestern, 1939. "Inter- and Intra-marriage among Economic Classes in a Metropolitan Community." *Michigan*.
- Alan Lewis Geller, B.S. City College of New York, 1939. "Forty-two Middle-aged White Collar Men View Their Personal Economic Futures." *Columbia*.
- Nathan Lewis Gerrard, B.A. Chicago, 1937. "Juvenile Delinquency in Hyde Park: A Community in Zone IV." *Chicago*.
- Eleanor W. Gluck. "An Ecological Study of the Japanese in New York City." *Columbia*.

- Milton Goldberg, B.A. Bowdoin, 1939. "The Effect of the Outbreak of European War on Religious Pacifism in the United States." *Columbia*.
- Morris Gordon. "Sociological Implications of the Hebrew Ethical Wills of the Middle Ages." *Columbia*.
- Cloyd V. Gustafson, B.A. DePauw, 1923. "An Ecological Analysis of the Holtenback Area of Los Angeles with Special Reference to the Racial Changes in Progress." *Southern California*.
- Seward Henry Hall, B.A. Columbia, 1937. "A Study of Unattached Women on Home Relief in New York City." *Columbia*.
- Vandyce Hamren, B.A. Southern California, 1938. "The Concept of Social Process in Contemporary Sociology." *Southern California*.
- Hondun Bud Hargrove, B.A. Wilberforce, 1938. "Nationalism in Mexico." *Fisk*.
- William Harrell Harlan, B.A. Nebraska, 1938. "Ecological Study of Four Lincoln Churches." *Nebraska*.
- William Henry Harrison, B.A. Dartmouth, 1939. "A Survey of the Buying Habits and Attitudes of the Subscribers to Consumers Union." *Columbia*.
- Paul Kitchener Hatt, B.A. Linfield College, 1936. "Social Attitudes in Anti-Semitism." *Washington*.
- Ernie Hawk, M.A. Ohio State, 1940. "Time Elapsing between Marriage and Divorce: A Study of 1,100 Cases of Franklin County Courts." *Ohio State*.
- Ted Hawn, B.A. Maryville College, 1926. "A Study of the Lenoir City Company." *Tennessee*.
- Harold Hennig, B.A. Newark University, 1938. "The Role of Charisma in the Seventh-Day Adventist Denomination, 1844-1915." *Columbia*.
- Joseph M. Hirsh, B.S. City College of New York, 1937. "Medicine in Transition: A Study of Social Problems and Issues in American Medicine." *Columbia*.
- Laura Huber, B.A. Iowa State Teachers College, 1919. "A Sociological Comparison of Twin Cities in Wisconsin." *Chicago*.
- Arthur Vincent Huffman, B.A. McKendrie College, 1935. "Community Readjustment of Patients Returned from State Hospitals." *Illinois*.
- Clyde Irion, B.A. Southern Methodist, 1936. "A Study of Neighboring in Dallas." *Southern Methodist*.
- C. P. James, B.A. A. & M. College of Texas, 1937. "A Study of the Taxicab Industry in the United States." *A. & M. College of Texas*.
- Genelle Jenkins, B.A. Nebraska Wesleyan, 1938. "Introduction to the Ethnohistory of the Omaha." *Nebraska*.
- Harvey C. Johnson, B.A. Texas College, 1936. "Race Prejudice as a Means of Social Control." *Michigan*.
- Louis Walter Kazienko, B.S. New Hampshire, 1938. "An Examination of the Adequacy of the Recreational Program of Concord." *New Hampshire*.
- Helen Harriman Kiepe, B.A. University of Oregon, 1936. "The Status of the Attitude-Concept as a Tool in the Experimental Study of Social Action." *University of Oregon*.

- Charles Edward King, B.A. Paine College, 1937. "The Maternal Negro Family of Barrow County, Georgia." *Michigan*.
- Jeanne S. Kirchner, B.A. University of California at Los Angeles, 1937. "Attitudes on the Modern Family Found in Recent American Fiction." *Southern California*.
- Orrin Edgar Klapp. "The Use of Social Identification as an Advertising Technique." *Chicago*.
- Selma L. Klein, B.A. Tulane, 1935. "Social Interaction of the Creoles and Anglo-Americans in New Orleans, 1803-60." *Tulane*.
- Barbara Adeline Klose, B.A. North Central College, 1939. "Individualism and Vertical Mobility of Lower Classes." *Illinois*.
- Tommy Lorn Kubach II, B.S. Missouri, 1939. "Factors Influencing Parole in Missouri." *Missouri*.
- Bernice Beverly Lapin, B.A. Wellesley, 1933. "Economic Opportunity and the Distribution of Physicians." *Chicago*.
- Lloyd Livingston Lee, B.A. Omaha, 1937. "The Development of Class Relations between the Mulattoes and Blacks in Haiti." *Fisk*.
- Pearl Jacobs Lieff, B.A. McGill, 1937. "Urbanization of the French-Canadian Parish." *McGill*.
- Arthur Godfrey Lindsay, B.A. University of Washington, 1939. "The Washington Old Age Pension Union: A Political Pressure Group." *Washington*.
- D. Ned Linegar, B.A. Miami, 1936. "The Use of Leisure Time by Undergraduate Liberal Arts Students." *Cincinnati*.
- J. B. Lloyd, B.A., B.S. A. & M. College of Texas, 1934. "A Study of the Social and Economic Trends of the Marquez Community." *A. & M. College of Texas*.
- Edwina Electra Lowe, B.A. LeMoyne College, 1937. "Attitudes of Negro Women toward Family Disorganization in Two Contrasting Communities." *Fisk*.
- Inez Jeppson Ludwig, B.S. Utah, 1928. "The Social Adequacy of Families Residing in Chesterfield: A Study of a Sub-marginal Community." *Utah*.
- Frederick R. McBrien, B.A. Dartmouth, 1939. "The Scapegoat." *Maryland*.
- William Russell McIntyre, B.S. Northwestern, 1939. "Treatment and Role of the Aged in Non-literate Societies." *Northwestern*.
- Carling Isaac Malouf, B.S. Utah, 1939. "A Study of the Gosiute Indians of Utah." *Utah*.
- Fatima Sandimanni Massaquoi, B.A. Lane College, 1938. "Nationalist Movement in West Africa." *Fisk*.
- Stephen Halsey Matteson, B.S. Wisconsin, 1924. "Musical Eminence." *Wisconsin*.
- Robert A. Matzke, B.A. Southern California, 1939. "A Study of Selected Changing Social Attitudes of Boys in the Los Angeles Federation Boys' Home." *Southern California*.
- Wendell D. Mayfield, B.J. Missouri, 1938. "The Illinois Parole System." *Iowa*.

- Robert Mayhew, B.A. Michigan State Normal, 1938. "A History of the Establishment and Growth in Service of the Attendance Department of the Detroit Board of Education." *Wayne University*.
- Frederick Jacob Meine, B.A. Newark, 1935. "The Development of Newspaper Reading and News Listening Habits among High School Students." *New York University*.
- Bessie Arvilla Miller, B.A. Juniata, 1938. "Residential Propinquity and Marriage Selection." *Penn State*.
- Vera Miller, B.A. Chicago, 1938. "A Sociological Study of the Diphtheria Antitoxin: Its Invention, Its Introduction and Diffusion in the United States and the Resistance to Its Adoption." *Chicago*.
- Louis Monferino, Jr., B.A. Stanford, 1927. "An Analysis of the Professional Training and Background of the Social Workers Employed by the State Relief Administration Operating in Los Angeles County." *Stanford*.
- David Graham Moore, B.A. Illinois, 1939. "Development and Philosophy of the Reformatory Idea." *Illinois*.
- J. W. Moore, B.A. A. & M. College of Texas, 1938. "A Social and Economic Study of the Italian Settlement, Steele's Store, Texas." *A. & M. College of Texas*.
- Ellen Smith Mracek, B.S. Colorado State College, 1935. "Community Recreation in the Five Small Cities of Colorado." *Colorado*.
- Lionel Dodge Newsom, B.A. Lincoln University, 1938. "A Study of Social Stratification." *Michigan*.
- Helene Ottenheimer, B.A. Utah, 1937. "Culture Patterns in the Hebrides." *Wisconsin*.
- John S. Page, B.A. Kent State, 1935. "The Drummond Community." *Syracuse*.
- Nannie Beatrice Peterson, B.A. Tougaloo College, 1938. "A Study of the Reading Interests of Children, with Special Reference to the Cedar Street Area of Nashville, Tennessee." *Fisk*.
- May Ellen Phipps, B.S., 1933. "Typical Personality Conflicts Experienced by Women during Their First Year in College." *New Hampshire*.
- Harriet L. Pinch, B.E. Eau Claire State Teachers College, 1936. "Personality Problems of the Adolescent Girl in Our Society." *Wisconsin*.
- Martha Jane Powell, B.A. Monmouth College, 1938. "The Social Structure of the School." *Illinois*.
- H. Hoyt Reagan, B.A. Alma College, 1936. "The Relation of Blindness to the Social and Economic Status of Families in Michigan." *Michigan State College*.
- Phyllis Folk Reamer, B.A. Illinois, 1935. "A Sub-regional Analysis of the Counties of Nine States Comprising the Northwestern Major Region, on the Basis of Selected Socio-economic Factors." *Illinois*.
- Carlton Hinckley Reed, B.A. Colorado, 1939. "A Culture-Area Study of Crime and Delinquency in the Italian Colony of Denver, Colorado." *Colorado*.

- Clyde L. Reed, B.A. Michigan, 1932. "An Exploratory Study of Juvenile and Adult Criminals to Determine the Advisability of Further Research." *Michigan*.
- Mary Elizabeth Reed. "Special Class as a Social Agency in Royal Oak, Michigan." *Michigan*.
- James D. H. Reefer, B.A. Michigan, 1936. "Distance as a Factor in Criminal Operations: Study of Inmates of United States Detention Farm, Milan, Michigan." *Michigan*.
- John Patrick Regan, Jr., B.S. Villanova College, 1930. "A Statistical Survey and Analysis of the Departments of Sociology of All Colleges and Universities in the United States with an Enrollment of One Thousand or More." *Pittsburgh*.
- Arnold Marshall Rose, B.A. Chicago, 1938. "A Study of Rumor." *Chicago*.
- Ella Mary Rosenberg, B.A. Bryn Mawr, 1918. "Refugee Psychology." *Bryn Mawr*.
- Bernard Rosenthal, B.A. Minnesota, 1937. "A Preliminary Standardization of a Community of Interest Scale: As a Measure of Marital Adjustment." *Minnesota*.
- Robert Howard Ross, B.A. University of Redlands, 1934. "Social Distance as It Exists between the First and Second Generation Japanese in the City of Los Angeles and Vicinity." *Southern California*.
- John Robert Russell, B.A. Indiana, 1938. "Differential Association and the Learning of Criminal Behavior." *Indiana*.
- Wayne Satchwell, B.A. Linfield, 1937. "The Status of the Blind in the State of Oregon." *University of Oregon*.
- Phillip Schinhan, B.A. North Carolina, 1940. "A Case of the South in Milk Production: An Introduction to a Proposed Study of the Milkshed of the Piedmont South." *North Carolina*.
- George Ferdinand Schnack, B.A. Stanford, 1939. "Subjective Factors in the Migration of Spanish People from Hawaii to California." *Stanford*.
- Thelma Kendrick Shelby, B.A. Dillard, 1937. "The Levantine Jew: A Survey of Race Relations in the Mohammedan World." *Fisk*.
- Peter Randolph Shy, B.A. Paine College, 1921. "Indian Nationalism in South Africa and Its Relation to Indian Nationalism in India." *Fisk*.
- Helene Siegel, B.S. Northwestern, 1937. "A History of the Detroit House of Correction." *Wayne University*.
- Eleanor Silker, B.S. Minnesota, 1926. "A Study of the Juvenile Delinquents in Four Mesabi Iron Range Towns." *Minnesota*.
- John Eugene Starkweather, B.A. Stanford, 1938. "The Family as an Aspect of Blackfoot Social Organization." *Stanford*.
- Charles Steele, M.A. Ohio State, 1940. "Caste and Class in Southern Rural Areas." *Ohio State*.
- Janet Lucile Stevens, B.A. Michigan, 1939. "An Evaluation of the Reliability of the Carr Delinquency Preventive Rating Form." *Michigan*.

- Donald Dean Stewart, B.A. University of Washington, 1938. "The Civilian Conservation Corps: A Study in Institutional Efficiency." *Washington*.
- Tao Teng, B.A. Great China University, 1935. "The Concept of Social Progress in American Sociology." *Southern California*.
- Wallace Felt Toronto, B.S. Utah, 1936. "Some Socio-psychological Aspects of the Czechoslovakian Crisis of 1938-1939." *Utah*.
- Melvin M. Tumin, B.A. Wisconsin, 1939. "Operationalism, Psychoanalysis, and Field Theory: A Methodological Inquiry." *Wisconsin*.
- Otto D. Unruh, B.A. Kansas, 1928. "Schisms of the Russian Mennonites of Harvey, McPherson and Reno Counties of Kansas." *Kansas*.
- T. P. Wakefield, B.A. A. & M. College of Texas, 1938. "Social Changes Produced by the Discovery of Oil in an Isolated Community." *A. & M. College of Texas*.
- Helen Clare Walker, B.A. DePaul, 1929. "A Study in Group Work To Determine the Effect of Supervised Games upon the Academic Grade Averages of Twenty-six Children." *Northwestern*.
- Patricia M. Wallace, B.A. Hawaii, 1940. "The Role of the Family in the Lives of Some Honolulu Girl Delinquents." *University of Hawaii*.
- Vera Jeanne Wantman, B.A. New York University, 1939. "Low Cost Housing: A Case Study of the Problem in Worcester, Massachusetts." *Clark University*.
- Woodrow W. Wasson, B.A. Vanderbilt, 1939. "Mobility of Adult Offenders in Tennessee." *Vanderbilt*.
- Anne T. West, B.A., M.A. George Washington University, 1937, 1939. "Success or Failure of a Selected Group of Patients Discharged from St. Elizabeth Hospital for the Insane (1926-1936)." *George Washington University*.
- James E. White, B.S. Washington State, 1939. "Social Factors in the Rehabilitation of Farm Security Clients in Union County, Iowa." *Iowa State College*.
- William Wallace Eugene Willey, B.S. Utah, 1938. "The Population Basis of Educational Policy in Utah." *Utah*.
- Lois Marietta Williams, B.A. Reed College, 1916. "The Application of a Specific Group Principle and Techniques to an Administration Problem in the Public Educational System of the Federal District of Brazil." *Northwestern*.
- Ralph L. Williamson, B.S. Iowa State College, 1925; S.T.B. Boston University, 1930. "The Community Church, Its Origin, Structure and Program." *Cornell*.
- Jean Elizabeth Wilson, B.A. Iowa, 1938. "Institutional Demands on the Adolescent." *Iowa*.
- W. S. Wilson, B.A. Tennessee, 1939. "The Scopes Trial: A Study in Social Causation." *Tennessee*.
- George Washington Woody, B.A. Virginia State College, 1938. "The Natural History of a Slum Area and Some of Its Inherent Characteristics." *Fisk*.
- Pek Si Wu, B.A. University of Shanghai, 1937. "Urbanization in China: A Study of Peiping and Shanghai." *Chicago*.

Kennett W. Yeager, B.A. Pittsburgh, 1938. "Development and Analysis of the Pittsburgh Goodwill Industries." *Pittsburgh*.

Trez P. Yeatman, B.A. North Carolina, 1937. "The Youth Group in the South: An Analysis of Population Trends in Relation to the Youth Problem." *North Carolina*.

Raytha Lloyd Yokley, A.B. Kentucky State Industrial College, 1937. "An Analysis of a Negro Community in Bloomington, Indiana." *Indiana*.

George Roderick Youngs, B.A. Calvin College, 1932; Th.B. Calvin Seminary, 1935. "Marital Counseling in the Lansing Community." *Michigan State*.

Elizabeth Zachary, B.A. Salem College, 1923. "A Study of Salem Academy during the Period 1926-1939." *North Carolina*.

STUDENTS' DISSERTATIONS IN SOCIOLOGY

The following list of doctoral dissertations and Masters' theses in preparation in universities and colleges in the United States and Canada is a compilation of the returns from letters sent by the editors of the *Journal* to departments of sociology. The name of the college or university in italics designates the institution where the research is in progress. The list does not include names which have formerly been printed in the *Journal*, except where the research problem has been changed. The number now working for doctoral degrees is 101, and the number working for Master's degrees is 191.

DOCTORAL DISSERTATIONS

- John Baker, B.S. Tennessee, 1938; M.A. Tennessee, 1940. "American Courtship, Marriage, Divorce, 1915-1940." *Wisconsin*.
- Zetta Bankert, B.S., M.S. South Dakota State, 1928, 1937. "School and Community Relations: High School Social Studies in Wisconsin." *Wisconsin*.
- Edward Jackson Baur, B.A., M.A. Chicago, 1935, 1938. "The Advertising Industry in America: A Study of Voluntary Control." *Chicago*.
- Park Beck. "The Social Composition and Social Ideas of Boards of Trustees of American Universities." *Columbia*.
- Therel R. Black, B.S. Brigham Young, 1939; M.A. Louisiana State, 1940. "Trends in Town-Country Relations." *Wisconsin*.
- Alfred Blyton, M.A. Ohio State. "The Uses of Speech in a Democracy." *Ohio State*.
- Melvin Brooks, B.A. Washington State, 1935; M.S. Iowa State, 1937. "Trends, in Marriage and Birth Rates by Occupational Classification in Wisconsin, 1923-1935." *Wisconsin*.
- Henry A. Bullock, B.A. Union University; M.A. Michigan. "Relationship between the Ecological Organization and Social Organization in the Area of Hampstead, Texas." *Michigan*.
- Louis Bultena, B.A. Dubuque, 1929. "Capitalism, Nationalism and the Puritan Revolution." *Wisconsin*.
- David Edison Bunting, M.A. Texas, 1933. "The Work of the American Civil Liberties Union in Defense of Freedom of Teaching and Learning." *Columbia*.
- James Patrick Burns, B.A., M.A. Tennessee, 1938, 1939. "Vocational Rehabilitation in Upper East Tennessee." *Vanderbilt*.
- Donald Calhoun, B.A. Erskine College, 1937; M.A. Furman University, 1938. "History of Family." *North Carolina*.

- Mabel Carroll, M.A. Cornell, 1940. "The Uses of Organizational Membership for the Measurement of Social Status." *Cornell*.
- Marion Cathbert, M.A. Columbia, 1931. "Education and Racial Marginality." *Columbia*.
- Marshall B. Clinard, B.A., M.A. Stanford, 1932, 1934. "Crime and the Process of Urbanization: A Study of Culture Conflict." *Chicago*.
- Howard Cottam, B.A. Brigham Young, 1932; Ph.M. Wisconsin, 1938. "Level of Living, Social Participation, and Social Adjustment: A Study of the Standards of Living of 299 Ohio Farm Families." *Wisconsin*.
- Ethelyn Davis, B.A., M.A. Southern Methodist, 1935, 1936. "The American Colony in Mexico City." *Missouri*.
- Richard Dewey, B.A. Wooster, 1936; M.A. Oberlin, 1939. "Sociological Processes Operating between Majority and Minority Groups in the United States." *Wisconsin*.
- William Fries Doering, B.A. Washington College, 1938; M.A. Vanderbilt, 1939. "Selective Factors in Migration." *Vanderbilt*.
- Russell W. Dorn, B.S. Clemson College, 1938; M.A. Louisiana State, 1939. "Territorial Organization." *North Carolina*.
- H. Warren Dunham, Ph.B., M.A. Chicago, 1929, 1935. "The Interrelationship of Criminal Behavior and the Schizophrenic Psychosis." *Chicago*.
- Stephen Epler, B.A. Cotner College, 1932; M.A. Nebraska, 1933. "Persons Honored by Certain Higher Institutions of Learning in the United States at Different Periods." *Columbia*.
- Lois Fahs, M.A. Columbia, 1936. "The Folk Dances as a Reflection of Rural Cultures." *Columbia*.
- James Ernest Fleming, B.A. Mercer University, 1935; M.A. Georgia, 1938. "Development of Sociology in the United States." *North Carolina*.
- William H. Form, B.A., M.A. Rochester, 1938, 1940. "A Study of the Therapeutic and Tension Release Mechanisms of Preliterate Peoples." *Maryland*.
- Edith J. Freeman, M.S. Cornell, 1939. "Social Class Differences in Parent Child Relations." *Cornell*.
- William Fuson, B.A., M.A. Kansas, 1936, 1938. "A Sociological Analysis of the Incidence of Mental Disorders in Kansas." *Wisconsin*.
- Joseph H. Gaiser, B.A. Whitman College, 1921; M.A. Wisconsin, 1924. "The Basque Settlement of Jordan Valley, Oregon." *Southern California*.
- John B. Griffing, B.A. Drake University, 1904; M.A. Columbia University, 1913. "Culture Factors Affecting Population Growth." *Southern California*.
- S. Earl Grigsby, B.S., M.A. Louisiana State, 1935, 1937. "A Socio-economic Study of Families Living on Marginal Land." *Cornell*.
- Louis Guttman, B.A., M.A. Minnesota, 1936, 1940. "The Prediction of Quantitative Social Variates by Factor Analysis." *Minnesota*.
- Dawson Hales, M.S. Utah State College, 1938. "Reconsideration of the Principle of Local Control in Education in Relation to Certain Basic Forces, Relationships and Trends in American Life and Culture." *Columbia*.

- Howard Harper Harlan, B.A. Richmond, 1933; M.A. Virginia, 1934. "Social Behavior in the First Two Years." *Virginia*.
- Harry C. Harmsworth, B.A. Colorado State, 1928; M.A. Southern California, 1932. "Attitudes of Mexicans in Southern California toward Prevalent Family Culture Patterns." *Southern California*.
- Amcs H. Hawley, B.A. Cincinnati, 1936. "The Study of Population Distribution with Special Emphasis on the Metropolitan Community." *Michigan*.
- Donald E. V. Henderson, B.A., M.A. Rice Institute, 1925, 1929. "A Factor Analysis of the Attitudes of Southern White College Students toward the Negro." *Chicago*.
- Howard H. Higman, B.A. Colorado, 1937. "Cultural Effects of War." *Colorado*.
- Ruth M. Hill, B.A. Miami, 1936. "A Study of Motivation in a Closed Social Group." *Wisconsin*.
- Elbert L. Hooker, B.A., M.A. Southern Methodist, 1936, 1937. "Measurement of the Social Participation of Urban Residents." *Washington University*.
- Abe J. Jaffe, B.A., M.A. Chicago, 1925, 1938. "Urbanization and the Birth Rate." *Chicago*.
- Sigurd Johansen, B.A., M.A. Minnesota, 1932, 1934. "Rural Social Organization in a Spanish-American Culture Area." *Wisconsin*.
- Robert W. Janes, B.A., M.A. Chicago, 1938, 1939. "Shawneetown: A Study of the Collective Action of a Community." *Illinois*.
- Clifton R. Jones, B.A. Union University, 1935; M.A. Iowa, 1939. "Factors Determining Negro Leadership." *Iowa*.
- Harold F. Kaufman, M.A. Missouri, 1939. "Social Psychological Analysis of a Small Community." *Cornell*.
- Forrest D. Kellog, B.A. Simpson, 1932. "The Role of the Protestant Minister." *Missouri*.
- Ferton Keyes, B.A. Yale, 1937. "Indices of Urbanization." *Yale*.
- William L. Kolb, B.A. Miami, 1938; M.A. Wisconsin, 1939. "A Study of the Sociology of Revolution as Based on the Life Histories of Revolutionary Leaders." *Wisconsin*.
- Jay Henry Korson, B.S. Villanova, 1931. "The Social and Economic Readjustments of Technologically Unemployed Cigar Makers in New Haven." *Yale*.
- Werner S. Landecker, J.D. University of Berlin, 1936. "Research in Social Organization and Social Planning." *Michigan*.
- Myron Lewis, B.A. Quincy College, 1935; M.A. Mercer University, 1936. "Metropolitan Regionalism." *North Carolina*.
- Arthur G. Lindsay, B.S. Washington University, 1939. "The Measurement of Social-Economic Status in Rural Communities of New York State." *Cornell*.
- Virgil A. Long, B.A. Kentucky Wesleyan, 1928; M.A. Emory, 1933. "A Sociological Study of the Board of Control in Wisconsin." *Wisconsin*.
- Gordon Lovejoy, B.A., M.A. Florida, 1935, 1938. "Paths to Maturity—a Youth Study." *North Carolina*.
- Merston M. McCluggage, B.A. College of Emporia, 1928; M.A. Kansas, 1931.

- "Motivating Forces in the Collectivization of Leisure-Time Activities in the United States." *Kansas*.
- Boyd E. Macrory, B.A. Asbury, 1931; M.A. Kentucky, 1935. "The Relationship of National Crises to Poor Relief Policies." *Wisconsin*.
- Nathan K. Mendelsohn, B.A. College of City of New York, 1935; M.A. Columbia, 1937. "The Influence of Tenure Status on Democratic Planning in Agriculture." *Columbia*.
- Barrington Moore, B.A. Williams, 1936. "Social Stratification." *Yale*.
- William M. Moore, B.A., M.A. Kansas, 1926, 1930. "A Sociological Study of the Development in the Use of Pictures in the Public Press of the United States." *Wisconsin*.
- Rashey B. Moten, B.A., M.A. Kansas, 1936, 1938. "Formal Organizations for the Integration of Negroes in the United States." *Kansas*.
- Bernard G. Mulvaney, B.A. St. Viator College, 1929; M.A. Catholic University, 1934. "The Correlational Analysis of the Relationship between the Catholic Composition of a Population and Its Birth Rates." *Illinois*.
- Richard R. Myers, B.A. Missouri, 1933. "The Building Worker in Detroit, Michigan." *Michigan*.
- Rasmus K. Nelson, B.S., M.S. Utah Agricultural College, 1933, 1934. "Sociological Factors in Land Utilization and Soil Conservation." *Missouri*.
- Evlon J. Niederfrank, B.S., M.S. Oregon State, 1932, 1935. "The Population of Maine with Particular Reference to Aroostook County." *Wisconsin*.
- Joseph E. Nuquist, B.A., M.A. Nebraska, 1935, 1936. "The Country Bank: A Sociological Analysis." *Wisconsin*.
- Mary Bess Owen, B.A., M.A. Indiana University, 1937, 1938. "The Social Psychology of Typical Psychoses." *Indiana*.
- Frederick B. Parker, B.A. Cornell, 1933; M.A. North Carolina, 1935. "History of Ethnic Groups in the South." *North Carolina*.
- Walter Perkins, B.A. Rollins, 1933. "Age and Sex Distribution with Special Relation to Rural-Urban Migration." *Wisconsin*.
- Floyd A. Pollock, B.A. Missouri Wesleyan, 1927; M.A. State Agricultural College of Colorado, 1932. "Federal-Navajo Relations as a Social-Cultural Problem." *Southern California*.
- Granville Price, B.A. Texas, 1926. "The Newspaper Institution in Relationship to Community Environment: Case Studies of Selected Newspapers." *Minnesota*.
- Elizabeth Rapp, B.A., M.A. Bryn Mawr, 1925, 1938. "The History of Welfare Work with Colored Children in the Philadelphia Area: A Study of Changing Concepts." *Bryn Mawr*.
- William W. Reeder, B.S., M.S. Utah State College, 1935, 1938. "Informal Social Participation of Farm Families in Otsego County, New York." *Cornell*.
- Edward Louis Rose, B.A., M.A. California, 1931, 1935. "Social Characteristics of United States Senators." *Stanford*.

- David Rosenbaum, B.A. Michigan, 1937. "The Sociology of Utopias." *Wayne University*.
- Leopoldo T. Ruiz, B.A. California, 1920; M.A. Columbia, 1924. "Socialization of the Filipinos as Affected by the Language Problem." *Southern California*.
- Julia Saparoff, B.A. Radcliffe, 1936; M.A. Wisconsin, 1938. "Antagonistic Cooperation as Exemplified by the Life-History of a Labor Union." *Yale*.
- Edward Sayler, B.A. York College, 1920. "The Techniques of Social Control in Race Relations." *Ohio State*.
- Robert Schmid, B.A. Ohio State, 1937. "Youth Movements in Germany: Prolegomena to a Theory of Social Movement." *Wisconsin*.
- Harry Bird Sell, B.A. Pittsburgh, 1920; M.A. Chicago, 1922. "The Propaganda of the U.S. Brewers' Association against Prohibition, 1862-1908: A Study in Collective Behavior." *Chicago*.
- Alfred Luverne Severson, B.A., B.D. Drake, 1929, 1930; M.A. Chicago, 1934. "Variations in Character of Race Prejudice, with Particular Reference to Anti-Semitism." *Chicago*.
- Rex A. Skidmore, B.A., M.A. Utah, 1938, 1939. "Mormon Recreation in Theory and Practice—a Study of Social Change." *Pennsylvania*.
- Margaret Gerrard Smith, B.A. British Columbia, 1937; M.A. Washington State, 1939. "Causative Factors in Juvenile Delinquency." *Wisconsin*.
- Rockwell C. Smith, B.A. DePauw, 1928; S.T.B. Boston College, 1931. "The Influence of Church Affiliation upon the Social Homogeneity of Selected Nationality Groups." *Wisconsin*.
- Edward Crawford Solomon, B.S. Georgia Tech, 1933; M.A. Peabody, 1940. "A Quantitative Situational Analysis of Subjective Factors in Rural to Urban Teacher Migration." *Vanderbilt*.
- Christopher Sower, M.A. Ohio State, 1932. "Sociological Approach to a Rural Youth Program." *Ohio State*.
- David G. Steinicke, B.A., M.A. Southern Methodist, 1937, 1938. "A Socio-economic Analysis of the Population Characteristics of the Madison Community." *Wisconsin*.
- Esther Boorman Strong, B.A. Vassar, 1922; M.A. Yale, 1940. "Wardship as a Social Instrumentality in Acculturation, with Special Reference to Indian Administration." *Yale*.
- Aaron Teitelbaum, Ph.B. Wisconsin, 1938. "The Accuracy of Divorce Statistics in Wisconsin." *Wisconsin*.
- Ina Telberg, B.A. Wittenberg; M.A. Western Reserve. "Cultural Changes in Soviet Russia." *Ohio State*.
- John W. Teter, B.A., M.A. Wisconsin, 1932, 1935. "An Ecological Study of Delinquency in Milwaukee." *Wisconsin*.
- Dorothy Hope Tisdale, B.A. Barnard College, 1925; M.A. New York, 1935. "Urbanism." *North Carolina*.
- Ellis J. Voss, B.S., M.A. Pennsylvania, 1925, 1927; LL.B. Temple, 1936. "Ocean City—a Satellite Community." *Pennsylvania*.

- Richard R. Wakefield, B.A., M.A. Washington State, 1936, 1937. "The Adjustment Processes of Clients on an Irrigated Resettlement Project." *Wisconsin*.
- Marguerite L. Walker, B.A. Mundelein College, 1934; M.A. Loyola University, 1935. "Problems of Social Adjustment in Selected Cases of Mental Disorder." *Southern California*.
- S. Kirson Weinberg, B.A., M.A. Chicago, 1943, 1935. "Forbidden Aspects of Family Relationships." *Chicago*.
- Vincent Heath Whitney, B.A., M.A. North Carolina, 1936, 1937. "The Village Society." *North Carolina*.
- Eugenia Renelin Whitridge, B.A., M.A. Cincinnati, 1918, 1923. "Chicago as an Art Center." *Chicago*.
- Melvin John Williams, B.A., B.D. Duke, 1936, 1939. "A Survey of Roman Catholic Sociological Theory in the United States since 1900." *Duke*.
- Robert F. Winch, B.A. Western Reserve, 1935; M.A. Chicago, 1939. "Social and Personality Characteristics in Courtship." *Chicago*.
- J. Milton Yinger, B.A. DePauw, 1937; M.A. Louisiana State, 1939. "Studies in the Sociology of Religion." *Wisconsin*.
- Louise Young, B.A. Vanderbilt, 1912; M.A. Wisconsin, 1915. "The Negro Woman in the South." *North Carolina*.
- José Zapata, M.A. Columbia, 1932. "Porto Rican Sugar Communities." *Columbia*.

MASTERS' THESES

- Stuart Adams, B.A. Ohio State. "The Decline of Sociological Positivism." *Ohio State*.
- Rena V. Albright, B.A. Southern California. "Social Adjustment Problems of the Married Girls under Eighteen at Metropolitan Continuation School." *Southern California*.
- John W. Alexander, B.A. Columbia, 1939. "Political Institutions in the Folk Society." *North Carolina*.
- Charles Hoyt Anderson, B.S. Utah, 1940. "The Use of the Elective Franchise in Salt Lake City." *Utah*.
- Henry Arendt, B.A. Illinois, 1940. "Some Aspects of the Work of Ormsby Village." *Illinois*.
- Thelma A. Arnn, B.A. George Washington University, 1938. "Social Background of a Group of Women Convicted of Homicide." *George Washington University*.
- Dorothy Louise Arnold, B.A. Smith, 1940. "The Relationship of the Socio-economic Background of Women Students of Indiana University to Their Achievement in the University." *Indiana*.
- Harry Milton Ashmun, B.A. Utah, 1940. "A Study of Social Breakdown in Salt Lake City." *Utah*.
- Eleanor L. Bailenson, B.A. Bryn Mawr, 1939. "Attitudes and Activities of One Trade Union Regarding Social Legislation, 1930-40." *Bryn Mawr*.

- Robert Freed Bales, B.S. University of Oregon, 1938. "The Concept 'Situation' as a Sociological Tool." *University of Oregon*.
- Clarence L. Barber, B.A. University of Saskatchewan, 1939. "Conditions of Demand and Supply for Housing in Worcester, 1920-1940." *Clark*.
- Martin Carl Bauman. "The Integrating and Disintegrating Factors in a Socio-religious Community, Lindsay, Nebraska." *Nebraska*.
- Ivan C. Belknap, B.A. Texas, 1940. "A Theoretical Schema of Social Disorganization." *Texas*.
- Haney H. Bell, B.A. Randolph-Macon College, 1939. "Classes among the Negroes in Durham, North Carolina." *North Carolina*.
- Fred Wimmer Bennion, B.A. Colorado State College of Education, 1940. "A Cultural Analysis of the Status of the White Collar WPA Worker." *Colorado*.
- Paul Layard Berkman, B.A. Winona State Teachers College, 1934. "The Chicago Teacher's Union, Local No. 1: The Unionization of a Profession." *Chicago*.
- Ray Birdwhistell, B.A. Miami, 1940. "An Anthropological Appraisal of Incest." *Ohio State*.
- Saul Blackman, B.S.S. College of City of New York, 1938. "Agricultural Mechanization of the United States." *North Carolina*.
- Paul E. Booz, B.A. McPherson College, 1936. "The Differential Decline in Auto Thefts." *Chicago*.
- Albert A. Branca, B.A. North Carolina, 1940. "Case Studies in Criminology." *North Carolina*.
- Frieda Brim, B.A. Chicago, 1937. "The Relation of Personality Traits in Men and Women to Their Adjustment in Engagement." *Chicago*.
- Alice Jarman Browder, B.A. Mary Baldwin, 1940. "Levels of Living Indices of Rural Sub-regions of Texas." *Texas*.
- Robert Kenneth Browell, B.A. Chapman College, 1937. "Social Implications of the Defense Program in Three Los Angeles County Areas." *Claremont College*.
- Claud Darwin Budd, B.S. Ohio State, 1940. "Cultural Analysis of Secret Societies." *Ohio State*.
- John A. Buggs, B.A. Dillard, 1939. "Racial Legislation in Tennessee: A Contribution to the Natural History of Laws Regarding Race and Social Status." *Fisk*.
- Betty Byrd, B.S. Michigan State Normal, 1934. "Negro Primary School Student Adjustment in Various Negro Social Classes, Detroit, Michigan." *Wayne University*.
- Henry Calvert, B.A. South Carolina, 1937. "A Population Study of Durham, North Carolina." *Duke*.
- Alexander Cann, B.A. Dillard, 1939. "A Study of the Tenant Farmers in Pulas-ki County, Arkansas." *Fisk*.

- Theodore Caplow, B.A. Chicago, 1939. "Rural Cultural Isolation: The Growth and Disintegration of Cultural Islands in the United States." *Minnesota*.
- Louis Anderson Carroll, B.A. Fisk, 1939. "Effect of the Depression on Unionization of Negro Workers." *New York University*.
- D. C. Chavis, B.A. Fisk, 1932. "The Underworld of Nashville: Its Character and Function." *Fisk*.
- Edwin Christ, B.A. Missouri, 1940. "Social Adjustment of the Physically Handicapped." *Missouri*.
- Albert Kircidel Cohen, B.A. Harvard, 1939. "Social Class and the Differential Implementation of the Criminal Law." *Indiana*.
- Elizabeth Rose Cole, B.A. Kentucky, 1939. "Trends in Treatment of the Insane in Kentucky." *Kentucky*.
- Melville Corbett, B.A. North Carolina, 1940. "Southern Levels of Life." *North Carolina*.
- Clara B. Cowan, B.S. Teachers College, 1925. "The Acculturation of the Cherokee Indians." *Missouri*.
- Gwendolyn Crass, B.A. Southern Methodist, 1934. "The Laboratory Technician." *Southern Methodist*.
- James E. Crimi, B.A. Aurora College, 1938. "Social Status of the Negro in Pasadena, California." *Southern California*.
- Paul Thomas Cundy, B.A. Central Y.M.C.A., 1937. "A Comparative Study of Selected Factors Relating to the Operation of the Program of the Boy Scouts in Certain Areas of High, Medium and Low Delinquency Rates in Chicago." *Chicago*.
- Joseph T. D'Amico, B.A. Syracuse, 1939. "A Study of Acculturation in a Muck-Farming Italo-American Community." *Syracuse*.
- Jerry Daniel, B.A. Antioch, 1936. "Relationship of Birth-Control Clinics to Birth-Rate." *North Carolina*.
- Richard Gray Davis, B.A. Penn State, 1939. "Conformity with Legal Norms in American Culture." *Penn State*.
- Owen R. Davison, B.A. DePauw, 1937. "An Analysis of the Fulfillment of Housing Objectives in a Specific Project at Cincinnati." *Cincinnati*.
- Mrs. Emily Dooley, B.A. Hunter, 1930. "A Critical Analysis of American Marriage Laws." *Tennessee*.
- Earl W. Douglas, Th.B., Ph.B. Gordon College of Theology, 1936. "The Case Work Method as Applied to Pastoral Counselling." *New Hampshire*.
- J. David A. Elmaleh, B.A. Pennsylvania, 1940. "Some Problems Dealing with Status Determination on the Campus of the University of Wisconsin." *Wisconsin*.
- Jean Elvins, B.B.A. Texas, 1937. "Social Stratification of Radio Audiences in Texas." *Texas*.
- Earl Endacott, B.A. Kansas, 1923. "Sociological Analysis of Friendship Relations of High School Seniors." *Kansas*.

- Shirley R. English, B.A. Texas, 1938. "Theories of the Universal State." *Texas*.
- Gerald A. Estep, B.A. Occidental, 1938. "Social Placement of the Port in Hawaii." *Southern California*.
- Harriet Alberta Estes, B.A. Kentucky, 1939. "Social Analysis of Funeral Expenses." *Kentucky*.
- Mae Estfan, B.A. Women's College, North Carolina, 1940. "Conflict between Second-Generation Children and Immigrant Parents." *Chicago*.
- Lauriel Eubank, B.A. Cincinnati, 1939. "Recreation as a Medium of Assimilation in Hawaii." *University of Hawaii*.
- David B. Fales, B.S. Idaho, 1926. "Participation of Cortland County Youth in 4-H Clubs." *Cornell*.
- Max Feder, B.S. in C.E. Minnesota, 1922. "An Evaluation of the Contemporary Jewish Immigration to the United States (1880-1940)." *New York University*.
- Merle E. Fish, Jr., B.A. Chapman College, 1940. "Social and Community Values of the Christian Youth Fellowship of the Wilshire Boulevard Christian Church of Los Angeles." *Southern California*.
- Arnold Leonard Fishman. "A Study of Status-Assignment in a Factory Situation." *Chicago*.
- Nelson N. Foote, B.S. Cornell, 1940. "A Study of Families Residing in Land Utilization Purchase Areas in Central New York State." *Cornell*.
- Jack Jay Fox, B.A. Colorado, 1939. "A Sociological Study of a Community of Beet Workers." *Colorado*.
- Sherwood Dean Fox, B.A. Harvard, 1939. "Charisma, Anomie, and Social Structure." *Illinois*.
- Gerald Fugate, B.Ed. Southern Illinois Normal University, 1940. "The Changing Functions of a Teacher's College: Southern Illinois Normal University." *Chicago*.
- Harold Garfinkel, B.A. University of Newark, 1939. "Negro Crime." *North Carolina*.
- Howard L. Gee, B.S. Utah, 1929. "A Statistical Analysis of Juvenile Delinquency in Utah." *Utah*.
- Robert L. Gilkes, B.A. Western Reserve, 1939. "The Organization of the Police Department of Cleveland, Ohio." *Western Reserve*.
- Daniel Glaser, B.A. Chicago, 1939. "The Social Psychology of Drunkenness." *Chicago*.
- Harold William Glenn, B.A. Vanderbilt, 1940. "The Nashville Metropolitan Region as Defined by Newspaper Circulations." *Vanderbilt*.
- Ruth Gallagher Goodenough, B.S. Cornell, 1939. "Recent Developments in Social Psychologic Theory." *Cornell*.
- Norvelle Winston Goodwin, B.A. William and Mary, 1931. "Miscegenation in Virginia." *Duke*.

- Fred Gordon, B.A. Southern California, 1936. "Study of the Old Age Dependency as It Is Affected by the Functioning of the Social Security Act." *Southern California*.
- Edward Earl Gotherman, Jr., B.A. Transylvania, 1940. "Recent Trends in the Control of the Liquor Traffic in the State of Kentucky." *Kentucky*.
- Ernest Clement Grady, B.A. Iowa, 1938. "Case Studies of Twelve Delinquent Negro Boys." *Iowa*.
- Cecilia Greene, B.A. Wayne University, 1938. "Eighty Years of Public Relief in Detroit, 1800-1880." *Wayne University*.
- Roy Gwaltney, B.A. Wichita University, 1935. "Social Adjustment Problems of Boys in California Junior Republic." *Southern California*.
- William H. Hale, B.A. Agricultural and Normal College, 1940. "The Development of Negro Insurance Societies." *Wisconsin*.
- Ella Hall, B.A. Kansas, 1938. "The Historical Development of the Y.W.C.A. as a Social Institution." *Kansas*.
- John Hall, B.S. New Hampshire, 1939. "Some Consequences of the Decline of the Shoe Industry in Lynn, Massachusetts." *New Hampshire*.
- Fayga Halpern, B.A. Washington University, 1940. "The Social Participation of a Selected Sample of Middle Class St. Louis Families." *Washington University*.
- Ruth L. Harris, B.A. Kansas, 1937. "The Woman White Collar Worker." *North Carolina*.
- Aubrey B. Harter, B.A. University of California at Los Angeles, 1937. "Contributions of the Literature on Psychoanalysis to Sociological Study." *Southern California*.
- Stella E. Hartman, B.S. in S.W. Carnegie Institute, 1927. "Study of Leisure Time Activities and Desires of Young Adults of Los Angeles." *Southern California*.
- William Henderson, B.A. Penn State, 1939. "Mobility of a Minority Group." *New York University*.
- Frank F. Higham, B.S.E. Bowling Green, 1940. "The Relation of Agriculture—Actual and Potential—to Manufacturing in the Sub-region." *North Carolina*.
- Walter P. Hollmann, B.S. St. Lawrence, 1939. "Proletarian Courtship and the Social Club." *Columbia*.
- Thomas H. Houck, B.A. Wofford College, 1934. "A Newspaper History of Race Relations in Durham, North Carolina." *Duke*.
- Vernon L. Hoyt, B.A. New York University, 1939. "The Influence of Migration upon the Function of the Family as an Agency of Social Control in the Case of the British West Indies." *New York University*.
- Jack T. Huber, B.A. Texas, 1940. "Some Selected Sociological Theories of Human Motivation." *Texas*.
- Edna E. Hudler, Ph.B. Chicago, 1916. "The Russian Revolution as an Outgrowth of the Conflict between State and Mir." *Washington University*.

- Lawrence R. Hugo, Jr., B.A. Pittsburgh, 1941. "Inductive Sociology: Analysis of Giddings' Principles with Present-Day Methods." *Pittsburgh*.
- Beatrice M. Huntington, B.A. Syracuse, 1939. "The Fair Labor Standards Act: Its Effect on the Wages of Women and Children." *Syracuse*.
- Louis S. Hurwitz, B.A. Clark 1940. "Old Age Pensions in Massachusetts." *Clark*.
- Jon Reckard Huston, B.A. Ohio Northern, 1938. "Social Criticism in the Novel." *Pittsburgh*.
- Lawrence E. Hutzell, B.A. Penn State College, 1939. "Leisure Time Activities of High School Students in an Iowa Village." *Iowa*.
- John Ivey, B.A. Auburn, 1940. "Farm Labor in the Southeast." *North Carolina*.
- Harold Jacobstein, B.A. Wayne University, 1940. "The Sociological Theories of Clarence Darrow." *Wayne University*.
- Paul Jans, B.A. Elmhurst College, 1938. "Union Organization and the Unemployment of Youth." *Wayne University*.
- G. Sarantakis Jasilik, B.A. Chicago, 1939. "Marriage Attitudes of Second Generation Greek Youth." *Chicago*.
- Lawrence C. Johnson, B.A. Iowa, 1939. "Effects of Urbanization on Types of Social Participation in an Iowa Village." *Iowa*.
- St. Elmo Johnson, B.A. Southern University, 1937. "Reflections of Race Consciousness as Expressed in Negro Poetry." *Fisk*.
- Saul M. Katz, B.S. Cornell, 1940. "Social Psychological Characteristics Resultant from Membership in a Minority Group." *Cornell*.
- John C. Kedneigh, B.A. Utah, 1939. "Some Aspects of the Merit System for Public Welfare Employees in Utah." *Utah*.
- Leonard Kent, B.S. Kent State, 1939. "Population Changes Resulting from Akron's First Public Housing Development." *Kent State*.
- Theresa Kerr, B.A. Penn State, 1935. "Sociological Aspects of Illegitimacy in Hawaii." *University of Hawaii*.
- Yukiko Kimura, B.A. Oberlin, 1934. "Some Phases in the Assimilative Process of Hawaiian-Born Japanese." *University of Hawaii*.
- Marguerite Kingman, B.A. Kansas, 1939. "The Sociological and Psychological Aspects of Behavior Problems of a Selected Group of Boys in a Neighborhood Adjacent to Westside Community House." *Kansas*.
- Pauline D. Knobbs, B.S. Northeast Missouri Teachers College, 1924. "A Study of Status Attitudes of Negro Groups in the United States." *Minnesota*.
- Lucille Kohler, B.A., B.J. Missouri, 1923, 1930. "Trend toward Separatism in the Education of the Negro in Kansas." *Missouri*.
- Tojiko Kubo. "Workmen's Compensation Legislation in Japan." *Columbia*.
- Carl J. Kujawski, B.A. University of Rochester, 1939. "Problems in the Inner Structure and Communal Role of a Settlement House." *Columbia*.
- Milton Lawson, B.A. Butler College, 1938. "Trends in Front Page News in Selected Negro Newspapers." *Fisk*.

- George Leopold Lewis, B.A. University of Redlands, 1936. "Juvenile Delinquency in Pomona, California." *Claremont College*.
- Eula Waldram Likes, B.S. Brigham Young, 1927. "The Married Student at the University of Utah." *Utah*.
- Mary Longley, Ph.B. Brown, 1919. "Training of Volunteer Leaders." *Bryn Mawr*.
- James M. McClain, B.A. Akron, 1940. "The Social Role of Folk Speech." *Western Reserve*.
- Roderick Dhu McCrimmon, B.S. Utah, 1940. "A Sociological Study of Unemployed Youth in Salt Lake City." *Utah*.
- Muriel G. McCrory, B.A. Southern California, 1921. "Sociological Evaluation of the Recreational Program of the Churches of the Wilshire District in Los Angeles." *Southern California*.
- Thomas P. Malone, B.A. Duke, 1940. "Theoretical Aspects of Differences in Religious Mores among Certain Preliterate Peoples." *Maryland*.
- Simon Marcson, B.A. Chicago, 1936. "The Role of Voluntary Segregated Education among a Minority Group." *Chicago*.
- Dorothy Marcuse, B.A. Queen's, 1940. "Children's Art." *Cornell*.
- Antonio Marino, B.A. Tufts, 1938. "The Social Patterning of Intra-family and Inter-family Relationships: A Study of Twenty-four Neighboring Italian Families in a New York City Block." *Columbia*.
- Thomas R. Marshall, B.A. Pomona, 1929. "Recreational Problems of Six Hundred Junior and Senior High School Pupils in Torrence, California." *Southern California*.
- Mahum Z. Medalia, B.A. Harvard, 1940. "Sociological Factors in the Use and Abuse of Agricultural Resources." *Missouri*.
- Ina Ruth Melenek, B.A. American International College, 1939. "Delinquency Areas in Durham." *Duke*.
- Olive Melinkoff, B.A. McGill, 1939. "Social and Group Plans for Wider Distribution of Medical Care in Los Angeles County." *Southern California*.
- Jacob Meyerowitz, B.A. New York University, 1938. "The National Labor Relations Act: The Campaign of the American Federation of Labor for Its Enactment." *New York University*.
- Ernest I. Miller, B.A. Elmhurst, 1931. "A Study of Land Settlements in Tennessee." *Tennessee*.
- James E. Montgomery, B.A. Maryville College, 1940. "A Comparison of Cumberland Homesteads with Rugby, a Utopian Settlement of the Cumberland Region in 1880." *Vanderbilt*.
- Geneva Moore, B.A. Bethel College, 1927. "The Negro Illegitimate Mother in Detroit." *Wayne University*.
- Herbert Hellenmeyer Moore, Jr., B.A. Transylvania, 1939. "Contrast of Health Conditions in Rural and Urban Areas in Kentucky." *Kentucky*.
- Helen Morean, B.S. Kent State, 1939. "A Study of Race Attitudes in Children's Literature." *Kent State*.

- Ruth Geist Moss, B.A. Cincinnati, 1938. "The Syrian Community in Cincinnati: A Sociological Analysis." *Cincinnati*.
- Carl Napier, B.A. Concordia Seminary, 1921. "The Childless Divorcee and Public Opinion in Regard to Her." *Southern Methodist*.
- Lois J. Neiser, B.A. Milligan College, 1937; B.S. Peabody College, 1938. "Library Use and Undergraduate Activities and Performance." *Vanderbilt*.
- Mary Suella Newby, B.A. Omaha, 1940. "Crime Regions of the United States." *Nebraska*.
- Billyanna Niland, B.A. Southern California. "Social Values in Vocational Guidance as Found in Los Angeles Senior High Schools." *Southern California*.
- Irene Oppenheimer, B.A. Radcliffe, 1939. "The Organisations of the Unemployed, 1930-1940." *Columbia*.
- Carl Ortmeier, B.A. Iowa, 1939. "Social Characteristics of Low Income Farm Families." *Iowa State*.
- Marion C. Owens, B.A. Wilson College, 1939. "The Process of Getting To Know People." *Columbia*.
- Richard Parker, B.A. Lincoln University, 1940. "Boycott as Recently Used in Selected Instances by Negroes as a Means of Securing Employment." *Southern California*.
- Alfred P. Parsell, B.A. Syracuse, 1938. "Population in Relation to Geographic Habitat of the Pomo Indians, Ukiah, California." *Syracuse*.
- Lillian Patterson, B.A. Washington, 1940. "Treatment of the Petty Offender in Representative Jails." *Washington*.
- Roger S. Pepper, B.A. Hillside College, 1939. "Pressure Groups among 'Small Business Men.'" *Columbia*.
- Evelyn Perry, B.A. Cornell College, 1939. "The Relationship of Certain Background Factors to the Personality Adjustment of Children in the Michigan School for the Deaf." *Michigan State*.
- Ralph James Preminger, B.A. Stanford, 1940. "Relationship between the Workingman's Party in California and the Chinese Question." *Stanford*.
- Daniel O. Price, B.S. Florida Southern College, 1939. "Statistical Study of Employment Indirectly Due to Industry." *North Carolina*.
- Ethelyn Ratcliff, B.A. Virginia Union, 1939. "The Social Factors Involved in Negro Infant Mortality Rates in Nashville, Tennessee, 1935-1939." *Fisk*.
- Earl H. Regnier, B.S. Kansas State College, 1932. "Social Participation of Farm Bureau or Non-farm Bureau Families in Formal Organization." *Cornell*.
- Erna Reich, Ph.D. University of Vienna, 1927. "Social Diagnosis." *Bryn Mawr*.
- Alice Reid, B.A. Virginia Union, 1939. "A Study of Transition: Gees Bend." *Fisk*.
- Mabel Reid, B.A. Vassar, 1927. "The Contribution of the National Health Survey in the Field of Morbidity Statistics." *Columbia*.

- John D. Rice, B.A. North Carolina, 1940. "The Negro Tobacco Worker and His Union in Durham, North Carolina." *North Carolina*.
- Henry W. Riecken, Jr., B.A. Harvard, 1939. "Social Effects of a Summer Shore Colony on a Rural Connecticut Town." *Connecticut*.
- Louise F. Robertson, B.A. Florida State College, 1935. "Selective Aspects of Negro Migration." *Missouri*.
- Aileen Ross, B.Sc. University of London, 1939. "The French and English Social Elites of Montreal: A Comparison of 'La Ligue de la jeunesse' with the 'Junior League.'" *Chicago*.
- Robert Sampson, B.A. Wisconsin, 1934. "Personnel Administration in Wisconsin Public Welfare, 1937." *Wisconsin*.
- Cecil O. Samuelson, B.S. Utah, 1941. "The High School Student in Salt Lake City Who Is Employed Part Time." *Utah*.
- Edward Sandrow. "The Concept of Justice in Several Ancient Semitic Codes." *Columbia*.
- Elizabeth René Sanford, B.A. Scripps College, 1939. "A Study of Leadership in Three Indian Communities." *Claremont College*.
- Sarah Sealey, B.A. Florida State College for Women, 1938. "Attitudes of Employers to Negro Servants." *North Carolina*.
- Lee Anna Seawell, B.A. Duke, 1940. "An Experimental Application of the Friend-Finder Test to a Group of Duke University Students." *Duke*.
- Joy Seitchik, B.A. Cornell, 1939. "Frustration as Affected by Environmental Change." *Bryn Mawr*.
- Louis A. Shapiro, B.A. McGill, 1940. "Upper St. Lawrence Valley Region." *McGill*.
- Eleanor Sheldon, B.A. Utah, 1940. "A Survey of Public Health Nursing in Utah." *Utah*.
- Erwin Orson Smigel, B.A. North Carolina. "The Effect of War on Sex Convention." *New York University*.
- Ernest Allyn Smith, B.S. New York University, 1940. "Cooperative Communities as Social Units." *New York University*.
- Evelyn C. Smith, B.A. New York University, 1937. "The Consumer Class and Their Financial Privileges: A Changed Social Concept." *New York University*.
- David N. Solomon, B.A. McGill, 1939. "Institutional Aspects of the Y.M.H.A. of Montreal." *McGill*.
- Ray V. Sowers, B.A. Florida Southern College, 1937. "History of the Florida Congress of Parents and Teachers." *North Carolina*.
- Catherine Steele, B.A. Toronto, "Teachers' Reactions to Certain Social Pressures." *Columbia*.
- Anselm Strauss, B.S. Virginia, 1939. "A Study in the Detection and Use of Attitudes in Social Life and in Scientific Study." *Chicago*.
- Fred Strodbeck, B.A. Miami, 1940. "The Change in Attitudes toward Autoerotic Behavior." *Indiana*.

- Oscar Gordon Tarcov, B.A. Chicago, 1939. "The Social Reorganization of a Mining Community." *Illinois*.
- Lois Taylor. "An Investigation of the Bronx Slave Markets in New York City." *Columbia*.
- Felice Teplitz, B.A. Barnard, 1937. "An Analysis of the Early Movement for Health Insurance in the United States, 1912-1920." *Columbia*.
- Milton Grover Thackeray, B.S. Utah, 1940. "The Occupational Adjustment of 1,000 High School Graduates of the Classes of 1938 and 1939." *Utah*.
- Kim Fong Tom, B.A. Chapman College, 1936. "Participation of the Chinese in the Community Life of Los Angeles." *Southern California*.
- Lucy Tou, B.A. Yenching University, 1937. "Credit Union." *Bryn Mawr*.
- Ralph Townsend, B.A. "The Community School in Open Country and Village Areas." *Ohio State*.
- Gladys V. Wadsworth, B.S. Columbia, 1932. "Selected Aspects of the Problem of Nurses' Training for Community Service Programs." *Syracuse*.
- Marvin Walker, B.A. William Jewell College, 1938. "The Effects of the Depression on Postponement of Marriage: A Study Based on Records in Cincinnati." *Cincinnati*.
- Pearl Walker, B.A. Howard, 1937. "The Relationship of Transportation Facilities to Metropolitan Regions in Tennessee." *Fisk*.
- Mary Elizabeth Walsh, B.A. New Rochelle, 1926. "Effect on Their Families of the Commitment and Discharge of Mental Patients. Based on a Study of Relief Families in New Haven." *Yale*.
- Joan W. Wheatley, B.A. Occidental College. "The Social Club in the Process of Social Acceptance." *Columbia*.
- Albert Whiting, B.A. Amherst, 1938. "Sociological Approach to Medicine." *Fisk*.
- Homer Williams, B.A. Park College, 1940. "A Study of Workmen's Compensation Cases in Missouri." *Missouri*.
- Wendell Williams, B.A. College of Emporia, 1938. "Institutional Care and the Dynamics of Collectivism." *Kansas*.
- Margaret Wilson, B.S. Cornell, 1938. "Attitude Differentials by Social-economic Classes in a Rural Population." *Cornell*.
- Shau Lam Wong, B.A. Lingnan University. "Cooperative Movement in China." *Southern California*.
- Robert Woodruff, B.A. Pittsburgh, 1938. "The Social and Economic Effects of Re-housing on the Family Life of Tenants in a Public Housing Project." *Fisk*.
- Chalmers Samuel Wooley, B.A. Illinois, 1940. "The Social Organization of a Farm Trading Center." *Illinois*.
- John Paul Yoder, B.A. Goshen College, 1932. "Amish and Mennonite Sects in Central Pennsylvania." *Penn State*.
- Maud Holmes Young, B.A. Bryn Mawr, 1915. "The W.P.A. in Columbia." *Missouri*.

NEWS AND NOTES

RESEARCH NEWS

Julius Rosenwald Fund.—The Fund has announced the award of sixty-four fellowships totaling \$100,000. The fellows include forty Negroes and twenty-four white southerners. Among the awards of interest to our readers are the following:

Cleo Walter Blackburn, Flanner House, Indianapolis; for studies in sociology, at Indiana University.

Mamie Katherine Clark, New York City; for studies in child psychology, at Columbia University; reappointment.

Adelaide McGuinn Cromwell, Washington, D.C.; for studies in sociology dealing with various activities of Negro women, at the University of Pennsylvania.

Charles Twitchell Davis, Hampton, Virginia; for studies in American culture, with special reference to the literature of the Negro renaissance, at the University of Chicago; reappointment.

Lyonel Charles Florant, New York City; for a study of the pattern of Negro population movements since 1930, at the University of Chicago; reappointment.

Manet Helen Fowler, New York City; for studies in social anthropology, at Columbia University.

John Hope II, Spelman College and Atlanta University; for a study of consumption habits and credit practices among low-income families in the southern economy, at the University of Chicago; reappointment.

Lloyd Harris Hughes, Western University, Kansas; for a study of the contributions of the Negro to the life and culture of New Spain, at the University of California.

Clifton Ralph Jones, Philadelphia; for a study of the social stratification within the Negro population, at the State University of Iowa.

Edward Nelson Palmer, Newport News, Virginia; for studies in sociology, especially the determination and measurement of factors associated with unemployment among Negro workers, at the University of Michigan; reappointment.

Thomas Nathaniel Roberts, United States Department of Agriculture, Tuskegee, Alabama; for studies in agricultural economics, at the University of Wisconsin; reappointment.

Estella Harris Scott, Fisk University; for studies in sociology, at the University of Pennsylvania; reappointment.

Mabel Murphy Smythe, Fort Valley State College, Georgia; for a study of the effects of protective labor legislation on Negro workers, at the University of Wisconsin.

Samuel Z. Westerfield, Jr., Washington, D.C.; for a study of the consumer purchasing and savings habits of Negroes and whites at the same income level, at Harvard University.

William Oscar Brown, Howard University; for a study of the race problem in Puerto Rico.

Melville Fort Corbett, Institute for Research in Social Science, University of North Carolina; for studies in sociology dealing with southern levels of life, at Columbia University.

Wilton Paul Ledet, Abbeville, Louisiana; for a study of the economic, political, and social history of the Acadians of Louisiana, at the University of Chicago; reappointment.

Edward Arthur McLellan, Sumner, Mississippi; for a study of Negro youth in the Mississippi Delta, at George Peabody College for Teachers.

Edward Crawford Solomon, Jacksonville, Florida; for studies in sociology dealing with factors influencing the migration from rural to urban schools, at the University of Chicago and Vanderbilt University.

American Youth Commission.—The Commission has announced the publication of the last of the regional studies of personality development of Negro youth entitled *Thus Be Their Destiny*. From *Thus Be Their Destiny*, *Color and Human Nature*, *Growing Up in the Black Belt*, *Negro Youth at the Crossways*, and *Children of Bondage*, Robert L. Sutherland, Hogg Foundation, University of Texas, will write an over-all summary, tentatively titled, *Color, Class and Personality*.

Canadian Census.—In connection with the recording and analysis of the 1941 decennial census, it is proposed to publish a comprehensive atlas of demography and agriculture covering all phases of census returns. As planned, the atlas will be published in two parts, each of which will constitute a volume of about five hundred pages. Part I will carry an introduction giving a summary treatment of the relationship of the population of Canada with world and Empire countries; a historical description of the territorial development of Canada; and a series of climatic and resources maps of the Dominion. Part II proper is planned to deal in six chapters with the growth, distribution, and density of population; urban and rural

population; sex and age distribution; racial origins; birthplaces, nationalities, and citizenship; and religion. The larger proportion of Part II will be devoted to the analysis of agricultural statistics of the census, but will also cover such subjects as conjugal conditions; mother-tongue; gainfully occupied, families, housing, and rentals; and vital statistics.

University of Chicago.—The University of Chicago will celebrate its fiftieth anniversary September 22–29. During this week of meetings there will be an assemblage of more than one hundred and sixty of the nation's leading scientists and scholars, including thirty-four distinguished men and women who will be awarded honorary degrees. During this period there will be a five-day series of symposiums under the direction of Dr. Frederic Woodward, vice-president emeritus of the University. Thirty-nine universities, including six in foreign nations, and fifteen museums, research organizations, and governmental agencies will be represented in the symposiums, which will deal with the newest fundamental advances in the biological, physical, and social sciences, the humanities, law, business, religion, and social service, in keeping with the theme of the University's celebration, "New Frontiers in Education and Research."

Among the leading speakers will be Hu Shih, Chinese ambassador to the United States; Robert S. Millikan and Ernest O. Lawrence, Nobel prize winners in physics; Amado Alonso, University of Buenos Aires (Argentina), philologist; and Carlos Monge, professor of medicine at the University of San Marcos (Peru); Robert R. Williams, discover of vitamin B₁; Charles H. Best, Canadian co-discoverer of insulin; Jacques Maritain, leading French neo-Thomist philosopher; and President Robert M. Hutchins of the University of Chicago.

Of particular interest to our readers are the following symposiums: "Environment and Education," Franz Alexander, Chicago Institute for Psychoanalysis; Margaret Mead, American Museum of Natural History; and Ernest W. Burgess and W. Lloyd Warner, University of Chicago; Robert J. Havighurst, University of Chicago, chairman. "Measurement and Experiment," Samuel S. Wilks, Princeton University; and Louis L. Thurstone, University of Chicago; William F. Ogburn, University of Chicago, chairman. "Civilizations in Transition," Michael I. Rostovtzeff, Yale University; Hu Shih, ambassador of China to the United States; and Robert H. Lowie, University of California; Louis Gottschalk, University of Chicago, chairman. "The Place of Law in Society," Charles H. McIlwain, Harvard University; Hans Kelsen, Geneva (Switzerland), Graduate Institute of International Studies and Prague (Czechoslovakia), German

University; and Robert H. Lowie, University of California; Charles E. Merriam, University of Chicago, chairman. "The Place of Ethics in Social Science," Richard H. Tawney, University of London; Charles H. McIlwain, Harvard University; Jacques Maritain, Catholic Institute of Paris and Columbia University; and Robert M. Hutchins, University of Chicago; John U. Nef, University of Chicago, chairman. Scholars and scientists are cordially invited to attend the Symposia. Those who desire to attend should inform the Director of the Fiftieth Anniversary Celebration, University of Chicago.

Committee on Junior College Education for Family Life.—This Committee has been established by the American Association of Junior Colleges for the purpose of studying the needs of the junior college students with respect to marriage, family relationships, and home life. It is planned that the conclusions regarding needs will be embodied in recommendations concerning programs, curriculums, staff, and other factors in American junior colleges. H. H. Tracy, Fullerton (Calif.) Junior College, is chairman of the Committee.

Committee for National Morale.—This organization, which is an affiliate of the Council for Democracy, was set up in the late summer of 1940 largely through the personal efforts of Arthur Upham Pope, the distinguished Iranian scholar. Its sponsors and members represent a wide range of persons, chiefly in professional life, who are interested in stimulating both public and private agencies to undertake the building of morale during the present national emergency. The executive committee is composed of prominent journalists, educators, research workers, physicians, and lawyers. Among the many social scientists and social psychologists associated with the Committee are Carl J. Friedrich, Frank Lorimer, Ralph Barton Perry, Ordway Tead, Gardiner Murphy, Gordon W. Allport, Hadley Cantril, Floyd Ruch, Walter V. Bingham, R. A. Brotemarkle, Margaret Mead, Gregory Bateson, and Kimball Young.

Through its research staff—composed principally of volunteer contributors—the Committee has prepared approximately thirty memorandums on various phases of civilian and military morale as illustrated not only in the United States but in various foreign countries as well. Of particular importance, however, is its recently published annotated bibliography of six hundred titles on *German Psychological Warfare*, including an introduction of nearly sixty pages which gives the major facts about the theory and practice in present-day German psychological strategy. This publication may be obtained from the Committee's office at 51 East Forty-second Street, New York City, at the cost of \$3.50 per copy.

Dominion Bureau of Statistics.—Enid Charles is engaged in a study of differential fertility in Canada. This research is financed by the Carnegie Corporation and sponsored by the Canadian Council for Social Research. The main objectives are (1) to throw light on the process of declining fertility by analyzing the changes in family patterns in regional, racial, and occupational groups during the last ten years and (2) to attempt to discover what social and economic conditions are consistent with the maintenance of a stable reproduction rate. The first part of the work will involve the calculation of nuptial reproduction rates, gross and net reproduction rates of married women, and reproduction rates by order of birth for the groups mentioned, in 1931 and 1939. The second part of the work will consist of a detailed study of differential fertility in relation to the different social and economic conditions in certain selected small areas.

Institute of Labor Studies.—This nonprofit scientific organization has been founded by a group of economists and other social scientists in recognition of the need for a clearing house to facilitate research collaboration in the labor field. The Institute seeks to advance labor research by the voluntary effort of social scientists themselves. It has no research funds from which to make grants-in-aid. It is the Institute's idea that interested scholars can use the spare time they are able to give to labor research to far better effect if they have access to the services of a clearing-house agency. Membership in the Institute is open to all scholars of standing who desire to encourage such research. It does not obligate the member to engage in such research himself, but if and when he does, he will find Institute services available, and meanwhile his support will help others. Inquiries and applications may be addressed to Katharine D. Lumpkin, research director, 54 Prospect Street, Northampton, Massachusetts.

Maryland State Department of Health.—A W.P.A. project has just been completed in which some sixty thousand schedules from the school census were compared with the birth records of the state. The purposes were to find unregistered births and to measure the completeness of birth reporting and school enumerations in each county of the state. It was found that birth reporting averaged about 97 per cent in completeness, the lowest county registering slightly under 90 per cent and the highest slightly over 98 per cent. For ages under five, school enumeration of the population averaged 86 per cent. There was great variability in the results—the best county enumerating about 97 per cent of the theoretical population and the lowest county about 66 per cent.

Missouri Social Security Commission.—An analysis is being made of records from all juvenile courts in Missouri in order to show the nature of juvenile delinquency, dependency, and neglect among juveniles and the legal adoption of children. This research project will show source of referral to juvenile courts, disposition of such cases, and the care provided the children while they were being detained by the court. It will also show for delinquent children the type of offense committed—whether the case is new to the courts or whether the child has a previous court record. For children referred for dependency and neglect the report will show the civil status of the parents, the reason for referral, and the residence of the children with respect to rural and urban areas.

Society for Social Research.—The spring program of the Society consisted of seven papers: "The Prediction of Individual Behavior" by Paul Horst, "Current Studies in the Field of Communications" by Douglas M. Waples, "The University's Plan for Studying Human Development" by Robert J. Havighurst, "The Image of the Other Man" by Gustav Ichheiser, "The Political Organization of a Slum Area" by William F. Whyte, "Urban Decentralization and Decay" by Homer Hoyt, "Illegitimacy and the Social Control of Sex in a Jamaican Peasant Village" by Arch Cooper, and "The Logic of the Case Method" by S. A. Stouffer.

The twentieth annual Institute will be held August 15-16 at the University of Chicago. The theme of the Institute will be "National Morale," and papers on this subject will be contributed by Harry Stack Sullivan, Washington School of Psychiatry; Robert E. Park, Fisk University; and by Hans Speier and Eric Estorick, both of the New School for Social Research. Inquiries regarding the complete program and reservations for rooms may be addressed to Arnold M. Rose, 1126 East Fifty-ninth Street, Chicago.

NOTES

Eastern Sociological Society.—Officers elected at the spring meeting are as follows: president, Talcott Parsons, Harvard University; vice-president, John Dollard, Yale University; secretary-treasurer, Julian Woodward, Cornell University; member of the executive committee, Norman Himes, Colgate University.

Mid-West Sociological Society.—At the fifth annual meeting, held at Des Moines, Iowa, April 17-19, the following officers were elected: president, Carroll D. Clark, University of Kansas; first vice-president, C. E. Lively, University of Missouri; second vice-president, Lowry Nelson,

University of Minnesota; secretary-treasurer, J. Howell Atwood, Knox College; members of the executive committee, Laurence H. Brown, Nebraska; John Saathoff, North Dakota; John Useem, South Dakota; and Margaret Reuss, Marquette University; representative on the executive committee of the American Sociological Society, J. O. Hertzler, University of Nebraska.

Pacific Sociological Society.—The northern division of this regional society met at Gearhart, Oregon, May 9-10. Meetings, consisting of three sessions, were made up by papers on (a) research in social problems, (b) theory and research, and (c) research in social organization.

Southern Sociological Society.—Under the title "Current Studies in the Field of Sociology in the South," the Society's committee on research has published a mimeographed report of the research activities of southern sociology.

Southwestern Sociological Society.—The Society held its annual meeting at Dallas, Texas, April 11-12, in conjunction with the various other units of the Southwestern Social Science Association. General topics discussed in the three half-day sessions were "Teaching Sociology in a Changing Culture," "Social Standards in a Changing Society," and "Current Social Research." Officers elected for the coming year are: president, William H. Sewell, Oklahoma A. & M. College; vice-president, A. E. Croft, University of Wichita; and secretary, J. K. Johnson, East Texas State Teachers College.

Bureau of the Census.—James C. Capt was inducted as director of the Bureau on May 22, succeeding William L. Austin, who retired in January. In the interim, Assistant Director Vergil D. Reed served as acting director of the Bureau. Dr. Reed will continue with the Census Bureau as one of its assistant directors. Howard H. McClure, formerly executive assistant to the director, recently was named to the other assistant directorship of the Bureau. For a number of years Director Capt was an executive in the Washington office of the Federal Work Projects Administration. He came to the Bureau of the Census in 1939 as confidential assistant to the former Director Austin. In this capacity Capt directed the selection and organization of a staff of more than 100,000 census field workers employed in the 1940 census-taking.

As an outgrowth of an increasing need for current statistics, a tentative plan has been drafted for an annual census on a sample basis. It is pro-

posed that in the first sample census, items of particular importance to national defense should be given preference. Accordingly, large portions of the proposed schedule are devoted to the measurement of population shifts which have occurred since the 1940 Census and to data concerning the labor force, unemployment, housing (especially vacancies), and cost of living. The suggested sampling procedure provides for the selection of not less than a 5 per cent cross-section randomly distributed by small areas and stratified so that some part of the sample comes from each county of the country and each city of 5,000 or over. The final results should provide reliable statistics for the nation as a whole, individual states, large cities, and for the urban, rural farm, and rural nonfarm subdivisions of the United States and the larger states.

Inter-American Statistical Institute.—The temporary organizing committee of the Institute has announced the election of officers who are to compose its "bureau" or governing body. These are: president, M. A. Teixeira de Freitas, Brazil; first vice-president, Stuart A. Rice, United States; second vice-president, Carlos E. Dieulefait, Argentina; third vice-president, Ramón Beteta, Mexico; and treasurer, Robert H. Coats, Canada. The temporary organizing committee, which is serving as a provisional secretariat until conditions permit the establishment of its permanent office, includes: Halbert L. Dunn, E. Dana Durand, and Walter F. Willcox, in addition to Dr. Rice. The aims of the Institute, according to its statutes, are: (a) to stimulate improved methodology in the collection, tabulation, analysis, and publication of both official and unofficial statistics; (b) to encourage measures designed to improve the comparability of economic and social statistics among the nations in this hemisphere; (c) to provide a medium for professional collaboration among statisticians of the American nations; (d) to co-operate with national and international organizations in advancing the science and administration of statistics.

Institute on Media of Communications.—The Graduate Library School of the University of Chicago will hold August 4-9 an institute on the implications of print, radio, and film for democratic government. Among the speakers at this meeting will be: Ernst Kris, New School for Social Research; Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Columbia University; Harold D. Lasswell, William Allanson White Psychiatric Foundation; Harold F. Gosnell, Samuel A. Stouffer, and Ralph W. Tyler, all of the University of Chicago.

National Conference of Social Workers.—The sixty-eighth annual meeting was held at Atlantic City, June 1-7. Officers elected for the coming

year are: president, Shelby M. Harrison, Russell Sage Foundation; first vice-president, Wilfred S. Reynolds, Chicago Council of Social Agencies; second vice-president, Michael M. Davis, Committee on Research in Medical Economics; third vice-president, Betsy Libbey, Family Society, Philadelphia.

New England Conference on Tomorrow's Children.—The second annual conference will be held at Harvard University, July 17-18. Programs may be obtained by writing to Eugene L. Belisle, Massachusetts Mothers' Health Council, Boston.

Norman Wait Harris Memorial Foundation.—The seventeenth Institute will be held at the University of Chicago, July 7-16, on "The Political and Economic Implications of Inter-American Solidarity." Among those who will attend are Leland H. Jenks, Wellesley College, and E. Franklin Frazier, Howard University. A number of prominent scholars from Central and South America will participate.

The Open Road.—This summer this nonprofit organization has arranged for five field-study trips: "Southern Conditions," sponsored by Teachers College, Columbia University, an intensive study of a southern county which is partly industrial, partly agricultural; "Minority Cultures of Colorado and New Mexico," sponsored by the University of Denver, a study of the values and customs of minority groups—Volga German farmers, Japanese farmers, Mexican agricultural laborers, Spanish Americans of New Mexico, Pueblo Indians, and Navajo Indians—which have conserved their identity and of their relations to the dominant American culture; "Life Problems of the Great Plains and the Rocky Mountains," sponsored by Colorado State College of Education, a study of five small communities: a cattle- and sheep-ranching area, an irrigated farming area, a Dust Bowl village, a coal-mining town, a historic gold-mining camp; "Planning Regional Development as Exemplified by the T.V.A.," sponsored by the University of Tennessee and Northwestern University, with the co-operation of the T.V.A., a study of the tremendous T.V.A. development and its effect on the lives of the Valley people in towns and on the land; "Community Relations in Connecticut and Pennsylvania," sponsored by the Connecticut State Summer Session, a contrasting study of life in a Pennsylvania coal town and a Connecticut manufacturing center. Particulars regarding these and other field courses may be obtained from The Open Road, 8 West Fortieth Street, New York.

Population Association of America.—At its meeting held at Princeton, New Jersey, May 16-17, the following officers were elected: president, P. K. Whelpton; first vice-president, Frederick Osborn; second vice-president, Dorothy S. Thomas; secretary, Conrad Taeuber; and treasurer, Halbert L. Dunn.

Society for Applied Anthropology.—A meeting for the purpose of organizing this Society was held at Harvard University, May 2-3, with fifty to sixty persons in attendance. Papers were presented, centering around the topics: "Application of Anthropology to Industry," "Two Modern Community Organizations," "The Social Work and Problems of Public Morale," and "Two Problems of Colonial Administration." E. D. Chapple, Harvard University, was named first president of this Society.

Vital Issues.—Under this title a monthly magazine has been launched whose purpose is to analyze problems confronting the American people. The Editorial Board includes Henry M. Busch, Western Reserve University, and Spencer D. Irwin, of the *Cleveland Plain Dealer*. The offices are located at 1740 East Twelfth Street, Cleveland, Ohio.

Albion College.—Melvin J. Williams, who has just received his Doctor's degree at Duke University, has been appointed instructor in sociology.

University of California.—Leonard Bloom, Kent State University, will teach courses in introductory sociology and the family during the summer.

Claremont College.—A course in social control is being offered during the summer by E. Adamson Hoebel, New York University.

University of Chicago.—The First Annual Conference for Teachers of the Social Sciences in Secondary Schools and Junior Colleges is being held July 1-3 on the central theme "New Frontiers in the Social Sciences." Each of the three days is devoted to a separate topic: "The Community" including papers by W. Lloyd Warner and Robert Redfield, University of Chicago; "The Individual and the Social Order"; and "Social Change," including papers by Edwin R. Embree, Julius Rosenwald Fund, and Earl S. Johnson, University of Chicago. Robert E. Keohane, University of Chicago, is chairman of the committee on the Conference.

W. Lloyd Warner has been promoted to the rank of professor of sociology and anthropology.

Robert F. Winch has been appointed instructor of sociology in the College.

Columbia University.—Robert M. MacIver, Lieber Professor of Political Philosophy and Sociology, has been appointed executive officer of the department of sociology. Paul F. Lazarsfeld, who has been visiting lecturer in social science during the last year and director of the university's office of radio research, becomes associate professor of sociology. Robert K. Merton, Tulane University, has been appointed assistant professor of sociology. William S. Robinson, instructor in social science, has been advanced to the status of lecturer in sociology.

Cornell University.—During the summer session W. E. Cole, University of Tennessee, is offering courses in the family and educational sociology.

Dartmouth College.—D. Appleton-Century Company has recently published *An Introduction to the Social Sciences* by Robert E. Riegel, W. L. Eager, Ralph P. Holden, J. M. McDaniel, Francis E. Merrill, Earl R. Sikes, Elmer E. Smead, and Louis D. Stilwell.

Duke University.—During the summer session Paul A. Root, Southern Methodist University, is teaching courses in social pathology and general sociology.


University of Idaho.—Carroll D. Clark, University of Kansas, is giving courses in collective behavior, contemporary social movements, and population changes and social adjustments during the summer session.

Indiana University.—A. B. Hollingshead has been granted a post-doctoral fellowship by the Social Science Research Council. He will spend next year visiting American universities.

Harvey J. Locke has been given a grant-in-aid by the Social Science Research Council, matched by a similar grant from the Graduate Research Committee of Indiana University. The grants will assist him in continuing his study of "Factors Involved in Marital Adjustment." He is comparing information on personality, background, and other data secured from a divorced sample with similar information from a married sample.

A Conference on Family Relations was held on April 11 and 12. The speakers at the conference were E. B. Reuter, State University of Iowa; E. W. Burgess, University of Chicago; F. M. Vreeland, DePauw University; and A. C. Kinsey, Indiana University.

Johns Hopkins University.—During the summer session Ivan E. McDougale, Goucher College, is giving courses in social disorganization



and introductory sociology. Joseph H. Bunzel is offering a course in the social functions of the theater.

University of Kansas.—D. Appleton-Century Company has published *New Social Horizons* by Seba Eldridge.

The second volume to be published in the "Social Science Studies Series" of the University of Kansas is *Comerio: A Study of a Puerto Rican Town* by Charles C. Rogler. The committee in charge of the series consists of W. E. Sandelius, chairman; C. B. Realey, editor; D. Gagliardo, and Seba Eldridge.

Kent State University.—During the summer session Harley O. Preston, Indiana University, will teach a course in principles of sociology and social control, and R. Drexal MacTavish will give courses in problems of child welfare and social service.

University of Michigan.—John F. Cuber, Kent State University, is to direct the community workshop during the coming summer.

Michigan State College.—The special course on marriage offered in the summer session will be given this year by J. Howard Howson, Vassar College.

Newark Junior College.—Theodore Lenn, formerly instructor in economics and sociology, has been appointed professor of social science and chairman of the department of social studies.

Ohio State University.—During the summer quarter Mark A. May, Yale University, is giving a course in character education and is leading a seminar in educational psychology.

San Francisco State College.—Carlo L. Lastrucci, who has completed his work for the Doctor's degree at Stanford University, has been teaching in the department of sociology during the past year.

University of São Paulo (Brazil).—Flavio de Campos and Mario Wagner, both of the faculty of the Escola livre de sociologia e politica, will spend a year in study in sociology and anthropology at the University of Chicago.

Smith College School for Social Work.—Stephen W. Reed, Yale University, is on a one-year appointment as lecturer in sociology.

University of Southern California.—Bessie A. McClenahan, who spent part of her recent sabbatical leave at the University of North Carolina studying "Regionalism" as developed there by Howard W. Odum and his associates, is introducing a pioneer course on the subject in the department of sociology. Pauline V. Young is the author of a book, recently published by Prentice-Hall, Incorporated, on *Social Case Work in National Defense*.

University of Tennessee.—A special course entitled "Multiple-Purpose Programs" is being offered during the summer session by W. E. Cole, sociologist, Frank B. Ward, economist, and Calvin Davis, Tennessee Valley Authority. This course deals with the engineering, economic, and social features of multiple-purpose programs, with special reference to river developments.

Ernest T. Krueger, Vanderbilt University, is offering courses in social problems and the family during the summer quarter.

Texas A. & M. College.—During the summer session a course in rural youth leadership, consisting of lectures and field trips to youth projects, will be offered by O. H. Benson, Boy Scouts of America.

University of Virginia.—The fifteenth annual Institute of Public Affairs is being held June 23–July 5 on the topic, "The United States, the War, and the Future."

University of Washington.—During the summer quarter Robert MacIver, Columbia University, is offering an undergraduate course in social change and social progress and a graduate course in social causation.

David B. Carpenter and Shotaro Frank Miyamoto, have been appointed associates in the department of sociology. Felix E. Moore, Jr., has resigned his position as instructor in sociology to accept an appointment in the Bureau of the Census.

West Virginia University.—Charles N. Burrows, Simpson College, is teaching courses in the family, race problems, and problems of crime and delinquency during the summer session.

University of Wisconsin.—McGraw-Hill Book Company is publishing *Elementary Social Statistics* by Thomas C. McCormick.

PERSONAL

Sir James George Frazer, noted anthropologist and author of *The Golden Bough*, died at the age of eighty-seven, at his residence in Cambridge, England, May 7, 1941. Lady Frazer died a few hours later. Sir James was recognized as one of the world's authorities on folklore, taboo, magic, superstition, myths, primitive belief, and rites.

Sir James, who was knighted in 1914 and was made a F.R.S. in 1920, was born on January 1, 1854, in Glasgow, and studied at Larchfield Academy, Helensburgh, Glasgow, and Cambridge. He was elected a fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, in 1879. On his seventy-first birthday he was made a member of the Order of Merit, a special British distinction limited to twenty-four persons.

Several hundred specially invited guests attended a memorial meeting at the New York Academy of Medicine, May 21, in honor of George E. Vincent, who died February 1, at the age of seventy-seven.¹ The four principal phases of his career were discussed by Arthur E. Bestor, president of Chautauqua Institution; James Rowland Angell, former president of Yale University and an associate of Dr. Vincent at the University of Chicago; Guy Stanton Ford, president, University of Minnesota; and John D. Rockefeller, Jr.

W. B. Saunders Company is publishing *Sociology Applied to Nursing* by Emory S. Bogardus, University of Southern California, and Alice Brethorst, Dakota Wesleyan University.

¹ For a brief discussion of Dr. Vincent's life and works see a statement prepared by E. W. Burgess, *American Journal of Sociology*, XLVI (1941), 887.

ERRATUM

The second reference in footnote 7, page 789, of the article "Social Anthropology and the Modern Community," by W. Lloyd Warner, *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XLVI (1941), should read: W. Allison Davis, Burleigh B. Gardner, and Mary R. Gardner, *Deep South* (to be published by the University of Chicago Press).

BOOK REVIEWS

Negro Youth at the Crossways: Their Personality Development in the Middle States. By E. FRANKLIN FRAZIER. Washington, D.C.: American Council on Education, 1940. Pp. xxiii+301. \$2.25.

Children of Bondage: The Personality Development of Negro Youth in the Urban South. By ALLISON DAVIS and JOHN DOLLARD. Washington, D.C.: American Council on Education, 1940. Pp. xxviii+299. \$2.25.

These two volumes are parts of a series of reports on investigations made under the direction of the American Youth Commission to determine "wherein Negro youth faced distinctive problems in their development as individual personalities." The significance, however, of these two works rests not merely on their contribution to social and psychological knowledge about the American Negro. They are highly relevant to our general understanding of the dynamics of caste and class behavior.

While the two works differ considerably in organization and method, they represent essentially the same orientation. Both assume the important characteristics of personality to be products of learning to live in a particular social context. They both seek to make clear the way the caste and class organization of our society patterns the human organisms differently according to the position occupied by these organisms. The differences in methods and organization of material yield supplementary rather than conflicting knowledge. Indeed, this reviewer is constrained to register regret that all three authors did not work together on both studies.

Frazier states that his general purpose is "to determine what kind of a person a Negro youth is or is in the process of becoming as a result of the limitations which are placed upon his or her participation in the life of the communities in the border states" (p. 261).

A social conditioning theory of personality is explicitly adopted and consistently maintained throughout. The general plan is to use case study materials to view the attitudes, characteristic behavior, and orientation of Negro youths as resultants of the impact of American society mediated through the family, the neighborhood, the school, the church, the economic system, and the current social-political movements.

Each of the mediating agents is examined by means of interview and

life-history material on individual subjects for the way they vary in their impact according to social-economic class differences. The sections are well documented with excerpts from case materials. These materials demonstrate beyond question that a Negro child and youth experiences a society differing sharply from that of the white child and as a result his personality shows corresponding differences in his sense of adequacy, security, respect for himself, and belief in his future possibilities. Nor can there be any quibble about the wide variations in the personality patterning found over the range of socioeconomic classes within the Negro group.

As a background to the discussion of the specific institutional elements, the author gives an excellent general description of the urban Negro community in the border states.

It is not possible to attempt here an evaluation of the findings. It will be sufficient to say that they are very significant for the research social psychologists as well as for those who are concerned with the practical problems of human welfare.

Certain weaknesses should be pointed out.

1. With regard to the class differences in social experience, training, and resultant attitudes, it would have strengthened the study considerably if, on the basis of case studies, a more formal instrument had been constructed and the insights and conclusions from the case studies subjected to a quantitative check.

2. The reviewer found himself wishing that in addition to describing class differences in certain attitudes and orientations, the author had attempted to describe the "ideal type" personality organization for each class. This is no doubt a difficult thing to do, and it might even prove not to be a desirable thing to do. However, in everyday practical social living we are constantly creating stereotypes that serve as reference points for organizing our attitudes and relationships to other people. Such constructs may also be useful in the scientific analysis of personality organization and its variations.

3. Two cases are described at length in order to illustrate the operation of a culture through the community-institutional complex. The cases are too stilted and depersonalized. It is difficult to remember them as flesh-and-blood personalities as one does some of the cases in the work by Davis and Dollard. This same wooden character is found in the Introduction, which is a report of a street conversation among three Negro boys aged fifteen, seventeen, and nineteen. The reproduction is so stilted and unreal—like a poor high-school dramatic production—as to produce a rather unfavorable attitude in the reader.

4. The book is oriented so completely to what the community and its institutions represent as barriers and "limitations on . . . participation" that one feels a certain restriction on insight and understanding of the total Negro personality. Of course it must be remembered the barriers and limitations are perhaps the most important things in the life of the American Negro.

Davis and Dollard also approach the study of society's impact on the Negro through case studies. But where Frazier organizes his report around formal divisions such as family, neighborhood, school, etc., and uses excerpts from personal case materials to illustrate the way institutions seem to enter the person's experience, Davis and Dollard organize their report around full-length case studies. The chapter headings of the central portion of their book are names of persons, not institutional categories. The institutional impacts must be found in their proper places in the life-experiences of the persons the reader gets to know through the case studies. One very important result of this method of presentation is that the reader, almost in spite of himself, identifies with the persons in their experiences and develops a real appreciation for the way the subjects view their world of caste and class to a degree not realized in Frazier's work. If one wanted to run the risk of oversimplification, he might say that *Negro Youth at the Crossways* represents a more intellectual experience of the problem while *Children of Bondage* yields more of a direct aesthetic, emphatic experience. This difference showed up in students' reactions. Where they would read an assignment in the first work with interest, they would characteristically read well beyond the assignment in the second and get excited about it. However, it should be noted that their comments reveal the fact that reading the first volume gives a more adequate grasp of the significance of the Davis-Dollar cases.

The book opens with a chapter on a learning theory of personality which reflects the influence of Hull and others at Yale who are seeking to streamline stimulus-reponse theory for use in studying social behavior. This influence seems to be effecting considerable modification in the psychoanalytic orientation of Dollard. While the results of attempts to integrate stimulus-response theory and Freudian psychoanalytic theory are not entirely satisfactory, this chapter indicates that some fruitful cross-fertilization is underway and the products will be increasingly important as time goes on.

The main section of the book is devoted to case studies of Negro youths of different social statuses. The cases are well put together, show good insight, and are easy to read.

The last section of the book is an attempt to increase the reader's sense of the pervasive reality of caste and class, to discuss more systematically the authors' conception of social class, and to summarize the differential cultural experience in home and school which is determined by class position.

From the standpoint of adding genuine conviction to the assertion that position in the social system is a powerful determiner of personality, this work is one of the best things we have in American sociological literature.

There are certain weaknesses which should be listed.

1. The basic frame of reference of the work is that used by W. Lloyd Warner, and reference is frequently made to this fact. While the concepts of caste and class are much older than Warner, his views of the concept have certain peculiarities which are familiar to the authors and others of Warner's students. But until the long-awaited report on the study of Yankee City is finally published, much that the present authors seem willing to take for granted will appear of dubious validity to those not conversant with Warner's ideas.

2. The cases are excellent for illustrative purposes but fall down badly when used for careful intensive analysis. Important family relational patterns are frequently disregarded or slurred over. The failure to analyze fully and carefully the different reactions of siblings to class and caste training and experience amounts to a major weakness. This fact showed up clearly when a small seminar of advanced students sought to check the analyses and interpretations of the authors by using the scanty materials on siblings of the cases studied as a basis for making some alternate interpretations.

Since the integration of the language of stimulus-response theory and that of Freudian theory is incomplete, one would expect that the interpretations in the cases would at times appear to be somewhat disjunctive. Such is the case, and in some instances some of the Freudian interpretative passages seem almost to be dragged in by the heels.

4. With the exception of some slight shifts in the theoretical verbiage, the work does not mark much progress beyond the point reached in *Caste and Class in a Southern Town*. It is a further illustration of the fruitfulness of the approach elaborated in that book. What is definitely needed now is a formulation of the problem that will permit of a more precise, rigorous methodology and more definitive answers to the questions raised by these exploratory studies.

Even though all the criticisms be accepted as valid, these two books stand as distinct advances in the study of the Negro and of caste and class

dynamics in American society. They are necessary reading for all those interested in understanding contemporary social processes and of the way human nature is formed in the social context.

LEONARD S. COTTRELL, JR.

Cornell University

Sociology. By WILLIAM F. OGBURN and MEYER F. NIMKOFF. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1940. Pp. xiv+953. \$3.50.

Not in many moons has a textbook in sociology been accorded so many encomiums as has the new Ogburn and Nimkoff *Sociology*. With many of the comments favorable to the book it is easy to agree. The book is interesting reading, lucid in style, "completely modern," attractive in format, and ample in scope. On the other hand, the writer is depressed by the thought that this text, written for the purpose of introducing students to the science of sociology, is so enthusiastically accepted as the "last word" by representative sociology teachers throughout the country.

In the words of the authors, in their Preface: "Sociology has been defined as what the sociologists are doing, and a book on sociology should mirror such activities." Obviously, the authors had this constantly in mind while they were writing this book. Here is a "sociology" that, if not an "over-all social science" (a conception of sociology that is decried by the authors), is sufficiently broad in scope to suggest to the authors "its possible use in orientation courses. . . , even though it [the book] falls short of establishing sociology as a general social science." As for the activities of sociologists, if this work is a "mirror of such activities," one can only stand amazed at the breadth and variety, the catholicity and unco-ordinated character, of interests represented. If the book fails to establish sociology "as a general social science," it certainly is not because of a lack of inclusiveness and amplitude. Indeed, one is led to raise the question, if the book here under review is to be taken as a criterion, whether sociology is a science at all.

If sociology is to be regarded as a special social science rather than as a general one, and if it is considered feasible and essential to induct the beginning student into sociology as a scientific discipline, then it is reasonable to expect an introductory textbook on sociology to be scientific in its theoretical framework, in its conceptual scheme, and in its presentation of empirical facts, the latter having a direct bearing upon, and an integration in, the conceptual structure. If there are no significant theoretical problems postulated, if no clear-cut theoretical system is stated, and if

the conceptual scheme is attenuated and inadequate for the purpose in hand, then, no matter how ambitious and exhaustive are the empirical references to phenomena, the work does not constitute a valid contribution to "scientific" knowledge.

The chief general criticism to be offered against the Ogburn and Nimkoff book is its failure, in a large measure, to come up to the requirements of a "scientific" treatise on sociology. The nearest approach to a scheme for the book lies in the emphasis throughout upon the commanding role played by culture "in the great drama of social life." In other words, here is a work purporting to introduce students to a science of sociology that singles out for a preponderance of attention the conditioning function of cultural factors, with incidental but not unimportant roles assigned to group life and to such nonsocietary factors as geographic environment and biological heredity. The "interaction" of the "four principal actors," of which "the leading character is culture," is represented as the proper subject matter of sociology. In brief, sociology here becomes the "science" of culture, the "superorganic" factor conditioning social life.

The concept "interaction," as presented in the book, receives an extension of meaning that is unusual, in the opinion of the reviewer. "Interaction" is said to go on among the four principal sets of factors—the organic, the inorganic, the "superorganic," and the group-social. In other words, "social life is best explained" by the "interaction" of man's nervous and glandular systems, his reflexes and emotions, his racial characteristics, and the like (biological heredity), with the sunshine, the weather, the soil, and other geographic features, and with the cultural traits of tools, techniques, customs, ideas, institutions, etc., and all of these with such factors of the social environment as associates, groups, mechanisms of imitation, suggestibility, and sympathy. If "interaction" can be said to go on among such a *mélange* of assorted factors, which is seriously to be questioned, it could hardly be said to constitute suitable subject matter for a science of sociology. If it can be so considered, then sociology calls for the services of supermen and begs for another name.

The authors rationalize the all-inclusiveness of their "science" by pointing out what to them seems well substantiated in practice, if not in logic, namely, that "sociology as confined to the study of the group processes has not had enough scope and vitality in its content to become established over such rich subject matters as are found in economics and political science." Therefore, they contend, "by widening the scope of sociology to include culture and especially by stressing the interrelation-

ships of culture, heredity, natural environment, and the group, sociology has increased its scope to considerable dimensions, and its body of knowledge now consists of 'big ideas' very well buttressed by concrete data" (p. iv). If the reviewer is not sadly mistaken, something quite different has characterized the development of sociology in America and in Europe. Moving away from the synthetic, over-all emphasis of a former day, the trend has been rather definitely in the direction of specialization, the refinement of concepts, the development and perfection of methodology, the rigorous analysis of empirical data, and the deducing of generalizations within the framework of systematized theory. Incidentally, the "rich subject matter" disciplines of economics and political science have been greatly enriched in recent years by the methodological and theoretical contributions of a sociological science which has as its central integrating principle the concept of *social interaction*. Unfortunately, in the book under discussion, the essentially social processes of interaction receive relatively little attention (principally in chaps. xii and xiii).

For some readers the first three parts of the book, embracing the first 241 pages, will be the least important from the sociological point of view. Their content, while being absorbingly interesting to persons who have had little opportunity to acquaint themselves with matters pertaining to cultural anthropology, biology, and geography, is biased in that the greater part of the emphasis is placed upon the influence of geographical environment upon culture, and upon the conditioning functions of culture, heredity, and the group upon personality development and disorganization. While the authors are careful to guard against giving the impression that they are one or more kinds of determinists, they come very close to leaving erroneous impressions by their massing of details from such examples as termites, the *Drosophila melanogaster*, race horses, the *Fundulus*, feral men, Gua, the chimpanzee, and the glandular equipment of dogs (Pl. 2, facing p. 206). The inferences drawn for personality and culture from comparisons between man and his native equipment and his learned ways of behaving, on the one hand, and the lower orders of animals and insects, on the other, are not only farfetched but also unnecessary in a truly sociological textbook. Whatever physical basis may exist for human personality lies within man himself and not in his simian, equine, and canine contemporaries.

Part IV, "Collective Behavior," is, on the whole, handled in a satisfactory manner, with the exception that the social processes call for more extended treatment than they receive. Clarity and a sounder perspective might have been obtained if the chapters dealing with the processes

(chaps. xii and xiii) had been introduced before chapter xi, "Status: Social Classes." This is a matter of opinion and cannot be considered a serious defect. Some of the illustrative material, such as the biography of Nicholas Murray Butler (pp. 258-60) and the pecking order of hens (pp. 373-75), is of dubious value.

Chapter xv, "The Distribution of Population," and chapter xvi, "The Growth of Population," seem out of place in their context between chapter xiv, "Human Ecology," and chapter xvii, "Characteristics of Communities," in Part V, "Communities." Such extended treatment of population can scarcely be justified in an introductory text on sociology, even though the materials on the subject are expertly presented. Criticism may be made of the manner of dealing with human ecology on the following grounds: (1) the concept is too narrowly delimited if it is to have sociological validity; (2) the processual character of social ecology is played down to the confines of a single paragraph (pp. 416-18); (3) the concept, once introduced, is dropped and never used again; and (4), finally and most importantly, the concept is not integrated into a larger and more inclusive sociological frame of reference.

In Part VI the social institutions (as if institutions could be other than "social") are discussed in relation to "the organization of society" (chap. xviii), in terms of their interrelationships (chap. xxiii), and as separate entities under the headings "Economic Institutions" (chap. xix), "Governmental Institutions" (chap. xx), "Religious Institutions" (chap. xxi), and "The Family" (chap. xxii). Here is to be found the usual discussion of institutions—their respective histories and descriptions of their natures and functions, supported by pertinent facts and statistical devices. There may be those who will miss the inclusion of certain other institutions found in our culture, such as the educational (treated briefly under government), the recreational, the social welfare, and possibly others. The chapter on the interrelationships of institutions is especially illuminating, but the treatment of institutions as a whole seems to me to be too divorced from the rest of the text and too remote from a system of sociology.

"Social Change" is the title of Part VII. Chapter xxiv deals with "The Growth of Culture," and, thus, the ever present cultural factor comes in for more expanded discussion. Social change is made synonymous with cultural change, and the latter is shown to be dependent upon invention and upon the receptiveness or nonreceptiveness of groups to new inventions (chaps. xxv and xxvi). The emphasis placed upon the social role of invention amounts to a kind of technological determinism. As

noted above, the authors are quite explicit in their notion that the "cultural" and the "social" are the same. "Cultural change" is "social change"; the cultural heritage is the social heritage. To this reviewer the position is untenable. The "social" includes the "cultural," and social change is effected by the operation of the social and ecological processes of interaction, operating, for the most part, within channels provided in the culture, to be sure, but frequently involving changed human relationships that effect culture not at all or not for a long time. Once again the criticism turns upon the inclusive meaning given by the authors to "culture" and upon the omnipotence they have ascribed to it.

In chapter xxvii "social disorganization" is represented as resulting "from conflict between the basic factors in human experience, that is, between geographical influences and culture, between heredity and culture, and between the various parts of culture." Herein may be found many of the so-called indices and causes of social disorganization, but a completely satisfactory *theory* of disorganization is lacking. The final chapter, entitled "The Adjustment of Man and Culture," is concerned with whether the course of the changes in the four basic factors in the social life of man is one of progress. On this point the authors acknowledge a measure of uncertainty, since "it seems impossible to find agreement or a scientific answer as to what progress is for a very long period ahead or for a great variety of cultures." In this respect they come out just about where all those have who have sought to examine the nature and prospects of progress. They close on a note of confidence that, despite many difficulties, the future will witness considerable forward movement through social planning.

It is a matter of great regret to me that I have been compelled by my convictions to take a generally adverse attitude toward this ambitious and honest book. As noted earlier in this review, it has many praiseworthy features, but in my judgment it falls far short of being a sound sociological treatise. It seems to me that it strikes an essentially non-sociological note in its central scheme and that it places too much emphasis upon details of biology, geography, and culture and too little upon the processes of social interaction. It may be that the authors are correct in suggesting that the book might possibly serve as a useful text in an orientation course. It might also be used as collateral reading with a systematic textbook in sociology, provided the teacher exercised a selective control over the portions assigned.

WARNER E. GETTYS

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Newer Knowledge of Nutrition. By E. V. McCOLLUM, E. ORIENT-KEILES, and H. G. DAY. 5th ed. New York: Macmillan Co., 1939. Pp. ix+701. \$4.50.

The title of this book raises at once the question of what this subject has to do with sociology. This is quite a legitimate question, and the need for an answer furnishes one of the reasons why a review of the book is desirable in a sociological journal. The justification may be pursued somewhat as follows: At one time last year representatives from the military establishments of England, France, Germany, Russia, and Italy came to a small town in Illinois to study the flour produced at a mill located there. They wanted to know how much thiamine was in the flour. Ordinary white flour contains only carbohydrates. Thiamine, or vitamin B₁, is called the "morale vitamin." Experiments have been reported indicating that healthy, vigorous, bouyant young people who are fed a diet deficient in B₁ become discouraged, listless, pessimistic, and depressed. One of the great problems of the army is to maintain morale, and hence a new invention which would keep thiamine in white flour is of sufficient interest to attract representatives from the great armies of Europe.

The subject of the morale of groups is admittedly in the field of sociology, although sociologists may be concerned only with scientific knowledge and not with its application. Group behavior and the relation of the individual to the group are at the very heart of sociology, as conceived by the writers of the last twenty-five years. Morale, of course, is a group phenomenon and is intimately connected with group-functioning. Social workers, heads of boys' clubs, and leaders of groups in general have as one of their major concerns the maintenance of morale. The sociologists' approach to this problem has usually been through social psychology—the use of symbols, leadership, propaganda, and other methods of psychologically influencing behavior. Now suppose nutrition also influences morale. Does that bring it into the realm of sociology, or should we ignore it saying that it is in the field of chemistry?

This illustration might be pursued quite a bit further if an article were being written instead of a book review. It may be suggested here, however, that it is quite possible that the biological foundations of human behavior may have been neglected by sociologists who either (a) wish to restrict sociology to the study of social psychological behavior in groups or (b) would rule out everything but culture. These attitudes are tending to become dogmas, and dogma is never a healthy attitude for science.

Dr. McCollum, of Johns Hopkins University, is one of the foremost

authorities in the world on the chemistry of foods, and he has written a book which is a model of scientific writing—clear, accurate, with a comprehensive survey of the experiments on both sides of the question. Yet it is readable, and its significance for the welfare of society is brought out by implication throughout the pages. McCollum contributes here and there from the field of nutrition some very interesting ideas that may be of interest to sociologists who do not restrict their field too narrowly. McCollum is responsible for the statement that mother-love is dependent upon manganese, for mother-rats fed a diet without manganese neglect their young and refuse to suckle them. Mother-love and the behavior of parents toward their offspring have been written about by sociologists in discussing the family, and they should also be interested in the relation of mother-love to sufficient manganese in the food. It may be remarked, as far as human mothers are concerned, that there seems to be no deficiency of manganese in the diet. Indeed, the opposite supposition might be entertained.

Recent experiments suggest that a person cannot be happy when there is a deficiency of calcium and phosphorus in his diet. The basis for this statement is that experiments show quite generally that irritability is the outstanding result of a deficiency in these two substances. It should be noted, however, that it is not claimed that an adequate supply of calcium and phosphorus will produce happiness. Again, should sociologists refuse to be interested in calcium and phosphorus because they are chemicals, even though they are definitely related to the behavior we sometimes refer to as indicating happiness? To cite another illustration, it is well recognized that birth control comes well within the subject of sociology. For some years it has been known that the reproductive systems of women who don't have enough vitamin E become disorganized and cannot bear children. Should not, therefore, vitamin E be of interest to sociologists?

Perhaps the readers of this review may think that I am laboring too much with the question of the field of sociology. Dropping that question for the moment, it is permissible to comment on the great and growing popular interest in the deficiency theory of nutrition. Indeed, the growth of interest in this subject, and the brilliant success of research in this field, makes us think at once that the deficiency theory may equal in significance the germ theory. The work of Pasteur and his contemporaries has revolutionized medicine and reorganized many of our social habits in regard to human welfare. The next twenty-five or fifty years may show the deficiency theory to be quite equal in importance to the germ theory. The

germ theory has the virtue of being a tool to prevent disease. So also does the deficiency theory. But the latter theory is more. It holds out the possibility of a positive improvement in human welfare. Through scientific feeding the white rat has been made over into a superrat; has become more healthy, more beautiful, more vigorous, more reproductive, and has a longer life. May there not be a possibility of producing in the future a superman? Should not such a possibility be of interest to sociologists?

W. F. OGBURN

University of Chicago

News and the Human Interest Story. By HELEN MACGILL HUGHES. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1940. Pp. xxiii+313. \$3.00.

The human-interest story stands somewhere between the news story and the fiction story. It shares with the news the reality of incident; it shares with fiction emphasis upon the universal characteristics of the event. For the first time a systematic study of the human-interest story has been completed, thus adding to the long series of original contributions to the studies of the newspaper that have been inspired by Robert E. Park through many years.

The natural history of the human-interest story associates it with the rise of the commercial press in the 1830's. The *New York Sun*, founded in 1833 by Benjamin Day, was the first great success in bringing gossip to the mechanics and artisans of the urban proletariat of New York City. Throughout the next hundred years the distinguishing mark of the press was the perfecting of news as commodity. Dr. Hughes follows this development of the profit-seeking principle with deftly selected details. During this period the chief function of the newspaper in the lives of the urban proletariat was to familiarize them with a new and ever widening world. Many of the workers had come from neighborhoods where their focus of attention had been narrowly circumscribed to local incidents. As they were brought in touch with the metropolitan universe of discourse, they found an interpreter in the cheap press. The human-interest story was one of the literary forms adapted to the needs of the "reader who moves his lips." The impersonality of the urban society was partly compensated by the tendency to personalize the newspaper. As Dr. Hughes remarks, "The aim of [the tabloids] and, one concludes, of all popular literature is, it would seem, to enable people to read each other's diaries."

Searching for a functional equivalent of the human-interest story of the metropolitan press of the United States, Dr. Hughes is particularly suc-

cessful. She calls attention to the *corrido*, or popular news ballad, that flourishes in Mexico, standing between the traditional folklore and the cheap papers and magazines. In earlier England she discovers the broadside ballad whose style and subject matter fits the generalized pattern that she is engaged in studying.

This admirable investigation has opened up many possible lines of investigation. Dr. Hughes has successfully shown that the human-interest story is very closely associated with the needs of people who are moving from local interests to widened participation in the world of modern life. Further investigations may establish dependable correlations between the needs of these people at successive stages of transition. To speculate, for a moment, along this line, we may call attention to the forms of anxiety that are involved in leaving home and facing a new and more complicated environment. There are varying degrees of sorrow at leave-taking, of joy at going away, of despair at the indifference of the new environment, of nostalgia, of embarrassment at not knowing one's way about, of sensitiveness to ridicule, of exposure to tricksters, of envy on the part of the stay-at-home for the traveler, of sympathy on the part of the stay-at-home for the one who must go away. There is little doubt that each of these emotional experiences is reflected in the thematic structure of the human-interest story and its equivalent, news ballads. Persons who detach themselves from extremely unfavorable environments may be expected to approach their new situation with very different sentiments from those who live in relatively well-integrated and well-endowed communities. The emotional needs of those who stay at home will be very different in the two situations. Further investigation along these lines, aided by more precise methods of analyzing the content of ballads and news stories, may enable us to establish far more refined correlations than are possible at this time.

Dr. Hughes has written a valuable monograph for the understanding of what the expectation of profit does to the contents of the printed channels of mass communication.

HAROLD D. LASSWELL

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What's Past Is Prologue. By MARY BARNETT GILSON. New York: Harper & Bros., 1940. Pp. 307. \$3.00.

This is an autobiography of one of the first successful women in the field of employment management, but it is not so much the story of Miss

Gilson's life as it is a commentary on the industrial life going on about her. The philosophy underlying her comments is of no particular brand. Although she bewails the retarded development of women in society as frequently as she bewails the stupidity of industrial management in handling labor problems, it would not be strictly accurate to attach the "feminist" label to Miss Gilson. Her ideas and feelings about industrial problems spring from varied experience as a branch librarian in a steel district, department-store salesgirl, vocational counselor, employment manager, research worker in labor problems, and university professor. She has sympathetic understanding of workers' and managers' points of view. With a minimum of sentimentalism she argues that the different interests can be harmonized and cites from her wide experience practical adjustments that resolved apparently hopeless conflicts.

WILLIAM M. LEISERSON

National Labor Relations Board

Sumner Today: Selected Essays of William Graham Sumner with Comments by American Leaders. Edited by MAURICE R. DAVIE. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1940. Pp. xxvi+194. \$2.50.

Sponsored by the William Graham Sumner Club, this volume contains sixteen of Sumner's essays, some important and some brief; twenty-eight comments on the essays by American "leaders"; a sketch of Sumner and a short statement of how he arrived at his conclusions, by his disciple, Professor Keller; an essay on Sumner by John Chamberlain; a Preface by Professor Davie; and a Foreword by the president of the Sumner Club, Mr. Peter. That this produces something of a potpourri is indicated by the fact that the reader's orientation is changed forty-nine times in two hundred and thirteen pages. It is all a little bewildering.

The original intention was to obtain an equal number of commentators from conservative and "liberal" ranks. The latter did not respond in so large numbers as the former, with the result that the book seems one-sided. Professor Sumner's laissez faire views are much more frequently indorsed than criticized, and even the critics tread so softly that one wonders if they are mice or men. Messrs. Evans Clark, Charles A. Beard, and Bruce Bliven are shining exceptions. The close limitation on the length of the comments, which is indicated by the fact that none of them runs more than five hundred words, gives them a fragmentary character. It might have been a better plan to have had a few commentators give their full reaction

to the whole of Sumner's system of thought. One would then have had something to bite into. Even as it is, however, a few interesting contrasts are brought out. For instance, in commenting upon "The Influence of Commercial Crises on Opinions about Economic Doctrines," the president of the Brookings Institution, Harold G. Moulton, says: "The most striking impression one gains from reading this address . . . is its applicability to present-day conditions," while the executive director of the Twentieth Century Fund, Evans Clark, says: "The sharpest impression I get from reading Dr. Sumner's address . . . is its incredible antiquity."

Those who believe that a conceptual framework is a prerequisite to the gathering of facts will wonder how Sumner ever achieved what he did if he worked in the manner Professor Keller describes. He read voraciously in thirteen languages. The resulting 150,000 sheets of notes were classified and reclassified under common-sense headings. "The only principle he seems to have had in mind was that like should go with like. . . ." Perhaps his work proves what a great mind can accomplish in spite of cumbersome methods.

ROBERT C. ANGELL

University of Michigan

Man against Himself. By KARL A. MENNINGER. New York: Harcourt Brace & Co., 1938. Pp. xii+485. \$3.75.

Menninger attempts to account for suicide and phenomena related to self-destruction, including various types of mental and physical disorders, from the orthodox psychoanalytical point of view. The author takes as his point of departure the observation that popular analysis of suicide almost invariably takes it to be an escape from an intolerable life-situation, whereas, as he seeks to point out, the more important determining factors are the unconscious tendencies on the part of the individual who commits suicide.

Three major unconscious motives for suicide are discussed: (1) the wish to kill; (2) the wish to be killed; and (3) the wish to die. The wish to kill—which is innate by hypothesis—is often turned back upon the wisher and carried into effect in suicide when robbed of its external target. The self in this case is unconsciously used as a substitute for the external object by the process of identification or introjection. The wish to be killed, including its erotic component, comes from the need for punishment for having acted against one's own conscience, which is also believed to be derived from a portion of the original aggressive instincts, transformed

here into an internal judge. And the wish to die—a frank expression of the death instinct—is said to be most clearly seen in cases of the mountain climbers and automobile racers, in which the desire for social recognition is considered as relatively irrelevant. The fountainhead of these various unconscious tendencies is believed to be the “original stream of self-destructive energy” with which we are born, i.e., the death instinct. Numerous cases studied by the author and others are cited as illustrations, constituting a rather imposing body of empirical data, which is clinically verifiable but amenable to variant interpretations.

The highly speculative character of the theory of the death instinct is admitted by the author himself. From the sociological point of view, a few additional questions may be raised. First, while the popular analysis of suicide in terms of external situations alone is obviously inadequate, there seems to be no good reason to identify all unconscious tendencies on the part of the individual with an instinct or instincts, for unconscious impulses are not necessarily inborn. In fact, in the author's presentation of clinical material, the repressed impulses that lead to suicide are in every case shown to have developed under specific social situations and to have been directed toward specific social objects. One wonders how logically it is possible for a single specific tendency to be thought of as both inborn and acquired at the same time. Second, while the turning-back of externally directed aggression upon the self or the inflicting of punishment upon self at the dictate of one's own conscience are no doubt some of the fundamental mechanisms involved in the suicidal act, it still remains to be explained how the self became an object in the first place and how the ability to act toward one's self as one would toward others or as others would toward self came about. As far as we know, no living forms equipped only with instincts are capable of such performances. Third, suicide seems to be possible only when man considers his status in society, real or imaginary, as far more important than mere biologic existence. It is difficult to see how this cardinal fact is accounted for by the instinctivist approach. And last, the logical conclusion of the theory of the death instinct as to the future of mankind is naturally pessimistic. Freud has well said in answer to Einstein's question about war, “It is useless to try to eliminate the aggressive tendencies of men.” Accordingly, the author's most important program of reconstruction consists of ways to redirect these supposedly innate aggressive impulses from improper to proper objects. But since specific aggressive impulses, as amply shown by the author's own clinical material, are almost always developed under ascertainable social situations, especially during one's early childhood, would it not be equally

logical to believe that the elimination of such aggressive impulses is not entirely beyond possibility? The phenomenon of suicide, for example, has been found by competent anthropologists to be practically unknown among the Pueblos, whereas among the Dobuans it is common. It is doubtful that instincts have anything to do with this difference.

All these questions, it is believed, may be better elucidated by taking fully into account the social and cultural factors involved in the development of any personality, which factors confront the psychoanalysts in almost every analytic session but which so far have been theoretically ignored by most of them. Excepting this highly speculative hypothesis, the book as a body of clinical data will be found stimulating and suggestive by many sociologists.

BINGHAM DAI

Fisk University

Human Nature Writ Large: A Social Psychologic Survey and Western Anthropology. By F. CREEDY. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1939. Pp. 484. \$3.00.

For at least one member of the sociological public this is not a book to be abstracted in a brief review. Through a grim irony this most unorthodox of social psychological volumes elicits the oldest cliché of the reviewer's art. This is, indeed, a "thought-provoking book." It is nominally an analysis of modern social institutions; through an arresting style, provocative observations, and colligation of the most diverse materials, it becomes a medium for instructive insights, even though occasional interpretations are far from compelling assent. Creedy's "social psychology" is an amalgam of variegated theoretical conceptions. It derives most fully from McDougall, Pareto, Marx, Freud, Veblen, Malinowski, and the logical positivists. Creedy achieves his most suggestive results by means of what Kenneth Burke has called "perspective through incongruity." His conceptual framework is disjointed and unintegrated. Withal, this is a book to be read by sociologists who are not averse to a work of fertile hypotheses, rationalistic codes of ethics, and a brave effort to effect a logistic formulation of sociological problems. Such readers will have a rewarding though sometimes disconcerting experience. In his Foreword, Malinowski records his conviction that this is "one of the most important recent contributions to social psychology."

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ABSTRACTS OF PERIODICAL LITERATURE¹

The persons who have aided in the preparation of the material for this issue are: Donald L. Foley, James Fontana, Hubert Bonner, and Everett K. Wilson. The numerals and letters appearing after each abstract correspond to the items in the following scheme of classification:

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|---------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| I. THEORETICAL SOCIOLOGY | e) The State and Political Process |
| a) Sociological Theory | f) The School and Education |
| b) History of Sociology | g) Economic Institutions |
| c) Methods of Research | h) Voluntary Associations |
| d) The Teaching of Sociology | IV. POPULATION AND HUMAN ECOLOGY |
| II. SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY | a) Demography |
| a) Human Nature and Personality | b) Ecology |
| b) Collective Behavior | c) The Rural and the Urban Community |
| III. SOCIAL ORGANIZATION | V. DISORGANIZATION |
| a) The Family | a) Personal Disorganization |
| b) Ethnic and Racial Groups | b) Social Disorganization |
| c) Social Stratification | |
| d) The Church and Religion | |

396. Notes on Some Population Data from a Southern Nigerian Village.—Many difficulties arise when interpreting and analyzing some data from a southern Nigerian village. This village is the large semi-Bantu village of Umor situated a few miles east of the lower Cross River in Obubra division and composed of thirty-one residential groups. Observations of primitive peoples are seldom available over a long period of time. Statisticians regard them as an unofficial census. Exact ages are usually unknown. Nothing more than a rough approximation to fertility rates can be hoped for. One may ask whether anything can be deduced from census statistics when there is little available information about age composition. Fortunately, one index may be known with accuracy. This is the ratio of minors to adults at a given time. Among primitive people the transition from adolescence to maturity is a notable event. Age groups and limits can usually be known. Taken by itself, this index gives no exact reproductive capacity, but it can be compared with ratios found in other communities in which the reproductive capacity is known. The smallness of the Ndai group of households and the lack of exact information make any precise statement about reproductive capacity impossible. But the known facts suggest a high reproductive capacity. Detailed evidence, obtained from a census of the Ndai group in the Ukpakapi ward, indicates a rapid growth of population during the last fifty years. At the time of the census the sex ratio was abnormal—186 wives in households of 109 married men. This excess of wives is explained by the influx of foreign women who became wives of males without

¹ Since the editors are trying to bring up to date the abstracting of significant articles since the termination of the *Social Science Abstracts*, occasionally there will be abstracts of articles published several years ago.

any departure of native women. Umor received an accession of population by purchase of foreign children. There is no significant difference in the proportion of polygamous marriages in the different age groups. Over one-half of the men have more than one wife, but less than a fifth have more than two wives. Instances of men with four or five wives are exceptional. The practice of polygamy makes possible larger families.—Enid Charles and C. Daryll Forde, *Sociological Review*, XXX (1938), 145-60. (IVa.) J. F.

397. Calvinisme et capitalisme l'expérience genevoise [Calvinism and Capitalism in Genevan Experience].—Max Weber, discussing the Protestant ethic and the development of capitalism, suggested the influence of the concept of predestination upon daily life and transformation of monastic asceticism into a spirit of frugality. This theory has not yet been applied to the Genevans themselves, which is the object of this study. Calvin preached not against satisfaction of human needs through capitalistic practice but against the abuse of such practices. Documents in Genevan archives indicate that the setting of a limited rate was more effective than a total prohibition frequently circumvented and that the struggle against the abuse of usury made it at first difficult or impossible to establish banks at Geneva. While in Spain a great era of overseas traffic and enormous profits nearly led to a break with the church which steadfastly prohibited interest-taking, in Geneva the limit was raised to 6½ per cent with a tolerance of 1 per cent, although in commercial dealings it was in fact often 8 per cent. Later the rate was lowered. Calvin had correctly reserved his criticism for those who take advantage of the weakness or need of the borrower. Geneva at the beginning of the sixteenth century was an ordinary town with a nucleus of artisans and small merchants. Clergy and noblemen acquired more wealth than entrepreneurs. The Reformation involved serious economic disturbances. In these circumstances Calvin came to Geneva, later imposing a strict regime. Far from being asceticism, his restrictions were motivated only by necessity for maintaining a moral and religious order. Capitalism remained primitive in form. Everywhere the practice of religion was a barrier against abuse. The first half of the seventeenth century was a period of traditional Calvinism with few exceptions. Evidence indicates that Genevan simplicity of habits was a matter of practical necessity. Interest-taking became recognized and customary. Direct evidence of religious influence is lacking. Geneva took its place in the capitalist movement. The second half of the nineteenth century saw modification of religious beliefs involving a depreciation of Calvinistic formalities and ecclesiastical power and increasing emphasis on the role of the conscience in daily life. Production also underwent changes, and new currents of immigration followed the Edict of Nantes. Geneva had always taken advantage of its intermediary role in international traffic. The resulting movement of capital favored the establishment here of merchant-bankers. There was a demarcation between the business world, where one might follow his interests within the limits of honesty, and religious life, with its Christian duties. During the first twenty years of the eighteenth century reaction against Calvinistic authority crystallized. Commercial and financial capitalism developed in response to international conditions. By 1705 the bank at Geneva was of international importance. The financial customs of Paris rather than concern over morality was the dominant influence. An active capitalism, furnishing the means of growth to commerce and industry, supplanted a passive capitalism of the exchange. Secularism increased. The legend spread abroad of the influence exercised by rigorous Protestantism. Actually the Genevans were at first only cambists. Experience in business, confidence arising from professional ability, and integrity in transactions established their position. Weber's idea was that the current liberalism permitted a distortion of dogma, thus lending spiritual support to capitalistic enterprise. But when theologians were hardly concerned with matters of predestination and the lifework, it is not likely that Protestant businessmen would have sought doctrinal justification. Asceticism does not apply to the Genevan businessmen. At most theirs was a frugality in the service of personal interest. Their integrity was the result less of fundamental Calvinism than of daily experience. Two errors must be corrected: the Genevans were not completely angelic in business, and, second, they did not, contrary to the whole tendency of their thinking, pretend to justify their worldly appetites through their religion.—André-E. Sayous, *Annales d'histoire économique et sociale*, VII (1935), 225-44. (III d, g.) E. K. W.

398. **Social Class Differences in Frequency of Marriage.**—If characters socially recognizable as desirable or otherwise are related to social classes and are inheritable, the contribution of each social class to the next generation's population is important. A factor affecting this differential contribution is differential frequency of marriage. A measure of the frequency of marriage in each social class is the proportion of married men aged forty-five to fifty-four per 1,000 occupied men of the same ages in each social class. The classes are divided as follows. Class I: upper and middle (subdivided into Class Ia, professional occupations, and Class Ib, others in Class I); Class II: intermediate; Class III: skilled; Class IV: intermediate; Class V: unskilled. (Class I is subdivided into Ia and Ib because the people, though placed in the same class, do not move in the same social circle.) These classes are studied through three census periods. The study shows that there are differences between social classes in the frequency of marriage, the largest difference being between Class V and the others. In 1911 the social classes, arranged according to decreasing frequency of marriage, were in this order: II, III, IV, Ib, Ia, V. Differences except that between Classes III and IV were statistically significant. The order was the same in 1921 but ten years later was III, II, Ia, IV, Ib, V. Great variation in frequency of marriage is found between occupations in each social class. Frequency of marriage has shown an upward trend in each group, especially in Class V and Class Ia. Differences in frequency of marriage between social classes shows a decreasing tendency except for the differences between Classes II and III and III and IV.—K. T. Lim, *Sociological Review*, XXXI (1939), 309-27. (IIIc, IVa.) E. K. W.

399. **La Ville étudiée dans ses quartiers: autour des Halles de Paris au moyen âge** [The City Studied by Districts: The Paris Market Place in the Middle Ages].—A city's increase of population may be accommodated in two ways: by vertical construction and the utilization of internal open spaces or by the development of the city on its periphery in the course of which it may envelop outlying settlements. Thus the great market place, set up at the beginning of the twelfth century on the edge of the city of Paris and occupying today a central position, is an example of a district pushing to the periphery of a city and becoming subsequently an active, internal unit. The construction of the wall of Philippe Auguste hastened the peopling of the district and determined on the west and north the form of road construction in concentric fashion parallel to the wall. The market place clearly prompted the convergence of the three main streets from the northwest. Philippe Auguste had covered buildings constructed and guarded by a night watchman. He was thus the virtual creator of the market district. Here gathered merchants from near and far, selling goods and making commercial exchanges with foreigners. Traffic was mostly in fabricated materials, but some foodstuffs were also marketed. At the center of the market place were the pillories, a fountain, and a cross. Concentration of buyers, sellers, and onlookers was so great that markets overflowed out along radial streets, even invading a neighboring cemetery. The entire district became specialized and marked with this particular function. Merchants lived as near their work as possible, those of like trade dwelling in the same district. Ancillary services of hotels and taverns flourished. Vagabonds, irregular workers, and beggars were numerous. The district, on the whole, was one of poor people. The market place was a center of political activity. Here the dauphin Charles went to seek support of the people. In this district, authority sought to repress revolutionary tendencies. Thus this district has come to form a delimited area, demographically, economically, and socially distinct and specialized as a result of the market place. Similar studies of each district of Paris will yield enlightening explanations of much of the capital's history, especially its civil turmoil.—A. Jourdain, *Annales d'histoire économique et sociale*, VII (1935), 285-301. (IVa, b, c.) E. K. W.

400. **Esquisse sur les populations syriennes** [A Sketch of the Syrian People].—Syria's present population composition and social organization must be understood in the light of the country's historical position: as the junction point of international trade routes between three continents, as an interstitial area between the world's two great civilizations, as a mixing ground of two races (the white and the brown), and as the battleground of three great religions. The primary element in Syria's social structure has traditionally been the religious community. In 1931-33 there were approximately

2,535,000 Moslems, 72,000 Christians, 25,000 Jews, and 14,000 of other religious faiths. The Moslems have been predominant in government, in landownership, and in social prestige. They have, by preference, lived in the great plains of the interior; the other religious minority communities have lived in the mountains and on the seacoast. Nominally, the government recognizes all religions. Actually, however, the non-Moslems form vassal states, having at their heads patriarchs or rabbis who are in turn responsible to the sultan. Firmans enumerate the civil powers that these leaders of the minority religious groups may exercise. To a large extent each religious community tends to perpetuate its own differentiated and autonomous social life. The Syrian family is not recognized in civil law; its form and regulation are wholly religious. In the Moslem communities, particularly, the families are patriarchal in rule; women play an inferior role in society. Endogamy strengthens the differentiation between communities. The religious differences that are reflected in the traditional family patterns form the crux of Syrian society's heterogeneity. Until recently the country has been almost wholly agricultural, and here the Moslems have been masters. Commerce, concentrated in the cities, has been run mainly by Christians and Jews. Great social changes are disturbing the religious phase of Syrian social organization: non-Moslems have been penetrating the interior, particularly into the cities there; cultural merging has broken down the former rather pure state of each religious community; in the cities, especially, secularization is gradually breaking the monopoly of religion in social control and the religious communities are gradually being replaced by economic classes. The second great element in Syrian society is the Arab tribe. The family is their basic unit. As an extended family, yet smaller than the entire clan, is the *hammouleh*, including the descendants of any one ancestor as determined by their kinship system. A still larger unit, the *achireh*, has the characteristics of a clan. The total of all these elements constitutes the *kabileh*, or tribe, which is ruled by the sheik or chief. Tribes vary in mode of life from almost completely nomadic to almost completely sedentary. Warfare is an important and fairly frequent feature of the tribe's life, such conflict being between tribes or sometimes between factions of the same tribe. These are settled by pacts which offer a breathing period, forming of alliances, or regulation of the territory over which respective tribes may roam. The third, and growing, element in Syrian society is the class. In the past the honorary hereditary Moslem landowning aristocracy constituted the highest class in a sort of feudal system. Working the land were the *fellohs*, or peasants. Outside the bounds of these huge estates roamed the tribes, more or less classless in nature. With the influx of commerce and industry the highest social class is being invaded by the rich or influential. In the cities a middle class has been springing into existence comprising the business and professional men. Unions are being formed, and class consciousness is growing. The progressive stages of social organization—tribal organization, feudal organization, and national society—are all found in Syria. An irrational loyalty to a religious community or to a tribe rather than to any area has characterized the Syrians throughout history. But now this conservative, static, religious-social organization is gradually breaking down. The former loyalty is being transferred to the Syrian state, particularly among the urban lower and middle classes. A national spirit is being felt. But it is the spirit of the Arab more than of Syria.—Edmond Rabbath, *Revue internationale de sociologie*, XLVI (1938), 443-525 (IIIb.) D. L. F.

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ECONOMIC FACTORS IN THE MORALE OF COLLEGE-TRAINED ADULTS

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ABSTRACT

The morale of 951 college-trained adults was measured on the Rundquist-Sletto morale scale. Fifty factors operating in the economic life of the high- and low-morale persons were tested for their possible association with morale. Clusters of factors reveal that morale is associated with financial security, the social approval which the holder feels he has acquired from his job, the opportunity he feels he has for advancement, and the returns he feels he is getting for his labor.

The problem.—Economic factors are often stressed as factors of prime importance in influencing the morale of the individual. While research has been conducted to test this belief among the unemployed,¹ little systematic effort has been given to the study of economic factors functioning in the morale of the employed person. This investigation was conducted in order to identify the economic factors associated with well-educated, employed persons of high and low morale.

The postulate was set forth that the morale of any individual is partly explained by the nature of the social situation which he contacts and partly by how the individual feels that some purpose or value of his own is affected by the situation.² In conformity with

¹ O. Milton Hall, *Attitudes and Unemployment* ("Archives of Psychology," No. 165 [New York: Columbia University Press, 1934]); E. A. Rundquist and R. F. Sletto, *Personality in the Depression* (Minneapolis, 1936).

² This postulate comes from an interpretation of James M. Reinhardt, "Personality Traits and the Situation," *American Sociological Review*, II (1937), 492-500. The postu-

this premise structural parts of the economic situation such as occupation, income, stability, and regularity of employment were examined. Likewise, such social-psychological reactions as attitudes of each person regarding the characteristics of his job and of the economic order were sought.

In an earlier study it has been demonstrated that institutional factors in the social environment are associated with morale. As the social conditions range from what society calls desirable to undesirable, a tendency exists for the morale of adults living in these conditions to range from high to low. The combination of the institutional factors associated with morale into a general expectancy table provides a useful empirical basis to predict the probabilities of high or low morale in the individual case. The social environment, however, is only a setting for social participation. The individual organizes his habits, attitudes, and wishes within a social milieu. Culture defines the desirable goals and persons strive for them. We come closer to the prediction and explanation of morale as the wishes of individuals are identified and as their success in achieving goals is evaluated.³

This report is concerned with a statistical description of both those institutional and those social-psychological factors in the economic environment which are associated with morale.

The population sample studied.—This investigation is only one part of a comprehensive research being conducted at the University of Minnesota.⁴ A grant of money was made available in 1937 to the General College for a thorough inquiry into the lives of former University of Minnesota students who had left the university from one to thirteen years before 1937. Sixteen hundred persons were selected

late was regarded as a hypothesis in a previous study where it was experimentally tested (see D. C. Miller, "The Morale of College Trained Adults," *American Sociological Review*, V [December, 1940], 880-89).

³ D. C. Miller, "Personality Factors in the Morale of College Trained Adults," *Sociometry*, III (October, 1940), 367-82.

⁴ See C. Robert Pace, *General College Adult Study in the General College Staff Report on Problems and Progress of the General College* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1939), pp. 171-258. Books are to be published reporting this research during the year under the sponsorship of the General Education Board.

in order that the sample might be representative of those who enter the university and constitute the collégiate population. Of the 1,600 cases, 800 were of each sex, and these were subdivided to 200 of each sex who entered the university as Freshmen in the school years 1924-25, 1925-26, 1928-29, 1929-30. The number drawn from each college was proportional to the total entering enrolment in the college of science, literature, and arts and in the colleges of agriculture, engineering, and education. These colleges absorb the major share of entering students. While maintaining these proportions, the sample was drawn randomly from alphabetical lists.

Collection of data.—Members of the General College staff co-operatively built the questionnaire which was selected to gather the wide range of information desired. The four major areas of vocational life, home and family life, social-civic life, and personal life were selected as a framework to guide the preparation of questions and the selection of scales of measurement. Specialists in test construction assumed the responsibility of putting the items in acceptable technical form. More than six months of effort were given to the process of phrasing, criticism by conference, rephrasing, and final adoption of items. Standardized scales were included to measure job satisfaction, economic status, cultural status, political attitudes, general adjustment, and morale. The final questionnaire forms were brought together in a printed booklet of fifty-two pages, illustrated with thirty photographs identifying the various activities of social life. A sample of 300 university graduates, not included in the 1,600, was used to test various problems experimentally. Dull, difficult, ambiguous, and infrequently checked sections were identified and eliminated.⁵

Questionnaires were then delivered to 1,381 persons. There were 951 usable replies received after using five follow-up notices. This represents 59 per cent of the 1,600 and 69 per cent of those who received the questionnaire. A review of the characteristics of those answering points to the general conclusion that the sample is a young, middle-class, and urban group of adults select in intelligence

⁵ Two valuable articles about this questionnaire have been published. See C. Robert Pace, "Factors Influencing Questionnaire Returns from Former University Students," *Journal of Applied Psychology*, XXIII (June, 1939), 388-97; Raymond F. Sletto, "Pretesting of Questionnaires," *American Sociological Review*, V (April, 1940), 193-200.

and educational training. The validity which the findings of this study possess is applicable only to the social strata from which the sample was drawn. Any application of these findings to other groups should be made in a tentative manner.

The measurement of morale.—The morale of the 951 adults has been measured by the Rundquist and Sletto morale scale. The inventors have said that the scale measures the degree to which the individual feels competent to cope with the future and to achieve his desired goals. The scale was completed and furnished with available norms in 1936. Reliability coefficients for the scale range from .70 to .80.⁶

Classification of the economic factors.—The investigation brought together data on fifty economic factors for both men and women. These were classified as (1) institutional factors and (2) social-psychological factors. The institutional factors are objective in the sense that they represent factors in the structure of the economic situation and are easily verified by independent observers who may examine written records. The social-psychological factors are subjective in the sense that they represent how the adults feel about their jobs. They are probably somewhat less stable and are more difficult to verify.

Techniques of testing for significance.—In order to find the factors associated with morale the technique of examining the difference between high- and low-morale groups was followed. This meant that a definition of high and low morale had to be made. The distribution of morale scores was secured from an application of the Rundquist-Sletto morale scale. Extremes of an approximately normal distribution were selected for analysis. Out of 478 men, 100 who had the highest and 100 who had the lowest morale scores were selected. For the women a similar procedure was followed. Out of 473 women, a group of 100 women of highest morale and a group of 100 women of lowest morale were selected. These very high- and very low-morale persons of each sex were compared on 50 variables. Differences in the proportions were examined and tested for statistical significance.⁷

⁶ Rundquist and Sletto, *op. cit.*, pp. 110-38. The morale scale is administered as *Minnesota Survey of Opinions* (short form), published by the University of Minnesota Press.

⁷ This test is made by computing the standard error of the difference between two given proportions and then by finding the ratio between the observed difference and the

INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS

Morale as related to occupational classifications.—Is high morale more general in the higher or in the lower occupational classes? To answer this question we have grouped our 200 men—100 of high morale and 100 of low morale—and our 200 women—100 of high morale and 100 of low morale—into the seven categories of the Minnesota Occupational Rating Scale. These categories are as follows: I, professional workers; II, executives and managers; III, retail

TABLE 1
HIGH- AND LOW-MORALE GROUPS BY
OCCUPATIONAL CLASSIFICATION

MINNESOTA OCCUPATIONAL CLASSIFICATION	MEN			WOMEN		
	Percent- age High Morale N=100	Percent- age Low Morale N=100	Critical Ratio	Percent- age High Morale N=100	Percent- age Low Morale N=100	Critical Ratio
I. Professional.	33	33	20	23
II. Executives and managers	31	14	+2.94	14	8	+1.49
III. Retail and skilled.	18	26	-1.37	12	23	-2.07
IV. Agricultural.	1	1	5	7
V. Small proprietors, minor clerks, semi-skilled.	11	17	0	1
VI. Apprentices, etc.	4	5	0	0
VII. Unskilled laborers.	1	2	0	0
VIII. Housewives.	0	0	48	37	+1.58
No data.	1	2	1	1
Combined classes (III+IV+ V+VI+VII).	35	51	-2.31	17	31	-2.37

+C.R. indicates higher percentage with high morale.

-C.R. indicates higher percentage with low morale.

dealers, clerical and skilled workers; IV, the agricultural group; V, small proprietors, minor clerks, and semi-skilled workers; VI, apprentices, watchmen, elevator operators, etc.; VII, unskilled laborers. An eighth category is added for convenience of this study. It includes all housewives.

Table 1 gives separately for men and women of high and low standard error of the difference. This ratio is commonly called the critical ratio. A critical ratio of 3.0 practically assures that the observed difference is not due to chance fluctuations. The probability that a difference with a critical ratio of 3.0 is due to chance is about 1 in 370. Whenever critical ratios of 3.0 and above are found, it is practically a certainty that observed differences with such critical ratios are significant, that is to say, the differences are due to other than mere chance factors.

morale the number in each occupational group. That number is also the percentage since 100 cases are reported in each array. Critical ratios of the difference between proportions in the occupational groups have been computed whenever it seemed that a factor might be associated with morale. The use of the critical ratio may be seen by examining the differences noted above in the men who are executives and managers. In the case of low-morale men there are 14 per cent; for high-morale, 31 per cent. The observed difference is 17 per cent. The standard error of this difference is 5.78 per cent. The critical ratio is +2.94. The plus sign signifies association with high morale. There are approximately three chances in a thousand that such a difference could have occurred by chance. We may have confidence that a significantly large proportion of these men in executive and managerial positions have high morale. In the case of women a critical ratio of +1.49 gives less confidence that high morale is associated with women managers and executives. There are thirteen chances in one hundred that the observed difference could have occurred solely by chance.

Professional people show no significant difference in morale. Exactly as many men display high as display low morale. This may be explained by the fact that professional persons may react to their comparative security in two general ways. Some accept the *status quo* and exhibit their satisfaction with the rewards of the high-status position which they have secured. Perhaps, by virtue of their training and daily contact, almost an equal number are so alive to the suffering of contemporary society that, although they themselves occupy relatively secure and respected positions, vicarious experiences resulting from identification fill them with discontent.

An interesting question which might be raised is why executives and managers tend to exhibit high morale more often than low morale when there is no difference observed in the professional ranks. Discussing this with sociologists, the interpretation most commonly accepted is the one which stresses the selective nature of the managerial or executive functions. These require energetic, optimistic personalities who believe that they can achieve goals set for themselves and their subordinates. There must also be taken into consideration the fact that the position of an executive in a social hierarchy is conspicuous, commands deference, and satisfies pride.

Low morale is exhibited by both men and women in the lower occupational ranks. This does not mean that an association has been demonstrated with each of these ranks (III, IV, V, VI, VII). In most instances the number of cases is too small to make such an investigation. However, we can say with confidence that on the basis of the cumulative differences more low-morale people are at work in these occupational ranks. Social-psychological reactions to be reported later in this paper throw some light on this occurrence. Of all the reactions distinguishing high- and low-morale men, the approval of the job by family and friends is the most important. Some college-trained persons are working at jobs which actually require less training and ability than they have to offer or less than they think they have to offer. Their morale is probably influenced by what they think their family and friends believe to be the achievement levels of their occupations.

Housewives tend to show high morale, but we cannot have confidence that an association has been demonstrated. The findings may be summarized by these statements: (1) Morale is not associated with professional occupations. (2) Executives and managers tend to have high morale. (3) Lower occupational ranks (III, IV, V, VI, VII) hold more low-morale persons. (4) All the above statements are true for both men and women. (5) It is believed that any differences (other than chance differences arising from sampling) between men and women in the various occupational groups can be explained largely by the cultural role assigned to the members of the two sexes.

Morale as related to income.—It is not uncommon for the person with low morale to explain his inability to reach his goals because of insufficient income. Income was reported in step intervals of \$500. By examining the distribution it was found that \$2,000 was a critical income. Table 2 shows that men and women with incomes under \$2,000 tend to have low morale, whereas those with incomes above \$2,000 tend to have high morale. Are the observed differences statistically significant?

We may have great confidence in the association of high morale in men with high income.⁸ Morale does not seem to be associated with the income which women receive.⁹ A separate search was made to

⁸ C.R. = +3.36.

⁹ C.R. = +1.09.

see if any associations could be detected if the women were divided into the subclasses of single, housewife, and married and working. Of these three classes, only the housewives showed higher morale when the family income was above \$2,000, but the difference was not statistically significant. It is probably true that the man faces the major responsibility in providing the income for a family. The ability to provide income commensurate with the expectations of his

TABLE 2
HIGH- AND LOW-MORALE GROUPS BY ECONOMIC FACTORS

INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS	MEN					WOMEN				
	Per- cent- age High Mo- rale	Cases	Per- cent- age Low Mo- rale	Cases	Critical Ratio	Per- cent- age High Mo- rale	Cases	Per- cent- age Low Mo- rale	Cases	Critical Ratio
<i>Income:</i>										
Below \$2,000.....	36	99	60	98	-3.36	58	90	66	85	-1.09
Above \$2,000.....	64	99	40	98	+3.36	42	90	34	85	+1.09
<i>Age:</i>										
23-29.....	46	100	63	99	-2.44	56	100	59	98
30-44.....	54	100	37	99	+2.44	44	100	41	98
<i>Regularity of income:</i>										
Income regular, Yes...	83	92	68	97	+2.44	87	69	92	74
<i>Stability of employment:</i>										
Employment steady,										
Yes.....	92	97	77	97	+2.95	85	67	87	75
<i>Hours worked per week:</i>										
20-44 hours.....	27	96	43	96	-2.48	46	69	63	71	-2.05
45 hours and over.....	73	96	57	96	+2.48	54	69	37	71	+2.05
<i>Financial plans for old age:</i>										
Yes.....	92	98	68	99	+4.42	79	93	56	87	+3.39

+C.R. indicates higher percentage for high morale.

-C.R. indicates higher percentage for low morale.

own and his family's living standard probably influences the morale of the male adult considerably.

Morale as related to age.—Age has important cultural and occupational definitions. In our group of adults approximately half had an opportunity to become established in their initial jobs before the depression years. The other half, which are the younger members, left the college to seek jobs in the depression years. Is age related to morale?

Table 2 shows a summary of the information gathered originally for all cases in terms of an interval of one year. The younger male adults have low morale.²⁰ Promotions which would have come to

²⁰ For men twenty-five years to twenty-nine years as compared with men thirty to forty-four, C.R. = -2.44.

them in an expanding economy have been denied them. Their opportunity to earn the income which they may have anticipated in the golden years of the twenties has not been readily available. From interviews with nearly two hundred of the adults, it is known that they have postponed marriage in many cases because they have not attained their expected income or it is irregular or uncertain.

There is no association of morale with age of women. This may be explained by the fact that women are not usually as expectant or dependent upon promotion. This is especially true of housewives. For the women who work (approximately one-half of the women in this sample do work) advancing age and maturity would be an advantage in some occupations; in others, it would be a disadvantage. It might be suspected that these contradictory elements would neutralize the differences which may appear in such cases.

Regularity of income and stability of employment.—Security is an almost universal wish. A regular income as a contribution to financial security may be as important as the size of income. The subjects were asked to indicate the characteristics of their job by checking "Yes," "Uncertain," or "No" in answer to each item in a list of job characteristics. Many of these require the individual to express his judgment. Of these items, two seemed objective enough to warrant confidence that they represent easily verifiable information. They are presented as sociological factors.

The first is "Income is regular." Eighty-three per cent of the men of high morale marked this "Yes"; 68 per cent of the men of low morale marked this "Yes." The critical ratio gives us confidence that regularity of income is related to high morale.¹¹

Of the high-morale women 87 per cent marked the same statement "Yes"; 92 per cent of the low-morale women marked it in the affirmative. This is a negligible difference. A comparison of high-morale women with high-morale men likewise shows a negligible difference, while a comparison of a low-morale group of women with a low-morale group of men shows a difference of 24 per cent.¹² This greater regularity of income for women can be explained by referring to the occupational rankings. Whereas over 20 per cent of the men are in occupational classes below III, only about 9 per cent of the

¹¹ C.R. = +2.44.

¹² C.R. = -4.22.

women who work are in these classes. These occupations are more unstable, and income is less regular. College-trained women who continue to work rather than marry either entered or move to the upper occupational ranks.

In answer to the question, "Is your employment steady?" 92 per cent of the high-morale men said "Yes"; only 77 per cent of the low-morale men said "Yes." This factor may be said to be demonstrated as associated with morale.¹³ For women, answers to the same question brought an 85 per cent "Yes" from high-morale cases and an 87 per cent "Yes" from low-morale cases. This difference is negligible.

Our proposition that in a greater majority of cases the jobs of the working women (113 cases) are more steady than those of the working males (200 cases) is partly affirmed by a comparison of the low-morale men with low-morale women on the stability of their employment. A difference of 10 per cent favoring the women is observed.¹⁴ This again indicates a greater stability of the employment for women. The finding is corroborated by S. A. Stouffer and Paul Lazarsfeld.¹⁵

Hours worked per week.—What, if any, relation is there between the number of hours worked per week and morale? Our data show that those working less than forty-five hours a week tend to have low morale.¹⁶ Table 2 summarizes the distribution.

The explanation for the low morale associated with working less than forty-five hours a week must certainly be based on information regarding the stability of the employment and the wage rate received. It seems feasible to suppose that these factors are unfavorably related to this smaller time span.

Financial plans for old age.—Financial security is strengthened by plans for financing old age. When asked if they had made such plans, 92 per cent of the high-morale men said "Yes"; only 68 per cent of the low-morale men said "Yes." We have confidence that this factor is definitely associated with morale.¹⁷ For women similar results are

¹³ C.R. = +2.95.

¹⁴ C.R. = -1.73.

¹⁵ *Research Memorandum on the Family in the Depression* (New York, 1936).

¹⁶ Men, C.R. = -2.48 for 20-44 hours a week; women, C.R. = -2.05 for 20-44 hours a week.

¹⁷ C.R. = +4.42.

found.¹⁸ Since we have such definite assurance of an association, this factor must certainly receive consideration in any discussion of morale.

Nonassociated factors.—There is no association between morale and the relation of the present job to the chosen field of specialization at the university. Similarly there is a lack of association with the number of firms by which the subjects are employed since leaving college. Likewise no relationship was found between economic status as measured by the Leahy Economic Status Scale and morale.

Summary of institutional factors associated with morale.—(1) Financial security looms as a most important factor in morale. Income above \$2,000 a year, regularity of income, and stability of employment are associated with high morale in men. Financial plans for old age are associated with the morale of both men and women. (2) Men from twenty-three years to twenty-nine years of age have lower morale than those from thirty years to forty-four years of age. (3) Both men and women working less than forty-five hours a week tend to display low morale. (4) Among the unexpected findings are the following: lack of an association of morale with professional as compared with nonprofessional careers and lack of an association of morale with the relation of the job now held to the occupation for which the adult had trained.

SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS

An examination of social-psychological reactions to the vocational activities engaged in by the adults was conducted so that the relation between morale and the job might be more clearly disclosed. It was believed that how the adults felt about their jobs would explain many questions not answerable by a knowledge of institutional factors. The search was made to find out if satisfaction with the job was associated with morale, to investigate possible associations between morale and specific characteristics of the job, and to discover what opinions about work were associated with morale. This report presents data on (1) job satisfaction, (2) characteristics of the job, and (3) opinions about work.

Job satisfaction.—This factor was measured by an adaptation of

¹⁸ C.R. = +3.39.

Robert Hoppock's Job Satisfaction Inquiry. A measurement on the scale may be said to evaluate the total satisfaction with the job.

This total satisfaction is summarized by responses indicating how well the adult likes the job, how much of the time he feels satisfied with the job, how he feels about changing his job, and how he thinks the satisfaction gained from his job compares with the satisfaction others receive from their jobs. The data show that men who are poorly satisfied with their job have low morale (see Table 3). Women indicating low job satisfaction are those associated with low morale.

TABLE 3
MORALE GROUPS BY JOB SATISFACTION

JOB SATISFACTION	MEN					WOMEN				
	Per- cent- age High Mo- rale	Cases	Per- cent- age Low Mo- rale	Cases	Critical Ratio	Per- cent- age High Mo- rale	Cases	Per- cent- age Low Mo- rale	Cases	Critical Ratio
<i>Scores:</i>										
(6-20).....	26	98	57	99	-4.55	28	74	56	76	-3.63
(21-28).....	74	98	43	99	+4.55	72	74	44	76	+3.63

+C.R. indicates higher percentage in high-morale group.

-C.R. indicates higher percentage in low-morale group.

Characteristics of the job.—These characteristics analyzed for their association with morale show the specific values which adults receive from their work. Twenty characteristics of the job are reported with data for morale groups (see Table 4). These characteristics were checked on a three-point scale including the responses, "Yes," "Undecided," and "No."

Outstanding differences between the high- and low-morale groups of men are those which occur in response to the questions as to whether family members approve of the job and whether advancement is on the basis of merit. These two characteristics of the job appear to be important indicators of morale. There is no evidence presented here to support a belief that the characteristics of the job are of themselves causing differences in morale. It may be that they

TABLE 4

MORALE GROUPS BY CHARACTERISTICS OF THE JOB

CHARACTERISTICS*	MEN				Critical Ratio†	WOMEN				MEN HIGH WOMEN HIGH C.R.†	MEN LOW WOMEN LOW C.R.†
	Per- cent- age High Morale	Cases	Per- cent- age Low Morale	Cases		Per- cent- age High Morale	Cases	Per- cent- age Low Morale	Cases		
1. Income is fairly certain.....	83	94	66	93	+2.83	93	67	90	68	-3.93
2. Tenure is fairly certain.....	79	86	66	89	+1.95	83	64	75	68	-1.24
3. Earnings are relatively good.....	85	95	64	97	+3.46	78	65	69	71
4. Ample opportunities for advancement.....	66	94	43	97	+3.28	42	62	15	71	+3.57	+5.18
5. Advancement is relatively rapid.....	43	90	21	94	+3.28	24	59	9	70	+2.30	+1.67
6. Advancement on basis of merit.....	73	92	43	93	+4.34	47	57	22	67	+3.00	+2.88
7. Competition is too intense.....	12	86	33	95	-3.52	5	56	2	66
8. Work possesses prestige.....	76	96	53	95	+3.42	63	65	58	69
9. Contact with many pleasant people.....	92	98	78	98	+2.80	94	64	74	70	+3.32
10. Reasonable freedom on the job.....	92	96	84	99	89	66	85	73
11. Friends approve of job.....	91	97	79	98	+2.39	88	67	89	72	-1.81
12. Employers are congenial.....	90	97	87	89	88	60	94	70
13. Family obligations can be satisfied.....	87	94	69	90	+3.01	83	60	69	64	+1.86
14. Personal life is one's own.....	73	95	76	97	71	70	72	74
15. Family members approve of job.....	96	96	71	97	+4.98	85	65	92	71	-3.74
16. Work is healthful.....	80	97	63	97	+2.67	81	67	69	72	+1.65
17. Working hours of right length.....	68	94	70	97	81	64	84	70	-2.19
18. Work is too fatiguing.....	3	92	14	94	-2.76	14	66	15	69
19. Work is too monotonous.....	6	95	15	95	-2.05	11	65	25	72	-2.38	-1.59
20. Work is in line with my abilities.....	88	92	70	96	+3.12	81	67	75	73

* Data represent those who answered "Yes."

† +C.R. indicates higher percentage in high-morale group; -C.R. indicates higher percentage in low-morale group.

‡ +C.R. indicates higher percentage among men; -C.R. indicates higher percentage among women.

are primarily responsible for the differences. However, the point may be made that persons of low morale are persons of neurotic tendency and that the attitudes they express toward their jobs would not be markedly altered by any changes in the nature of their jobs. Only a careful search into the organization of the personality of each individual would bring tentative answers, and no attempt will be made within the limits of this study to establish causation. We can say that whether family members actually approve or not, the morale scores of men are observed to be lower when they feel that the work they are doing does not have the approval of their family.¹⁹ Likewise, morale scores are lower when they feel that advancement is not on the basis of merit.²⁰ Every business organization, every educational institution, every organized group which is seeking to build a working unit of high morale should squarely face these two facts. The implication is that either changes in the administrative structure are demanded when workers report these characteristics (assuming that morale is lowered by them) or the individuals need case-study analysis to find the more deep-seated reasons why they report dissatisfaction with their job (assuming the causes are not in the characteristics reported but in experiences that may lie outside of the work environment). Perhaps no point of view is valid which does not regard the worker as a social being conditioned by participation in many social groups and performing a role in the work situation that is greatly influenced by other group identities. The importance of this point of view has been clearly demonstrated by F. J. Roethlisberger and W. J. Dickson in their book, *Management and the Worker*.²¹

Other significant differences between men of high and low morale show that three major considerations are associated with morale. These are: (1) the social approval which the holder feels he has acquired from his job; (2) the opportunity he feels he has for advancement; (3) the returns he feels he is getting for his labor.

High morale is associated with an approval pattern as shown by a statement already reported, namely, family members approve of job,²² and the statements that work possesses prestige²³ and friends approve of job.²⁴

¹⁹ C.R. = +4.98.

²⁰ C.R. = +4.34.

²¹ Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1940.

²² C.R. = +4.98.

²³ C.R. = +3.42.

²⁴ C.R. = +2.39.

Characteristics of advancement are associated with morale as shown by the answers to the statements, advancement is on the basis of merit,²⁵ ample opportunities for advancement,²⁶ and advancement is relatively rapid.²⁷

High morale is associated with the feeling that there are satisfying rewards for the labor exerted. This is to be seen in a series of statements including: earnings are relatively good,²⁸ family obligations can be satisfied,²⁹ income is fairly certain,³⁰ tenure is fairly certain,³¹ contacts with many pleasant people,³² work is healthful.³³

Although only a small percentage answered in agreement, significantly more low-morale men complained that competition is too intense³⁴ and the work too monotonous³⁵ and fatiguing.³⁶

Women may need approval of their job, but our data do not reveal differences between high- and low-morale groups. Apparently women have jobs which they feel are approved. This we can understand since only 9 per cent are working in occupations classed below occupational group III.

The significant differences for women appear in the characteristics of advancement and in satisfaction with the environmental conditions of their work. Associations with advancement are demonstrated in the affirmative answers of high-morale persons and in the denial of this opportunity which is reported by the low-morale persons. These statements reveal significant differences: ample opportunities for advancement,³⁷ advancement on basis of merit,³⁸ advancement is relatively rapid.³⁹ It is interesting to note that the greatest difference between morale groups of women should occur on the statement, ample opportunities for advancement. Although the women are classified in high occupational classes, it appears that advancement is limited for many of them. Many women, doubtlessly, have seen less-trained men promoted over them since culture has traditionally assigned most leadership roles to men. The struggle of the single and the married woman to hold her job in the face of

²⁵ C.R. = +4.34.

³⁰ C.R. = +2.83.

³⁵ C.R. = -2.76.

²⁶ C.R. = +3.28.

³¹ C.R. = +1.95.

³⁶ C.R. = -2.05.

²⁷ C.R. = +3.28.

³² C.R. = +2.80.

³⁷ C.R. = +3.57.

²⁸ C.R. = +3.46.

³³ C.R. = +2.67.

³⁸ C.R. = +3.00.

²⁹ C.R. = +3.01.

³⁴ C.R. = -3.52.

³⁹ C.R. = +2.30.

increasing male competition may diminish the opportunities for advancement.

The rewards for labor which exhibit greatest differences are on these statements: contacts with many pleasant people,⁴⁰ family obligations can be satisfied,⁴¹ and work is healthful.⁴² Associated also with low-morale women (with a small percentage reporting such agreement) is a feeling that the work is too monotonous.⁴³

Striking differences occur between men and women. Men have greater advancement opportunities but less security and tenure. Low-morale men also feel that they have less approval of their job by others than do women. Women are more satisfied with the length of their working hours than are the men but complain of the fatigue and monotony of their work more often than do the men.

Opinions about work.—Seven statements were put before the adults. They were asked to mark each statement according to one of such choices as "agree," "undecided," or "disagree" (see Table 5).

Largest of all differences occurred on the answers which men gave to the statement, the money value of a university training has been exaggerated in recent years. Of the low-morale men 61 per cent agreed that this was true, whereas only 36 per cent of the men possessing high morale agreed that this was true.⁴⁴ Two other differences between men of high and low morale are significant. Associated with low morale is agreement to the statements, the government should provide employment to all who cannot find work⁴⁵ and the government should gradually take over all large industries.⁴⁶ The percentage responding in agreement to these last two statements is small, and under no circumstances should it be understood that the agreement is a majority opinion of the low-morale persons.

Only one large difference occurs for women of different morale groups. This is the higher agreement which low-morale women make to the statement, the government should gradually take over all large industries.⁴⁷ This agreement is in line with the men of low morale. Again the percentage responding is low, and caution is urged in interpreting the differences.

⁴⁰ C.R. = +3.32.

⁴³ C.R. = -2.18.

⁴⁶ C.R. = -2.88.

⁴¹ C.R. = +1.86.

⁴⁴ C.R. = -3.63.

⁴⁷ C.R. = -2.05.

⁴² C.R. = +1.65.

⁴⁵ C.R. = -3.08.

TABLE 5*

MORALE GROUPS BY OPINIONS ABOUT WORK

OPINIONS ABOUT WORK	MEN				WOMEN				MEN HIGH; WOMEN HIGH— C.R.	MEN LOW; WOMEN LOW— C.R.	
	Per- cent- age High Morale	Cases	Per- cent- age Low Morale	Cases	Critical Ratio	Per- cent- age High Morale	Cases	Per- cent- age Low Morale			Cases
1. Employers are generally indifferent to working conditions dangerous to health or safety of their workers...	4	99	10	100	-1.67	6	86	3	86	+1.07
2. The government should provide employment to all who cannot find work.....	14	97	32	100	3.08	19	86	20	87	+1.89
3. The government should gradually take over all large industries...	4	98	16	100	2.88	4	85	13	88	-2.05
4. The less government regulates business, the higher will be our standard of living.....	30	97	26	100	22	85	29	86
5. The money value of a university training has been exaggerated in recent years.....	36	99	61	99	+3.63	52	86	51	86	+1.37
6. The prestige attached to "white-collar" jobs is overestimated by young people.....	81	99	87	99	80	86	74	86
7. A person in a skilled trade is worth as much to society as one in a profession.....	81	98	80	100	87	86	89	87	-1.55

* Opinions about work data represent those who marked 'Agree.'

In comparing men and women of high morale, the women agree much more than do the men that the money value of a university training has been exaggerated in recent years.⁴⁸ This can be understood when the income of women is compared with the income of men. Men who entered in 1928-29 earn a median annual income of \$1,800 (1937). Women who entered in 1928-29 and who are working earn a median income of \$1,200 (1937).

Summary of social-psychological factors associated with morale.— (1) Three major considerations are associated with morale: (a) the social approval which the holder feels he has acquired from his job; (b) the opportunity he feels he has for advancement; (c) the returns he feels he is getting for his labor. (2) Men of low morale often report that their families and friends do not approve of their jobs. They also say that they lack advancement opportunity. (3) Women of low morale often feel that they do not have advancement opportunities and pleasant people with whom to work. (4) Men report greater advancement opportunity than women but less security in income and tenure. Low-morale men feel that they have less approval of their job by family and friends than the low-morale women do, but they do not complain of the working hours, fatigue, and monotony of their jobs as often as do the women. (5) Both men and women of low morale are poorly satisfied with their jobs. (6) Significantly larger proportions of men and women of low morale think the government should gradually take over all large industries. The percentage who responded in agreement to this statement is small, but a significant difference tells us that low morale is associated with this response. (7) Factors not associated with morale of men and women include freedom on the job, congeniality of employers, and freedom in personal life.

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⁴⁸ C.R. = -2.21.

GROUP FRUSTRATIONS IN CONNECTICUT¹

DAVID RODNICK

ABSTRACT

Connecticut is a state whose population is composed almost entirely of minority groups. Even the Yankees have developed all the cultural characteristics of a minority group. The insecurities of the various groups brought about through failure to achieve the status to which they feel they are entitled have brought about group conflicts that have become more intensified during recent years.

Connecticut is a state whose population is mainly composed of minority groups. It is Yankee in a historical sense rather than in an actual one, for two-thirds of the people within the state are first- and second-generation immigrants. Its Protestantism is also traditional, since three-fifths of the state's church members are Roman Catholic. And although the overtones of the state's life and background are primarily of Yankee origin, there still remains an unresolved mass of conflicting group cultural and personality patterns that represents more truly the sociological picture of the state.

Although no single group forms more than one-fifth of the population, nevertheless groups dominating in status do exist within the state. The British-Americans, of which the Yankees are part, control both economic and social life, and their political influence is as strong as ever. Second in status are the German and the Scandinavian groups, who, in the processes of acculturation, tend to identify themselves with the middle-class Congregational and Episcopalian cultures of the British-Americans. The Irish come next as the leaders of the Catholic groups and as the intermediaries between the older stock and the large mass of immigrants. Beneath the Irish come the groups of lower standing, the Jews, Poles, Italians, Slovaks, Hungarians, French-Canadians, and the Negroes. The Poles, Jews, and Italians, who represent one-quarter of the state's population, are most consistently disliked by the British-Americans and the

¹ This paper is based upon a two-year study of the ethnic groups in Connecticut. Some two thousand interviews and life-histories were collected. The free-association technique was used in collecting life-histories, since it was felt that the interviewees would be less truthful emotionally were questionnaires employed.

Irish, probably due to the fact that these three groups have recently become both economic and political threats to the older stocks.

The feelings of frustration that almost all groups have developed as a result of being unable to achieve that status to which they believe they are entitled, have operated to instil in each stock attitudes of superiority toward its neighbors. These attitudes of superiority are by no means of European origin, for many of them could have arisen nowhere but in the United States. The only prejudice common to most European ethnic groups was the religious and economic reaction against the Jew, and it was this that was brought by the eastern and northern European peasant. The dislike of the Irish for the Pole, the Italian, or the French-Canadian, or the reaction of the Slovak to the Italian, or the Italian to the Pole, could have arisen only in the daily contact of these groups with one another in Connecticut.

None of the eight thousand first-generation Slovaks in Bridgeport had seen either a Negro or a southern Italian before coming to this country. And yet a strong reaction has developed among the Bridgeport Slovaks against these two groups. While it is the Irish that tend to make the Slovaks feel most insecure, the fear of arousing the antagonism of the Irish even more forces the Slovaks to divert their feelings of resentment toward a much weaker group. The group least able to fight back is the Negroes, who as a consequence receive the full brunt of the resentment that the Slovaks have stored up against their own low economic status.

I always tell my children not to play with the nigger-people's children, but they always play with them just the same. I tell them that nigger-children are dirty, and they will get sick if they play with them. I tell them that they could find Slovak friends just the same as they find niggers.

This place is now all spoiled, and all the people live like pigs, because the niggers they come and live here with the decent white people, and they want to raise up their children with our children. If we had some place for the children to play here, I'm sure that the white children would not play with the nigger-children.

While the motivation for the prejudice against the Negro is that the latter tends to make the Slovak aware of his own low economic status, the reaction against the Italians is primarily due to an at-

tempt to find his social place within the hierarchy of groups. Thus, the superiority of the Germans, the British-Americans, and the Irish are accepted by the Slovaks. If he developed any reaction against these, his opportunities for employment, and even for the privileges of being left alone, would be lessened. Toward the Italians, who both outnumber and compete with him, the Slovak is continually struggling to assert himself, in order to determine once for all the respective ranking of these two groups. Since the main distinction of language difference cannot be used as a mark of superiority, differentiating characteristics such as the intensity of religious belief or cultural dissimilarities are used both by the Slovak and by the Italian to achieve status. As a result of this need to develop self-confidence in himself, the Slovak has masked his resentment toward the Italian by the feeling that the latter is not a loyal Roman Catholic.

I am a religious woman, just like the rest of the Slovak people here. We people are not like some others who don't believe in religion. . . . People without good religion are no good. They go with the devil. The Slovak people always go to church. . . . The Slovaks would rather go to church than eat. We have a good church and a good priest. The Italians have a good church now, but what's the use of their good church! A lot of the Italians don't go to church anyway. We have lots of Italians on this street, but I don't think that three out of the fifteen families go to church on Sunday. And when they go to church, I hear they don't want to put money in the basket. They are too stingy for religion, but they like to spend money on other things. The Slovaks are not like this at all. The Slovaks pray all the time; in the morning and in the night.

Italian ethnocentrism, on the other hand, is centered about the accomplishments of the inhabitants of Italy during the last two thousand years, on the assumption that any great man produced at any time during this period is proof enough that all individuals born within the group have all the biological potentialities of genius. This postulate should, however, be taken as a defense against the helplessness in which the Italians found themselves, both in Europe and in the United States.

There's no nationality that's produced more great people than the Italians. Look at Michael Angelo, Leonardo Da Vinci, Dante and the others. The Italians have contributed more to civilization than any other people. The greatest painters, sculptors, writers and composers have been Italians. It's about time that the others respect the Italians for being more important than any other people. Yessir, the smartest people in the world have been Italians.

Among the first-generation Italians, any differentiation between their familial life and that of others is immediately exaggerated in order to be used as a weapon against those groups toward whom they hold resentment. It is as if the Italians were to say, "These people think they are better than we. But as a matter of fact they have plenty of faults, too. When you take everything in consideration, you'll find they are pretty inferior to us." This tendency to prove to themselves their own initial superiority is exemplified by the following remarks of a first-generation Italian male.

The Italian people are different than the other people. When somebody dies in the family, the Italian people feel like they lose somebody. The Polocks when they die the people in the family and all the friends have whiskey and beer and they have a good time just like a party. The Americans and the Slovak people they do the same thing. I was to a Slovak funeral one time and the people there they talk about everything, and they talk like no dead person was in the house. All the women get in one room and all the men get in the other room. The women talk and the men drink. One man that I knew one time told me that the Irish people have the worst thing. They make all kinds of fun when the Irish die. They take the dead man and they try to make him stand up. If they do that in an Italian place they would get killed for making such a disgrace. The Italian people when somebody dies in the house they never forget who they lose. I can't understand these other people how they do it. I don't think that they're civilized. The Italian people don't go to the show or no place when somebody dies in the families. When somebody dies in the other nationalities the people go to shows and they go to the dance in one or two weeks. That shows that they have got no respect for the dead people.

While the above examples might be considered as prime examples of ethnocentrism in the sense that whatever the group does is right and what in any way differs from their beliefs and attitudes is wrong, there is still more to this state of affairs than this. The important point to be mentioned here is that these differences are only accentuated when a need to compete arises. When a group feels that it occupies a definite place in the social hierarchy of the country, that it is respected and unmolested, then a patronizing attitude toward those who differ from it may result. Where, on the other hand, intense competition exists between groups, both on economic and on status levels, attempts will be made by the groups concerned to prove to themselves that their desires for higher status are due to their own cultural superiorities. It is rather interesting that the Old

American stock of Thomaston, a small town near Waterbury, is far more tolerant of other ethnic stocks than are those of New Haven, Bridgeport, or Hartford. The reasons for this difference are rather obvious. In Thomaston the Old American stock are the officials, the businessmen, the skilled workers, and the foremen. The recent stocks, who are mostly Lithuanian, Polish, and Italian, are mainly unskilled and semiskilled factory workers. Few of the first generation or their children live on a higher economic level than the vast majority of the Old American stock. Despite the cultural differences that exist between the Yankees and the recent comers, an equilibrium has been reached in which members of the Old American stock are accepted as cultural superiors while the immigrants are looked upon as unskilled laborers. To the skilled workers of Thomaston it is inconceivable that they ever will be in an inferior economic position to the immigrants, since no matter how poorly paid many of them might be, their opportunities are still greater than those of the eastern or southern Europeans. With a condition of this sort there is less bitterness among the Yankee workers of Thomaston against the other ethnic groups than exists, say, in the larger industrial centers.

No, I haven't any dislikes, if you mean do I hate the Polocks, or the Germans, or the Jews. I don't dislike any race of people. I try to be broad-minded. There's good and bad in all races, and anybody that says all members of a certain race are all bad is just ignorant. I know plenty of Yankees that you can't trust any further'n you can see 'em, but just because they happen to be descendants of the old settlers they think they're better'n average. People like that make me sick. I mean it. They make me sick.

What do I think the effect of these incoming groups will be? We'll be better off in the future. They will take some of the conceit out of us Yankees and give us a more cosmopolitan attitude. In reality the Yankees haven't a corner on all the intelligence in the world. We need a merging viewpoint. Our job is to teach them to be good American citizens. We should make them feel welcome and give them a break.

Contrasted with these attitudes are those held in the larger cities of Connecticut where economic rivalry is greater and where the proportion of Old Americans in the population is comparatively small. Among the latter many anxieties have been built up concerning the effect of these culturally divergent groups upon themselves. And al-

though the Old American stock still possess control over the economic life of the city, there is enough competition in business and politics to develop fears concerning the future. This feeling of insecurity in the presence of the various ethnic groups who reside in the large cities of Connecticut is exemplified by the remarks of a middle-aged Yankee woman.

I used to write a bit; wish I could now. I've got some things to say decidedly. I feel the American people are being pushed back like the Indians were. There are few real Americans now, and we are just shoved back and stepped on by a terrific lot of foreigners. . . .

We have let all this rough stuff come into the country. Of course, they have as much right as I have to live, but they should be good citizens. They aren't. That's why we are in this mess. They should be checked on all the time. In stores we are pushed and shoved by people who don't look as if they know anything. They never take off their hats when the flag goes by. They have no respect or reverence for anything. It's too bad this country has been put where it is. These foreigners only want to get all they can. That's all they are thinking about. Last Fall I was walking along State Street. A man was coming casually toward me. I don't know what nationality he was. I know he wasn't drunk. As he passed me he said, "Worst country in the world." I wish I had called a policeman. These people are trying to stamp us out and overthrow our government.

Many of these fears stem from the hostile impulses of the older stock toward the newer. Since the culture patterns contradict these impulses by stressing the importance of equal treatment for all individuals, as represented in a sentence quoted from the above life-history,² this hostility can be justified only if it is first made to come from the other ethnic groups. Thus the group having these hostile impulses will feel that it is not they who possess the hostile impulses, but rather the other stocks which are attempting to exploit, submerge, and even enslave them by attempting to change the constitutional form of government. In many cases, too, these attitudes of hostility may be part of the submerged wishes of the dominant group, in which their own desires, as a result of guilt feelings, are put in the minds of the immigrants and their children.

Nor is the older American stock the only one in Connecticut to insist upon the other groups conforming to its own patterns of belief and behavior. Almost every group that lives in a concentrated

² "Of course, they have as much right as I have to live."

colony where it has little contact with the native population will affect superiorities of its own toward the small minorities that dwell among them. In New Britain, for example, where a large Polish colony exists the Lithuanians and the Ukrainians are the ones who must bear the brunt of being looked down upon. In this instance the Poles brought over with them from Europe definite feelings of superiority toward the Jews, Lithuanians, White Russians, and Ukrainians. With their children brought up in homes and parochial schools where Polish nationalism and cultural superiority were early implanted in their minds, the transition to American middle-class patterns was not an easy one. In many cases the second generation had their American ideals grafted upon a Polish base, so that their ideas of what Americanism implied were as much part of what they had been told of Polish nationalism as it was of the dogmas that they received in contact with children of other groups. Since an attitude of dislike and distrust of the Lithuanian had existed in pre-war Poland and had been accentuated in the post-war period, it was continued almost in full force in New Britain. One second-generation Lithuanian male describes Polish hostility as it existed around 1925 in that city.

My playmates before and for quite a long while after I went to school were Polish. There were some Irish in this neighborhood, but they played with themselves most of the time. We used to fight with them for calling us names like "Hunkies" and "Polocks." I didn't get along very well with the Polish children either, because they were always adopting a superior attitude toward me, saying that I was a half-breed and in a lower class than they were. I remember that after a rain storm we used to build dams in the gutters, and they always broke mine and chased me away from theirs. If I sailed a stick of wood down the gutter, they always picked it up and threw it away. I hated them, and hated the Irish kids worse and used to join the Polish kids in fighting them.

While I was young and living in the Fifth Ward, I was ashamed of being a Lithuanian. This was because all the Polish children of my age kept making me feel inferior. . . . Another thing was the attitude of the Polish children towards me. They always treated me differently, so I began to feel that way.

As against the example of the Polish colony in New Britain organized along religious and nationalistic lines is the Hungarian one in Bridgeport where neither ethnic nor religious affiliations are as important as the acceptance of the belief that Hungary's thousand-



year borders must be returned to her. When Hungary received a slice of Czechoslovakia as a result of the German invasion, almost all Bridgeport's Magyar organizations, Roman Catholic, Protestant and Jewish, participated in a victory parade. Until 1939, too, the Hungarian Jews in Bridgeport were considered as part of the colony, since these spoke Magyar rather than Yiddish and participated in many of the Magyar patriotic societies. As Hungary became more and more Axis-controlled, repercussions of this European situation have become felt in Bridgeport. During the last two years a deep schism has begun to separate the Jews and Christians within the Hungarian colony. One of the important Magyar weekly newspapers Bridgeport, which carries on its masthead a map of pre-war Hungary and the slogan "Hungary's Thousand-Year Borders Must Be Returned to Her," began carrying on a campaign of anti-Semitism among the Christian Magyars. When the articles first appeared in the newspaper, one of the leaders of the Hungarian Jewish group asked for an explanation. The editor replied that the attacks were influenced by many factors, chief among them being that the Jews had become enemies of Hungary by attacking the Axis powers and that the Hungarian Jews were indifferent to the readjustment of Hungary's borders and paid no attention to the persecution of Magyars in Rumania and in Yugoslavia. To the first-generation Magyars in Bridgeport Germany was the only nation which could help Hungary regain its former importance, and an attack against the Nazis was construed to be an indirect reaction to Hungarian nationalism.

I find a general feeling of resentment throughout the Hungarian section toward the Jews. Various individuals tell me that heretofore the Hungarian Jews have identified themselves with the Hungarians in all matters except religion, but of late "other Jews" have been distributing propaganda through the section calling upon Hungarian Jews to unite with the "other Jews" in a combined boycott of German-made goods and plans and projects to aid refugee Jews from Europe. The Hungarians are almost unanimous in their belief that all the resentment amongst the Hungarians against the Jews is brought about by agitation on the part of "other Jews" amongst the Hungarian Jews.

However, identification with their homeland and its customs is by no means limited to the first-generation immigrants. The second generation correlates its status also with that of their parent's home-

land. And even the third generation, when unable to identify themselves with the Old American stock, will attempt to develop an artificial pride on an ethnic basis. The concept of "race" still plays an important part in Connecticut culture, for despite the fact that the native stock accepts the postulate that all American ideals and behavior are acquired culturally, yet in practice kinship of blood is given greater importance than learning processes. To the Old American, southern and eastern Europeans are considered inherently inferior; northern Europeans definitely superior. When the term "white man" is used by the native group, what is meant is one who is neither Italian nor Slavic nor Jewish. As a result, groups that thought little of developing any self-conscious pride upon first arriving in the United States are compelled to encourage a "love" of their group as a reaction to the ethnocentrism found about them.

Unfortunately, culture change cannot take place in the individual unless he first accepts the point of view of those who look upon him as different. Thus, a Jew who attempts to acculturate himself to the dominant culture must first accept its reaction toward him. This is exactly what occurs with most of the second-generation immigrants in Connecticut, in whom an emotional reaction against their parents has been developed by their acceptance of American culture. On the other hand, while the first generation is given feelings of inferiority, yet no opportunities are available for them to develop any reaction against the habits of their group through the adoption of another set of behavior patterns. The result is that many of them are compelled to conform overtly to a way of life in which they do not feel at home. The first generation coming from northern Europe and the British Isles can identify themselves with their homelands and continue their group life for the reason that the countries from which they come have status in the eyes of Americans. The groups coming from southern and eastern Europe who attempt to do likewise are termed "Un-American," although little difference exists between the former and the latter in the way in which they identify themselves with their homelands.

Almost all groups in Connecticut, thus, are on the defensive. Each group is attempting not only to achieve a status that it feels

SCHIZOPHRENIA, MANIC-DEPRESSIVE PSYCHOSIS AND SOCIAL-ECONOMIC STATUS

CHRISTOPHER TIETZE, PAUL LEMKAU, AND MARCIA COOPER

ABSTRACT

Relatively more schizophrenia is found in the "lower" social-economic groups and relatively more manic-depressive psychosis in the "upper" groups. It is suggested that this may imply a group differential in the ratio of schizothymic and cyclothymic personality types.

The present paper deals with the relative incidence of schizophrenia and manic-depressive psychosis in broad social-economic groups. For the benefit of readers without psychiatric training, a very brief and much-simplified clinical description of the two psychoses is presented first. The concepts here set forth are not necessarily those of the authors but are believed to represent those of the sources from which our material is derived.

Schizophrenia, also called dementia praecox, is characterized by a gradual weakening of rapport with others and disregard for consensus, by delusions and hallucinations, by queer and bizarre behavior, and by various types of disorders of thinking and speech. The course of the disease is chronic and frequently extends over many years. It may be interrupted by temporary remissions, but most cases finally lead to what has been called "mental deterioration." The age of onset is usually between eighteen and forty years. Men and women are affected in about equal numbers. Manic-depressive psychosis is characterized by periods of elation with motor excitement and periods of depression with motor retardation. The duration of these periods varies from a few weeks to several years. Each period ends in full recovery but recurrence is common. Depression is more frequent than elation. The complete form of the disease with alternate manic and depressive phases is rare. Early middle life is the danger period as far as manic-depressive psychosis is concerned, the typical age of onset being thirty to fifty years. There is a marked predominance of the female sex among the patients.

Only very general statements can be made at the present time

concerning the etiology of schizophrenia and manic-depressive psychosis. It seems likely that both psychoses are the expression of general disturbances of the human organism. The nature of these disturbances has not yet been fully established. There can be little doubt that heredity is of importance in the genesis of both schizophrenia and manic-depressive psychosis. In the case of schizophrenia a recessive type of inheritance has been accepted by many authorities. Heredity, however, is not the only factor involved. Environmental forces certainly promote or prohibit the development of the psychoses.

Close relationships are known to exist between schizophrenia and manic-depressive psychosis and certain personality types of normal individuals. These types are called the "schizothymic" and the "cyclothymic" type. Schizothymic persons are described as sensitive, seclusive, and sometimes suspicious, queer, and eccentric; they have only few and loose ties with their fellows and with the community. Schizophrenia tends to develop in individuals of this type. The cyclothymics are quite different; they are communicative, practical, sociable, occasionally moody, but generally well integrated, mature personalities. Manic-depressive patients typically belong to this group.

Apart from the disorders of advanced age, schizophrenia is the most common psychosis. It accounts for about one-fifth of all first admissions to and one-half of all resident patients in mental hospitals in the United States. The difference between these two ratios is due to the fact that schizophrenics tend to stay in the hospital much longer than most other types of patients. The great importance of schizophrenia is best realized by remembering that about one child out of a hundred born must be expected to develop the disease. Manic-depressive psychosis is less common than schizophrenia. The ratio between schizophrenia and manic-depressive psychosis is different in different countries. American statistics report about twice as many first admissions with schizophrenia as with manic-depressive psychosis; European psychiatrists have found higher ratios. These differences may be due to variations in diagnostic practice. True race differences cannot be excluded but have not been demonstrated.

To the best of our knowledge Ludwig Stern¹ was the first author to report differences in the ratio between schizophrenia and manic-depressive psychosis in various "cultural" groups, as he called them. He studied data on 1,326 male patients, admitted to the Psychiatric Clinic in Freiburg from 1906 through 1912. Classification was made by diagnosis and by occupation. Individuals without occupation were classified according to the occupation of their fathers, and that was also done in a few cases where the occupational status of the son

TABLE 1.

ADMISSIONS OF MALE PATIENTS WITH SCHIZOPHRENIA AND MANIC-DEPRESSIVE PSYCHOSIS TO THE PSYCHIATRIC CLINIC IN FREIBURG, BY OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS, 1906 TO 1912*

Occupational Group	Schizo- phrenia	Manic Depres- sive	Ratio
Artisans—proprietors and wage workers. . .	64	25	2.6
Farmers and rural laborers.	74	30	2.5
Factory workers and urban laborers.	51	22	2.3
Business—proprietors and salaried employ- ees.	27	37	.7
Professional men and public officials.	25	40	.6
Total.	241	154	1.6

* Summarized from Stern, *op. cit.*

was manifestly influenced by his mental condition. Table 1 presents a summary of Stern's findings concerning the 395 patients diagnosed as afflicted with either schizophrenia or manic-depressive psychosis. We have consolidated his occupational breakdown into five larger groups, taking special care to include in each group persons in all stages of their occupational careers, as farmers and farm laborers, master artisans and journeymen, etc. Differences in age distribution between the groups are thereby kept at a minimum. The class differences shown in Table 1 are very striking and, in spite of the small material, statistically significant. Among workers and farmers schizophrenia is much more common than manic-depressive psychosis, whereas in the business and the professional group more manic-depressives than schizophrenics are found. A second study by

¹ *Kulturkreis und Form der geistigen Erkrankung* (Halle: Carl Marhold, 1913).

Stern,² carried out on a series of cases from the City Hospital of Frankfort, fully confirmed the results of his earlier investigation.

In 1918 William J. Nolan³ analyzed two large series of first admissions to the New York Civil State Hospitals during the preceding years. His material includes 3,692 male schizophrenics and 2,080 male manic-depressives. The very detailed occupational classification of the United States census was used. Nolan's papers give rates of first admissions per 100,000 for many occupations. We feel hesitant to accept these rates for three reasons:

1. The notorious difficulty of properly matching the occupational classifications in statistics collected by different agencies, such as hospitals and the census.
2. The exclusion of private hospitals, which must lead to underrepresentation of the more prosperous classes.
3. The very small numbers of patients in many occupations.

These objections do not apply if comparisons are limited to those made between one group of patients and another, and if single occupations are combined to form larger social-economic groups. This has been done in Table 2. The classification is based in principle upon the one used at present by the Bureau of the Census, but certain groups are again combined to achieve maximum uniformity of age distribution. It should be noted that the table includes first admissions of schizophrenics for the period from October 1, 1909, to June 30, 1916, and of manic-depressives for the period from October 1, 1909, to June 30, 1917. In the computation of the ratio between the two psychoses this difference has been taken into account.

In the nonfarm population the same pattern will be observed as in Stern's studies. Among professional men committed to state hospitals, schizophrenia and manic-depressive psychosis occur approximately equally often; in laborers the ratio is almost three to one. The intermediate groups show a fairly regular trend. A remarkable difference between the American and the German material is seen in

² Ludwig Stern-Piper, "Der psychopathologische Index der Kultur," *Archiv für Psychiatrie und Nervenkrankheiten*, LXXIV (1925), 514-25.

³ "Occupation and Dementia Praecox," *State Hospital Quarterly*, III (1918), 127-54, and "Occupation and Manic-depressive Psychoses," *ibid.*, IV (1918), 75-102.

the position of the farming group. In Table 1 it ranks definitely with the "lower," in Table 2 with the "upper" classes.

In 1933 a tabulation of patients in hospitals for mental diseases was made by the Bureau of the Census.⁴ This report contains very interesting data on first admissions to state hospitals by sex, diag-

TABLE 2

FIRST ADMISSIONS OF MALE PATIENTS WITH SCHIZOPHRENIA OR MANIC-DEPRESSIVE PSYCHOSIS TO THE NEW YORK CIVIL STATE HOSPITALS BY SOCIAL-ECONOMIC GROUPS, 1909 TO 1917*

Social-Economic Group	Schizo- phrenia (1909-16)	Manic Depres- sive (1909-17)	Ratio (Adjusted)
Nonfarm laborers.....	848	339	2.9
Semiskilled operatives and service workers.....	956	585	1.9
Craftsmen and other skilled workers.....	807	415	2.2
Business group†.....	562	369	1.7
Professional workers.....	65	70	1.1
All nonfarm workers.....	3,238	1,778	2.1
Farmers and farm laborers.....	245	201	1.4
No occupation or unascertained.....	209	101	2.4
Grand total.....	3,692	2,080	2.0

* Summarized from Nolan, "Occupation and Dementia Praecox," *State Hospital Quarterly*, III (1918), 127-54, and "Occupation and Manic-Depressive Psychoses," *ibid.* IV (1918), 75-102.

† Nonfarm proprietors, managers, and officials; semiprofessional, clerical, sales, and kindred workers.

nosis, residence, and economic status. Table 3 is based on these data. The *Statistical Manual*⁵ defines the terms used in this table as follows:

"Urban" and "rural" are used as in the United States census classification. Places having a population of 2,500 or more are considered as "urban." All other places are considered as "rural." The term "economic condition" refers to the patients' circumstances before the onset of the psychosis. The terms used in classifying "economic condition" are defined as follows:

⁴ U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Patients in Hospitals for Mental Disease, 1933* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1935).

⁵ National Committee for Mental Hygiene, *Statistical Manual for the Use of Hospitals for Mental Disease* (Utica: State Hospitals Press, 1934).

Dependent: Lacking in necessities of life or receiving aid from public funds or persons outside the immediate family.

Marginal: Living on daily earnings but accumulating little or nothing; being on the margin between self-support and dependency.

Comfortable: Having accumulated resources sufficient to maintain self and family for at least four months.

Patients should not be classed as "dependent" because they are not able to reimburse the hospital for their maintenance, provided they were previously able to maintain themselves. Minors and aged people cared for by their families

TABLE 3

FIRST ADMISSIONS OF PATIENTS WITH SCHIZOPHRENIA AND MANIC-DEPRESSIVE PSYCHOSIS TO STATE HOSPITALS, BY RESIDENCE, ECONOMIC STATUS, AND SEX, AND TO PRIVATE HOSPITALS BY SEX IN THE UNITED STATES, 1933*

TYPE OF HOSPITAL, RESIDENCE, AND ECO- NOMIC STATUS	MALES			FEMALES		
	Schizo- phrenia	Manic- Depres- sive	Ratio	Schizo- phrenia	Manic- Depres- sive	Ratio
State hospitals:						
Rural—dependent.	575	400	1.4	481	475	1.0
Rural—marginal.	1,146	840	1.3	796	755	1.1
Rural—comfortable.	197	216	0.9	171	186	0.9
Urban—dependent.	1,263	482	2.6	1,088	756	1.4
Urban—marginal.	3,406	1,454	2.3	3,043	1,933	1.6
Urban—comfortable.	311	255	1.2	422	417	1.0
Private hospitals.	799	902	0.9	1,014	1,336	0.8

* From U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Patients in Hospitals for Mental Disease, 1933* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1935.)

should not be classed as "dependent." Their economic condition should be considered as that of their families.

A pensioner who has no accumulated resources should be classed as "marginal."

First admissions to private mental hospitals are added for comparison. These persons as a group are probably much better off than the "comfortable" in the state hospitals. Rural patients seem to be more susceptible to manic-depressive psychosis, urban patients to schizophrenia. This confirms the findings in New York State, seen in Table 2. In both groups the trend of the ratios from the "dependent" to the "comfortable" is quite regular in the males and only

slightly less so in the females. The differences are more pronounced among men than among women. Private patients are mostly urban and should be compared with the urban group.

Faris and Dunham⁶ found in their ecological study in Chicago that schizophrenia shows very high rates in the central areas of high mobility, such as the hobo and rooming-house areas, and in other deteriorated areas. Manic-depressive psychosis shows a distribution pattern which is random in character. The ratio between schizophrenia and manic-depressive psychosis is 3.5 times higher in the poorest quarters than in the best.

It seems too early to make generalized statements about the incidence of schizophrenia and manic-depressive psychosis in different social-economic groups in terms of rates of first admissions per 100,000 population. It seems likely to us that schizophrenia is more common in the "lower" than in the "upper" groups and that the opposite is true for manic-depressive psychosis, but neither relationship has been demonstrated beyond doubt on a sufficiently broad basis. We do feel, however, that the evidence accumulated in the present paper warrants a generalization about the ratio between the two psychoses. This ratio tends to follow a uniform pattern, at least if urban and rural groups are considered separately. There is relatively more schizophrenia in the "lower" social-economic groups, relatively more manic-depressive psychosis in the "upper" groups. We shall now be concerned with the interpretation of this difference in ratios.

The possibility of a statistical fallacy must be ruled out first. There is no reason to believe that diagnostic practice in state hospitals is influenced by the occupation or the economic status of the patient, though it must be admitted that private hospitals may in doubtful cases have a greater preference for the more optimistic diagnosis of manic-depressive psychosis. Variations in age distribution between the social-economic groups in our tables have been practically eliminated by suitable combinations and can only account for a very small part of the differences actually observed.

It seems possible that young schizophrenics can be and are kept at

⁶ Robert E. L. Faris, and H. Warren Dunham, *Mental Disorders in Urban Areas* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1939).

home for a longer time in the higher than in the lower income brackets. It also seems possible that a depression requires earlier hospitalization in a professional man or businessman than in a laborer with a monotonous mechanical job. But our comparisons are based on first admissions rather than on resident patients and as long as a patient ultimately goes to the hospital it does not matter very much—from the statistical point of view—how long this step may be delayed. Therefore this factor cannot be held responsible for the social-economic group differences in the ratio between schizophrenia and manic-depressive psychosis.

This leads us to the conclusion that the differentials observed in the hospital material indicate true variations of incidence. In view of the relationship between schizophrenia and manic-depressive psychosis and the normal personality types, this implies the assumption that there is a higher concentration of schizothymics in the "lower" social-economic groups and a higher concentration of cyclothymics in the "upper" groups.

It seems unwise to say more at this point. It may be that the physical and social environment experienced by members of different social groups contains factors which are able to produce schizothymic and cyclothymic personalities or to promote or prohibit the development of schizophrenia and manic-depressive psychosis.

If, on the other hand, one chooses to think of the personality types as genetically determined, then it seems likely that the selective action of social mobility has concentrated schizothymic stocks in the "lower" social-economic groups and cyclothymic stocks in the "upper" groups and that this is the basis of the differences in the ratio between the two psychoses.

The facts presented in this paper seem compatible with either hypothesis.

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COMMENT

This summary of research upon the differential relation of schizophrenia and manic-depressive psychosis to socio-economic status suggests further research to test the assumption and hypotheses of the paper.

The assumption of the authors that their findings point to "a higher concentration of schizothymics in the 'lower' social-economic groups and a higher concentration of cyclothymics in the 'upper' groups" can be readily verified. Two projects proposed to prove or disprove this hypothesis are to give one of the available tests differentiating these two personality types (1) to persons at "higher" and "lower" socio-economic levels and (2) to persons in different urban areas, i.e., a residential suburb, an apartment-house area, first-settlement immigrant district, and a rooming-house area.

The hypothesis of the effect of social mobility upon the differential distribution of schizophrenia and manic-depressive psychosis might be tested (1) by plotting the past addresses of a random sample of each group and (2) by following the occupational career of a random sample of both groups. In this way the relative progress of the two groups up or down the ladder of economic success might be determined.

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RESEARCH ON THE URBAN NEGRO

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ABSTRACT

Since the Negro's position is an essential part of the social structure in the South, a structural approach is generally sufficient for studying Negro-white relations. In the North, however, the social structure does not depend on keeping the Negro (or other "aliens") in a given place; and the status of minority groups has been marked by rapid changes. The nature of urban life and the differences in the sentiments of northerners as against southerners are examined as explanation of these changes. It is found that fixed status rather than free competition tends to govern the Negro's position in social relations based on primary contacts, while competition is allowed in other spheres. The interaction of social distance and free competition thus determines his position in the social structure at any given moment. By devising indices of fixed status and free competition, Negro-white relations in various societies may be directly compared.

The most fundamental and rapid social changes in America today are occurring in the cities, and it is in the cities that more and more Negroes are now coming to live. The increase in urbanization has been greater in recent decades for the Negro than for the white population, the percentage increase between the years 1920 and 1930 for the Negro population being almost 46 per cent, and that for the white population about 24 per cent.¹ The present interest of social scientists both in urbanism and in race relations has motivated our attempt to formulate a theoretical framework in which to study the Negro population of large urban localities.

Several of the recent investigations of Negro communities were made in the "Deep South," in localities characterized by stability in the social order and small population aggregates.² These studies have in common the so-called "structural approach"; they have indicated the place of the Negro in the social structure and the myths and sanctions which keep him "in his place."³ In the study which we have been making of the Chicago

¹ The percentage of the 1890 Negro population which was urban was 19.4; by 1910 this proportion had increased to 27.4 per cent; and two decades later, in 1930, the census reported that 43.7 per cent of all Negroes lived in urban places.

² Among these studies are John Dollard's *Caste and Class in a Southern Town* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1937); Hortense Powdermaker's *After Freedom* (New York: Viking Press, 1939); and *Deep South*, by Allison Davis and Burleigh and Mary Gardner, under the direction of W. Lloyd Warner (in press).

³ Powdermaker modifies the strictly structural approach. After pointing out the necessity of analyzing the social structures of both the white and Negro communities, she states: "Yet what we deal with in this hybrid community is less structure than a process, a complex of actions and interactions to which structure forms a background itself hardly static." (*op. cit.*, p. 71).

Negro community,⁴ the perspectives and methods employed in the research on the southern Negro were re-examined to ascertain their adaptability for our problems. Analysis of the social structure was of great value in showing the present social differentiation within the Negro population and the relations between the social structure of the entire city and the Negro community, as well as laying a basis for comparable studies in other cities.⁵ It soon became apparent, however, that our research problem also required an analysis which would reveal the changing position of the Negro in the structure. The necessity for an additional approach, different from that used by students in the South, arose out of the radically different nature of the setting of the study.

In the Deep South the Negro occupies a "caste" position, according to some of the recent studies mentioned above. It is on the subordination of the Negro that the social order depends. Maintaining the Negro in his traditional place is essential for the smooth functioning of the economy, the political system, the educational system, and other parts of the social structure.⁶ The study of the South at various periods of its history shows that Negroes and whites have lived side by side for generations, and yet Negroes have always been separate from whites in the structures of the society.

In the North, on the other hand, the economy, the political system, and the educational system were not designed to subordinate or segregate the Negro population; their stability does not hinge on "keeping the Negro in his place." Again in contrast with the South, the North has experienced

⁴ St. Clair Drake, "Churches and Voluntary Associations in the Chicago Negro Community"; Estelle Hill Scott, "Occupational Changes among Negroes in Chicago," and Mary Elaine Ogden (McNeil), "The Chicago Negro Community: A Statistical Description" (reports of the Work Projects Administration, District 3, Chicago [mimeographed]); and other unpublished monographs on various aspects of the Negro community of Chicago, sponsored by the Institute for Juvenile Research and administered by the Work Projects Administration.

⁵ W. H. R. Rivers points out that comparative studies demand a structural approach ("The Ethnological Analysis of Culture," *Nature*, LXXXVII [1911], 358-60).

⁶ In describing the social order of the South, Reuter states: "The selection and placement of population and the economic structure were determined by the character of the natural area. The racial status and division of labor were essential parts of the system. The political system was formed as a tool of the economic interests. The social and moral order developed as a natural outgrowth of the economic and political arrangements. The ideological system arose immediately and inevitably from the system itself" (Edward B. Reuter, "Competition and the Racial Division of Labor," *Race Relations and the Race Problem*, ed. Edgar T. Thompson [Durham: Duke University Press, 1939], p. 54).

successive invasions by various foreign-born groups which have entered the structure as subordinates, but with the passage of time have become dispersed throughout it. For example, the Irish of the past century in Chicago were looked down upon and ridiculed by the native whites, but today the Irish have achieved positions of power and prestige in the various hierarchies of the society.⁷ Analysis of the position of Negroes in the total society of Chicago shows that there are levels in the substructures of the society (e.g., the economic, the political, and the "social") beyond which Negroes are not found.⁸ In the economic structure most Negroes are found in the lower levels of the hierarchy, performing unskilled work. In the political hierarchy, while there may be Negro aldermen, there is not a Negro mayor. On the other hand, it can be shown that there are certain places in the social organization of the city where Negroes have developed a separate structure of their own, the most striking of which is the system of social classes which parallels that of the whites.⁹

A further contrast between the Deep South and an urban center such as Chicago is found in the realm of sentiments. All over the South the Negro's status is "fixed" to a large extent; there is repression against any attempt to change that status and a belief permeating the entire society of his innate inferiority and the eternal necessity of preserving the color line. The social logics of the North do not so compulsively emphasize

⁷ During the fifties, according to Bessie Louise Pierce, "competition from cheap Irish labor was dreaded just as later that of Negro labor was feared. The attitude of labor toward the Negro, therefore, was not entirely racial" (*A History of Chicago* [New York: Knopf, 1940], II, 185 n.)

⁸ Park states in his recent paper on race relations: "It seems, then, that one may think of race relations as existing not only on different levels, that is (1) ecological, (2) economic, (3) political, (4) personal and cultural, but one may think of these different levels as constituting a hierarchy of relations of such a nature that change upon any one level will invariably have repercussions, not immediately, but finally, upon every other" (Thompson, *op. cit.*, pp. 34-35).

⁹ An interesting development in Negro-white relations is seen in the rise of "bi-racialism." Living in a segregated community, and isolated from participation in parts of the white social structure, Negroes have capitalized on this segregation and isolation by developing a race consciousness and a race pride and by voluntarily building up a separate economic structure, hoping thereby to parallel the white structure and to offer greater economic opportunities for Negroes. See Charles S. Johnson, *The Economic Status of Negroes* (summary and analysis of the materials presented by the conference on the Economic Status of the Negro, held in Washington, D.C., May 11-13, 1933, under the sponsorship of the Julius Rosenwald Fund [Nashville: Fisk University Press, 1933]), p. 14.

white American supremacy—the population is too heterogeneous for the support of this racial doctrine. The expediences of city life, the characteristic mobility, anonymity, and secondary relationships of individuals, the division of labor and the consequent interdependence of the city population¹⁰ do not present a favorable setting for the tremendous expenditure of attention and energy seen in the South to keep the Negro “in his place.”¹¹ The implications of these differences are that Negroes have fuller participation in northern city life than they enjoy in the rural areas and small towns of the South.

If any one process characterizes urban life it is the intense competition which is evident in all spheres of life and which leads to great extremes of wealth, power, and prestige. Cooley, in his essay entitled “Personal Competition,” describes the general relation between social conditions and the intensity of competition in the following propositions: “The intensity of competition varies: (1) with the degree of personal liberty; (2) with the rate of social change; (3) inversely as the efficiency of the selective agents.”¹² There is no doubt that both the degree of personal liberty and the rate of social change are greater in the city of the North than in the rural South, and especially as these factors affect Negroes. The “selective agents” in the South are certainly efficient—so efficient that Negroes are not allowed to compete for many of the values of the society there. This is true to a much more limited degree in the North.

For the Negro, and other “visible” groups, race distinctions serve to limit the effectiveness and areas of competition. Race antipathy, the vague sense of insecurity which results from contact with strangers,¹³ is further reinforced by the tradition of the South in the case of Negro-white relations. Color and cultural differences are bases for barring Negroes (and other “alien” groups) from certain neighborhoods in the city and from intimate social participation with “whites.”¹⁴ Race con-

¹⁰ Louis Wirth, “Urbanism as a Way of Life,” *American Journal of Sociology*, XLIV (July, 1938), 1-24.

¹¹ B. Schrieke, *Alien Americans* (New York: Viking Press, 1936).

¹² C. H. Cooley, *Sociological Theory and Social Research* (New York: Henry Holt, 1930), pp. 168-69.

¹³ Robert E. Park, “The Bases of Race Prejudice,” *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, CXXXX (November, 1928), 11-20.

¹⁴ It is apparent that to posit all “whites” against all “Negroes” as two contrasting groups is an oversimplification. Among whites as among Negroes, extreme differentiation of attitude toward the “opposite” race is found, not the least significant of which is indifference.

flict arises in the northern city when Negro competition is felt keenly enough, at which point color becomes a symbol of unwanted competition. It is when the numbers of colored competitors threaten coveted residential space, economic gains, political power, or other values of the society that race conflicts arise.¹⁵

In the Chicago study it seemed fruitful to regard the position of Negroes from two viewpoints: Negroes as competitors and Negroes as a fixed-status group. In certain areas of social life Negroes participate as competitors; in other spheres, they are noncompetitors. In the first kind of area, competition is regulated by custom and convention; but in the other areas competition does not exist—the principle of fixed status there determines the position of Negroes.¹⁶

The competition of Negroes for space, for jobs, for political power, and for social recognition in Chicago is recognized both by Negroes and by whites. Underlying these, there is, of course, the struggle for existence, a basic and unconscious biological process which, however, is modified by economic factors as well as by the demographic characteristics of the ethnic groups—for example, age-sex distribution and marital condition.¹⁷ Competition for space is a basic ecological process, which, in a city where race and ethnic segregation occurs, may be regarded as competition between the ethnic groups. Negroes are limited in their competition for jobs by lack of training and skills, and probably only in times of labor short-

¹⁵ Some clue to the intensity of the competition between Negroes and whites for land, jobs, and status which has resulted in conflict is to be found in the number of brutal race riots which, within a brief period, followed the Negro migration to the North. Johnson points out that in East St. Louis the riot was over Negro workers who had menaced jobs of white workers; the Chicago race riot was caused by the conflict of Negro and white workers in the Stock Yards for jobs and the competition for space in Hyde Park; the riot in Arkansas rose out of a desire to curb the tenants' demand for more for their cotton; and in the Atlanta riot of 1906, a chief incitement to violence was the menace to the economic security of whites by Negro carpenters and bricklayers (Charles S. Johnson, "Race Relations and Social Change," in Thompson, *op. cit.*, p. 286).

¹⁶ It is important to emphasize that the attempt of whites to limit the competition of Negroes is directed not only against them, but against all groups of potential competitors who are "visible" in appearance or language, or culturally of a lower standard of living and hence identifiable as competitors. Because of the Negro's higher degree of visibility and the tradition of slavery the Negro is perhaps more limited in his ability to compete with whites than other "non-white" groups. See Robert E. Park, "The Nature of Race Relations," in Thompson, *op. cit.*, pp. 3-45; and Charles S. Johnson, "Race Relations and Social Change," in Thompson, *op. cit.*, pp. 271-303.

¹⁷ S. J. Holmes, *The Negro's Struggle for Survival* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1937).

ages are Negroes competing with whites on equal terms. Some Negroes, however, have obtained positions of economic power in the city. The political power of Negroes is fully realized by Chicago politicians and by Chicago Negroes themselves, and in politics Negroes have made gains which could not have been attained through other means. Negroes, however, do not belong to white churches or social clubs, nor do they marry into white families;¹⁸ and there is a system of social classes among Negroes which is separate from other systems of social classes which exist among whites.

The Negro is ever attempting to widen the sphere within which he may be allowed to compete. Each new achievement of a Negro—whether it be the winning of a world's title in sports, or a new appointive position in the city government—is hailed by the Negro press as a step forward. New migrants are amazed and delighted to see Negro policemen, to have a Negro alderman, to see a Negro employee in the public library. After a while these gains of the Negro in the North are taken for granted and the Negro loses more and more of the "caste mentality" which he could not avoid developing in the South and comes to think of himself as being able to advance his status beyond any allowed him there.

However, in social relations based on primary contacts, race antipathy serves to preserve the color line. In intimate social relations with whites based on nonutilitarian motives, Negroes are barred, for here the sentiment of race prejudice inhibits the development of primary relations, and the mores of the society crystallize the belief in the undesirability, if not the danger, of intimacy with persons of different racial origin. Whites may not want to eat with Negroes, to live in the same neighborhood with them, or to marry Negroes, but whites will work with Negroes for mutual gains and will compete with them for prestige in sports, scholarship, or political power—for economic interdependence, collective action, and competitive co-operation are characteristic of city life, just as is social distance.¹⁹

Social distance fixes the role of the Negro in certain spheres of social life; competition allows him to widen the area in which he participates. It is the interaction of these two processes which determines his position in the social structure at any given moment, and the direction of the proc-

¹⁸ Interracial marriages do not represent marriages between "families" in the sense that the families encourage or sanction such marriages. On the contrary, interracial couples are generally ostracized by both Negroes and whites.

¹⁹ See the discussion by Park of "sentiments" and "interests" in Robert E. Park and Ernest W. Burgess, *The City* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1935), chap. i.

esses can be fully perceived only by a structural analysis of the society in which the processes are taking place. The rise of separate Negro social structures is a response to the fixed status of Negroes enforced by whites in the areas of social life where primary contacts predominate. In the relationships so characteristic of city life—namely, the secondary, impersonal, instrumental relationships, where other persons are regarded as means rather than as ends in themselves—interests rather than sentiments motivate behavior and thus Negroes are not barred from competition. But even in these instrumental relationships, competition is not as effective for Negroes as for whites in determining place in the social structure, for Negroes are subject to race antipathies and are thus limited in their mobility. On the other hand, the Negro's position in the various parts of the social structure is continually changing, responding to changes in economic conditions (prosperity, depression), to change in political administration (conservative, liberal), as well as to pressure by Negroes themselves or by agencies or groups interested in raising the Negro's status.

A fruitful method of studying Negro personality was found in the analysis of the individual effects of the principles of fixed status and free competition in operation in the society. In the northern city, influenced by the democratic ideology and the freedom of city life, the Negro lives in two worlds—the white world and the Negro world. He becomes aware of the contradiction between the ideology of democracy and free competition and the fixed status to which he is assigned by whites. While in the South, there is little doubt as to how he ought to act, in a city like Chicago he is often not at all sure. He may work for a white man and receive recognition for his skill and capabilities, but he must not “marry the boss's daughter.” He may be awarded a degree from the university, but he cannot expect to practice medicine in a white hospital, be pledged to a white fraternity, or attend the Senior formal dance—at least not under ordinary circumstances. But there is no strict rule to guide him. White northerners are themselves often uncertain as to how to act with Negroes, what to expect from them, and how far to treat them as equals.

The marginal personality²⁰ of many Negroes is the result of their dual position in society, because of the fact that in a supposedly democratic society they are allowed to compete for some values but are not allowed to compete for others. If their status were unalterably fixed and explicitly

²⁰ We do not believe that all Negroes in Chicago are “marginal,” but “marginality” is more characteristic of Negroes in Chicago than in a stable southern community.

defined in all aspects of social life, Negroes would perhaps become accommodated to this situation. If, on the other hand, Negroes competed fully and equally in all spheres of life, they would not develop a mentality different from other persons in the society. In either case the marginal man would disappear, for this personality arises out of the confusion which exists in the minds of persons in a society characterized by the principles of both fixed status and free competition.

In conclusion, the position of the Negro in the South is embodied in the structure of the society, and his continued subordination, therefore, is necessary to insure its smooth functioning. To the extent that his position remains consistent with the social structure, a structural analysis is adequate as a method of study.²¹ In the North, the social structure does not depend on the subordination of the Negro, and rapid changes in his status have occurred within a relatively short period of time. Therefore, in addition to a structural analysis, it is necessary to study the processes and the sentiments sanctioning the processes which allow the Negro to change his position in the structure.

From the intensive investigation of Chicago and of other cities of different functional and regional types, a number of "indices" of free competition and fixed status which determine the Negro's place in the structure might be devised which would make possible a comparison of Negro-white relations for the cities studied. The various studies of Negro-white relations could then be placed in a continuum, the two poles of which would be the ideal types of communities characterized by free competition and fixed status. It would then be possible to bring into one general framework the studies of the caste-like societies of the Deep South, of the contrasting urban societies in Chicago and New York, and all other variations of this dimension which might exist.

CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

²¹ It must not be assumed, however, that even the rural parts of the South are completely stable at the present moment.

SOME SOCIAL FUNCTIONS OF RELIGION IN RURAL JAPAN¹

JOHN F. EMBREE

ABSTRACT

In order to understand the religion of a society it is necessary to understand the social and economic organization of that society. In this study of a Japanese peasant community it is noted that those things which are of greatest social value to the community enter into its religious beliefs. Further, the religious life served to strengthen the social relations of the group involved and to emphasize the interdependence of the individual and the group.

In order to understand fully the religion—the body of ritual and belief—of a society it is necessary also to understand the social and economic life of that same society because the sacred beliefs and practices of a people are a function of their whole economic and social organization. Because of this fundamental fact we can never learn the nature of a religion simply by a perusal of the sacred texts, i.e., written words, torn from their social context; nor will a life of Buddha and a study of his original teachings in 535 B.C. tell us much of the nature of religion in a Japanese village in A.D. 1935.

In this paper I shall use the term "religion" as referring to the body of beliefs and ritual practices of a given community connected with sacred things—things of social value. These sacred things may be aspects of the environment or of the social organization or even individuals as members of the community; they may also be representations of any of these things.²

People in preliterate folk societies—and peasant communities in Japan are to a degree folk—depend much more directly on their physical environment than do those in cities. To a city man the first of May is much

¹ The general conclusions concerning religion in a southern Japanese village presented in this paper are based on a year's field study by Ella Embree and myself in 1935-36 under the auspices of the Social Science Research Committee of the University of Chicago. Most of the factual material gathered may be found in *Suye Mura, a Japanese Village* (Chicago, 1939), especially chap. vii. Remarks concerning Chinese village life are based on the studies of Hsiao-Tung Fei (*Peasant Life in China* [London, 1939]) and Daniel Kulp (*Country Life in South China* [New York, 1925]).

² This approach to the study of religion was first emphasized in Europe by Emile Durkheim (*Les Formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse* [Paris, 1912]). Modern social anthropologists such as Mauss, Malinowski, and Radcliffe-Brown have in various ways further developed it. See, for instance, Radcliffe-Brown, *Taboo* (Cambridge, 1939).

the same as the first of November, but to a Japanese farmer there is a vast difference. In May he prepares his rice-seed beds and plants the seed, while in November he gathers in the last of the harvest and looks forward to a season of rest and relaxation.

Every month, almost every day, has its own special occupations for the Japanese peasant. A reflection of this periodic recurrence of agricultural pursuits is the periodic recurrence of festival days. These festival days are regulated by a lunar calendar, and most of the important ones occur on the fifteenth of the lunar month—the time when the moon is full, a fine occasion for groups to come together for a celebration of some deity and day, for drink and good fellowship.

It is notable that those things of greatest social value to a community are the things which enter into its body of religious belief and ritual. In Japan the basic and all-important product is rice, and there is a deity, Inari, associated with rice, fertility, sex, and good fortune (by the combination of rice and sex, by the way, Inari is a patron deity of the farmers, on the one hand, and prostitutes, on the other). Rice and rice wine form the commonest offerings to the gods.

Things may be of negative as well as of positive social value. Wind can destroy paddy rice if it comes at the wrong time, rivers can flood and cause damage. Thus we find a special wind day in the festival calendar, and the destructive power of rivers is recognized in a river god, Kawa no Kami sama, who is regarded as, on the whole, malevolent.

The farmers' year in Japan, and in China as well, is filled with a series of festivals in honor of various deities and aspects of the environment. The names of the deities are not important—whether they are what is called Shinto, or Buddhist, or Taoist, is of interest only to the culture historian. The significant thing is that they mark the different seasons of the peasants' year, that by what they are associated with and the type of offerings given they reflect in a ritual manner the things of greatest social value to the community.

Furthermore, the annual ceremonies in honor of each deity serve as periodic occasions for the individuals of the community to unite in a common ceremony, renew their sense of social solidarity in common ritual, followed by genial sociability. The individual's beliefs become expressed again, and by the repetition are kept alive. The individual again becomes conscious of his dependence on his fellows, on the one hand, and gains renewed vigor from the social contact, on the other. He goes back to his daily work with an added zest for life.

To illustrate these points, the deity Jizō may be taken as an example.

Historically Jizō is a Buddhist deity, the one who guides children's souls through Hades. His role as a guide and protector of children exists in Suyé Mura, but only to a minor degree as compared with his other functions.

First of all, Jizō serves as a protector of crossroads, entrances to villages, and other dangerous places. Second, some houses have images of Jizō by their entrances as protectors. Occasionally such households are said to have such images not for protection but as an aid to sorcery. Thus Jizō's supernatural powers may be turned toward either good or evil. Third, he serves as keeper of brides. At weddings some young men of the neighborhood bring an image of Jizō into the banquet hall, accompanied by ribald jests and demands for wine. In this context Jizō is said to keep the bride from running away to her home. Fourth, certain particular Jizō are regarded as good for curing certain diseases, especially earache, and receive prayers and offerings from the sick in this connection. But most interesting of all, images of Jizō are frequently found in *buraku dō*. (In rural Japan, villages are made up of a number of hamlets, and each hamlet or *buraku* has a religious structure which houses one or another deity, usually Buddhist—it may be Kwannon, Yakushi, Jizō—the particular deity is not important.)³

The neighborhood *dō* serves as a play place for children, a sleeping place for wandering beggars and pilgrims, and a place of meeting in the evening for young men and girls. The *dō* is no mere empty structure, for the presence of an image of a deity makes it an inhabited building, a dwelling. Thus mothers feel it is a good place for children to play; a lone pilgrim does not feel utterly alone when he sleeps there. This, then, is one important function of the *dō*—a public building where children may play or adults stop for a visit or a night's rest—a familiar homely little building looked after by the local group and housing a deity. The *dō*, in a sense, represents the hamlet.

Another expression of this is the annual celebration. Each hamlet is subdivided into groups of two or three houses called *kumi*. The members of one group are responsible for looking after the *dō* celebration one year, those of another group the next year, and so on. During the day of the festival the group in charge serves tea and beans to visitors and exchanges gossip. Someone from each house in the hamlet comes during the day to make an offering to the deity and to drink tea. Some time during the day, or in the evening under the full moon, there is a general gathering of

³ For further details on these practices see *Suyé Mura, a Japanese Village*.

neighborhood people to drink together. Thus once a year the local group renews its social solidarity by means of the local *dō* festival.

Jizō, then, as a particular named deity, is irrelevant. The use of some sacred object to mark crossroads and dangerous places reflects the society's recognition of these places as sources of potential harm, hence requiring some preventive measure. A home is directly important to the family and indirectly to the community, and every dwelling is protected by deities of various kinds—some have statues of Jizō. Certain families suspected of black magic are supposed to have some shrine to the evil dog spirit, and Jizō is one of the many forms such a shrine may take. Again, at marriage, Jizō is simply one of several aspects of the ritual recognition of the importance of marriage to the community. As to Jizō *dō*, the significant thing about this aspect of the religious life of the village is the way in which the *dō* serves to give expression to the social unity of the local group. There are many other festivals which serve the same or similar functions. Some involve Buddhist deities, some Shinto, but both serve the same ends. In China the village temple houses Taoist and Buddhist deities, but the social functions of the temples are independent of the particular historical brand of deity housed.

The local shrines and temples and the festival calendar are associated with agriculture, with the seasons and with the local group dependent on them. Myths which may be associated with certain deities and rituals serve to sanction custom. The subject of mythology, one important aspect of religion, I have no time for here.

The religious system and festival calendar in rural Japan and, as far as I can judge, in rural China, serve, then, these functions: (1) Through the offerings and beliefs surrounding the deities involved, i.e., in the belief and ritual concerning them, both individual and collective, they reflect things of social value to the community, such as rice, wind, sickness, and health. (2) As common centers for the local group and through the periodic ceremonies they serve to maintain the solidarity of the local group and to keep alive the common sentiments and beliefs by having them recurrently expressed.

In both Japan and China there is, however, another whole body of belief and ritual in addition to the local deities, shrines, and community ceremonies, namely, ancestor worship. In China ancestral worship, although indorsed by Buddhism, is closely connected with Confucianism. But in Japan it is today closely associated with Buddhism—ancestral tablets are often kept in the local Buddhist temple; a Buddhist priest performs the rituals at funerals and memorial services.

The significant thing about ancestral worship in both countries is that it concerns the immediate family and the extended family, rather than the community or local group. One of the most important, and in the nature of things inevitable, events in family life is the death of the house head—an event which necessitates a complete rearrangement of social relations within the household. The son who was formerly subservient to the head is now himself head and takes over both the privileges and the responsibilities of head of the house. The widow goes up in status on the death of her husband, and her voice carries more weight in family affairs. All in all, the death of a house head is a break and a shock to the smooth functioning of the immediate family.

In rural Japan there is an interesting dichotomy which manifests itself at a funeral. The local group, the neighborhood, comes to the aid of the stricken family by assisting in the funeral preparations, calling the priest, digging the grave. The extended kin group, on the other hand, assembles from far and near to mourn and participate in the funeral rituals. There is here a recognition of two separate social groups, one based on geographical nearness and the other on kinship, each group affected by the death and each responding to it, but doing so separately.

In addition to the funeral a means of giving continuity to the family life and lessening the break caused by death is through the concept of the head becoming a spiritual, but nonetheless real, ancestor to whom duties of filial piety continue to exist and who continues to serve as a unifier and strengthener of family ties. With time a given ancestor's influence dies out, but this is a gradual, not a sudden process, and in China a given real or mythical ancestor of several centuries back comes to serve as a symbol for all ancestors between him and the recently dead. This legendary first ancestor serves as a symbol for the extended family group or clan.

Ties with the ancestors are maintained daily through offerings to the tablets and periodically through an annual ceremony participated in by the whole extended family through offerings at the graves, memorial services, and visits among relatives. In Japan this is the period called *Bon* in the seventh month when the ancestors are believed to come back to earth for a short period. In China this is the period of *Ch'ing Ming* in the third month. Both the *Bon* and the *Ch'ing Ming* periods serve to revivify the sense of the continuity of the family through time from generation to generation. It is a special, more important, re-emphasis on the part of the descendants of a unity expressed daily in each home through offerings to the tablets.

The funeral service, the periodic memorial services for particular re-

cently deceased members, and the annual ceremony for the dead serve to bring together the extended family, the horizontal spatial family in contrast to the perpendicular temporal family. The bonds of kinship are strengthened by these reunions, the interdependence of family members is re-emphasized.

Ancestor worship, then, serves to unite the kin group, to insure its solidarity; a solidarity based on blood relationship in contrast to the other aspects of village religion which serve to unify the local group—the group based on common territory and common occupation.

We may now summarize the significant aspects of religion in rural Japan. It consists fundamentally of a body of ritual and belief which may be classified under two broad heads: (1) the series of seasonal festivals associated with agricultural and other deities and celebrated on a neighborhood basis; (2) ancestor worship, performed on a kinship basis.

These two aspects of the religious life serve the following functions: (1) to give ritual recognition to things of social value to the society, e.g., rice, silk, wind, water, human life; (2) to strengthen the social relations of the groups involved, especially the local group and the kin group (there are sometimes special deities connected with occupational groups also, such as carpenters or waggoners); (3) to give the individual (*a*) a sense of dependence on the group through emphasizing his duties toward it, and (*b*) a sense of security as a member of the group, thus emphasizing his rights as a member of the group. A man of few kin, or a man who lives isolated from the local group, is a poor man, a beggar, a nobody.

These generalizations, based on a study of the religious beliefs of rural China and Japan, should also apply to rural France, or England, or Italy. Instead of Buddhist deities we would find Christian saints, but the functions of the ritual and belief should be similar; and in order to test these conclusions they must be applied to data from peasant Europe to see whether or not they are valid.

The particular development of ancestor worship is not found in rural Europe, though it is the center of the religion of the Bantu-speaking peoples of South Africa. (In Bantu tribes, as in Japan, there is a special form of worship for the king's ancestors in connection with things of national concern.) The festival calendar is found in both peasant Europe and peasant Asia, and the basic social needs met by the religious practices of both sections are similar, the functions of the religion in both areas correspond—the differences are differences of concrete historical detail, not of social function.

A NOTE ON SOME ETHNOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES IN RECOGNITION OF SIMULATED EX- PRESSIONS OF THE EMOTIONS

ELIZABETH C. DICKEY AND FRANKLIN H. KNOWER

ABSTRACT

The achievements of samples of American and Mexican school children in the recognition of pictures of simulated expressions of the emotions were compared. Mexican school children were generally more sensitive to the specificity of these expressions than were the American school children. Some interpretations of the differences and the possible values of the method for ethnological research are suggested.

Reports of racial differences in expression of the emotions may be found in the literature of the field of ethnology as early as the work of Darwin.¹ The recent summaries by Klineberg² indicate that most of the studies have been of an anecdotal character. A natural result of the investigational procedure used is that more consideration has been given to differences in forms of expression than to sensitivity to and accuracy of interpretation of such expressions. While cultural differences may well be described in terms of differences in forms of expression, they may also be described in terms of frequency of use of various expressional forms and the accuracy with which such expressions are interpreted. Culture groups in which gestural forms of communication are most common should also be culture groups in which this means of social stimulation is most accurately interpreted. The writers recently became interested in the possibility of submitting this hypothesis to an exact quantitative analysis as it might apply to American and Mexican culture differences in the recognition of simulated expressions of the emotions.

One of the writers was teaching at the time in Mexico City and had access to Mexican school children whose co-operation might be secured as subjects. Minneapolis public school children were secured as American subjects for the study. The pictures used were the set of twenty-two photographs developed by Dusenbury and Knower³ for their Group IV

¹ Charles Darwin, *The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals* (New York: Appleton, 1896).

² See Otto Klineberg, *Racial Differences* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1935), chap. xv, and *Social Psychology* (New York: Holt, 1940), chap. vii.

³ Delwin D. Dusenbury and Franklin H. Knower, "Experimental Studies of the Symbolism of Action and Voice, I: A Study of the Specificity of Meaning in Facial Expression," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, XXIV (1938), 424-35.

subjects. The set consists of eleven pictures each of a man and a woman. Each picture consists of an enlarged print (6.5×9.5 centimeters) from a selected frame of a motion-picture film of eleven simulated expressions of different emotions or emotional attitudes. The judging sheet used for the American subjects was the same as used in the previous study. For the Mexican subjects both the directions for judging and the judging sheet were translated into Spanish, but otherwise the conditions for judging the expressions were held as nearly constant as possible in both groups. The groups of subjects were approximately matched for age and academic status. The subjects responded to the pictures in small groups of eight to twelve each. A flash-card method of presenting the pictures was used. Each picture was exposed for a period of thirty seconds; and during this time the subjects studied the picture and recorded its number opposite the terms which in their respective judgments best labeled the expression shown.

Table 1 indicates the emotional expressions studied and the percentages of accuracy of response for the judgment of various groups. Among the eighty-eight possible group comparisons of Mexican and American children in judging specific pictures, the Mexican children are seen to be more accurate in sixty-two (or 75 per cent) of the cases; they are equal in five (or 6 per cent) of the cases; and the American children are superior in twenty-one (or 24 per cent) of the cases. The percentage of accuracy when accumulated for each expression (data for the pictures of the man and woman are combined here) and for each group of subjects compared favors the Mexican school children. The last two columns of our tables show the percentage differences and the critical ratios for these differences between the two groups of subjects. All critical ratios except the one for the difference in laughter indicate significant differences. The critical ratio for the difference in recognition of laughter shows about ninety-seven chances in one hundred of being significantly different. A rank order correlation of $+.83$ between the percentages of recognition of the several moods indicates a comparative consistency in the degree of specificity in the expressions of the pictures. Speculation as to the reason for greater differences in the recognition of some pictures than others appears to the authors to be relatively fruitless with the possible exception of expressions of "religious love" and "pity." It has been suggested that the greater familiarity of the Mexican children with the scenes of religious paintings may have accounted for this difference. The consistent differences for the two groups would appear to the authors to be the result of a greater sensi-

TABLE 1

PERCENTAGE OF CORRECT JUDGMENTS OF VARIOUS SIMULATED EXPRESSIONS OF EMOTIONS FOR SUBJECT GROUPS

	JUNIOR HIGH BOYS				JUNIOR HIGH GIRLS				SENIOR HIGH BOYS				SENIOR HIGH GIRLS				TOTAL JUDGMENTS	DIFFERENCE	C. R.	
	Man		Woman		Man		Woman		Man		Woman		Man		Woman					
	Amer.	Mex.	Amer.	Mex.	Amer.	Mex.	Amer.	Mex.	Amer.	Mex.	Amer.	Mex.	Amer.	Mex.	Amer.	Mex.				
No. students per group.....	115	13	115	13	118	57	118	57	204	148	204	148	185	90	185	90	616	
Religious love.....	19	46	24	54	23	58	28	53	37	65	36	74	43	50	43	83	65	30	12.24	
Reverence.....																				
Awe.....																				
Anger.....	44	100	72	92	57	97	90	72	60	86	83	88	70	82	91	95	69	86	17	8.50
Hate.....																				
Rage.....																				
Laughter.....	85	100	90	84	90	95	98	100	92	96	98	100	97	92	99	99	95	97	2	2.11
Glee.....																				
Merriment.....																				
Amazement.....	43	31	44	31	53	32	40	39	47	47	34	62	57	56	35	70	43	54	11	4.40
Astonishment.....																				
Surprise.....																				
Torture.....	27	31	64	77	29	49	68	53	35	58	71	70	52	59	71	71	54	65	11	4.40
Great pain.....																				
Suffering.....																				
Sneering.....	26	15	44	46	27	44	45	44	41	58	55	81	41	59	70	83	47	61	14	5.60
Contempt.....																				
Scorn.....																				
Sadness.....	57	46	39	23	47	63	39	58	51	55	46	57	63	69	54	68	51	61	10	4.00
Grief.....																				
Crying.....																				
Fear.....	32	31	56	69	44	56	45	83	51	49	59	90	60	58	70	92	55	71	16	6.67
Terror.....																				
Horror.....																				
Determination.....	18	31	43	46	19	53	41	46	29	40	54	52	32	42	51	79	37	51	14	5.60
Stubbornness.....																				
Firmness.....																				
Doubt.....	30	69	43	15	29	68	47	35	40	83	39	39	48	71	48	28	41	55	14	5.60
Hesitation.....																				
Questioning.....																				
Pity.....																				
Sympathy.....	19	54	15	39	20	32	16	16	33	62	23	40	30	59	28	32	26	45	19	7.92
Kind helpfulness.....																				
Percentage of combined judgments correct.....	36	50	48	52	40	59	51	55	47	64	54	69	54	64	55	73	50	65	15	21.43

tivity of the Mexican than the American school children to the communicative symbols of action.

The facts that the pictures were made by Americans for American subjects and that the judging sheet used by the Mexicans was a Spanish translation of the original English version cannot be interpreted as conditions favoring the demonstrated superiority of the judgments of the Mexican children. It is possible that the Mexican children did better in the project because such experimental activities are less common in their school program and thus arouse greater interest than is the case with American school children. The American children, however, appeared to co-operate wholeheartedly in the project. The most reasonable interpretation of these differences would seem to be that they reflect cultural differentials. The data are offered as an illustration of a method which may be used in the quantitative study of cultural differences and in demonstrations of ethnological characteristics of the populations studied.

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NEWS AND NOTES

RESEARCH NEWS

Social Science Research Council.—The Council has announced eighty awards, totaling \$75,000, for the academic year 1941-42. The awards provide for study and research in the fields of economics, political science, sociology, statistics, political, social, and economic history, cultural anthropology, social psychology, geography, and related disciplines.

Seven of the awards, carrying a basic stipend of from \$1,800 to \$2,500, plus travel allowances, cover post-doctoral research-training fellowships to men and women under thirty-five years of age who possess the Ph.D. degree or its equivalent. These fellowships are granted for the purpose of enlarging the research training and equipment of promising young social scientists, through advanced study and field experience.

Thirteen appointments are pre-doctoral field fellowships which carry a basic stipend of \$1,800 plus travel allowance. The recipients are graduate students under thirty years of age who have completed all the requirements for the Ph.D. degree except the thesis. These fellowships are intended to supplement formal academic study by opportunity for direct contact with the materials of social science not available in the classroom or library.

The remaining sixty awards are research grants-in-aid designed to assist mature scholars in the completion of research projects already well under way. These grants average about \$450 and do not ordinarily exceed \$1,000. Twelve of these appointments were made through a special fund specifically granted for the purpose of assisting and encouraging the research of social science faculties in the South. The objectives and requirements for eligibility are the same as those governing the national grants-in-aid, but applications are restricted to fourteen southern states.

Awards of particular interest to readers of the *Journal* are as follows:

POSTDOCTORAL RESEARCH-TRAINING FELLOWS

A. B. Hollingshead, sociology, Indiana University; for training in sociological and anthropological field research methods.

William Hord Nicholls, economics, Iowa State College; for training in economics, sociology, and law.

Douglas Llewellyn Oliver, Harvard University; for field training in cultural anthropology in a rural midwestern community.

PREDOCTORAL FIELD FELLOWS

Katherine Spencer, anthropology, University of Chicago; for field training in communities of new settlement in North America.

GRANT-IN-AID APPOINTEES

Brewton Berry, sociology, University of Missouri; for a study of the archeology and the ethno-history of the Siouan tribes of Missouri.

Leonard S. Cottrell, Jr., sociology, Cornell University; for a study of factors in marital adjustment.

Paul F. Cressey, sociology, Wheaton College; for a study of recent social changes in the southern Appalachian Mountains.

Margaret Wooster Curti, Teachers College; for a comparative study of the intelligence and certain special abilities of white and colored children in Jamaica, British West Indies.

Wayne Dennis, psychology, University of Virginia; for psychological studies of Hopi and Cochiti children.

Abraham L. Harris, economics, Howard University; for a study of Werner Sombart and the roots of National Socialism.

Rudolf Heberle, sociology, Louisiana State University; for a study of the industrial and occupational structure of the population of Louisiana.

Clifford Kirkpatrick, sociology, University of Minnesota; for a quantitative study of the courtship experience of college students.

Harvey James Locke, sociology, Indiana University; for an analysis of marital adjustment through a comparison of data on divorced and married couples.

Calvin F. Schmid, sociology, University of Washington; for a study of political movements in the state of Minnesota.

H. Ashley Weeks, sociology, State College of Washington; for the construction of an expectancy table for the purpose of predicting juvenile delinquency.

Edgar Zilsel, International Institute of Social Research; for an analysis of society, technology, and economy in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.

SOUTHERN GRANT-IN-AID APPOINTEES

Morton B. King, Jr., sociology, University of Mississippi; for a study of rural locality groups in Lafayette County, Mississippi.

Bureau of the Census.—The program of the Sixteenth Decennial Census is proceeding at an unprecedented pace. The publications, both advance and final, which will result from this Decennial Census have been summarized in a series of tentative lists available upon request from the Bureau of the Census. These lists cover the fields of population, housing, agriculture, manufactures, mineral industries, business, and the territories and possessions which were covered in the Decennial Census and indicate not only what is already available but also the approximate time at which the other publications will be released.

Division of Research, Work Projects Administration.—At the request of the National Defense Commission, the Division is conducting a survey of defense migration to determine the volume of population movement into important defense cities, the places from which the workers are moving, their success in finding work, and other information. A study of this nature has been conducted in Chicago on a tryout basis, and similar studies will be conducted in the future in a number of cities in the United States.

University of Illinois.—The rural sociology department at Illinois is carrying on a rural organization study. The first phase—an inventory of rural organization—is in the tabulation stage. They have made an inventory of organization in over 500 communities in the state. The second phase—a study of the work of the organizations—covers approximately 400 organizations, such as community units, farm-bureau units, granges, parent-teachers associations, etc. The schedules have now been collected. The field work of the third phase is being done; it is an intensive restudy in four townships of participation of farm people in rural organizations.

Michigan Agricultural Experiment Station.—The Farm Management Section and the Sociology Section of the Station are co-operating with the Bureau of Agricultural Economics in a study of the resources and opportunities of rural youth of Branch County, Michigan. O. E. Baker and Nat T. Frame are carrying out the Bureau's part of the study. The project has been set up in such a manner as to fulfil the requirements for a survey of youth needs and opportunities and at the same time provide basic data for two other studies. The Farm Management Section is concerned with the experiences of young men in farming and the factors contributing to early success or failure, and the Sociology Section, in data for a study of the clientele of the county agricultural extension leaders.

The Farm Management Section is represented by Frank Atchley and the Sociology Section by D. L. Gibson.

Tentative approval has been given by the Sociology Section of the Michigan Agricultural Experiment Station for a study of the co-ordination of local and extra-local organizations and agencies in selected rural communities of Michigan. The project will attempt to discover the principles, methods, and types of total community organization found useful and effective in social and economic planning and adjusting total community resources to total social needs in rural communities. The leaders of the project are D. L. Gibson, research assistant, and E. B. Harper, experiment station sociologist.

Public Work Reserve.—The Public Work Reserve has recently been organized in the Federal Works Agency to establish a reservoir of useful public projects to absorb possible post-defense unemployment. The National Resources Planning Board is co-operating in the general supervision of the Reserve, and the Work Projects Administration is furnishing funds and staff. Immediate objectives will be to determine the volume, nature, and distribution of potential public work and to encourage state and local agencies to prepare programs of needed capital improvements and of required new or expanded public services.

Charles B. Lawrence, Jr., has been appointed consultant on public services for the Public Work Reserve.

Social Security Board.—Monthly benefits under the old age and survivors' insurance program have now been paid for over a year. The Board has undertaken a long-range study to determine whether or not the purpose of the Social Security Program, as stated in the Board's report to the President on proposed changes in the Social Security Act, submitted in December, 1938, "to pay benefits that provide a minimum degree of social security—as a basis on which the worker, through his own efforts, will have a better chance to provide adequately for his individual security," is being fulfilled.

The initial survey has been launched in Philadelphia, where a sample of 532 cases—one-third of the beneficiaries in that city—will be studied. The period covered will be one year prior to retirement and the year following retirement during which benefits have been received. Only beneficiaries who have retired within the first six months of 1940 and who, therefore, have had about one year in which to make an adjustment will be considered.

The schedules call for information relating to a primary beneficiary, the spouse, and children. Facts to be gathered concern the insurance record of the worker, the resources of the "economic family" or household, retirement experience, cash and noncash income, assets and debts, and other relevant changes.

United States Women's Bureau.—Under the title *The Migratory Labor Problem in Delaware* the Bureau has published a study of the work and problems of 300 families of Negro migrants who were found in eight Delaware cannery camps in September, 1940.

Washington State College.—Field work on two projects was recently completed by Fred Winkler and Charles Nelson. The first study was set up to measure the effect of federal governmental programs on the attitudes of people living in a rural county; the second concerned itself with problems and opportunities of rural, out-of-school youth. The area chosen for both studies was Pend Oreille County, an area characterized by mining, lumbering, and small-scale farming. An analysis of the population trends of incorporated places in the state of Washington is being made by Dr. Reuss.

Fred R. Yoder directed the second Washington Country Life Leadership Conference, held on March 7 and 8, under the auspices of the department of sociology. The theme for this year's conference was "Rural Social Institutions in the Changing Rural Community."

NOTES

American Prison Association.—The Seventy-first Annual Congress of the Association met at San Francisco, August 18-22, under the slogan "Crime Control for National Security and Defense." Among the speakers were Sanford Bates, New York State Board of Parole, Norman S. Hayner, University of Washington, and Pauline V. Young, University of Southern California.

Child Study Association of America.—The Association's Annual Institute will be held November 14 and 15 at the Hotel Commodore, New York City, on the theme "Family Morale in a World at War." Participating in the program will be General Lewis B. Hershey, Paul V. McNutt, Martha Eliot, of the Children's Bureau, James Plant, Lawrence K. Frank, and Eduard C. Lindeman. Further details may be obtained from the Child Study Association, 221 West Fifty-seventh Street, New York City.

Institute for Propaganda Analysis.—Maurice Davie, Yale University, has been elected to the Institute's Board of Directors.

National Association for Nursery Education.—The Association's biennial conference will be held in Detroit in October on the theme "Life, Liberty and Happiness for Children Now."

National Recreation Association.—The Twenty-sixth National Recreation Congress will meet in Baltimore, September 29–October 3. Highlight of the Congress, which signalizes the thirty-fifth year of service by the National Recreation Association, will be the Monday conference on the community's responsibility for defense recreation. Members of local defense committees and public officials will spend the day discussing the recreation needs of service men and defense workers. Meetings throughout the week will stress the general morale-building values of recreation in addition to specific defense services. Among the subjects up for discussion are industrial problems, programs for indoor and outdoor community centers, recreation for colored groups, activities for girls and women, church recreation, and play in institutions.

For further information address T. E. Rivers, National Recreation Association, 315 Fourth Avenue, New York City.

Society for Social Research.—The annual Institute of the Society was held in Chicago, August 15 and 16. The major emphasis was given to the topic of morale, its implications being considered by papers under the general headings: "Morale and the Relations between Ethnic Groups," "Morale and the Community," "Morale and the Economic Process," "Crisis and Morale," "Research on Morale," and "Communication and Morale." The Institute was concluded by the annual dinner, the feature of which was an address by Harry Stack Sullivan, William Allison White Psychiatric Foundation, on "Psychiatric Aspects of Morale."

Sociological Research Association.—The Association is meeting in Chicago, September 5 and 6. The following papers will be delivered: "Average Number of Children per Woman in Butler County, Ohio: 1930," by W. S. Thompson, Scripps Foundation; "Personality Development of the Southern Rural Negro Youth," by Charles S. Johnson, Fisk University; "Crucial Problems in Methods of Predicting Social Adjustment," by Ernest W. Burgess, University of Chicago, S. A. Stouffer, University of Chicago, and Leonard S. Cottrell, Jr., Cornell University; and "Analysis of Action as Research Operation," by Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Office of Radio Research, Columbia University.

Association for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis.—Founded in May, 1941, this new organization is dedicated to advancing psychoanalysis "in a spirit of free inquiry, tolerance and open-mindedness on the foundation laid by the basic discoveries of Sigmund Freud. In addition to promoting scientific advancement, it seeks to acquaint professional groups whose members deal with human beings and human problems with psychoanalytic concepts for use as tools in their special fields of work, and to serve the public by increasing the general understanding of mental phenomena."

The major activity of the Association during the coming year will center around its training program; the Institute will offer lectures and seminars. Evening lectures and seminars concerning fundamental problems in psychoanalysis and the relation between personality and society will be of particular interest to sociologists, anthropologists, psychologists, political scientists, and specialists in related fields.

Dr. William V. Silverberg, Lebanon Hospital, has been elected president of the Institute and Dr. Karen Horney, dean. Further information may be obtained by writing the secretary of the Association, Dr. Harold Kelman, 1230 Park Avenue, New York City.

Canadian Committee on Reconstruction.—This Committee was set up by order in council "for the purpose of examining and discussing the general question of post-war reconstruction, and to make recommendation as to what Government facilities should be established to deal with this question." Among the members of the Committee are F. Cyril James, chairman, McGill University; R. C. Wallace, Queen's University; and Edouard Montpetit, Université de Montréal.

Carnegie Corporation.—Arnold M. Rose has been appointed research assistant to Gunnar Myrdal, who is engaged in preparing an analysis of the Negro problem in America.

Inter-American Statistical Institute.—In a message to the Congress, the President has transmitted a recommendation by the acting Secretary of State that the government of the United States become an adhering member of the Inter-American Statistical Institute.

Statistical Activities of the American Nations, a volume of 842 pages, has been issued by the Temporary Organizing Committee of the Institute. This is a compendium of statistical services and activities in the 22 nations of the Western Hemisphere (including Canada), together with biographical information concerning the leading statistical personnel in

these nations. The volume may be obtained at the price of \$2.00 from Halbert L. Dunn, secretary-general of the Temporary Organizing Committee, Census Bureau Building, Washington, D.C.

Russell Sage Foundation.—J. Glenn Donaldson has been appointed assistant director of the Foundation's Department of Consumer Credit Studies.

Virginia State Planning Board.—Lyonel Florant, who held a Rosenwald Fellowship for the year 1940-41 and has been reappointed for the year 1943-44, has accepted a two-year appointment as research associate in charge of a study of population trends since 1800.

Butler University.—Richard Dewey has been appointed instructor in sociology.

Cornell University.—Louis Guttman has been appointed instructor in sociology in the department of sociology and anthropology. During the last academic year Mr. Guttman held a pre-doctoral fellowship granted by the Social Science Research Council.

Escola Livre de Sociologia e Política de São Paulo.—A department of sociology and anthropology has been organized with the following teaching and research staff: Donald Pierson, Ph.D., whose study of the Brazilian Negro, based upon two years' field work at Bahia, is to be issued this fall by the University of Chicago Press, chairman; Herbert Baldus, Ph.D., ethnologist with several years' field experience among Brazilian Indians, author of *Ensaio de etnologia brasileira* (São Paulo, 1937); Emilo Willems, Ph.D., author of *Assimilação e populações marginais no Brasil* (São Paulo, 1940), a study of assimilation among German colonists in the southern states of Brazil, joint author with Herbert Baldus of *Dicionário de etnologia e sociologia* (São Paulo, 1939), and co-editor with Romano Harreto of the new journal, *Sociologia*; Bruno Rudolfer, director of the Bureau of Municipal Statistics of the city of São Paulo; Sergio Milliet, head of the Divisão de Documentação Histórica e Social of the Departamento de Cultura of São Paulo; Noemy da Silveira Rudolfer, director of social-psychological research for the local Instituto de Educação, author of *Introdução a psicologia educacional* (São Paulo, 1938); A. R. Müller, recently returned from a year of graduate study at Oxford; W. P. Leser, co-author with Pedro Egydio de Carvalho of *Metodologia estatística* (2 vols.; São Paulo, 1936-38); Cecilia de Castro Silva, M.A. (Radcliffe); and Mario Wagner Vieira da Cunha. Thirteen courses are

being given in the department, including seminars on "Race and Culture," "The Brazilian Indian," and "Methods in the Social Sciences." Seventeen graduate students are enrolled.

University of Idaho.—Paul K. Hatt, who has been a teaching fellow for the last two years at the University of Washington, will take charge of the courses in sociology this year.

University of Iowa.—E. B. Reuter is to teach during the coming academic year at the University of Puerto Rico, and during his absence Charles B. Rogler of the University of Puerto Rico will teach at the University of Iowa.

Hans von Hentig, formerly of the University of Bonn, recently of the University of Colorado, taught classes in criminology during the summer session and will continue as visiting professor of sociology during the first semester of the academic year 1941-42.

Marshall B. Clinard has left the staff to accept an appointment with the Bureau of the Census, Division of Criminal Statistics.

University of Maryland.—C. Wright Mills, formerly on the staff of the University of Wisconsin, has been appointed associate professor of sociology. Peter Lejins, former professor of criminology and criminal law at the University of Latvia, has been appointed assistant professor of sociology.

University of Michigan.—William Fuson has been appointed instructor in sociology and social statistics.

Michigan State College.—During the summer two institutes were held on the campus under the sponsorship of the department of sociology.

The Thirteenth Annual Institute of Social Welfare, July 14-18, brought about 800 social workers, board members, and others to East Lansing for five days of instruction under the direction of state and national leaders. This Institute is sponsored not only by Michigan State College but also by the Michigan Welfare League and various state departments.

The second was the Michigan Conference on Family Relations. About fifty persons active in counseling, teaching, research, and other aspects of marriage attended and participated in the one-day session held on July 19.

University of Minnesota.—Samuel M. Strong, who was on the staff of Howard University during the last year, has been appointed lecturer in

sociology. Dr. Strong will teach the courses of Raymond Sletto, who is engaged in research at the United States Department of Agriculture.

New Jersey College for Women.—Margaret Smith has been appointed instructor of sociology.

New York University.—H. Harold Axworthy, associate professor of sociology, died August 2 at the age of forty-eight of a heart attack at his summer home in Sag Harbor, Long Island. Dr. Axworthy, who had done all his undergraduate and graduate study at New York University and had been a member of the faculty for eighteen years, was an active participant in local community enterprises, being at the time of his death director of the Bureau of Community Service and Research, director of the White Fund Camp, maintained by the University at Bear Mountain Park for underprivileged children, chairman of the National Youth Administration Work Council of New York, a member of the regional committee of the N.Y.A., chairman of the student affairs' committee at Washington Square College, and chairman of the administrative committee of the department of sociology and anthropology at the school.

University of North Carolina.—The University of North Carolina Press has published Harriet L. Herring's *Southern Industry and Regional Development*.

Margaret Jarman Hagood's statistics text for sociology is now in press and will be released by Reynal and Hitchcock early this fall.

Howard W. Odum has been granted the degree of Doctor of Humane Letters by Clark University.

Syracuse University.—Charles Bowerman has been appointed instructor in sociology and social statistics.

Talladega (Alabama) College.—Hylan Lewis, formerly on the staff of Howard University and during the years 1939-41 a Rosenwald fellow at the University of Chicago, has been appointed professor of social science.

University of Toronto.—John F. Embree, who has been on the staff of the University of Hawaii, has been appointed assistant professor of anthropology.

University of Washington.—Norman S. Hayner was appointed by Governor Langlie to make a survey of the four penal and correctional institutions of the state. Jesse F. Steiner and Joseph Cohen, as well as the fol-

lowing graduate students, are collaborating with him: Clarence Schrag, Audrey Kittell James, Alan Bates, and Irving Herman.

The Social Exhibits Hall, one of the six rooms in the new research unit of the sociology department, was formally opened in May. The materials on display have been taken largely from Calvin F. Schmid's *Social Saga of Two Cities* and *Mortality Trends in the State of Minnesota*. An exhibit for the Puget Sound area is now under preparation.

University of Wisconsin.—John L. Gillin has completed nearly thirty years of teaching at the University and will be on leave next year prior to becoming emeritus professor in 1942-43. He has been succeeded by T. C. McCormick as chairman of the department of sociology and anthropology, and courses in the field of social pathology will be taught by Leland C. De Vinney.

Philleo Nash, recently of the University of Toronto, will give a seminar in "Comparative Social Systems" during the first semester.

T. C. McCormick is chairman of a newly created division of statistics, which co-ordinates all statistical courses in the University, and supervises graduate work in statistics.

Reuben Hill has been promoted to the rank of assistant professor of social education. He also teaches courses in marriage and the family and group work in the department of sociology.

J. L. Miller has been promoted to associate professor in the bureau of economics and sociology in the extension division.

PERSONAL

Colonel Henry Barrett Chamberlin, operating director of the Chicago Crime Commission and for more than twenty years a leading fighter against crime, died in Chicago, July 7, at the age of seventy-four years.

He organized a plan of having observers in the criminal courts and a system of records as a basis for the active work of the Chicago Crime Commission, of which he was founder and operating director. He was the director of the Illinois Prison Inquiry Commission and chief author of its report *The Prison System in Illinois* (1937).

At the celebration of its fiftieth anniversary last June, Stanford University granted the title of Honorary Fellow of the university to William F. Ogburn, of the University of Chicago.

Clifford R. Shaw, Illinois Institute for Juvenile Research, was awarded an honorary Doctor of Law degree by Adrian College.

BOOK REVIEWS

A Study of History. By ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE. London: Oxford University Press, 1939. Vol. IV: pp. xvi+656; Vol. V: vi+712; Vol. VI: vi+633. \$23 per set.

Toynbee's monumental *Study of History* is one of the important works of historical synthesis in our time.

Toynbee does well to raise the question of criteria for identifying the limits of a "society" (as distinct from a nation or state) as an "intelligible field of historical study." It cannot be said that he has provided clear-cut means for establishing this identification. Quite likely, independent observers who sought to adopt the criteria which he has set forth would arrive at materially different identifications of the limits of historical and contemporary societies. Nonetheless, by virtue of these criteria Toynbee finds that six "living" societies are derived from earlier societies: the Western and the Orthodox Christian from the Hellenic society; the pair of Islamic societies (the Iranic and Arabic) from the Syriac; the Hindu from the Indic; the Far Eastern from the Sinic. Through historical examination, Toynbee uncovers eleven additional societies: the Egyptian, Andean, Minoan, Sumeric, Mayan, Hittite, Babylonian, Yucatec, Mexican, Russian Orthodox Christian, and the Far Eastern (in Korea and Japan). Having identified his "units," Toynbee is now prepared to put these twenty-one societies through their paces, to compare their geneses and growths, breakdowns, and disintegrations.

Certain "unrelated" civilizations, Toynbee assumes, have derived from "mutations of primitive societies" whereas the "related" civilizations have seceded from earlier ones. Primitive societies differ from the civilized by virtue of the different kinds of mimesis (social imitation) which occur in them: in the former, mimesis is directed toward the past—custom is king—whereas in civilized societies it is directed toward "creative personalities which command a following because they are pioneers on the road towards the common goal of human endeavours." But this is a casual rather than a permanent difference; the change from a static condition to a dynamic activity marks the transition from the primitive to the civilized societies no more than it does the alternative mode of emergence of civilizations "through the secession of proletariats from the

dominant minorities of pre-existent civilizations." There is thus an alternation of static and dynamic periods, of Yin and Yang, of the Simonian organic and critical periods. The geneses of civilizations, then, are conceived as special cases of a universal rhythmical pulsation.

Toynbee now finds himself confronted with the question: Why did the geneses of civilizations occur when they did ("some six thousand years ago")? He is content to account for the prior torpidity, of some 300,000 years, in three pages. The explanation is found in *vis inertiae*, rooted in the cake of custom. But what positive factors led to the latter-day emergence of civilizations? In his search for an answer, Toynbee adopts the Cartesian procedure of eliminating several alternatives to arrive at the presumably correct one. The first of the fallacious solutions is the "racialist dogma" which he exposes to a brilliant, if belated, critique, showing in conclusion that "two civilizations have been created by contributions from three different races, nine by contributions from two different races, and ten by the unaided endeavors of a single race in each case." A systematic review of environmentalist theories leads to the conclusion that "any kind of climate and topography is capable of serving as an environment for the genesis of a civilization." Having refuted these two notions, Toynbee believes himself to have discovered that "the cause of the geneses of civilizations is not simple but multiple; it is not an entity but a relation." This elusive relation he finds in "Challenge-and-Response." The "challenge" may come, as in the geneses of the Egyptian and Sumerian civilizations, from such natural changes as the progressive desiccation of grasslands and the successful response through a combination of migration and transformation of the natural environment. The Sinic civilization represented a conquest over the dangers of flood and swamp; the Mayan, a successful battle against the encroachment of exuberant tropical forests; the Andean a triumphant struggle with heat, drought, and arid soil. Among the "related" civilizations, however, the challenge came not from the physical but from the human environment. The antecedent civilization loses its creative power, alienates its "inner proletariat," seeks to maintain stability through a regime of force, and thus issues a challenge to the proletariat which leads to their secession from the dominant minority.

Evidence that the challenge issued by nature must be continuously met with an adequate response if the society is to survive—a clearly tautological thesis—is afforded by the spectacle of vanished civilizations: the reversion of nature to her primeval state among the Mayan ruins of Copan or Tikal or Palenque; by the desolation and aridity of the land



which once harbored the Indic civilization in Ceylon; by the Syriac ruins in Petra and Palmyra, now swallowed up by a bleak desert.

Having "demonstrated" that the actual geneses of civilizations have occurred in environments which offered difficult conditions, Toynbee turns to the complementary evidence: when nature is bountiful, the people are indolent, lethargic, unenterprising, uncreative, as among the nonliterate of Nyasaland, Amazonia, Melanesia. A further empirical review of cases is held to justify the thesis that the difficulty and the stimulating quality of environment increase *pari passu*. Quite apart from the intrinsic severity of certain physical environments, the sheer effort of breaking new ground itself is held to act as a stimulant to civilizational achievement. A special case of this is found in migrations, particularly transmarine, which generate unusual challenges and result in efflorescence of civilizations. Much the same conclusion is reached with respect to the effect of "human environments" which Toynbee classifies as either "geographically external" to societies upon which they act or "internal" (e.g., social classes within a given area). In the case of the external human environment, a further distinction is drawn between impact in the form of "a sudden blow" and in the form of "continuous pressure." Heavy sudden blows serve only to invigorate unprecedentedly the society attacked; once again, the greater the challenge, the greater the stimulus. Instances abound: the catastrophic defeat of the Romans at the Allia was followed by their subsequent victories; the near-collapse of the Incas after the Chancas' military success was succeeded by the triumphant expansion of the empire; other cases in point are the Macedonian triumphs after the disaster of Cynoscephalae; the victory in 1813 of Austria over Napoleon after the earlier tragedy at Austerlitz; France in 1918 after the debacle of 1870. Toynbee summons better than a score of historical examples to show also that a "continuous external pressure" induces new social structures or reinvigorates the old. Still another stimulus is found in "penalization" by which Toynbee means (through an admitted analogy to Adlerian notions) that "in a body social, any section or group or class which is socially penalized—either by accident or by its own act or by the act of other members of the society in which it lives—is apt to respond to the challenge of being handicapped in, or altogether excluded from, certain fields of social activity by concentrating its social energies upon other fields and excelling in these." Thus, the Scot immigrant in modern England; the Flemish weaver in medieval England; the Polish market-gardener in New England; the Huguenot exile almost the world over; the philosopher- and administrator-slave of Rome; the religious response of

the caste-bound Negro; the Mormon achievements; the Jews, Parsees, Nestorians. Complementary evidence is provided by cases in which "the ethos and aptitudes which are characteristic of penalized religious denominations tend to disappear if, and when, and in proportion as the penalization is remitted." Thus, assimilationist Jews, emancipated non-conformists, the Imamis of Persia.

It is patent, however, that not all challenges stimulate civilizational achievements. Is there a point beyond which challenges are so severe that there is little or no chance of adequate response? Is it likely that there is an optimum point with respect to severity of the challenge? Toynbee maintains that the last question may be answered affirmatively if it can be shown that less successful responses are evoked by challenges which are greater or less than those of intermediate severity. Thus, the challenge of Greenland was excessive and that of Norway defective. The "abortive" civilization of Scandinavia reached its zenith in Iceland, which presented an optimum degree of severity. So, likewise, the optimum in North America is attained in the area lying between the northern boundary of Massachusetts and the Mason and Dixon line, with Maine, Massachusetts, and "Dixie" representing excessive, optimum, and defective challenges, respectively. Thus, too, the devastation of Italy by Hannibal, of Attica by the Persians (or of France in 1914-18), and unscarred Thebes after 479 are cases of excess, optimum, and deficiency of military challenges. With these, and some thirty other instances, Toynbee finds it imperative to recast his initial formula to include the notion of an optimum mean severity if challenges are to be truly stimulating. The neatness of the formulation is scarcely paralleled by an incontestable analysis of the data.

Toynbee discovers five "arrested civilizations"—the Eskimo, Polynesian, Nomadic, Ottoman, and Spartan—which attest that although a challenge which a society is just capable of meeting is the most stimulating, it ultimately evokes the fatal penalty of arresting further development. The "real optimum challenge" is not one which leads to a single successful response but rather one which evokes a chain of linked yet ever new challenges and responses. "The single, finite movement from a disturbance to a restoration of equilibrium is not enough, if genesis is to be followed by growth. And to convert the movement into a repetitive, recurrent rhythm, there must be an *élan* which carries the challenged party through equilibrium into an overbalance which exposes him to a fresh challenge and thereby inspires him to make a fresh response in the form of

a further equilibrium ending in a further overbalance—and so on in a progression which is potentially infinite.”

Having hypothesized the rhythm of disturbance, equilibrium, disturbance as the pattern which initiates civilizational growth, Toynbee now turns to the criterion of growth. He finds that this does not consist in cumulative conquest of the human environment, at least as indexed by geographical expansion, for this is, if anything, correlated with social disintegration. He likewise concludes that technological progress, as an index of conquest of physical environment, does not coincide with civilizational growth. The criterion of growth is neither of these successes over the two phases of external environment but manifests itself in victories over self-imposed challenges. Growth means that the “civilization tends to become its own environment and its own challenger and its own field of action.”

Fortified by this solution which he conceives as an empirical discovery rather than a definition, Toynbee is prepared to analyze the process of civilizational growth—that is, the progressive self-articulation of civilizations. In this connection, he rejects the antithetical views that society is simply “a sum or aggregate of atomic and autonomous individuals” or that it is “a perfect and intelligible whole,” of which the individual is simply a part, existing in no other capacity. Instead, he concludes—here echoing Durkheim, whom he shows no evidence of having read—that “societies themselves are simply institutions of the highest order—institutions, that is, which comprehend without being comprehended by others. The study of societies and the study of institutional relations are one and the same thing. The nature of these social and institutional relations between individual human beings is thus the ultimate object of our present inquiry into the relations between individuals and societies.” But Toynbee shifts his position and asserts that dynamic movement in society derives from “transfigured personalities,” from “creative individuals,” who, at most, amount to a small minority “in the society which their action pervades and animates.” These personalities exercise their influence through “Withdrawal-and-Return,” through withdrawing from most social relations, meanwhile heightening their perception and imagination and feeling, and then returning to take their place as leaders. Much the same pattern is found for creative minorities as for creative individuals. This is a movement in three phases; extrication of the minority from “the general life of the society to which it belongs”; a period of comparative isolation in which the creative exploits occur; the return “into commun-

ion" with the general life of the society. Minority and majority issue reciprocal challenges: the first demanding acceptance of the creative solution to the common problem, the other calling for conversion or hapless failure.

In March, 1939, a time painfully appropriate to the subject of "break-down" and "disintegration" of civilizations, as he himself observes, Toynbee completed the second batch of volumes in his encyclopedic *Study*. His prior findings lead directly to the problem of the sources and patterns of civilizational breakdown inasmuch as no more than ten of the twenty-six civilizations he has identified—including three of the five arrested civilizations—are still "alive." Moreover, of the survivors, the Polynesian and Nomadic are approaching extinction while seven of the remaining are threatened with assimilation or annihilation by our own Western civilization. And, it must be added, even the lone candidate for survival shows suspicious symptoms of approaching weakness and decline, in Toynbee's view.

The nature of the breakdown of civilization can be summed up as follows: "A failure of the creative power in the minority, an answering withdrawal of mimesis on the part of the majority, and a consequent loss of social unity in the society as a whole." In seeking to explain these breakdowns, Toynbee first introduces his now familiar device of disposing of alternative explanations; in this case, the three "predestinarian" theses: that breakdowns are simply by-products of a running-down of the universe; the Spenglerian notion of an inherent and determinable life-span of societies; and the doctrine that the breakdown is due to biological degeneration of the members of society. A fourth necessitarian version—an endless cycle of civilizations—is modified rather than rejected. The development of civilization itself may have direction although periodic recurrences within this process can be detected, just as the endless cycle of the wheel does not fix the direction in which the vehicle moves. Having eliminated the various theories which ascribe civilizational decline to cosmic forces beyond human control, Toynbee examines various interpretations of human sources of decline. The technological conception which would attribute decline to loss of command over physical environment has been partly refuted in connection with his discussion of growth of civilizations; it remains only to show that in the exceptional cases where technical and social decline coincide, the first is not the cause of the latter. Quite the contrary; a declining technique is simply a consequence or symptom of civilizational decay. Thus, the Roman roads were abandoned not because of a loss of technical control but because they became liabili-

ties rather than assets. (See other examples, IV, 40-51, in one of the most brilliant analyses in the entire study.) A second possibility would be loss of command over the "human environment" as measured by geographical expansion. Here it is argued that rapid and widespread cultural diffusion is a mark of disintegration inasmuch as it seldom occurs in the form of diffusion of a total culture and hence reflects the prior disintegration of a culture which no longer coheres. Toynbee's unfamiliarity with detailed analytical studies of diffusion is painfully evident at this point.

Toynbee rejects as wholly inadequate the thesis of Gibbon that the dissolution of a civilization (as distinct from nonliterate cultures) is ever the result of an assault by external societies; invariably, the death of civilizations is a case of suicide rather than of murder. The knockout blow may in fact be delivered by an alien people but it is a knockout rather than a knockdown only when it has been preceded by fratricidal or internecine conflict within the moribund civilization.

The final criterion of breakdown is "a loss of self-determination"; a conclusion which complements the earlier finding that the criterion of growth is "a progress toward self-determination." The loss of integration is manifested in several forms. Chief among these is the "intractability of institutions" when some new social forces—new aptitudes or emotions or ideas—are not brought into line with existing institutions by appropriate adjustments or when anachronistic institutions are not blasted away by revolutions but are perverted into "enormities," thus leading to a dislocation of the social structure. An instance of the latter "perversion" is found in the institution of slavery, which was given a new lease on life by the impact of industrialism which stimulated the demand for raw materials. Toynbee likewise contributes a startling analysis of the way in which modern warfare has been transformed from the virtual "sport of kings" into the total war of the twentieth century wherewith "the ancient institution of War has received a fresh and unprecedentedly powerful impetus from the impact of the new social forces of Democracy and Industrialism." Industrialism, harnessed to the parochial structure of national states, has led to economic nationalism, mutual exploitation, and, to some extent, warfare untempered by ecumenical (universalist) mercies. In similar fashion, Toynbee examines "six formidable disharmonies that have been produced in the institutional structure of our Western Society, directly or indirectly, by the impact of the two new forces of Democracy and Industrialism within the last 150 years."

A second basic form of the loss of self-determination is the "nemesis of creativity." This refers to the processes whereby the creative minority,

which has initiated a successful response to one challenge, becomes disqualified to repeat this success in the face of further challenges. One such process consists of "resting on one's oars" by idolizing one's personality or society or some particular institution or technique which has previously proved effective. The obsession with outmoded institutional mechanisms sterilizes creativeness and adaptability; it involves a fatal glorification of means which have become the object of uncritical anachronistic idolatry. Idolized techniques are likewise a source of social decay, for under changing conditions excessively nice adaptation becomes a liability rather than a source of strength, particularly when their record of past effectiveness renders them sacrosanct.

The breakdown of civilizations is followed by disintegration, evidenced by a schism of social classes which are no longer articulated by an overarching set of cultural ideals. The creative minority, which once enjoyed the voluntary loyalty of the mass, becomes a "dominant minority," which seeks to keep its prerogatives and immunities by exercising force. The schism fractionates the society into dominant minority and internal proletariat who bring into being, respectively, the institutions of universal state and universal church. An external proletariat—the dispossessed who exist outside the society in question—becomes militant; it institutes itself into "barbarian war-bands." Civilizational disintegration is related to the failure of the creative minority to recruit its personnel from different sources in order to meet the varying types of challenge. It becomes a closed corporation. (In this connection Toynbee gives no indication of familiarity with Pareto.) In fifteen of the twenty civilizations which have clearly broken down, the ill-equipped, discomfited minority instituted a universal state in order to maintain itself in power. The disoriented internal proletariat, imbued with resentment at having been disowned by the society which they would call their own and no longer controlled by respect for the achievements of a quondam creative minority, evolves a "higher religion" which often foretells a basic reversal of social roles. The external proletariat now rejects the acculturative influences which have hitherto radiated from a creative minority. At that geographical point where it is sufficiently removed from the dominant minority to be secure, the external proletariat takes up arms. (Although Toynbee finds these external proletarians among "barbaric peoples" on the fringe of earlier disintegrating civilizations, he must turn to the black- and brown-shirted "barbarians in spirit" of the *Fascii di combattimento* and the *Sturmabteilungen* for his latter-day case.)

The four alternative modes of escape from an intolerable situation are

archaism, futurism, detachment, and transfiguration. Of these, two are doomed to failure inasmuch as they involve violence: the archaistic effort to return to a Golden Age and the futuristic effort to create, through force, a new social structure. The "gentle" alternatives are both possible, but Toynbee chooses transfiguration—the preparation of the individual for the world beyond—to detachment which, seeking nirvana, includes no positive goal, intra- or extra-mundane. Toynbee emerges from his elaborate survey with an apocalypse which banishes fatalism and exalts transcendentalism, but in his exploratory search for this way out he creates a magnificent, if not altogether acceptable, philosophy of history.

A detailed critical appraisal of this work calls for a second Toynbee, not the present reviewer, for a volume, not a minor review. Some of its sociological limitations should be apparent from the summary of the *Study*. For one thing, Toynbee's transcendental theology enacted upon the stage of human history is a matter of private faith, not historical sociology. His clearest civilizational case study is that of the Hellenic society; the others are more or less ruthlessly fitted into the Procrustean framework derived from this instance. An admittedly small number of cases is used throughout as a basis for purely empiristic extrapolations; for example, the theorem that three-and-a-half responses to a challenge will inevitably be followed by breakdown and disintegration of a civilization. The paradigm of genesis, growth, breakdown, disintegration, and dissolution of civilizations is excessively flexible inasmuch as the *tempi* of development are so variable that virtually any succession of events can be eventually fitted into the scheme. Further, in spite of Toynbee's effort to avoid the capriciousness of an individualistic interpretation which ascribes to great personalities what further analysis would attribute to social factors, his conception of cultural change is basically individualistic. Great reconstitutive changes follow only the appearance of great creative leaders. Many of Toynbee's basic concepts—civilization, creativity, universal state, etc.—are ill defined. His lavish metaphors and similes, allegories and parables, suggestive as they sometimes are, are too often assumed to possess evidential value.

Whatever the estimate of some of Toynbee's "demonstrations," none can deny the intensely stimulating quality of this tremendous work. For this alone, the *Study of History* merits careful study by empirically minded sociologists who find stimulus in fertile hypotheses.

ROBERT K. MERTON

Columbia University

The American Impact on Great Britain 1898-1914. By RICHARD HEATHCOTE HEINDEL. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1940. Pp. ix+439. \$4.00.

This book contains a detailed study of the American influences on the peoples of the British Isles in the years preceding the first World War, with occasional discussion of earlier and later influences. It is, therefore, opportune at a time when the peace of the world during the next century is likely to depend on the possibility of co-operation between the English-speaking peoples. Professor Heindel deals with many phases of their cultural relations and reviews, one by one, the press, politics, art and letters, business, science and education, and other topics. The facts which he marshals are closely documented.

So complete is the review that one omission stands out as singular. Nothing is said of the projects for imperial federation advanced by Mr. Lionel Curtis, which were based largely on the lessons of American history and which relied on the wisdom of the *Federalist*, very much as Mr. Streit has done more recently in considering even more ambitious federal plans.

As a source of information the book is very valuable, but it is doubtful whether it will do much to help Americans to *understand* British reactions to American phenomena or the British to *understand* these phenomena. For instance, the divorce laws of American states are quite capable of explanation, sharply as they differ from one another, and so, too, is the British attitude toward such of these laws as come to its notice. To mention, as Professor Heindel does, the trial of Earl Russell for bigamy, without reference to the curious practice of an American state in assuming jurisdiction in divorce matters on the basis of a short period of residence and of proceeding to dissolve a marriage without seeing that the party most interested receives adequate notice, is unfair to both countries. In the same way both the prevalence of lynching in some states and the horror felt in Britain for this rough-and-ready justice can be explained. And it is somewhat misleading to remark that "the *Spectator*, which would have praised Carnegie if he had given some money to Oxford and Cambridge, did not look on the £2,000,000 [given for education in Scotland] as an unmixed blessing," for that journal might well have felt misgivings if a like sum had been given to throw open the Old English universities without the barrier of fees.

At times Professor Heindel seems unwilling to distinguish the tone in which remarks are made. A comment made in an intimate letter written to amuse is not the same thing as the same remark made in a scientific discussion; American slang, like phrases borrowed from a different social

class, may be used in inverted commas or as one's own natural speech; and a description of an American may differ from reality for the same reason which, Aesop tells us, made a Greek audience prefer the imitation of a pig's squeal to the real thing.

There are wise and thoughtful paragraphs in the book, and the wisest of all is the last. Undoubtedly no other people has affected, affects, or will affect the British as deeply as has the American, and it is important that we should understand the process without indulging in hypersensitiveness, on the one hand, or sneers, on the other.

H. F. ANGUS

University of British Columbia

The Social Role of the Man of Knowledge. By FLORIAN ZNANIECKI. New York: Columbia University Press, 1940. Pp. 212. \$2.50.

In this small book an international scholar makes an important contribution toward the clarification of that nebulous no man's land, the "sociology of knowledge." He distinguishes between "social systems," the subject matter of sociology, "systems of knowledge" or constituent elements in social systems, and the "sociological theory of knowledge," which he relegates to the sphere of epistemology and philosophy. As sociologists "we have no right to evaluate any of the data we are studying." The social "scientist" must be factual and objective. To be sure, systems of knowledge are not "social facts," but the author contends that "their historical existence within the empirical world of culture, in so far as it depends upon the men who construct them, maintain them by transmission and application, develop them or neglect them, must in large measure be explained sociologically" (p. 10). This statement needs clarification. What is meant by "systems" of knowledge? How are they related to social systems? How can they exist outside the minds of individual thinkers except in so far as they are objectified in group action? We can well understand why the author says that this problem will "occupy many sociologists for generations to come."

Chapter ii divides the creators and disseminators of knowledge into three main groups: the objective social scientists, who deal with facts; the leaders and organizers, who apply knowledge to practical problems; and the sages and philosophers, who deal with values. Here there is much overlapping of functions. The "technological leader" (pp. 87 f.), for example, must necessarily combine, to a large extent, the qualities of the other groups. Interesting is the statement that the importance of the "sage,"

whose role was threatened by the rise of the "technological expert," "seems destined to increase rather than decrease . . . with the development of social planning." A third chapter deals with the roles of schools in collecting, preserving, and disseminating knowledge, while a concluding chapter discusses creators of new patterns of knowledge. The book is concisely and clearly written and remarkably free from the epistemological and philosophical generalizations that make the writings of German scholars on this topic so confusing, but it would be greatly improved by a bibliography of opposite source material illustrating the conclusions of the book.

JOHN M. MECKLIN

Dartmouth College

The Clash of Political Ideals: A Source Book on Democracy, Communism and the Totalitarian State. By ALBERT R. CHANDLER. New York: D. Appleton-Century Co., 1940. Pp. xvii+273. \$2.00.

Dr. Chandler's annotated selection approximately repeats the pattern of Dr. Zimmern. One is led to regret here the "impressionistic" method of selection which results in the almost exclusive presentation of those parts of the various political ideologies involved which have attracted most attention and affect of adherents and adversaries. Whatever obvious advantages this procedure may have, it necessarily diminishes the possibility for the reader to compare the competing ideologies as to their positions toward the same problems. Thus, while the references to National Socialism are mainly centered around race (and specific possibilities of German foreign policy), and the present official ideology of the Soviet Union is largely represented by the persisting remnants of democratic phraseology, it would have been easy to exhibit perfect pendants to Stalin's democratic nostalgia in pronouncements of the other totalitarian chiefs to the effect that their regimes are the only true democracies existing or conceivable. On the other hand, the relationship of the individual to the state, which is largely the same in those regimes which—by virtue of that sameness—one calls "totalitarian," is not sufficiently elucidated in the quotations given, although a "mild" formulation of Mussolini is presented.

Other well-known difficulties of such selections as Dr. Chandler's are presented by the often obscure relationships of "official" ideologies not only to the practices but also to the "real" beliefs of the groups which rule in their name. Dr. Chandler would have enhanced the value of his selection by taking account of the chasm between exoteric and esoteric ideologies in the contemporary totalitarian states. During these last years

Messrs. Drucker and Rauschning have directed attention to the considerable influence of an esoteric "nihilism" (as propounded, e.g., by Ernst Lunger) in the Nazi élite; the very scanty data which we possess on the present attitudes of the Soviet élite show the same abyss between an old phraseology which is perpetuated for obvious expediency reasons and the emerging *arcana imperii*.

Dr. Chandler also does not emphasize sufficiently the profound variations in the exoteric contents of modern political dogmas, variations through time which the guardians of the dogmas typically disguise and deny. Thus he terms his Mussolini quotations "the *classic* statement of Fascist doctrine" (p. 206),¹ whereas most specialists on Italian fascism would, I presume, agree that there can be no such thing in view of the rapidity and amplitude of the fluctuations of that "doctrine." In the same vein Dr. Chandler reproduces the 1933 statement of a Soviet official source, according to which "Stalin *developed* the doctrine of Lenin concerning the possibility of building socialism in our country" (p. 199).¹ He does not, however, give the corresponding quotations from Lenin which would show the falsity of that statement.

On the whole, Dr. Chandler's opus is a valuable addition to political-science pedagogy.

N. C. LEITES

University of Chicago

Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolution. By THORSTEIN VEBLEN.
New York: Viking Press, 1939. Pp. xxi+343. \$3.00.

First published in 1915, this book is an attempt to interpret the peculiarity of the German industrial and political system. The comparison throughout is with England, implying that the United States is similar in nature, and leaving the classification of other countries a puzzle to the reader. Veblen's main points can easily be summarized. Germany started on the industrial course much later than England; the "technological" spirit of modern capitalism had not had time to permeate the former as it did the latter. While "it is at the hands of the English-speaking peoples, primarily [?], that the mechanistic conception has been given its dominant place" (p. 109), "the intellectual drift among the German peoples has been rather away from the materialistic animus . . ." (p. 106). Moreover, modern Germany is ruled by Prussia, which, in turn, was developed on feudal conquest and conserved the remnants of feudalism at least three centuries longer than England. Consequently, the

¹ Italics mine.

German (Prussian) concept of the state is basically different from the Anglo-American concept of a commonwealth; the former "is a personal entity, with rights and duties superior and anterior to those of the subjects" (p. 161). Accordingly, Germany's "industrial and commercial concerns have been under the regulative control of an interest centering on other than industrial and commercial ends," with "material interests . . . conceived in such fashion, with such incidents and restrictions, as may best serve the State's usufruct" (pp. 176 and 211 ff.). In ultimate resort, Veblen in true Marxian spirit reduces the difference between English and German developments to geographic terms (insular versus continental location).

Veblen did not make much of an attempt to "verify" his generalizations. They have some semblance of reality when applied to Hitler's Germany; but Veblen generalized, as is usual among literati, using Ludendorff's "garrison-state" as a pattern by which to gauge Germany's structure throughout history. Imagination was, of course, his strength; he combined it with a sovereign disregard for factual evidence. He contends, as a typical example, that imperial Germany's "return to more of a mercantilist policy of tariffs . . . was a political expedient, an expedient for the good of the State rather than of the industrial community" (p. 178). That a man of Veblen's vision could thus be misled by the cheapest sort of pressure-group argument is certainly surprising. His theory of the essentially dynastic character of the Prussian state has been obviously disproved in the last twenty years.

The basic trouble with this type of historical philosophy is its preconceived idea of some eternal characteristic for a nation. The main ideas of this sizable volume are summarized in the last chapter. The reprinting of the entire volume, filled with repetitious verbalizations, has little prospect of serving the only good purpose for which it should be destined, namely, to stimulate further thought.

MELCHIOR PALYI

Chicago

The Culture Historical Method of Ethnology: The Scientific Approach to the Racial Question. By WILHELM SCHMIDT. Preface by CLYDE KLUCK-HOHN; translated by S. A. SIEBER. New York: Fortuny's, 1939. Pp. xxx+383. \$5.00.

Few approaches to the study of culture have been so discussed as that of the culture-historical school of Germany and Austria. The daring of its hypotheses and the vigor of its pronouncements, as well as the extensive-

ness of its documentation, have brought a feeling that, whether one agrees with it or not, it must be reckoned with. It is because of this that the translation of the authoritative statement of the case of this school by its most distinguished living member is to be welcomed as a useful addition to the literature in English of theoretical ethnology. This is the more true since, as Kluckhohn points out in his Preface, this translation will, for the first time, make it possible for many of those whose concerns are with the development and spread of cultures to acquaint themselves at first hand and in detail with the position of this group.

For those who are already acquainted with the writings of this school, the book offers little new. Work that has been done since the publication of Graebner's *Methode der Ethnologie* would seem to have made refinements of his position and additions to his system essential; how little they have been changed or refined will be striking to readers of this book. Schmidt's attitude toward Graebner, indeed, is one of reverence, as is betokened by the slightness of the criticisms brought against propositions first advanced three decades ago. As a matter of fact, the only major criticism encountered in Pater Schmidt's volume is where we are informed: "It is regrettable . . . that in the beginning neither Graebner nor I recognized clearly enough nor described the double character of the culture circle" (p. 175). That is, its existential nature was not adequately differentiated from its methodological character; and hence its place in the system was overemphasized, as is indicated by the common designation of the Graebner-Schmidt school of thought as *Kulturkreislehre*.

The discussion of the roots of the *kulturhistorische Schule* (pp. 25 ff.) will be valuable to students interested in the history of cultural theory, while the vigorous critiques of those, especially in the United States, who, in discussing the position of this group, have disagreed with their tenets, will make amusing reading (pp. 36-71). Less amusing will be the failure of Pater Schmidt to grasp the significance of variation in individual behavior among those who live under a single culture (pp. 117 ff.). Here, indeed, is one of the strongest indictments to be laid against his position, since the problem of the reliability of data—when a fact may be regarded as a fact—turns on just this point. Thus, when we find in a given tribe a dozen different art-styles, which are we to say is the "real" one? Or, if all are "real" and one resembles the style in certain other tribes and others the styles of still different folk, which resemblances (in terms of the criteria of quantity, quality, continuity, and degree of relationship set up by Pater Schmidt [pp. 143, 150, 157-58]) are to be employed in recovering

those historic contacts which, we are told over and over again, are the primary aims of ethnology?

Many other points could be raised, both in praise of the incisiveness with which certain methodological cautions are discussed and in criticism of other views advanced. On the whole, however, one comes from a re-reading of the position of this school with a feeling that the principal objections raised in the past still hold their validity—criticisms of such fundamental points as the acceptance of the view that primitive folk are to be regarded as our contemporary ancestors, or the assumption that one can objectively determine the relative age of functioning elements in a nonliterate culture that is a going concern. One also comes away with the renewed conviction that the reservations laid down by students in the United States as regards the usefulness of limited, as against broad, distribution studies and reconstructions of unwritten history retain their value, and that the task of reconstructing world-history by methods such as the extreme diffusionists advocate can lead to no results susceptible of objective proof. Furthermore, with the dynamics of culture available for study before our eyes, why, one must ask, must we be content to deal with hypothetical cultural movements and their resulting amalgams? Only where prehistory yields a record can scientific confirmation of historical developments be attained; on the basis of data from living primitive folk, however, these must perforce remain ever in the realm of conjecture, except in certain restricted cases.

The translation by Dr. Sieber represents the accomplishment of a difficult task, which has obviously been a labor of love. When one considers the obscureness of Graebner's writing, numerous quotations from which are found throughout this book, or the esoteric, specialized terminology this school has developed, one does not envy his task. That he has had to have recourse to such awkward English phrases as "culture-circles" (*Kulturkreise*) merely indicates what his problems were.

MELVILLE J. HERSKOVITS

Northwestern University

Cultural Relations on the Kansu-Tibetan Border. By ROBERT B. EKVALL. ("University of Chicago Publications in Anthropology," Occasional Papers No. 1.) Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1939. Pp. xvi+87. \$1.50.

This is an account of cultural contacts among four ethnic groups of rather diverse culture living in central Asia. The treatment concerns the

following paired relationships: (1) the Chinese and the Chinese-speaking Moslems of Arabic descent; (2) the Chinese and the sedentary Tibetans; (3) the Moslems and the nomadic Tibetans; and (4) the nomadic and the sedentary Tibetans. On the basis of his materials the author has tried to characterize the nature of these various paired relations in terms of what seem to him the dominant features of the contact. (1) Thus that between the Chinese and Moslems he designates as "segregation and hostility" marked by sharp conflict and tendencies to in-group solidarity on each side. (2) Between the Chinese and the sedentary Tibetans, in contrast, we find chiefly an "infiltration" of the former into the communities of the latter. (3) Between the Moslems and the nomadic Tibetans there is no conflict but "trade and mutual diffusion of traits." (4) Between the two groups of Tibetans the relationship is described as chiefly that of "differentiation or super- and subordination." While the characterization of culture contacts by single concepts is usually open to question, the author appears to have substantiated his case fairly well. Moreover, he is thoroughly aware of the fact that other types of contact also occur between his paired groups. For instance, in spite of hostility between the Chinese and Moslems there is a certain amount of shift of population, especially from the former to the latter. But in the second situation, that between Chinese and sedentary Tibetans, the population pressure of the former accentuated by the added fact of increased migration of Chinese refugees in recent years—coming from the war-torn areas of China proper—seems basic to the whole infiltration processes which Ekvall describes. But this does not imply a complete dominance of Chinese traits by any means. There is also a certain "Tibetanization" of the migrants." Yet on the whole, except in the matter of religion, the Chinese exert a "steady pressure of a more vigorous culture and people upon a weaker one."

The contact of the Moslems and the nomadic Tibetans is of still another character. These peoples are separated by rather long distances; furthermore, they are "different in race, religion, language, and occupation." Yet the combination of a subsistence economy and of a strong commercial pattern on the part of the Chinese Moslems has produced a type of trading contact between these peoples which has resulted in a mutual diffusion of traits with consequent alterations in the lives of each. There is here little if any biological intermixing of peoples or of infiltration of population by migration, yet the contacts have effected not only material traits, food habits, etc., but language and other items as well.

The relations of the two Tibetan groups to each other—the one sedentary, the other nomadic—indicate still other features. These peoples are

homogeneous as to race, language, and religion. They differ in their economic life, in their communal organization in some customs, and in certain of their ideals. The farming Tibetans have a distinct sense of inferiority to the nomads and the demands for seasonal labor and the contacts arising from trading provide an outlet for some shift of population from the sedentary to the pastoral groups and with this a rise in social status. Yet even in the face of this relation of dominance and submission, there is a good deal of mutual interchange of particular items from their respective cultures.

The two most important general "lessons" to be drawn from this monograph are these: (1) the nature and meaning of culture contact may vary widely among a number of possible basic social processes; and (2) in spite of such associations each society as a culture of its own, a distinctive cohesion and solidarity, and a course of internal development. These latter must be taken into account when considering the effects of the alterations arising from the contacts themselves.

One unfortunate use of terms might have been avoided. The author uses the concept "culture" in a broad and in a narrow way. Thus on page 29 he evidently distinguishes between political effects and cultural ones (see also p. 32). And on page 45 he distinguishes between "borrowings" of a utilitarian nature and those "of a more cultural and symbolic nature." This difficulty, which is to be found elsewhere, is doubtless a hangover of linguistic habits from the popular conception of culture, but is it unfortunate to see it creep into a serious anthropological monograph.

KIMBALL YOUNG

Queens College

Race Relations and the Race Problem. Edited by EDGAR T. THOMPSON. Durham: Duke University Press, 1939. Pp. xv+338. \$3.50.

Eleven authors have contributed to this unusually well co-ordinated symposium. Southern race relations are analyzed both in their historical perspective and in their cross-sectional aspects. The publication is, in the words of the editor, "the result of an effort to organize a discussion of race relations with special reference to the South in such a way as to throw emphasis upon the *relations* rather than upon a particular race." Through this emphasis the book, or significant portions of the publication, transcend the problem of Negro-white relations in the South.

This is true of the first chapter, by Robert E. Park, on "The Nature

of Race Relations," a discussion of the position of the stranger and of marginal groups in complex civilizations resulting from conquest, colonization, and migration. The social setting of race relations in the history of the Occident is characterized by two alternative types of social organization: the folk culture of the province, its familial heritage and kinship cohesion, on the one hand, and the metropolis, the scene of impersonal competition and relative indifference, on the other. The modern world seems to bring about a unique change in race relations, foreshadowing a single great society in which race conflicts will be more and more "confused with, and eventually superseded by, the conflict of classes." This theme is further elaborated by Charles S. Johnson in the last chapter of the book. Present-day race relations "are an incident of world economics . . ." and a phase of the history of European expansion. With its future limits in sight, this process appears to shift the basis of race relations from a caste to a class structure.

In "A Comparative Study of American Caste," Lloyd Warner and Allison Davis describe class and caste relations within and between the two major racial groups of a southern city, showing the incongruity of the class structure of the Negro and of the white sector of southern society. Edward B. Reuter views the biracial economy of the South as a survival of a historical adaptation to the geography of the region and its human resources. In their struggle for existence Negroes have developed the traits which, in the long run, will help them to establish a position above the economic level of the "poor whites." This process is described in its agricultural aspects by Rupert B. Vance ("Racial Competition for the Land"). Edgar Thompson's study on the racial implications of the plantation economy of the South and Guy Johnson's paper on the history of southern race conflicts present the historical background of the biracial *status quo* of the South. S. J. Holmes gives a survey of Negro-White reproduction trends in the light of the differential rate of urbanization of both racial groups. Lewis C. Copeland's study on "The Negro as a Contrast Conception" is, in a way, an application of the sociology of knowledge to the breaking-up of the old caste equilibrium and its ideological manifestations.

The book offers both a useful synthesis of factual information and a series of attempts to reinterpret familiar aspects of race relations in the South.

ERNEST MANHEIM

University of Kansas City

Race, Language and Culture. By F. BOAS. New York: Macmillan, 1940. Pp. xx+647. \$5.00.

This collection of sixty-three papers dating from 1887 to 1939 is an impressive record of "firsts" in modern American anthropology: first to elaborate upon heterosis or hybrid vigor in Indian-white crosses; first to focus attention upon generational changes in descendants of immigrants; first to point the importance of family-line, or genetic, background in child growth and development; among the first to attempt systematization of Amerind language—and so on, almost indefinitely.

The papers are grouped under the three main categories mentioned in the title. Under "Race" are included papers on Indian-white crosses (1894), descendants of immigrants (1910-13, 1916), population of the United States (1922), growth and development (1912, 1913, 1935, and 1892-1939 combined and revised), and miscellaneous papers on statistics and anthropometric techniques (1899, 1902, 1913, 1936). Under "Language" are included papers on the classification of American Indian languages (1920, 1929, 1937). Under "Culture" are included papers on method in ethnological research (1887, 1888, 1896, 1920, 1930, 1932), historical approach (1911, 1933, 1936), diffusion (1911, 1934), totemism (1910), mythology and folklore (1891, 1895, 1904, 1914, 1925), religion (1920, 1922, 1927), social organization of the Northwest Coast (1896, 1920, 1924), art (1903, 1908, 1916), and archeology (1902, 1912). These papers are the nucleus of Boas' more definitive works, notably his volumes on Amerind languages and social organization and mythology of the Northwest Coast Indians, and of his more popular books, *The Mind of Primitive Man* and *Anthropology and Modern Life*.

The papers, almost without exception, emphasize Boas' major interest in the dynamics of life rather than the mere description of conditions. Culturally and biologically the theme is more how it works, less what it looks like. This is, I suppose, a form of functionalism, but it is functioning of the whole rather than integration of the part. Particularly in the biological studies of growth and race is a dynamic process emphasized; not status or condition of the moment, but how the race-type evolved, how the child developed. Boas' studies march along; they never stand still.

In this book we see, as it were, the inception of many of our current concepts of human life, biological and cultural. The book is not Boas—it is American anthropology: birth, childhood, adolescence, and now the full ripe vigor of maturity. I can think of no more stimulating source or reference book for beginning students in sociology and anthropology.

W. M. KROGMAN

University of Chicago

Why Men Behave like Apes and Vice Versa or Body and Behavior. By EARNEST ALBERT HOOTON. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1940. Pp. xxv+234. \$3.00.

The five Vanuxem lectures which Professor Hooton delivered at Princeton University during the winter of 1939-40 are here published in expanded form, preceded by a twelve-page "Harangue on Human Affairs." The general doctrine expounded is a somewhat crass form of biological determinism: animal organism determines behavior, the evolutionary status and the mental status of the preliterate account for their cultural retardation, bodily constitution in the individual is linked with mental capacity and social behavior, national behavior is a function of the national biology, etc. The author's convictions are profound and impressive; his evidence is meager and disappointing. In the five lectures he deals with the influence of body on behavior "In the Primate Order," "In the Human Family as a Whole," "In the Races of Man," "In Nations and Ethnic Groups," and "In the Individual." They are in general routine and quite uninspired classroom lectures at about the Sophomore level; they present little that is new in data or theory; from a literary point of view, they are inadequately organized and poorly worded.

The book is marred by numerous and apparently gratuitous errors, by the author's peculiar sense of humor, and by an excessive amount of ill-natured abuse. In the introductory "harangue" the errors of fact, inference, and emphasis plus those of exaggeration, contradiction, and sentence structure are about as numerous as the sentences; on three consecutive pages taken at random the reviewer noted some twenty-three faulty items. The author's sense of humor is not overrefined; he does not distinguish between humor and "cracking wise," nor does he always draw a clear line between "wisecracks" and simple vulgarity. He is by all odds funniest when he is trying to be serious. "I suppose the civilized man may be called domesticated because he lives upon domesticated plants and animals. . . ." He has another equally enlightening bout with the concept in a later connection (pp. 89-90). German morality and technology are evolutionary, i.e., biological, characters. The author does not like the social scientists, the social anthropologists, the humanitarians, and many others; particularly he is irritated by the sociologists. This is of course quite proper and readily understandable. They are "self-deceivers"; "social science is a farce"; sociological ideas are "theological hangovers"; social scientists refuse to accept biological determinism because they fear that it would jeopardize their source of livelihood; they are "professional humanitarians"; they talk "frightful balderdash"; anthropology and so-

cial science are "sweet narcotics" that are "obsolete and useless"; the sociologists "concoct ideological panaceas"; "the environmental and sentimental school of anthropology" and other social scientists make scapegoats of environment as an alibi for genetic deficiencies; at least some of the anthropologists, psychologists, and sociologists who do not accept the conclusions based upon the student use of Porteus' maze tests are "more concerned" to establish attitudes conducive to democracy than with "search for scientific truth"; the "so-called social sciences" make a hypocritical pretense of basing judgments on scientific proof; the anthropologist goes among the savage people because he has an inferiority complex that keeps him from getting along in civilized society, he fortifies his ego by consorting with savages, he exaggerates savage capacity to obtain a vicarious superiority; the "slumming sociologist," the "sociological zealots," and sociologists generally are "false prophets" "clutching at straws," "blowing bubbles," and now are about to sink ingloriously and for "the third time" beneath the surface of Mr. Hooton's great "river of biological knowledge."

One can readily understand the aversion of the cautious and modest scientist for this motley and raucous aggregation of wild jackasses; and one can fully understand it when he realizes that these unspeakable ruffians have punctured the careful scientist's statistical balloons, riddled his logic, and scattered his scientific toys.

But in the end, in this best of all possible worlds, truth will triumph. Indeed, it is already about to do so. "The future of man is dependent upon biology" and "the return of biology in the treatment of human affairs is imminent." If this indeed be true, and if Mr. Hooton's biology is to be the brand administered, it forebodes no good to human affairs.

E. B. REUTER

University of Iowa

Gullah. By MASON CRUM. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1940. Pp. vii+351. \$3.50.

The Sea Islands and the coastal region of South Carolina have preserved, in considerable cultural isolation, a Negro population whose traits, and particularly the peculiarities of speech, are only slightly modified from the forms set during the period of slavery. Dr. Crum has given to this group, commonly known as "Gullah Negroes," conscientious, if sometimes labored, treatment. The point of reference is the institution

of slavery; the description and analysis, a blend of historical, cultural, and sentimental peregrinations.

Three consecutive chapters are devoted to a detailed discussion of the low country, the Sea Islands, and the plantations; and a fourth chapter, to "The Gullah World of Nature," in which is related interesting information concerning the frogs, the devilfish, birds, and ducks found in the region and well known to the Gullahs. Discussion of the dialect, spirituals, and religion of the Gullahs brings out some new material and proves interesting and useful. The emphasis here is on the slavery period. The peculiarities of the Gullah Negroes are described through observation and valuable source materials. They are presented in their most common economic setting, the rice plantation.

Inasmuch as Dr. Crum's Preface sets forth the challenging proposition that the history of the Gullah Negroes, geographically and culturally isolated and retaining many of the culture patterns of a slave economy, furnishes a key to the racial situation in America, one is led to expect a penetrating analysis of contemporary race relations. Such an analysis, however, fails to materialize.

The book is valuable for its description of the Gullah Negro and his environment; but its sentimental oversimplification of the race problem in the South, its frequent moralizing tone, and its lay effort to draw psychoanalytic implications from the culture will perhaps lessen its value for objective social scientists.

CHARLES S. JOHNSON

Fisk University

State of the Masses: The Threat of the Classless Society. By EMIL LEDERER with a Foreword by HANS SPEIER. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1940. Pp. 240. \$2.50.

Students of the social sciences find it hard to classify the so-called "dictatorships" Germany, Italy, and Russia into the traditional pattern of government. These states are certainly not democracies, although the Russian constitution of 1936 was hailed, even by many Americans, as a great achievement in "industrial democracy," and although the Nazis themselves, at least in the first period of their reign, claimed that their regime was based on the people and was therefore a real democracy. Neither are the dictatorships oligarchies, since it would be impossible to find any small social group which exclusively rules the people. Nor does calling the dictators "tyrants" solve the problem, for none of them is in

reality an absolute ruler. The idea of leadership implies followers, the constant appeal of the leader to the people, the extensive use of propaganda for this very purpose; these are features unknown to Plato and Aristotle. Surely, Plato's tyrant needs followers, too, in order to rise to power; but they are dismissed after having served this purpose, and the absolute ruler surrounds himself with a small number of carefully selected henchmen. Now, if the modern dictatorships do not fit into the traditional pattern of government, what, then, are they?

Emil Lederer's answer is: they are a government *sui generis*, a new phenomenon so far unknown in social science, and we are witnessing a turning-point in the history of mankind. This is quite a strong statement, and the author makes great efforts to prove his point. With his rich knowledge both of facts and theories, and with much acumen and an amazing gift of foresight (the book was written before the outbreak of the present war), he points out that modern dictatorship is neither "the last ditch of defense of capitalism, nor is it the rule of a single man by violence" (p. 17). It is not the revolt of the middle class or of the younger generation. Rather is it a regime based on masses which are not, as in former revolutions, dismissed after they have swung their leader into power but which are "institutionalized." It is "the dictatorship by masses over the masses themselves."

Lederer, who was an economist and a thorough thinker, uses the sociological approach to define the concept of *masses*, or *crowds*, as distinguished from *social groups*. Groups are based on a common interest, be it economic, cultural, religious, or even only traditional, and are parts of a stratified society. They assume the existence of other groups with different interests. They might fight each other, and the victorious group might rule over the losing ones; but even under absolute monarchy they recognize, or at least tolerate, the existence of other groups. This holds particularly true of one modern type of social group, the political party. Though the party appeals to the whole nation, it is implied in the party system that there are several parties competing for power. Masses or crowds, on the contrary, are a number of people who individually belong to different groups and consequently have different interests. As long as they form a mass, however, they are not aware of these differences because they are united, either on an emotional basis or for the purpose of action, or both. By this they are distinguished from mere *multitudes*, which are massed together by coincidence and are not a social phenomenon.

There are in Lederer's book many observations on mass psychology and mass behavior based on what we know from Le Bon, Graham Wallas, and E. A. Ross and applied to the political subject. Whereas a group is still susceptible to reason, the crowd is not. Therefore the type of leadership is different for a group and for masses. Members of a crowd cease to be individuals; by feeling united they cease thinking, are "carried away, elated, released from inhibition," and can be used by the leader, who united them, for whatever purpose he wants to use them. But in order to keep them in existence, to keep them from breaking apart, he has to use them, either by direct action or by stirring up their emotions against an enemy. This friend-enemy relationship is an essential point of fascist mass psychology already set forth by the German forerunner of fascist political science, Carl Schmitt; it is the reason why masses are intolerant and strive for absolute power—in other words, are totalitarian. Both the necessity of permanent motion and their destructive tendency make the crowd a "social steam roller," which crushes and buries all social groups under its weight. Its amorphous character distinguishes the totalitarian state from any other form of government. Therefore, not every reactionary or aggressive state is fascist, as is shown by Japan, which, according to the author, still is a stratified society, not ruled by the masses, and where "public opinion is not manufactured" (pp. 65 ff.).

Masses as sociological phenomena cannot be formed at will but arise from certain revolutionary situations. Such a situation did not exist in Europe before 1914, except in Russia during the short period of 1905. Although large social groups, unheard of in number, entered the political scene with the workers' parties, they did not cease to be groups, did not become masses, but lived and fought within the framework and according to the rules of a structural society. The first World War, however, prepared the ground both for bolshevism and fascism by shaking traditional authority and revealing that governments can be conquered if the crisis is great enough. Lederer, without contributing new facts, presents a highly illuminating description and evaluation of the emergence of fascism in Italy and Germany and of the behavior of certain social classes. In both countries it was not the menace of bolshevism but rather the artificially created fear of it that drove the bourgeoisie into the camp of the fascists. The author uses sarcastic words against the blind conservatives, who would not believe in the fascist threat to conquer the state, a threat which they took as demagoguery, but who were firmly convinced that, according to historical experience, "after

success the masses would be dismissed and would return to their slums and workshops" (p. 85). This attitude prevailed both in Italy and Germany. Still more bitter and very pertinent are the passages in which the author elucidates the contribution of "objective" science to the undermining of mental resistance. Before 1914 professors already began to withdraw into an ivory tower, refusing to present positive values for the solution of social problems. This resignation of a school which in Germany was known as *wertfreie Wissenschaft* was later on carried over to the functions of a democratic government which stayed neutral in the struggle between the supporters and the enemies of democracy. It "did not realize that citizens are sheets of white paper on which anyone can write . . . and it refused to write anything on the sheets itself except the bill of rights, in antiquated terms, on infrequent holidays" (p. 62). So society fell victim to a movement which was not created by a leader but which itself created its leader, who, in turn, kept it alive by feeding it with both idealistic slogans and class hatred. Considering the repeated attempts of American and English scholars to trace Naziism back to the German philosophy of the nineteenth century, it is interesting to note that, according to Lederer, Italian fascism, as stated by Mussolini in his article in the *Encyclopedia italiana*, follows the same irrational ideas extolling the supremacy of the state (as embodied in the party), sacrifice, and heroism, deriding pacifism and scorning socialism with its pursuit of happiness (p. 88)—ideas which are usually held typically German.

Many readers will argue with Lederer's main point that fascism is destructive of social stratification. Is Italy not a corporate state effectively organized in syndicates and federations, with workers and employers separated except in the top? And, although the Labor Front in Germany embraces both employees and workers, is not the Reich much more articulated in economic organizations and trade associations than the democracies? Did not the Nazis revitalize the old guild spirit of the Middle Ages? And even in Russia, where the intelligentsia has been wiped out, there still exist within the proletariat the two groups of industrial workers and peasants. Lederer does not deal with these possible objections, but his answer would be that all these groups are no longer social groups in the technical meaning of the term, but only instruments of the state or party bureaucracy. Social functions require a certain, however limited, amount of freedom, which no totalitarian government can afford to allow. The capitalist and the shop owner, the worker and the farmer, the lawyer and the doctor, all have ceased to be individual members of

social groups; they have no life of their own, nor has the group to which they belong by compulsion; they are only atoms in the state of the masses.

The book has, after the author's death, been carefully edited by Hans Speier, a colleague of Lederer's at the New School.

HEINZ GURADZE

Drury College

Criminal Behavior. By WALTER C. RECKLESS. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1940. Pp. xi+532. \$3.75.

Dr. Reckless has contributed an excellent new text in criminology. It is not a rehash. The views and analyses are those of the author, who has re-examined and thought through his materials for himself rather than borrowed from texts already published. There is considerable new material presented, particularly in the first half of the book on the nature and causation of crime. The evidence from anthropological literature and comparative data from other cultures and nations is valuable and suggestive. The treatment of penology and prevention, in its broad outlines and organization, follows conventional sociological lines, but the details of viewpoint and presentation frequently stress new aspects of the problems involved. The historical perspective on criminological theory is broader than usual for American criminologists but is still meager in some respects. Dr. Reckless' style is sometimes somewhat turgid and one may disagree with some of the views expressed, but the book is, on the whole, a good one which contributes to the field and ought to provoke controversy.

The dominant novel aspects of the book is the viewpoint on crime causation. It is a view which will probably appear somewhat inconsistent and puzzling to many readers. Dr. Reckless regards the search for the causes of crime as futile and sterile. He states that

the greatest influence retarding the progress of criminology has been the traditional emphasis on the study of the causes of crime. If the strangle hold which this traditional emphasis has on criminology could be released, enormous resources in research effort could be diverted to the realistic and comparative study of criminal behavior. The concept of causation is, after all, rather inapplicable to the study of social behavior.

Offhand this appears to be the counsel of despair, but Dr. Reckless, instead of leaving out the consideration of the etiology of crime, devotes almost half his book to it. He does not regard his own contribution as a

study of crime causation but certainly other criminologists would so classify it. His chapters on "Social Disorganization and Crime" and "The Development of Criminal Careers" contain, what most persons will regard as excellent analyses of crime causation. Thus, Dr. Reckless, on the one hand, tells us that the study of crime causation is sterile and vicious in its influence. On the other hand, he refutes his own thesis by giving us analyses of the etiology of crime which are significant and important.

Two main substitutes for the study of crime causation are suggested. The first is the study of differential crime risks in different localities and at different times for various classes, occupational groups, etc. The other is the study of the processes involved in an individual's becoming a criminal. He does not think of either of these as involving the etiology of crime. Of the first of these proposals it should be said that it is a line which has been stressed already for at least a century. Michael and Adler, who are cited by Reckless in support of his views on the sterility of the study of crime causation, regard this type of emphasis as the reason for the sterility and the fragmentary character of much criminological research. Dr. Reckless, however, recommends more of the same.

It is difficult to know precisely what Dr. Reckless means by "cause" or "causal analysis," but it appears that his conception is rather narrow and absolutistic. He seems to imply that the search for causes is a search for some sort of condition or "factor," which, when found, will provide final and conclusive answers to all questions and exhaustively "explain" the origin and nature of criminal behavior. Conceived in this way the search for causes would indeed be futile. However, if causal analysis is thought of merely as the description of sequences of events or inter-related processes, then the search for causes becomes at once more tentative and more hopeful, and the description of the "behavior sequences or processes by which individuals become criminal and develop criminal careers" (p. 256) becomes an integral part of the study of the etiology of crime rather than a substitute for it as Reckless regards it. Analysis of this type, which Reckless correctly emphasizes, involves the problem of attempting to break up the totality of the problem of law violation into homogeneous separate problems according to sociological—not legal—principles. Reckless fails to consider this latter problem which is of considerable theoretical importance.

ALFRED R. LINDESMITH

Indiana University

Juvenile Delinquency: A Comparative Study of the Position in Liverpool and in England and Wales. By J. H. BAGOT. London: Jonathan Cape, 1941. Pp. 93. 5s.

The main part of the study is based on a 1934 and a 1936 series of juvenile cases found guilty of indictable offenses in Liverpool. The author has a good appreciation of the fluctuation in volume of delinquency resulting from changes in policy of handling offenders. Like others, he is unable to indicate what allowance or correction should be made for these administrative factors. The rate of male delinquents in Liverpool for these two years is approximately three times as great as that for England and Wales generally. Bagot confirms again the finding that delinquency in the towns is greater than that in the country. He also confirms the intra-urban variation in delinquency by various districts of Liverpool. The percentage of recidivism for boys' cases seems to be somewhat higher than the proportion in large American cities. But one cannot tell what this signifies, if true. The percentage of lone-wolf offenders among the boys likewise appears to be somewhat higher than for a city such as Chicago.

There are many other interesting points called to one's attention in this study. Particularly interesting was the finding that delinquency increased after school vacations were over. Sunday was the day of maximum reported delinquency for boys; Saturday for girls. The effect on delinquency of removing families from central overcrowded areas of Liverpool to better housing projects on the outskirts was noted. It was found that the immediate effect was not to decrease the amount of delinquency but that after several years (six or seven) the effect was to lower the rate of offenders.

The points of the study are simply made and simply told. There is no padding. And there is no testing of hypotheses of the more profound sort. There are no contributions to the knowledge of delinquent behavior made therein, although there are some data for confirmation of generally accepted findings.

WALTER C. RECKLESS

Ohio State University

Negro Crime. By JESSE SPIRER. ("Comparative Psychology Monographs [81st ser.]," Vol. XVI, No. 2.) Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1940. Pp. 64. \$1.25.

Using commitments from the Western State Penitentiary of Pennsylvania from 1906 through 1935, Spirer ably demonstrates that Negro

male greatly exceed native-white male commitments in proportion to population, even when correction is made for sex and age disparities. The disproportion for crimes of violence (murder and assault) was over three times that for predatory crimes (against property), four times that for crimes of sex, and twenty-three times that for fraudulent crimes.

The commitment differential was greater in the decade 1916-25 than in the previous or succeeding decade, which might suggest a disorganizing effect on Negroes of the sudden northward migrations.

Of several socioeconomic or demographic factors tested for their connection with excessive Negro criminality, the disproportion of out-of-state Negroes to out-of-state native whites appears to be of unusual importance. Spierer does not take into account the greater liability to arrest and conviction of the Negro as a possible major explanation of the excessive criminality of colored males. A criminologist would certainly need to take that factor into account.

One section of the study is devoted to a review of what psychologists have concluded about the comparative mental traits of the white and black race. From this review, which is wholly extraneous to the data of the study, the author concludes that mental inferiority cannot account for the difference in Negro and white criminality.

WALTER C. RECKLESS

Ohio State University

The Adolescent Personality: A Study of Individual Behavior. By PETER BLOS. New York: D. Appleton-Century Co., 1941. Pp. xiii+517. \$3.00.

This is the second volume to be issued by the committee on the study of adolescents which was set up in 1932 by the Commission on Secondary School Curriculum of the Progressive Education Association. The committee accumulated a considerable body of case material of a highly miscellaneous nature by means of interviews with children and their parents, school records, reports of teachers, observations of students, tests, collections of student themes, and art compositions, etc. During a period of several years, over six hundred case studies were collected. The individuals include students of the junior high school, senior high school, and college rank as well as young people no longer in school. The records include young people from different sections of the country and from different social and economic strata of the population.

In the collection of material no attempt was made to follow any sys-

tematic procedure; the effort was to use as many sources as were available. "The purpose of the Study was to gather the kinds of data about individual adolescents which would offer insight into their behavior and motivations, and would serve as a diagnostic basis for education rather than for treatment." This body of data is said to be the basis of the present volume which is believed to give a "sound basis for educational diagnosis and for judging the changes likely to result from one educational course of action or another."

The book seems somewhat awkwardly organized. The introductory section defines the author's conception of personality—a psychophysical concept which makes personality essentially synonymous with the physiological organism—and defends the procedure and organization of the volume. Four cases are presented. Two of these make up the second part of the volume, two others make up the fourth part, and the third and fifth parts are on the development of personality and on education and adolescent personality.

The book was designed to "convey information and insight about adolescent development to people in general concerned about youth and to educators in particular." For these purposes the volume probably has real value. But the sociologist will not find it indispensable. The psychophysical standpoint is not notably well adapted to the analysis and explanation of social behavior, and the interpretations seem to the reviewer to be, at times, a little forced. The cases are particularly disappointing. They are given at some length—the average is about forty thousand words—but even so, they do not always give an entirely satisfactory presentation; they are somewhat more formidable than revealing. Aside from routine information and reports from teachers, the bulk of the actual presentation is in the form of summary reports of interviews. Quite obviously these must be affected by the interviewer's psychological preconception and by what, specifically, he is seeking to discover. Mary, for example, had twenty-two interviews averaging about two hours each; these are summarized in forty-six pages without information as to what principle guided the interviewer in what he selected to report. In the printed form this interview material appears to be not so much data on which the study is based as illustrative material somewhat naïvely assembled and selected to support a position previously and independently arrived at.

E. B. REUTER

University of Iowa

The Great Hatred. By MAURICE SAMUEL. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1940. Pp. 201. \$2.00.

The spectacle of extreme and harsh anti-Semitism in current times puzzles and indeed baffles thoughtful students of race relations. It imposes a strain upon conventional explanations and makes one view it as an exceedingly obscure and unanalyzed phenomenon. The volume by Maurice Samuel makes a penetrating incursion into this unknown area and presents an odd but illuminating analysis, departing from the conventional interpretations of ethnic prejudices which are so frequently adduced to account for anti-Semitism. Samuel views it as a manifestation of a hidden conflict in the culture and the spirit of Western civilization. His contention is that our Western culture is at present characterized by a deeply felt opposition between the "force" principle of human relations and the "non-force" principle as it is incorporated in traditional Christianity. This inner conflict is one which is not faced openly and, consequently, leads to vehement and brutal activity on the part of those who espouse the force principle.

Anti-Semitism has its setting in this conflict and gains its character from it. Quoting Samuel, "anti-Semitism is the expression of the concealed hatred of Christ and Christianity rising to a new and catastrophic level in the Western world." The Jews are intuitively sensed as the givers of Christ and Christianity—the nonforce ideology is felt as identified with the Jews. The clash of the force ideology with the nonforce principle expresses itself, accordingly, in vehement and hostile anti-Semitic actions.

This thesis may at first strike the reader as odd and debatable, particularly in the light of the passionate manner in which it is presented by Samuel. However, its plausibility emerges more and more as a result of careful reflection upon the author's treatment. Samuel has dug deep into the psyche of Western culture and has made a substantial analysis of its unconscious nature.

Students of race relations in general, as well as those interested specifically in the problem of anti-Semitism, will find it worth while to read this volume and reflect on it. It may be mentioned, parenthetically, that in it Samuel presents a very incisive discussion of a number of obscure features of Nazi psychology.

HERBERT BLUMER

University of Chicago

Men on the Move. By NELS ANDERSON. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1940. Pp. xiii+357. \$3.00.

Men on the Move is a synthesis of the results of research studies of migrants made principally during the last decade, financed principally with federal funds, and oriented principally to administrative problems. In view of the sources of information and his purposes, the author has done an excellent piece of work. The problem of appraising this book in a wider context is presented by the author's apologetic and contemptuous description of his own earlier book on *The Hobo*. The following statement is intended to be a defense of that earlier book, as well as an elaboration of the plan of the present book. *The Hobo* was a description of the life and culture of hoboes. It assisted readers to understand how hoboes behaved and how their personalities and culture were formed. It was a contribution to sociological theory. *Men on the Move*, on the other hand, is not, and was probably not intended to be, a contribution to sociological theory. It is a description of the technological changes through which workers become "disemployed," an analysis of the direction and distance of migration, an analysis of the statistical distribution of some of the formal characteristics of migrants—such as age, education, nativity—a cursory discussion of some of the difficulties of the migratory life, and a discussion of how the problems of migration may be solved. It is not concerned with migrants in communication with each other and makes no analysis of the culture of migrants. This failure may conceivably be due to the fact that modern migrants are not habitual or professional migrants, as were the hoboes. However, the statistical analysis shows that 43 per cent of the unattached migrants had been migrating at the time of investigation for more than six months, and *The Grapes of Wrath* is probably correct in showing that migrants begin to develop a unique culture in a very short time. It is more probable that the failure to describe the culture of migrants was due to the author's present concentration on administrative problems and to the fact that he has not lived with the modern migrants, as he did with the hoboes, and therefore has only the superficial acquaintance with migrants which comes from the statistical reports which constitute his sources of information. To say that *Men on the Move* does not deal with the behavior or culture of migrants or with communication among migrants is not to say that it is useless; it is to say that it is not sociology. It is not necessary that this book be sociology, but it is neces-

sary that someone study the behavior and culture of the modern migrants in the way in which Anderson studied the hobo, that is, sociologically.

EDWIN H. SUTHERLAND

Indiana University

The Boss: The Hague Machine in Action. By DAYTON D. MCKEAN. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1940. Pp. xi+285. \$3.00.

The story that Professor McKean tells is the one that the attentive reader of the great metropolitan newspapers expect him to tell. Only here every suspicion and every black mark against the boss and his machine are verified and supported by concrete evidence of a convincing sort. He doesn't say that the leader is working for his own pocket all the time; he prints his record and his testimony before a legislative committee. He doesn't merely say that Jersey City is the most extravagantly managed city of more than one hundred thousand in the United States; he quotes the pertinent figures from the 1940 *Municipal Yearbook* on the comparative costs of government in seven comparable cities. And he gives meaningful answers to the certain question: "Why doesn't someone speak out—some businessman, or lawyer, or clergyman, or newspaper, or labor leader, or anyone? The answer is always the same. First there is no free speech here, where "the Statue of Liberty, which is visible from the streets of the Horseshoe, stands with her back to Jersey City." People who insist on speaking out are either (1) slapped down by the ubiquitous police, or (2) given a job, or (3) deprived of some privilege or advantage beneficial to them in their particular line of work. Mulhooly said more than fifty years ago: "A chunk of meat will cure the bark and the bite of a dog; therefore if you don't know how to silence a Reformer, it's your own fault." There are dozens of concrete examples of meat given to the leaders in the different professional and occupational groups, and when someone with exceptional moral courage like Norman Thomas attempts to speak, he is grabbed the minute he arrives and hustled back to New York.

Dr. McKean further points out that Jersey City is 75 per cent Roman Catholic. This fact is basic, for the author says that the Roman Catholic church could put Hague out of business over night if it wanted to. The answer to why it does not do it has, in part, been given above. And then the church is against communism, and Hague has publically dedicated himself to the task of destroying communism. Besides, Hague says that his is "the most moralist city in America." There are no houses of prostitution, no burlesque shows, no taxi dances in Jersey City—but these in-

stitutions can be had by the sinner if he will go just across the city boundary line. Gambling, however, is not counted a sin by Mayor Hague.

I am left with one question after reading this excellent book. Who is at the top? Who, besides the church, is above the political boss? Even though Hague said, "I decide. I do. Me," yet he must get orders as well as give them. There is no inkling here of a supreme arbiter above the boss.

J. T. SALTER

University of Wisconsin

Controlled Fertility: An Evaluation of Clinic Service. By REGINE K. STIX and FRANK W. NOTESTEIN. Baltimore: Williams & Wilkins, 1940. Pp. xiv+201. \$3.00.

The effectiveness of the pre-clinical and post-clinical contraceptive practices of a homogeneous group of nearly one thousand women who visited the Sanger Bureau from the Bronx between certain dates is analyzed with such care as to constitute a model of this type of research. There are many new conclusions here, but unfortunately they are insufficiently distinguished from points already established.

Among the outstanding conclusions are these: (1) Contraceptive efforts without medical guidance (made prior to a clinical visit) are much more highly effective than heretofore supposed. Some people were misled because of faulty methods of measurement resulting from a failure to take into account the time factor and different degrees of exposure risk to pregnancy. Since this conclusion is likely to take some of the wind out of the sails of the doctors who are always contending that contraception must be put exclusively under medical direction, we wonder what the reaction to this observation will be in high medical quarters. (2) The male sheath is shown to be every bit as reliable as the favorite clinical prescription. This is no news to some of us. However, the authors fail to trace the factors of cultural imitation which have led the American clinics to adopt the practices started in the Sanger Bureau as the result of Mrs. Sanger's visit many years ago to Holland and England. The nexus of influence is so clear that it stares one in the face.

I would not give the impression, however, that the authors have failed to see their problems whole. For they did, as a general rule. There is not only careful, objective, systematic, and painstaking analysis here, but Part IV examines the broader implications of this study for clinic policy; acceptability to the patient of the method prescribed is even more important than absolute reliability of the technique. Part IV also treats the

research possibilities in birth-control clinic data and stresses the need of standardization of record forms and of more follow-up studies. The last two chapters emphasize the point that the clinics are more useful as public health agencies than they are influential in reducing population (because the clinics reach so few).

There is new evidence here that the Catholic patients, prior to a clinical visit, began contraceptive practice later in marriage and used less reliable methods; tended to use less effectively whatever techniques they employed; tended to resort less frequently to induced abortion. These figures certainly point to differential fertility by religious groups, even when economic status is held constant—a hunch I have long held—but which several population experts have denied. If the authors realize the implications of their figures on this point, there is no evidence of it.

The present study, unlike some of the papers published by the authors heretofore, makes a greater effort to put this research in its setting and to recognize the work of earlier investigators. That is a step in the right direction. More could have been done. It should be axiomatic in scientific inquiry that a particularized study should be presented against a background description of the previous work in order that the reader may see things in a developmental as well as cross-sectional manner. All matters considered, however, this is a first-rate scientific analysis, and it will bear study by workers in many fields.

NORMAN E. HIMES

Colgate University

The Economic Geography of Barbados: A Study of the Relationships between Environmental Variations and Economic Development. By OTIS P. STARKEY. New York: Columbia University Press, 1939. Pp. xii+228. \$3.00.

The inclusive nature of the geographer's interests, which, according to Brunhes, embrace all manifestations of human activity—economic, historical, and political—is abundantly illustrated in this analysis of the development of a small plantation frontier in the West Indies. The familiar stock in trade of the physical geographer—climate, topography, soils, minerals, flora, and fauna—are combined with the carefully documented facts of economic history in a series of simple time charts designed to establish the relation between “environmental variations and economic development.” The entire volume is in fact an elaboration and refinement of a somewhat involved “chronological chart showing the principal (political, economic, technical, and environmental) factors influencing the development of Barbados, 1627–1935.” That the findings are chiefly of

a common-sense variety is a consequence not of any lack of scholarly application but rather of the complexity of the problem which has been posed and the gaps within even the simplest statistical arrays over such a long period of time.

The main outlines of the economic history of the Barbados are presented in terms of four major and twenty-three minor periods within each of which an effort has been made to analyze the variations of the Barbadian physical environment, such as soil exhaustion, hurricanes, pests, droughts, and epidemics, and of "changes in human ability to utilize the Barbadian environment" growing out of technological discoveries and changes in the world-market. Of necessity, the analysis is always brief and sometimes rather vague. "The trend of production was slowly upward, probably because of more plentiful labor, the substitution of windmills, and increasing applications of manure" (p. 123). Even the more detailed analysis of the Barbadian economy since 1850 leaves much to conjecture and estimate. Thus the statements that "the larceny curve varies inversely with the prosperity of the working class in most years" (p. 194) and that the number of deaths varies with the drought conditions in the island have only meager statistical support.

The author finds in the experience of Barbados confirmation of the theory of his former teacher, J. Russell Smith, that "civilization is the product of moderate adversity. Even the most devastating hurricanes were not entirely disadvantageous. . . . Nature has not 'spared the rod and spoiled the child' in Barbados." The variations in climate especially have been severe enough to keep the Barbadians "out of a rut." On the other hand, he concludes that other nongeographical obstacles have also contributed to Barbadian economic progress. The impressive array presented by Starkey at the close of his book of the "progressive measures adopted during or immediately following hard times" leaves the critical reader unconvinced, however, that the changes noted are always causally related to the geographic and moral social factors mentioned.

University of Hawaii

ANDREW W. LIND

Order and Possibility in Social Life. By DOUGLAS E. HARING and MARY E. JOHNSON. New York: Richard R. Smith, 1940. Pp. xii+772. \$4.00.

The title of this work is that of an essay by the late Professor Giddings. Its general nature is indicated in the following, from the Preface: "In the discovery of what man *can* do, the data of the biological sciences are pertinent; in the discovery of what man *does*, the social sciences provide de-

scriptive data. In the practical decision as to what a specific individual or group of individuals *wish to do*, the limitations and possibilities of human nature and social order are definitive" (italics in original).

Book I, by describing what man *does* in ten different societies, emphasizes the diversity of human behavior. What man *can* do is then studied in three books on the human species, the human individual, and his social behavior. Order and possibility are more closely approached in Book V with a brief history of human culture, human populations, the social constitution, societal resemblances and differences, and the force of circumstantial pressures. Some ultimate questions of social philosophy are broached in Book VI, with the general conclusion that man is not yet able to build a utopia, but that it is not human nature to despair. As the much-lamented Russell G. Smith said: "there abideth always beauty, laughter, love—these three, the Blessed Trinity of aristocratic and pagan minds."

This book is solid and heavy; though the language flows easily, the meanings are often hard to grasp. It fights some rather old battles; it is shy of recent research materials in the fields of mental measurements, experimental and social psychology; and it relies altogether too much on direct quotation. It does, however, revive a number of very useful concepts developed by Giddings, such as like response, like mindedness, concerted volition, etc. It is heavy sledding for beginners, but any student who can and will digest it will derive from it a fairly sound understanding of the order and possibilities in social life.

FRANK H. HANKINS

Smith College

Introductory Sociology. By ROBERT L. SUTHERLAND and JULIAN L. WOODWARD. 2d rev. ed. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1940. Pp. xii+863.

The 1937 edition of this book had 270 adoptions. This illustrated revision is concerned not with basic organization but with the elaboration of statements and the addition of current illustrative material.

Teachers will discover the substantial anthropological section retained, with the statement on the nature of culture profitably expanded. The chapters on personality have been rephrased and given an injection of Freudian terminology. Materials from primitive cultures have been added here, and there is less emphasis on wishes and traits. Caste figures prominently in the materials on groups, and the statement on nationalism incorporates fresh current history.

The theoretical materials on the community stress the analysis of the

region. A descriptive chapter on health and welfare organizations has been added. Political and economic organization are treated as one unit, with the technical materials on the latter eliminated.

In dealing with interaction greater emphasis is laid on the significance of communication. The materials on conflict are amplified but the co-operation-competition dichotomy introduced is of debatable value. However, a section on co-operation seems standard equipment on 1940 model texts. The section on social change is scarcely altered.

The heavier type, interlarded with script, and the near-irrelevant photographs detract from a worth-while revision.

OSWALD HALL

Brown University

Statistical Procedures and Their Mathematical Bases. By CHARLES C. PETERS and WALTER R. VAN VOORHIS. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1940. Pp. xiii+516. \$4.50.

While probably too advanced for beginning students, the above volume is invaluable for those acquainted with the fundamentals and "is intended to bridge the gap between the elementary courses . . . and the original contributions in the monographic press." Appreciating the frequent lack of mathematical knowledge on the part of statistics students, the authors present chapter i, "A Little Calculus," in which they introduce fundamental concepts and notation to enable the mathematically unsophisticated to follow the arguments. Derivations are incorporated into the text rather than relegated to the Appendix, and the authors make an unusual effort to explain the mathematical steps. They are careful to state the assumptions involved in the various proofs and are cautious about the assumptions they make.

In addition to presenting standard formulas and derivations, the authors provide a number of special formulas for use where the better-known procedures are inapplicable. This feature makes the book unusually valuable as a research manual. Such statistical concepts as homoscedasticity and fiducial limits are given brief but clear treatment, and original sources are cited for the interested reader. In addition to consideration of dispersion, central tendency, and correlation, chapters are devoted to multiple-factor analysis, probability, analysis of variance and various tests of significance. The Appendix tables include normal probability integrals in terms of abscissas and areas, t and chi-square distributions, and tetra-choric r .

While the examples and problems are drawn almost entirely from psy-

chology and agronomy, there is from the sociologist's point of view only one serious criticism, namely, that there is no discussion of time series. Use of this volume in conjunction with such a volume as Mills's *Statistical Methods* or Croxton and Cowden's *Applied General Statistics* would compensate for this shortcoming.

ROBERT F. WINCH

University of Chicago

The Beggar. By HARLAN W. GILMORE. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1940. Pp. 252. \$2.50.

This is an unbiased examination of the begging profession by an author who not only familiarized himself with the literature on begging but became intimately acquainted with the ways of behavior of beggars through associating with them. The beggar is presented as the natural product of interrelationships between begging customs, giving customs, and life-experiences. The reader of this book gains an understanding of the beggar as a person whose human nature is molded by the same social processes which mold the human nature of other persons—culture and life-experiences.

An excellent analysis is presented of the social distance between the world of the beggar and that of settled society. Most of the things which settled society approves the world of the beggar belittles, and most of the things which settled society taboos the world of the beggar condones or approves.

Through the use of illustrative case materials and a lucid style the author gives a vivid picture of the techniques and types of begging, beggars of the open road, urban beggarmdom, child beggars, the habitat of beggars, social sources of recruits of the begging profession, the practice of almsgiving, and social control of begging.

HARVEY J. LOCKE

Indiana University

Personality and Problems of Adjustment. By KIMBALL YOUNG. New York: F. S. Crofts & Co., 1940. Pp. 868. \$4.25.

College students are increasingly asking for some light on the questions of personality and conduct of human relations with which they are so pre-occupied. For the most part the psychology courses into which they go seeking this illumination are concerned mainly with laboratory experiments and psychometrics, neither of which offers much of value to students who are asking for understandings and insights. It seems probable

that the answer to this need of students will be provided by sociologists and cultural anthropologists who can give students not only the materials dealing with personality development and the many forms of deviations and distortions but can do so in the context of the social and cultural milieu out of which the personality emerges.

This volume by Kimball Young, as indicated in his Preface, is designed essentially to be a college text in courses dealing with the psychology of personality or with problems of mental hygiene and to serve as an orientation to the interplay of personality, society, and culture. It should also prove to be a valuable supplementary text in social psychology, and in sociology, social work and education courses dealing with personal adjustment problems. I sincerely hope that the effort to combine the standpoints and data of psychology, social psychology, and cultural anthropology may contribute its quota to the growing rapprochement of these three fields.

To meet these varied objectives this volume provides an extensive discussion of the "Foundations of Personality" and the varied conceptions and theories now offered in this field; then a presentation of problems of personal adjustment in childhood and adolescence both in the family and in the school and also the problems of adjustment in marriage and the community, with attention to the variety of personality deviants and breakdowns. The final section deals with the wider implications of personality needs and expressions, with particular reference to the various opportunities offered for release, compensation, and escapes. The final chapter stresses the cultural and personality implications of the present-day conflicts between the democratic and the totalitarian societies.

It is apparent that this volume provides a wealth of material for discussion and for wider reading which should prove exceedingly useful in the organization of educational programs focused upon the basic problems of personality and culture.

LAWRENCE K. FRANK

New York

The Psychology of Adolescence. By KARL C. GARRISON. Rev. ed. New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1940. Pp. 477. \$3.00.

Two questions may be raised concerning each of the many studies of adolescence: *why* was it made and *how* was it made? Is the motivating interest abstract scientific curiosity or is it the need for the immediate control of individual adolescents? Is the method that of the observation of the whole group from the outside in or the equally objective attempt to get new insight by observing the outer world as the adolescent sees it from the inside out?

This present volume is of the scientific outside-in type and contains much valuable material for the relatively sophisticated student who is already familiar with statistical and psychological concepts and implications.

The book is divided into two parts. Part I, "The Development of the Individual," includes chapters on physical, mental, social, and moral development, others on motivation, interests, and the attempt to achieve independence. Part II, "Personality Development," is essentially a survey of experimental studies and methods to date as they apply to personality problems, mental disturbances, delinquency, guidance, etc.

At the end of each chapter are stimulating "Thought Questions" and selected bibliographies which, with competent leadership, should make this an excellent book for group study and discussion.

JESSIE R. RUNNER

Iowa City

Theory and Practice of Social Case Work. By GORDON HAMILTON. New York: Columbia University Press, 1940. Pp. viii+388. \$3.00.

The book has many high lights and is a thought-provoking treatise on the processes and techniques, goals and philosophy, of social case work with families and children. For the most part the presentation is systematic, and the style is lucid. Liberal use is made of pertinent case data to illustrate the more abstract discussion of case-work processes. The author has a sound philosophy of social case work, and her discussion of the application of theory to practice is consistent as far as it goes. The repetition of certain case-work processes in various sections of the book may be regarded as a useful pedagogical device.

The greatest limitation of Miss Hamilton's book is the fact that she has apparently done little field research on the social and personal problems American families have encountered in the last decade or two. Therefore, her selections of case data are, in many instances, unique rather than representative of the social situations of family life, of the cultural setting, and of the "inner life" of the people who seek assistance from social agencies.

In her abstract discussion of case-work processes Miss Hamilton shows keen insight; yet the concrete case data rarely show the relationship between the client's cultural setting, the social forces determining his life-pattern, and the problems with which he comes to the agency for assistance. The various sources of these problems are obscure; yet it is shown how decisively the worker treats these problems.

Perhaps one of the most thought-provoking and constructive texts on case work was written by Ada E. Sheffield, *Social Insight in Case Situations* (1937), which presents the cultural approach to social case work. Yet not a single reference is made to this practical and useful volume.

On the whole, it may be said that Miss Hamilton has made a substantial contribution by reviewing the theory of social case work and by a clear discussion of many excellent practices in case work.

PAULINE V. YOUNG

University of Southern California

The Landscape of Rural Poverty: Cornbread and Creek Water. By CHARLES MORROW WILSON. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1940. Pp. 309. \$3.00.

Experience gained from years of reporting for newspapers has enabled the author of this volume to spot a highly important subject and to phrase a most alluring title for it. Had the author possessed, or taken the pains to secure, a thorough grounding in the essential, pertinent, and readily available data on this subject—a preparation roughly commensurate with his skill in making phrases—the result would have been a masterpiece. Unfortunately, the product does justice neither to the title nor to the subtitle, which the publishers have emphasized. It is a mere hodgepodge of miscellanea that have interested the author for one reason or another. Some of them have to do with rural poverty; others have a very remote, if any, relationship to the announced subject. A large number of minor inaccuracies and typographical errors mar the presentation. However, a few of the chapters, and notably the one on “The Little Red School House,” are fairly adequate treatments of the topics designated in their headings.

T. LYNN SMITH

Louisiana State University

Children in the Cinema. By RICHARD FORD. London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1939. Pp. viii+232. \$2.00.

How children are influenced by what they see on the screen has been of special interest to a variety of persons. Ford's book attempts to answer questions regarding the extent of, as well as the nature of, the influence movies have on children in Great Britain. The answers are given in terms of an extensive review of the literature on the subject, accompanied by data gathered by questionnaires addressed to a number of managers of movie theaters.

Ford's survey of these data leads him to a number of optimistic conclusions. Thus, he finds that the standard films presented in the ordinary movie programs have been steadily improving and that the number of films which children may see unaccompanied by adults has steadily increased. He also finds an increase in the number of movie theaters holding regularly scheduled children's matinees in which are shown specially selected films. Ford's study also indicates that, although children are sometimes frightened by what is shown on the screen, there is nothing to suggest that they are permanently harmed by these experiences. In addition, there is nothing in the evidence accumulated in the study to indicate that juvenile delinquency is causally related to what is shown in the films.

The author seems to be well qualified to write on the subject. He has had the experience of organizing regular film matinees for about 100,000 children. This experience has tended to convince him that these regularly scheduled and carefully supervised matinees will eventually lead to permanent improvement in the influence exerted by the movies over children.

E. D. MONACHESI

University of Minnesota

The Criminality of Youth. By THORSTEN SELLIN. Philadelphia: American Law Institute, 1940. Pp. 116.

This analysis of the criminality of youth was made by Dr. Sellin on assignment by the American Law Institute, which has been working on a model act for youthful offenders. This is the only general summary of the data regarding offenders of the age group sixteen to twenty-one. It contains an analysis of all the general criminal statistics regarding youthful offenders and also of the criminal statistics for selected states and cities in America and for certain European countries. The following are some of the conclusions. The total crime rate of youth is not disproportionately high, but the rate for serious crimes is disproportionately high. The probability that a first offender will become a second offender is many times greater than the probability that a person will become a first offender, and the probability of further recidivism increases with each conviction. For these and other reasons, special provisions for youthful offenders are desired.

EDWIN H. SUTHERLAND

Indiana University

Japan and the United States, 1790-1853. By SHUNZO SAKAMAKI. ("The Transactions of the Asiatic Society" [2d ser.], Vol. XVIII.) Tokyo, 1939. Pp. xi+204.

This study gives a chronological account, based mainly on Japanese sources, of Japanese contacts with, and knowledge of, the United States before Perry's Expedition in 1853. The first ten chapters deal briefly with the early visits of American ships to attempt trade, to repatriate Japanese stranded abroad, or to call for American sailors stranded in Japan, while later chapters deal with English studies in Japan (mostly the compiling of dictionaries from the Dutch) and pre-Perry knowledge of the United States.

The general conclusions of the book are that Japan was well fortified with knowledge of the United States when Perry arrived and was well disposed toward his country because (1) American ships had made several humane trips to Japan's shores to repatriate lost Japanese; (2) most of the contacts with American castaways had left a good impression; and (3) the Dutch, for economic and political reasons, had always given the Japanese government favorable reports of the young Republic.

The book is primarily a documentary historical account, so that, except for a short concluding chapter, no attempt is made to assess the effects on Japanese culture of the various early contacts with America. There is a full Bibliography, an Appendix giving a chronological survey of all Western ships in Japanese waters from 1790 to 1853, and an Index of Proper Names.

JOHN F. EMBREE

University of Toronto

Cheltenham Township: A Sociological Analysis of a Residential Suburb. By A. H. JONES. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1940. Pp. xiv+173. \$2.00.

This is a factual study of certain objective aspects of a residential suburban area approximately 10 miles north of the city of Philadelphia. After a brief introductory chapter on methods employed, there is a chapter summarizing generally known material on the growth of cities. There follow two chapters on the historical background and development of the area studied. The rest of the monograph is devoted to a fairly detailed account of migration, the family, schools, business and occupational distribution, economic status, government, disorganization, recreation, and the church. All the available statistical sources bearing on these subjects have been used. Most of the rest of the data were secured through a

questionnaire distributed to all the students of the Cheltenham Senior High School and two junior high schools on given dates. Of the returns received, about 51 per cent were usable, each representing a family with children in the schools mentioned. The study is competent and is modest in its pretensions. It will be valuable as a source of local information as well as a source of comparison with other suburban areas. Some day, perhaps, data of this kind from a large number of widely scattered communities can be brought to bear on some general theory of suburban society. A Bibliography and Index are appended.

GEORGE A. LUNDBERG

Bennington College

Time-sampling Studies of Child Behavior. By RUTH E. ARRINGTON. ("Psychological Monographs," Vol. LI, No. 228.) Columbus, Ohio: American Psychological Association, Ohio State University, 1939. Pp. 193 and 85 unnumbered pages of Appendix.

Observations are reported of nursery-school, kindergarten, and first-grade children under the time-sampling method of Dorothy Swaine Thomas. The hypothesis was tested that some children are predominantly "materially minded," others predominantly "socially minded." Work with materials was found to be so largely influenced by situational factors as to be of little value in forming an estimate of stable characteristics of the child. Observations of social behavior proved to be more satisfactory. The talkative child, for example, tended to remain talkative, even when observations were separated by a year. The amount of talking to other children increased from the younger nursery-school group to the kindergarten group.

It is evident from the paucity of conclusions, in comparison with the volume of painstaking effort, that repeated short time-samples cannot substitute for a dynamic analysis of the situation in which the child is found. In selected situations, subjected to such analysis, the time-sampling method may be a useful supplementary tool, but as a major research device it is decidedly limited.

ERNEST R. HILGARD

Stanford University

False Security: The Betrayal of the American Investor. By BERNARD J. REIS. Introduction by JOHN T. FLYNN. New York: Equinox Co-operative Press, Inc., 1937. Pp. xv+362. \$2.75.

Essentially, this book is a brief directed against the American investment-banking fraternity, against their operations in the 1920's. Invest-

ment trusts, trustees, corporation managements, reorganization committees, and certified public accountants are included as well. Real estate bonds and foreign issues come in for special attention. Individual cases based on evidence uncovered and published by official investigating committees are the main content. The author's delight are cases of obvious or near-obvious fraud, which give the book the readability of a detective story. Needless to say that such a principle of selection—emphasizing the examples of worst mischief, on which to base future supervisory procedure—is not conducive to balanced judgment. It omits, in particular, to raise the question: Why did the investing public permit the security business the pranks it indulged in? Wasn't it encouraging, and not for altruistic reasons, the scramble for illegitimate profits and value-appreciations? Maybe the public gets the kind of bankers it deserves.

MELCHIOR PALYI

Chicago

Public Administration and the United States Department of Agriculture.

By JOHN M. GAUS and LEON O. WOLCOTT. Chicago: Public Administration Service (published for the Committee on Public Administration of the Social Science Research Council), 1940. Pp. xii+534.

The authors have given an admirable exposition of the history and growth of the United States Department of Agriculture and have described the recent rapid expansion of its functions and the consequent changes in its administrative structure. As the title indicates, it is primarily a study in public administration.

The chapter on "Rural Life" will be of particular interest to rural sociologists. Considerable attention is given to the relation of the department to the state land-grant colleges. The ecological basis of agricultural problems and administration is also stressed.

In explaining the "emerging issues" of agricultural policies and departmental organization under the New Deal, an interesting observation is made on the implications of scientific research:

Changes occur, but the new policy will be found to have roots in some undramatic research, fact-collecting, information-providing, or similar "non-coercive" activity that actually plays its eventual part in coercion because the new information becomes a weapon in the struggles of pressure groups. Civil servants assigned to the task of analysis come into situations in which a public interest is discovered because hitherto it had been no one's business to study them [pp. 68-69].

The authors have a sympathetic understanding of the position of

leadership which the department has been forced to take in the rapidly changing economic and technological situation, but one has the feeling that a more critical attitude toward the implications of the present tendencies would be helpful to those who are concerned with the intricate problems of adjustment involving national, state, and local administrations, as well as farmers' organizations.

DWIGHT SANDERSON

Cornell University

The American and His Food. By RICHARD OSBORN CUMMINGS. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1940. Pp. xi+267. \$2.50.

This "history of food habits in the United States" is more than an account of changes in food consumption. It is a history of the nutritional adequacy of the dietary of the various classes and sections, with emphasis upon the factors affecting the foods available and the foods eaten. The book is well written and contains material that should be extremely interesting to a large group of people. The author does not simply furnish a chronicle of events but gives interpretation and penetrating observations as well. In his use of technical material beyond the usual scope of the historian, one gets the satisfying impression that he understands what he is writing about and that its accuracy is insured in a deeper sense than by the reported checking by experts.

The reader must not expect, however, in these 267 pages a complete history of the food-consumption habits of the American people. It is not the American equivalent of Drummond and Wilbraham's, *The Englishman's Food*. The footnote citations should be valuable clues to the sources from which it is to be hoped other students will glean the details necessary for such accounts. The book as a whole shows of what interest and significance they could be.

HAZEL KYRK

University of Chicago

The Psychology of Music. By MAX SCHOEN. New York: Ronald Press Co., 1940. Pp. vii+258. \$3.25.

For those who have not been following the growing body of psychological studies analyzing music, the author, who is one of the contributors in this field, assembles the essential results of a half-century of research by many distinguished scientists. Since the book is intended for the musician rather than for the technical psychologist, it is not difficult to follow. The impression one gets from this summary, although such may not have been the author's intention, is that the search for laws of music

in human nature and physics has been misdirected and that the principles which account for abilities for enjoyment and for performance of music have their origin in experience, which is cultural. It is because the sources are so hidden and subtle that they appear in the guise of nature.

There is an Index and a selected bibliography of 264 titles.

ROBERT E. L. FARIS

Bryn Mawr College

La Participation. By JEAN PRZYLUŚKI. Paris: Alcan, 1940. Pp. xii+167. Fr. 18.

L'Homme et le sacré. By ROGER CAILLOIS. Paris: Leroux, 1939. Pp. xi+146. Fr. 18.

These brief volumes apply sociological analysis to data from primitive societies in a highly suggestive and useful manner.

La Participation, the more original and valuable of the two, attempts to explain the evolution of modes of orientation to society and to the cosmos as they are related to the evolution of the social structure. Its guiding conception, diverging from Lévy-Bruhl, is that differences of perception are determined by different systems for the classification of reality. These systems are fixed by tradition effectively to orient activity for the proper adjustment of society, and from them all peoples derive inferences which, whether scientifically accurate or not, are always logical. The author traces the evolution of these frames of reference in the development of religious conceptions and practices and shows how they derive from the experiential worlds of three ideal-type stages of social organization: (1) mobile hunting and food-gathering associated with the nondifferentiation of phenomena; (2) settled agriculture, related to cosmic dualism (based on the distinction between the cultivated community and the savage world beyond); and (3) urban commercial society, giving rise to rationalism, universalism, and monism.

L'Homme et le sacré is an interesting and basically useful treatment of the significance and function of the "sacred" in social life but, aside from a number of illuminating analyses of details, adds little to our essential understanding of the phenomenon.

HENRY ELKIN

New York City

Social Pathology. By STUART A. QUEEN and JEANNETTE R. GRUENER. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1940. Pp. x+662. \$3.50.

This revised edition (formerly Queen and Mann) deals with one issue: "How do various handicaps—physical, mental, economic and others—

affect the social participation of individual persons?" Case summaries are given, but they include little positive material on social participation. Treatment programs are briefly considered. This approach has its limitations since a handicap is an experience receiving its meaning in interaction with innumerable other factors that are quite as important as the handicap. Likewise, multisided participation is an experience, an interactive factor in social pathologies and not a goal that exists in the nature of things.

A more serious limitation is the fact that this approach takes as its frame of reference one aspect of an interactive relationship. There is a reciprocal interactive relationship between handicaps and social participation, each getting its meaning in terms of the other. Mental deficiency, a biological variation, may become a social pathology through too much participation. Social participation helps to produce and release mental ill-health; it may be a factor in tuberculosis or any type of physical or mental ill-health. Alcoholism may be an escape from participation as well as an obstacle to participation; an indifference to participation precedes dementia praecox or is a part of the process. Senescence is superannuation, a withdrawal from social participation, etc.

The limited approach makes this book valuable as supplementary reading rather than as a text where a broad inclusive frame of reference is needed.

L. GUY BROWN

Oberlin College

Public Assistance: American Principles and Policies. By EDITH ABBOTT. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1940. Pp. 894. \$4.50.

Social Legislation. By HELEN I. CLARKE. New York: D. Appleton-Century Co., 1940. Pp. 655. \$4.50.

Despite the principle, brought over from England in the seventeenth century, that taxpayers must provide the necessities of life for those unable to provide for themselves, "miserable shifts and expedients" remain the order of the day. This is the central theme of Edith Abbott's newest book. In establishing this proposition she has assembled nearly one hundred documents—excerpts from statutes, judicial opinions, and official reports of various kinds. These are introduced in five groups by extended discussion written by Miss Abbott herself. The five parts of the book deal with such matters as the "right to relief," the persistence of old "pauper laws," medical care for the impecunious, the movement away from local responsibility, and the development of a federal relief program.

Here we have a vigorously written account, amply documented on the

legal side, of an important series of changes in what might well be called our institutionalized security system. A clear statement is made of conflicts and lags, of achievements and shortcomings in a vital part of contemporary American civilization. The book was prepared for students in professional schools of social work. It may well be used as a reference work by practitioners and by students of our changing culture.

Miss Clarke's book deals with legislation affecting both public assistance and the family. Its scope is further widened by chapters devoted to historical backgrounds. Instead of quoting public documents, she summarizes their contents and comments on their significance.

Social Legislation will doubtless be useful as a point of departure in the study of legislation affecting the family and public relief. But its contents are not a unified body of material nor is either of the two main fields covered completely. Nowhere is it made very clear just what legislation is "social." Perhaps all the author intended to do was to bring together the discussion of laws with which she thought social science students ought to be familiar.

STUART A. QUEEN

Washington University

The Railroaders. By W. FRED COTTRELL. Stanford University, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1940. Pp. x+145. \$2.00.

Who is a railroader, and who is not? What are the bases of status in this world apart? What are the effective rules of the game? How do the peculiar demands and conditions of his occupation affect the selection and, later, the personality of the railroader? These are the questions to which Mr. Cottrell points his description. They are precisely the points pertinent to any sociological analysis of an occupation.

The railroaders show in marked degree the bureaucratic tendency of which one phase is a "freezing" of the institutional organization of work to such a point that technical improvements are hampered. The author discusses this problem with considerable insight into the influence on the personality of rigid rules and of defense of arrangements based on past rather than present technique.

The presentation is modest and forthright. The data are gathered from the author's own experience. A student of occupations and professions would do well to read it for ideas, whether or not he is especially interested in railroad men and their problems.

EVERETT C. HUGHES

University of Chicago

Modern Marriage. Edited by MOSES JUNG. New York: F. S. Crofts & Co., 1940. Pp. xiv+420. \$3.75.

This volume is an outgrowth of a course on modern marriage given for the last six years at the State University of Iowa. Under the direction of Professor Jung the course has presented lectures by specialists from various disciplines related to the many aspects of marriage. These specialists from the fields of biology, psychology, sociology, philosophy, economics, law, psychiatry, religion, and art are the authors of the twenty chapters of *Modern Marriage*.

Some of these chapters—those dealing with the economic, the legal, the physical, the biological, and the eugenic phases of married life—contain much concrete, specialized information. Others are more in the nature of homilies or are of questionable relevance in a volume of this kind. One chapter, "The Growth of Intelligence," does not contain a single reference to the subject of marriage. The volume as a whole and even the better chapters referred to above fail to show adequately the relation of the selected topics to successful marital adjustment. Except for a few brief references no attention is given to the research findings pertinent to this problem.

PAUL WALLIN

Chicago

Your Marriage. By NORMAN E. HIMES. New York: Farrar & Rinehart, Inc., 1940. Pp. xiv+434. \$3.75.

This excellent nontechnical treatment of engagement and marriage is meant as a practical guide for those about to be or who have recently been married. It differs from most books of its kind in that the author wherever possible incorporates research findings into his discussion, more particularly those of the Burgess-Cottrell and Terman studies. It also differs from similar works in that considerable attention is given to such problems as budgeting, the use of credit, buying and selection of insurance. Although the sexual phase of marriage is not the central theme of the book, the author presents a clear and compact discussion of premarital sex relations, sexual adjustment in marriage, techniques of birth control, and methods for preventing venereal infection.

PAUL WALLIN

Chicago

144 *Smaller Cities*. By E. L. THORNDIKE. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1940. Pp. 135. \$1.50.

This book continues Thorndike's statistical study of American cities.¹ He finds wide differences in their indices of "goodness," "income," and "personnel," most of which are attributed to the intelligence and morality of their populations rather than to size or wealth. The providing of conditions to secure health, education, and income is recommended as means for attracting good people and holding superior individuals. These points are backed with tables of quantitative data showing the position of each place on the scales selected. Some items seem arbitrary (e.g., number of telephones to indicate "desirable personal qualities"); correlation formulas are overworked, and occasional mistakes occur (e.g., 30 is an unsatisfactory "standard urban death rate"). The work is a useful summary of conditions in 1930. It offers few pertinent suggestions for 1950.

University of Washington

HOWARD WOOLSTON

Saltykov and the Russian Squire. By NIKANDER STRELSKY. New York: Columbia University Press, 1940. Pp. xii+176. \$2.50.

M. E. Saltykov-Shchedrin wrote of the Russian nobles in the third quarter of the last century. His literary etchings in acid depicted the landowning masters of the old empire as they lived and sinned shortly before and immediately after the emancipation of serfs. Available in translation into the English and other Western languages, Saltykov's works are little known today outside of Russia. The Soviet critics and leaders, however, have rediscovered the satirist with a particular relish. In reprinting and quoting him extensively, the communists prove how hopelessly unjust and rotten was the socioeconomic and political system which their regime supplanted in 1917.

Mr. Strelsky does a valuable job not only of refreshing the Western memory of the great novelist-sociologist but also of reminding the reader that there may be another non-Marxist kind of admiration for Saltykov. While agreeing with the Soviet critics on "the prophetic fatality" of Saltykov's personages, Mr. Strelsky does not believe that Saltykov's record of the energetic bloodsuckers or passive and stupid parasites, so prevalent among the Russian squires of the nineteenth century, is marked with hatred alone. The cruel landowner of Saltykov's description is "not a monster, but a man, a human being who suffers even as others suffer and who evokes from us not only a sense of horror but also of pity and—yes, it is possible—even of kinship." For, concludes Mr. Strelsky, in every man and every class "there lurks some hidden trace" of that cruelty and stupidity which distinguished the lords of bygone Russia.

New York City

ALBERT PARRY

¹ See *Your City*, reviewed in *American Sociological Review*, IV (December, 1939), 863.

And Still the Waters Run. By ANGIE DEBO. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1940. Pp. x+417. \$4.00.

Here is a picture, by a distinguished American historian, of the process by which the members of the Five Civilized Tribes of Oklahoma, in exchange for the privileges of citizenship and civilization, lost their land, institutions, and honor. "The policy of the United States . . . was a gigantic blunder that ended a hopeful experiment in Indian development, destroyed a unique civilization, and degraded thousands of individuals." It is small comfort to find that the letter of the law was adhered to in most instances and that, after a generation of systematic exploitation, the present Indian administration is trying to pick up the pieces.

FRED EGGAN

University of Chicago

Rural Life in Process. By PAUL H. LANDIS. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1940. Pp. xviii+599. \$3.75.

This textbook develops the thesis that "rural life is in a state of rapid transition" and that "rural society can be understood only when considered as a part of the total design of American life." A more distinctive feature of the book is its regional emphasis on the West, illustrated by the treatment of migrant farm laborers. Rural life in the United States is presented under these five subjects: structure and organization, social experience and personality formation, interactive processes, social institutions, and emerging problems of a dynamic rural society. The second recent text in this field to use an obvious conceptual framework, this one draws upon social psychology buttressed by social anthropology.

MERTON OYLER

University of Kentucky

Family Counseling Service in a University Community. By MARGARET GILBERT BENZ. ("Teachers College, Columbia University, Contributions to Education," No. 800.) New York: Columbia University, 1940. Pp. xvi+125.

The Family Counseling Service was a four-year (1932-36) experimental organization operating under the guidance of a number of schools and departments of Columbia University. The present study is an analysis of the "needs" (for the most part, as expressed by the subjects) of the urban, middle-class, well-educated group served. The author concludes

that the three problems of greatest concern to the families studied were: (1) the education of children and the selection of schools, camps, etc.; (2) the position of women and their inadequacy of preparation for home management; and (3) the maintenance of individual family homes and procurement of domestic help (pp. 115-17).

Viewed in terms of research standards, the work is a fact-finding study. It proceeds from no hypotheses, involves no theoretical framework, and arrives at no theoretical conclusions.

ROBERT F. WINCH

University of Chicago

The Unseen Plague—Chronic Disease. By ERNST P. BOAS. New York: J. J. Augustin, 1940. Pp. ix+121. \$2.00.

The Unseen Plague consists of a review of the extent of chronic diseases in the community and their effect on the social structure and a summary and appraisal of the present methods of medicinal and social care. It is a timely and usable record of fact based on twenty years of active experience in the field, and may serve as a basis for planning by government, community, physicians, and individuals interested in social welfare.

VERA MILLER

Chicago

Economic Status of University Women in the U. S. A. By SUSAN M. KINGSBURY. (Bulletin of the Women's Bureau, No. 170.) Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1939. Pp. 70. \$0.15.

This is a factual report based on data gathered from questionnaires submitted to the gainfully employed members of the American Association of University Women. Its statistics concern the relation of education and training to salary and type of occupation; and discrimination encountered because of age, sex, and marital status. Coming at a time when democratic institutions may find necessary swift compromises in their definition of female employability, as they did in the last war, this study is most timely.

IRENE TOABE

Chicago

Men at Their Worst. By LEO L. STANLEY, M.D., with the collaboration of EVELYN WELLS. New York: D. Appleton-Century Co., Inc., 1940. Pp. 322. \$3.00.

Since 1913 Dr. Stanley has been chief surgeon at California's San Quentin prison. Over forty thousand inmates have come under his "personal care." He

has performed thousands of operations, including testicular implantations and plastic surgery. He has officiated at one hundred and fifty executions. He has known many of the nation's most publicized offenders.

For the most part, this volume deals with descriptions and accompanying ruminations of bizarre and sinister crimes, executions, and escapes. There are brief comments concerning constitutional factors as related to crime, medical practice in a penitentiary, research into sleep behavior, penal administration, and public relations. Autobiographical references allow some insight into the author's admittedly unpopular social position in the prison community.

This book can have only limited value for the serious student. The criminology it offers is naïve. Its journalistic style will appeal to lay readers, and the implications resulting will not aid in molding a public opinion, favorable for the "new penology."

DONALD CLEMMER

Institute for Juvenile Research
Chicago, Illinois

Das Existenzminimum in Deutschland: Untersuchung über die Untergrenze der Lebenshaltung. By J. ROSEN. Zürich, Switzerland: Verlag Oprecht, 1939. Pp. 90. Fr. 4.50.

This detailed budget study of ninety families—all or partly unemployed and on relief in Berlin for 1933—adds to the steadily accumulating statistical picture of the living of the lower fringes of "respectable," though probably undernourished, families in modern urban society. Records were kept for one week for eighty-seven, and for a number of weeks for three more. The spending of the average weekly family income of twenty reichsmarks is discussed in minute detail. A comparison is made with the Reich family budget study of 1927-28. The changes in cost of living and in employment in Germany are reported for 1928-33. Finally, certain theoretical family budget principles are elaborated with relation to "a minimum of existence" standard. The low standard of living is related to the theories of the proletariat in Oswald Spengler's works. By implication, the relation of this picture to the development of National Socialism is outlined.

CARLE C. ZIMMERMAN

Harvard University

Alabama Rural Communities: A Study of Chilton County. By IRWIN T. SANDERS and DOUGLAS ENSMINGER. Montevallo, Ala.: Alabama College Bulletin, Vol. XXXIII, No. 1A (July, 1940). Total No. 136. Pp. 80.

Written by two former students of Sanderson, this study evolves the neighborhood-cluster concept as a working definition of the community—an approach

readily learned by lay leaders in rural life and admirably suitable for less urbanized sections of America. Sociologists will find this bulletin a real contribution to community analysis and to "streamlined" methods of publication.

University of Kentucky

MERTON OYLER

Public Relief, 1929-1939. By JOSEPHINE C. BROWN. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1940. Pp. xvii+524. \$3.50.

Perhaps we are still too near the epoch-making public welfare legislation of the past decade to evaluate it definitively. But there is great value in having a succinct description of those developments and a record of what we thought of them as they occurred. Miss Brown is a social worker, and, in the main, her reactions reflect the attitudes and judgments of a majority of the social workers throughout the country. Moreover, her narrative is abundantly documented with references, not only to official governmental publications, but also to the contemporary literature in the field of social work. Her book is, therefore, an authentic historical record of the struggles of the social workers of this generation to obtain for their clients an adequate consideration of urgent needs and for their communities a rational procedure for meeting those needs.

The book has values, however, that transcend the interests of any one field. Public welfare has become, and seems likely to remain, a major function of government. Hence it is now a field with which many classes of students must be familiar, including economists, tax experts, political scientists, sociologists, and others. Even the lay citizen realizes that something is going on in this area that he needs to understand. Miss Brown's book has much to contribute to all these groups. She has sifted a great mass of data with meticulous care. The narrative based on these data is clearly and interestingly presented. The interpretations are convincing because they so patently rest upon a foundation of broad knowledge and of tested professional insight. The book is a genuine contribution of the first order of importance.

WAYNE McMILLEN

University of Chicago

Comerio: A Study of a Puerto Rican Town. By CHARLES C. ROGLER. Lawrence: University of Kansas, 1940. Pp. vi+198.

Comerio is a community of twenty-five hundred in the interior of Puerto Rico, studied for about six months by the author and his staff. He describes a two-class system consisting of a predominately white "first class," and a "second class" constituting four-fifths of the population—white, negro, and mulatto. The fact that he found "differences of opinion among local observers" as to the validity of a "third class" (p. 29) suggests that perhaps the lower class is more

complex in its structure than the author indicates. The class system is used as a framework around which the rest of the material (economics, family, government, etc.) is oriented, although the essential unity of the community, coexisting with sharp class differentiations, is stressed.

ARCH COOPER

University of Chicago

Lowell: A Study of Industrial Development. By MARGARET TERRILL PARKER. New York: Macmillan Co., 1940. Pp. xii+238. \$2.25.

Dr. Parker's little book deals with the geography, history, and industrial experience of Lowell, Massachusetts, a city which has been in itself an epitome of the rise and fall of the New England textile industry. She traces this rise and fall in painstaking detail but gives most of her attention to the topographical and geographical position of Lowell in the Merrimac Valley and New England and the successive changes in the location of firms and mills within the city. The book is a Ph.D. thesis in geography, and while it offers a careful case study in industrial location, it has very little of interest for the sociologist other than as a compilation of facts about a single community. In that role it will be useful as background material of the sort that would ordinarily fill the first chapter or two of a sociological study. As such it is of interest in massing in available form many of the factual changes through which Lowell has passed in its latter-day industrial decline and its pressing search for new industries for its ever growing relief population and idle mill space. Dr. Parker is not happy when she approaches facts of sociological or economic character, tending to be perfunctory with them; and she seems never to have heard of human beings. But the fault is not hers. Rather it is a sign of the too great fragmentation of the social sciences. Yet if any sociologist wants a geographical and historical handbook on Lowell, Massachusetts, with which to begin either a community study or an investigation into the social process or effects of industrial decline, let him arm himself with a copy of Dr. Parker's book.

CONARD M. ARENSBERG

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Die Einleitung der Ehe: Eine vergleichende ethnologische Untersuchung über die Vorstufe der Ehe in den Sitten des schwedischen Volkstums. By K. ROBERT V. WIKMAN. Abo: Abo Akademi, 1937. Pp. 395. Fmk. 150.

Rites and customs connected with premarital courtship and sexual relationships spread widely over the Scandinavian peninsula are investigated by a disciple of Westernmarck who collected his material in Sweden. Their socio-geographical distribution indicates a close connection with a special type of agricultural economy, the so-called *Sennwirtschaft* (in Swedish, *Fåbodsekomomi*). At summertime the cattle are driven to mountain pastures remote from the

village. A great part of the female population and especially the adolescent and adult unmarried women leave the village in the valley. Thus contact between the sexes is likely to become a matter of common experience for the whole group and to be imbedded in definite customs.

Wikman was stimulated in his research primarily by an endeavor to explode the myth of premarital sexual "promiscuity" in parts of the European peasant culture. Actually sexual freedom is restricted. Customary visits to the girls' bedrooms are found to be supervised by the age group of adolescent boys in the village. Consummation of sexual intercourse is customary at the final stage of courtship. This should not be looked upon, however, as sexual freedom before marriage. Rather it is a behavior sequence which is regarded as a primary stage of marriage itself.

SVEND RIEMER

University of Washington

Preface to Eugenics. By FREDERICK OSBORN. New York: Harper & Bros., 1940. Pp. 312 (including Index). \$2.75.

A timely, well-documented, readable, and challenging volume, primarily for laymen, but so broad in scope and application that it may be studied with profit by specialists in every related field. The author's basic social philosophy is hinted at in the Preface in the following sentences: "The conditions of the present time constitute a preface to eugenics. . . . If eugenics is neither as exciting nor as radical as the public believes, it is none the less fundamental to the achievement of man's ultimate hopes for a better world." In his basic philosophy the author still endeavors to hew very closely to facts and probabilities of the past and the present. He rides no "hobby horse" to the distraction of reason and common sense, and he does not minimize the social and economic difficulties in the way of a rapid forward advance of eugenics along a straight path.

A. J. CARLSON

University of Chicago

Introduction to Community Recreation. By GEORGE D. BUTLER. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1940. Pp. 547. \$3.50.

This publication of the National Recreation Association is apparently designed for use as a textbook for college courses in recreation. Its emphasis is upon the value of public recreation facilities, the standards that have been set up, and the methods and activities that have proved to be most successful. Little attention has been given to quantitative data that would throw light on recreational trends, and there is no discussion of commercial recreation or of the unorganized leisure-time activities that play such a large role in community life. By community recreation the author means the public recreation program carried on largely under the auspices of local governments.

The limited scope of the book makes it unsuitable for recreational courses that include the whole field of leisure-time pursuits. In the special field it covers, it stands out as an authoritative book that should be helpful to students in training for recreational leadership as well as to lay workers in this field. The major portion of the volume deals with the planning of recreational programs, the operation of playgrounds and recreation buildings, descriptions of the various types of recreation services, and problems of organization and administration. It is a manual for practical workers and will not be of much use to students interested in a critical survey of the recreation movement.

J. F. STEINER

University of Washington

Avocational Interest Patterns. By DONALD E. SUPER. Stanford University: Stanford University Press, 1940. Pp. xiv+148. \$2.25.

The students of vocational interests have built up a literature on the ways in which these interests originate, the extent to which they are integrated with the personality, and such questions. Super opens up the same type of study for hobbies. His work is on a small scale and is only a start, but it does succeed in bringing out some of these patterns, which are not the same for different types of avocations. He concludes with an "individualized theory," which is that "avocations are chosen according to the present needs of an individual in a given situation, and on the basis of the possible ways in which that individual can meet those needs in that situation." If that appears too obvious and commonplace, the reader can satisfy himself that it is a real advance by looking at the early theories of vocational interests and abilities.

The study contains a useful review of the scanty literature on avocations and a bibliography of nearly two hundred items.

ROBERT E. L. FARIS

Bryn Mawr College

Critiques of Research in the Social Sciences, Vol. II: *An Appraisal of Frederick C. Mills' "The Behavior of Prices."* By RAYMOND T. BYE. Social Science Research Council Bull. 45. New York, 1940. Pp. xv+335. \$1.00.

The second methodological study of the Social Science Research Council, in the field of economics, includes a critique by R. T. Bye, a rejoinder by F. C. Mills, two reprinted reviews by J. Viner and B. D. Mudgett, the proceedings of the conference, and two comments by W. C. Mitchell and Read Bain.

The author and reviewer are not in agreement as to the thesis of the book in question. Mr. Bye states that Mills intended to reach a new (institutional) theory through an inductive analysis of the pricing system, and that at the same time he measured the deviations from the equilibrium price (p. 54). These two interpretations are hardly in accord with each other. The author, however, dis-

claims any honor of being an institutionalist or that he had any intention of formulating a new economic theory. Moreover, he points out that the methods employed were selected not at random but purposely, and that the instability of the pricing system cannot be analyzed adequately by using the equilibrium theory as a guide.

The conference discussed in a very interesting fashion the interrelation between the deductive and inductive methods and some aspects of price studies. Although the conference did not come to a definite conclusion, the discussion suggests that the two methods were regarded as mutually interdependent. The traditional position of holding one method superior to the other was not taken.

Future studies should attempt to analyze the nature of this interrelationship with reference to a particular problem.

ARTHUR SCHWEITZER

University of Wyoming

A Hundred Years of Economic Development in Great Britain. By G. P. JONES and A. G. POOL. New York: Macmillan Co., 1940. Pp. 420. \$4.50.

For those who rely upon Clapham in the teaching of British economic history but have found his three volumes too lengthy for the use of students, this textbook will prove useful. It is scholarly in its method of presentation and fully documented. Like the work of Clapham, however, it suffers from a failure to relate the subject matter to a general theory of interpretation. What the authors have done is to write the history of economic institutions rather than to follow through the main lines of economic development. The one-hundred-year survey is divided into three periods, and, within these, attention is directed to the developments which took place in transportation, agriculture, manufacturing, credit and banking, and the state and labor. This topical method of treatment has certain obvious advantages in the marshaling of the material, but it means that the presentation of the facts proceeds on a purely descriptive level. It is impossible to discern and explain developments closely related within a time sequence. The results are most evident in the final section of the volume; here the student is presented not with an interpretation of the economic development of Great Britain since the war of 1914-18 but with what is little more than a description of modern economic institutions and of the kinds of changes which have come about within these institutions.

S. D. CLARK

University of Toronto

ABSTRACTS OF PERIODICAL LITERATURE¹

The persons who have aided in the preparation of the material for this issue are: Hubert Bonner, James Fontana, Donald L. Foley, and Eric Rosenthal. The numerals and letters appearing after each abstract correspond to the items in the following scheme of classification:

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|---------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| I. THEORETICAL SOCIOLOGY | e) The State and Political Process |
| a) Sociological Theory | f) The School and Education |
| b) History of Sociology | g) Economic Institutions |
| c) Methods of Research | h) Voluntary Associations |
| d) The Teaching of Sociology | IV. POPULATION AND HUMAN ECOLOGY |
| II. SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY | a) Demography |
| a) Human Nature and Personality | b) Ecology |
| b) Collective Behavior | c) The Rural and the Urban Community |
| III. SOCIAL ORGANIZATION | V. DISORGANIZATION |
| a) The Family | a) Personal Disorganization |
| b) Ethnic and Racial Groups | b) Social Disorganization |
| c) Social Stratification | |
| d) The Church and Religion | |

401. *Les Occupations d'usines en France de mai et juin 1936* [The State of Industrial Occupations in France in May and June, 1936].—The French trade-union movement has been traditionally weak. Collective bargaining has never been widely used. In 1933 only 7.5 per cent of the nation's workers were represented in collective-bargaining procedures, while even this figure was raised by the relatively strong organization of the mining, bookbinding, and maritime transportation unions; most industries had practically no effective collective bargaining. The reconciliation of France's two great labor parties in 1934 was followed by the victory of the "Popular Front" in the spring of 1936. These events reinforced the social consciousness of the working class, boosted trade-union membership, and inaugurated a series of stay-in strikes, in which factories were occupied as a novel strike technique. The strikes started in early May, grew to such proportions that during June about 1,800,000 strikers occupied about 75 per cent of the 12,000 factories, receded to about 180,000 strikers during July, to about 60,000 in early August, and a general termination of strike activity by the middle of August. The strikes represented a spontaneous mass movement neither foreseen nor initiated by the trade-unions. In the early weeks, especially, the unions were so weak that they nearly lost control of the whole outbreak. During most of the movement the unions did not even direct; their role was to counsel the strikers and to co-ordinate action. The early attempts to affect conciliation failed, and it was not until the government initiated compulsory conferences that agreements were reached. The workers' demands of a material nature, such as raise in wages, were less prominent than their aspiration for

¹ Since the editors are trying to bring up to date the abstracting of significant articles since the termination of the *Social Science Abstracts*, occasionally there will be abstracts of articles published several years ago.

mitigation of the social inferiority that had been traditionally forced on them by the very strongly organized employers. It was these latter demands that were finally satisfied. The Matignon agreement, reached in June for the metal workers particularly, may be considered typical, recognizing the collective contract, the validity of syndicalist laws (that had been in the Work Code, allowing freedom of union activity, but had not been recognized by employers), and the authority of delegated workers to bargain collectively, but not arriving at any direct settlement of wage problems.—Salomon Schwarz, *International Review for Social History*, II (1937), 50-104. (IIb, IIIg.) D. L. F.

402. *Introduction à l'étude historique du mouvement syndical chrétien* [Introduction to the Historical Study of the Christian Syndicalist Movement].—The aim of this article is to outline and stimulate possible research on the Christian syndicalist movement by presenting the structure of the problem. The movement in Europe, from its beginnings in the late nineteenth century, has been led by labor leaders and by members of the clergy, the latter acting as individuals and not as a part of any organized church support. Ideologically, the movement represents the organized flight of a minority labor group against the atheism of the socialist movement. It has been strong in those sections where provincial and religious traditions have been strongest and has attracted mainly clerical workers in contrast to manual laborers. It has upheld nationalism and the application of Christian ethics to labor problems in contrast to the internationalism and the materialism of socialism. The Christian syndicalists, while recognizing class conflict, have felt that this was but a difference of opinion within what is essentially a world-community. Thus they have advocated peaceful discussion in place of violent action; they have criticized the violence of the socialists but have in certain instances collaborated in strikes as a method of last resort. Employers, however, have not recognized any distinction between the Christian and the socialist syndicalists and have treated both groups as one. The autonomous spirit of the Christian syndicalists has prevented forthright alliance with political parties, but the members have aided workers' and Catholic parties, while opposing socialism and fascism. In spite of the fact that both the Christian syndicalists and the fascists have been anti-Marxist, once fascists have come into power, the Christian syndicalists have fared as badly at their hands as have the socialists.—Paul Vignaux, *International Review for Social History*, II (1937), 28-49. (IIIg.) D. L. F.

403. *Sozialaufstieg und Begabtauslese* [Social Ascendancy and the Selection of Gifted Children].—A study of a sample of the students of the University of Munich shows that one-third of the students is recruited from the professional upper class or from groups of equal status. One half of the students comes from the middle class, while the other half originates in the lower class. An investigation into the social position of the grandparents indicates that vertical mobility is a slow process and that it takes at least three generations to arrive. There is evidence that the student's mother comes from a class lower than that of his father. An investigation into a possible correlation between social class and level of achievement in school indicates that the upper and middle classes make better grades but that, on the other hand, a smaller percentage of those students that are recruited from the middle and lower classes and who make good grades transfer to classical collegiate institutions. These findings indicate that equality of opportunity for equally capable students has not yet been achieved.—Hans Wipplinger, *Allgemeines statistisches Archiv*, XXVIII (1938), 6-22. (IIIc.) E. R.

404. *Experiments on Physically and Mentally Defective Children with Perceptual Tests*.—Physically defective children, on the average, differ little from normal children in spite of the fact that teachers rated many of them as backward or dull. The mean scores on perceptual tests of the physically defective children were slightly below the normal on the group test. Though the scores were slightly above the normal on the board form of the test, it is doubtful whether any of these differences are significant. The mentally defective children had mean scores which were consistently and significantly lower than the normal, though their mean scores showed a regular increase with age on the perceptual tests as is usual on the Stanford-Binet tests. Perceptual tests

of education can be used to differentiate between children who are backward because of loss of schooling and those who are backward because of mental impairment.—J. C. Raven and A. White, *British Journal of Medical Psychology*, XVIII (1939), 40-43. (IIa.) J. F.

405. *Studies in the Application of Mental Tests to Psychotic Patients.*—The results of mental tests throw some light on the processes of thought in schizophrenic patients. They succeeded in vocabulary tests by giving sufficient associations with words to show familiarity with them. Relative failure on other Stanford-Binet scale tests showed that they were not able to use words adequately in the solution of new problems. Schizophrenics separate words from the objects and ideas which they commonly represent and ascribe to them a private and personal significance. Words become objects in themselves which are manipulated, combined, and systematized. In a nonverbal test this desire to systematize is shown by effort to find an alternative which combines all the elements in the matrix. If the results are carefully analyzed, they reveal differences between clinical groups of patients, and they might serve to distinguish between mental defect and abnormal mental functioning.—Marsh Davidson, *British Journal of Medical Psychology*, XVIII (1939), 44-52. (IIa.) J. F.

406. *La Notion d'équilibre en sociologie* [The Idea of "Equilibrium" in Sociology].—This is a résumé of the author's theory of equilibrium as given in his *Le Problème logique de la société*. Human society has two essential functions: (1) defense, as found in the *group externe* aspect of society, and (2) sociability, as found in the *group interne* aspect. Earliest society was primarily a means of defense in the battle for life. The sociability function followed in a slow, complex development. The defense function involves (a) a common interest against enemies and (b) social constraint as the means by which any would-be deviate is made to adhere to the group's common interest. The sociability function involves (a) negative organization (penal law, marriage customs, civil law, political organization) and (b) positive organization (differentiated social groups and functions, particularly the division of labor). The solidarity from the defense function is thus bolstered by the social organization. This social organization is stable or in equilibrium if it is based on common interests, if the social constraint is effective, if the sentiment of social solidarity is maintained, and if the "natural conservatism" of social life remains dominant. The defense or external function of society is primary; the battle for life is the cement of society (or of the family, the political party, the economic corporation, etc.). Equilibrium is a structure of common material and moral interests.—W. Malgaud, *Revue internationale de sociologie*, XLVI (1938), 21-33. (Ia.) D. L. F.

407. *Le Mouvement de la population en 1935* [Population Trends in 1935].—The French marriage rate rose gradually from 140 (per 10,000 population) in 1890 to 150 in 1913 and to 156 in 1931; from that year it began to decline sharply, dropping to 136 by 1935. In 1913 the French rate was the tenth highest in Europe; by 1934, of a total of twenty-one countries, it had dropped to sixteenth place. This recent decline in the marriage rate seems to have been due at least in part to (1) the decreasing number of young women and young men (due in the latter case to low wartime birth rate) and (2) the depression. The French birth rate dropped from 257 in 1868 to 190 in 1913, to 175 in 1931, and to 152 in 1935. In 1913 it was the lowest of the twenty-one countries in Europe, but by 1934 six other countries had rates lower than France's. During the last twenty years the death rate has not diminished as markedly in France as in other countries. The rate of 175 in 1913 was surpassed by seven other countries; the rate of 151 in 1934 by only four; and the rate in 1935 showed an increase back to 157 (although there were not enough reports available from other countries to afford a comparison here). France's infant mortality figures, however, have been comparatively favorable. In 1929 there was an (absolute) excess of deaths over births of about 8,600; in 1935 this excess had risen to about 19,500, while the total number of births and deaths had dropped, thus making the relative increase even more pronounced.—Jean Bourdon, *Revue d'économie politique*, L (1936), 587-604. (IVa.) D. L. F.

408. *Die Säuglingssterblichkeit der Mehrlingsgeborenen* [The Infant Mortality of Twins].—Already in 1882 Harald Westergaard remarked that the chance of stillbirth is much greater in the case of twins than in the case of single births and that the mortality rate among twins is likely to be higher than that among single infants. An investigation carried on by the Central Statistical Institute of Italy confirms these hypotheses. Data analyzed for a three-year period from 1934 to 1936 indicate that the number of stillbirths among twins is three times as high as among single births and that the mortality of the former is nine times as high in the first six days and six times as high during the age from seven to twenty-nine days than that of a single infant.—Franco Savorgnan, *Allgemeines statistisches Archiv*, XXVII (1937), 439-42. (IVa.) E. R.

409. *Le Marché du travail et le mouvement syndical en 1935* [The Labor Market and the Trade-Union Movement during 1935].—At the end of June, 1936, there were at least 420,000 unemployed in France, of whom about 325,000 were men and about 95,000 were women. Half of these unemployed were in the Seine Department, mainly in metal and building trades, in clerical work, and in food and transportation concerns: The trend in employment was consistently downward from 1930 until 1935, when it lessened; the trend started up again during the first half of 1936. The strike movement was not very serious during 1935, there being only about thirty to forty strikes a month. The wage scale, however, was very low, and discontent was growing, leading to the serious disorders of June, 1936. The most important event for the French labor movement during 1935 was the fusion of the two rival labor organizations—the C.G.T. and the C.G.T.U. Some confusion still existed due to different ideas as to organization, but basically labor acquired a solid front during 1935. By the end of the congress held in March, 1936, the C.G.T. (the stronger of the two) had about one million members; by the end of the strikes in June it had about four million. Never before in the history of France had the trade-unions developed such strength.—Roger Picard, *Revue d'économie politique*, L (1936), 1144-56. (IIIg.) D. L. F.

410. *A Reply to Recent Criticisms of Intelligence Testing*.—Out of sixty assertions and critical observations made by J. C. Hill, in a recent paper ("A Criticism of Mental Testing," *British Journal of Medical Psychology*, Vol. XVII [1938]) which criticizes intelligence testing destructively, four or five deserve close attention. This is a reply to his paper. Dulness is a characteristic of inherent brain dynamics rather than attributable to environment. The more we learn about the processes entering into intelligence, the less optimistic we become about effects of environment on innate constitution. Evidence from the Spearman theory of *g* points to caution at least in appraising the influence of nurture upon intelligence. New testing procedures are called for, directed more toward dynamic processes and less toward experience factors. Less place for environment will be seen when these new developments occur. It is a far cry from factors that retard intelligence to remedial measures for effective disorders that may be the golden key which will unlock minds of defective children and make them new and normal. This kind of hope reflected by Mr. Hill in his recent paper gives psychologists a right to ask questions. Facts, rather than aspirations, are needed. The apathy of the defective, the aggression of the unstable, and similar qualities among the dull have their origin elsewhere than in the cupboards of a baby's unconscious mind.—W. Stephenson, *British Journal of Medical Psychology*, XVIII (1939), 53-63. (IIa.) J. F.

411. *A Sociological Theory of Schizophrenia*.—The schizophrenic is aware of reality and is interested in everything going on in his little fictitious backyard. His reaction is a delayed type which defeats its own aims, since it never comes to fruition. His delusional system is incoherent because it is built on extrapolation. There is no longer a similarity between the structure of the nervous system and the structure of the schizophrenic's picture of the world. He still extrapolates from reality but no longer troubles to check the results of his extrapolations against reality. Because of this and because of the fact that he becomes almost a part of the physical environment so that the object-observer partition has no longer any importance, unreality feelings occur. The schizophrenic misunderstands the external world. This theory is one of several possible ones

and is selected because it offers certain conveniences of manipulation and contains no concepts which may not be given an operational meaning.—George Devereux, *Psychoanalytic Review*, XXVI (1939), 315-42. (IIb, Vb.) J. F.

412. "The Master Builder": A Case of Involutional Psychosis.—With *The Master Builder* Ibsen began a new period in his playwrighting—the final period in his creative life and one of preoccupation with the problems faced by a man who is aging. Halvard Solness, the "master-builder," lived through such a period. The physical processes of involution were making themselves felt, and he reacted emotionally with an intensity so disproportionate to actual circumstances that contact with reality was lost. A personality study based on Halvard's fantasies and actions in light of his lifelong development reveals many interesting factors. He could not bear the competition of his own children for his wife's affection or the competition of the younger generation in his profession. As involution progressed, he became so insecure that he found it necessary to develop a psychosis to assuage his pain. At first he fought the younger generation. When he saw that he could not win in this struggle, he allied himself with former enemies, lost all contact with reality, and became the younger generation for a brief moment. The discrepancy between his objective potentialities and his fantasy life finally led to his death.—Viva Schatia, *Psychoanalytic Review*, XXVII (1940), 311-18. (IIb, Vb.) J. F.

413. Le Mouvement de la population en 1934 [Population Trends in 1934].—From 1933 to 1934 the French marriage rate per 10,000 population fell from 151 to 142, the (live) birth rate from 163 to 161, and the death rate from 158 to 151; the excess of deaths over births, consequently, rose from 5 to 10. The proportion of deaths under one year of age dropped from 75 to 69 per 1,000 live births. The French death rate is considerably higher than that of most of the other European countries. Many demographers and physicians state that France's chief aim should be to reduce this unduly high death rate. At the same time, however, they oppose any propaganda techniques (as used in Germany) for raising the birth rate.—Jean Bourdon, *Revue d'économie politique*, XLIX (1935), 553-62. (IVa.) D. L. F.

414. Über Förderung erbgesunden Nachwuchses [On the Promotion of Healthy Progeny].—A great increase of hereditary diseases may be predicted since private and public welfare organizations care more for defective families than for healthy ones. While healthy families practice birth control, the defective ones, especially the feeble-minded, procreate at a high rate. Although the findings concerning the hereditary character of diseases cannot as yet be stated in terms of scientific laws, they can be stated as probabilities. Since the selection of mates is made on an instinctive basis and since an appeal to the rational faculties is not successful, particularly with those persons that have a defect, one must appeal to their personal interest in a healthy progeny as well as to their communal feelings to protect their children from becoming a public burden.—M. Tramer, *Gesundheit und Wohlfahrt* (1940), 33-38. (IVa.) E. R.

415. Die Partnerschaft als grundlegendes Problem der Charakterologie [Partnership as a Basic Problem of Characterology].—Formerly social psychology dealt with feelings like envy, sympathy, love, hatred, etc., by tracing the origin of these sentiments, by observing the shift from one sentiment to another, and by defining their degree of complexity. This treatment of sentiments is not sufficient since it neglects their intentional character. All sentiments are directed toward someone in a concrete situation. Consequently, they vary with varying situations. The introduction of this situational aspect is called the "factor of partnership." Every consideration of the "social sentiments" that may be found in one person should be guided by the fact that there are always two persons involved.—Franciska Baumgarten, *Acta psychologica*, V (1940), 53-62. (IIa.) E. R.

416. Das Arbeitsbuch in der Statistik [The Labor Passport and Statistics].—When the six and eight-tenths millions of unemployed in Germany were being put to work

in 1933, industry preferred the younger age groups. Young unemployed persons, therefore, moved to the large cities, thus preventing a proportionate decline of unemployment in the large cities. This problem was solved by legal regulation of the hiring and movement of workers. In order to get better information about labor, the labor passport was introduced. This certificate contains information about its holder with reference to his apprenticeship, attendance at industrial schools, previous and present work record, size of family, etc. All laborers and white-collar employees earning less than a thousand marks a month must own such a passport if they wish to find employment. This information is duplicated in a file at the labor office which can be used for all kinds of statistical tabulations, especially to define the rate of change of jobs held by the workers.—Richard von Valta, *Allgemeines statistisches Archiv*, XXVII (1937), 263-73. (1c.) E. R.

417. Die italienische Bevölkerungsbewegung und die faschistische Bevölkerungspolitik [The Trend of the Italian Population and the Fascist Population Policy].—After Il Duce's rise to power, an attempt was made to check the decline of the Italian population. During the period of 1901 to 1921 Italy lost through emigration two million people and from 1921 to 1931 one million more. Since emigrants are usually in age groups that are characterized by high fertility, the loss for Italy has been considerable. The emigration of the able-bodied young men had two disadvantages: loss of soldiers and decrease of productive power. While between 1922 and 1924 the emigration amounted to 340,000 annually, in 1936-37 it had declined to only 50,000. The re-migration to Italy amounted to 35,000 in 1936-37. Since 1922 the birth rate has declined continuously, despite fewer stillbirths and abortions. The decline of the birth rate in Italy, as elsewhere, has been due to contraception. In 1922 the fertility per thousand married women between the ages of fifteen and forty-five amounted to 237; it had declined to 192 in 1937. Although the mortality in general has declined, it did not balance the loss resulting from the decline of the birth rate. A study sponsored by Professor Gini in 1928 revealed (1) that 25 per cent of the families with seven and more children were in agriculture; (2) that 20 per cent belonged to industrial labor; (3) that more than 30 per cent of the children of this group were the result of premarital relations; and (4) that the infant mortality increases with the number of children. Another study in 1931, also sponsored by Gini, revealed that the average number of children born to women was 4.1, while only 2.8 survived. In recent years marriage loans for couples under twenty-six years of age have been made available. In order to avoid the damaging effects which too fast a sequence of births would have on mother and children, the amortization of subsidies is interrupted for a year after each birth.—Franco Savorgnan, *Allgemeines statistisches Archiv*, XXVIII (1938), 145-51. (IVa.) E. R.

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
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PSYCHIATRIC ASPECTS OF MORALE¹

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ABSTRACT

Psychiatry approaches its problems by way of relevant extremes of behavior. Psychiatric consideration of morale thus begins with the study of demoralized people. Beyond demoralization is the relatively momentary state of panic. Acute demoralization, sometimes ushered in by panic, grades through blank terror, fear and escape, psychoneurotic disablements, and "getting rattled" to rage and anger. Chronic demoralization grades from discouragement to despair. The circumstances in which demoralization occurs or is avoided are illuminating. They include both interpersonal and biological factors. Modern warfare includes, as an essential element, psychiatric strategy and tactics, offensive and defensive, for impairing enemy and protecting home morale. The principles of the former include destruction of faith in the meaning of life, disorganization of governmental control, disintegration of the communities making up the enemy power, and direct demoralization of its citizens. Some reasons for vulnerability at these points are adumbrated. From this analysis, a few principles of a positive or protective strategy can be deduced: dissemination of understanding of the social structure necessary in the nation at defensive war, the synthesis of solidarity, the control of disintegrative people, realistic distribution of roles, and the hygienic management of activity. Some favorable efforts are already visible: rational selection of personnel; development of the Morale Activities Branch; and the possibility that the Office of Civilian Defense will bring about more adequate understanding of the person in the national integration.

Psychiatry is sufficiently broad a term, with enough lunatic fringes of meaning, to justify a few didactic statments. Psychiatry, among the medical disciplines, corresponds to social psychology among the social sciences. It is concerned with interpersonal relations, the processes that occur in integrations of more than one person—in two-groups, three-groups, and larger aggregations; all but

¹ An address before the Society for Social Research, the University of Chicago, August 16, 1941.

one of the "members" of which integrations may be imaginary—i.e., personifications rather than real persons. Psychiatry, unlike social psychology, approaches the understanding of living, human life, by way of the study of aberrant processes. It studies the life-courses by which people come to manifest in interpersonal relations the patterns that are called mental disorders. This is its approach; but its field proves to be coterminous with that of social psychology—in fact, rather wider than the field of some social psychologists.

To become a psychiatrist one first completes formal medical training by a general internship. One goes then to the hospital for the mentally disordered and becomes familiar with the more striking patterns of aberrant behavior. One then seeks to understand the steps by which these have come about. It becomes evident that the peculiarities shown by mental patients are chiefly overaccentuated or unduly prolonged instances of relatively universal behavior. The explanation of the picture often stands out when one has secured an adequate history of the patient's life among people.

The psychiatrist comes finally to realize that man, *the animal*, is born with individual variations in an astounding potentiality for living. He knows that man, *the person before him*, is never adequately explained by biology alone. Man, the animal, expands into or grows to be a person by living through his plastic years in an environment of other people—from which environment he has obtained or comes to include a great deal of that universe to which we ordinarily refer as culture.

It is this continuing acculturation of the growing biological organism that produces the human being in contradistinction to a specimen of *homo sapiens*.

Biological and cultural development evolves the personality. As personality expands it becomes more and more completely inaccessible to the instrumentalities of the natural sciences. It progresses to a complexity that defies meaningful statistical approach. It ceases to be a suitable object for scientific method. It is best treated, as I have said elsewhere, as a hypothetical entity useful in explaining the data of a very important field of science—viz., interpersonal relations.

The rub in this matter is that each of us knows immediately or

intuitively that he exists; while few, indeed, of us have been permitted by experience to discover how almost completely one is unknown to one's self, except as he observes himself or hears reports of himself as he is observed in interpersonal relations. As the Western world, at least, has come to put great stock in responsibility, it is hard for us to learn to evaluate personal phenomena on the basis of observation rather than on that of traditional opinions and beliefs. This makes the adventure of self-observation as rare an experience as is preoccupation with "one's self" common. With this comment on psychiatry and the difficulty of the psychiatric viewpoint, let me proceed to the psychiatric approach in a study of morale.

As has been suggested, this will be by way of observing demoralized people. We expect this to yield some clues as to what is significant, and that these clues will lead gradually into the almost infinite complexity and variety of the phenomena that are manifested in comparatively healthy people.

The most utter demoralization—demoralization so complete that the term scarcely applies—is that of panic. Panic might be described as utter demoralization. Panic is an experience to which most of us seem to be strangers, many may have had a touch of it under one of, let me say, two typical panic-provoking situations. Perhaps the more frequent of these is the sort of thing that happens if a sidewalk which you have walked over two or three times a day, year after year, suddenly yields under your feet. Until the yielding sidewalk comes to a new position of rest, your mental state will be a close, if mild, approximation to that which we call panic. There will be a ghastly sensation from within, from all over within; there will be nothing remotely like reasoning or the elaboration of sentience; there will be a tendency to random activity, but practically no movement of the skeletal system because it is inhibited by diffusion of stimulus and contradictory motor impulses. As you recover, and the intense cramps which have developed in the viscera relax, you find yourself exhausted, tremulous, perhaps without control of your voice. All this is after panic has disappeared, has passed over into terror, from which you are recovering. Another situation that is experienced perhaps more commonly in the late years of primary school, which

brings up phenomena very close to panic, is that of being choked by someone. Interference with the free flow of air produces profound disturbance in the organism long before asphyxiature sets in. The mental state and the somatic concomitants are closely related to full-blown panic.

Real, fully developed panic is ordinarily confined to the unhappy experience of those who have to deal with severe mental disorders. It is the paralyzing prologue to almost unutterable terror which sweeps over some adolescents as they are passing into a schizophrenic state. Even with them it is short-lived, and they become catatonic shortly after the episode of panic.

Finally, there is a "panic" which is related in its beginnings to actual panic, but consists in blind attempts to save one's self from something terrible. This is closely related to the "panic" that occurs in certain special circumstances among troops.

From these few words about panic, let me pass to what I call acute demoralization; of which it is probably useful to recognize at least three levels of intensity. In the most intense, the person is overwhelmed with terror to the degree that he engages in random activity. There is no possibility of figuring out or discovering from him, in retrospect, why he did the strange things that he did.

The middle degree is terror with escape, in which the person becomes utterly preoccupied with getting away from the situation in which he has encountered terror.

Still milder in intensity is the much more prevalent situation among troops of terror with symbolic escape by an acute psychoneurotic episode—hysterical paralyses, blindness, attacks of tremor, and so on; and various nonhysterical psychoneurotic manifestations. Acute, high-grade demoralization is something well within the experience of all of us when young, and known to most of us, later on, in the milder degree of "getting rattled" in a situation of some importance.

When one is "rattled," one manifests a considerable degree of imperception, an arrest of constructive, adaptive thinking, and a high degree of suggestibility to almost anything that seems simple and a way out of the difficult situation. There is complete insensitivity

to elaborate, difficult suggestions; but the person is relatively impotent to ward off or to resist any simple idea that is given him.

Perhaps the mildest form of acute demoralization, in which a good deal of the personality remains effective, with its protective devices still available for function, is rage and "blind" anger.

It is useful, in coming to grips with the problem of morale, to have these instances of acute demoralization in mind as events, often of brief duration, which recur at remote intervals along the life-course of many of us. Besides these widely spaced events we see, often without knowing it, many instances of chronic, persistent demoralization. These are much less spectacular but usually very much more disastrous. The mildest grade of this is a sort of chronic discouragement, in which the person is preoccupied with pessimistic ruminations about the future, his inadequacies, and one thing and another—a state rather difficult to distinguish from a mild depression, excepting that in the depression there is severe restriction of the content of thought, and repetitious ideation, while in discouragement there is considerable shift of the ideational material. The thinking (in discouragement) is by no means circular, but all the ideas are tinted with gloomy anticipations. These states of discouragement grade up to the grave (and, fortunately, in this country thus far seldom seen) form of chronic demoralization—despair.

In despair, there is a severe restriction of the revery processes, there is little thinking, and what there is consists of ideas that have been entertained many a time before. The person is profoundly pessimistic in his intensely concentrated outlook and there occurs a disintegration of interpersonal relations which may become quite as complete as is the case in the severe psychoses. People in despair, in general, rapidly become numb and become completely detached from all the feelings and impulses that tie them to other people. They engage in automatic sorts of behavior; for example, when walking—they will keep walking almost indefinitely, once they get started. It does not matter very much where they are going, because they are vaguely certain that it will not be any better if they get there—and they will not get there. This is the mental state of the people who, utterly involuntarily, have been such great help to the success of the *Blitzkrieg*. Great streams of them have littered

military roads to the extent that supplies and reinforcements could not be gotten to the front.

The psychiatrist, from considering the people that he has seen in these various states of demoralization, from thinking over what they have shown, can derive some ideas bearing on the general problem of morale—its development, protection, and maintenance.

It seems that people become acutely demoralized under circumstances in which an implicitly trusted universe collapses; when an elaborate complex of interlocking and mutually supporting and dependent beliefs, convictions, faiths, and so on, suddenly proves to be built entirely of figments of self-deception. An event suddenly shows that the universal does not make sense and one finds one's self badly demoralized.

Acute demoralization also appears when any grave threat of insecurity or of cutting off all of one's satisfactions is perceived under circumstances which prohibit rational analysis and the synthesis of that wonderful thing which we call an understanding of what has happened—which understanding is often a reference to some plausible non-entity, one of these insubstantial universals. It gives one a great feeling of security to "understand." If a grave threat appears suddenly and one just cannot go through the internal motions that give one this feeling of understanding, one can become acutely demoralized.

From the chronic forms, easier to study because they are not so transient but instead horribly untransient, we learn that they happen in people who experience repeated failures of presumably adequate efforts. A person who is quite certain that he is doing the thing that ought to bring success, doing exactly the thing from which somebody else is getting results, without any profit; and who does it again and again to be sure, and it simply does not work—and this goes on and on and perhaps spreads into other things where he makes presumably adequate effort and nothing comes of it—becomes discouraged or even, if the goals pursued are sufficiently important, desperate.

Demoralization of the chronic type appears when people become convinced that they cannot improve a situation of insecurity or dissatisfaction or, much more commonly, when they observe that they

cannot prevent other people from making their situation worse. Thus, a person who finds himself in the clutches of hostile people who have already deprived him of the feeling of personal security and are cutting off his channels of satisfactions, when he finds that he cannot do anything to prevent their continuing to do this rapidly becomes demoralized.

When one has to depend for security and satisfactions on someone whom one knows to lack affection or respect, one is in a situation prone to eventuate in demoralization. This sort of situation is in a way intolerable, and one meets it first by self-deception. Revery processes appear to show that this indispensable person *is* developing some affection or some respect for one. This wishful idea is rebuffed. A new structure of self-deception is erected, but not quite so solidly. When rebuff destroys this—and the next, and the next—one comes finally to be thoroughly demoralized.

The interpersonal element is thus seen to be a large element in demoralization. It is one of the virtues of psychiatry that it makes contact with biological realities as well as with interpersonal ones, and we may now consider some biological aspects of demoralization which stand out as particularly important in determining the degree of stress under which acute demoralization will happen.

It is a commonplace of practice among schizophrenic patients that one can often defer the eruption of an acute psychosis by giving the person a powerful hypnotic that puts him to sleep for eight hours or so. He is better the next day than he has been, perhaps, for a week. Unhappily, the hypnotic does not alter the interpersonal factors that are productive of the psychosis, so that the best it can accomplish, perhaps, is to give one a last chance to tackle them. One usually fails and the psychosis follows; but the experience none the less demonstrates that some biological element which was impairing the man's morale to the point at which panic could supervene is temporarily remedied by a good night's sleep.

The most obvious biological aspect of the situations in which people experience terror suggests that one becomes vulnerable when exposed to circumstances that impede the activity of the sensory organs and their related apparatus, the distance receptors by which we are acquainted with events going on around us. It is notorious

that terror is far more commonly experienced in darkness than in daylight and in fog than in clear weather. The Hitlerite outfit, with its ingenuity about such things, discovered that "panic" is more easily achieved when people are subjected to almost deafening noise. ✓ The screaming bomb is an invention based on this principle. The type of noise which seems to be most effective in this connection is the progressive shift in pitch produced by a high-tone siren. The shriek of a high-frequency, a tenor, siren is apparently essentially demoralizing. Even though it is an extremely effective warning, exposure to this sound, in the most harmless civilian uses, quite often calls out evidences of stress. Some of the stress is due to the demoralizing effect of impedance or interruption of the auditory distance receptors; some of it has been demonstrated to be due to specific response to increasingly shrill sound.

These physical factors are in their way important but of rather restricted scope. There is a group of chemical or biochemical factors that are much more frequently relevant; of which an important one is acute or recent undernourishment. Very chronic, insidiously developed states of malnutrition are not directly conducive of demoralization. ✓ A person may be suffering from pellagra and maintain some morale of sorts. But if for a long time one has had an adequate diet, and then this diet rapidly becomes seriously inadequate and continues so, there are likely to appear certain disturbances of the vital biochemistry which seem to leave one peculiarly unable to "pull one's self together" after unpleasant events, and therefore a ready prey to demoralization. This may be the result of a toxic condition to which the body has not yet adjusted. We know that there are some special poisons, mostly elaborated by our microbe enemies, which render one peculiarly vulnerable; and the toxic condition which results from prolonged, excessively strenuous—in part because unaccustomed—physical exertion seems to be another thing to keep in mind in this connection.

Another of the probably more biophysical than biochemical factors is that of dehydration of the tissues of the body. A great many of the more material inner operations by which we live are best understood from a study of dilute aqueous solutions. If the concentration of many or all of our vital solutions is increased by a rapid

loss of water, the blood is certain to become relatively low in water content and much more viscid. The friction provoked in its flow through the small-caliber vessels is then enormously increased and the load on the heart—the source of all the energy used in circulating the blood—proportionately multiplied. The blood supply of the central nervous system may thus be placed at the mercy of any sudden demands for muscular or visceral activity, so that one faints. If one, instead, is nearly fainting from any exertion—if one's heart pains, if one becomes short of breath, or if one's contact with reality through the sensory channels blurs when one exerts one's self—one obviously is not very well able to look out for one's self then, and the feeling of personal security becomes tenuous and the liability to demoralization is greatly increased.²

Then there are the obscure biochemical effects which come from undercooling—a fairly complex condition, in that a person supplied with food of sufficient caloric value can scarcely be undercooled. But if he has only an ordinary amount of nourishment—that is, an amount sufficient for ordinary exertion—and has to remain for hours partly submerged in cold water or exposed to bitterly cold weather, his body temperature may drop a little below its ordinary operating level, which will greatly increase the liability to demoralization.

Similarly, perhaps from a toxic condition but possibly because of an essential disturbance of vital biochemistry, heat exhaustion and the effects of unaccustomed strenuous exercise when exposed to high temperature and humidity reduce a person to the point where he is easily demoralized. And, finally, there are the rather too numerous cases where a person has a relatively mild illness, a "touch of the flu," and is exposed to a little wetting or chilling, or something else which brings about a blend of fever, malaise, and weakness, and he finds he "doesn't tick" and so becomes demoralized.

The general factor underlying all these cases is a relatively abrupt or rapidly supervening reduction in the functional efficiency of the body.

² Without running greater risk of making this a technical medical presentation, let me remark that this factor of dehydration—and the chloride starvation which is sometimes its cause—is often the important element in the vulnerability that follows epidemics of intestinal upset from carelessness with food or water supply.

These biological aspects of the problem deserve a good deal of attention—first, because it is most important that commanders of troops and people who are concerned with public mental health should have them in mind; and, second, because they in their way add to the understanding of the interpersonal aspect, which I wish now to generalize in another way. The concomitants—the situations of which demoralization is a part—seem to include the following, with notable frequency.

A person learns from colleagues, companions, collaborators, the enemy, or someone, abruptly and without any long and kindly preliminaries helpful in bracing himself for it, that he has been overconfident, stupidly and vacantly overconfident, in some one of the fields of his knowledge of what is possible.³

Another great field of overconfidence, the sudden demonstration of which sometimes leads to demoralization, is shown in the unpleasant discovery that one is not able to effect reality in the way that one always supposed one could.

Then comes the special interpersonal case of these two, an overconfidence as to one's relations with a significant person or that significant person's relation to one's self—different aspects of the same thing—as when one has always supposed, for example, that someone respects one and then hears a remark which shows beyond doubt that all that was an illusion or an amiable fiction that had been carried on, perhaps for pity, perhaps for ulterior objects. An all too frequent example is when one assumes that one is loved and discovers quite suddenly that this is scarcely any longer a tenable hypothesis.

Finally, from the standpoint of the study of morale, perhaps the most significant pattern of overconfidence is undue faith in the culture-complex that has given one meaning and value and has fixed one's relations with other people. When one discovers that this is all

³ I remember in that connection being quite distinctly demoralized during the first World War. When rumors came through the press that the Germans were bombarding Paris, I calmly announced to an intelligent friend that, from my knowledge of physics, this was sheerly impossible. When I, sometime later, discovered that it not only was possible but was a fact, I felt quite shattered. It was not a matter of being lowered in anybody's esteem; it was sudden contact with the fact that I could be so damn foolishly unable to grasp the limits of possibility in a "simple" field in which I used to fancy myself strong.

a mistake, that one was just misinformed, that it is not the way things are, that one's comfortable belief has been just a long, intricate, and infinitely involved error of training; the experience is almost certain to be deeply demoralizing.

Besides these sudden demonstrations of chronic overconfidence, another concomitant of demoralization is the state of continuing distrust which follows the discovery of any of these deficiencies. It is in this category that we should put the final demoralizing processes in the case of having to depend for security or satisfaction on a person or group which is perceived to have no respect or affection for one. This is a situation very much more common in our ordinary civilian life than might at first glance appear. It is all too often the case in poorly handled troops and is, I think, quite an important explanatory factor in the spread of demoralization in some of the European situations of the recent past.

Let us now consider those people who avoid demoralization or maintain their morale in the face of the type of situation that we have been discussing. When we seek to understand how some people have come with glowing records through ordinarily demoralizing situations, we discover that some of them have a technique of quickly demonstrating their ability to improve their circumstances. When they tend to be demoralized, they do something that works and thus reassure themselves. A lesser example of this, rather common I believe in the business of growing up, is to show one's self that, even if one cannot prevent unpleasantness, one can at least interfere vigorously with other people's attempts to demoralize one. The demonstrated power to obstruct is reassuring. The power to affect reality is shown, if negatively, and this is a strong guaranty against falling apart in this particular way.

In general, we find that the maintenance of alert attention and constructive preoccupation in any discouraging situation is security against demoralization. When alert attention and constructive preoccupation do not get results in reasonable time and one begins to suffer those odd phenomena which we know as fatigue, then the device used to avoid demoralization, the liability to which is increased by the presence of fatigue, is to shift from the potentially demoralizing situation to preoccupation with something in which one has rela-

tive confidence. Sometimes the shift is permanent and that particular threat of demoralization is never again permitted to encompass one. Sometimes it is temporary until, for example, one has had a good night's sleep and feels quite adequate to tackle the thing.

With all this as a sort of preamble, let me go on to what I trust may be constructive consideration of the present world-situation.

" The circumstances of modern warfare require the collaboration of practically everyone. Ineffectual persons anywhere in the social organization are a menace to the whole. The avoidance of demoralization and the promotion and maintenance of morale are as important in the civilian home front and the industrial and commercial supporting organizations as they are in the zones of combat. For this reason, psychiatric strategy and tactics have become overwhelmingly important in war.

The principles of psychiatric strategy are developed along lines calculated to demoralize the enemy people while protecting one's own people from all demoralizing influences and positively supporting their morale.

Psychiatric strategy against the enemy seeks to destroy the people's faith in any essential meaning of life. The vulnerability of a people to despair is greatly enhanced by casting doubt on any of the "eternal verities" by reference to which they customarily reassure themselves when reason fails in the face of defeats and disasters.

In this connection, it is important to take account of trends such as those measured by Rev. Anton Boisen—the marked increase in the number of communicants of evangelical religious creeds without comparable loss of membership by the congregations of the more conservative creeds. The rising level of insecurity has driven these people through realization of their personal helplessness into activities calculated to provide merit in the other world.

The corresponding feature of destructive psychiatric strategy takes the form of frontal attacks and sapping operations on the belief in a benevolent God and a social order founded on divine justice.

It is here that the evil genius of the Hitlerite government is most conspicuous. They arrange spectacles to show that divine justice fails to manifest itself. They stage brutally profane demonstrations against the virtue and godliness of the ministers of organized reli-

gion. For the protective strategy in this field, they breathe new life into the ancient Germanic pantheon and give it a profoundly specious but domestically effective semblance of validity by reference to beauty, or even truth.

The second major phase of destructive psychiatric strategy strikes at the central integrating system of the enemy people, their governmental organization. The goal is disorganization of effective central control. The integrity and good sense of the chief of the government and the integrity and the good sense of his staff is attacked. The purposes of the government are questioned. Information on the acts and operations of the government necessary for the guidance and reassurance of its citizens is opened to doubts and denials of its truthfulness. The validity of all news is impugned. The Hitlerite outfit have become so good at this strategem that they now produce large quantities of unreliable news which they distribute through their almost unlimited, mostly unwitting, facilities. As soon as the specious news is widely circulated—under Washington date lines in this country, of course—they circulate contradictions. They send out the unreliable news and then prove that it is unreliable.

This is wonderfully effective in spreading demoralization, because once the mediate channels of communication are taken to be unreliable the people are actually isolated from their government and the way has been prepared for isolating them from immediate spoken communication. In this day and age, a great deal of information about the operations of any central government has to be brought to the attention of the governed through the mediate channels of communication, whether they are newspapers, the radio, the publication of government reports, or the posting of bulletins. In countries where bulletins are popular, the Germans saw that plenty of erroneous bulletins were posted—and then made a great to do about how erroneous they were.

Once the reliance on communications from the central government and its agencies is choked off, the psychiatric strategy can be directed at the individual communities—made to apply to the people who are known by sight or known personally to the citizen. Effort is made to widen all the cleavages that exist in the group. The Hitlerian religion of race has been eminently successful in that con-

nection. Methodically cultivated anti-Semitism has been wonderfully useful in making people uncomfortable with one another. I was told very solemnly by one of the Nazi officials that I was entirely misguided in my views in this connection. Actually almost everyone that he had ever met was full of anti-Semitism. The people who insisted that they were not anti-Semitic were, of course, so anti-Semitic they did not dare to be aware of it. I was reminded of traditional psychoanalytic arguments. The point is that it does not matter whether you are anti-Semitic or not as long as you get to fretting about it. Once the matter has become important to you it begins to make you uncomfortable when there are Jews around or when you may be with a person who might have had a Jewish great-grandfather. Increasing social discomfort in face-to-face contacts is very important. To the same end, also, they encourage all forms of trouble between employers and employees, children and their parents, teachers and their flock. Any old slightly sore spot by diligent hammering can be made to radiate disintegrating influence.

This is fundamentally significant, because the people with whom one rubs shoulders, day in and day out, are the living embodiments of the culture in which one is living. They are reassuring in so far as they prove that the social order is working successfully. When one begins to distrust them, security in the social system diminishes, and one's actual dependency on the volunteer fire department, the policemen, etc., ceases to be comforting. One is nearer alone and unprotected; nearer to the state of the person already mentioned who has to depend on people that he feels do not respect or like him.

We come, then, to what I have called a direct demoralization of the citizens themselves. The enemy is ordinarily well across the frontier, or at least across the battle line, and the citizens to be demoralized are on the other side, without direct, immediate contact. This form of demoralization is direct in that it seems to strike, one might say, "within the individual's psyche." No one else seems to be concerned in the demoralization. This sort of an interpersonal operation may have been evolved from considering the man upstairs who takes a long time to drop the other shoe. This strategem is calculated to communicate a feeling of recurrent suspense, each new wave of which the victim finds himself less able to tolerate. In brief, the

operations are as follows: For days the cables—cables originating not in Germany but in various other points of Europe—indicate that Germany is suffering a crushing defeat. Then comes stillness. This period of stillness is very important. Suddenly the news comes from Berlin and elsewhere that instead of a defeat Berlin has had a magnificent victory. Our friends and allies are the ones that were taking the beating. Then there is a long pause in which news dies down and irrelevances are bandied about. Then it begins all over again and runs a painfully similar course but with a somewhat different focus. And this goes on and on.

Another similar stratagem is used through diplomatic channels: Germany makes a very threatening gesture; or does something devilish like having someone assassinated. All the bloody details are available to any newspaperman who wants to cable them. Sabers are rattled and drums are beaten; it looks as if war were to start the next day. The situation gets tense; the State Department issues a statement of deep concern. Then it all tails off into an idea of impending world-reunion. This dies down. There is the pause. And suddenly another vicious, terrible thing is done; something unexpected, a grossly inhuman attack or something of that kind. The up and down, up and down, with the little pauses in between, seems simply to destroy the resilience of hope in the people who hang upon the events.

Results of these demoralizing techniques are feasible chiefly because people nowadays live without formulating the values which they vaguely feel are giving meaning to living; and rationalize their all too generally irrational impulses by appeals to plausible statements which had lost demonstrable meaning from half a century to four or five centuries ago.

They are feasible because, second, the personnel of the government, the social control machinery, are in general not schooled to any high responsibility, and includes many people singularly inept at dealing with other people—including newspaper men—so that their public presence does not inspire confidence.

Particularly in our American democracy, people seldom realize any measure of their interdependence with others. We continue to suffer the evils of the most rampantly individualistic cult that any

culture-complex has evolved. Finally, our notions of ourself—i.e., the self we are always telling people about, including ourself—are full of fossils perpetuated by our primary educational system from philosophies and “psychologies” of bygone days. Moreover, there are among every people some few who are simply incapable of full social life—the psychopath, absolutely; the detached, unsocial people, relatively; and the already demoralized people, at least temporarily. There are also some few—or many, depending on the community—who are actually hostile to the social order and to those who live adequately in it. Some of these may “deliberately” give aid and comfort to the enemy. These are the “fifth columnists” among us. Many more of them serve quite unwittingly as agents of the enemy. Finally, there are disaffected groups who are preoccupied with goals inconsistent with the common purpose; and some of these groups are so antagonistic that they are seditious or frankly mutinous.

What can be offered here along constructive lines will, I fear, be even more inadequate than the preceding hurried sketches. I can but enumerate some of the ideas which seem to me to offer a basis for building up a counter-strategy for protecting our people. If we can quickly perfect a counter-strategy, we will then, I suppose, have time and ingenuity to work out a little strategy of terror of our own.

The ideas which I am about to offer, I fear, will in some cases be quite unwelcome. They nonetheless represent the upshot of my attempt to figure out what we can do to protect our population from, shall I say, further demoralization—even, perhaps, actually ultimately build up high morale.

// First, it would seem necessary to disseminate a clear realization that the nation at war or under the threat of war cannot function after the same pattern or in the same general way that it did in peacetime. I do not believe that I need to urge arguments in support of this statement. Two perhaps not too widely realized facts seem to me to be particularly worthy of emphasis here. The army of a democracy cannot be democratic, however relatively democratic its personnel may be. There is no conceivable place for an equal voice in the government; and often no freedom of decision but rigid discipline and unquestioning execution of orders.

Second, the civilian population of a democracy on the verge of war cannot remain free to question the necessity for maximum universal effort for the national defense. It cannot expect factual data on which to reach a consensus as to the proper action of the government, its strategy and diplomacy; nor feel free to give aid and comfort to the enemy on the basis of profit for personal predilection. Painfully banal as these two thoughts may be, I fear they need very much wider acceptance.

The second element in a protective counter-strategy would seem to require that the tendencies which manifest themselves as self-reliance and self-protection, if not self-seeking, and the competitive efforts that are well-nigh universal among us be changed by skilful retraining into a realization of mutual dependence, a realization of mutual support and protection, and of co-operative, if not fully collaborative, effort. Such a demand may impress you as purely visionary. Remember, however, that it is a problem always encountered in the conversion of conscripted or drafted troops into soldiers.

In the history of the democratic countries it has become increasingly clear that this is the magic that has to be accomplished by the early months of military training. Now that warfare has come to involve everyone, the same characteristics which make the new conscript—or, as we now call him, the new selectee—anything but a soldier also make the civilian population anything but people capable of the effort called for in total defense. The dominating self-reliance, which may be one of our great virtues, the ability to look after one's self and the ability to compete successfully with the best of them, is not only no good, but an actual menace in modern warfare. This is because now, unlike Civil War times, the enlisted man controls more gunfire than did a company of infantry then, or a squad in the World War. Troops, therefore, can often be spread thin and each soldier used, one might say, as a tactical unit. In offensive, and particularly in defensive, operations, nowadays, some few soldiers spaced rather widely—by no means able to rub shoulders with one another or to exchange encouraging profanity, and otherwise to keep one another in line—are instructed to maintain a certain considerable part of the enemy lines under fire; while a few others on another side are instructed to maintain another group of the

enemy under fire. As yet another group of soldiers go through between these to make an attack on the enemy directly in front. The enemy is very busily firing at everyone, perhaps with light artillery. The boys on either flank are having bullets from their left or right hand whiz pass their nose. Self-reliance and self-defense naturally would cause them to turn and take potshots at the enemy who is firing at them. As a result of neglecting their special task, they and the whole mission might then be enveloped from the neglected flank and the whole maneuver washed out. We have to train troops free of the tendency to look out for themselves, firmly ingrain in them a tendency to depend on their fellows as their fellows have to depend on them, and inculcate a faith in the presumption that the general strategy and tactics of the situation have been worked out by people who intend to be as economical of man power as possible. It takes training to accomplish this, believe me. A parallel shift of personal attitudes on the part of the civilian population will be badly needed a year from now if the misfortune of war befalls us; or two or three years from now if, by some miracle, we avoid war but it continues elsewhere.

The third protective strategic element seems to require that persons who, by reason of personality distortion, mental defect, or mental disorder, cannot reasonably be converted into trustworthy citizens of the nation at war must be cared for in circumstances that reduce to a minimum the chances of disastrous effects from their limitations. This is rather a cold-blooded proposition. Actually, as Dr. White once said, "the mental hospital is the only place where a person is entitled to enjoy a mental disorder," and in the nation at war the psychopathic personalities, among others, certainly might well be out of harm's way in a civilized version of the concentration camp. The general situation would be notably more stable and trustworthy by virtue of their absence.

The fourth element is that the aptitudes and personal suitabilities of each citizen must be recognized and made to determine his field of usefulness in the total effort. It may seem an unpleasant prospect if, instead of continuing to enjoy ourselves doing things we do badly, we have to spend our energy on things we do well. War, however, just is not a comfortable pattern of living.

Fifth, those who possess the attributes of leadership, broadly defined, must be called upon to lead, must understand whither they are to lead, and must be trained to a fully responsible attitude toward their followers. Of all things, the leaders must be discouraged from "passing the buck." The success of the nation in arms depends largely on fitting each citizen efficiently into the total effort, or removing him safely and humanely from harm's way. The pyramid of leadership has to include many people of relatively limited scope, but should have none who cannot stand the recognition of their incompetence.

A sixth element is the fact that wise policy, ably administered, must concern itself with the physical, the mental, and the spiritual hygiene of everyone.

And, seventh and last, timely foresight to the ultimate remedy of evil effects of mobilization and defense efforts is essential if the certainty of a good future is to be preserved. Psychiatric counter-strategy cannot leave to blind faith and hope the ultimate realization of human betterment, nor evade even temporarily the unpleasant facets of our transition from an undisciplined aggregation to a rigidly disciplined people near to or at war. There is probably no people with a higher average intelligence or a more inquiring—if easily satisfied—curiosity than we. Already there is on every hand a wondering about the outcome for the democratic social systems of this war with the Axis Powers. I have just been saying that practically everybody has not only to be changed from the individualistic, self-reliant, to-heck-with-the-other-fellow attitude to an attitude of mutual support and protection, but must come actually to manifesting this in a society the structure of which must be distinctly paternalistic—authoritarian—in order to win in the fight on national socialism. Quite clearly, depending on how long they have been exposed to this new way of living, people will need more or less intensive assistance in the change from wartime to peacetime relationships with, we hope, restoration of the family as the unit out of which the social order is made. After the regimentation and the vast increase in management of man power which is almost inevitably to come upon us, we must have some pretty practical plans for carrying things back to good

peacetime living, and carry these plans through resolutely, when and if it ever becomes possible.

I have been asked to end my statement with some comment on what I know about things that are being done. I am inclined to protest that this document is already too long, and that I know very little about what is being done. I sometimes think that everything is being done; the contradictory as well as the concomitant and supporting. And I sometimes think that nothing is being done; except the diligent cancelation of every effort. But there are a few things which I must say and, if I seem to be somewhat unencouraging in my account, I am really only manifesting a very old attitude. I think I was born with regrets; anyway, I have been pessimistic ever since I can remember—with all due deference to the gods, good friends, and patient collaborators of good will, all of whom have been very kind.

So it came about last fall, when the committee of the White Psychiatric Foundation had produced a succinct statement, including a simple but valid and seemingly practical guide to the psychiatric inspection of selectees—in time for inclusion in the regulations for carrying out the Selective Training and Service Act—that I said to my colleagues that we had done a noble work, but that we had better get all the satisfaction from mutual admiration that we could because nothing would come of it. To amount to anything, someone in authority would have to be interested in it; and then, even if this minor miracle should transpire, to become meaningful it would require the collaboration of a very large group of psychiatrists. Further, that if I knew psychiatrists, they were the most individual of all this wonderfully individualistic nation. Then the wheels of time spun. To my amazement, the medical adviser to the Selective Service System was keenly interested, and this particular program was adopted. I mentioned in the ensuing conferences that there might be some considerable difficulties about getting the thing to work uniformly over the United States and that one must expect a good many headaches. The wise General Staff Corps medical officer presiding assured me that everything connected with mobilization was attended by headaches; that the significant questions were not: Would it be difficult? They were: Did we know what we were trying to do? And had we done it?

The next great surprise was this: Of over five hundred psychiatrists who are actively involved in this work of the Selective Service System, and the nearly four hundred of them who have participated in seminars to discuss the principles and the program, there has been hardly one voice raised in objection to the principles or the practices suggested.

The co-operation of the psychiatric branch of the medical profession has been spectacular and is (and I think I need fear no contradiction in so stating) the outstanding performance of any medical group in this mobilization—a fact not exactly discouraging.

Some aspects of this part of the vast psychiatric program that will perhaps presently unfold have been disquieting. In the age-band susceptible to conscription (twenty-one to thirty-five), we find in the 29 per cent who come up for medical examination a rate of mental or personality unsuitability for the military vocation that is variously reported at from 10 to 40 or 50 per cent. The White Foundation estimate, considering the age-band nineteen to twenty-six, had been about 15 per cent. I have some reliable data that suggest that 25 per cent would be nearer the actual facts.⁴

Even though many of these registrants are unsuited for the military vocation by reason of warp of personality or actual mild mental disorder which does not disqualify them for carrying on adequately in various civilian occupations useful in the national defense, this percentage is oppressively high. Moreover, and here is the reason for discussing this one of the national developments, there may presently be repercussions of this high rate of disqualification for the military service on the morale of the civil community. All of which, excepting only the magnitude of the problem, was duly anticipated.

When Director Dykstra opened the first of nine seminars for psychiatrists working on selective service or on army induction examining boards, he remarked:

In this seminar we shall be dealing with the mission of psychiatry in the Selective Service System, and I believe you will come readily to agree with us that this mission has two major aspects: (1) the exclusion of unsuitable candidates from among registrants sent on to the Army Induction Boards; and (2) the

⁴ The author at this point in his address reported on the work of the Central Examining Board for Psychiatry and Neurology in the District of Columbia, a matter fully covered in "Selective Service Psychiatry," *Psychiatry*, IV (August, 1941), 440-64.

protection of those rejected candidates, on the one hand, and general civilian morale and solidarity on the other, from damage in the process of psychiatric classification.

The first of these major phases of our problems entails three activities: (1) the mobilization of psychiatric competence; (2) the unifying of diagnostic viewpoints and practices; (3) the education of the local board examining physicians, so that they may make adequate use of the psychiatrists on their Medical Advisory Boards.

The protection of rejected candidates and civilian morale generally involves at least three lines of activity: (1) the establishing of an approximate consensus as to the principles that are involved; (2) the establishing of liaison and arranging collaboration with other agencies that can help us; and (3) and we face it squarely—outright public education.

The matter in point is the protection, on the one hand, of candidates found unsuitable in personality, in mental health, or in mental endowment for the vocation of bearing arms; and, on the other, civilian morale and solidarity. Let me say, parenthetically, that little has been done toward the realization of this part of the program; only the first and second parts of the first major phase have been reasonably well realized. I can put the morale aspect of psychiatric classification into a sentence or two; into a statement that cannot be given too wide a hearing.

It must be recognized by as many as possible of the more intelligent members of the community—and interpreted by them to the less intelligent—that unsuitability because of mental or personality factors for induction into the army *has no necessary relation to the worth of the registrant as a human being, or to his potential usefulness and ability to work*. Many people who would be at a great disadvantage under the circumstances of military training and service can do and are now doing with high efficiency a great variety of work that is indispensable to the national defense. It is a violation of good sense and humanitarian principles, and a real disservice to the public interest from every standpoint, to have the adaptive capabilities of a young man damaged or destroyed because he is exposed by the fact of military rejection to all sorts of unintelligent backbiting and the airing of archaic prejudices and misunderstandings about personality factors. This field of injustice and unwitting aid and comfort to the enemy needs the active attention of every one of us, because every one of us seems to feel that he is a born expert in understand-

ing and appraising human nature, and all too horribly great a number of us get pathological satisfaction from making invidious and derogatory comparisons.

Another tangential by-product of the program of psychiatric selection is the fear, sometimes adumbrated before me, that we are ruining the fine old American stock by turning back all these people, while we take into the army the "cream" of our youth.

In the first place, we are not yet inducting women; and they are still bearing children and presumably contributing half the chromosomes and at least three-quarters of the early experience—which seems to a psychiatrist to have some significance for the future of America. And, second, six out of ten registrants are now being exempted from induction under selective service by reason of dependents or employment in indispensable trades. And so it is possibly 25 per cent of four out of ten, or one out of ten, that is being returned to the community.⁵ And this one is being returned to the community by no means necessarily because he is biologically inferior; much more usually it is because he has been wretchedly brought up by some of these same stalwart Americans who are worrying about the "eugenic aspects" of the program.

As to registrants unacceptable because of mental deficiency, there is some agitation which may ultimately bear not too unconstructive fruit by providing special types of services for them. I would not oppose this violently because, looking over the United States, I think that quite possibly the federal government and the military authorities can look after these limited folk quite as well as they are now being cared for in a good number of states. At the same time, the inducting of mentally deficient selectees was not a success in the first World War, and I wish that they might be absorbed in the routine industrial and agricultural tasks in the home front, for which they are often peculiarly well suited by very virtue of their deficiency.

Finally, I want people to know that we want neither the cream

⁵ Actually, careful calculation on the basis of such official figures as we have, suggests that if the program is carried on to November 18, 1946, we shall have, by then, raised the concentration of persons handicapped for military service by reason of mental and nervous factors among all those who are now twenty-one to twenty-eight years old by about five per thousand. See *ibid.*

nor the dregs—if you must use these figures—of the population. We want members of that multitude of people which life seems particularly determined to supply us—the rather intelligent, rather social, and 'darned healthy person; the rather unlimited supply of whom comes with singular frequency from these allegedly "morbid" parents that I have tried to keep out of the army. Just as (I cannot help adding) these nice, healthy, commonplace people, when they marry, seem to be driven by their very bored normality to so tinker up their children that they will become ineligible for the military vocation.

I pray that we may avoid any further worry about the evil effects on the future American stock of the first little intelligence that has gone into sorting out people for military service. Let us be clear on the fact that we are under infinitely greater, more real and immediate threats to our future than eugenic considerations will ever bring us, so that anything that we can do to make the army a success becomes a simply imperative necessity.

A final word about what is being done must be said of army morale and the general morale of the nation. About the army itself there is perhaps undue concern. I say this for two reasons. In the first place, as I see our new troops, their morale and *esprit d'corps*, while not at all spectacular, while strikingly different from what we might expect on basis of the last all too hysterical great mobilization, is definitely better and more reliable by far than is the morale and the formulated or underlying solidarity of the people as a whole.

Second, we have been quite forehanded on the matter of service morale. A Joint Army and Navy Committee on Recreation and Welfare was set up shortly after the Selective Service and Training Act began to function. As its chairman and guarantor of results it was given the chairman of the President's Civilian Advisory Committee on Selective Service, Mr. Frederick Osborn, primarily an expert in the field of population but also a man of truly astonishing intelligence and very wide experience in getting things done. This joint committee brought to its aid expert advisers from a great number of relevant fields. It evolved plans and procedures both careful and timely, and presently crystallized plans for morale activities in the army that promise to function at a new level of efficiency. Under the leadership of Brigadier General Ulio, previously of the Adjutant

General's Department, this new agency in the War Department is now actively engaged in rectifying errors and initiating useful additions to the training and service program.⁶

Future concern with the field of civilian morale is still in the realm of uncertainty. An important contribution is certain to be made by the Office of Civilian Defense, under directorship of Mayor La Guardia. Something of real promise may come from the state and local councils of defense, organized somewhat on the pattern of the first World War. Something is rather likely to come from Colonel Donovan's activities in collating authentic information.

It seems to be urgently desirable that we seek to remedy the helplessness of a great part of the population who now are discouraged with their efforts to figure out what really goes on. I am convinced that direct, word-of-mouth communication of reliable information is the only sure preventive of the general befuddlement which is so important a part of enemy psychiatric strategy. There are in every community some few people who exercise intellectual or at least conversational leadership. These are the people whose expressed views gradually spread and become the "personal opinions" of almost everyone else. These are the people who, in so far as anyone can, crystallize opinion and belief for the less talented or less well informed.

It has seemed to some of us that this natural, inevitable, and indispensable leadership in the realm of the "understanding" which I have said is so important in avoiding demoralization, must be utilized methodically. These leaders must be discovered, shown their usefulness in promoting and protecting civilian morale, supplied with valid, dependable information about significant events, and encouraged to disseminate sound views and to build firm and realistic attitudes among others—not by any new and "official" activity, but by merely somewhat more responsible performance of their normal social function.

WILLIAM ALANSON WHITE PSYCHIATRIC FOUNDATION
AND
SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM

⁶ General Ulio being incapacitated by illness, Mr. Osborn, on nomination by the President, July 19, was commissioned a brigadier general and took command of the Morale Activities Branch, War Department. His appointment was finally confirmed on August 30, 1941.

THE NATURE OF MORALE

WILLIAM ERNEST HOCKING

ABSTRACT

This topic is first summarily treated by offering a description or definition of morale, by way of lending some precision to a term which may be getting more publicity than is good for it (Part A). But the real job is to go on from this to consider what we have learned of the subject between the wars (Part B), and then, with these concrete facts in mind, to get as far as we can into its inner workings (Part C).

As for (A), morale could be fairly pictured as a healthy state of will, as a man (or group) confronts its objective, a state of "willingness," the mental counterpart of physical fitness or "condition." But this generality runs some danger of losing sight of the main thing in morale—freedom—the best example of the psychological meaning of that wily word. Morale is a free gift, whatever a man's general condition, which is offered to or withheld from a particular undertaking.

As for (B), we have learned chiefly from the morale of remarkable social movements, which have followed two main types: one highly focused and theorized, with sentimental extravagance trained about a personal leader; the other diffuse, growing its creed, directly responsible to the realities of the social situation. These examples, while extending the conception of morale, enforce the fact that morale is a democratic element in group psychology, whatever the structure of the group.

As for (C), several distinctions are made which lead progressively nearer to the core of the subject. The distinction between individual and group morale shows to what extent the individual in a group retains his initiative if the morale is normal. The distinction between positive and negative objectives shows the psychological advantage of the morales of anger, hatred, and fear, and the only way out of this situation. The distinction between organic and idea-factors shows the primary role of belief and of the queer concept of "importance," leading to a discussion of the "morale of greatness." The distinction between virginal and mature morale shows the increasing weight of intellectual elements and of the veracity of feeling, a conception which psychology has still to develop, if it can.

A. WHAT ARE WE TO MEAN BY "MORALE"?

1. Wherever we find society we find the fact of leadership. And leaders have always known that their business is a double one: to see to the equipment of their men for their job and to keep them in humor with the job. This latter task, which has become fixed in the usage of speech as the "moral" task, may be easy or difficult according to circumstances; but it has never been regarded as unimportant. The yells of savage leadership are addressed to emotions as much as to muscular action; the leader must have an adequate voice, one that resounds with confidence and vigor, prime ingredients of a good "morale." All great military leaders have been morale-makers: Caesar knew instinctively that, before he could fight at Pharsalia, he must first mend the spirit of his army, defeated at Dyrrachium.

Morale, then, is something else than physical preparedness for an enterprise, something additional but not separable. For while equipment does not make morale, the lack of it may ruin morale. We often imagine machines to have a morale: the well-tuned motor, warmed up for action, feels to its driver as if tugging at the leash, even hungry for punishment, eager for the climb that will test its powers. This capacity to do work, built into the machine, is not morale—for the term "morale" is meaningless apart from consciousness; but, when we fancy the machine conscious of its own power, this self-conscious potency is a good part of what constitutes morale. And when we have horse-and-rider instead of machine-and-driver, the purpose, urge, and hope of the man infect the beast, and the power of the beast becomes part of the morale of the man. It was the spirit as well as the momentum of action which made the cavalry charge in its day so formidable.

2. Morale itself, however, is something more than awareness of capacity, and a high morale may exist when capacity is low. Can we single out this something more?

Morale has something to do, obviously, with the control of action; it refers to a deep-seated control of the energy that goes into action. To a certain extent, organic action is controlled by outer objects—sensory objects and thought-objects. The sensory objects may act as "stimuli." We are aware of a more-or-less of desire or aversion which seems to hail directly from the quality of the object itself; we are, as we say, "moved by" it. The thought-objects, goals of hope or avoidance, seem to operate on us in the same way, "calling out" our efforts in proportion to their felt worth, positive or negative. But there is a control of these controls. A man is always aware of the tendency of objects to move him, and he consents to, or refuses, their solicitation. He criticizes his own attractions, fears, and repugnances. He holds in his hand the ultimate lever which allows himself to be moved, or denies himself, or spurs himself on. This deeper control is referred to as "morale."

Morale is a character of the will in reference to a particular undertaking (either of one's own or of outside suggestion); it is a measure of one's disposition to give one's self to the objective in hand. It thus belongs to the region of the little-explored activity of "giving,"

in that deeper, idiomatic sense in which the producer of a play calls on an actor to "give." Whatever its physical ingredients, it is, in the end, a gift of the man to the job. It is, in this respect, akin to "interest."

The loafers, the passivists, and the unhappy products of progressive schools wait around to "be interested," on the assumption that the world owes them a continuous thrill, the last and highest of the rights of man; the live ones "*take* an interest." Of course, interest has something to do with the quality of the object; but it has quite as much to do with the deliberate attitude of the subject. The same is true of morale; for morale includes, among other things, taking an active interest in the objective. I do not discount the importance of having a fit objective for action. This is the first condition of any morale whatever, and there are many conceivable aims and actually conceived aims which can never elicit a high morale in a group of alert human beings simply because they are not worth it; but, assuming the fit objective, there is still the question of what degree of devotion will go into it. If there is anything free about the human being, it is to be found here, in this deed of gift. It is the surplus push put behind performance to give it a certain "go," so that not every accident or obstacle will bring a halt; it is an original drive, not a borrowed or imitative spurt, arising from one's own conviction and good will.

3. When one is in good "condition," bodily and mentally, morale is likely to rise easily and spontaneously to every adopted undertaking. Commonplace activities light up with a certain sparkle derived apparently from the person rather than from their intrinsic promise. This is not precisely the case, for a good morale does not consist in lending to the job in hand a falsely high valuation; morale is the reverse of an artificial or dramatized enthusiasm, one of the pitfalls which attends the external effort to "arouse" morale. The fact is rather that we habitually grow dull to the values that are there; routine brings value-blindness. Good condition brings us not to excess but to the truth of the case. And when condition is good, the ordinary enemies of morale—fatigue, tedium, fear, friction with collaborators, disillusionment itself if it leaves the central value intact—are thrown off like infections from a sound blood stream.

For this reason I once defined morale as "condition." What condition is to the athlete's body, morale is to the mind. Good morale is good condition of the inner man; it is the state of will in which you can get most from the machinery, deliver blows with the greatest effect, take blows with the least depression, and hold out for the longest time.¹ I believe this is accurate, but I now see a danger in the metaphor. For condition is fitness in general, fitness for any undertaking, whereas morale is fitness for a particular undertaking. Bodily condition can be developed by training, making a man good in advance for whatever requires physical stamina. So too the will may be brought by suitable discipline to a state of fitness in general. Anyone feels the difference at once between the flabby will, product of ease and the expectation of ease, incapable of self-severity (too numerous in America), and the will well heeled, with a bit of iron in it, ready for trouble. Morale can use both these types of condition, but it requires something more—a specific commitment to a specific task. Morale is not condition in general; it is inner condition for a particular objective; it is a will-to-give to the job in hand.

B. LESSONS OF TWENTY YEARS, 1919-39

4. With these remarks, which will serve rather as locating our subject matter than as an analysis, let me mention some developments in our knowledge of the nature of morale since the first World War.

'It was during that war that morale as a crucial factor in military success became a lively scientific concern in this country. The impetus given at that time to its study has continued in both branches of the service, especially at the Naval War College at Newport. It lay in the nature of the case that the most determined and systematic investigations have been carried out in Germany, especially under those groups who refused to believe that Germany was defeated in the field.² But in my judgment we have learned most from the growing recognition of morale as a factor in every social enterprise and

¹ *Morale and Its Enemies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1918), p. 14.

² Committee for National Morale, *German Psychological Warfare* (New York, 1941), p. 8.

especially from observing the extraordinary social movements which have filled the interval, both in Europe and in Asia.

These movements, beginning with the Menshevik and Bolshevik revolutions in Russia, have been carried forward by vigorous minorities, for the most part by young men, by groups professing a definite ideology or creed, with a nationalist outlook and a powerful personal leadership. But others have followed a different pattern. The two most notable Asiatic movements—the student movement in China in the twenties and the nationalist movement in India under Gandhi and Nehru—were far less centralized and far less shaped by preformed philosophies and programs. Had our attention been occupied solely with movements of the first type, including Fascisti and Nazis, we should have been led to think of morale in terms of regimentation and obedience, party discipline and the unreal realism of party myth, falsely simplified black-and-white issue-making, opportunism unhampered by principle, the justification of every means by the party end. When minds were thus brought to a sharp focus by a definable and attainable absolute and unified by a slaughter of inhibitions, we saw mankind brought to a quasi-religious height of devotion; and the old-line religions, whose pristine enthusiasm seemed a glorious but distant memory, felt misgiving not unmingled with envy. But in China morale was as high, with none of these strained accompaniments. Let me illustrate.

5. Between 1922 and 1937 there was much discussion whether China had a genuine national unity. It had been trying democratic forms on a wide scale, but with little experience and not too great success. Could the Chinese masses learn to think in terms of the nation rather than in terms of the large family or clan? In "Jimmy" Yen's great experiment in mass education at Ting Hsien there was training at once in literacy and "citizenship," attempts to induce practical co-operation across family lines for county and national ends. Until the Chinese masses, and not the literati alone, could think China, and sacrifice for China, there could be no national morale, no true democracy. The Mass Education Movement reached its millions but had a long way to go to reach the four hundred and fifty millions of China.

By 1931 the answer appeared. In September, Japan took control

in Manchuria. In 1932 Japanese coastwise steamers were leaving Hong Kong and Kowloon without cargoes or passengers, standing high out of water, while British and Dutch vessels were crowded beyond legal limits, filling decks and gangways. These were the Cantonese who were boycotting Japanese lines, far distant from the northern provinces and supposed to be cool toward the Nanking government; and it was the Cantonese Eighth Route Army which drew world-attention by its magnificent tenacity under bombing from the air in the defense of Shanghai. When I saw the ruins of Chapei, and the long lines of Chinese trundling away their poor findings from the ashes of their homes, wasting no time in lament, sturdy of soul, looking forward and resolute, I knew that China was one and that the morale of that people would hold, with or without ideologies, programs, incarnate supermen, or utopias.

It became evident also that the notion of morale required extension. We have been using the term as applied to overt undertakings, but there is also a morale of endurance, or, perhaps better, a morale for *being* as well as for doing. Action is sporadic, being is continuous; neither individuals nor groups are always undertaking things. Is there not a morale of the will-to-live? Some social groups such as schools and industrial groups are for the sake of specific action. Their morale is the morale of their work. But families have a morale (witness Bob Cratchit's family) without being in perpetual excursion as a family. The state also has first to be and then to do; and its will to exist is the first field for the morale of its citizens. Crusades may stimulate the active morale of churches, though with doubtful profit; and wars of aggression may stir the blood of patriots and endow the state with a new feel of reality; but the latent, perhaps subconscious, attachment to the state solely for the sake of its functions as promoter of national life may be of stronger root.

The morale of focused action, fully organized for direction, purpose, and ideal, will doubtless present the anatomy of our subject with greater clarity and articulation; but it is a special and narrower form of a more general disposition. Morale is the disposition to affirm, from one's own resources, both the deeds of group living and the living from which deeds come.

There is, of course, a connection between being and doing; for

conscious beings cannot exist long without specific action. Complete inactivity becomes anesthesia, and both men and institutions get into action in part to realize that they exist. Even institutions which, like the church, are not defined in terms of a specific enterprise need occasionally to bring themselves to corporate action in order to renew their vigor of existence. Latent periods vary from group to group; but, even for the family, morale sinks into a sort of somnolence, a merely vegetative state, without the annual observances which involve renewal of common action. The state has usually no need to invent programs of action; history provides them. War has seldom had the excuse that it was the only escape from state tedium or from the insensitivity of citizens to public duty; but some activity the state requires for its health. This is the defect of the *laissez faire* conception of state functions. If the state has only to regulate or protect its internal institutions and interests, it has not enough of its own to keep the morale of the citizens in good order. Those who have maintained that war is a function necessary to the healthy state would be nearer the truth if they held that corporate action is essential to the healthy state. To say that war is necessary is as defensible as to say that pugilism is necessary to the healthy man.

6. All these social movements have illustrated the fact that morale is a democratic element in group structure, however the group may be organized. Even in a slave gang or in a prison shop where structural democracy is at zero there is a more-or-less of morale for the current performance; the amount and quality of the product depend on the level of that morale, quite as much as do the quality and amount of the product of a group of field hands. It is a democratic element because it cannot be compelled; it can only be offered by the workers. The modern dictator is dependent on it and knows that fact. Frederick the Great could spur his troops on by shouting at them, "Dogs, would you live forever!" The shrewd dictator of today makes no attempt to command morale; in his own way he begs for it, orates for it, presents himself as popular hero, savior of his people, imbeds his name in their daily salutations, encourages the legend of infallibility. He has to pay the democratic price of being what his people spontaneously admire and sounding with louder tone their own emotions.

Realizing the difficulty of living up to this part, he tries to trick morale into being by studying its psychological "laws" and playing upon its causes. If he has the advice of a clever psychological staff, he will succeed in this scientific morale-mill up to a certain point, namely, the point at which his (psychological) subjects find out, or suspect, that he is operating on them. Then the alleged "laws" abruptly cease to work. For it is impossible to manipulate men causally at the same time that you are dealing with them in good faith; and, since belief in the good faith of the leader is the very basis of morale, the fabric of morale—unity of purpose—is destroyed.

A reservation must be made in this statement. No one resents being made the subject of mental manipulation when he is in full consent to the process of training and discipline; men who are making or breaking habits quite frequently practice psychological management on themselves. The breach of morale begins where management implies deception, as in the use of propaganda to falsify the data on which the subject-mind operates. Traveling through southern Germany in early September, 1938, and also in meeting many German people in the summer of that year in Yugoslavia, I found one of the persistent sources of uneasiness the doubt whether the news they were getting was reliable—whether, for example, the sufferings and longings of Sudeten Germans were what the German press was representing them to be.

Even so, the manipulation of truth to impose pragmatically useful versions of events on the minds of a nation has shown itself unexpectedly effective. I have not found that the mass of Japanese people entertain serious doubts as to the benevolent purposes of the national enterprise in Asia. Viscount Ishii's "Monroe Doctrine for Asia" is commonly accepted, I believe, as a valid analogy. We have to reckon with a certain willingness of the human mind to be deceived, if the deception runs in line with what men have made up their mind to do or to believe. This strange passivity toward mental seduction is helped by the very complexity of political interactions and by the resignation to a relativity of truth which reports itself in the saying, "*Ici, il n'y a pas des faits, il n'y a que des versions!*" To be accurate, then, we shall have to admit that the victims of psychological causal trickery do not always resent the process even

when they know about it; it may simplify for them the line of action to which they are committed, as it suits the fisherman to feign that his live bait does not suffer. What we can say is that people so conditioned with their own connivance are vulnerable when and in so far as the truth appears; they are operating on a dramatized morale which lacks the stability of the real article.

if Morale remains the democratic gift to the enterprise which the dictator has to persuade his people or his party is their own. In every social group there are three classes of members: (1) those who have the idea of the group so strongly that they would form another group for the same purpose if the present one did not exist; (2) those who understand and agree with the purpose enough to support what the first-named propose; and (3) those who adhere. As morale rises, the second class move into the first, and the third into the second. The technique of the dictator is to eliminate all mere adherents, to create a minority of classes (1) and (2) with high morale, to do with these what has to be done, and to confront the mass of the nation with *faits accomplis*, in the expectation that most will acquiesce, leaving a relatively small group to be suppressed. He remains the more completely dependent on the spirit of his acting minority, that is to say, on the democratic factor in its mentality.

7. It follows that only in an actual democracy can morale reach its height. For the best morale is only obtainable with those who would form the group for the given enterprise on their own initiative, and this requires that they have the idea and the disposition to create. Group-formers can grow and get practice only in a regime of free association. It is here that there appears a certain divergence between the two ingredients of morale, discipline and initiative.

In the early days of the American navy, many recruits were accepted from Scandinavian countries. They were better than the American recruits for docility, order, and thoroughness. The Americans were critical of their officers, uppish, disposed to think they could do as well or better in the places of their superiors, and presented a markedly inferior appearance at inspection. In time, this element of critical conceit became recognized as one sign of the activity of minds which were thinking the whole action through from the position of the officer as well as from that of the common seaman

and that this was the unpurchasable disposition which would give drive to an actual engagement and would supply replacements as officers fell. The poorer discipline meant a priceless element in morale, the free gift of the comprehending intelligence, convinced of its right to know the object of the order or command.

Democracy ought to be able to give much to morale, because it is accustomed to see the point of common effort and lend a hand.³ It also sees the point of being regimented for serious purposes and accepts the temporary autocracy with a will: "Let Jim be the boss." The question is never one of obedience alone—you can get that from an animal—but of how much of a man obeys. The man with the most thought to give, the most understanding to give, the most fellow-feeling to give, the most sense of what it is all about, ergo the strongest emotional concern—that man will have, and spread, the best morale. And that man will be the product of democracy.

C. ANALYSIS OF MORALE

8. Our survey so far has given us an amount of illustration without which critical analysis tends to be conceptual and abstract. It will now be in order to indulge in a few distinctions.

INDIVIDUAL AND GROUP MORALE

We have been taking the word "morale" as common usage does, sometimes to indicate the degree of energy and confidence of private individual effort, sometimes to indicate individual energy and confidence in a group, sometimes to indicate the energy and confidence of the group itself. It would be dogmatic to deny the validity of any of these uses. Psychiatry addresses itself to individual morale. The captain's heaviest burdens are those of the individual slumping private. But the characteristic problems of morale belong to group temper, and it is to group mentality that the term is most characteristically applied. *Esprit de corps* is definitely a group phenomenon.

There is a new dimension of effort and a higher threshold of fatigue when a plurality of wills is concerned. It is not good economy to send a single man into the woods to cut cordwood; all the ob-

³ As Professor Allport has ably pointed out in "Morale: American Style," *Christian Science Monitor*, April 26, 1941.

stacles of the labor are lightened by companionship, all the moods of the forest are more friendly, and the advent of weariness is postponed. Further, the fact that your objective is shared adds an element to its convincingness. Thus the social problem of morale is in one sense easier; in another, more intricate and more complete.

As an individual experience, a good morale has for its symptoms, besides energy and confidence, single-mindedness and that affirmative act we called "giving." As a social experience, these last-named symptoms take on further meaning. Single-mindedness has to mean unity of purpose with the group as well as an absence of conflict in one's self. Giving implies intelligent teamwork, frictionless acceptance of division of labor with whatever subordination one's own role is involved, and obedience to the agreed source of direction. With a good group morale, the members spontaneously use "we" as the author of the group action. We have, then, something like a merging of wills into a single will for the performance in hand (an ideal almost literally realized in some ensemble music). For the individual this looks like a surrender of self-direction, but it is not quite this. It is rather an achievement of indirect or vicarious self-direction by the free adoption of the total will as one's own. In a good morale the individual will-action is enlarged rather than diminished; each individual tends to take group awareness into himself and to think for the group as well as with it, contributing here and there an instant nudge of direction to the rest.

Whoever enters group action at all gives himself up to a temporary flow of necessity. But his morale consists in being, with his own will, a step ahead of necessity.

THE MORALE OF POSITIVE AND OF NEGATIVE OBJECTIVES

9. We have already recognized that there is a difference between the morale of being and the morale of action. The morale of being is the degree of affirmation of the will to live, whether for one's self or for one's cause, one's group, one's family, one's friend, one's nation. The morale of action is of two sorts—the morale of work, aimed toward achievement, with the issue of success or failure, and the morale of strife, with the issue of victory or defeat. The morale of strife or contest, as the dramatic mode, tends to impose its imagery on the

others. The plain will-to-endure is pictured as a contest with discouragement. Labor becomes a struggle against obstacles; and, if competition enters, then victory and defeat are a suitable language. There appears to be a psychological attraction of the will toward the imagery of combat.

But combat is the only type of morale in which the objectives are predominantly negative. We do not normally go to war to create a better world; we work for a better world. War is justified only as against something. When some power goes to war for what it calls a better world, we call it an aggressor; for, if it were really out for a better world, it would not need to adopt that means, as Tagore pointedly reminded Noguchi when the Japanese poet invited him to join in praising the Japanese ideal for a new Asia. It is always proper to ask an aggressor what he is fighting for; but the defender can only be asked what he is fighting against.

It is frequently said that no high morale can be achieved for purely negative objectives. How can anyone say this, in view of the history of warfare? If pain and fear are "prepotent stimuli" for physical reactions, resentment, anger, hatred of self-satisfied and self-righteous "haves" by hungry and desperate "have-nots" are the prepotent stimuli and sustainers of war spirit. The chief motivation of the Nazi campaign is to be seen in the emotional passages of Hitler's speeches, with their incessant rehearsals of the crimes of Versailles, the failure of the Allies to play fair with a Germany disarmed in trust of their honor, the repeated rebuffs to his allegedly benevolent and hopeful efforts. In comparison with these appeals to wrath, his myth of a positive goal is shadowy, variable, and indistinct. In our own War of Independence the positive aim was dismissed with a phrase—"to take the just place"—whereas the body of the Declaration is the recital of grievances. Consider the fragile morale of Italy's wars of professed crusade in Ethiopia and Greece. Contrast the morale of the Soviet forces at the invasion of Finland with that now shown in defending their own frontier. The fiercest fighting morale, and the most determined, is that directed against entrenched injustice. If there is no real grievance, the war leader must invent one and get his people to believe it. The destruction of that belief is the destruction of their morale.

To be sure, there is an implied affirmation in every negation. To fight against invasion is to fight for the fatherland. To fight against tyranny is to fight for liberty. But contrast the positive aims of warfare with the negative incentives. The incentives are past events, actual, definable particulars. The positive aims are generalities, futurities, suffering from nonexistence and tending to provoke dispute as soon as they take shape in specific programs.

Hence those who criticize the democracies because they are only fighting against something and not for something, on the ground that negations can give only half a morale, are not on firm psychological ground. They have not realized the strong wrath of a necessitated defense. Nor have they felt the terrific emotional surge of finding one's national self caught in a trap and doomed to economic sterility by a sanctified status quo. If the negative morale of combat is ever to be replaced by the positive morale of work, it will require a growth through the world of sympathetic negation to remove the bitter touch of isolated despair.

ORGANIC FACTORS AND IDEA-FACTORS: THE FRAME OF MORALE

10. Since morale is definitely the mental contribution to effective action, it is somewhat paradoxical to invite the body-mind contrast back into morale itself. Yet there is a point in distinguishing from those factors derived from self-conscious decision, those factors which emerge from the psychophysical machine: its health, energy flow, endocrine balance, and what we speak of in draft horses as "beam" and "bottom," endurance under continued demand, and the like.

It is tempting to dwell on the organic factors, for they are the eminently cultivable side of the matter. They have also a "head" of their own; they tend to produce a level of steady efficiency characteristic of the individual in some independence of the total auspices of action and their appeal to imagination and faith. If the total outlook is depressing, and there is nothing to be done about it, or if, as is frequently the case in war, the total situation is completely unknown to a local unit, the mind has a large capacity for shunting out this horizon (which we may refer to as the "frame of action") and enjoying the morale of immediate behavior. "Nerve," for example, is not identical with courage, which deals with actual danger; it con-

sists in shunting off the concern about dangers which for the moment are not one's business and carrying on the detail. A high civic morale during war, as seen so admirably in the British public, requires a well-developed nerve in this sense.

Of these organic factors, I wish to point out only one principle: they act as a ballast and tend to counteract wide changes which might arise from the idea-factors alone.

When the frame of action has an abnormally low value (as in defeat, imprisonment, and slavery, where no activity can connect with one's major ends), organic factors seize on any available activity and tend to find in that an enjoyment of effort. Thus poverty taken as an inescapable condition has never of itself been able to destroy human morale; witness the temper of the masses of China.

On the other hand, when the frame of action has an unusually high value (as at the arrival of an opportunity felt to be great), the organic factors see to it that the stimulus does not too severely drain the working capacity of the organism. This braking effect, reflected in consciousness as a certain dulling of the sense of the exceptional, may provoke self-reproach, as if one ought to be more alive than one is to the great occasion. But the emotional awareness of the exceptional is less conducive to effective performance than its quiet rational measure.

Morale is a response to meaning; its legitimate source is meaning as seen in the objectives of action. The meaning of the whole outlook of living is the rational origin of the meaning of any particular deed and, therefore, of the morale for that deed. Meaning descends from the whole to the part. But there is another current of meaning which arises from the part to the whole: if living and acting are satisfactory at this moment, that immediate enjoyment tends to spread its quality to the whole horizon. Peasant populations in the plains of Europe and Asia have held the tenor of their way relatively uninterrupted by the shifting fortunes of empires through recorded history; the stable morale of the villages has been the balance wheel of the world. It is also the peril of civilization, since it induces in peaceful populations a somnolence toward the long-distance threats to their security.

When we turn to the idea-factors, therefore, we are in the native air of morale. It would be absurd to define morale in terms of or-

ganic well-being alone, since the typical test of morale comes when physical well-being is drained. Morale, we say, is first of all a response to meaning; it implies a belief that to be something or to do something is significant or important and that it is possible to achieve this end. "Importance" is an interesting category; an object need not be intrinsically valuable in order to be "important" if it is a means to a valuable end. Importance is a halo which may light on dull objectives if they are way stations to our major aims. It is these ultimate aims which sustain morale in any undertaking; and this implies that morale is directly dependent on a man's faith. It is an inseparable aspect of religion, a corollary of whatever religion a man has. There can be no morale in an enterprise which runs counter to the ultimate tenet, unless indeed it represents a change of faith or becomes itself a new religion.

THE MORALE OF RADICAL TRANSITION

11. There is in every man a lurking yen toward some sort of revolution. This also comes from his religion or rather from that faith which is the mother of actual religions—the faith that the possible value of living, if we had the secret of it, is unlimited. Then any way of life which has become dull is wrong and ready for discarding; a critical shadow is cast on all our humdrum living; and every prophet who promises a better way receives a hearing. Every pessimist is true in what he denies—that happiness has been attained.

Hence, while war and catastrophe are dreaded by every voice of reason, there is a minority whisper welcoming the crisis. Here comes the desired revolt from the commonplace and its assumed scale of importances. Here comes the exhilaration of a major struggle, rooting up the floor boards of life. We are delivered at a blow from the vanities and false fronts of pseudo-essential routines. We recover our normal size as the jinn released from the bottle. In every upheaval we rediscover humanity and regain freedoms of which we had robbed ourselves through our possessions and habits. We are cured of myopia and the petty bookkeeping with private gains. We relearn some old truths about the connection between happiness, unselfishness, and the simplification of living.

The chief secret of the Nazi morale is their exploitation of this permanent urge of men to escape from themselves out of mere low-

scale orderliness of existence. I will not call this a bent to revolution: I will call it the belief in greatness—the greatness of our own destiny. Whenever greatness passes near us, we rise to it, ashamed of what we have been.

There is a morale of greatness. It is different from the morale of emergency, excitement, exceptional stress. It does not need to be whetted up. It cannot be fed by propaganda. It perishes in the end apart from both freedom and truth. But it shows us one thing we need to learn—that the morale of greatness thrives on sacrifice. There is a vast difference between the blown and boosted morale injected into a flabby public by professional purveyors of pep and promise, and the genuine morale of inner fire built on a deep disturbance of the will, like that of the Chinese teachers and students making a university in the Shansi caves. Without hardship, there is no firm morale; without dislocation of living, there is nothing commanding grave and loyal resolve. Hardship indeed cannot be invented, and artificial discomforts introduced into training are dubious developers of character. But training is itself dislocation and hardship; and the source of morale is the understanding of its necessity, the will to put it through, and the impatience of that cushioning and amusing, distracting and exhorting, which imply that the recruit is already a hero, suffering for his country and requiring the constant ministrations of the sympathy squad. If the recruit has been seized with the Purpose which so alters the face of community life, he will take care of his own minor hardships; if he has not that Purpose, the volume of sugared attention to his inner man will alienate rather than attract him. His morale will die like a cat too much petted.

The morale of a public and the morale of a camp have a common requirement to make on the morale officer—the requirement of respect for the gravity of the decision which is to be that of the nation and of each citizen and recruit. This means that the man must be treated as a thinker and as a will open to shaping by the law of greatness. But greatness can be conveyed only by those by whom it is felt.

NOTE ON THE TRAINING OF MORALE

Conscious efforts to bolster or improve morale are of three sorts: (1) training for general condition of body and will; (2) systematic attention to the conditions of work, with the purpose of removing irrelevant and unnecessary privations; and (3) clarifying and affirming the purpose supporting the common action.

Of (1): this is the point which properly elicits all the skill which psychology and the art of pedagogy can bring to bear. Here volumes have been written and are yet to be written. I shall make only the remark that there is a region at which physical and mental fitness run together and are trained together. Physical setup is at the same time self-control. Moral self-command begins with command of the body. Hence posture and bearing are indicative of the state of will; no man can command others who cannot rule his own body.

Of (2): this is the point at which most nonsense is poured out in the name of applied science. Recruits must be "conditioned." They must be secured against subconscious cravings arising from the synthetic and uprooted camp situation, lack of female companionship, absence from hobbies, and other disproportions of artificial existence. Very true. But there are two principles to supplement these diagnoses. First, that it is natural for man to be artificial; and, if he is not uprooted from habit by circumstances, he will uproot himself temporarily and submit himself to just these privations in the name of a holiday. Second, that man has a hundred instincts and therefore instinctive needs; but that there is only one of them—apart from hunger—that requires to be satisfied. That is the will to power, in the form of being able to put one's ideas into effect. This requires to be satisfied, because it includes all the other instincts in itself. The regimentation of camp must be such as to allow each man a region for private self-expression.

Of (3): this is so much the essence of the whole matter that, if it could be secured, scientific attention to "conditioning" would be almost unnecessary. It would be extravagant to say, "If you have a good cause, present it and let morale take care of itself; if you have a bad cause, seek the aid of applied psychology." The element of truth in this too caustic remark is that, after we have analyzed morale perfectly into a set of attitudes such as "hopeful," "resolute," etc., we have just come face to face with the question, "Is there any respectable way to secure hopefulness except to present the objective grounds for hope?" Attitudes are attitudes toward objects, and control of the attitude must begin with the objective facts, unless one proposes to have recourse to lies or drugs. Its extravagance lies in its ignoring the truth that attitudes toward exceptional strains require to be thought out and prepared and can be helped into place by enhanced self-knowledge.

But, in the end, morale is always for a purpose, and the only radical aid one can give is the enlivening of the purpose. The only safe ground for group unanimity or national unity is the rational ground for the common purpose. The nation must have absolute confidence in the candor and sincerity of its leadership. There must be a great cause, felt as such. One must have confidence that none in the group is holding himself out of the current or stirring feeling for his own profit; it is hard to make common cause with a charlatan or a pig. There must be strict avoidance of the appeal to unity on the ground of good form or of being with the majority; the demand to unite because it is patriotic to do so is a confession of rational weakness of the cause itself—it is a dead-dog demand,

a *pis aller*, and, like whipping men into line, one of the best ways of laying up an inner revulsion, which is already disunity.

MORALE, VIRGINAL AND MATURE

12. I have but one more distinction to suggest—that between the morale of first love, first enthusiasm, and all the morales which can follow after an experience of partial disillusionment.

The morales of 1914-18, both in Europe and in America, were of the first sort: morales of emotions, epithets, slogans, songs, none of which are much in evidence today in any of the contending countries. Those earlier morales were of generations inexperienced in war; they were to this extent naïve morales, taking their goals simply, wholeheartedly, passionately. They were comparatively unsophisticated in respect to the skill and range of propaganda. No one on this side, and few in England, suspected Lord Bryce's relation to the "Bryce Report" on atrocities in Belgium. They were, let us say, virginal morales.

The men who today are called to face war are not for the most part the same generation that fought in the last war; but they have absorbed that earlier generation's reflection. Having learned more of the texture of history, and having learned how that morale was made, we are no longer capable of it. Epithets leave us not alone cold but suspicious of their user. Oratory hangs heavy in our ears. Neat aphorisms, summing the principles at stake in "polar words" with black-and-white contrast, give us one more count of distrust of generalities. We are not incapable of taking sides, but we know in advance that that man is a liar who declares his side as all-truth against all-error, or all-civilization against all-barbarism. Our morale trouble is the trouble of maturity; we have intelligence and we have consciences. We know the defects of our own system, we know the corruptions that lurk under the fair cover of democracy, we know our own degree of complicity in the troubles of Europe; and a bad conscience is the worst equipment with which to enter a crusade, the subtlest enemy of morale. Our morale, even that of our younger generation, must be a mature morale, it must be born of a reason running far beneath the surface of diplomatic representations.

It is noteworthy that almost all of the national and popular movements belonging to the between-war era have been of the virginal

type. Manned by young men, most of them affect populations to which concerted political activity was a complete novelty. China and India have long been race conscious; but until this century, neither has been nation conscious at the popular level. Russia, slowly feeling its way beyond czarism, has not yet achieved a total self-consciousness. The Nazi movement displaced a frost-bitten experiment in republican government, still in its infancy. The minorities which pre-empted the direction of these peoples could be uncritically united, because it was for their members their first vast political deed of self-expression, their first utopia.

The element of hope in this fact is that they also must mature. They are in fact visibly maturing, and for them also the problem of a morale of emotion becomes increasingly difficult. The type appeals begin through repetition to sound hollow: the roar and the braggadocio run themselves out; the role of the absolute becomes, with time, more palpably inappropriate to the human figure. The need for truth becomes a craving, breaking through all censorship. The morale manufactured in the psychological workshop shows the limits of applied causality in the control of men.

In truth, the maturity of morale means that in the Western world the conception of a crusade is untimely and the war method of achieving a renewal of values is intolerable to mankind. Islam itself can no longer find it pertinent to declare a jihad, a holy war. I doubt whether even the Sudan could offer support to another mahdi. We are enduring the last and most nearly realistic of all the pageants of political deity, the mightiest effort to revise by overthrow. If we can rise to a true realism of international order, in response to the agonies inflicted on all sides in this struggle, we may dismiss the pageantry and its virginal morale as the passing of that type of deity in the world. With its passing, the world may be so far moved forward in self-consciousness, from Japan to America via Asia and Europe, that the morale of maturity; the morale of rational sacrifice, the bending of the common will to the problems of all states, can become the order of the day.

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MILITARY MORALE

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ABSTRACT

Military morale is in a large sense inseparable from civilian morale because each reacts upon the other and both are in large measure based on fidelity to a cause. But there is a certain kind of morale that is distinctly military. It begins with the soldier's attitude toward duty. It develops with the soldier's command over himself. It is a spirit that becomes dominant in the individual and also in the group. Whether the soldier has physical comforts or suffers physical hardships may be a factor but is seldom the determining factor in making or unmaking his morale. A cause known and believed in; knowledge that substantial justice governs discipline; the individual's confidence and pride in himself, his comrades, his leaders; the unit's pride in its own will; these basic things, supplemented by intelligent welfare and recreation measures and brought to life by a spirit of mutual respect and co-operation, combine to weld a seasoned fighting force capable of defending the nation.

Military morale, as a soldier understands it, is both a quality and a condition of the mind, of the body, of the spirit. It may be affected by circumstances not subject to any man's control, yet as a condition it can be made or broken, as a quality it can be built up or torn down, by human device and intent. To create it, to stimulate it, to guide and foster it, calls for a masculine type of effort by strong, hard men; yet it is a thing of delicate growth; to be tended by highly sensitive intellectual and spiritual stewardship. It is like life itself, in that the moment you undertake to define it you begin to limit its meaning within the restrictive boundaries of mere language.

But for practical purposes of discussion let us say that military morale is that conditioned quality, in the individual soldier and in the unit of command, which holds the soldier, holds the unit, to the performance of duty despite every opposing force or influence.

This means command and obedience, at every level down to or up to the individual man. A platoon in storm of battle functions successfully because it responds to the orders of its leader. Consider then the individual soldier in that platoon. His brain, his body, his whole physical organization, will be subject to reflexes occasioned by noises and dangers that whirl and crash about him. It is not enough that he hears the voice or sees the signal of the leader. He must understand the signal. Nor is that enough. He must have an inner con-

trol; he must relay the command to himself. Command and obedience here function, or fail to function, at the crucial point of military success or breakdown. This is the vital link in the chain of command. As a fighting machine the body of the soldier must obey the will of the soldier. When the man commands himself he moves, with the other men in his unit, responding to leadership—and that is the final test of military morale.

The ultimate business of a soldier is to fight. And since his time of trial is a time when there is no reprieve for the unready, no choice but to win or lose by a complete outpouring of strength against strength, it is his constant business to shape his daily living toward the utmost of readiness for battle. Great fighting forces are built when leaders of leaders succeed in training men to train men to train themselves. The essence of the art is to preserve, throughout the inflexible necessities of authority, the resilience of the human individual's free will.

In a tactical crisis the commander's immediate work is done in his estimate of the situation, his present decision, his order. His victory has been won or lost beforehand; he cannot win with unconditioned troops; it requires spirit and body to carry out orders of the mind. For better or for worse, the result is now dependent on the organization he has formed, educated, and inspired.

It is important to stress and reiterate the statement that military morale is a quality and condition of fighting men and that to study and foster it is a function of military command, because those phases of the process of upbuilding it which are centered about the provisions made for the personal comfort of the soldier, and for his recreational activities in his off-duty hours, are more readily observable to the civilian eye than are the long hours of training in the technique of soldiering during which the man is inured to the tough requirements of his ultimate job. Recreation and welfare activities are a part, and a very important part, of the morale program, but they should fit properly into the whole picture without false perspective. The mountaineer rests now and then on the trail, but it is by the climbing, not by the resting, that the crest is reached. The military commander must of course be a psychologist. It will be a

great help to him if he has scientific knowledge of psychology, and this is true with progressive importance in the ascending line of authority. But it is also necessary that he should have the art, that he should be a psychologist in the practical sense of the term—that he should not only know *about* men but should know *men*—and this is true with progressive importance in the descending line of authority down to the point where a squad leader who may never have cracked a book on psychology knows nevertheless what to say and when to say it in dealing with the men at his elbow.

An instance of the value of the application of psychology in military training is the care taken to find the right place for the individual man as early in his training as possible. In our Army, at the reception center, the new soldier is questioned by a number of interviewers who record his qualifications and aptitudes. The complex modern organization requires a wide range of special skills, and the indexing of individuals at the outset greatly simplifies and speeds up the process of locating the soldier where he will at one and the same time be most useful to the Army and most interested—and hence most happy—in his own place. A highly important function is that of the commissioned and noncommissioned officers with whom the recruit makes his first contacts with army life, for the impression made at this point will affect his attitude, and attitude may be regarded as the most important initial factor in the individual's morale as he enters the service. At the very outset the attempt is made to insure a feeling on the recruit's part that he is now a member of a powerful team; that the security of his family at home is dependent on the success of this team; that his own personal security is bound up in the success of this team of which he is a part; that there will be recognition of himself as a man if he responds to the calls of the team on his endeavors; that he is entering on a new experience that will necessitate his pouring-out of his strength unselfishly toward the accomplishment of a common purpose and yet one in which his individual powers will increase and in which provision will be found for his personal education and development.

Something is accomplished in laying the foundations of morale when the soldier is brought to realize that it is actually a difficult

thing to assemble, feed, clothe, shelter, and train a large army, and that he is recognized as personally responsible for his own part in accomplishing that difficult task.

It should be well noted that merely to feed, clothe, and shelter an army does not complete the building of its morale, even though these things be done to the point of perfection. It is in the soldier's understanding of and attitude toward his environment that his military morale will be evidenced. It is a serious misuse of the term and misunderstanding of the facts to say that morale is high when the table is bounteous and the warm overcoat fits well and there are clean sheets on the nice comfortable bed. Physically comfortable conditions are pleasant, and they are conducive to general health and well-being; there is no virtue *per se* in asceticism or in hardship. Nevertheless, physically comfortable surroundings have only this connection with a soldier's morale: he learns with experience and observation about what degree of ease and good living is compatible with military performance and how much it is reasonable to expect and under what training conditions. By his own intelligence and by the teaching of his officers he learns what to expect in the field and in the permanent camp. His observation, his feeling, his reason, give him an opinion as to whether he is or is not being handled justly and considerately. To withhold comforts from a soldier when by every reasonable standard his camp should be comfortable certainly undermines morale by creating dissatisfaction, even resentment; and yet it is when rations are lowest, privations sharpest, and every physical and emotional strain the hardest to bear that the quality of military morale may rise to its truest and best, even to the highest plane of spiritual dignity. It is not the comfort that makes morale nor is it the suffering. Morale is established, in so far as comfort and privation are concerned, when the soldier knows his own strength of purpose to be proof against the softening of the one and the attrition of the other. A great deal can be effected in the early stages of a soldier's education by the simple processes of good humor and good example on the part of his officers and of the seasoned campaigners among the enlisted men who are his seniors in service and whom he will tend to imitate.

Anyone will say that the great basic factor in the creation of military morale is devotion to a cause. That is a theme that needs no elaboration here. History is full of noble examples of such devotion, and its effect on both military and civilian morale, which as so influenced are one and the same and interdependent on each other. Any sacrifice to defend the loved ones at home; any sacrifice to uphold our soldiers out there. Emotional fervor will pierce the impregnable line, will hold against the irresistible assault. It is important to remember that emotional fervor may be aroused by the beating of the tom-toms, may be a form of medicine man's hypnotism—or it may be of the abiding, magnificent character that is rooted in fidelity to ideals and standards that are genuine, that are understood, that are dearer to the individual than his own personal life. The difference between the fervor that is manufactured by hypnotism and the fervor that is engendered by conflict in defense of true and fine standards is that while either type will carry men through incredible exertions, it is the emotion based on faith in genuine values that outfights and outlives the counterfeit. The chaplain exercises an indispensable function in building military morale, for religion as a strengthening and stabilizing influence on the character of the individual can hardly be overestimated.

It is beyond any military commander to implant this kind of morale in his men overnight. This is the morale of a whole people. It needs tradition. The commander can develop it, find means to enhance it, build upon it; he can be one of the whole people's leaders who strengthen it and help to pass it on, but if the substance of it is not in his men when he starts to train them, he cannot be expected to do more than build a machine that will fight until it meets its first disaster.

But let us assume that an army is composed of men who have had, in their home and school training and environment, such traditions and such indoctrination as will make them willing to endure effort and real sacrifice for a national cause which they understand and in which they thoroughly believe. That is a wonderful beginning for building military morale, but the finish lies far beyond. The men are still human, with human desires and responses, and there must be a

fitting, in both directions, between these human qualities and a soldier's way of life. It is not enough that the cutting-tool be made of good steel: there must actually be an edge on it before it is usable.

There is a simile here that is applicable all the way through. From mining to refining, to shaping, tempering, grinding, and honing. From selection to disciplining, to teaching, indurating, perfecting in team play, and inspiring to battle.

The selection of the men themselves is like mining the ore and taking the metal from its matrix. It is not merely a question of saving money for the government by reducing the potential of disabilities due to weakness of constitution. Nor is it merely consideration for the weakness of the individual and his discomfort and suffering in trying to keep up with stronger men. There must not be weaklings in the fighting units of the command. Every straggler is a liability. Inferior steel is rejected at the beginning, lest there develop flaws that may at some critical time of strain cause a break in the blade.

The refining process in metal working is comparable to that period in the young soldier's experience when he is learning how to act and feel like a soldier. A soldier is a human being; properly trained, he is more of a man than he was before, because he has developed within himself an inner strength that he did not even know existed; but though he is still a human being, he has a different attitude toward himself and toward life than he had when he was a civilian. The refining of the metal is the disciplining of the soldier. By the term "discipline" an experienced military man does not mean mere punishment for wrongdoing, mere subjection in entirety to the will of a superior officer. A truly disciplined soldier obeys because he knows that obedience and command are a part of the same equation of conduct; he learns a deep pride in his understanding of the necessity of orders; he obeys as a member of a team who is unwilling that any other member should excel him in the readiness and skill with which he catches the signal and carries the ball or guards the runner. This is the first and greatest lesson to be learned—this lesson in feeling and acting like a soldier.

Unless a boy has been brought up at home with more than ordinary parental wisdom and skill, he will not step immediately into

the new of life in a military camp. Most young men respond rapidly, however, to the training given them by their commanders. In every command there will be some among the recruits who do not respond readily, and these constitute an important problem. It is very important that such a man, on the occasion of his first encounter with the stern necessity of military obedience, be handled with intelligence, patience, psychologic insight, and true leadership, as well as with the firmness that must always be present. He can almost always be brought to a co-operative attitude, but if he cannot, he is going to be a worse liability than the physical straggler. Harsh punitive measures at this stage will not do. Understanding of the soldier's conception of life must be established. Harsh punishment is for the knowing, deliberate offender whose offense endangers or demoralizes his unit. This does not mean that men should be handled softly. It does mean that instruction should precede orders, that orders should be within the power of the new soldier to understand and follow, that corrective measures should be used rather than punitive wherever possible, and that punishment when necessary should be just, prompt, and not out of proportion to the offense.

While the processes of discipline are going on, teaching is begun. The soldier must learn how to take care of himself under all conditions; and it would surprise any person unfamiliar with psychology as it reveals itself in a military camp to see how far from simple it is to teach men to train themselves in the simplest skills of outdoor living. The soldier must learn how to use the weapons of combat; and here, again, it is surprising how far from simple it is to bring about a realization of the seriousness of the uses of those weapons. It is often remarked among experienced instructors that in combat practice it is hard to get men to take cover with anything like the completeness and alacrity with which they will learn to take it after they have been under actual fire.

This teaching of the technique of soldiering has a basic effect on military morale, for it is essential to the development of the soldierly qualities of pride and courage. Many occupations involve risks. The cowboy, the fireman, the structural steel worker, the high-rigger of the lumber camps—these men do things in the course of their day's

work that would make impossible demands on human courage if they were not trained by experience in knowing just what to do at the right split second. An important part of courage is knowing what is to be done, where the danger lies, and how to neutralize the danger. Along with this knowledge comes pride in performance, and the successfully taught soldier finds a thrill in the inner knowledge that comes to be his: that he is competent to be the guardian of his people, that he has a fighting technique proof against any ordinary dangers and so "grooved" that he can perform even when he is frightened—as frightened it is fairly certain he will be on occasion. Whoever among us all has never been frightened must have led a sheltered life indeed, or else he is a very insensitive individual.

But military morale has not yet been built. The discipline has been well established and the training well advanced, but to refer again to our simile, the tempering, grinding, and honing remain to be accomplished. Induration is necessary. Maneuvers have this as one of the objectives. Within the limits of good sense, having in mind the avoidance of damage by excessive fatigue, men learn by maneuvers in the field what it is like to be red-eyed with weariness and still to carry on with planning and doing. It makes veterans of them, as nearly as may be short of battle with live ammunition. Parade-ground exercises will not teach men how to move a mechanized outfit rapidly through the black night, without lights, to points coordinated with the movements of other members of the intricately organized team. Actually to have done it, even once, is a morale-builder of indispensable value.

The maneuver under simulated war conditions not only indurates the individual but shows up the weak spots in team work for correction and perfection; it grinds the edge of the cutting-tool and readies it for the final honing, which is the final process of conditioning a fighting army and which is our simile for the eve-of-battle pep talk to the team that has been trained for the gridiron, for the hour-of-trial inspiration of the men on whose rugged, toughened, self-confident, and understanding fidelity the ultimate safety of their own people ultimately depends. Military morale is for this end.

Two important factors have been left for final mention for the

sake of emphasis. Not every soldier carries a bayonet, not every airman dives in a bomber, not every sailor goes undersea or mans a gun turret. Every branch of military service has its calls for duty and for sacrificial fidelity. The need for team work reaches all the way forward and all the way back. It has always been true and is now more true than ever, that military and civilian morale are welded inseparably. In modern war there are no noncombatants, broadly speaking; the spiritual inclusion is complete. A break in morale at any point will weaken the whole effort.

The other of these two factors is that of conservation of the wholesome psychologic balance of the individual in military service. What about the twenty-four-hour day of the soldier? Even a machine of metal parts needs rest, overhauling, oiling, reconditioning. The human machine needs a good deal of reconditioning, needs it in daily, weekly rhythm—food, sleep, rest, recreation, relaxation, just plain fun.

In the Army of the United States the principle has been accepted that the responsibility for providing for these necessities rests with the Army, and within the limits of Army camps it is no longer left to the volunteered ministrations of civilian agencies. The Morale Branch has been established, whose functions not only include studies and recommendations and activities in the whole field of military morale but include specifically the responsibility for installations of physical facilities for recreation and administration of recreational activities of every practicable sort. There are dayrooms for the companies, recreational buildings for the regiments, and service club buildings for the posts with hostesses. The hostesses also preside over guest houses for the accommodation of relatives and friends who occasionally visit the soldier in camp. There are chapels, theaters, athletic fields, libraries, and swimming pools where practicable. Special camps are being provided in increasing number in what are known as "leave areas," where from five hundred to a thousand men can be accommodated on duty-free week ends, the camps being located where a combination of opportunity exists for water sports and other outdoor diversion, with the entertainments that can be found in cities. The purpose is to provide relaxation

from tension and routine, a change of environment, a spot of refreshment, a breathing spell.

Morale officers assist commanders in all morale responsibilities, and in particular they supervise these important necessities of daily life in the military camps. They also serve as liaison officers between the camp authority and the civilian leaders and authorities of adjacent communities. This is a necessary function in the zone where military and civilian morale overlap, as the welfare activities conducted for soldiers in civilian areas are under the direction of civilian agencies.

Social contacts, dances, shows, radio programs, church affairs, dinner invitations in private homes, transportation problems, police regulations—the incidental responsibilities of the morale officer liken him to the eldest brother of an old-fashioned large family.

Military morale, then, is whatever you may be thinking of when you are contemplating the activating, vitalizing force of any large or small military organization—one man or millions. Health measures, recreation, books, comforts, training program, discipline—all these and their variations are but the means. The thing itself when developed is the indomitable spirit of man.

General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, in the course of an address on this subject, said:

I would change Napoleon's axiom of the ratio of morale to material from three to one to six to one. . . . In a spirit of mutual respect and co-operation, the Army of the United States must now proceed with its high purpose of welding the elements of the American democracy into a disciplined, seasoned fighting force capable of defending the nation.

UNITED STATES ARMY

MORALE AND CIVILIAN DEFENSE

JAMES M. LANDIS

ABSTRACT

Morale is a particular state of mind which is shared by members of a group. It consists of the devotion of men to an idea for which they are ready to make any sacrifice. Civilian defense and civilian morale are built on total participation. Civilian morale requires the reactivation of democratic ideals and the acceptance by the American people of their responsibility for total defense efforts.

Morale is a familiar experience and its importance is universally recognized. It represents the dynamic factor in human action. A group of men engaged in a common task must have sound bodies and some form of acquired skill, just as a good machine must be made of materials having the requisite strength and of parts shaped and fitted in accordance with an appropriate design. But a group of men, like a machine, will not operate without power. In the case of the machine this power is physical or chemical; in the case of human groups it is mental. Men are not automatons but act from feeling, interest, will, and thought. These provide what is called the "motivation" of their action. The term "morale" refers to this distinctively human form of motive power. The morale is said to be good when this motive power is such as to raise the action of the group to its maximum of efficiency; the morale is bad when the motive power is weak, intermittent, or unregulated, so that the human group, like the machine, falters, stalls, or gets out of hand.

So far, then, good morale is a state of mind, shared by members of a group and moving them to make the fullest use of their strength and skill to attain a given objective. It is not a state of mind existing in one man alone, but in many. It is not a state of mind to be enjoyed, for itself, but to serve as a spring of action. It is not a uniform state of mind—the same under all circumstances—but is relative to the end in view.

With these fundamental conditions in mind, let us now examine the causes. This question I propose to approach not scientifically but practically. What are the methods of control by which good morale is created and preserved?

First, there are the physical causes. The state of a man's mind depends on the state of his body. He is made sullen or irritable by bad food, apathetic by undernourishment, irresolute and depressed by fatigue or lack of sleep; he may be wholly incapacitated by sickness or wounds. Hence there is an obligation to give attention to men's bodily needs and to the satisfaction of their appetites. But if morale is to be judged by its effectiveness in promoting a given objective there is a limit to the use of these physical causes. The army does not exist for the purpose of giving its members a pleasant life; that end could be better attained by leaving them at home. As soldiers they must be prepared for war and so their bodies must be hardened. Modern war puts a more severe strain on the human body than war in any other period of military history. The function of military morale is not to remove bodily hardships but to make men capable of extraordinary endurance and exertions. They have to be trained and not pampered. Under combat conditions and even in maneuvers soldiers must expect less sleep, less rest, and even less food than usual, and good morale requires that they shall stand such privation without any slackening of effort. The art of morale, then, consists not in giving men what their appetites demand but in persuading them that the denial of their appetites is necessary. Soldiers are quick to distinguish between privations due to incompetence and privations imposed by the conditions of warfare. The important thing is that they should accept these conditions and be willing to adopt the means, however disagreeable or painful, because of their devotion to the end. So a merely physical morale, founded on the appeasing of appetites, gives way to the implanting of a purpose that is stronger than their appetites.

The second cause of morale is psychological, consisting in the arousal of certain reactions that are called instinctive because they are believed to be inborn and universal. The good officer, like the good politician or personnel manager, knows how to arouse these reactions, even though he may never have studied psychology. The instinctive reactions which are ordinarily assumed to be favorable to good morale are combativeness, rivalry, initiative, fellow-feeling, gregariousness, docility, infectious gaiety. Through the arousal of these reactions men are disposed to fight, to seek victory over op-

ponents, to outstrip competitors, to follow example, to help comrades, to enjoy participation in collective action, to obey orders, and to remain cheerful even under adverse conditions. Here again, however, the mood must suit the circumstances and must contribute to the attainment of the objective. Gaiety of spirits, for example, makes for good morale when it serves as a correction of boredom, fatigue, or minor forms of discontent.

In the last war a sense of humor helped to reconcile men even to muddy trenches, swarming rats, bursting shells, and snipers' bullets. Or observe this column of tired soldiers, loaded down with heavy packs, marching along a dusty road in Flanders on a hot day in the summer of 1917. One company after another passes with grim endurance pictured on their faces. They are taking their punishment, but it is wearing them, galling them in body and mind. But at length comes another company in high spirits, the men joking with one another, singing snatches of song, and apparently having a good time. What makes the difference? Only a red-haired, freckle-faced boy, a divinely appointed funnyman, who is not afraid of the sound of his own voice—rather likes it in fact—whose shameless spontaneity loosens the tension of effort and diverts consciousness from the place that hurts. But it is evident that it is possible to be too funny or to be funny at the wrong time. Lightheartedness may make men irresponsible or overconfident. At any rate, somebody has to remain serious. The test lies in the practical effect, relative to an objective—such as the defeat of an enemy.

Similarly, the arousal of the fighting instinct may lead to recklessness, or to a refusal to obey orders; rivalry may lead to jealousy and prevent team work; imitation may destroy initiative; fellow-feeling may lead to sentimentality or softness; gregariousness and docility may destroy individual self-reliance.

So we are brought back again to the fundamental requirement of good morale—namely, that men should be devoted to an idea and be ready for whatever suffering, whatever effort, whatever mood or attitude that idea may require. Men may work together with the maximum of effectiveness only when their devotion to a common idea is stronger than their private ideas, and stronger than their appetites.

The morale of ideas, or ideational morale, is different for every group. The idea is acquired—it is not a part of the original endowment of human nature, shared by all mankind. The red-haired funnyman described above might have belonged to any army or any unit. The effect would have been the same. But ideational morale depends on the special conditioning which results from experience, tradition, and indoctrination.

I speak of the morale of ideas, rather than of idealistic or ideological morale, not in order to avoid unnecessary syllables but because I wish to suggest that it is a very simple and ordinary thing and need not have a "moral" character, as that term is commonly used. The two simplest cases, in military experience, are *esprit de corps* and the will to victory.

Esprit de corps is the pride which the individual takes in the army, service, or unit to which he belongs. He was not born with any such pride; he has acquired it from his associations. It need have no deeper meaning. The collective body to which the individual "belongs" may stand for nothing beyond itself—it is just the American Army, or the Twenty-sixth Division, or the Sixty-ninth Regiment, or the Air Force, or even the company, the platoon, or the squadron. Through the operation of psychological causes, such as emulation, the collective body—its honor, its reputation, its success in whatever it undertakes—assumes a paramount importance for its members. Loyalty to this body and to its symbols is stronger than personal interests or opinions and stronger than their appetites. Because they identify themselves with the collective body they feel its attainments to be their own, and enjoy a sense of participation in a co-ordinated activity, like that of a team, a chorus, or an orchestra.

The will to victory is *esprit de corps* combined with the idea of an enemy. The combative instincts acquire a specific and permanent object. *Carthago delenda est*—"Carthage must be destroyed." An alien nation becomes a "hereditary enemy." The present determination of Britain and America to "defeat Hitler" is a case in point. It is not an expression of instinct but a fixation, by which a number of instincts are directed and focused by an idea, as a result of experience and report over a period of years.

Morale becomes idealistic or ideological when such motivating

ideas are broadened and generalized. Thus when, in the last war, President Wilson addressed the selectees as "soldiers of freedom," he meant that the members of the American Army or of any of its subdivisions should think of these collective bodies as the instruments of a larger cause. He desired that American soldiers should thus be moved not only by a sense of partisanship but by a sense of rightness. Similarly, when we are called upon to defeat not Germany but Naziism, not Hitler but "the dictators," it is in order that we may feel not a purely national or personal enmity but a moral enmity, and seek the defeat not of men but of a principle of evil.

A group's ideational morale tends to become idealistic or ideological in order to satisfy the doubts and scruples of one's own members, in order to win allies, and in order to gain the approval of neutrals or even of enemy nationals. Suppose that the members of an army begin to feel that mere glory does not justify their sacrifices—that dying for an army differs only in degree from dying for "dear old Siwash"—or that they begin to suspect that feelings are being worked up so that they may be the willing tools of their leaders and rulers! Or suppose that a Roman begins to feel that a Carthaginian is, after all, a human being, and that there is nothing particularly noble about killing him and enslaving his wives and children! If the allegiance of partisans is to be held, sheer *esprit de corps* or sheer enmity has then to be converted into other terms if it is to appear worthy and reasonable.

The necessity for this transformation will vary according to circumstances. It is relatively unnecessary with professional soldiers or in the heat of battle; it is relatively necessary for men who still think and feel in terms of civil interests and occupations, during intervals of peace and preparation, at a distance from the theater of actual hostilities, or over long periods of time as the military mentality relaxes and more normal ambitions and modes of thought and feeling have a chance to assert themselves. In short, idealistic or ideological morale is better suited to a broad appeal, to the distant view, and to the long run.

The application to the present situation in America is evident. Modern warfare requires of us, as of all nations, a total effort. Our morale must be all-comprehensive. It must provide a motivation

not only for combatants but for all the supporting services which reach out into every region, every group, and every occupation. Whether, at this writing, we are or are not at war is a technical question; but in any case we are not feeling the heat of battle, nor are we in the theater of hostilities. We cannot depend on the primitive passions of combativeness and self-preservation to inhibit doubts and scruples, to supersede the dictates of prudence, or to dissolve our differences. We are taking the relatively distant and the relatively long view of the situation, and we can still enjoy the luxury of reflection. We require good reasons. Therefore, while we must make use of the physical and psychological agencies of morale and create *esprit de corps* and a will to victory, this motivation will not suffice—not for a moment. We must, in fact, begin with an idealistic or an ideological morale, and then implement it by physical and psychological means and by collective pride and a fixed determination to defeat the particular enemy.

The name for our ideal or ideology is "democracy"; which means, briefly, that organized society shall be controlled by, and for the benefit of, its individual members. This form of human society, we think, is the best—the best for every people that is capable of achieving it and in any case the best for us. This we take to be the goal of our historical evolution and the ultimate standard of our policy. It is in order to be this, and to be this more fully, that we assert the right to exist and to enjoy security. It is this which is our united interest, as distinguished from the interests which are merely yours or merely mine; or, rather, this is the common pattern and framework of that life together within which we hope, each of us, to find his own good. If this idea is to serve the purpose of morale each man's devotion to it must be stronger than his appetites, and stronger than his devotion to any narrower end which divides him from his fellow-Americans. This does not and cannot occur completely, but it is only in so far as it occurs in a high degree in a considerable majority of the people that we can be said to have any moral unity or any morale on the idealistic, ideological level.

The Office of Civilian Defense exists for the purpose of organizing the citizens—men and women—of each community as auxiliaries to the regular armed forces. It is the function of this federal organiza-

tion, of the state committees of public safety, and of the local defense committees appointed at the request of the governors of the states to prepare the people at large to meet the threat of war. These agencies are engaged in the training of personnel whose duty it would be, in case of attack, to report the approach of an enemy, to extinguish fires, to provide shelters, to repair damage to property, to evacuate women and children, and to care for the sick or wounded. They are engaged in mapping local areas, with special reference to public utilities, and in making an inventory of facilities available for any of the foregoing measures of defense, relief, or security. They co-ordinate existing agencies, public and private, which are already devoted to these ends.

All of these organizations, federal, state, and local, require their own morale. They call for physical strength and alertness. They must be infused with a spirit of combativeness and of emulation, each unit seeking to outstrip the other in its zeal or efficiency. They must be bound together among themselves by a sense of partnership, by loyalty to their directors and chairmen, by mutual trust, and by confidence in their united strength. They must, if they are to serve well, acquire *esprit de corps* and a will to victory—a resolute determination to avert or resist the danger from abroad.

But the organization of Civilian Defense has a deeper meaning. It is symbolic of the fact that readiness for defense, like war itself, is total. Nothing will suffice short of the consolidated and organized effort of the entire nation. Civilian Defense gives every man and woman a place in the ranks, along with the armed forces, the leaders in industry, and the workers in industrial plants. It is peculiarly dependent, and peculiarly responsible, for that morale of ideas, that fidelity to democratic ideals, which provides the only adequate motivation for a genuinely national American effort.

The members of the British Home Guard have witnessed the death and destruction wrought by the enemy's planes. They can hear the thunder of guns across the Channel and know that the invader is at their door. The toll of their dead and wounded mounts from day to day. The deeper spiritual reserves of a brave people fighting for their lives and their independence have been aroused. American civilians would not be less brave in the hour of extremity—

but they are now called upon to serve when the danger is as yet comparatively remote. They must be induced by prudence and intelligence to do what they would instinctively do in the immediate presence of a catastrophe, in order that a future catastrophe may be lessened or averted. They must rely on a peacetime morale to prepare for a wartime possibility. What they cannot draw from the heat of passion or from inexorable necessity they must draw from a deliberate fidelity to their principles and their institutions. Since they can rely less on the vividness of the danger they must rely more on a sense of the value of the thing endangered.

✓ The organization of Civilian Defense supports the armed forces by supplementary services; it spreads defense throughout the land. It must also support the morale of the armed forces by spreading morale throughout the land. Behind the army, the navy, and industry, Civilian Defense stands as an auxiliary agency. Behind the spirit of the army, the navy, and industry stands the spirit of their families and their communities. ✓ Soldiers, sailors, managers, and workers have not ceased to be members of families and communities. They are still civilians and will remain civilians, despite their uniforms, their weapons, their machines, and their tools. Their morale is not likely to rise higher than its civilian sources. It is a duty of Civilian Defense to raise this morale high and to keep it high, so that the men in the forward ranks may receive from their homes a continuous refreshment of zeal and determination; so that they will feel themselves watched, applauded, and reinforced by a solid nation.

The attainment of a civilian or national morale, comparable to the development of our armaments and adequate to the present emergency, imposes the following tasks:

1. Those values which are embraced with the idea of democracy must be felt to possess superlative worth and must be given precedence over every narrower interest. If these values have been forgotten, they must be remembered; if they have grown rusty, they must be made to shine; if they have grown cold, they must be warmed; if they have been disputed, they must recover the adherence of every American.


2. It must be realized that democracy, like every idea, lives in men's minds and hearts, and that men's minds and hearts dwell in physical bodies—that democracy is thus vulnerable to physical force and requires physical force for its defense. It must be recognized that democracy is now endangered by a physical as well as a moral enemy, and that its defense now requires a readiness to meet that enemy with a force of proportional magnitude.

3. Dissenters of every political or doctrinal persuasion must be reminded that there is a time for debate and a time for united action, and that full collaboration with other nations for the purpose of securing the defeat of Nazi Germany is now a public policy which it is the duty of every American citizen to support.

4. The American people, despite a traditional faith in their impregnable remoteness, must be taught that there is no longer any such thing as a "safe distance," that there is no security for America except in an orderly world, and that the only effective defense is an offensive against the disturbers of peace. Americans must be persuaded to accept once and for all a responsibility proportional to the greatness of her power and the greatness of her interest.

Only on the basis of these convictions can there exist a morale deep, wide, and enduring enough to see this country through this third great crisis in her history, comparable in its gravity to the Revolution of 1776 and the War between the States of 1860. Only on the basis of these convictions can we hope to transform a precarious defense into a lasting security.

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PROPAGANDA AND MORALE

GEORGE CREEL

ABSTRACT

Since the morale of the front line derives directly from the morale of the civilian population from which the armed forces are drawn, the mind of a nation must be mobilized no less than its man-power. Particularly today, when wars are a trial of strength between opposed ideals as well as opposed armies, public opinion is a major force, and the one sure way to form a steadfast, enduring public opinion is to inform it. Any form of censorship and any attempt to suppress, twist, or conceal will result inevitably in an impairment of the popular confidence that is the very heart of morale. A free people cannot be told what to think but must be given every fact in the case and permitted to do their own thinking. Propaganda—the fight for the promotion and maintenance of morale—can have no other basis than honesty and candor, for in every human being there is an instinct for truth. Tom-tom beating and tribal incantations, built on lies, deceit, corruption, megalomania, and national egotism, may rush a nation into war and whip up passions for a while, but froth and dregs are bound to be the ultimate result. The justice of a nation's cause must be proved and preached, but even that is not enough. If the struggle is to enlist heart and mind and soul, the bloody business of wholesale slaughter must be illumined by the hope of a new and better world-order. Hitler may sneer at the "idealistic note" in propaganda, but it is only to high idealism that free peoples respond.

The relation between propaganda and morale is intimate and inseparable. The "war will" of the civilian population is a nation's second line, and "war will," particularly in a democracy, depends upon the degree to which people can be made to consecrate and concentrate body, soul, and spirit in the supreme effort of service and sacrifice, giving complete assent to the truth that all business is the nation's business and every task a common task for a single purpose. Without national unity, based on high resolves and unfaltering determinations, the courage of the firing line is bound to be weakened, for the morale of the army derives from the morale of the nation of which the army is only the fighting part. Ask any admiral or general, and he will admit that propaganda—the fight for public opinion—is as integral a part of any war machine as ships, guns, and planes. The "mind" of a people must be mobilized as well as its man-power.

There is still another aspect of the question to be considered. Modern wars are a trial of strength between opposed ideals as well as opposed armies, with moral victories having all the value of military decisions. The "verdict of mankind," as Woodrow Wilson put it, is by no means an empty phrase. Propaganda can win either the

friendship or active support of neutral nations and, if based on truth and backed by facts, can even break down enemy morale, both in the front line and behind it.

All of which has been military gospel for centuries. If the campaigns of Caesar, Hannibal, Frederick the Great, Napoleon, and Washington are studied, it will be seen that each one recognized public opinion as a major force. George Washington, in particular, relied heavily on propaganda and placed as much faith in the pen of Thomas Paine as in the muskets of his ragged soldiers. So it is today in this second World War. Goebbels is more the right hand of Adolf Hitler than beefy Goering, for the *Führer* ranks psychological offensives along with his *Panzer* divisions. Winston Churchill's "blood, sweat, and tears" is the very essence of propaganda, and Russia and Italy, albeit blunderingly, work their propagandists overtime.

Before going any further with the discussion, however, there must be some agreement on definition, a clean-cut establishment of difference between meat and poison. When Pope Gregory XV, back in 1622, created the *Congregatio de propaganda fide*, what he had in mind, and all that he had in mind, was the guidance of those sandaled missionaries who went forth from Rome to preach the gospel in foreign fields. The propagation of faith! The spread of Christian doctrine! Just that and nothing else. Today, however, propaganda retains no trace of its original meanings and here in the United States particularly has come to stand only for evil, deceit, and corruption. The reason is not far to find. Throughout the first World War both German and Allied propagandists concentrated on the manufacture of hate, convinced that the "will to win" had its source in the baser emotions. After the Armistice a large majority made printed confession of their activities, some cynically, others boastfully, but all shamelessly. The manufacture of atrocities was confessed, and dishonesties were grinningly admitted and justified as "part of the game." Straightway American opinion, reacting from the intense emotionalism of the war years, made propaganda a whipping boy.

Editors, historians, and publicists, especially those who had been most chauvinistic, hastened to purify their records by furious condemnation. Some saw propaganda as an actual cause of war, and

others, as the corrosive product, but all were a unit in austere and pharisaically demanding its exorcism from American life. It was attacked as the "primary weapon of the world's invisible governments, its microbes infecting humanity like a plague," and as a "new and subtler instrument to weld mankind into one amalgamated mass of hate." George Sylvester Viereck, head of the German drive in the United States prior to 1917, even came forward with an exact definition. "Propaganda," he asserted, "is a campaign camouflaging its origin, its motives or both, conducted for the purpose of obtaining a specific objective by the manipulation of public opinion."

Putting the hysterical and brazen to one side for the moment, there is another objection to propaganda, or rather a distaste, that operates to keep many people, particularly scholars, scientists, and the academic type, on the side lines when controversial issues are involved. The late Stuart P. Sherman, professor of English in the University of Illinois at the time, touched upon it in his *American and Allied Ideals*, a pamphlet, written in 1917. He said:

Most educated Americans have been bred and trained to look with suspicion upon the propagandist. Most of us have been indoctrinated with the ideal which is said to guide the investigator in the fields of science, namely, to follow truth patiently, dispassionately, wherever it leads, without references to its practical consequences. Accordingly, most of us have adopted the attitude of neutral enquirers and expositors. We seek to create the impression that we have no axe to grind. We have accustomed ourselves to studying and presenting our facts with true impartiality, all that there are on one side and all that there are on the other, concealing our point of view, abstaining from advocacy, withholding our conclusions, leaving the verdict to a jury which our own apparent indifference has frequently rendered genuinely indifferent.

To depart from this position of personal reticence and neutrality is for some of us distasteful and for all of us dangerous, unless we know precisely what we are about. To participate, in the fever and excitement of war time, in a zealous campaign for political and cultural ideals is frankly to forsake the still air of delightful studies for the arena of violent and angry passions. It is to be occupied no longer with "mere literature" but with high explosives.¹

So much for the definitions and interpretations of propaganda as set down by those who fear it and distrust it and by others grown sick of returning to their vomit. Instead of advancing a definition of

¹ "War Information Series" (Washington, D.C.: Committee on Public Relations February, 1918), No. 12, pp. 3-4.

my own, let me cite two examples of what I regard as perfect propaganda from every possible point of view, both the work of one who was not only America's first propagandist but indubitably the greatest of all time. Although few historians confess it, even after Lexington and Bunker Hill, the colonists had little real conception of the struggle as a war for independence. The armed protest of America was against evil ministers and unjust laws, and, with these wrongs redressed, the people were eager and willing to resume their allegiance to good King George, the "Father of His People." So matters stood until January, 1776, when suddenly Thomas Paine, a poor, middle-aged, English bankrupt, lighted a fire that bathed the land in flame, burning away moldy traditions and inherited submissions. *Common Sense*, as he called his pamphlet, rose high above haggling and was contemptuous in its dismissal of petty disputes over laws, taxes, and ministers. Strong and clear as the seven trumpets of rams' horns that blew before Jericho, Paine sounded a call for independence in the name of the free states of America.

Since nothing but blows will do, for God's sake let us come to a final separation. Anything short of that is mere patchwork—it is leaving the sword to our children. . . . *Dearly, dearly*, do we pay for the repeal of the acts if that is all we fight for . . . [p. 31]. It is as great a folly to pay a Bunker Hill price for law as for land . . . [p. 22]. 'Tis not the affair of a city, a country, a province or a kingdom, but of a continent. 'Tis not the concern of a day, a year or an age—posterity are involved in the contest. . . . Now is the seed-time of continental union, faith, and honor—as in absolute governments the king is law, so in free countries the law ought to be king . . . [p. 56]. The continental belt is too loosely buckled . . . independence is the only bond that can tie and keep us together [p. 59].²

The whole theory of monarchy was explained and denied; the evils of England's rule recited; reconciliation was proved to be ruin; and America's chances of victory were honestly weighed. Other appeals followed in quick succession, and General Washington, realizing their "sound doctrine and unanswerable reasoning," urged their circulation to the utmost as invaluable in the stimulation of a sound, dynamic public opinion. Paine's pamphlets, more than any

² *The Writings of Thomas Paine* (from *Common Sense* [Albany, N.Y.: Charles R. and George Webster, 1792]).

other one thing, were responsible for the Declaration of Independence.

Now it was the bitter days of November, 1776, when Washington and his men, like deer before the hounds, fled across New Jersey's frozen marshes, as tattered and demoralized a crew as ever called itself an army. First the disaster at Long Island, due to Israel Putnam's blunders, then the loss of the Hudson River forts, and now this dreary, hopeless flight through a panic-stricken land, its people shamelessly eager to make terms with the British. Gone were the fierce enthusiasms of Concord and Bunker Hill, the glow of the great Declaration, and all that sustained the revolution was the iron fortitude of the commander-in-chief.

The decision to deliver a surprise attack on the Hessians at Trenton was more a resolve born of desperation than any stroke of strategy. Cold, hunger, and exhaustion had turned the troops into stumbling automatons without hope of victory, but as Washington declared in a dispatch, "Necessity, dire necessity, will, nay, *must*, justify any attempt." Only by some bold deed, rich in glory, could the spirit of the colonies be lifted above caution and despondency. It was in the black hours of December 23, while Washington sat gloomily weighing his chances, that a pamphlet fresh from a Philadelphia printing press reached his hands. Again it was Thomas Paine who called to America, and calling in a voice that had the blare of some tremendous clarion.

These are the times that try men's souls. The summer soldier and the sunshine patriot will, in this crisis, shrink from the service of his country, but he that stands it now, deserves the love and thanks of man and woman. Tyranny, like hell, is not easily conquered, yet we have this consolation with us, that the harder the conflict, the more glorious the triumph; what we obtain too cheap we esteem too lightly; 'tis dearness only that gives everything its value. Heaven knows how to put a proper price upon its goods, and it will be strange indeed if so celestial an article as Freedom should not be highly rated.

Judged from the standpoint of the needs that it was meant to meet, literature holds no finer piece of writing than the first *Crisis* that came white hot from Paine's eagle quill. Now soberly, now ardently, the progress of the war was analyzed and disasters were shown to be the result of popular panic rather than British superior-

ity; Washington's tactics were explained and commended; Howe's successes sneered away as a ravage, not a conquest, and a final call to courage ended on this high note.

By perseverance and fortitude we shall have the prospect of a glorious issue; by cowardice and submission the sad choice of a variety of evils—a ravaged country, a depopulated city, habitations without safety and slavery without hope—our homes turned into barracks and bawdyhouses of Hessians, and a future race to provide for whose fathers we shall have doubts of.

By the leap of his own heart, Washington divined the effect upon his men. Straightway drums were sounded, and the soldiers, divided into groups, listened to Paine's winged words as officers read them by the light of torches. It was as wine to the weary patriots, giving them strength to endure the bitter winter winds that swept the Delaware and whipped them as they stumbled through the snow and sleet on the nine-mile march to Trenton, and when they fell upon Ball's unsuspecting Hessians, the battle cry of every man was "These are the times that try men's souls." Not Rouget de Lisle's "Marseillaise" and not John Zizka's "Ye Who the Lord God's Warrior Are" ever lifted the hearts of men more surely to the stars.

Nor did Trenton's victory mark the limit of effect. As Paine's *Crisis* went from town to town, from hand to hand, confidence succeeded dejection, and soon deserters were returning, new recruits pouring in. The politicians and public men, shamed into an appearance of courage at least, took up their neglected duties; and the people, recovered from panic, braced themselves afresh for the grim struggle. Not once only did this thing happen. At every crucial moment in the Revolution, when the struggle seemed hopeless, when leaders and men despaired, Thomas Paine issued some stirring appeal that went straight to the soul of America; a master propagandist who played upon the hearts of the colonists with strong, sure touch. It is not too much to say that his pen was no less mighty than the sword of Washington, for there would have been no armies to lead, no cause to save, had the "rebellious staymaker" not blown upon the dying fires of patriotism until they blazed again.

As no other, Thomas Paine proved that propagandists do *not* have to lie, do *not* have to preach hate, do *not* have to corrupt, and do *not* have to fall victims to megalomania and national egotism. As

further proof, I offer the two-year record of the Committee on Public Information, America's propaganda agency throughout the first World War. Among our activities may be mentioned the following: more than six thousand separate and distinct news releases, each dealing with a matter of importance; some half-hundred pamphlets, packed with detail and rich in possibilities for error; seventy-five thousand Four-Minute Men speaking nightly from material supplied by the committee; other hundreds delivering more extended addresses on fundamentals; thousands of advertisements prepared for donated space in newspapers and magazines; countless motion and still pictures, posters, and painted signs; war expositions; literature prepared for thirty-three foreign-language groups in the United States; the *Official Bulletin*, appearing daily; and in every capital of the world, outside the Central Powers, offices and representatives served daily by cable and mail services that offered every chance for open lies or honest mistakes. And from first to last only four charges of error and untruthfulness were leveled against the committee, and for all of them we had adequate answers.

From April 14, 1917, to June 1, 1919, the world-wide activities of the committee cost the taxpayer exactly \$4,464,602.39. A small sum compared to the \$10,000,000 that the Office for the Coordination of Cultural and Commercial Relations among the American Republics is now spending in one year on Latin America alone, but large enough at the time to make Congress rage about "waste and extravagance." Just as this charge was disproved, however, so were congressional committees compelled to admit that not one dollar of the amount had ever been sent on a dark and secret errand. Neither at home nor abroad did the committee ever spend a penny on bribes or press subsidies. At no point was there ever the "camouflage of origin or motive," to use Viereck's phrase, but the utmost openness. Always it was our policy to find out what the German propagandists were doing, and then we did not do it. People have an instinct for the truth, and while falsehood and trickery may win for a while, detection and reaction are inevitable in the end.

Just as we stayed away from deceit and corruption, so was the committee at pains to avoid even the appearance of manufacturing hate. We issued no atrocity stories, such as the mutilation of women

and babies, alleged crucifixions, etc., etc., and in spite of British pressure refused to sponsor the Bryce report. The temptation was there, of course, for the baser emotions are far more easily stirred than mental processes. Ask any public man, and he will confess that it is much simpler to make people hate than it is to make them think. Nor was it as if the committee was not implored and even commanded to "strike a more savage note." Senators and congressmen attacked us daily as pacifists and pro-Germans for our failures in this regard; even high officials joined in the chauvinistic chorus, and so-called "patriotic" organizations, of which there were many, bedeviled us with appeals to preach hate. As a result of continued refusals, the American Defense Society wrote a letter protesting that the attitude of the Committee on Public Information was

so pacific that some of its work amounts to giving aid and comfort to the enemy. . . . Furthermore, we believe that the Creel Committee has signally failed to put into the hands of our American soldiers and sailors any publication adequately telling them in plain language what they are fighting for, and why they should hate the enemy they are expected to meet and kill.

In my answer I said:

It is true that this Committee has never preached any doctrine of hate, for it is not our duty to deal in emotional appeals, but to give the people the facts from which conclusions may be drawn. And nothing is more untrue than to say that we have failed in this regard. Proof of this can be found in inspection of literature we have issued, the articles we have sent out for publication in the press, the speeches of Four-Minute Men, and all the other varied activities of the Committee. I dispute flatly your assertion that after three years of German warfare the people of the United States are still ignorant of German savagery, just as I dispute flatly your assumption that the speeches of the President of the United States, defining the causes of war, have not been read by anyone. The people of the United States *do* understand, and the proof of it lies in the fact that the mothers of the country have given their sons to the Selective Service Law without question, that every Liberty Loan has been oversubscribed, and that no request of government has ever lacked complete response. Perhaps it is that this very indomitableness of resolve, this iron determination, leaves no room for the manifestations of surface passion.

As a lifelong admirer of Thomas Paine, carrying admiration to the point of writing a book in his vindication, I learned still another fundamental of propaganda from the study of his works. Many people believe that public opinion—the keystone in the arch of

morale—is a state of mind, formed and changed by the events of the day; a combination of kaleidoscope and weathercock. At every point Paine dissented from this theory, denying that public opinion had its rise in the emotions and was tipped from one extreme to the other by every passing rumor and every gust of passion. On the contrary, he proceeded upon the assumption that it had its source in the minds of people, its base in reason, and expressed slow-formed convictions rather than the excitement of the moment. In every issue of the *Crisis*, every issue of *Common Sense*, he provided “information” for the “formation” of public opinion. True, he argued mightily in every pamphlet, but always from the facts in the case. There again he set a pattern. In totalitarian states, where there are no such things as free speech and a free press, people are compelled to accept what is handed out to them by the censor and the propagandist. In a democracy, however, nothing is more imperative than that the people be given full information and exact information. A feeling that they are being kept in the dark, or an impairment of popular confidence in the news, lessens morale quickly and often-times fatally.

This applies not only to the war-making branches of government, both when preparing for war and when war comes, but also the policy-making branches. Throughout the entire period of neutrality, for example, Woodrow Wilson took no action except in full view of the people. His notes to the imperial German government, instead of being mere diplomatic exchanges designed to secure redress for certain wrongs, were presentations of fact with specific purpose to form public opinion by informing it. Examine his speeches and state papers, and it will be seen that never at any time did he deal in flat statements or present conclusions without his reasons for making them. Neither during the neutrality period nor afterward did he permit public opinion to become confused or bewildered. Invariably he briefed the case, then argued from that brief, and, as a result, a whole people backed him up when he went before Congress with his war message.

The committee turned to pamphleteering—as every propagandist must—not only because I like Paine’s pattern but because we could not rely upon the press to create the kind of public opinion

that expresses slow-formed convictions based on facts. A newspaper, chronicling only the events of the day, and dying with the day that gives it birth, is of no value when the objective is a firm and enduring morale. As a consequence, I drafted Guy Stanton Ford, then dean of the University of Minnesota, and under his brilliant direction the foremost historians of the country were called together for pamphlet production. For their guidance two aims were set down; the first was to make America's own purpose and own ideals clear to both ourselves and to the world, whether ally or enemy. The sane execution of this purpose, involving a presentation of what democracy meant to its own people and to all forward-looking peoples, had greater implications than the war needs of the moment. Almost equally important from the standpoint of national morale was a thorough presentation of the aims, methods, and ideals of the dynastic and feudal government of Germany. Both aims were realized, and I say again, as I said at the time, that no nation ever made a clearer or more truthful presentation of its case, not only to its own people, but to the world. Of all the mass of matter issued by Professor Ford's division, dealing with thousands of facts, only one public charge of misstatement was ever voiced, and this was followed by an apology.

All in all, more than seventy-five million copies of our pamphlets went into American homes, all upon direct request. This does not include the circulation given by metropolitan dailies that printed many of the pamphlets in full, nor does it take account of the hundreds of thousands of copies printed by state organizations and even by private individuals. These figures tell something of their usefulness, but not all. The pamphlets were an arsenal from which our speakers drew material, particularly the Four-Minute Men. At this point I differ from President Roosevelt in his high estimate of "cracker-barrel conversations." The committee organized public discussion and stimulated it in every possible manner, believing that it was wise and proper to substitute the logic and reason of the platform for the ignorances and passions of the curbstone.

Aside from the disclosure of military secrets and treasonable utterances, we stood for the ultimate in free speech. What greater mockery than to fight for democracy abroad and undermine it at

home! Here again is something for the propagandist to bear in mind: at all times he must be on guard against contradictions.

If I have seemed to stress unduly and tiresomely the activities of the Committee on Public Information, it is because I know of no other way to make clear my own conception of propaganda in its relation to morale. A free people cannot be told what to think. They must be given the facts and permitted to do their own thinking. Trying to fool, wheedle, or cheat them is a blunder of magnitude, for I say again that people want the truth, demand the truth, and have an instinct for the truth. When Winston Churchill turned away from "goose-stuffing" and told his people frankly that he could offer them only "blood, sweat, and tears," he laid bedrock foundations for their morale. Does anyone imagine for a split second that the Germans could take it as the English have taken it? No, for their morale is built on lies, and when the tide of battle turns, the Reich's civilian population will curl up just as it curled up in 1918.

Just one point more, and I am done. Hitler, in *Mein Kampf*, warns against pitching propaganda on any "idealistic note." So far from agreeing with him, I hold that it is only to a note of high idealism that people respond. Even Germans! Civilized people can never be made to accept war as inevitable and ennobling, and the propagandist who attempts any such task is digging a pit for himself and his cause. The bloody business of wholesale slaughter must be illumined by a ray of hope if the struggle is to enlist heart and soul, and even as Thomas Paine made freedom his battle cry, holding up independence as an ideal for the inspiration of the colonists, so was the committee's propaganda based entirely on Woodrow Wilson's great slogan, "a war to end war." The whole world, sick of the dog-eat-dog tradition, rose in gladness at his call. Everywhere people looked with new eyes upon the horror of destruction that had laid Europe waste and saw it as the logical consequence of tribal hates and superstitions. The thundering ideals of the President imparted a sublime militancy to the innate pacifism of America. A war against war! Mothers gave their sons that the dream might be made to come true, and men went to death with a new courage. The Allied governments accepted the principles of the League of Nations as though

they had come down from Sinai, and neutral nations rallied to our cause. The great ideal, reaching the deluded peoples of the Central Powers, undermined the structure of lies and fears that kept their souls in shadow. The collapse of the Prussian war machine was not physical only but a sheer spiritual disintegration as well. Nothing is more certain than that German reverses will cause it to happen again, for what Goebbels puts out is not propaganda in any true sense of the word but tom-tom beating and tribal incantations.

Unless, then, the lessons taught by experience are deemed of no value and disregarded entirely, the determination of an American propaganda policy would seem to have few difficulties. First and foremost, it should have its base in honesty, candor, and complete confidence in the courage, fortitude, and patriotism of the people. Not lies, not deceit, and not "goose-stuffing," but the formation of public opinion through information. Every activity of government should and must be opened up to the inspection of citizenship, for when all is said and done, war is the people's business and deep concern and not the personal enterprise of admirals and generals. Bad enough in peace time, blindfolds are criminally stupid in a national emergency. All of which applies to the White House with even greater force than to the war-making branches. Among civilized peoples, at least, nothing is more imperative than that a "case" be made for war, so that people may know exactly why they are called upon to take arms and exactly what it is that they are fighting for. In a democracy only the chief executive can make this case, for his is the only voice heard by all. And if he fails for any reason, the propagandists might as well shut up shop and search for some way to make an honest living. Nor is it enough merely to establish the justice of the nation's cause. Even as Woodrow Wilson, a president must look beyond war to the peace and sound a high call to the idealism that is the soul of the race. Then, and only then, will morale have its foundations on that rock against which storm and flood shall not prevail.

SAN FRANCISCO

RADIO AND NATIONAL MORALE

JAMES ROWLAND ANGELL

ABSTRACT

✓ Morale includes intellectual and emotional factors. It requires, therefore, facts and motives to keep it vigorous. Both the radio and the press make their impact upon these areas. The radio has a psychological advantage over the newspaper in that it requires less effort to listen than to read and in that its message is carried by a human voice. Furthermore, its news is reported more quickly and to a greater audience. Although the movie requires the exertion of going to a theater, it can exploit the principles of crowd psychology. There is substantially no limit to the type of morale-promoting techniques which the radio can employ. A central organizing body is needed to coordinate the activities of all morale-promoting agencies.

Both writer and reader may be spared the superfluous task of laboriously proving that radio is a tremendously powerful element in the creation and maintenance of national morale and that it may be equally well used as an extremely sinister force in the destruction of such morale. Every intelligent person knows these things to be true. It is perhaps most worth while for the purposes immediately in hand to dwell on the differences between radio and the other principal morale-building agencies which are available in a democracy like our own. Obviously there are to be mentioned here the press, the movie and the theater, the pulpit and the public platform, to say nothing of the various educational institutions which play upon the minds of their pupils with varying but continuing force.

Without attempting any thorough analysis of the elements that go into the composition of morale, we may remind ourselves that, like all human attitudes, morale depends in part upon certain intellectualistic factors—notably upon what we accept as the facts in a given situation—and in part derives from the depth and vigor of the feelings and emotions which are called out by the specific issues at stake. Morale cannot long exist in a vacuum. It must have food to feed upon and a strong and enduring set of motives to keep it vigorous.

A high national morale, especially in times of crisis, involves, among other things, a general belief that the government is in safe hands with intelligent men of integrity in charge. It involves measurable confidence in the essential economic and social stability of

the country and in the adequacy of its resources—both human and material—to meet any instant demands. It involves in normal times a reasonable conviction of security. These are all clearly elements of a relatively intellectual type. They concern information and knowledge accepted as reliable fact. But if, and as, a crisis develops menacing the welfare and even the existence of a nation, the firm resolution to face and master it will require, in addition to accurate and adequate knowledge, the stirring of the most vital feelings. Individual men will do much from a sheer cold sense of duty, the masses must be moved by emotional excitement and exaltation if they are to reach any high pitch of forceful action, and especially if this involves conscious acceptance of sacrifice, pain, and even death as lesser evils than those with which they feel themselves to be menaced.

Now the great agencies which we have already mentioned make their impact upon both of these important areas of human nature, and I proceed as suggested to remark certain differences in the manner in which radio makes its peculiar contribution when compared with the others.

In times like our own, when crucial events move with unparalleled rapidity, when a week or day may bring shattering changes in the outlook upon life, the prompt dissemination of news takes on a critical importance that in earlier generations was unknown. In the instant transmission of such news radio enjoys a position of primacy which even the newspaper press, its only possible rival, does not seriously challenge. The fact that the larger part of the news thus distributed has originated in identical sources largely supported by newspapers, such as the Associated Press and the United Press, does not alter the fact that millions of people hear news on the radio before they see it presented in the press. Moreover, it takes practically no effort to listen, whereas securing a paper and reading it does require such effort and may be inconvenient. The illiterate who read with difficulty, or not at all, can and do easily follow the radio statements. Furthermore, the relatively abbreviated radio report apparently does not diminish, but for many persons rather augments, the interest in reading later the fuller statement which may appear in the newspaper.

It is often charged that the radio news reports are colored by the prejudices of the broadcasters, and under totalitarian regimes this is completely true, but in our own country this is as little true as could be expected, with due regard, of course, to the limitations of human nature. The so-called news commentators undoubtedly at times incorporate their own bias into their discussions and probably could not avoid doing so if they tried. But the sheer news reporter is generally reading a statement submitted by some news-gathering agency, and save as by intonation and accent he may imply approval or disapproval, belief or disbelief, there is very little tinkering with fresh news on the American radio, and most of that which occurs is almost certainly quite unintentional. Radio companies cannot afford to create public distrust of their broadcasts, and such distrust is an inevitable consequence of frequent and purposeful misrepresentation.

Nor should it be forgotten in this connection that the newspaper, the only other important source of news, is equally often accused of coloring its news columns by misleading headlines which create prejudice, or by other devices, and in any case the editorial page is frankly partisan. American radio, in general, claims to forego editorializing, and the claim is commonly correct as far as concerns overt expression, though its critics maintain that by indirection at least it makes its policies felt as truly as does the newspaper.

Again, as compared with the printed page whose meaning is taken in by the eye, radio with its transmission of the living human voice enjoys with most listeners a great psychological advantage. This is under ordinary conditions less significant in the mere communication of news, but when a great personality speaks on an issue of current moment, the effect as compared with the reading of the address at a later time is generally far greater. That the speaker is at a distance, possibly half around the world, that the voice conveys a sense of sincerity and integrity (if it does), makes an appeal that the printed page simply cannot equal in the case of most persons.

On the other hand, the more highly educated and the more habitual readers in the public may want to study the address at leisure before acceding to the principles advocated, and at this point the radio naturally must surrender at once to the newspaper or the mag-

azine—to say nothing of the book. The listener follows as well as his mind permits, but, save in rare individuals, there is little or no capacity to survey in its entirety the cogency of the presentation as may readily be done when the material is in print.

As assets then for radio are (1) the immediacy of its conveyance of news; (2) the vast mass of persons thus reached, many of them having only delayed access, if any, to the newspapers, and not a few being unused to reading, or incapable of it; (3) the psychological appeal of the living human voice as contrasted with cold type—even when accompanied with the barrage of photographs now so universally employed by the press. Clearly the first two points are most significant for morale on the side of information and knowledge; the third has this attribute also, but it is especially important in its emotional potentialities. The promptness with which invading armies attempt to seize radio stations is itself evidence of the invaluable assistance which radio may render to either invader or invaded, and not least because of its effects upon morale.

The newsreel and the ordinary movie both possess tremendous emotional appeal and when skilfully used they may exercise a mass influence second only to radio itself, if indeed it be second. The influence of radio is commonly exerted in the home, and while the number of persons reached may take on astronomical dimensions, the bulk of the listening is actually done in small domestic groups and often by single individuals. The movie, on the other hand, as a morale-builder requires that people make the effort to go to a theater; but when an audience is actually gathered, the movie can exploit the principles of crowd psychology. People become excited and the excitement is contagious, and presently a great body of emotional exaltation is created which sends the audience out powerfully moved to action.

The newsreels showing soldiers in camp or in battle, warships at sea and engaged in naval battles, airplanes, tanks, flame throwers, and all the paraphernalia of modern wars—these may be extremely stirring when they are used to promote patriotic feeling. Movie plays such as *Pastor Hall* exercise a tremendous influence upon the average audience, and many other examples from the present war and the previous great war will occur to everyone.

Naturally the movie cannot compete with the radio or the newspaper as an instant transmitter of information, but it often serves as a summarizer of recent important events and does it in a way to leave more persistent memories than does the radio. This circumstance is partly attributable to the fact that some persons recall more accurately and permanently what they see, while others are more successful in retaining what they hear. But no small part of the power of the movie is due to the general setting which it gives to that which it relates. A radio statement that Smolensk is being attacked by the Germans is rather less likely to be apprehended adequately, than if pictures of the place, its people, its position on the map, etc., are shown as in a movie.

The traditional theater may exercise a profound effect upon those who are in a position to see powerful plays competently produced; but that number is relatively very small compared to the patrons of the movies and the radio. No one would wish to use a purely quantitative measure in evaluating these things, but in matters of national morale numbers cannot be disregarded.

The forum and the public platform have come to use broadcasting so regularly when it can be arranged, that one can hardly distinguish the two as far as concerns influence upon morale. As in the case of the theater, the limited number of people who can hear a speaker by direct contact in an audience lessens enormously the influence of voice, manner, and personality, which apart from sheer brilliancy of presentation, constitute the incomparable assets of the effective public speaker. Many of these traits can, of course, be caught and transmitted by radio, so that it is not to be wondered at that this new device should be so eagerly sought by commanding leaders. But it does make rather futile any effort to contrast the two procedures for stimulating morale.

The pulpit in its turn is widely using radio and for much the same reasons that have just been mentioned in connection with publicists and politicians. On the other hand, the forces to which religion appeals are definitely distinguishable from some of those we have been considering. To many shut-ins the broadcasted religious service is the only means of contact with public worship and as such is pathetically appreciated. Furthermore, by means of radio the greatest preachers of our generation may be heard by millions who cannot

possibly expect to hear them in a church. The importance of the religious element in national morale is easily overlooked and underestimated, especially in so secular minded an age as this. But it is nonetheless there, and radio, because it finds its way directly into so many millions of homes, enjoys a unique power to marshal the spiritual and ethical forces of the nation. It is doubtful whether any other agency can compete with it in this field.

The critical element in broadcasting is, of course, the program, and if this be not of a character to attract and hold the listeners' attention, no results of any kind are going to follow. Some programs are listened to because they are amusing, some because they are informing, some because they are restful and refreshing, and some because they are exciting and beautiful, as in the case of great musical renditions. Others attract attention because of the personalities appearing on them and because of interest in the issues they discuss or the causes they represent. But no program holds an audience that does not strongly appeal to some such motives as I have mentioned, and all programs, especially those aimed at reinforcing national morale, must, of necessity, be very sensitive to these considerations. Inexperienced laymen are full of bright ideas as to what should be done on radio programs—and often they are right enough in their ideas—but when it comes to translating these ideas into an actual radio program, the result is all too often a complete flop.

Assuming that the general nature of the program has been skillfully designed, there is substantially no limit to the type of morale-promoting techniques which can be employed. At the present moment, for example, with roughly a million and a half young men taken from their homes and introduced into military camps, there is a tremendous opportunity which radio is already seeking to exploit to keep parents in direct personal touch with their boys. This is done through programs sent out from the camps in which the soldiers and sailors themselves participate and in which the life of the camp and its daily experiences are dramatized and made vivid to those at home. Where possible, television is being brought in to augment this process and, as a result, parents and friends actually see for themselves the life of the camp, and often they catch sight of their own boys passing before the camera. Conversely, a systematic effort is

being made to broadcast into the camps all kinds of interesting and entertaining material, and, as is well known, actors and actresses, musicians and other artists are offering their services for the putting-on of entertainments on the camp grounds.

Needless to say all this kind of thing contributes greatly to relax the tension both at home and in the camps and makes for better morale all around.

Again radio is making constant use of our important national officials and of the leaders of every branch of our civil, industrial, and commercial life to broadcast whatever may be appropriate at a given moment, either in the way of assurance of the wisdom and efficacy of particular measures which may have been adopted, or in the interpretation of news from at home and abroad with a view to stabilizing, as far as possible, the confidence of our people in our national future.

Of late we have also, by the use of short-wave broadcasting, systematically attempted to bolster up the morale of the other great democracies and especially to offer every kind of encouragement to the nations which have been overrun and abused by Hitler's hordes. We have tried to give them accurate news of the occurrences in the world which Hitler had attempted to prevent their obtaining. We have told them what we in the United States are doing to help them and what we are equipping ourselves to do in the future. The effect of all this on their depressed morale is beyond words to describe.

In conclusion, it must be perfectly obvious to any thoughtful person that however important a wise use of radio may be for the protection and development of national morale, the operation of this agency cannot be considered in isolation. It is simply one of a number of extremely important means which may be used to influence national attitudes—possibly the most important single one. But to produce any thoroughgoing and consistent results there must be a fundamental and systematic co-ordination of all of these agencies. If they are dealt with as separate individualistic activities, they will fall far short of their easy possibilities, and they may readily find themselves engaged in essentially contradictory and mutually interfering procedures. The only method by which such a result can be prevented would seem to be the creation of some central body, like

the recently organized morale commission, which should develop a coherent and practicable plan of co-ordinating these activities and which, without attempting to dictate in detail, would at least by the transmitting of information keep each of the groups intelligently informed of the plans of the others and would, in that degree at least, lessen the amount of duplication and possible conflict which can so easily arise when well-intentioned, but ill-informed, enthusiasts undertake to serve public functions.

To many types of mind it may at once appear that the only sane method of handling a problem of this kind is to turn it all over to the government. That is, of course, exactly what has occurred in the dictator-controlled countries and as an immediate practical solution of a complex problem it has something to be said for it. But the consequences which inevitably flow from such a procedure, especially in the case of radio, are so grave and so menacing to the essence of democracy that no informed person could entertain the possibility without the utmost misgivings. It is no secret that we have long had in the United States many individuals who have been keen to secure control over the radio and the moving picture as a means of endowing themselves with supreme political power, and there can be no question of the danger resident in such a possibility.

It is vastly more important that the complete freedom of radio be maintained than that we seek to improve morale by confiding broadcasting to government auspices. All history testifies to the incredible difficulty of regaining the control of an agency like the radio if it be once surrendered into political hands. There has been some tendency of late on the part of certain of our officials to extend their grasp to this and to certain other important civil activities which are indispensable to the maintenance of our liberties. It is to be hoped that these tendencies will be vigorously opposed and that however alluring the program may seem which would intrust such morale-building agencies as radio and the movies to government hands, the temptation will be resisted. A high, intelligent, and devoted national morale is of the utmost value at all times, but it cannot be permanently purchased by the sacrifice of such liberties as reside in the use of a free radio.

MORALE AND THE NEWS

ROBERT E. PARK

ABSTRACT

With the appearance of total warfare in the modern world, morale has assumed a new importance. The object of so-called "psychic warfare" is to destroy morale, particularly the morale of the civil population. The effect has been, when successful, to paralyze the national will, making collective action impossible. Nations exist only when and in so far as they are able to act. The methods of creating national solidarity and of destroying it are abundantly illustrated in recent events in Europe. Propaganda is ordinarily the weapon with which civilian morale is destroyed, if not created. With the more extensive use of the arts and devices of psychic warfare, war has tended to assume the character of a dialectic process, in which it appears not as a struggle of physical forces merely but ideas and ideologies. News makes public opinion; but public opinion is sometimes, if not always, inimical to morale. It is inimical to morale when it tends to intensify and magnify differences of attitude and opinion. But discussion, upon which public opinion is based, in so far as it brings into the open sentiments and attitudes that would otherwise be suppressed, tends to bring about understanding and unity. By so doing it improves morale. War and conflict may be said to function when they bring about an understanding upon which a secure peace may be based.

I. PROPAGANDA

Since war has invaded the realm of the spirit, morale has assumed a new importance in both war and peace. Total war is now an enterprise so colossal that belligerent nations find it necessary not only to mobilize all their resources, material and moral, but to make present peace little more than a preparation for future war. Under these conditions so-called psychic warfare, which can be carried on in the between states of actual belligerency, has assumed an importance and achieved a technical efficiency which, if it has not changed the essential nature of war, has profoundly altered the character of peace, making it much harder to bear.

✓ The object of attack in psychic warfare is morale, and less that of the men in arms than of the civil population back of the lines. For the "strategy of terror" is directed rather more at noncombatants and against those who must wait and endure than against those who have some way of striking back.¹ Incidentally, this is one way in which total warfare, in so far as it is a war of nerves, fails to achieve its ends. It fails because it gives everyone something to do; something also which, since it involves participation, if only symbolically,

¹ Edmond Taylor, *Strategy of Terror* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1940).

in a great collective enterprise, is at once a source of inspiration and release. It tends thus finally to increase the solidarity and improve the morale not only of the civil population but of the army as well. It seems at any rate to have done this and more in England, where it has, apparently, created a national spirit and a national solidarity such as has not existed there since the date of the Spanish Armada.

The will to join with others in collective action is one of the elementary motives that move mankind. The consciousness and the excitement of participation in great events constitutes one of the most exhilarating and satisfying of human experiences. In the reverberation which such participation invariably arouses in other minds the action of every individual participant acquires a new dignity and a new glory as well as an added moral support.

It is in and through these vast collective enterprises—wars, revolutions or social movements, like the labor movement—that new institutions come into existence and old ones are sometimes rejuvenated. No one seems to have understood this better than José Ortega y Gasset, the author of *Invertebrate Spain*. No one, at the time that this volume was published in 1937, had more reason to understand it, for these essays are devoted to an analysis of the processes by which the integration and the disintegration of the Spanish empire and the Spanish national unity came about. What he says about Spain is peculiarly pertinent today to conditions in the rest of the world and to the subject of this paper. The first of these essays is entitled "How To Make and Break a Nation."

✓ "It is not yesterday, tradition, the past," he says, "which is the decisive, the determining force in a nation. Nations are made and go on living by having a program for the future." It is neither important nor necessary to unity and solidarity, he adds, "that the component parts of a society coincide in their ideas and their desires; the important, the essential thing is that each should know and to a certain extent incorporate into his own life the ideas and the desires of the others."²

There is probably no other social process, no form of interaction, by which the individual components of a society are so effectively or

² José Ortega y Gasset, *Invertebrate Spain* (New York: Norton, 1937), pp. 19-45.

so completely integrated, if not fused, as they are by participation in some form of collective action. In fact, as it is conceived by some writers, society exists and is "in being," to use a nautical term, only when it is capable of concerted and consistent action.³

The so-called "we" group is typically the group that acts. Particularly is this true if one includes under this term every form of society in which ethnocentrism or group self-consciousness ordinarily manifests itself. It is true that a crowd or a mob does not think of itself as "we"; not at least until it comes in contact and in conflict with some other crowd or mob. In the latter case it presently assumes the character of a gang, gives itself a name, and perhaps assumes some vague sort of exclusive possession over the territory which is its peculiar habitat. This is characteristic of some of the lower animals—birds in particular. If I venture to mention this very lowly type of society in this connection, it is to emphasize the fact that not only armies and nations have need of some sort of morale but every other type of social group as well which must act effectively in order to survive in conflict with other societies.

The arts and devices by which a morale of a people can be raised and a national spirit revived if not created, as well as the methods by which national solidarity of an enemy people can be undermined and eventually destroyed, have been convincingly demonstrated in the recent history of Europe and are abundantly illustrated in the current news. There is, in the firsthand reports of observers and participants of the present conflict in Europe, material for a more realistic political science, such as has been historically attributed to Machiavelli but has been more recently and more systematically exemplified in the writings of the Italian sociologist, Pareto. For such a realistic political science, firsthand accounts of political events like William Shirer's *Berlin Diary* are a kind of source book. His account of one of the earlier Nuremberg "pep-meetings" of the Nazi party is a contribution not merely to history but to sociology. "Pep-meeting" is not the right word for the Nuremberg ceremonies. Something less secular and more suggestive of a religious revival would better describe it. Here is an excerpt from that diary under the date of Nuremberg, September 5, 1934.

³ J. A. Thomson, "Animal Sociology," *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (14th ed.), I, 971.

I'm beginning to comprehend, I think, some of the reasons for Hitler's astounding success. Borrowing a chapter from the Roman church, he is restoring pageantry and colour and mysticism to the drab lives of twentieth-century Germans. This morning's opening meeting in the Luitpold Hall on the outskirts of Nuremberg was more than a gorgeous show; it also had something of the mysticism and religious fervour of an Easter or Christmas Mass in a great Gothic cathedral. The hall was a sea of brightly coloured flags. Even Hitler's arrival was made dramatic. The band stopped playing. There was a hush over the thirty thousand people packed in the hall. Then the band struck up the *Badenweiler March*, a very catchy tune, and used only, I'm told, when Hitler makes his big entries. Hitler appeared in the back of the auditorium, and followed by his aides, Göring, Goebbels, Hess, Himmler, and the others, he strode slowly down the long centre aisle while thirty thousand hands were raised in salute. It is a ritual, the old-timers say, which is always followed. Then an immense symphony orchestra played Beethoven's *Egmont Overture*. Great Klieg lights played on the stage, where Hitler sat surrounded by a hundred party officials and officers of the army and navy. Behind them the "blood flag," the one carried down the streets of Munich in the ill-fated Putsch. Behind this, four or five hundred S.A. standards. When the music was over, Rudolf Hess, Hitler's closest confidant, rose and slowly read the names of the Nazi "martyrs"—brown-shirts who had been killed in the struggle for power—a roll-call of the dead, and the thirty thousand seemed very moved.

In such an atmosphere no wonder, then, that every word dropped by Hitler seemed like an inspired Word from on high. Man's—or at least the German's—critical faculty is swept away at such moments, and every lie pronounced is accepted as high truth itself.

The arts and devices of spiritual warfare are many and various and more subtle no doubt than any analysis has thus far disclosed. But one of the weapons of psychic warfare, both of offense and of defense, is propaganda.⁴ Harold Lasswell, who has made propaganda the subject of an extended investigation and who writes more shrewdly about the subject than most others with whose writings I am familiar, has sought to distinguish between education and propaganda. His distinction is based on the difference between two elements or two aspects of culture which he describes as "technique" and "value." He says: "The inculcation of traditional value attitudes is generally called education, while the term propaganda is re-

⁴ See Kimball Young and R. D. Lawrence, *Bibliography on Censorship and Propaganda* ("University of Oregon Journalism Series," No. 1 [Eugene, Ore.: University of Oregon, 1928]).

served for the spreading of the subversive, debatable or merely novel attitudes."⁵

The distinction is substantially that between news and propaganda or, better still, between news and editorial. The editorial page seeks to inculcate not merely attitudes but opinions; and editorial opinions may be either "subversive, debatable, or merely novel," and are, for most newspaper readers in the United States, since they do not read them, neither one nor the other.

✓ The difference between news and editorial is one thing that every newspaperman knows, when he needs to, even if he is not always able to formulate a definition that makes the distinction clear for all cases. The essence, or intrinsic quality, of news is hard to come at, but news is not propaganda, and it is not editorial. In a general way one may say that news states the fact, editorial, the truth. The facts ✓ may call for reflection, for deliberation, and sometimes for more facts. The truth, however, has the character of finality. Having it, i.e., having the whole truth, one stops investigation, ceases to reflect, and is either silent like a plant or acts like a human being. Propaganda ✓ is likely to be a little more imperative than the ordinary editorial. Since it seeks action, it aims to dispel doubt and it pretends sometimes to the finality of truth even if it is only a half-truth or a downright lie.

News may be and often is, when the facts are such as to serve the purpose of the propagandist, the best kind of propaganda, but news and facts are always capable of more than one interpretation, and that would be fatal—reflection is always fatal—to propaganda.

✓ It is because events are capable of more than one interpretation that we discuss them. It is out of these discussions that public opinion emerges. Discussions not only make public opinion, they sometimes make war. But as far as my observation goes, they rarely ever ✓ make peace. That does not seem to be their function. When discussion is carried on in the orderly, academic fashion, which Socrates first introduced and philosophers have kept up ever since, it is called dialectic. The function of dialectic, if it also can be regarded as a social process, seems to be to test opinions. One tests opinions by

⁵ Harold D. Lasswell, "Propaganda," *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, XII (New York, 1934), 522.

finding out if they are consistent in their different expressions. The outcome of discussion is usually to lay bare the submerged hypotheses, not to say submerged complexes, on which divergent opinions are based. This sometimes leads to an agreement, but it sometimes reveals differences so profound and so charged with emotion and sentiment that further discussion appears unprofitable, if not impossible. When that happens to individuals there seems to be no way of carrying on the controversy except by fighting. When it happens to nations, as it has happened recently in the case of England and Germany, it leads to war.

From this point of view war, whether physical or psychic, presents itself as an instance of the dialectic process. When a discussion ceases to be academic, when it takes finally the form of an armed conflict, it does not cease, to use the language of a recent writer, to be a "battle of minds where ideas, ideologies, propaganda, and emotions clash in ordered ranks, disciplined like soldiers."⁶ In this battle of minds and wills, in which the purpose of each belligerent is to maintain, and if possible enhance, its own morale and at the same time undermine and weaken that of the enemy, propaganda, whether it seeks merely to interpret events or to indoctrinate and defend the assumptions and the ideology in accordance with which events are interpreted, is a principal weapon of offense and defense.

II. MORALE

There seems to be some uncertainty as to just what morale is and where it is located. Is it in the individual or in the group or in both? Whether its locus is in the group or in the individual, there is no doubt of its importance. It counts much in battle but how much? No one knows precisely. It is one of those imponderables with which one must reckon but which one cannot weigh.

Morale in an army is a "will to fight"; in the civil population it is the ability to endure hardships at home and bad news from the front. This will to fight and to endure seems to be a compound of several other imponderable components: courage, confidence, and the Christian virtues faith, hope, and charity, provided by "charity"

⁶ Taylor, *op. cit.*, p. 1.

one means understanding—the kind of understanding one expects to find in small fighting units or in a well-organized family. It is the understanding that is the basis of *esprit de corps*. The charity which notoriously begins at home does not include the enemy, and charity in the abstract is not a qualification of a fighting man.

Morale, though it is dependent upon the qualities we call virtues, is not to be identified with morals or with mores. Morals are habits, and, like conscience, are rooted in tradition. When they encounter new conditions they are likely to be confused and involved in conflict, compromise, and casuistry. This is the case of the conscientious objector. Morale, on the other hand, is prospective; it rests on such discipline and solidarity as anywhere exists, but its outlook is forward. It is will, the tendencies of the organism to act, organized about a faith in the future rather than about an interest in or a pious concern for the past. Morale, whether in war or in peace, is will; the will to act and to persevere in a course of acting until the hopes which inspired it have been realized. While we ordinarily limit the term “morale” to action, we also apply it to situations in which activity is routine and does not seem to be either controlled or directed.

When President Roosevelt addressed the American people on March 12, 1933, most of the banks in the United States were closed, and most of the people in the United States were in a state of panic. In the course of his remarks he said: “After all, there is an element in the readjustment of our financial system more important than currency, more important than gold, and that is the confidence of the people.” The effect of this address has been described as magical. Bronislaw Malinowski, whose studies among the Trobriand Islanders has made him an authority on the subject of magic, would say, I suspect, that the President’s speech was magic. The effects brought about by words and symbols, as I understand him, are the essence of magic.⁷ One of the functions of the magician in primitive society, he tells us, is to restore morale when fear in the presence of some unforeseen or unprecedented event, like the recent invasion from Mars as reported by Orson Welles, has shaken it.⁸

⁷ *Argonauts of the Western Pacific* (London, 1932).

⁸ See Hadley Cantril, *The Invasion from Mars* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1940).

This seems to demonstrate again, what has often been demonstrated before, that words and symbols which create and maintain the morale of an army are equally necessary to maintain the morale of a civil society. It seems, therefore, that we must recognize morale as a factor in all our collective enterprises. It is a factor in the operation of the stock exchange, quite as much as it is in the activities of the Communist party.

It is interesting to note that upon the same date that President Roosevelt made his historic radio address to the people of the United States the press announced the triumph of the Nazi party, or perhaps one might better say of the Nazi sect, in the elections in Prussia. Commenting on this election, the *New York Times* correspondent said: "Through the election history of the National Socialists and the Nationalists, Germany for the first time since the days of the Old Empire, has been unified." Incidentally, some two hundred persons were killed in the course of the campaign, but the New York correspondent believed at this time that "violence was spent."⁹

Morale has not only its spiritual but its physical, more specifically its physiological, aspect. From the point of view of physiology, and perhaps of sociology, morale seems to be the ability of an individual or of a society to maintain tension over a period of time; to carry on an action or an enterprise to completion. The action, with interruptions, may continue, it seems, indefinitely as is the case of one who acts consistently to achieve a career or to carry out a project to which he has devoted a lifetime. What tension, in its most elementary phase, involves, one may gather from watching a cat waiting for a mouse, or any predatory animal stalking its prey.

Early in the present century sociological speculation and research were given a new orientation mainly by the writings of two men: Scipio Sighele in Italy and Gustav le Bon in France. Le Bon, whose little treatise on *The Crowd (Le Foule)* has done much to popularize the new point of view, discovered that, under certain specific conditions, a casual gathering of individuals, drawn together by no common purpose and having apparently no common interests, could, and if the necessary conditions were present would, in response to what he called "the mental unity of crowds" be suddenly, not to say

⁹ F. T. Birchell, *New York Times*, March 12, 1933.

miraculously, transformed, becoming, as he expressed it, no longer an agglomeration of individuals but "a single being."

All this, as he states it, sounds portentous. What he is describing, however, is a familiar experience. It is the fact that a crowd, when excited, becomes a mob and becomes, what a mere agglomeration could not, a very effective agency for carrying on very elementary forms of collective action—a lynching, for example. One may observe much the same phenomenon in a herd of cattle or a flock of sheep. Mary Austin, in her little volume entitled *The Flock*, has described the way in which, under the influence of some distress or sudden terror, a flock of sheep will sometimes mill about in an ever narrowing circle "until they perish by suffocation."¹⁰

What happens under such circumstances is what happens in a crowd when the attention of every individual is, by chance, focused upon some more than usually exciting object or incident. By a psychological process, not unlike the milling of the flock or herd, the interest and the excitement of every individual is intensified by the response each unconsciously makes to the manifest interest of every other individual. The crowd assumes under these circumstances the character of a closed circuit, each individual responding to his own excitement as he sees it reflected in the attitudes and emotions of his neighbor. The effect of this circular reaction is to produce steady re-instatement of the original stimulus as well as a corresponding increase in the suggestibility, excitement, and tension in every individual until the crowd is a collective unit, psychologically integrated and completely mobilized for whatever action is expected or by chance suggests itself. In any case the impending action, if it takes place at all, will be sudden, impetuous, and, unless manipulated by some outsider, quite unpremeditated and unplanned.

Since its actions are unpremeditated, unplanned, and without perspective, one would probably not, in the sense in which that term is usually used, speak of morale in the crowd. When, however, an action as projected and planned requires not merely readiness to act but the will to act consistently amid all the accidents, incidents, and changes of fortunes of a long campaign, morale acquires the

¹⁰ Mary Austin, *The Flock*, quoted in Park and Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology* (2d ed.; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1924), pp. 881-82.

meaning we give it when we speak, as we do so frequently nowadays, of morale in the army and morale in the civilian population. Nevertheless, in the broader sense in which that term is sometimes employed, as when one refers to the prevailing state of mind in France before and since the German conquest, one may, it seems, speak of the morale of any society or of any group in which some sort of concert is maintained by some sort of communication. In such a society there will be changes in tension in response to changes in life-conditions; changes in orientation in response to events as they occur. In human society there are always fashions. As fashions come in and go out, social tensions rise and fall, and society, which inevitably faces in the direction from which the news comes, alters its attitude to its world in response to these changes reported in the press.

One of the most pervasive forms in which tension and will manifest themselves in individuals and in society is in moods. Every occasion, be it a funeral or a wedding, has its characteristic atmosphere. Every gathering, even if it is no more than a crowd on the street, is dominated by some sentiment. One is more likely to notice this mood, perhaps, when one cannot share it. In that case, whether it be a sad or a happy occasion, one is repelled and inevitably seeks more congenial company.

I was constantly impressed, in reading William Shirer's *Berlin Diary*, with the fact that he seemed to note every change in the spiritual weather in a world that was for him every day a little less congenial than the day before. This moral atmosphere seems to be a very faithful index as well as a condition of morale in a civil community—even in a smaller community like that of the diplomatic circle in a foreign country. At any rate it has been a constant concern of Hitler and of his propaganda bureau to preserve in Germany an atmosphere in the civilian population that would support the morale of the army in the field and the program of the government at home. It is this that gives significance to the Nuremberg ceremonies that Shirer describes. It is obviously the purpose of all the ceremony and the ritual associated with the Nazi movement to create an atmosphere, a tension, and an expectancy which, in focusing attention upon the things hoped for, will effectively inhibit any consideration that runs counter to those hopes.

To maintain this atmosphere and protect the German population from the "poison," as Goebbels called it, of foreign propaganda has been the purpose of the censorship. To interpret and mediate the effect of such reports of events as reached them are the functions of the propaganda bureau.

It is obvious that the impulse, the will to act, expresses itself in characteristically different ways in different types of societies; different, that is to say, in the crowd, in the gang, in the political party, ✓ and in the sect. In fact, it may express itself in all these different ways in the successive phases of the evolution of a collective action. This collective impulse assumes in the course of its evolution most of the characteristics of a mind—that is, of a collective mind. Thus, Mary Austin speaks of the "flock mind," Le Bon describes the idiosyncrasies of the "crowd mind." We are familiar with the phrase "public mind." The question as to where this so-called mind or will is located, whether it is a phase or an aspect, like class consciousness, of the individual consciousness or has some sort of independent existence, seems to lose most of its importance if we mean by "collective mind" no more than the unity and intimate interdependence which makes it possible for individuals to act concertedly and consistently. The capacity to act collectively is apparently created by that interpenetration of mind involved in communication.

✓ In the gang or other intimate group, where association is based on familiar and personal relation, morale takes the form of *esprit de corps*. In a political party which is a conflict or discussion group it is represented by a policy, supported by a formal principle of some sort. In a religious sect morale is supported by the authority of a creed or by dogmas which cannot be questioned. It seems that the Nazi party, in the course of its history, has passed through all the phases represented by the four types of society I have mentioned. Its first appearance was in a *Putsch* or coup d'état that was carried out by a group almost as little organized as a mob. From that point it fought its way up in a kind of gang warfare with the communists. It became later a political party and as such gained a new status when its supporters gained representation in the Reichstag. Meanwhile it had taken on, at least in the case of its leaders, the character of a more or less fanatical political, if not religious, sect. It now includes among

its spiritual possessions not only a ritual and a creed but, in the volume *Mein Kampf*, a Bible. Finally, it has in Hitler its prophet, if not its God. As a political sect it has attempted to suppress every form of dissent with all the fervor and fanatical vigor of a newborn religion. Under its direction the German people are now apparently engaged in a holy war to reorganize the social life of the planet in all its fundamental aspects—economic, political, and religious.

If this statement is a little too summary to do justice to the historical facts, it at least suggests what morale can be under a totalitarian government such as exists today in Germany and what it cannot be in a more secular society like our own.

III. NEWS

The distinction between activity and action, as I conceive it, is that action has perspective, has a beginning and an end, and, in the process of transition from the first impulse in which it has its origin to its final consummation in a final overt act, it is likely to encounter events that sometimes make that consummation precarious. Action, in short, is activity that is controlled and directed. That is the reason, when and if action is prolonged and difficult, it requires, to insure success, "will" in the individual and, in the group, morale. These actions and their perspectives give the dimensions of the world in which, one might say, life actually goes on, as distinguished from the academic world where not life but thought, a preparation for action, goes on.

Each and all of us live in a world of which we are the center, and the dimensions of this world are defined by the direction and the distances from which the news comes to us. For news is not something new merely, it is something important; and it comes to us with an urgency that requires action, even if no more than a change of attitude or the reaffirmation of an opinion.

All this is of no importance except in so far as it suggests the relativity of worlds in which men are actively alive and for whose orderly existence they are in some way personally responsible. What comes to us in the way of a record of events from elsewhere, that is, outside of or on the outer limits of our world, is mainly myth, legend, or literature; something that is perhaps intrinsically interesting but

not so immediately important that something needs to be done about it. It is because the world in which we live is like this that we discover it visibly expanding about us as the perspective of our practical interests and actions lengthen.

How profoundly these perspectives have been changed during the process of the present war! Suddenly, after the fall of France, it seemed as if the planet had grown smaller and our world larger. The isolationists among us are those who for various reasons not wholly articulate, I suspect, are unwilling or unable to accept this change. It is in a realm defined by the circulation of news rather than by the world with which we are in immediate contact that all our great collective enterprises—war, revolution, and national government—are carried on.

" The task of organizing, of energizing, and, above all, of animating with a common will and a common purpose vast armies and whole peoples is an incredibly complicated but, with modern means of communication, not impossible task. At any rate, the German government, with the assistance of the censorship and the propaganda bureau, seems, as far as is humanly possible, to have succeeded, from time to time, in imbuing its armies and, to a less extent, its civil population with something of the unanimity of Le Bon's psychological crowd. This has helped to maintain the morale of the nation in the successive crises through which it has passed.

✓ The German army, one hears, has been greatly democratized in the course of its rejuvenation. There has come into existence a comradeship between the officers and men that did not exist in the Prussian army before the National-Socialist revolution. This has created in the army, and particularly in the navy, an *esprit de corps* that did not exist during the first World War.

German political technicians, with the aid of German scholars in the several social sciences, history, anthropology, and the new German science, *Geopolitik*, have developed, as their contribution to the national morale, a political philosophy which is designed to justify the German people's claim to the position of the dominant race in Europe. They have at the same time formulated a political program which promises, if successful, to make this claim good. Since Europe has held, perhaps still holds, a dominant position in the modern

world, German domination of Europe would imply domination of the world.

Finally, Herr Hitler and his associates seem to have inspired the army, if not the people, with an invincible faith in their mission and destiny—a faith such as would ordinarily exist only in a religious sect. Hitler and his junto have sought to support that faith by ritual, by myth, and, above all, by ceremonies that revive from time to time the atmosphere and the mood of exaltation in which it was originally conceived. This faith in their mission and destiny has been transmitted to Germans abroad, living in what one might describe as the Diaspora of this latest of the “Chosen People.” From that source other peoples, who, according to Nazi doctrines, can never hope to be identified with the master-race have nevertheless been infected by its doctrine.

Morale and discipline, as Hermann Rauschning, the author of *Revolution of Nihilism*, says, is now a religion in Germany and has achieved in that nation an unprecedented high level of intensity and effectiveness. It has nevertheless been created and sustained by essentially the same means as social solidarity and discipline have been created and maintained wherever men have been associated to form societies and to act collectively.

A nation includes within its wide embrace all ordinary forms of association with which we are familiar, i.e., local, familial, economic, political, religious, and racial. It is the problem of national morale to co-ordinate these groups so that they co-operate rather than clash. In the language of the Nazi party’s political technicians, it is the problem of *Gleichschaltung*. It has been achieved by co-ordinating, subordinating, and eventually fusing every local and minor loyalty into a totalitarian loyalty to the national state. Where that has not been actually achieved, as in the case of the Lutherans and Catholics, it has nevertheless been attempted. There is already considerable literature, psychological and pedagogical, which shows what was attempted and what has been achieved in the army, the schools, and the press.¹¹

The relation of news to morale is not so obvious as is that of the

¹¹ See *German Psychological Warfare: Survey and Bibliography* (New York: Committee for National Morale, 1940).

other page of the newspaper, the editorial. News comes to us and to the newspaper we read from every part of the world in which we and its other readers are interested. It comes ordinarily, provided it is not written up so that our interest in it is symbolic and literary rather than factual, in the form of disconnected items. Newspapermen have discovered that, other things being equal, news items are read in inverse ratio to their length. The national weekly newspapers like *Time* and *Newsweek* have discovered that they can give a new news interest to these items (1) by classifying them and (2) by digging up so-called background materials which enable us to see them in their relation to other events widely dispersed in time and space. To put a news item in a setting of historical or otherwise related facts gives it a character which is sometimes historical and sometimes sociological. Such an item becomes history in so far as it finds a place in the historical sequence. It becomes sociological in so far as, when classified, it throws light upon social process irrespective of the place or time in which the process takes place.

As here described, news has no influence upon political action or morale. Its tendency is to disperse and distract attention and thus decrease rather than increase tension. The ordinary function of news is to keep individuals and societies oriented and in touch with their world and with reality by minor adjustments. It is not its function ordinarily to initiate secular social movements which, when they move too rapidly, bring about catastrophic consequences. On the other hand, when some important or disturbing event occurs that "makes the front page" and captures the headlines, it may also capture and hold attention for days and weeks, like the story of the abduction of the Lindbergh baby and the subsequent trial and execution of the alleged abductor.

The story of such an event or series of events is not an item, it is a "story"—a continued story, in fact; one that may grow more absorbing as each day and each issue of the press brings forth some new development. In this way it may become so absorbing as to dwarf interest in every other lesser incident in local or current history. As a story it becomes more enthralling just because it is published in instalments which give opportunity for readers to reflect, speculate, or brood over the significance of each successive instalment. Under the

circumstances readers of the news interpret these incidents and all the details in terms of memories of their own experiences and of similar tragic episodes with which they are familiar. In this way the news ceases to be mere news and acquires the significance of literature, but of realistic literature like the "true stories" of the popular magazines and of the earlier ballads that preceded them in the history of the newspaper.¹² What fixes and holds the interest of the reader tends to disorient him; tends to possess him.

It is the same with wars in which we seem to see history in the making; wars in which the fate of nations and of civilization is involved. It is when attention is focused on these events which are not items but chapters from the current history that we who are spectators eventually get sympathetically involved. Under these circumstances it is inevitable that we should, in accordance with the differences of our personal experiences and our personal prejudices, interpret events and history differently. It is inevitable that we should take sides, since discussion tends to emphasize and bring out differences as well as obscure, temporarily at least, more fundamental points of view upon which we are united. This is unfortunate, perhaps, for national morale requires above everything else that in a crisis we should act as a nation and be united as a people.

Public opinion is therefore not a good index of morale because, being the fruit of discussion, it intensifies differences. Public opinion is on the surface of things and does not reflect the attitudes and points of view on which the community is united. The very existence of public opinion is itself evidence that we are not at the moment as one in regard to what as a nation or a people we should do. However, as things get discussed and drop out of discussion, the direction which public opinion takes in the course of time indicates the direction in which collective will, in the process of formation, is taking. This is what the Gallup polls show.

Public discussion of public policy during periods of crisis, when discussion tends to become embittered, invariably brings to the surface not only divergent points of view but the memories and original experiences upon which these interpretations of events are based.

¹² Helen Hughes, *The Human Interest Story* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1940).

One has but to read the exasperated and often outrageous views expressed in letters to the editor to recognize that these letters are the reflections of personal frustrations and of deep emotional experiences whose sources are often so obscure that it would require the skill of a psychoanalyst to discover them. But in so far as freedom of discussion gets to the source of this emotional violence and so brings it into the open, discussion to that extent contributes something indirectly to the national morale. These controversial letters serve as a purge to the minds of those who wrote them and give comfort to those who would like to have written them if they could.

In a recent copy of the *Detroit Free Press* I ran across a very clever and not ill-natured indictment of Harold Ickes. He was described as the kind of a man who writes exasperating and exasperated letters to the editor. Well, probably Harold Ickes is that kind of a man, but he has been a great comfort to me and I am sure to others. He exaggerates, to be sure, as an exasperated man will; but he says things that someone should say, and I am certain through my own experience that he is improving the morale of the country. I recall what he has said about Lindbergh, whom I admire. I wish I could hear him on Senator Gerald Nye. I suppose he has at some time landed on the senator from North Dakota, but if so I have missed it.

✓ Getting this stuff off our chest is, as I have suggested, good for the country. It improves morale, and, besides that, one can be certain that no one who comes out with the bitterness that is in him is going to be a fifth columnist. These letters to the press are not public opinion, however. They are merely personal opinions. If they could be accompanied by a confession "sudden, complete, and bitter" which would reveal the context in which they were formed, they would throw a great light on the sources of discontent which make it difficult in a country like ours, composed of people who have come to us from the ends of the earth, to unite wholeheartedly, except in a great national emergency, on an all-out totalitarian policy, such as a great national emergency requires that we should.

I said at the outset of this paper that war tended to assume the character of a dialectical process in which ideas rather than force play the leading role. As events make the issues as originally con-

ceived and stated obsolete, belligerents find it necessary from time to time to redefine their aims and discover more fundamental and more reasonable grounds to justify the course they have chosen to pursue. In the long run, particularly if conflict is prolonged, it becomes necessary not merely to satisfy the questions which reflection has raised at home but to justify the aims and conduct of the war to the public abroad which may not be wholly committed to either side. In this case war ceases to have the character of an international *coup d'état*, aiming by means of a *Blitzkrieg* to present the world with a *fait accompli*, and becomes more and more a war of ideas and ideologies. Such wars inevitably come to have the character of revolutions. They end in that case by bringing about not merely changes in material possessions but in institutions and the fundamental conceptions of life. It is, in fact, why in so far as they do this that war can be said to function in the historical process.

Under these circumstances, morale supported by a principle of reason ceases to be a matter of either hope or fear and becomes a morale force. In the long run it is these morale forces that determine the issues for which wars are carried on.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

THE ROLE OF MOVIES IN MORALE

WALTER WANGER

ABSTRACT

The movies as a medium of communication can be used to clarify, to inspire, and to entertain. While the primary work of the movies in building national morale has been to provide recreation and entertainment for the public, the men who make the movies are ready to produce both clarifying and inspiring films. In order for such films to be produced, it is necessary for our leaders to clarify the concepts associated with the democratic way of life. The makers of the movies will then place these concepts in dramatic form before the public.

National morale in a democracy must be built through three channels: (1) by clarifying to the individual his place, responsibilities, and rewards in a great democratic endeavor; (2) by inspiring the individual citizen with enthusiasm and confidence in the principles and purposes of the democracy of which he is a part; and (3) by affording the individual relaxation from the urgent problems which crises impose.

Those who wish to build a strong and lasting morale in a democracy must recognize that their function is threefold: to clarify, to inspire, and to entertain. The Nazis and the Communists ballyhoo a philosophy which pays tribute to the individual by making him feel identified with a heroic and compelling cause. Both the Communists and the Nazis appeal to the little man as an individual with "historic" rights and a "historic" mission. The dispossessed and the disillusioned in Germany or in Russia find deep satisfaction in feeling part of a mighty world-campaign. The Communists talk about the "heroic" world-proletariat; the Nazis inflame their followers with appeals to blood superiority, the "destiny" of the German people, and the fight against "international" oppressors, Jews, etc.

These are obvious points and scarcely deserve extended comment; the significant fact is that both the Nazi and the Communist propagandists work with a credo which gives a sense of importance to the individual in a complicated and bewildering world. The most profound aspect of Nazi or Communist morale lies in the fanatical conviction which individual Communists or Nazis possess, the unshak-

able certainty of the justice of their cause, the basic assumption that each is a part of that cause. The Nazi or the Communist has a sense of clarity about the role which he is playing in a mighty social enterprise. It is a false and oversimplified clarity, but it serves its function: It makes the individual think he understands the society of which he is a member.

The tragic error in democratic education is the failure of democracy to explain itself to those who live and work in a democratic system. It is not surprising that indifferentism and defeatism overwhelm the citizens of a democracy.

Why, indeed, should the individual American not be bewildered by economic reverses, social problems, international crises? He has no understanding of why his world is in uproar. He has no conception of the causes, the reasons, or the solutions to national problems. He does not have the easy rationalizations of Nazis and Communists. He has no made-to-order devils upon whom to place blame. Where the Nazis simply blame the "international bankers" or the British, where the Communists reassure themselves by blaming the "capitalists" or the "profiteers," the democrats can only seek to understand the operations of an immense, complex, and impersonal social system. Unlike the Nazi or the Communist, the democratic citizen has no pat utopia, no fixed and glowing goals. He has not been fed lofty promises of the "classless society" or the "German world." He does not identify himself with a proud, fighting cause. He, unlike the Nazi and the Communist, never has considered it in his natural line of duty to understand this government and do something about it. He has left that always to the other fellow.

The first morale task of a democracy is to explain democracy to its citizens. This is no easy task. We need a primer of democracy: clear, confident, inspiring. We must communicate to the citizens a simple but rock-bound conception of the ideals of the democratic world, the rewards which men get from that world, of the noble aims and certain triumphs of the democratic order.

National morale requires deep and moving emotions. The Communist has faith; the Nazi has passion; the democrat has reason. But reason is cold and inadequate in a world which is driven by political faiths and political passions. And this means that the build-

ers of morale must weave a fabric of faith and a fabric of emotion around the rational aspects of democratic life. Men must be inspired with confidence in the justice, the sensibleness, and the imperishable verity of a democratic creed. Democratic citizens must be inspired with fighting loyalty to democratic aims. Men must be emotionalized, to use a clumsy word, about their country and their country's goals. This does not mean they must be regimented.

The psychological paralysis which engulfed France, the emotional poverty of the Europe which the Nazis overran, were, in the last analysis, testimonials to a lack of conviction. There can be no courage without conviction; and there can be no sound morale without courage. It is almost a cliché to say that the Nazis won their battles before they sent their armies into action. They won those battles because they capitalized upon the confusion and the disenchantment of the people in the countries which had failed to give their people clarity and emotion about political principles.

In the United States the creation of morale must be concerned with an insistent, long-range campaign to inspire the American people with fervor about American life. Our symbols must be vitalized and revived. It is not enough to talk about the Founding Fathers, the Constitution, or the Declaration of Independence. In a world convulsed by new ideologies and false issues, the democracies must present their strong case, which has not been done properly to date. Democracy must be interpreted to the common man as more than a negative concept (no interference with individual worship or speech). Democracy must be clothed with ringing affirmations; it must be imbued with a virile and aggressive mass spirit.

How can the movies aid in national morale? Most obviously, by providing recreation for the millions. This has been the traditional role of motion pictures. Entertainment is not a luxury; it is a necessity. Hollywood's contribution to our national morale so far has been to provide entertainment to the public in a constant and steady stream. This has not been part of any plan. Movies are made for profit, and profit is made by making movies which satisfy popular tastes. We are serving the public and are dependent upon their nickels and dimes to keep us going. It is impossible to sell them anything they do not want.

Entertainment does not necessarily have to be limited exclusively to escapist entertainment. It can be inspiring entertainment or enlightening entertainment. There is no difference between the film and the printing press. We have popular light literature written with no idea other than escapism. We have detective stories and humorous tales. There are also the best sellers, which contain a good deal of inspiration, and there are the classics full of enlightenment. There is no more reason to limit the film than the printing press. There is definite progress in public tastes, and it is our job to keep abreast of that progress. Experimentation and testing should be done in the motion-picture industry as in every other industry.

The movies can play a far greater role in building morale. The movies can be immensely valuable in "emotionalizing" our society and its goals. It is a familiar saying that one picture is worth ten thousand words; one moving picture which talks and sings and laughs, which re-creates reality with a verisimilitude accomplished by no other medium, is worth ten million words.

The movies can dramatize anything: our past, our current problems, our aspirations. The movies can dramatize ideas and goals no less than romances. The movies offer an unparalleled opportunity for inspiring the citizens of a democracy with loyalty, conviction, and courage.

Our political thinkers must formulate basic purposes, ideals, and concepts around which Americans can orient themselves. Movies can and will dramatize these concepts. But it is folly to expect that showmen can become political scientists simply by taking thought. It is foolish to imagine that the most complicated and contemporary problem—mass education—is understood by men who are expert in telling stories about the boy who meets the girl. The determination of what ought to be said is a problem for our national leaders and our social scientists. The movies will make significant contributions to national morale only when the people have reached some degree of agreement about the central and irrefutable ideas of a nation caught in the rip tide of ideological warfare.

Hollywood has, of course, produced occasional movies which have achieved laudable results—movies on American history, American heroes, anti-Nazi films, movies reaffirming simple principles of demo-

cratic life. But the socially relevant movies have been few and far between; the total number of movies which clarify or inspire are negligible compared to the number which simply continue to entertain.

Lastly, the movies can be used to clarify. The Signal Corps of the United States Army is at present making films in Hollywood, using Hollywood's talents and technical facilities. These films, however, have a very limited purpose. They are meant solely for the purpose of instructing our soldiers: how to operate a machine gun, how to open a parachute, etc.

But what of the larger problem of clarification? What of the task which demands that every man and woman and child understand his country and his place in that country? The absence of a healthy, aggressive morale in the United States testifies to a failure in our entire educational system. We have been too little concerned with making democracy intelligible to its citizens. We have been too sanguine about a mass loyalty which must constantly be nourished and inspired. We have evaded the challenge which demands that our people understand what they stand for and what they will fight for or live for.

The movies, in the final analysis, are nothing more than a method of communication. The movies are a technical instrument for saying something to millions of people. The problem of the movies and national morale, therefore, rests upon a deeper problem: what basic concepts should the movies disseminate in order to strengthen morale? The movies can disseminate those concepts vividly, dramatically, and appealingly. The movies can reach more people and can impress them more sharply than any other medium. The movies can be used on every front of the fight for morale. But just as a machine gun needs a man to fire it, and just as an armored division needs a general staff to direct and co-ordinate its movements, so the movies are simply an instrument which is available to democratic men who know what they want to say via films.

Our country is neither at war nor at peace. Our national policy is, accordingly, beclouded, tentative, and unsure. As long as this uncertainty exists, hesitation and confusion will mark all our efforts, whether in making movies or establishing priorities. When the pol-

icy of the United States becomes sharp and final, when the people of our country reach a consensus upon their goals and their tactics, then the problem of national morale will become simple and clarified. And then the movies will function as instruments of democratic communication. When our political leaders and our social scientists have enunciated the ideas and the values with which every democrat can be imbued, the movies will spread those ideas and values across the length and breadth of our land.

The movies entertain; they can also inspire; they should also clarify. But this means that the men who make movies, like the men who drive trucks or fly planes, must also be inspired and clarified as to the purpose of their society and the values of their world. The movies and the men who make movies are soldiers in the ranks of democracy; they need leaders who can inspire and explain, so that they can then inspire and explain to the enormous public which loves films.

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MORALE AND RELIGION

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ABSTRACT

Morale and religion are defined. The negative of religion is cynicism, which develops no morale. Religious customs and rites of early society reveal the sense of importance of their scrupulous observance. The very life and welfare are felt to depend upon such observance. The same feeling persists in more developed religions, and in the aggressive world religions morale rises with success in expansion. The various groups within these missionary religions carry with them these same traits of importance. It is still a powerful tribal or clan consciousness, undisturbed at its depth by critical doubts. New critical inquiries into the nature and history of religion have weakened traditional morale. With the passing of the old idea of revelation a radical transformation is taking place, and in the period of transition morale is lowered. It is being recovered to some noticeable and promising extent by new forms of religion which are more self-critical, scientifically reasonable, humanitarian, and in other ways confirmatory of the recognized values in modern culture. This new morale is vitally democratic in spite of changes in democracy itself, and is therefore deeply significant for the morale of the nation.

A useful definition of morale is "Tenacity in the face of adversity." Religion, whatever else it may be, is whole-souled devotion to what are felt to be the most important ends or values of life. It is obvious that where such devotion exists it will contribute to tenacity and morale. Vital religious faith is grounded in the conviction that the individual and his group are on the side of powers or conditions which offer security and make life worth while.

The one final opposite of religion is cynicism or complete pessimism, and for that negative state there is no morale. The cynic sees no real reason to exert himself on behalf of anything which burdens him or interferes with his happiness. He is essentially pessimistic about the possibility of finding and justifying any ends as worthy of laborious effort. Such persons profess that they have "nothing to live for" and their chief satisfaction seems to lie in believing themselves disillusioned concerning the things other people still take seriously. In actual life persons of this kind are rare—and they are sick. They may be "spoiled children" in any social stratum but they are likely to be most common in the leisure class where an education with no social motivation has made it possible for them to be smart and irresponsible yet physically comfortable. For persons of this

kind there is no genuine morale and nothing has commanding value or any value significant enough to be called religious. Naturally religious values and their accompanying morale are likely to be undermined and confused in an age like the present when rapid and revolutionary changes are overthrowing so many customary forms of culture without offering any clear and appealing patterns in their stead.

In contrast to the cynic, the natural human being hopes and plans for ends and ideals in keeping with his needs and desires. The group to which he belongs lives within systems of conduct which are felt to be important—even necessary—for the realization of those ends. This feeling of importance has grown up with usage and widespread repetition of customs and ceremonials. The life-stream of humanity flows on through the common channels of procuring food, protecting the weak, conversing about events, celebrating seasons and memories, attending to changes in nature, and having regard for neighboring peoples whether friendly or hostile. In simpler societies all individuals live by much the same pattern within the habits of their group and each one is sensitized to the behavior and emotions of his fellows. In the body of this common life germinates a sense of a whole, vague and mysterious, but powerful and dominant. When outwardly separated from the tribe, a hunter in the bush is still under the authority of the tribal custom and does not feel free to appropriate for himself the animal he has killed. Only a specific part belongs to him. The rest is assigned to others according to their relationship in the family or clan. Such customs vary endlessly in different lands but always there are some conditions of environment and tradition which weld the clans into solidarity of interest and conduct. Each group has symbols of itself—totem, hero, spirit, god.

The early law of blood revenge indicates how truly every man was blood of his blood and bone of his bone to every other man, for that "law" held that when a man was killed, his tribe did not need to find the doer of the deed but revenged itself upon any member of the offending tribe. It was "a tooth for a tooth" but it did not matter *whose* tooth. This solidarity of the clan or tribe is the primary condition of morale and it is the substance of the religious quality of life in primitive society. The fact that this unification of members

of the group develops unconsciously in the routine of living, and that it is toughened by the strains of warfare and adverse catastrophies, does not lessen its reality or detract from its importance. It is built up through celebrations of crucial events and through myth and symbol.

The ceremonies of initiation induct the adolescent youth into the spirit of the tribe by fasting, ordeals, and awesome stories of the past which fasten lasting images in the mind and create loyalties through endurance of pain and fear and taboos. Only destruction of the tribal life can destroy the morale and the religion once established. It is only in the past century that these facts about preliterate peoples in various parts of the world have been brought to light and fairly assessed. The sudden impact of higher upon lower cultures seldom transforms the latter but rather shatters and annihilates them. Scarcely any native tribes of Australia have endured contact with the white man's ways. In Africa, only after several generations of missionaries have worked with successive generations of children and youth have any considerable number begun to be converted. Many natives have been weaned away from their ancestral folkways without being imbued with the outlook and habits of the foreigners.

The slow growth of new religious faith and morale helps in understanding the nature and the tenacity of both. It is not merely that the new culture has often been imposed and thereby has been like striking flint with flint. This process allows of no real penetration. It works upon the surface and seldom takes account of the fact that the building of a different social order requires the establishment of the economic, social, and educational systems with which the proffered order has itself arisen. For example, Protestantism has been allied with an industrial economy which is alien to many of the peoples to whom Protestant missions have sought to appeal. The very forms of labor, thrift, and organization in which the attitudes and ideas of the missionaries have been shaped are not indigenous to tropical lands or to those in which castes, slavery, polygamy, and totemism prevail. Even where these forms of life have been greatly modified or legally abolished, their psychological effects may remain as barriers against new systems.

At higher levels the unity of society is more complex, yet involves

the same quality of allegiance. The individual is still a cell in the larger body and feels its life dependent upon its fellow-members. It is through familiarity with them and their manner of life that its own life derives its reality and zest. Separated from them the individual becomes confused and weakened. His personal emotions run with the fortunes of his group, rising with their strength and fading with their failure. The enlargement of the social unit by increase of numbers and development of functions introduces new conditions for significant morale and religion. These new conditions involve higher forms of thought and imagination. Beyond the face-to-face group lie neighboring peoples, more remote ancestors, and an extending future. Wider areas arise in which both the sense of kinship and of social antagonism become possible. As a people makes new conquests and dominates new territory the feeling of strength and greatness grows, and the value of religious symbols is enhanced. The gods become more powerful and elicit more reverence and fidelity.

In the "higher" religions the bonds that bind more peoples together become more conscious and more abstract. The gods grow with the numbers and functions of their devotees, and the unity of their followers is more dependent upon a wider social feeling with its greater scope of association and imagination. The very process of growth feeds upon itself and projects ambition toward new conquests and into a longer future. This thirst for enlargement reaches its height in the "world religions" which include in their ambition the assimilation of all mankind. In the unfolding of their movement there is of necessity a corresponding development of their conscious life, records of history, interpretations of their meaning and purpose, adaptation of ceremonials, and portrayals of the future. It is upon the success of this intellectual and imaginative side that the significance and force of such movements depend. In such efforts Buddhism deepened the inner realm of reflection and mystical exaltation; Christianity emphasized its system of individual and social morality, especially with reference to salvation in the future life; Mohammedanism sought extension by an austere monotheism, rigid ethics, and the promise of an indulgent paradise hereafter. In each case the results showed that success was largely determined by the congruity of the appeal with the temperament of the converts. Bud-

dhism spread in Asia, Christianity in Europe and America, and Mohammedanism in Arabia and near-by lands. Each achieved a high morale under its own forms of aggression and the resistance encountered. None of them made much headway in the areas dominated by either of the others. Today the growth of all of them has been slowed down by new conditions affecting the whole civilized world—conditions which make the old types of propaganda less effective. These new conditions arise largely from the spirit and achievements of the age of science and its technologies. In order to understand the significance of this new spirit is it important to compare it with the prescientific ages and to discover if possible how this new age may find religious unity and a consequent morale.

Even the high religions and their various sects have largely developed in the manner and character of tribal faiths. Their sanctity, in the consciousness of their adherents, is, to a great extent, due to wont and use. Particular races and groups follow their own ways under the force of custom. Their ways and beliefs are right because they are familiar and have been cherished by many generations and by great numbers. It is seldom that an individual gets far enough out of his culture to view it objectively and critically. For the most part, a man's habits, tastes, and modes of thought are fashioned and fixed in the tradition and attitudes of his family and race before he is supplied with the disposition and training to estimate himself and his views of life with any considerable detachment. This is peculiarly true of those representatives of religious faiths who have gone out as missionaries. They have been imbued with the history and doctrine of their own faith and have carried it out to the world as a finished and ready-to-use religion. Often the practical aspects and the moral challenge of its ethical principles have been effective and valuable in awakening and stimulating new patterns of living. They have spread hope and expectancy; they have offered beneficial techniques, especially in medicine, sanitation, agriculture, and education of children. This has been notably true of Christian missionaries, who have carried far and wide the scientific and practical fruits of Western culture almost as if these were integral parts of the Christian religion itself. This combination of absoluteness in doctrine and practical adaptability in affairs of daily life has been effective in

gaining recruits in some areas, but it has often been inadequate in dealing with the better-educated and the more powerful classes.

Perhaps this point becomes clearer when the activities of Christian denominations are considered. They have grown up under various social pressures through the leadership of individuals or groups responding to some special condition or conviction. Luther rebelled against the tyranny and corruption of the Roman Catholic church of his time; Calvin sought a satisfying doctrinal interpretation of the scriptures and a more consistent biblical theology; Wesley was moved to carry Christianity to underprivileged classes of English society and to encourage them to believe in the freedom and availability of salvation for all men; George Fox proclaimed the "inner light" as a guide to God and human redemption; Thomas Campbell was scandalized by the plethora of sects and searched the New Testament for direction toward a plan for uniting all Christians. Each movement took over much that had been thought and practiced before but focused attention upon some neglected text or form of organization or method of living. In the light of history Protestant denominations appear more as developments from partial insights and special interests than as attempts to gain comprehensive and impartial formulations of the total body of religious faith and practice. This impression is deepened by the intense conflicts between the different parties which opposed each other with an intensity of dogmatism and exclusiveness that proclaimed each one the sole possessor and guardian of "the true faith" and the only way of salvation. These wars of the sects were much like the wars of primitive tribes in which all outside the favored chosen people were as nothing before God. Because they did not know or refused to accept, the one true faith, they were hopelessly lost now and forever. If any missed an important belief about God or Christ or the Bible or failed to keep some ordinance of the Church he could not be regarded as safely within the divine grace. That was a barbarous tribalism infiltrated with much magic and superstition which have continued in wide areas of the common life in spite of popular education and a high degree of civilization. Only in recent decades, with new discoveries in biblical criticism and the lessening hold of the old religion upon the educated classes, has this clannishness and tribalism begun

to give way to genuine tolerance and earnest co-operation on behalf of the central attitudes and moral principles of a reasonable and vital faith.

It is important to recognize, however, that within each of the numerous denominations there has been high morale. Individuals exhibited great devotion to the tenets of their faith and sacrificed for its furtherance as a means of "saving" the world and doing the will of God. Personal virtues were scrupulously striven for and patriotism was shared by all if for no other reason than in appreciation of the liberty which a democratic society allowed for the propagation of the faith and the convictions of the enlightened. It was a merit of this free, democratic country that it gave opportunity for the adherents of a creed to do their utmost to spread it to the ends of the earth. Every group thus found an open way provided for its own extension and could therefore make this a ground of genuine loyalty to the political order which guaranteed its rights and its opportunities. Though divided from one another by their peculiar beliefs, all parties were of one mind with reference to the support of the form of government which made possible their "liberty of prophesying." There was thus a morale within each denomination in support of its tenets and in maintaining the general moral standards of the Christian life. There was also a national morale in loyalty to the land of political and religious freedom in which the rights and opportunities of all individuals were respected.

New conditions have arisen in America which have weakened the traditional morale. As is frequently pointed out, the passing of the frontier has made impossible the pioneering frontiersman; the urbanization of the population has diminished the significance of the small community and abolished the town meeting; the growth of industry has subordinated the old agricultural economy; the development of corporations and labor unions prevents the free enterprise which once made the "self-made" man; political machines have obscured the significance of the free ballot; and the machine age is the scene of vast unemployment and unprecedented measures of federal and state relief. Individuals are forced into vocational and economic groups, but these groups compete as "blocks" for favors of special legislation which limits the loyalty of the individual to the scope of a partial interest. The morale which is built within the range of a

particular class tends to defeat the development of a morale which is inclusively social and national.

These conditions deeply affect the religious life and institutions. Many regard the churches as supported and controlled by the wealthy few. The rapid growth of eccentric, emotional religious bodies among the poor and underprivileged accentuates class consciousness. But there are deeper currents affecting traditional faiths. The critical study of the Bible has so changed the picture of its contents and the conception of its sources that it can no longer fairly be made the basis of traditional religious ideas. Its literature is a mixed composite from many ancient cultures and from varying ethical codes. Even in the New Testament, doctrines, worship, and church organization are as diverse as the Hebrew and Greek backgrounds which they reflect. While these facts have not as yet filtered down from academic scholars into the popular mind, they have had the effect of creating a widespread feeling that the foundations of the old formulas of the faith are seriously shaken. The trumpets of the more enlightened ministers seem to give an uncertain sound on what were once clear notes.

History, psychology, and the social sciences have undermined all the standard systems of theology. These systems were formulated in the prescientific era and therefore the creeds based upon them are now archaic and unbelievable. No shortening or diluting can make them acceptable to thinking and consistent minds. But within the new climate of man's spirit a new religious growth is appearing, more in accord with modern knowledge and better suited to foster a morale adequate to the needs of the times. The signs of this religious growth do not come in the old terms and are not always identified as religious on account of fixed preconceptions and assumptions. But in the larger and freer conception of what is religious they are already discernible. It may not be entirely venturesome to specify some of these signs, since there is a marked tendency among those qualified, to regard the religious values as those values which are held to be most important in a given culture.

The growth of humanitarianism is one sign. Human welfare has emerged into new importance in this age. The rise of democracies is itself evidence of this. Beyond the removal of the old barriers of slavery, limited suffrage, and partial public education, have de-

veloped benevolent agencies of an unprecedented magnitude and efficiency. Care for public health and recreation; knowledge of man's advance set forth in scientific museums, libraries, and works of art; concern for children at birth and through a lengthening infancy; experiments in vocational guidance; care of defectives; provision for the aged; adult education; and many forms of social work, express love for fellow-man and fulfil that injunction of the Christian religion to love one's neighbor, than which there is no injunction greater. Nor do these things lack that imaginative perspective which is essential to the spiritual quality of life. They envisage the hope of a better race and of a better society which fits into the dream of the kingdom of heaven on earth.

The cultivation of this practical reasonableness is another sign of vital religion. It is applied truth that makes men free. It is practical wisdom that is justified of her children. Philosophical thought and metaphysical speculation are legitimate pursuits but they attain religious significance only when they are brought into operation to enlarge the horizons of action and the meaning of life. As long as the processes of thought are held aloof and cultivated as if they could be ends in themselves, they lack that participation in life and that consequent warmth of emotion that are essentially religious. It is the discovery of the importance of *attitudes*—attitudes of love, sympathy, reverence for life in its simple and homely aspects—that is opening the way to real reasonableness in religion. When the basic attitudes of fellow-feeling and social action are put in the foreground, reasonableness becomes meaningful as that wisdom which invents instruments and agencies for the efficient operation of these attitudes. In this relation there is constant opportunity for intelligent criticism, experimentation, and redirection of interest in the understanding and realization of values. Such reasonableness also prevents the error of assuming that religious values are of a unique order. It rather makes evident the fact that religious values are at the same time other kinds of values—economic, political, scientific, aesthetic, social.

A third sign of growing religion is the dawning recognition that no values are separable from any other values. Many of the tragedies in the world today spring from the attempt to cultivate some interest as if it could exist alone. It is an old story that human satisfaction

cannot be found in the exclusive pursuit of money, power, pleasure, health, knowledge, or "spirituality." Only a unified, reasonably balanced system of values fulfils the needs of human nature.

There is much in the life of American churches to support the claim that they are already deeply imbued with this newer religious spirit. The survivals of old doctrines, forms, and phrases are felt to be vestigial and obsolescent. Litanies, hymns, and prayers express new growths of thought and aspiration. The great Federal Council of Churches minimizes doctrinal differences to the point of ignoring them. It stresses the practical application of social attitudes in programs of religious education, moral reforms, and humanitarian idealism. It encourages the union of religious forces for these practical ends in cities and in small communities.

The life of the ordinary local church to a large extent has its vitality in binding together people of different classes and culture into a living fellowship inspired by a sense of the importance and appeal of the mystic fellowship of all great souls in the service of man and God. In the great days of the year, Christmas, Easter, Independence Day, Thanksgiving, the religious spirit rises to heights which surpass the limits of creed and race. It is notable that the birthday of Abraham Lincoln becomes more and more a day of religious remembrance although Lincoln belonged to no church. This is a fact of undeniable significance for it means that his character and attitude represent what the people of America deeply feel to be the soul of genuine religion. Thus the churches gather into symbols and ideals the meaning of their aspirations and unify their multiple and complex values in an inclusive faith.

It is this faith which becomes clearest in times of national stress and danger. Then it shows its power to strengthen the morale of the whole nation, for the factors in this faith indicate what men who possess it will fight for and die for. To them life without freedom, reasonableness, brotherhood, and a sense of what they consider divine, loses its meaning and its worth. Important as it is to have a faith worth dying for, it is more essential to have a faith which gives zest and direction to life in times of peace, and not for one land alone but for all mankind.

RECREATION AND MORALE

EDUARD C. LINDEMAN

ABSTRACT

The sources of morale are a confident attitude toward the future, the capacity to behave efficiently under pressure, and a certain variety of perspective. Morale is a resultant of work, play, and understanding. Morale can be generated through recreation, and the behavior learned in sport can be an aid in facing problems. Recreation workers should realize therefore that they are both leaders and educators.

"Morale" is a word which can be made to mean any desirable form of conduct on the part of the masses in a crisis. If the demand is for obedience, morale will be considered to be the readiness to obey. If, on the other hand, the situation calls for voluntary participation in a joint enterprise, morale would be thought of as willingness to volunteer. If, in a critical moment, a nation requires funds and issues notes of indebtedness in the form of bonds and the people quickly and eagerly purchase the bonds, it will be said that their morale is high. If a commodity becomes scarce and the government asks citizens to curtail consumption and they do so willingly, without grumbling, their morale will be called good.

The word "morale," as used in modern times, has acquired at least three distinct elements of meaning, namely, belief that collective conduct is right conduct, confidence in the cause underlying the crisis, and voluntary submission to discipline. Thus, in a wartime situation, the morale of the army will be good if the soldiers are personally involved in the cause for which they fight, if they have confidence in their leaders and their equipment, and if they feel that their actions are less the consequence of compulsion than of eagerness to serve. The morale of the civilian population under similar circumstances will be sufficient to sustain effective action on the part of the military forces if a majority of citizens feel that the cause for which the fighting is being done is just, if they believe that the national leaders have understood the cause and also the costs involved, and if they are prepared to make sacrifices on behalf of victory.

Since, then, morale is a state of mind, many theorists seem to be-

lieve that it may be engendered and sustained by propaganda which appeals to reason. Others, assuming that morale is primarily an emotional and not an intellectual state, insist that it may be brought into being and maintained only by appeals to prejudices, fears, and prospective rewards. These are, so I believe, partial views. Morale is a state of health, and the foundations of health are manifold, not single. The sources of morale are (a) a reasoned and confident attitude toward the future, (b) the capacity to behave efficiently under pressure, and (c) that variety of perspective which accepts tragedy as a reality from which none but the sordid may escape. The person who is healthy in body, mind, and spirit will possess morale to such a degree that in crises all his powers will increase. His valor will automatically produce an increment for his functions. His performance will reach a higher level than has hitherto been possible. In short, his morale will call forth a maximum of latent capacity.

These are theoretical considerations which must now be brought into focus with respect to the present situation confronted by our nation. We have embarked upon an unprecedented program for national and hemispheric defense. At any moment we may be called upon to engage in actual battle. But, regardless of whether or not we become a belligerent in this current war, we shall find ourselves for a long time to come living within a war economy. The success or failure of this enterprise will depend in the long run not upon our technological or financial resources but upon those inner resources of personality which we have described above as morale. How, then, is this quality of morale to be secured and sustained?

Before attempting to formulate an answer to this query, we may profitably pause to discuss certain distinctions which attach to this particular war. Perhaps the most important distinction to be noted is that in a technological war the differences between civilians and armed forces tend to be eliminated. In past wars the civilian population was considered to be a kind of cheering-section for those who did the fighting, and thus two separate programs of morale became feasible. In modern warfare morale becomes organic, applicable to the total population, those trained to fight and those who may be wounded or killed in spite of the fact that they are noncombatants. In modern war the scene of battle is everywhere. Property is de-

stroyed, not merely in the pathway of moving armies, but wherever airplanes may fly and submarines may float. Still another factor which alters the situation is brought about by means of modern methods of communication and the refinements of official propaganda. These references are, perhaps, sufficient to indicate that we should not now be content with procedures for morale which were found to be successful in former wars.

The type of morale required of American citizens in this crisis may be instituted and sustained by means of a program which will include the following items:

1. Truth-telling with respect to world-events, progress achieved in our defense preparations, and those domestic problems which enhance or impede the nation's policy
2. Fortright propaganda on behalf of those democratic ideals which constitute our major reason for taking the risks of war
3. Intellectual and emotional preparation for our future role in assisting in the reorganization of the world for peaceful purposes
4. A rapid extension of mental hygiene education for purposes of preventing hysteria, depression, and irrational mass movements following the cessation of war
5. A nation-wide propagation of ideas and demonstrations designed to elevate the nutritional standards of the total population
6. Rapid expansion of all programs of public sanitation and public health
7. Mobilization of the liberal and democratic forces of the nation for a steadfast protection of civil rights
8. Extension of social and economic legislation designed to protect the weak and the handicapped, to insure a greater distribution of wealth and income, and to bring about a greater degree of justice
9. A national plan for expanding and improving physical education and recreation for the entire population

The above list of items needed for an appropriate morale program omits mention of the special problem precipitated by the existence of a conscript army. This problem is, however, included by implication. It is no longer feasible, so I believe, to fight modern wars successfully unless the battle takes place on two fronts simultaneously, on the battle front and on the home front. I am concentrating atten-

tion upon the latter problem because I have little doubt concerning our ability to create an efficient fighting force. My doubts derive from the conviction that we still seem to believe that we can fight a war or engage in gigantic war preparation by utilizing ideas of a by-gone age. Those who tell us that we must now concentrate our entire attention upon winning the war and postpone all programs of social and economic reform until the war has ended will betray us. They do not understand the nature of modern warfare. They do not understand that, if this formula is repeated, another war will have been fought in vain. The proper mood for realizing whatever gains a war may bring must be engendered while the fighting is in progress. If this is not done, the mood which will arrive "when peace breaks out" will be regressive.

The last item in the above proposal for a morale program deals with the relationship between the collective temper of a people and their use of leisure. In treating this subject in a special manner I shall confine myself again to theoretical considerations. The task of criticism respecting the methods now being employed for furnishing wholesome recreation to the armed forces and to the workers engaged in defense production belongs in another context. Critics of social programs should, nevertheless, scrutinize these methods. They should observe responses in particular instances, as, for example, the refusal of soldiers in one army camp to grant an audience to one of our leading stage humorists. In the last war the soldiers seemed to regard it a favor to them when Broadway entertainers performed in the camps, but something has changed since the last war. Similar discrepancies are being observed in the initial recreational programs in civilian centers, and especially in the attitude of leaders of various organizations responsible for these activities. Slowly we are coming to learn that the problem of morale in this war is far different from that of the war of 1914-18 and vastly more complicated. It is for these reasons that it seems relevant to suggest certain theoretical viewpoints, ideas which may lead to new hypotheses and fresh experiments.

When the Athenian democracy had reached a stage similar to our own, with the aggressor already at the gates, some leaders thought the morale of the army and of the people could be revived by words; they implored Pericles to go forth to the people and explain to them

once more the virtues of democratic life. He finally consented to do so, and in his famous funeral oration¹ (he had chosen the occasion of a mass burial of those young Athenians who had been killed in the latest of the Peloponnesian wars) he spoke wisely and beautifully. But, alas! it was too late: the democracy of Athens perished.

We may still profit by the wisdom of Pericles, even though his words were inadequate for the re-establishment of Greek morale in the great crisis to which their culture succumbed over two thousand years ago. Pericles attempted to describe the quality of democratic life and in doing so furnished several clues which may aid us in discovering recreational values for our time. In the first place, Pericles considered recreation to be a therapeutic against melancholy. The tendency toward depression of mind, toward pessimism, and in the direction of resignation to fate is very strong at present and affects primarily two groups, namely, the young and the sensitive. If this mood continues and deepens, there will not exist the requisite morale for winning a war or for consolidating a peace. Commercial institutions dedicated to entertainment have reacted to this predisposition in three ways: they have fed upon it by producing plays and movies revealing the moral degradations, conspiracies, and brutalities of people who have already deserted the democratic way of life; they have gone to the opposite extreme by producing lavish musical shows almost completely lacking in social meaning; and they have attempted to inject the partiotic motif by means of songs, symbols, and historical reference. I think it is safe to say that whatever morale exists in the United States at present is not being created in theaters and in music halls. The songs simply do not "come off," and the tragic presentiments remain impersonal.

Professional sports offer another index to public temper and here, I believe, the prospect is brighter. Audience reactions at baseball games and prize fights seem to be spontaneous and vigorous. I am told, however, that local loyalty to baseball teams has become more fitful and that the drop in attendance when a given team is losing is sharp and decisive. The skilful player is appreciated, but the crowd's acclaim goes to the home-run hitter, the "slugger." A similar manifestation appears in boxing: the crowds feel cheated if the fight ends without a knockout.

¹ Thucydides, Book ii.

In amateur sports the mood seems to be one of pervasive boredom. The younger players in tennis, for example, hit the ball harder than ever, but they seem to possess less will to win. When the tide runs against them they capitulate easily. Recently I witnessed a tournament in which three quarter-final matches ended with scores of six to love, and in two of these the losing player served double faults on match points. I doubt whether I have ever felt so dismayed in connection with amateur sports as when viewing a photograph of a girls' high-school basketball team walking off the floor after a defeat: every player on the team was weeping copiously.

The truth of the matter appears to be this: We have hitherto neglected to bring athletics and recreation genuinely within the democratic context,² and now that democracy is on trial we discover that the cultural deposit from leisure does not furnish us with that variety of morale necessary for conducting an aggressive prodemocracy struggle. Our first and major task lies here: now that we are in danger we should utilize the current necessity for purposes of democratizing recreation and sports. This is an undertaking which will require statesmanship and high moral determination. Racial discrimination, for example, is almost universal in certain of our sports. In others the managerial responsibilities are discharged by persons who live within or upon the margins of the underworld. The young men now in our armed forces may experience a genuinely democratic program of recreation in their camps, but when they once more reach their home communities they will encounter sharp inequalities. Although we may abhor the objectives of the totalitarian governments, we must admit that they have done more than have we in making leisure a public responsibility and in furnishing recreation to their masses.

The preceding paragraph implies that a long-term plan for meeting the recreational needs of our people has become imperative. I assume that the beginnings of this plan may emerge from the fact that we must rely upon recreation as an important source of morale in our present crisis. Morale is the resultant of work and play and understanding, plus a balance between all three. It is the task of theorists to propose experiments and experiences from which this result may

² For an impassioned statement of this situation see the recent volume by John Tunis entitled *Democracy and Sport*. New York: A. S. Barnes & Co., 1941. Pp. ix + 52. \$0.75.

be expected. These experiments will be more likely to succeed if those who conduct them have in mind certain tests or criteria of evaluation; and it is now my purpose to suggest a set of values which seems to me appropriate for a democratic recreational plan.

A grim joke was recently published in a magazine for high-school pupils. A basketball coach was addressing his team preparatory to an important contest. These were his words: "Now, boys, remember that basketball develops individuality, initiative, and leadership. Now get out on the floor and do exactly as I told you." This coach had somehow assimilated some of the symbols of democracy, but the reality had escaped him completely. He had missed what leaders of the young so often fail to recognize, namely, that in a democracy each individual must "set up a responsible government within his own individual person."³ The first test, therefore, which a recreation leader in a democracy must meet is this: Does he allow the players to solve some problems on their own, and is he concerned over the worth and the dignity of individuals?

Recreation leaders are educators. As far as actual habits of conduct are concerned, they probably exert more influence than do classroom teachers. But the goals of all educators are the same. Hence we have a right to ask the recreational leader if he is traveling in the same general direction as the practitioner of general education. Is it his goal to produce a maximum number of healthy, socially sensitive, reflective, and happy individuals—individuals who are willing to accept responsibility for perpetuating the values of a democratic society? If this is his goal and if his methods validate his goal, he will be one of the builders of the national plan.

Those who are capable of enjoying their recreational experiences are healthy persons. It is a truism that children and youth do not pursue health per se, that is, as an end in itself. But in a carefully designed recreation program they will acquire health as an accessory. As I have already indicated, health is a complex conception. It includes the ability to use one's body, to engage in vigorous activity, to co-ordinate one's movements, and to maintain a physical tone. But it includes also those aspects of health which enable a person to face reality, to refrain from "blame-fixing," to sustain an eagerness for the new problem and the new situation. And the healthy person

³ Louis H. Sullivan, *The Young Man in Architecture*.

will in addition be sensitive to others; he will possess what the late Alfred Adler called "social feeling," the capacity to enjoy co-operative activity, to share in the ends of others. The playground, the dance floor, and the gymnasium are the laboratories in which one may discover tendencies toward, or away from, healthy growth. Here one experiences the joy which comes from harmony and co-ordination of functions, the free use of energy, and unaffected pleasures.

Since recreation is a cultural category, it seems legitimate to test all programs of recreation according to specific cultural declarations and aims. We say, for example, that we are a democracy, and hence it is fair to ask whether or not our recreational life is compatible with that ideal. I have already indicated several ways in which the democratic test may be used, but a difficult consideration has been omitted. In addition to being a society which is by tradition democratic, ours is civilization which is affected by many forces which have nothing to do with democratic ideals. The "machine", for example—another term for technology and science—tends to produce increased standardization, specialization, and mechanization. These are influences which may run counter to the democratic ideal. Their effect is to destroy the organic unity of experience. Our lives become more fragmentary and our experiences more segmental. I can see no effective way of overcoming these consequences except through a recreational program which will restore the balances and provide opportunities for more organic experiences. Every recreation leader should ask himself at the beginning of every program which he inaugurates: Is this activity likely to lead toward, or away from, a balanced life?

The early Greeks, Plato especially, engaged in what may be called philosophic discussions concerning the place of physical education, recreation, and the arts in general education. The classical tests of value for Plato's time were all subsumed in three simple quality words: the true, the good, and the beautiful. Ours is a more pragmatic age, and we must ask additional questions. We wish also to know of the person devoted to the true, the good, and the beautiful whether he continues to grow as a total personality. We wish to know whether his recreational life is a restless passing from one fad to another or whether it reveals depth and persistency and durability. If we are genuinely interested in democratic conduct, we will also ask if his recreational life shows any social meaning, any growth

in the capacity to share experiences with others. And, finally, we may inquire into the coherence of his total life-pattern, his work as well as his play.

It is probably axiomatic to state that a democratic society cannot exist unless there are in its population a maximum of persons who enjoy democratic conduct—who are, that is, democratic personalities. And when a democracy is in danger it must rely upon these democratic personalities for its sustaining morale. The basic proposition which I have attempted to state is that we cannot have democratic personalities and democratic morale unless we get them through a democratic experience in recreation. This is not to imply that other departments of experience do not have an equal share in producing this result, but it does imply that if recreation is neglected the other forces will be weakened and to a degree negated. This happens to be true for two primary reasons, namely, because leisure represents so large a bulk in the total of our waking time and because the element of free choice in leisure offers a better test of character than is possible under conditions of compulsion. But what, in more specific language, is a democratic personality?

An American college president has recently supplied an excellent working definition of democratic personality.⁴ He states that a democratic personality is one which gets itself somehow distributed among the folk. I think this is what people mean in general when they say of a particular individual, "He is democratic." In the pre-machine era this process of distribution was simple enough. How is it to be accomplished by, let us say, factory workers who labor in an industry which is highly automatic and where even person-to-person communication is ruled out by circumstances? Is it not obvious that for a vast number of American citizens the chief opportunities for getting themselves distributed will arise in leisure? Democracy, as Professor John Dewey is fond of saying, rests upon the capacity to share experiences with others. When public opinion is no longer the result of shared experience, it is likely to come about by means of various propagandas. The person who does not or cannot share his experiences will find it easy to accept his opinions ready-made from self-assertive authorities. Here, then, is a new meaning for recrea-

⁴ An unpublished address delivered by President Paul F. Douglas before the Washington branch of the American Management Association.

tion. It is the modern equivalent of the country store and the cross-roads post office; it is the place where people meet spontaneously, engage in free activity, and automatically come to know one another in a fundamental manner. Some experts in physical education disparage mere attendance at sport events; they regard this as a form of vicarious experience and hence not fruitful. My opinion is contrary; I have witnessed some of the finest types of shared experience on the part of spectators at baseball games. But I am not advocating a merely passive form of recreation. One of the reasons why so many people enjoy baseball, for example, is the fact that they know the game; they have themselves played it.

This is, perhaps, not the most suitable occasion for allowing one's thoughts about personality to become too abstruse or subtle, but I have been deeply troubled in recent months by a state of mind among my fellow-Americans which, as far as I can give it a name, seems to be a stubborn unwillingness to understand the true nature of that corrupting "disease" of our time which goes by the name of "fascism." I do not pretend to understand the various elements which contribute to this resistance, but certain features within it seem to become clearer. One of the therapeutic consequences of fascism appears to be the release which it offers to individuals to express their latent aggression. It is not accidental, I believe, that so many of the initial converts to fascist doctrine are persons with some variety of physical defect, that is, persons for whom the unconscious aggressive impulses have been repressed. I am not sure that I am here on wholly sound ground, but it appears to me that there might be greater resistance to the above tendency if our culture furnished more innocent opportunities for the expression of this aggressive impulse. We all seem to have it in a degree. Competitive sports make use of it, and this seems to me wholesome, provided, of course, that the person who engages in competition will also enjoy other experiences of a collaborative character. An appropriate expression of aggressiveness is one which takes place under the guidance of accepted rules. In sports, then, one gains in two respects: one expresses aggression and one learns to obey rules. The type of aggression which fascism finally lets loose among people seems to have a constant tendency to violate the rules. Ultimately, this form of aggression takes on the character of outlaw activity, and those who charge Hitler and his cohorts with

"gangsterism" are aiming in the right direction. It is worth mentioning, perhaps, that the German language has no indigenous word for "sportsmanship."

What has been said above may sound odd to some readers, since it seems to assume that there will be more morale among people who express their latent tendency toward aggression than among passive and completely peace-loving people. Paradoxical as this may seem, it is what I believe. The ways in which this aggressive impulse expresses itself in family bickering, in organization quarrels, and in chronic institutional feuds seem to be much worse than to allow it to come to the overt level, in that variety of competition which allows the aggressiveness to melt away the moment the game is over.

The role of design in experience has not been adequately explored, and hence what one says about it must be kept strictly in the realm of speculation. In medieval society, for example, the need for design appeared to receive a high degree of satisfaction in the order of society itself. The good, the true, and the beautiful were derivatives of the same source. Ethics, art, and logic were not separated values but rather integral parts of the same cluster. Unifying experiences, therefore, were to be anticipated. Only those who wilfully placed themselves outside the culture pattern—and these must have been rare instances—suffered from a lack of morale. Our contemporary culture offers no such sense of unity. If it has a design, no one is able to describe it, unless as a form of disintegration, *à la* Spengler. Hence, there has arisen in our time a strong impulse to place design upon people. This is, from one viewpoint, the primary meaning of modern ideologies. It also accounts for many unusual phenomena in American life, as, for example, the tendency among the newer leadership in trade-unions to operate these once-free associations by rules of compulsion. Some of the newer and more powerful unions operate without apparent consciousness of the Bill of Rights. Many trade-union leaders make no pretense of behaving democratically, and within the sphere of their influence acquire the habits of dictators. Frequently, the trade-union group sets itself off from the community in which it exists as though the union constituted an island floating upon the democratic "sea" but was not an integral part of the total democratic process.

I turn once more to recreation as the antidote. Since we all seem

to possess the urge to design, why not offer increasing opportunities for this impulse in leisure? The stuff of the earth lies all about us. Its materials are all relatively malleable. We may place our sense of design upon clay, textiles, woods, and metals. We may each of us design some small corner of the earth's surface in the shape of a garden, and, even though few of us have the capacity to become artists, we can all become artisans. The skeptic will ask: "Is it likely that a generation trained in the free expression of design would automatically make a better world?" I do not know, but the experiment is worth trying. Certainly, the loss of morale—our present preoccupation—is somehow correlated with the loss of a "design for living."

Today, when we need to strengthen the core and fiber of our democracy (*morale*), we should pay more attention than ever to sport. We need to give everybody an equal chance to play: rich, poor, black, white, Jew, Gentile, Chinaman, those who are quick and perceptive as well as those who in sports are slow and inept. We must not decrease the sporting opportunities for the many. We should in every possible way subordinate to the good of the mass, the wishes of the publicised title-holders who draw headlines in the press and stare at us from the newsreels. Fair play. Respect for others. Deference to constituted authority. These are part of the warp and woof of democratic life, as they are the essence of true sport. *Never before in the history of the United States have we so needed the spirit of democracy in our sport and the spirit of sport in our democracy.*⁵

These are words to which I can give wholehearted assent. But, before closing this discursive essay, I must add a further word of warning. I believe with deep sincerity that morale can be generated through recreation, and I believe that the behaviors learned in sports will sustain our morale in many of the trials still to come. But I do not believe that morale rests upon any single facet of life. There can be no sturdy morale without a sense of dignity, and dignity derives from good organisms seeking a good life in a good society. Those who are specialists in recreation and do not at the same time aid us in bringing our democracy to greater fulfilment in all spheres of experience will fail in the end. The function of recreation in modern society is essential, but it should not become compensatory. He who furnishes recreation to the poor and does not also strive to eliminate poverty is already caught in a living confusion.

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⁵ Tunis, *op. cit.*

MORALE AND ITS MEASUREMENT

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ABSTRACT

✓ Morale is the relationship of a group to a given end. In the present situation it is likely that the specific factors affecting morale are not the same in any two countries. While it is difficult to find measurable indices of civilian morale, such indices may be selected and used. The Ministry of Information in Britain has used the public-opinion survey for measuring morale as well as the more detailed methods used by Gallup. A study made by Paul Lazarsfeld and associates suggests the possibility of using the panel method as a technique of inquiry for ascertaining morale under war conditions.

Morale is the relationship of a group to a given end. The end is always set by an authority—by the management of the corporation in the case of industrial morale, by the military authorities for the army, and by the government for its civilian subjects. Assuming that the end is desired firmly and determinedly by the authority itself, the problem of morale then becomes the extent to which the authority's followers or subordinates will also strive to achieve that goal. The greater the homogeneity of the group and the closer the identity of the leaders with the led, the fewer will be the problems encountered in maintaining high morale. The more heterogeneous the group and the greater the social distance separating those giving the orders from those at the receiving end, the more likely it is that low morale will ensue in times of stress. Unity can be enhanced by the provision of good material conditions of all kinds. Unity can also be augmented by ideological means, the history of the group being a very important weapon in the ideological armory. In practice, of course, factors of both kinds—material and ideological—operate together, it often being possible to offset any deterioration in the former by a greater emphasis upon the ideological factors. One of the outstanding problems in maintaining morale is determining the lengths to which this substitution can be carried.

✓ The separate spheres of society, military, industrial, and civilian, are today more closely interrelated than ever before. Civilians are literally in the front lines and must, while carrying on their everyday jobs, experience some of the hazards which it is the duty of the sol-

dier to face. This is only one aspect of the interrelatedness and by no means the most important. In the last war the efforts of one industrial worker behind the lines sufficed to equip two or three soldiers at the front. Today each soldier, as a result of the greater fire power required, the greater complexity of armaments, and the enormous increase in mechanization, absorbs the efforts of approximately four civilian workers. The most successful British general of this war, General Wavell, puts at the head of all military problems that of supply, which is simply a method of underlining an army's dependence upon its civilian base. A modern army is unable to maintain itself for a single day without the highly skilled and highly organized efforts of its whole civilian population. Any disturbance of civilian efforts will, therefore, rapidly react upon the military situation; the connection is close and direct. A deterioration in the supply situation will lead to a deterioration of the military position, and there is little hope of escape from these consequences.

A similarly close connection exists in the realm of morale, but the interactions between the different morale sections are by no means so automatic or so direct. A military defeat will produce its impact on the state of mind of the civilian population, but whereas in one nation gloom and dispiritedness may ensue, in another a military setback will become the spur to even greater efforts. Hitler, it is certain, can maintain himself only by a succession of military victories. The most dispassionate observers seem to agree that the reaction of the German population to a defeat would be negative and exceedingly severe. In Britain, on the other hand, events have shown that an impairment of morale does not follow upon defeat. "Blood, sweat, and tears" was the only promise made by Churchill when he took office; while successes have been recorded in some areas, the situation in others has definitely worsened. Yet Churchill has retained his popularity, and British morale today stands very high.

Differences of this kind in national reactions and the implications of these differences are very important in the measurement of morale. They imply that there is no universal correlation applicable to all countries between morale and the factors affecting it—that methodologically, therefore, it does not suffice to plot the curve of the

factors. Expressed in other words, while in one country the factor curves may fall and the total morale curve fall with them, in another country the factor curves may also fall, but the total morale curve may remain a straight line or even rise. It is necessary, therefore, in measuring morale, to use a technique which gives results independently of the factor curves. We may go still further in the emphasis upon the differences in rational reactions: it is likely that the specific factors affecting morale are not the same in any two countries. It is interesting to compare the memoranda, *Morale in China*, and *Morale Factors in Collapse of France, 1940*. Both are issued by the Committee for National Morale and both are excellent pieces of analysis. But there their similarities end. In the case of France attention is directed toward the following causes of bad morale among many others—political tension, public violence, repudiation of existing regime by large bodies of citizens, exaggerated individualism, general passivity, demographic factors, and susceptibility to panic and despair. In the analysis of China's morale, however, we find a discussion of such factors as dependence on American and British aid, the relations of the "return to the coast" school with the "new hinterland" school, the price of grain, the absence of medical facilities, and the treatment of Manchurian troops by the central government.

The enumeration of these differences indicates that morale is a function of the economic situation, the character of the social and political groups within a country, their relations to each other, the degree of political organization and consciousness, the military situation and the relationships with other countries, and of a body of recollections and beliefs which have emerged from a country's history. An illustration may illuminate the importance of the country's history. Reference was made above to the high standard of British morale, both absolutely and relatively to the atmosphere in Germany, and at the same time it was pointed out that this good state of British morale cannot be explained simply by reference to the objective circumstances. Part of the explanation will be found in Britain's history. Since Henry VIII successfully defied the pope and Elizabeth's fleet defeated the Spanish Armada, England has not once been completely beaten in a war, with the exception of the American Revolution. England has not experienced a full-scale in-

vasion since William I conquered the country in 1066, and hence there is no dread—either acquired or retained from personal experiences—of the enemy appearing and oppressing the land. For most Britishers the possibility simply does not exist that their country might be beaten. The world is a place where the British always get off to a slow start in a war but, once started, their military machine and their navy may grind slowly but they grind exceeding small. The world has been like that for nearly four hundred years, and there is no reason to believe that it will change at the present time. That is the way the ordinary Britisher argues.

✓ The German, however, remembers the heavy defeat suffered in 1918, up to that time the most complete military defeat, measured in terms of territory, men, and materials lost, ever suffered by any country. He remembers the depression of the early 1930's, which Britain, comparatively speaking, escaped. He remembers the years of sacrifice prior to the present war and he remembers his leaders'

✓ promises that that war would be of short duration. But it has lasted two years, and early in 1941 Hitler talked of "if the war goes into 1942." If, therefore, the German surveys the war to date and finds his country's forces occupying most of Europe, he is nevertheless sobered by recalling that in 1918 much the same position did not stave off defeat. While the Germans are oppressed by the ghosts of the past, the British are supported by the genius of their history.

The study of national morale, therefore, becomes a historical, political study to which individual psychology, with its somewhat formal, general categories, can contribute little and to which psychiatry has but slight relevance. The collective population of a country as a unit of study belongs to a different class of objects from a human being. The analogy of a society or a community as a man may throw light on certain aspects of its workings; it is important to remember that it is only an analogy. The first attempt to measure morale was also a successful attempt, and a description of the methods employed will reveal that in plotting the curve, reference was made only to objective, sociological factors, and subjective, psychological factors did not enter into the picture at all.

Newton D. Baker, the secretary of war during the first world war, insisted that all the varied information being received in the United States concerning the state of morale in Germany be reduced to

quantitative form. The work, undertaken by the War Department, General Staff, Military Intelligence, resulted in the first morale curve ever plotted. The main curve was the state of civilian morale. The subsidiary curves were: (1) variations in Germany's military position, (2) sinkings by U-boats, (3) the food situation in northern Germany, (4) the degree of political unity, and (5) the state of Austria-Hungary.

Germany's morale is arbitrarily standing at 100% in August, 1914. Zero, for the same line, is taken to be the point at which the effective majority of the German people will refuse longer to support the war. The degree of movement of this line is determined mainly by a consideration of the deflections of the secondary lines which represent the forces exerting the greatest influence on the German state of morale.²

This explanation is given on the chart itself by those responsible for plotting the curves. None of the sources is cited except that No. 1, sinkings by U-boats, is said to be "based on monthly reports of tonnage sunk." Presumably No. 3, dealing with the food situation, was restricted to northern Germany because it is there that the big cities are found, and it is from there that most information would be coming out by means of visitors, neutral seamen, and so on.

From spring, 1918, the main curve was falling sharply; it was not far from zero when the revolutions actually started in Austria and Germany. Accordingly, this attempt to measure morale may be regarded as successful in its outcome. Certain points should be made on the methods employed. The two curves most closely resembling each other in shape are the main morale curve and the one indicating Germany's military position, suggesting that the military situation was the chief determinant of civilian morale. At one point, however, in April, 1918, the military situation curve remained a straight line while the morale curve began to drop sharply. A similar drop is not to be found in any of the subsidiary curves, and the conclusion is inescapable that the shape of the main curve at this point was determined by information other than that appearing in the subsidiaries. This indicates the main weakness of the method—that addi-

² George G. Bruntz, *Allied Propaganda and the Collapse of the German Empire in 1918* (Stanford University, 1938), pp. 192-93. All the detailed information concerning the chart comes from Bruntz, and it is due to his efforts that the chart was made available to the public.

tional and different information had to be secured to check whether, in fact, the main curve was moving in accordance with the subsidiaries. There was, that is to say, no fixed relationship between the main curve and its subsidiaries. This was true of Imperial Germany over time and it is true today when we compare Nazi Germany and Great Britain.

Does this mean that any attempts to measure morale simply by reducing ready-made social phenomena to quantitative form must be abandoned? The question cannot be answered directly since the results of any attempts which are now being made cannot be published till after the war. Some comments might be ventured. Failure is almost certain if reliance is placed on independent, objective facts such as food supply or the number of bombs dropped by the enemy on the home population. These factors must pass through and into people's consciousness before they express themselves as an effect on the state of morale. That consciousness may reflect them in this fashion or that; there is no mechanistic, automatic impact holding constant in all instances. Can we find measurable aspects of civilian behavior which may be used as morale indexes? Theoretically, we can, practically, they are not easy to name and they are probably still harder to isolate satisfactorily during the special circumstances of wartime.

✓ Strikes—their frequency, extent, and duration—offer one possibility. The experience in Great Britain during the last war shows that prohibiting strikes does not stop them. Strikes are also prohibited during the present war; some have occurred, but they have been slight in scope. ✓ Industrial output is another possible index, but corrections would have to be made for variations in supply of materials, changes in managerial skills, alterations in hours, dilution by unskilled labor, and other such factors. Nevertheless, these corrections are practicable, and this index ought to be of considerable value. ✓ Variations in the convictions for drunkenness or drunken driving should also prove useful, subject to corrections for instances, not infrequent in present Britain, where there is a shortage of beer or spirits, and for other such influences as changes in police procedure. ✓ Statistics of other forms of crime, especially crimes against property, such as housebreaking and robbery, should prove en-

lightening, but in every instance great care must be exercised in drawing deductions from the statistics collected. In spite of all the pitfalls, it is believed that reliable results could be achieved with the use of such material, and the outcome of such research would be intensely interesting. Have any new techniques been developed since World War I to measure the morale of the home population?

✓ The Nazis keep a very careful check on the state of their civilian morale. All the local leaders must make periodic reports, giving the replies to specific inquiries sent from regional and other headquarters. A very large number of persons are engaged in reporting the nature and contents of overheard conversations, using restaurants, public vehicles, factories—all places where people congregate—for gathering the material. A large amount of systematic sounding of public opinion is done by “controlled” conversations, i.e., the investigator introduces deliberately a number of topics on which he wants the other person’s views, making a mental note of the answers received. From the results of a large-scale experiment made under the most difficult conditions in Germany just prior to the war, it can be said that this method gives completely dependable results, and that the persons questioned remain entirely oblivious of the fact ✓ that they have been “interviewed.”

All the information is collected centrally, but whether it is reduced to quantitative form and, if so, how, is not known. There are grounds for believing that the reports made to headquarters are realistic. Thus just prior to the outbreak of the war Hitler told British Ambassador Henderson that at the time of Munich, September, 1938, the German people were not wholeheartedly behind him—Hitler, and that therefore he would not have risked a general war. He went on ✓ to say that he was satisfied that he now had the support of the people and that he was determined to solve the Polish question by force, if necessary.

✓ The British employ some of the same methods for measuring civilian morale, but they are also able to take advantage openly of the most recent development in measuring public opinion—the ✓ public opinion survey. The Ministry of Information sets up its own unit to make surveys, sampling the population by picking names at random from the National Register. This method has all the disadvantages arising from the necessity of interviewing a given list of

persons. There are indications that the Ministry may take advantage of the better known Gallup methods in surveys made on its behalf.

The important feature of opinion polls is that, by constant repetition of the same question, movements in opinion can be traced and thus the data for plotting a curve become available. For the purpose of such a curve several questions should be asked, the results of each acting as a check on the validity of the results of all the others. Samples of questions actually repeated many times in Great Britain may be given from the work of the British Institute of Public Opinion. "In general, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with Mr. Churchill as prime minister?" "Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the government's conduct of the war?" "Do you think that we shall win this war, that it will be a stalemate, or that we shall lose it?" "Would you approve or disapprove if the government were to enter into peace negotiations with Germany now?" It will be seen that all these topics cluster round the central theme of the attitude toward the war and toward those conducting it. Hence, the results are related. If they are not, then significant tendencies may be revealed. Should it be found, for instance, that Mr. Churchill's stock is rising or remaining stable while the public becomes increasingly critical of the conduct of the war, there is a clear implication that the persons surrounding Mr. Churchill are losing the confidence of the public.

A great advantage of polls is that when many details are secured about the contacts cross-tabulation can be made, and the conditions operative in morale formation can be laid bare. To give an example: if, in the United States, members of a particular religious denomination are found among the noninterventionists in a much larger proportion than in the total population, and if it is also found that when all the members of this denomination included in the survey are subdivided, e.g., into male and female, economic groups, and regional groups, virtually no differences emerge between these subgroups, it may reasonably be concluded that their nonintervention attitude arises from membership in this particular denomination and not primarily from any other condition.

A warning also emerges from analyzing total results into figures for subgroups. The warning can best be shown from an example. Mr. Churchill's popularity with the British public has never varied

more than 3 per cent—from 85 per cent to 88 per cent. But this slight variation in the total results concealed the fact that among the lower income group Mr. Churchill was losing ground, while in the rest of the population he was increasing his standing. The total number saying they were satisfied with him remained relatively constant since the two movements more or less counterbalanced each other. To be realistic, therefore, any measurement of morale should not rest upon the net results for the whole country, but on the figures for the important opinion subgroups.

Can the results of opinion polls be regarded as dependable, remembering the pressure which is exercised against expressing critical opinions? No general answer can be given to the question: it can be said that in Great Britain men and women are still prepared to voice their disapproval of the government and its measures, and that the Ministry of Information continues to use the results of opinion polls and suggests that it finds them consonant with information obtained from other sources.

The feasibility of using a panel for making election forecasts and for securing opinions has recently been demonstrated by Professor Paul Lazarsfeld.² The important condition for the successful use of a panel seems to be that the interviews should form only an insignificant incident in all the influences at work on the persons questioned. During the campaign preceding a presidential election the propaganda liberally poured out by the opposing parties sufficed to smother the significance of even repeated interviews of the same persons and thus to prevent any distortion in their views arising from these repeated interviews. It may well be that the stress of wartime conditions and experiences would serve the same purpose and that, accordingly, the panel could be used as a technique of inquiry for ascertaining morale under war conditions. Should this prove to be the case then panel inquiries, with the opportunity presented thereby for detailed and intimate questioning as the interviewer became better known to the contact, might prove to be the ideal form of morale investigation. As far as is known the experiment has not been made but it is one which seems very well worth while.

BRITISH INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC OPINION

² Paul Lazarsfeld and Marjorie Fiske, "The 'Panel' as a New Tool for Measuring Opinion," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. II (1938).

MORALE AND MINORITY GROUPS

LOUIS WIRTH

ABSTRACT

As a nation composed of many diverse racial and cultural elements, the United States faces a unique problem of building national morale. The Indian, the Negro, the Oriental, and particularly the European immigrants and their descendants constitute our principal minorities. The great number, the dense concentration, and the isolated group life of some of these, together with their subordinate social position and the consequences of our past Americanization policies, raise questions about our national solidarity. The disadvantaged position of our minorities lends itself readily to exploitation by foreign governments. The Nazis and Fascists have employed a propaganda and organizational campaign designed for American conditions. Their appeals are directed in part to the minorities, in part to the dominant groups. The situation thus created inclines us to adopt remedial and precautionary measures, some of which are ill advised. Our strategy of morale-building might well capitalize on the diverse origin of our people and our democratic traditions. Our experience in the last war and the lessons learned from the conquered nations of Europe suggest a more effective national policy for us. We are likely to get better morale by emphasizing our common aspirations rather than our common memories because, if our minorities can be convinced that their minority status is not permanent and that they can hope to share fully in the promises of democracy, their effort in the national enterprise can be relied upon.

The concept "minorities" is here used to apply to those who because of physical or social and cultural differences receive differential treatment and who regard themselves as a people apart. Such groups characteristically are held in lower esteem, are debarred from certain opportunities, or are excluded from full participation in our national life. Certain groups within our society occupy not merely a disadvantageous objective position but also tend to develop a conception of themselves as inferiors, as aliens, and as persecuted groups, which significantly affects their roles in the collective enterprises of the nation. The existence of such groups in our midst calls attention to the fact that our society has not yet been fully knit together into a single, integrated, national unit.

It would be a grave error, however, to exaggerate the division that exists in this country along racial and cultural lines, as not only the Nazis but also our own alarmists have done. While it is necessary to recognize that some sections of our people cherish cultural heritages which have their roots in other countries and continents, it is equally pertinent to observe that for most of our people and in the

greater part of their life-careers, the culture of America is the only medium of expression. The very number of our diverse peoples and their gradual infusion into our society save us from the dichotomous division into Americans and aliens, just as the unbroken democratic, individualistic tradition extending over nearly two centuries of independent national life prevents us from hopeless cultural fragmentation on one hand and rigid uniformization on the other.

I. THE COMPOSITION OF AMERICAN MINORITIES

If we inquire who these minorities in our midst are, we may begin with the truly native Americans, namely, the Indians, who were reduced to a state of relatively permanent subordination by their technologically superior European conquerors. Their number has dwindled to about three hundred and fifty thousand. But, since a good share of this native population lives under conditions of segregation and tribal organization and is not deeply involved in our industrial and political life, it is not ordinarily thought of as constituting a significant minority problem, especially in a period of crisis such as we face now.

The second and much more significant segment of our minority peoples is drawn from the successive waves of European immigrants and their descendants who came here as voluntary or forced migrants from the days of the first settlement on to the present. The approximately thirty-eight million immigrants that flocked to these shores in the last hundred years found an embryonic national heritage which was molded largely by the earlier Anglo-Saxon settlers, but they have modified that heritage in considerable degree as the diverse racial, religious, and cultural elements participating in this mass movement found foothold in the widely scattered communities of our nation.

During the period of the most rapid industrial expansion of the United States an ever deepening cleavage developed between the status of those who had come earlier, mostly from western and northern Europe, and who came to be known as the "old immigrants," and those who came later, from eastern and southern Europe, or the "new immigrants." By 1930 the "new immigrants" substantially ex-

ceeded the "old immigrants" in number. Of our white population today, about forty million are either foreign-born or the children of immigrants, and of these about one-sixth are German, one-eighth Italian, and more than one-fifth from the Slavic countries. The country of origin, however, is relevant for our purpose only because it indicates the potential mass which, by language, traditions, or sentiment, may be subject to influence from the mother-country, especially in those instances where, as is the case among the Germans and the Italians, the mother-country has adopted an extended conception of nationality. It is by no means to be inferred, however, that the loyalties of these immigrants, and particularly of their children, should be tied up to any great extent with their country of origin. The recent alien registration indicated that there were less than five million immigrants, including minors, who had not as yet achieved the status of citizens, although over one-third of this number had taken steps in that direction. The proportion of our white population that is native-born (77.8 per cent in 1930) is increasing, as is the proportion that is native-born of native parentage (57.1 per cent in 1930), which may indicate that with the relative cessation of immigration and with the progress of intermarriage and assimilation we are being welded into a more homogeneous national body.

Our approximately thirteen million Negroes, constituting about one-tenth (and to date a constantly declining proportion) of our total population, have become highly differentiated in status and widely dispersed in settlement in recent years. Perhaps more than the immigrants, however, the Negro, by virtue of his racial marks and his historical position in American society, has been subject to the disadvantaged status of a minority. The same applies to the Oriental and, to a lesser degree, to the Mexican. It applies also to the residents of and immigrants from our overseas possessions.

Aside from the racial and national stocks, we must consider among the minority peoples in the United States those who are set apart by religious differences from the dominant group. This includes approximately twenty-two million Catholics, four and one-half million Jews, and certain sects such as the Quakers, the Mormons, the Mennonites, and Jehovah's Witnesses. We need not here be particularly concerned with the quasi-minority status of peoples from our "cul-

tural islands," such as the southern highlanders and the "Cajuns" of Louisiana.¹

II. MINORITY GROUPS AND NATIONAL SOLIDARITY

The mere co-existence in the country of a variety of racial, national, cultural, and religious groups would not be relevant to the question of national morale unless these groups could be presumed either to obstruct the national objectives or to require special treatment to induce them to participate wholeheartedly in the defense effort. It is pertinent, therefore, to inquire into the status of our minorities in so far as this involves actual or potential obstacles to national unity.

With the exception of such critical periods as severe depressions and wars the trend in this country has been for one minority group after another to blend its special characteristics with the nation as a whole, to shed its closely knit internal organization and at least its outward peculiarities, to enjoy expanding opportunities, to rise in status, and to gain acceptance. The present crisis gives rise to the apprehension that this trend might be reversed, in part because minorities are seen as a potential threat to national unity.

The imposing size of some of these minority groups—such as the Negroes, for instance—would not of itself be a potential divisive force in our national life if there were not at the same time dense concentrations of such groups in specific areas, as is the case especially in our great cities. The spatial concentration of minority groups is reinforced by and in turn facilitates the social organization of the members, as witnessed by the emergence of separate religious, educational, economic, fraternal, and convivial voluntary associations among them. Their importance as forces in maintaining the separate identity and solidarity of the minority group on a local scale is often appreciable and may be enhanced by the federation of local unions, lodges, clubs, and associations into nation-wide bodies which are

¹ There are, of course, other sections of our population bearing at least some of the marks of minority groups whose differential position in society as it might affect national morale is not sufficiently apparent to warrant stretching the definition of the term "minorities" here adopted. In some sense women, migratory workers, slum dwellers, share croppers, and communists, among others, fall into this category. A discussion of the morale aspects of such groups is manifestly beyond the scope of this paper.

capable of exercising effective control over great numbers, maintain the group's capacity for collective action, and cultivate group sentiments and attitudes toward national issues to an extent where they approximate political blocs.²

When we consider, moreover, that substantial groups of immigrants are unable to read English, we have the further likelihood that the minority groups will be exposed and perhaps susceptible to news and propaganda purveyed by the foreign-language press—and, conversely, inaccessible to the media of communication of the nation at large. A factor operating in a similar direction is the inability on the part of some immigrants to speak and understand English, which circumscribes their range of communication and may make them dependent upon foreign-language radio programs, church services, and other forms of oral communication, and which may appear, though only in isolated instances, as a problem in the armed forces of the United States.

Thus the fact that a large proportion of the newer immigrants are concentrated in great urban centers, are predominantly Catholic in religious affiliation, and are at the same time of Polish, Italian, or Irish national origin produces a broader basis for social cohesiveness than is to be found among some of the older immigrants who are more widely dispersed, affiliated with a variety of denominations, and of heterogeneous national origin. The same applies to the large Negro, Jewish, Oriental, and Mexican settlements in this country. Moreover, in all of the above instances internal group solidarity may draw considerable additional strength from the pre-existing prejudices toward these groups on the part of the population at large, which consigns the members of these minority groups to an inferior social status, concentrates them into restricted occupational categories, and reduces their chances of improving themselves as individuals to such an extent that they may come to feel that they have a common bond arising out of persecution.

When any special category in the population is subordinated to

² In this connection it is encouraging to note that the valuable data in the files of the Division of Alien Registration will give us, when properly analyzed, the most adequate picture we have ever had of the voluntary associations flourishing among ethnic groups in the United States.

the rest for a considerable period, especially if the group so singled out has other bases of cohesion, when it is concentrated in large numbers in a definite area, when it is racially or culturally visible, when it is engaged in intense competition with the dominant group, and when its educational level is rising, we may expect group consciousness to emerge and eventually an overt struggle for recognition to take place. This is clearly the case in the Negro and to a large extent in the Jew. The disillusionment which the Negro experienced after the first World War, coupled with the frustration of his aspirations for fuller participation in the democratic order that was to follow the war—in which, despite discriminatory treatment, he had participated with great devotion—accentuated his race consciousness and gave new impetus to racialist movements among broad masses of Negroes who had hitherto been immune to them. Similarly, the revival of virulent anti-Semitism and persecution was a factor in the spread of Zionism among many Jewish groups who were formerly deaf to the appeals of Jewish nationalistic movements.

The native Americans themselves have contributed to the perpetuation of cleavages by periodic outbursts of xenophobia in the form of racialism and anti-alienism. Even when such movements ebbed, the tendency was widespread to ascribe stereotyped characteristics to certain minority groups, thus inhibiting the individuation of the members. Even the Americanization movement in some of its phases appears in retrospect to have had consequences adverse to national unity. In attempting to counteract the nativistic doctrine that an unbridgeable chasm divides the true, native-white, old Americans from the mongrel, unassimilable late-comers, one wing of the Americanization movement sought to convert the immigrant as speedily as possible to the culture of the New World with the result, in a number of instances, that the reverse of the anticipated effect was brought about and the immigrant withdrew all the more completely into the shell of his self-sufficient, isolated, ethnic community.

The more humane Americanizers of a generation ago, far from joining in this clamor, were insisting that the newcomer be protected against the pressures that would lead him to give up his old cultural heritage too abruptly. In its more extreme and sentimental form this policy, though unintentionally, gave support to a view of the

American nation as splintered into countless isolated fragments, each of which embodies certain precious cultural values which must be preserved even at the cost of reducing the country to virtual impotence in the defense of its existence. This approach to Americanization, together with the high evaluation of immigrant heritages with which it was associated, remained dominant in this country until the international crisis revived the problem in a new context. Thus the conception of Americanization as a slow, gradual, spontaneous interpenetration of immigrant and native groups and their cultures has had to be subjected to serious reconsideration in the light of the Nazi and Fascist policy to retain control over their nationals in foreign countries and to use them as spearheads of penetration and conquest abroad. In the face of the propaganda and organizational campaigns of the totalitarian nations, even the most liberal wings of the Americanization movement have been forced to ask whether our traditional tolerant attitude toward the immigrant could be maintained without seriously undermining our national solidarity.

Thus, to all of these factors promoting cleavage there has been added another provided by the parent-countries themselves. They have been diligently and often covertly at work to set up new organizations in this country and to transform old ones to tie the immigrant to the militant and, from the standpoint of American interests, subversive movements which are controlled and financed by foreign governments or by their agencies established for that purpose. These organizations have made their appeal not only to their nationals in this country but also to those who have already acquired American citizenship and to the remote descendants of the immigrants as well. In fact, they have been attempting to consolidate all of the various groups whose grievances could be exploited by propaganda to create in them attitudes of apathy toward national defense, suspicion toward others, and even the disposition to affiliate themselves with movements designed to defeat our avowed national policy.

Ever since the first World War the foreign-language press in the United States has been steadily declining. Its potential public has shrunk in numbers because of the virtual cessation of recruitment

from abroad and the assimilation of the immigrants remaining here. The Nazi and Fascist governments, however, having discovered its uses as a propaganda medium, have in sundry and often devious ways given certain papers a new lease on life.³

Since one of the chief weapons employed by the Nazis in the softening-up of other countries is the ideology of race, and since the racial myth has been one of their most potent instruments of political revolution, it is pertinent to inquire into the prospects of the acceptance of the Nazi racial doctrines in the United States.⁴ One would suspect that in a country as diverse in its racial and ethnic composition as is the United States racism could find only a negligible number of followers. The United States has had its anti-Negro, anti-alien, anti-Catholic, anti-Semitic, and anti-Oriental movements before. They have risen and declined in accordance with the magnitude of our internal social problems. Given the background of latent feelings of racial, ethnic, and religious prejudice and conflicts, however, we may expect the tensions between the dominant groups and minorities and between different minorities themselves to become at least temporarily more acute. Under conditions of adversity tolerance is likely to give way to blind hatred, especially if aroused and directed by organized propaganda.

The propaganda and organizational campaign of the Nazis and Fascists among the German and Italian immigrants in the United States has sought to inspire not only loyalty to and enthusiasm for the Nazi and Fascist regimes but also a sense of persecution designed to develop attitudes characteristic of members of self-conscious, militant minority groups who would ultimately join with other sections of the American population harboring similar grievances into powerful bodies which, with or without the aid of an invasion from abroad, would bring about the destruction of our democratic institutions.

³ The foreign-language radio broadcasts may be presumed to have been a factor in and to have compensated in some degree for the reduced influence of the immigrant newspaper. However, because of the nature and control over radio in this country, it is less susceptible than the press to direction from abroad and lends itself less readily to exploitation in behalf of causes contrary to public policy.

⁴ Whereas formerly the immigrant retained and was even encouraged to maintain cultural ties with his former countrymen, the Nazi and Fascist program is to appeal to the tie of blood.

Our own unsolved problems, tensions, and conflicts are thus to be exploited for the purpose of stimulating and fostering disunity leading to internal paralysis and preparing us for a change in our social, economic, and political system which would be equivalent to a bloodless victory of Nazidom.

Nazi propaganda has set in motion subtle programs, not only to make our minorities self-conscious and to impregnate them with an oppression psychosis, but also to set one minority against the other: Gentiles against Jews, Protestants against Catholics, and whites against Negroes. This can be frustrated only if the nation as a whole will seek to remedy the imperfections of democracy upon which minority sentiments thrive and if each minority group will recognize that an attack on one undermines the security and aspirations of all.

Besides the factors making for the reluctance of the minorities to be assimilated, it is also necessary to consider the readiness of the dominant groups to assimilate the minorities. In periods of prosperity and peace we are likely to overestimate our national unity and to underrate the power of intolerance movements, so that when we face depression and war we are taken aback by the extent to which internal division, mutual suspicion, and hate can be cultivated among those whose power or security is threatened or who have failed to achieve the full status to which they felt themselves entitled. Such elements in the dominant group are receptive to propaganda which reminds them that, since they belong to the "superior" race, are "old settlers," and have been or are threatened with being deprived of their privileges by an "inferior" group of late-comers, they must assert their prerogatives of dominance. The most common basis of such mass sentiments is to lay the blame for the failure, frustration, insecurity, and unhappiness of the dominant group on the cunning and unfairness of a minority group. For those who feel themselves threatened in the continued enjoyment of their power and security a minority serves as a convenient scapegoat toward which mass indignation can be diverted. Similarly, for those who have been frustrated in their ambitions or who have already become declassed, the minority group furnishes a rationalization of their own inadequacies and an object toward which they can release their pent-up emotional drives for aggressive self-assertion. If you yourself can-

not rise, you may seek to compensate by putting down someone else who has risen. Our own history of intolerance in the form of anti-Negro, anti-alien, and anti-Oriental movements gives ample evidence of the bitterness and ferocity with which, in periods of contracting economic opportunity and threatening insecurity, the minorities which have been most successful in the competitive struggle and in their adaptation to American life have been treated by those who, despite initial advantages, have lagged in the climb to wealth, prestige, and power or who, once having had them, have lost them. Only in this way can we fully understand why the "poor whites" insist so vehemently upon their "racial superiority" over the more successful Negroes and why some of the older Americans embrace nativistic doctrines with a readiness roughly proportional to the degree in which they have already been outstripped by the later arrivals. While the alien and the Negro are berated for their failure to assimilate, they are at the same time and by the same people denied the opportunities for full participation in American life. We may expect the latent antipathies between different sections of our people to become overt as the existing economic, prestige, and power relationships become disturbed; and we may expect the lines separating these groups to harden as these temporary disturbances of the status quo tend to become chronic.⁵

Having reviewed the factors making for interethnic cleavages, it is appropriate to point out some of the elements in our present situa-

⁵ To counteract the efforts inspired by foreign governments or their agents to undermine our national unity, ill-considered, random measures have been resorted to, designed to control immigrant groups by depriving them of the freedoms ordinarily enjoyed by residents of the United States and subjecting them to official and unofficial discrimination. Special registration and surveillance, suppression or rigid control of the foreign-language press and schools, restrictions of freedom of occupational choice, exclusion from the benefits of relief and public welfare services, are among the local and even national legislative measures that have been seriously advanced. Some would even go as far as to treat naturalized citizens as permanent aliens and curb their privileges to an extent which would virtually reduce them to citizens of inferior grade. In certain highly specialized occupations in essential defense industries it has recently been found that some of the key skilled jobs have been to a disproportionate extent held by persons whose national origin makes them suspect. Certain other groups, the Negroes in particular, because of being discriminated against in many occupational fields (including the army and navy) and excluded from many unions, have every reason to develop a persecution complex.

tion which promote unity among our ethnic groups. Paradoxical as it may seem, the rise of naziism and fascism abroad has itself served as a unifying influence in American life. Anyone acquainted with the life in America of the great immigrant colonies can testify to the fact that the rise of the totalitarian governments in Europe came as a severe shock and that the tactics of these governments were humiliating and distasteful to vast sections of the immigrants and their descendants here. Many of the most outspoken enemies of Hitler and Mussolini are to be found among the German and Italian immigrants in the United States. Some of them have even gone so far as to question the desirability of perpetuating the predictatorial heritages of their mother-countries, lest by maintaining them their loyalty to America might be called into question and their participation in Old World cultural activities be misinterpreted as an act of identification with the presently dominant regimes in their respective countries of origin.

To those sections of the old immigrant colonies that stand openly aligned in opposition to the policies of the dictatorships, there must be added the recent accretions consisting of those who have fled from the persecution they have suffered at the hands of the totalitarians and those large groups of immigrants whose countries of origin have recently been conquered by the Axis powers. The resentment which particularly these latter groups feel toward naziism and fascism makes them all the more fervid supporters of our form of government and our present national policy. In fact, aliens generally, like new converts, are likely to outdo the natives in their manifestation of patriotism when the opportunity is offered. This should not be dismissed as a mere protective reaction.⁶

The propaganda from abroad which is specifically directed toward

⁶ As during and immediately following the first World War a number of renascent European minorities, including the Czechs, the Poles, and the Irish, had drawn upon the moral and material support of their respective former compatriots in the United States, so today the conquered nations of Europe may well look to the immigrants they have sent to these shores to vitalize the struggle to regain their freedom from Nazi domination. While this will, of course, add to our strength in our national defense effort, it may also lead to a less rational formulation of our national policy, especially our war and peace aims, in the attempt not to offend the national aspirations of these various conquered countries and in the further effort to minimize the conflict between these various groups here.

the United States is likely to make it difficult at times to reconcile our concern about national unity and defense with our traditional laissez faire policy toward the varied racial and cultural groups still persisting, often in a segregated form, among us. It is a regrettable fact that precisely when we are most concerned about welding our diverse peoples into a unified national body as speedily as possible and without coercion, we must reckon with the suspicion with which in time of crisis every separately identifiable group is regarded. On the one hand, the present crisis may serve as a solvent of racial, ethnic, and religious differences, but, on the other hand, it may give rise to the aggravation of tensions and of latent antagonisms and result in widespread and demoralizing witch-hunting. The extent to which it will be more of one than the other will depend upon our strategy for building national morale.

III. THE STRATEGY OF MORALE-BUILDING

A prime element in morale⁷ is the identification of the individual with the collective enterprise. A primitive group or a small compact community finds little need to generate this sense of identification on the part of its members artificially. Such a group can rely upon an unbroken tradition rooted in the immemorial past, sustained by day-to-day intimate contact among the members, all of whom know everything worth knowing about one another, tied together as they are by bonds of kinship and mutual dependence whose strength has been tested by innumerable crises. Such primitive groups, moreover, have their fixed symbols endowed with power to evoke loyalties and their sacred rituals and ceremonies through which the appropriate forms of behavior expected of each individual in critical situations are thoroughly and periodically rehearsed. Finally, the primitive group is welded into a solid mass because it cultivates an in-group

⁷ By "morale" we mean that element in collective action which enables the participants to persist in their determination to achieve their collective purpose. Morale supplies the collective will to see an action through until the objective is reached. We ascribe morale to a group to the extent that it maintains this steadfastness of purpose, maintains its solidarity, its integrity, and its will to victory even in the face of adversity. Morale should be distinguished from *esprit de corps*, or collective enthusiasm, which, while it may be conducive to morale is not identical with it, but is as different from it as high spiritedness and evanescent enthusiasm differ from quiet endurance and undemonstrative, persistent, imperturbable adherence to a cause.

feeling with the correlative out-group attitudes of suspicion and hostility toward nonmembers, because all outsiders are *ipso facto* enemies or potential enemies.

We rightly take it for granted that there are certain essential elements which are the prerequisites for effective collective action and for enduring group will. As in the military forces good and ample food, clothing, and shelter, adequate weapons, thorough training, the instilling of an unflinching sense of duty, inspiring leadership, clear objectives contribute to morale, so in civilian activity the availability of the essentials of life, leadership that inspires confidence, purposes that are clear-cut are among the elements conducive to the capacity of a group to act collectively. After all, both soldiers and civilians must live before they can live for high purposes. Hence, in our analysis of morale, we must posit as an essential prerequisite a modicum of physical well-being on the part of all, coupled with the conviction on the part of those who must make extraordinary sacrifices that privations are necessary and would be willingly endured by all the other members of the group to the extent of their ability. But it should not be inferred that mere well-being or satiety always go toward building morale. In fact, as such a historic case as that of the Society of Jesus shows, a group infused with a sufficiently powerful crusading spirit may actually use personal privation and sacrifice as a leading instrument in morale-building.

While these prerequisites for morale must exist in every group, they are not sufficient to maintain morale at a high level. It is one thing to evoke morale, but it may be quite another to sustain it. This is especially true because of the fact that morale counts most in time of crisis, and in time of crisis no one can enjoy full personal security; nor can we in time of crisis assure either the armed forces or the civilian population of that same high level of health, welfare, and security to which we may have accustomed them in times of peace. A people accustomed to a low standard of living, to rigid regimentation, to a minimum of personal security, is less likely to see in war a catastrophe which threatens these values, for war represents a less abrupt transition from the ordinary routines and levels of living for such a people than it does for a people like our own.

One of the essential conditions of high morale is a set of settled

convictions; to make great sacrifices willingly a group must have an unambiguous cause for which to struggle. They must be imbued with the feeling that their cause is right, that something desirable will result or something undesirable will be abolished through their collective effort. Above all, they must have the abiding belief that their cause can and will be realized. Finally, they must have individually a stake in the common enterprise. To bring about this sense of a cause—and what is more, this sense of common participation in a worth-while cause—is peculiarly difficult under the conditions which our nation confronts today. It is more difficult in many respects than it is in the case of our most likely enemy, because the United States is not only a vast nation comprising many diverse sections, each with its own local and regional outlook, but we are also a nation of many peoples, each with its own peculiar cultural traditions and heritages. Racially and ethnically we are not as yet one but many, and for long we have pursued a domestic *laissez faire* policy tolerant of the diverse cultural heritages of the many strains that are ultimately to be merged in the melting pot of races and peoples and cultures that is to constitute the United States of the future. While this implies certain weaknesses, it may also become an element of strength, for here no single race and culture is universally recognized as the standard with reference to which all the others are to be judged.

Our country faces a peculiar problem in the present war as contrasted with the situation of our potential enemies precisely because of its democratic traditions. In our ordinary peacetime pursuits we demand little self-discipline, put a great premium upon individual liberty, tolerate a variety of prejudices, and encourage a maximum of criticism. Whatever may be said about the long-time advantages of an army of free men as over against an army of slaves, it must be admitted that the regimen of the armed forces requires a high degree of discipline and a subordination of the individual to his superiors. We have the important task of reconciling order and discipline with freedom and individualism, and, what is more important, we must somehow reconcile diversity of background, way of life, mutual suspicion, and antipathies between groups with unity of purpose and centralization of authority.

Morale in a democracy may be more difficult to develop than in an autocracy, but in the end it is less fragile and more robust. At any rate, in a democracy, where the decisions of the leaders must be sustained by the uncoerced consensus of the citizen, it is possible to get reliable accounts of the state of morale at any given moment. Realizing that morale is a product of slow growth, the question arises whether we have time to develop it. Knowing that suspicion, dissension, and division are the supreme psychological weapons of our enemy, it behooves us to weld out of this mass of our diverse, individualistic citizenry a compact unified body of men and women who have a common stake in values, of which they were oblivious, which they took for granted until they were threatened and until they saw them disappear in nation after nation.

The diversity of origin of our people, if properly understood, can become one of the greatest of morale-building factors in the United States. It is almost certain to guard us against the tendency to think of ourselves as a superior race or to identify our nation with the Anglo-Saxon peoples, for we could not do so without doing violence to the origins of a substantial proportion of our population. It would be a sad error to believe that because the Anglo-Saxon peoples and their institutions were dominant when the nation was young we too are today an Anglo-Saxon people and that those of that stock are by virtue of that fact a privileged or superior group. Moreover, in the heterogeneous composition of our national cultural complex, we have potentially the broadest possible base for the development of a civilization which more nearly than any other in the world would embrace all the others.

The accentuation of our differences, however, is likely to become one of the most insidious factors in the sapping of our national strength, for we cannot mobilize our full potential force as a nation to fight against a real enemy without if we must dissipate our strength and divert our passions toward an imaginary enemy within. By allowing racism and anti-alienism to flourish we will deflect our attention from those recruiting stations of the "fifth column" which are far more dangerous than our racial minorities and our immigrant groups. Granting that there are certain alien groups which have been successfully propagandized by foreign governments, we must

not forget that there are many more, especially those whose mother-countries have become the victims of aggression, who now more than ever are immune to the wiles of Nazi propaganda. We need to realize that the nonacceptance of certain sections of our people by the older and whiter Americans causes large masses who wish to be good Americans to conceive of themselves as outsiders and inferiors, wounds their pride, undermines their self-respect, puts them on the defensive with reference to their origin and heritage, and thus places serious obstacles in the path of their identification with the nation's effort and significantly reduces their contribution of skill and talent. We cannot, moreover, permit those whose security is threatened and who have become hysterical with fear to exploit this crisis for singling out the alien, the Negro, and others of minority status as scapegoats to bear the blame for the many ills, the frictions, the divisions, and the sacrifices which confront us in a troubled world. Considering the enemy we are fighting against and the doctrines that enemy espouses, we as a country that so obviously is of mongrel origin surely cannot embrace his doctrine or follow his policies by asserting the prerogatives of a superior race or by recognizing citizens of inferior grade.

The openly pro-Nazi and pro-Fascist groups operating in this country are not our greatest danger, for they are known and can easily be dealt with. There is anxiety about those who, while professing their loyalty, are suspicious of everyone else and have a vague apprehension about the loyalty of those with whom they are not familiar and whom they do not understand but of whose existence they have only recently become aware because hitherto they were aliens living in a separate world. To tell the alien that he must not speak out openly because he is likely to be suspect or because he does not belong, to tell him to lie low and let the true Americans do the speaking and the leading, is to impress him with the feeling that his participation in the common enterprise is not wanted. This can result only in either paralyzing his efforts or driving him into the arms of the enemy.

The feeling of anxiety among the old Americans is understandable. They are not only becoming aware of the distance that separates them from the immigrants and the other minorities but they are also

experiencing a sense of insecurity because when they do get acquainted with them they discover that America is no longer the America that was theirs. It is these old Americans, consequently, who find it on the whole more congenial to embrace the doctrines of the élite, which lend themselves readily to adaptation by the Nazi doctrines infiltrating from abroad, than the minority peoples themselves. This is likely to make them impatient with any effort to win over the immigrant and the Negro, among others, and predisposes them to an acceptance of strong medicine.

When we confront the charge that we are discriminating against certain sections of our people on racial, religious, and cultural grounds, we are inclined to dispose of these charges by promising that when the crisis is over we will make appropriate amends. We may hope thus to elicit immediate loyalty and postpone remedial action until some indefinite future date, only to forget about it promptly when the crisis is over. Thus, during the last war, we were made keenly aware of our discriminatory practices against the Negro, but when the war was over we complacently sank back again into the smug attitude of *laissez faire*. If the current literature about the Negro in the defense program is any index of what is happening in many places in our country, including our armed forces, this disappointing experience of the last war may be said to be one of the factors which makes the Negro skeptical about his stake in our national enterprise. It is an attitude which can easily be exploited by those who make it their business to sow and cultivate the seeds of discontent. It may well be true, as General Hershey recently put it when confronted with the charge that the army was practicing Jim Crowism, that the army did not make our racial attitudes but can only take them as it finds them. But it may also be worth considering that in a time of national crisis, such as the present, mass attitudes are more fluid than ordinarily and that problems which could not ordinarily be touched can now be boldly attacked. When the clamor for national integration is as loud as it is today, and resentment against Hitlerian doctrines is as pronounced as it is, we do, perhaps, have an opportunity to accelerate the trend toward fuller participation on an equal footing of all of our people in our national life.

The experience of the last war, especially in connection with the activities of the Committee on Public Information which are just now coming to light, should have taught us that, while some of our minorities are likely to become serious menaces to national unity and to the national effort, they can also be used constructively to heighten national morale and to increase our capacity for collective action on a national scale. Among the lessons that we have learned is, or should be, that the greater part of these minorities have a direct stake in our national enterprise, that they do want to give of their resources and their enthusiasm, that they do want their groups to have high morale, that they can be solidified into collaborative action with the nation as a whole more effectively through their own leaders than through outsiders, and that the more they understand, approve, and share our national objectives the more thoroughly do they devote themselves to their attainment.

These experiences have also taught us that one of the greatest dangers of our treatment of minorities in such a crisis is that of indiscriminate persecution and suppression. Among the gravest mistakes we made during the last war was the error of disrupting even the pro-American associations of nationals of enemy countries and the persecution of loyal immigrants merely because of their national origin. We might learn this time also to prevent the tendency on the part of some elements in these minority groups to take advantage of the war to settle old quarrels of a factional sort or of a personal sort by denouncing their rivals to the government agencies. There is every reason to believe that in the present crisis we may avoid some of these mistakes.

There is a disposition in the United States to attempt to weld our people into a unit by appealing to the past—but like most peoples, and perhaps more than most peoples, we have not had a common past. It is true, of course, that we perhaps have a longer and more unbroken tradition of free institutions than any other nation on earth—but, on the other hand, large sections of our people have not shared either in that tradition or in the fruits of that tradition. They have remained marginal peoples who still speak of the older Americans as “they” who enjoy the advantages of these free institutions. It would be foolish to underestimate the sources of national solidar-

ity that lie in the past. Man is in a very real sense a time-binding animal. He does not live merely by instinct and in the present but by the habits he has learned and by his memories of what has gone before. Our noble state documents, our laws, our songs, our art, our symbols, our slogans, our epics, our traditions, our history, our heritage—all these weld us into some sort of unity, into a nation. But compared with some of the political units of Europe we are young and fragile.

The United States is not merely a territory, a political unit, and a body of traditions, but a promise. It is a promise for all of us but especially for those who, whether they came here to escape oppression and poverty or to seek adventure and opportunity, have given to this country a strength which lies in the very motives that brought most of us or our ancestors here. The American dream goes far beyond the four freedoms and acquires new meaning with every new day. If it were not a fluid and expanding idea, the many diverse peoples who embrace it would have difficulty in identifying themselves with it as something real. America is accomplishments, to be sure; but it is largely aspirations. America is unfinished. Our principal source of national unity and strength, therefore, lies less in the past than in the present and in the future. America belongs to the future, and it is in this sense that our minorities can share with the rest of the population a common set of objectives. To the old Americans these may be largely composed of aspirations for security, but to the new Americans they shade in the direction of keeping open the road of opportunity. To old and new alike they mean a maximum of personal freedom and personal dignity.

If we can keep our imperfect realization of these values from hardening, and if we can prevent the obvious frustrations and disadvantages of wide sections of our people from being accepted as permanent, if those who have not as yet been fully accepted into the community can become convinced that if not they then at least their children may become so, then our so-called minorities will not be a threat to national morale but its chief contributing factor.

MORALE IN FASCIST ITALY IN WARTIME

SAVILLE R. DAVIS

ABSTRACT

Fascist propaganda was not successful on the home front. The outcome of Italian military ventures in Albania and in Libya was a logical consequence. While allowed to circulate, Swiss and Vatican newspapers were extremely popular while Italian papers were accepted with contemptuous amusement. By means of the foreign press, short-wave radio, and the grapevine the Italian people have kept surprisingly well informed. It appears that the Italians would rather lose to the British than to the Germans.

For eighteen years Mussolini projected into the consciousness of the Italian people his slogan, "Believe, Obey, Fight." He employed every device of modern propaganda technique. He confidently expected a high state of civilian morale on the day when fascism should meet its supreme test in another world war.

He was deceived. When the Italian conscripts went into action in Albania and in Libya, their belief was flagging; their obedience was mechanical. They had no heart to fight.

The months since Italy entered the war, then, present a remarkable case study in national morale. To those of us on the scene, it was apparent that the Italian people won the battle of domestic propaganda. They refused to become genuinely militarized for the sake of the Fascist party's gamble on quick German victory. They managed to resist all efforts to convert them into friends of Germany and of German national socialism.

Fascism, then, was defeated on the home front. What happened in Albania and in Libya followed as a logical consequence of the anti-war feeling back home. It is not possible to fight modern battles with an army of conscientious objectors.

I cannot cite any statistics, any Gallup polls, in support of these statements. At present writing only two accounts of the breakdown of fascist morale have been brought out of Italy under conditions which permitted free writing. And while the account in the *Christian Science Monitor* tallies with that of John T. Whitaker in the *Chicago Daily News*, historians must wait for the assembling of more diversified source material.

Nevertheless, I believe it is fair to say that the qualified American

reporters in Rome during the past year are in substantial agreement on the essential facts. As long as Mussolini kept war purely in the realm of oratory, as long even as he confined war to the smaller expeditions in Ethiopia and in Spain, the bulk of the Italian people continued to tolerate fascism as a domestic system. But when he tried in earnest to direct their allegiance toward Germany, discontent became general. When he declared war a great fear seized the whole people and they began to talk with astonishing fervor against the regime. When the balloon was punctured, and the people realized that the Fascist party's militarism was a hollow mockery, only the iron hold of the German Gestapo on the reins of power managed to save appearances for the Duce. Had it not been for the Germans, there was more than an even chance that Mussolini would have then been overthrown.

Throughout this period I lived in Rome, traveled regularly through central and northern Italy, and made an effort to talk to people of all classes. These, briefly, were my observations:

People of all classes laughed at the newspapers. "Give me my thirty centesimi of lies," said a workingwoman to the news vendor at a Roman kiosk. The fascist propagandists were sparing no language in their effusive courting of the Germans. News reports were but thinly veiled polemics. Virginio Gayda and Giovanni Ansaldo poured their scalding rhetoric down the columns of page one, often printing three or four thousand words in a single issue. And yet these prophets, so often quoted in the American press, were ignored in the most classical fashion at home. It should be recognized that Italians both understand and expect that their politics will be served up steaming. They accept it with a millennial patience; indeed, they know propaganda of old.

The attitude of the average Italian toward the press was one either of contempt or of indifference. Meanwhile Swiss newspapers were snapped up by all who could read French or German. And the *Osservatore romano*, organ of the Vatican, was the most popular newspaper in Italy until the fascist strong-arm squads drove it off the streets shortly before Italy entered the war and compelled a strict neutrality thereafter in its columns.

The radio was likewise given scanty attention in so far as it spread propaganda. It carried the usual line of talks, German hookups,

biased news, etc. But an incident will illustrate the degree of success. After Italy was several months in the war, the party observed a great indifference on the part of the public toward the broadcasting of the General Staff communiqué at 1 P.M. daily. So the order was issued for all Italians in public places to stand and remain silent during its reading! They did so, with an ineffable calm.

The Fascist party itself was leaden with dissension. Among my friends and acquaintances were scores of party members who were hotly at variance with the party line. Shortly before Italy entered the war, the party leadership was changed, and some of the most ruthless members of the so-called Old Guard of fascism—the veterans of the street-fighting days—were sent out to enforce discipline. They were drawn chiefly from the element which was actively pro-German, such as the group surrounding the editor of the *Regime fascista*, Roberto Farrinaci, or from those old-timers whose only ethic was loyalty. These men imposed a partial terrorism, to be sure. But their success was chiefly in silencing the more serious criticism; they did not convert.

The Italian public was astonishingly well informed. The upper and middle classes had their Swiss newspapers and their short-wave, radios. The lower classes gleaned much while serving table or listening to conversation in the salon. Their grapevine was raised to a high degree of speed and enthusiasm, if not of accuracy. A call from the kitchen brought all the domestics in an apartment house to their courtyard balconies in a trice. The milk boy sped news from one house to another, and the *corriere* bringing chickens and eggs from the country served as liaison officer between town and country.

"You may say that this is the reaction of the Italian people," said Guido Rocco, the gracious head of the Foreign Press Direction, when giving to the foreign press an answer to a speech of Churchill. Then he smilingly corrected himself, "No, you cannot say that. The speech hasn't been published in the press; the people are not supposed to listen to the foreign radio." And under cover of the laughter, he added softly, doubtless inadvertently, "But of course we all know they do!" This from the chief of foreign propaganda.

As for the supporters of the war, it is impossible to number them accurately. They included the genuinely pro-German element in the party—those men who believed in the fascist ideal. They included

the disciplined and loyal men and women who followed and did not question. And they included the ranks either of the passive or of the tolerant among the people at large. This conglomerate may well have embraced a majority of the people a year before Italy entered the war. On June 10, 1940, it was clearly a minority. It may improve its position henceforth, but when I left Italy this spring I doubt if ten per cent could have been found to vote either for continuing the war or for a fascist future. The proportion might well be smaller.

It is essential to understand how many are the conflicting forces which conditioned the people's attitude toward war propaganda.

In the first place, these were Italians. The complexity of their national character and of their social behavior is too casually discounted in the Anglo-Saxon world. Italians become enthusiastic readily, kindle to the spark of a crusader, pour out a torrential loyalty, bruise their spirit against delays, betrayals, and defeats, and relapse suddenly into fatalism and apathy—emotionally spent. They are exuberant in the day of sunshine and plunge into orgies of despair in the day of misfortune. They have none of the stable, constructive mentality of the more northern peoples, or their resistance to adversity. The depth of their culture, indeed even the stones around them, give even the humblest peasant a lively consciousness of history and of the transiency of the present. Speaking of fascism and war, he will give you his vernacular equivalent of "This, too, will pass." Italians are an exploited people, accustomed to having their thinking imposed upon them; and yet this very weight of steady oppression has built up in their systems an immunity to indoctrination which may go far to explain their behavior today. Inevitably, such a people as the Italians would be the despair of a Goebbels.

Obviously, these Latin qualities operated substantially to vitiate the effect of propaganda. There are other factors, which can be classified about as successfully as one can pattern the unpatternable:

The Italians remain passionately nationalistic. Their traditional enemies have been the Germans. They don't see why they should do other than fear the Germans today. "We cannot win," people said to me over and over again, in different words, but with the same meaning; "even if we win, we lose—to the Germans. We would rather lose to the British."

They were by nature anti-National Socialist. They recognized in-

tuitively that the rigor of genuine fascism, at which Mussolini was only play-acting, had been carried out to its grimmest conclusion by Germany, and they felt this to be the negation of their gracious, sunshine-filled way of life.

They were in large part pacifist. In the last war, it is true, they were aroused to a high militarist pitch; but only for a period. They remain a nation of aristocrats, poets, musicians, tillers of the soil. War is repugnant to them. Their debilitating war-weariness increased through the Ethiopian and Spanish ventures to a point where all groups of Italians spoke to me about it with lackluster words or in actual agony of spirit.

Meanwhile there were characteristic deficiencies in the propaganda itself. For Mussolini was never the rigorous, relentless fascist type. He shifted from conservative to radical, from peacemaker to militarist as the international winds changed their quarter. He changed his advisers and officials readily so as to avoid the formation of opposition groups. All this made for disorganization, vagueness of policy—and for the temporary security of Mussolini's personal rule. The people recognized this essentially easygoing Italian softness behind the iron mask of fascism, and the propaganda was consequently denatured in their eyes. Furthermore, Italians are accustomed to political posing, to oratory which sounds flamboyant in its English translation but which in its own setting flows quite naturally from the Italians' inner urge to put on a good show and to see a good show.

Finally, it should be recalled that the Germans had had but a scant five years to come to terms with the new subtlety and effectiveness of modern propaganda and to learn from experience how to neutralize it. The Italians had nineteen years of fascism—more than enough for many a hypnotic chant to wear out its strength and for a healthy reaction to set in.

Much of the collapse of fascism, then, can be laid to the quirks and characteristics of its Italian environment. Nevertheless, I left Italy convinced that there was more of significance to the Italian story than merely the discrediting of one more Italian tyranny. In other countries, under more favorable conditions, the fascist idea may prove more tenacious. But its weakness must be basically the same—and its end should not be otherwise.

MORALE IN FRANCE DURING THE WAR

PIERRE COT

ABSTRACT

✓ The morale factor was the chief cause for the collapse of France; this is emphasized by the fact that the political breakdown followed the military defeat and that the French government preferred a policy of "collaboration" with Hitler rather than a continuation of the struggle in North Africa. Generally speaking, the French are a peaceful people. When the war broke out, nothing was done by the government to mobilize the moral resources of the country and to emphasize the ideological content of the war. ✓ In the army the weak point was the morale of the officers. The majority of the troop officers were young reserve men recruited among the bourgeoisie, who manifested the defects of their class. As far as the general staff was concerned, its weakness was the result of an insufficient intellectual preparation for modern war, as well as its pro-fascist sympathies. The French government is a pro-fascist government, principally composed of generals and representatives of leading industries. This government is not popular. There is an awakening of the national sentiment coming from the roughness of the German occupation and a revival of an anti-fascist and democratic feeling. The recent events prove that democracy is still living in France.

The question of morale has always preoccupied military chiefs. Napoleon used to say that the morale of an army is to its equipment as three is to one. On the other hand, Clausewitz has written: "A great European nation cannot be entirely defeated without the help of internal disunity." And in *Mein Kampf* Hitler blames the German defeat on the progressive collapse of the moral resistance of the people—ruined, he says, by the combined action of the Jews and of the Social Democrats.

Modern war, with its multiple forms and its scientific technique, has further increased the importance of the morale factor. On one hand, modern war has become really total; the entire nation participates, not only by a military effort, but by an economic effort taking the form of privations as well as of production, and by an intellectual effort extending to scientific research as well as to ideologic propaganda. By the practice of aerial bombings the zone of battle has extended to all the territory of the nation at war. The classical distinction between fighters and non-fighters has been obliterated on land as well as on sea. It is therefore the country as a whole, and not only the army, that should be warned against the effects of its own discouragement and against the blows of foreign propaganda.

On the other hand, the modern battle asks of the men who are in charge of fighting it an immense individual effort. The battle is no longer a charge of armed masses arriving for the fight led by officers directing and framing

the action of each soldier. It is a battle of mechanical engines, often acting in an isolated way. Each one of these engines—tanks, airplanes, special cannons, projectors, etc.—is served by a crew of a few men and sometimes by only one man, and the necessary links between these engines are assured by a combination of instruments of precision often manipulated also by only one man. The modern battle requires, thus, the co-ordinated action of specialists and technicians acting individually. The fighting man is more isolated than before, and his action demands not only a better technical preparation but a much greater moral force. Thus modern war asks of the people as a whole, and of the soldier in particular, a moral resistance greater than in past times.

These general observations allow us to realize exactly what is meant by "moral value" and "moral force" in this study. These words are taken in a military sense; they have to do with the moral qualities which allow an army or a nation to consent to the sacrifices required by war. These qualities have little to do with the demand for the true, the good, and the beautiful, which since Kant has been the most generally accepted basis of the moral law. Thus, observers all acknowledge that the morale of the young soldiers who ran over Holland, Belgium, and France was very high; but they were the same men who led the massacre of the Jews and the raping of women in Poland. They were barbarians and fanatics, deaf to pity and to reason; they were the product of the Hitlerian education and doctrine—this abominable mixture of fascism and of pan-Germanism which has perverted one of the noblest nations of Europe. Nothing has been higher than the morale of the German troops, and nothing has been lower than their morality. The study of the morale of a nation at war cannot then be confused with a study of the effects of war on the morality of this same nation.

One cannot insist enough on the role that the moral factor played in the collapse of France. This collapse was the result of numerous and varied causes—moral, military, economic, social, and political. But the common factor of all these elements will appear most likely to historians as the moral factor. France was a family divided into clans; before being invaded, the elements of her resistance had been dissociated and her national unity had been broken.

Certain analysts of the French crisis do declare:

In all ways France was unable to resist the German mass, 80 million inhabitants with an economic structure more industrial than agricultural, represent a

stronger weight than 40 million inhabitants with a structure more agricultural than industrial, 200 divisions with 10,000 planes and 10,000 tanks will win always against 100 divisions with 2000 planes and 2000 tanks.

This reasoning is based on a confusion between the notions of quantity and of quality. It is not the military defeat of France that has been an unexpected and disconcerting phenomenon, but the conditions and the consequences of this defeat. Other countries like Holland, Belgium, Poland, Norway, Greece, or Yugoslavia have been invaded by Hitler's troops, and their armies have been beaten. But their governments have remained more dignified and greater than the one of France. In most cases these governments have preferred exile to submission; those among them that have accepted the defeat and the occupation, as the Danish government and the King of Belgium, have retired in silence, refusing to collaborate in the new organization of fascist Europe. The case of France is different: (1) The government capitulated when France possessed a colonial empire, protected by a war fleet of five hundred thousand tons, whose power added to the British fleet would have been sufficient to deprive Hitler of all dreams of victory. (2) Only the French government has boasted of collaborating with the new order of Hitler. It has been the only one to make official vows for the victory of German troops over British or Russian troops. This government, only, has given to the Axis Powers its economic, diplomatic, and colonial resources. It defended Syria, where France was only the guardian and mandatory, against the British troops, who were acclaimed by the Syrian people. But to Japan it has given French Indo-China, where the unhappy native manifested his attachment to the Chinese cause. It becomes, then, impossible to define the French catastrophe in terms of a military defeat, caused by the inadequacy of the general staff, the lack of farsightedness of the governments, or the numerical inferiority of the soldiers and of the workers. The French catastrophe by its extent and by its results has revealed a national decomposition whose elements have to be looked into with care. If this research is limited to the moral side of things, one is led to the examination of three problems: the morale of the country up to the armistice, the morale of the army during this same period, and the morale of the country since the armistice.

PROBLEM I. THE MORALE OF THE COUNTRY BEFORE THE ARMISTICE

The events have proved that this morale was bad. The causes of weakness of French morale were, at the same time, general causes, extending

to all social classes of the nation, and particular causes belonging to certain social categories.

Among the general causes comes first the exhaustion of the French nation following the 1914-18 war. To understand this phenomenon it is necessary to take into consideration the following facts: (1) France, in fact, never recovered completely from the Napoleonic wars and all their consequences; the birth-rate statistics show that, at that time, the sources of French vitality were extinguished following an effort and a tension which exceeded the resources of the race. (2) The 1914-18 war was relatively more deadly for France than for the other belligerents; France had mobilized relatively more men than the other countries; furthermore, the proportion of men killed or missing was for France 10.5 per cent of the gainfully occupied male population, while for Germany it had been 7.8 per cent; for Italy 6.2 per cent; for England 5.1 per cent, and for the United States 0.2 per cent. In the same way the proportion of those mutilated was for France 11.1 per cent, where it had been for Germany 7.5 per cent. It is not within the compass of this article to examine the causes of these losses. Let us limit ourselves to register their incidence on the morale of France. In September, 1939, the proportion of young soldiers brought up with the horror of war by mutilated fathers or by war widows was greater in France than in Germany.

To this first general reason one must add another one, which had as a natural effect the multiplication of the first. As a consequence of the war, of the treaty of peace, and of the Hitlerian doctrine, an important part of the German population had been systematically brought up in the cult of vengeance. The French people were looking toward the procedures of conciliation and repeated that a bad international agreement was always better than the best of wars. Here, again, I do not judge—I observe. It is a certainty that defeated Germany had all to gain in the modification of the European status quo, while victorious France had her interest in the conservation of the status quo. Hitler only used, without creating it, the natural tendency which made of Germany a “dynamic” power, while France became a “conservative” power. Nationalism in France was stupidly conservative for the same reasons that Germany was imbued with bitter hatred and vengeance. From this point of view the evolution of the nationalist groups in France is very curious to consider. Those who on the eve of 1914 had been “chauvins” became on the eve of 1939 “appeasers,” the main question being for them the defense of the frontiers and of the French colonies. They did not even notice that, in sacrificing Republican Spain and then Czechoslovakia to the immediate guaranty of

their own frontiers, they were making war more unavoidable and more dangerous; their fear of war precipitated war.

The third general cause of moral weakness must be looked for in the absence of all propaganda, destined to explain to the French nation why she was fighting. All wars are ideologic ones; even when a country thinks that it is defending its territory, it is fighting for an idea—the idea of independence and of national integrity. Of the war that began in 1939, one can say that, from the French point of view, its ideological contents were easy to bring out and that it was dangerous not to do so. France and England were fighting for the principles of collective security and of international order, and without this there can be no security or peace for anyone; they were fighting to save the elementary principle that no one has the right to judge one's self. Finally, and above all, they were fighting for democracy and for all the spiritual and moral values that this word evokes to an Englishman or to a Frenchman. It was dangerous not to emphasize these ideological contents of the war because, in order to have the international order respected, France and England had been obliged to attack Germany. Technically the action of the democracies was either an operation of international police or an aggression. Not to point out that it was a matter of international-law enforcement was to give weapons to German propaganda, which repeated that Germany, pacific and conciliating, was the object of an unjustified aggression. German propaganda would not have had any effect on the morale of the French people if this people had heard: "We are fighting for democracy and for international order." But German propaganda touched its goal because French propaganda avoided the fact that this war was an ideological struggle for democracy and collective security against fascism and Hitlerism, and because French propaganda was limited to telling the people: "Fight today in fear of being attacked tomorrow." It offered them only the egoistic and poor reasons of a preventive war. Furthermore, it told them about Poland the contrary of what they had heard a year before about Czechoslovakia. To the holy war of fascism it refused to oppose the holy war of democracy; on the national scale and in the international sphere the French refused to play their best card.

These three general reasons are enough to explain why the mass of the French people began and followed through the war with a low morale. There is no doubt that other general causes would be useful to cite and would enforce the reasoning. But I must limit myself to the main lines in order to arrive at particular causes in certain sectors of French public opinion. These particular causes seem to me the most important.

During the war, from the point of view of moral resistance, France had two major weaknesses: the attitude of the Communists and, above all, the attitude of the industrial and financial upper middle classes.

Let us consider first the attitude of the Communists. Until August 23, 1939, from the point of view of strictly national matters their attitude was above reproach. The Communists were mostly preoccupied by the dangers of the international situation and their greatest efforts of propaganda were directed against the powers of aggression, that is to say, Japan, Hitler, and Mussolini. They were the adversaries of fascism and the most ardent partisans of collective security. But, since the Hitler-Stalin pact, this attitude was entirely modified; the Communists declared then that the war which the democracies were fighting was purely a capitalist war which had no interest for them. They did not do any sabotaging but they adopted, toward the war, a kind of indifference which contributed to ruin the morale of the country.

We know of the important part played by the Communist party among the French workers; we cannot here look into the causes of an influence which are closely bound to the revolutionary tradition which has always inspired the French working class. The fact to be considered is that an important fraction of the leaders of the workers' trade-unions were Communists. The hostility of these leaders to the democratic cause was evidently a serious blow to the moral unity of the country.

This blow could have been mitigated by a policy of collaboration with the non-Communist representatives of workers' organizations. In a less serious state of affairs England asked for Bevin's collaboration, but France never sent an appeal to Jouhaux. The French government did exactly the contrary. It chased from parliament the seventy-two Communist deputies and sent to concentration camps the leaders of the workers who were Communists or simply guilty of not approving its policy; but no sanction was taken against the Fascists or the partisans of an immediate accord with Hitler. Finally, it imposed on the employees more sacrifices than on the employer; the right to strike was abolished, but the right of great profits was maintained. All these political faults gave to the governmental action a reactionary character that could only aggravate the dissention between the country and the working class. Not only to the Communists but to the whole of the working class these mistakes gave the impression, false or true, that the government was grabbing the opportunity of the war to dissolve their organizations, stop their development, and suppress the advantages acquired by them. Briefly, nothing was done to arouse interest in the war among the mass of workers, who

only saw their liberties suppressed one after the other, and their leaders imprisoned one after the other. This shortsighted policy gave back to the Communists some of the prestige that the Stalin-Hitler pact had taken away.

But the attitude of the French bourgeoisie was somewhat more serious than that of the Communists. In this attitude we may probably find the secret of the moral collapse which provoked the fall of France.

The French *grande bourgeoisie* has always been not only conservative but reactionary. It has never understood that the best way to avoid the aggravation of social conflicts was not to oppose the necessary transformations and evolutions. It was ferociously attached to its interests and to its privileges. Until the reforms of 1936 France offered the paradox of being the great European country where political opinions were the most radical and where the social regime was the most backward. Toward the end of the Third Republic there was growing opposition between a bourgeoisie more and more egoistic and shortsighted, and a people asking more and more energetically for an extension of the democratic principle to economic and social problems.

By fear not only of communism but of all social reforms capable of touching its interests, this bourgeoisie threw itself into the arms of fascism.

In the demoralization of France fear of communism played a greater role than communism itself. Fear of communism was often a pretext, a simple method of rallying for defense of the social regime the middle classes, the lower middle classes, and the small landowners. What the upper bourgeoisie feared was not communism, which had little or no chance in France, but democracy—that is to say, the people's finishing up, by the law of the greater number, the economic and social reforms which the bourgeoisie did not want. Here, again, we find ourselves in the presence of quite a general phenomenon having taken in France a particular character. The general phenomenon is the rallying of the great bourgeoisie to fascism, considered as a political technique in order to prevent the collapse of capitalism; the particular character is the acceptance, by the French bourgeoisie, of a Hitlerian victory as a necessary condition of the establishment in France of a fascist regime. Many French bourgeois saw in Hitler and in Mussolini the modern champions of the old social order. To the reformers of the popular front they preferred Hitler. Even before the war their choice was made. Many foreign witnesses have reported these words often spoken in the Parisian *salons*: "Rather Hitler than Léon Blum."

To explain this perversion of the national sense we must go back to history. Patriotism in France is more a tradition of the people than of the privileged classes. During the Second Republic a conservative deputy proclaimed, on the anniversary of the Battle of Waterloo: "I fear less the invasion of the Prussians than the return to France of the revolutionary refugees." During the French Revolution the aristocracy emigrated in order to organize, in foreign territory, an army capable of fighting against the national armies and suppressing by force the political New Deal realized by the revolutionary assemblies. One cannot then be surprised that having to choose between their class interests and their patriotic duty, so many French bourgeois made a bad choice.

It is not necessary to insist on the importance of this choice. Practically, the French high middle class controlled the administration and the most important posts of the state. In backing the fascist organizations and in considering Hitler as a rampart against communism, this bourgeoisie broke the national unity which would have been attained around a democracy.

Evidently, all these considerations are applied to the average and not to the whole of the individuals. There have been among the French bourgeoisie men whose morale was very high; the existence of the De Gaulle movement and the reaction of certain refugees are enough to prove it. Just as it is unfair to accuse all the Communists, it is unfair to accuse all the bourgeois. But we must strongly underline that the existence in France of fascist partisans, and especially of sympathizers, has contributed more than anything else to the demoralization of the country. The fifth column was recruited among the admirers of fascist methods.

Although it is always dangerous and unfair to generalize, it is, in a way, necessary. Let us finish by saying that *the French moral crisis was less the French nation's moral crisis than the moral crisis of the French bourgeoisie.*

PROBLEM II. THE MORALE OF THE ARMY UP TO THE ARMISTICE

This conclusion will be verified if we examine the morale of the army. In a general way the morale of the troops—that is to say, of the people—was superior to the morale of the officers, of which a great majority came from the high middle class.

When all classes of a nation do not have a good morale it is vain to hope that its army will fight well. In fact, the soldiers of 1939 were not

worth those of 1914; they did not oppose the invader with that stubborn resistance which marked the defenders of Warsaw, the Greek and Yugoslavian troops, or which the Russian soldiers show. But the question arises whether, and in what proportion, this attitude was the reflection of the morale of the nation. This question can be answered in examining the special causes of demoralization which could have acted on the army, to aggravate the general causes coming from the general condition of the nation.

Let us consider, in the first place, that the French army, compared to the German army, was placed in less favorable morale conditions than in 1914; it had to face the *Blitzkrieg* when its chiefs had prepared it for the *Sitzkrieg*; it did not have the necessary arms, plans, or formation for this sort of war, which certain clear-sighted men like Paul Reynaud or General de Gaulle had foretold but of which the general staff had obstinately denied the possibility on the western front. As soon as the *Panzerdivisionen* had penetrated into the mass of the French troops, these troops were disconcerted and became incapable of effective military action. The troops retreated in disorder, thus increasing the general confusion. Briefly, the battle was fought under the worst possible conditions to allow for a moral test of the French soldier.

In spite of those bad conditions, all the foreign war correspondents remarked that when the soldiers were well commanded their traditional qualities reappeared. The evidence establishes that the morale of the troops was superior to that of the officers; panic was greater among officers than among soldiers. The reason for this difference can be revealed by making certain observations regarding the troop officers and the general staff.

The majority of troop officers were young reserve men, recruited among the bourgeoisie. These officers manifested the defects of their class, and specially in the contradiction existing between their patriotism and their political sentiment. Many among them were, at the same time, patriots and Fascists. They were willing to fight for their country, but they felt ill at ease in a fight for democracy. They were fighting the Germans whom they did not like but whose ideal they admired. This opposition of political opinions and of national sentiments became, in each one of them, a moral conflict, compared to the German officers whose political faith upheld their patriotic faith. During the whole winter the young French officers had been submitted to the anti-British and anti-democratic propaganda of the fascist press; this propaganda had demoralized them without their realizing it.

The case of the general staff is more complicated. Here two elements must be taken into consideration: a professional element and a political element.

The professional element is the result of the intellectual disorder provoked by the success of the German methods. French military doctrine collapsed suddenly; its frivolity appeared in a clear way. Everyone realized that time had been spent in preparing the war of 1919 instead of preparing the war of 1939. The military chiefs, who had shrugged their shoulders when anyone spoke of German or Russian theories, saw their mistake. But it was then too late to improvise on the battlefield the answer to the German advance. All that could have been done was to slow this advance by systematic destruction of bridges, roads, and railways and to assure the embarkation of what was left of the French army to North Africa. But at that time certain military leaders lost their heads and others were seized by the political element which we have mentioned above.

Officially the French army was placed outside politics. But we have only to look into the political history of the past century to see that from 1840 to 1940 there have always been generals aspiring for dictatorship, or at least inclined to participate in the struggle of regimes of force against the democratic elements. Cavaignac, MacMahon, Boulanger, and the general staff of the Dreyfus case have marked the steps of this movement. Historians have not yet at their disposal the documents allowing them to fix the responsibilities of men like Pétain, Weygand, or Darlan in the growth of French fascism. But it is established by their own writings that Marshal Pétain and General Weygand had been closely associated with the activities of all the fascist leagues. Both were affiliated with the leaders of the "Hooded Men" whose conspiracy was denounced by Marx Dormoy, who has lately paid with his life for this exposé. On the other hand, Hamilton Fish Armstrong reports that, in order to bring the French government to ask for an armistice, General Weygand stated the facts about a communist revolution which only existed in his imagination. These great leaders of the French army are now the benefactors of the strangling of the Republic. Without going as far as to apply to them the saying "*is fecit cui prodest*," we may say that their hurry to seize power played a role in their decision. They did not, from one day to the other, transform themselves into dictators; they had meditated on the adventures of MacMahon, of Boulanger, and of Franco. We must class these meditations among the many factors of demoralization of the French army.

PROBLEM III. THE MORALE IN FRANCE AFTER THE
ARMISTICE

The last problem will not be long. The precise and detailed data on the morale of France after the armistice is lacking. Submitted to the double dictatorships of Pétain and the Gestapo, the people are silent and do not manifest their feelings. Nevertheless, taking only the most certain testimony, one can make the following remarks.

The first remark is very general. It has to do with the apathy which has reigned and still reigns in France. This sentiment is beginning to wane and one can notice the awakening of the national and political sentiments. But many Frenchmen are still dominated by the material questions, the problems most difficult to solve: to eat, to drink, to reunite a scattered family, to find a job. They are absorbed all the more in these questions, having not quite understood what happened to France. The explanation given by the government (responsibility of General Gamelin and of certain political men or men of the democratic regime) has been so unsatisfactory for the public opinion that the famous Riom trial could not be carried through. Furthermore, the Vichy government is doing its best to keep up this state of apathy; military dictatorships have never liked the people to think freely. Last, because of his old age, of the respect that surrounded him, and of his reputation for integrity, the personality of Marshal Pétain has been until now the greatest obstacle to a real awakening of the *esprit critique* and of national sentiment. Having the policy of "collaboration" carried out by Marshal Pétain has been for Hitler a flash of genius. Many more Frenchmen would have revolted against this policy and would have understood its real meaning if it had not been sanctioned by the hero of Verdun.

The second remark has to do with the government and with leaders of the new French policy. France is dominated by military men and by Fascists. The directing personnel appears to be divided into rival "groups." The government is composed of admirals, generals, some civil servants, and some representatives of the leading industries and of the great banks (e.g., Pucheu and Lehideux). This last element has the control of the economic problems, the military men having the control of the political problems. On the other hand, there exists a more radical group, composed of men such as Laval, Doriot, Bergery, Deat, etc. These men criticize not the principle of the policy of "collaboration" but its explanation, which they judge to be too moderate. Between these two groups, as always happens in totalitarian countries, a true hatred has developed. The imprisonment of Tixier, Vignancourt, and Colonel Groussard proves

this hatred. The opposition of these "gangs" is more important than one realizes at first in the demoralization of French public spirit and in the development of fascism because it favors jealousy, hatred, and intrigue. With much cunning, Marshal Pétain has managed to stay out of all these rivalries for a long time, but from many sources arrives information affirming that his popularity is decreasing. The impotence of the government in trying to solve, even partially, the problem of the equitable distribution of food, the absolute obedience to Hitler's will (clearly shown by the delivery to Japan of Indo-China), the political oppression which increases every day, and the murder of Marx Dormoy announcing a crisis of violence and murders, have clouded Marshal Pétain's star. This, again, in a state of popular confusion contributes to the general demoralization of the people.

With the third remark we arrive at more favorable elements. There exists in all France, and especially in occupied France, an awakening of the national sentiment. This awakening comes from the roughness of the German occupation. More and more the French understand that "collaboration" is a game of fools and that Hitlerian Germany, under pretense of collaboration, wants to enslave them. More and more, in spite of governmental propaganda, the French are wishing for a British victory; it is not an exaggeration to say that 85 per cent of the people in the occupied zone and 75 per cent of those in the unoccupied zone are pro-British.

The fourth remark has to do with the revival of an anti-fascist political sentiment. This sentiment comes from various causes; certain are general to all countries which, realizing the reality of fascism, favor democracy, even with its imperfections. Other causes are particular to France. Among these we must mention first the old liberal tradition which has always fought military intervention in politics; control by military government is condemned to unpopularity in France because there are few countries where the military men lack as much political sense and because there are few countries as rebellious as the French to solutions by force. Second, there is not only the conservative but the definitely reactionary character of the policy of the government; Frenchmen see the rebirth of the "moral order" with a procession of police investigations, of denunciations, and of hypocrisies. They are wishing secretly for liberty.

These remarks allow the release of three conclusions.

First, the moral resistance of France, as a nation, to German domination and, as a democracy, to military and fascist dictatorship, faces particular obstacles. France suffered more than other nations, and the equivocal fact of the existence of Marshal Pétain does not help her in her re-

habilitation. In the actual state of affairs one cannot count on France to lead a movement of resistance to oppression; it will not be from France that revolt will be born against Hitlerism.

Second, there exist germs of national and democratic resistance, and these germs are developing as fast as possible, taking into account the unfavorable circumstances. Fascist propaganda has had only limited effects; it carries with it the foreign birthmark and the mark of defeat. The French know that without the help of the *Gestapo* the formation of a dictatorial government would have been impossible. The purely patriotic resistance is important as it thrives on the German excesses and awkwardness. But the democratic and anti-fascist resistance is the most interesting and the most important phenomenon; the foci of active actions are appearing especially among the working classes, who are learning the art of sabotage. Centers of passive resistance to governmental actions are being organized not only in the cities but in the country, where the farmer finds again his traditional defiance to military governments.

Third, it would be simplifying too much the action of the French people in bringing it down to the proportion of a class political struggle; thus, De Gaulle's army is composed mostly of young patriotic bourgeois whose reactions have been more patriotic than democratic. But, for historical reasons, the most ardent elements of the struggle and of the national awakening are the democratic and anti-fascist elements; it is they who lead the dangerous battle of the underground struggle.

These are the conditions where the morale of France, after having proved its insufficiency to resist the Hitlerian propaganda, is tempering once more in the trial. For a century and a half French democracy has had many serious blows and eclipses. It has sometimes disappeared; but it has always reappeared.

GEORGES MILLS, NEW HAMPSHIRE

MORALE IN GERMANY¹

ERNST KRIS

ABSTRACT

Morale as discussed in this paper refers to "morale of the group." Morale in totalitarian and democratic countries cannot be compared without full realization of the impact of the differences in government and social organization on the group. The first point discussed concerns, therefore, the special conditions created by National Socialism on the problems of group morale.

Weak spots in German morale and the countermeasures adopted by the authorities, especially morale prophylaxis in the field of propaganda, are discussed. The method of this prophylaxis is intimately related to the National Socialist doctrine of psychological management in general. Magic protection through supreme leadership and the covenant of the hated against those who want to destroy them are described as two main trends in German psychological defense.

The fact that this war is the second in the memory of living men determines many of their reactions. Here we may contrast two channels through which the past reaches the present: the present may interpret the past from experience, or it may have recourse to analogy. In the early days of this war it became suddenly and tragically clear that in psychological no less than in military warfare the conquered of 1918 had adapted experience to the changing scene, while the former victors had relied on analogies. This antithesis can be described in greater detail.

In the Allied countries the quest for information on the state of morale in Germany was, at the outbreak of this war—admittedly or not—influenced to some extent by the expectation that at an early stage a breakdown of morale in Germany would determine the issue of the struggle. Nazi Germany, it was said, had started the war of 1939 under conditions similar to those prevailing in Imperial Germany after two or three years of warfare; thus the disintegration which impeded the war effort of Imperial Germany in the last stages of the first World War was expected to recur shortly after the second World War began.

I shall not discuss here the data on which this expectation was based but rather the assumptions implied in their evaluation. These assumptions concern the part attributed to psychological factors in the German defeat of 1918. Since we have as yet no satisfactory method for isolating one factor within the framework of social events, we are accustomed to relying on rather general impressions.

¹ The present paper was written before the outbreak of the Russo-German War. No attempt is made in this paper to survey or to list systematically the sources of the data on German morale. An attempt of this kind would, if comprehensive, undoubtedly yield some detailed results.

Powerful as was the influence of psychological factors on Germany's destiny in 1918, the theory of their decisive and final importance was suggested by German reactionaries and the German General Staff. They promoted the view that the cracking of morale in Imperial Germany caused the defeat; they concealed the other side of the picture—that in the total war situation of 1914-18 enemy action—the Allied blockade—had first driven Germany into a hopeless situation in the fields of supply, especially of food, and consequently of production and that, while actual hardships of many kinds existed, bad morale became a decisive factor only after the defeat of the German army in open battle.²

The thesis of German reactionaries, inspired by the German General Staff, was intended to save the prestige of the armed forces for the sake of future rearmament. The origin of this version can be traced to the various writings of General von Ludendorff, who in the early post-war years endeavored to justify his military misfortunes—especially his gambling strategy of August, 1918, and his own psychological breakdown after its failure—by a legend describing the German army as the brave who were conquered by the clever, i.e., by Allied and socialist propaganda. The army, it was said, had surrendered to the promises of President Wilson and to "judeo-marxist" forces within Germany. One of the spies indoctrinated by the General Staff in 1919 with this legendary theory was Herr Hitler. He stated it in 1923 in *Mein Kampf*, and at the height of his victories he has reiterated that "the German Army was never conquered in the first World War." The doctrine here described and some similar arguments were readily absorbed in democratic countries. The ground was prepared by that propaganda consciousness which the last war called into being and which was turned into propaganda phobia by the various debunking campaigns of the 1920's. As a result, under the heading of "the broken pledge given to the German people," the progressives in the democracies became unwittingly the pacemakers for a doctrine circulated by German nationalists.³

² The literature on these questions will be found in George G. Bruntz, *Allied Propaganda and the Collapse of the German Empire in 1918* ("Hoover War Library Publication," No. 13 [Stanford University Press, 1938]). The literature on military history was recently summarized in Cyrill Falls and John W. Wheeler-Bennett, *Was Germany Defeated in 1918?* ("Oxford Pamphlets on World Affairs," No. 30 [Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1940]). For the problems of German morale in 1918 see especially H. V. Freytag-Loringhoven, *Die Psyche der Heere* (Berlin: Mittler, 1923), who asserts that at the end of the war "the overwhelming majority of the troops were in a far better psychological shape than was indicated by the military authorities."

³ This is an instance of that fatality in timing which later made some liberals in democratic countries plead for "fairness to the Nazis"; it is well known that, at least in

In Germany the negative response to the war propaganda of the Imperial government was short-lived and readily diverted against the Versailles powers. The interest in all problems of psychological warfare and management was kept alive.⁴ The lesson of the first World War was carefully learned both by the military authorities and by Adolf Hitler. The second World War found Germany fully prepared in the psychological field. The defense of the home front was intrusted to the party élite and to the propaganda organizations, the pillars on which Hitler had erected the edifice of his state. The part played by both in Germany's psychological defense must be characterized briefly.

For the purpose of discussion I shall refer to information on psychological conditions in Germany which continues to reach this country through various channels—through reports from experts in mass communication (press and radio) and through letters and narratives from travelers. Out of this manifold material I select three statements on potential "weak spots" in morale corroborated independently not only by a plurality of informants but also by the countermeasures adopted by the Nazi government. (1) The lack of enthusiasm for the war among German civilians, which is described as widespread. (2) A certain dissatisfaction with living conditions caused or intensified by the war—a dissatisfaction said to be common with many. (3) A certain amount of anxious apprehension as to the future; it decreases with each of the consecutive victories; its periodical increase seems to be correlated to periods of stalemate and postponement of decision.

These attitudes are ascribed to "the man in the street."⁵ Evidence at the disposal of the general public does not permit estimating either their intensity or their distribution in society. Their potential influence on morale, defined as "persistence in the pursuit of collective purposes," cannot be discussed without reference to the relation existing between the individual and the group in a totalitarian state. This relationship is different from that in a democracy, since participation is based upon coercion, and the group activities are closely controlled by members of the coercing élite.

Britain, the guilty feelings of these liberals toward Germany became a tool in the hands of Tory appeasers.

⁴ See L. Farago and L. F. Gittler, *German Psychological Warfare, Survey and Bibliography* (New York: Committee on National Morale, 1941).

⁵ Even the reports which in the first eight months of the war reached the exiled leaders of the German opposition fairly regularly did not usually report about group behavior as such but rather about that of typical representatives of groups. Not "the workers" in a specified factory but rather "some of our friends working at . . ." were quoted.

Neither the group participants nor the supervising élite are homogeneous. The élite is stratified according to power and deference, and the identification of members or special groups with the leader is graded in intensity; some members of the élite have been incorporated only through their functional position as specialists. The situation is further complicated by the changing age structure of the élite, the old party members and those who have joined them from year to year being rapidly supplanted by those brought up in the party. The attitude of these young people seems, on the whole, to bear out the contention that the education of the child and of the adolescent affords better chances for indoctrination than propaganda with the adult.

The members of the group may share voluntarily in its activity, or they may be indifferent or opposed. The man in the street whose dissatisfaction is described by our sources will in all likelihood be indifferent or opposed: he is a coerced participant.⁶

The number of people like him is subject to change, while the intensity of their disinclination fluctuates. Yet even if there were many of them and their detachment from the group or their hostility to it was marked their influence would still hardly count. In a totalitarian organization the coerced participants cannot form independent groups. Wherever they join in collective activities they are overpowered by the élite.⁷ Only if dis-

⁶ He has of late received the attention of the Nazi élite. This is the way his attitude is analyzed on the official German radio on May 6, 1941: "The Prusso-German conception of freedom is governed not by the question 'freedom from what' but by 'freedom for what.' *We all agree that there are still Volksgenossen who regard the political grip of the party as compulsion.* But such a view need not always simply be interpreted as a proof of hostility to the State. By his racial characteristics the German is a personality and not one of a herd. But those inherited racial characteristics tend to individualistic exaggeration. . . . This insistence on one's own but also the claim to be able to express it to the point of boredom—all these qualities are familiar to us. . . . Every sensible man who knows himself must always remember his weakness . . . and *will welcome the grip of the Party as a loving embrace of freedom.*" It is difficult to say whether a statement of this kind may be taken as a symptom of a shift within Germany.

⁷ Up to now they have also been able to control competitive élites. This was the case with the military groups in Germany opposed to Nazi control before the outbreak of the war. The lack of comprehension of the totalitarian system of organization has in this respect misled democratic leaders. A set of rumors concerning dissatisfaction in the German army was promoted by the Nazi élite after the dissatisfaction had been brought under control. A secret radio station supposed to establish contact between anti-Nazi circles of the German army and certain agencies of the British government were, in fact, operated by the Gestapo. After some hesitation I am inclined to believe that this misinformation may have had considerable influence on the attitude of the cabinet of Mr. Chamberlain. See in this connection the report of the German Ministry of the Interior dated May 10, 1940, broadcast on Deutschlandsender on the morning of the

satisfaction spreads to the élite, if its allegiance to the leader is weakened or competitive élites are admitted, can the coerced participants gain influence on the group activity. This possibility undoubtedly exists. It is realized as a danger by Hitler. He refers to it in speeches on the aim of the enemy; from the preventive activities mobilized against this danger we may hope to learn more of the possible development of German morale in a crisis to come.⁸ I shall briefly outline these activities as intrusted to mass communication to the German home front. I shall relate the arguments used to eliminate the three potential weak spots of morale mentioned above.⁹

Germany shared the resistance of man to the second World War. Not even Nazi management has been able to overcome this resistance. After the march into Austria, the increase in Hitler's prestige was based upon his peaceful conquests. After the Polish campaign, which enjoyed a traditional prestige of its own as a campaign for the deliverance of German

invasion of the Lowlands. For the practice of planted news see the *Instructions for German Agents in the Americas*, published by the *Petit parisien* on November 15, 1933; an English translation was published by Robert Dell, *Germany Unmasked* (London, 1934). For the theory of élite interrelations see K. Mannheim, *Man and Society* (New York, 1941).

⁸ These countermeasures should be interpreted as witnesses not to the seriousness of the threat but only to its existence. Hitler, the master of planning rational methods for the gratification of the irrational attitudes of the German people, believes in the importance of psychological prevention as a matter of routine of management. A detailed study of German mass communication shows that this routine even comprehends remote details. In 1941 the preventive measures are being intensified. Thus the ratio of items dealing with enemy weakness compared with those dealing with German strength is in German home news clearly increasing. For statistical data see E. Kris, "Mass Communication in Relation to the Governments of Other Countries"; for the theory of psychological planning in Nazi Germany see H. Hartmann, "Rational and Irrational Behaviour," paper read to the New York Psycho-analytic Society, 1941; E. Kris, "The 'Danger' of Propaganda," *American Imago*, Vol. II, 1941.

⁹ The material used here is derived mainly from German home broadcasts transmitted on standard waves and therefore not audible in this country. They are collected in the *Daily Digest of Foreign Broadcasts*, published as a confidential document by the British Broadcasting Corporation in London; they also contain a fair amount of quotations from German newspapers and periodicals. They are here taken as a representative sample of mass communication. The work conducted at the Research Project on Totalitarian Communication at the New School for Social Research (directed by Hans Speier and myself) is partly based on this document. What is said here is in many ways connected with this work. I am especially indebted to Hans Speier for his continued interest in this paper. See *The Implication of Print, Radio and Film for Democratic Government, Proceedings of the Library Institute, 1941*, ed. Douglas Waples (Chicago, 1941). In press.

nationals¹⁰ Hitler made the peace offer of October 6, 1939. Its rejection was said to prove that the declaration and continuation of the war were due to the aggressive intentions of the Allies. At any extension of the struggle the new conquest was announced by a solemn and amply documented statement testifying that German action was taken in order to prevent, first, the Allies, later only Britain, from occupying Norway, the Lowlands, or Yugoslavia. Modifications of the routine are rare. In the case of Yugoslavia, President Roosevelt shared in Mr. Churchill's aggressorship.

There clearly is nothing new in the argumentation itself; it follows strictly the age-old patterns of the "we are justified" appeal—only the persistence is new. While the second Reich admitted its breach of faith in invading Belgium, the third remains more consistent. The pattern is applied with almost superstitious rigidity. Every aggression is described as a defense.¹¹

At the same time, however, while "war was forced upon the German people," an elaborate system of mass communication brings the war home to the people. It starts with the communiqués of the High Command, in days of action supplemented by flash news and interpreted by special commentators; reports from the front, the technically best productions of the German system of communication, take the audience in the days of battle even to the front line. In one broadcast of this kind the helpless cry of a dying soldier was heard to stress the realism of the feature program.¹² In days of stalemate the restless life of the soldier is described by interviews which are sometimes hardly censored, or the ethical appeal of soldiering is stressed. These are, of course, only some of the many ways which, in a variety of repetitions, establish the link between home front and front line.

This double aspect of the defensive war, enhanced by the thrills of

¹⁰ The German action was said to have been not only provoked but also necessitated by the threat to Berlin. For stereotypes prescribed by German propaganda in this connection see E. Kris, "German Censorship Instructions for the Czech Press," *Social Research*, Vol. I (1941).

¹¹ Propaganda routines of this kind are applied in spite of their lack of plausibility, on the assumption stressed by Hitler, that what is repeated with sufficient persistence will be believed in the end. It is one of the assumptions responsible for the failure of Nazi propaganda in democracies. See Kris, "The 'Danger' of Propaganda," *op. cit.* The pattern mentioned above is not only directly influenced by Allied propaganda in the last war but also by the conclusions of H. D. Lasswell (*Propaganda in the World War* [1927]).

¹² These programs are the work of the reporter companies, the death roll of which is largely advertised by the Nazis as "good service" to their audience.

soldiering, is meant to supplement the lack of genuine enthusiasm. American correspondents, however, who report that, even in days of new military victories, special editions of the newspapers may remain unsold,¹³ give the impression that at least the coerced participants of the Nazi state have not forgotten that for a second time what they were told would never happen again is actually happening.

The general dissatisfaction with hardships, added to the restrictions which German consumers had been inured to for a number of years, were, through the mediums of mass communication, not only justified in various ways but actually glorified. Herr Goering's formula of guns versus butter gave the tune. Restrictions were not, as in the last war, introduced after shortage had arisen; rationing was correlated to planned action. With every victory this justification became more plausible; with every pillaged country some restrictions could be loosened; with every month of the war the comparison with the enemy's living standard became more acceptable. Britain, the aggressor, is made responsible for all the hardship, and while Lissauer's chant of hate, written in 1915, was not revived—the Jewish descent of the author being too well known—the set phrases of the anti-British propaganda of 1914–18 have all been unearthed. Thus the traditional devices of a hate campaign are carefully applied. All arguments, however, are also repeated on a higher level. The very restrictions imposed upon the German people are said to be witness to a new social structure, while the enemy is made to represent plutocratic reaction.

Thus the case is shifted into an ideological sphere. The recommendation of Le Bon (he speaks of "illusions") is streamlined in Nazi management. Every political aim is expressed also in terms of a new ideal. The conquest of Europe becomes its unification.

The third of the statements on weak spots in German psychological armor, that on apprehension, is by far the most promising. In the last war defeat broke suddenly the chain of military victories; no victory therefore can quite dispel the specter, especially since another repetitive factor, American participation in the war, is possible.¹⁴

Two sets of arguments are used to discard the apprehension. The one

¹³ We also meet repeatedly with announcements advising us that in restaurants conversation has to stop while the news is being broadcast (W. L. Shirer's *Berlin Diary* [New York, 1941] contains a variety of examples).

¹⁴ The study of references to the last war in German mass communication forms an important subject in itself. The study of army communiqués conducted at the Research Project on Totalitarian Communication supplies detailed evidence on this point. One example may be given here: An official comment of the High Command communiqué of June 6, 1940, states in detail what strategic actions were taken in order to "make certain that the 'miracle of the Marne' of 1914 could not repeat itself."

says that the German people were engaged in one war only: it started in 1914 and will be concluded soon. Thus the defeat is made a part of the episode of truce. The second set stresses the differences between the two situations. The loneliness of Imperial Germany is contrasted with Nazi Germany's popularity in the world. For a long time the war on two fronts was contrasted with the war against surviving Britain. The most telling of these comparisons, however, concerns the difference in leadership, and in this connection the leaders of the last war are described as inexperienced and naïve as compared to Adolf Hitler.

No analysis of the various "build-ups" of Hitler's prestige in different phases of his leadership or with different strata of the German people can be attempted here.¹⁵ There was a time when his messianic mission, his fanatic will, his devotion to Germany were floodlighted; he was then a heroic leader of the young. The emphasis has been shifted of late. Omnipotence is typical: the fabulous career, the complete success of all enterprises, the clockwork-like functioning of the initiatives with their paralyzing effect upon adversaries—all this is summarized in terms of, "Whatever Hitler does is well done."¹⁶ In his supreme capacity as a protective paternal image of unequalled power he offers himself and is offered by the engineers of persuasion to the Nazi élite and to the whole German people as object for identification. The offer is not devoid of an atavistic flavor; twice in a speech to German workers in December, 1940, he expressly stated that only for good reasons had he refrained from cutting off the heads of German intellectuals at one time opposed to him. The hard core of Hitler's new paternalism is, however, omniscience; a series of new verbalizations and a great number of items regularly featured in the German propaganda assure us that planning is made to appear magic. Proofs, were they required, could easily be obtained from analysis of German home propaganda in the, unfortunately, rare and limited situations of defeat. The one outstanding example is the Battle for Britain in the summer and fall of 1940. It will be remembered that German propaganda to South America had given and revised date lines for victory. The broadcasts in German from London, which, in spite of all devices of persuasion

¹⁵ The formulas are frequently derived from his own speeches, which seem to some considerable extent to reveal Dr. Goebbels' influence. They contain the blueprint of German propaganda, subsequently adapted by *minores dei* to the whole flow of communication.

¹⁶ A comparison between the two German war films—*Baptism by Fire*, describing the Polish campaign, and *Victory in the West*, describing the Battle of France—bears this point out clearly. In June, 1941, in a bus in the Yorkville section of New York City a slightly intoxicated youth was heard to mutter to himself while stepping to his seat: "Trust Hitler and you'll be all right."

and coercion operated by the Nazis, continue to attract a large, faithful, but by now apparently not too credulous, audience, described in dramatic terms the postponement of the dates and the failure of the plan. Contradictions of this argument continue to play a decisive part in German home propaganda. Never, they repeated, had any date line existed; it was invented by British liars for their own purposes. Hitler would choose his own time and then act with his usual precision; in the meantime, Britain, the blockaded blockader, was in for slow starvation.¹⁷

The trust in Hitler's power may, to some extent, account for what is by some described as widespread reaction to the British bombing of Germany. Dissatisfaction and apprehension are said to occur not infrequently in bombed areas. While the extent of this attitude is difficult to assess, the tenor of German home propaganda seems to prove that a problem of morale exists.

The opposite reaction to enemy bombing—the reaction common to the Spanish Loyalists, the Finns in 1940, and the British—seems best accounted for when we refer to two psychological generalizations: (1) Real danger is, on the average, faced better than vague apprehension; the fantastic or imaginary elements of anxiety are deflated by the impact of the concrete situation, (2) The attack of the enemy mobilizes antagonism against him. This aggression solidifies in-group cohesion.

In Germany these mechanisms seem not, or not yet, to have operated to a similar extent. The reason may be that for the German people the destruction of their homes by enemy planes is a greater psychological shock; they had been promised safety by their leaders, and the promise was not fulfilled.¹⁸

This interpretation, if correct, may appear to justify optimism as to the reaction of the German people in a period to come, when the time table of victories would gradually be upset, when the active participation of the

¹⁷ A similar technique has been adopted when dealing with United States support for Britain, one of the gravest sources of apprehension in Germany. The formula is that United States belligerency is fully anticipated in the German plan. A detailed analysis of the patterns and arguments used by German counterpropaganda is in preparation.

¹⁸ While German women are supposed not to write to serving soldiers about petty worries, such as waiting in queues for cigarettes to send to the front, the reduction of the meat ration during the summer, or about the "nervous conditions of the air-raid wardens," air raids are a permissible subject. The soldiers "clench their fists and swear a merciless vow when they hear that the Englishmen are raining their bombs over sleeping towns." This "advice" given on June 1, 1941, by the broadcast feature program, "The Voice of the Soldier," reflects the psychological policy in dealing with the home correspondence of the army, a subject the importance of which was suggested by the experience of 1918.

United States might revive the pattern of defeat after triumphs and the dissatisfaction of the coerced participants—the German radio on June 25, 1941, addressed them as “the cowardly pessimists and grouchers”—might spread to the élite.¹⁹ German morale, one might say, is vulnerable at the top; the magic spell will not survive defeat, and, should the trust in the leader vanish, disintegration may proceed with the speed of panic.

While a development of this kind is thinkable and, from a psychological point of view, plausible, one should not overlook that a second line of psychological defense exists—one which again uses the memory of 1918. Fear of retaliation by the enemy implements or supplants the trust in the leader. This fear is consistently nourished by German home propaganda; in case of defeat, it is said, the enemy would disrupt and divide Germany; no disunity between the people and the leaders is possible, since both, without discrimination, are kept in abhorrence by foes, conquered and unconquered.²⁰ When official British propaganda to Germany was anxious never to identify the Nazis and the Germans in December, 1939, the lowest point in German morale in this war, Fieldmarshal von Brauchitsch stressed this line of propaganda in his Christmas address. It has never since disappeared. Should, therefore, the chain of triumphs be once interrupted, then, as a second line, the covenant of the gangsters—the “we fight for our lives” appeal—will be increasingly played up. It might then depend on the skill of democratic propaganda, on the conviction it carries, on what it offers as concept of the future,²¹ to prevent this second line of defense from solidifying. This propaganda might then attempt to support the man in the street—the coerced participant against his élite supervisor.

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¹⁹ Opportunistic late-comers to the party and specialists of various kinds may then prove to be the best predisposed for this contagion. But not even National Socialism has discovered a “sincereometer,” to use an expression of Lenin’s.

²⁰ There is some indication that the cold hatred the German army of occupation is meeting in some of the conquered territories affects the attitude of the German soldiers. German broadcast propaganda in Holland and Norway suggests this. It is also a frequent item in other reports. The isolated soldier seems to suffer from the complete rejection of his attempts to associate himself with the life of the people around him; the greatest difficulty seems to arise where sexual relations are concerned. The ban of the Norwegians against Norwegian girls being taken out by German soldiers has been answered by Herr Terboven, the governor, by severe threats.

²¹ It can be shown in detail that each casual statement of British statesmen, in which any plan for the future is mentioned, is at once debunked by the German home propaganda. When in January, 1941, Mr. Churchill spoke of peace for Europe, he was actually accused of plagiarizing Herr Hitler’s “New Order.” These debunking attacks form an established routine of German counterpropaganda.

MORALE IN CONTEMPORARY ENGLAND

ERIC ESTORICK

ABSTRACT

In the present war, morale, which is playing a greater role than in any previous conflict, explains in great measure the resistance of England to the numerically superior forces of the Axis. The subject is divided into five sections: (1) morale defined, (2) Britain keeps its finger on public morale, (3) Britain works to bolster and maintain its morale, (4) Germany wages war against British morale, and (5) what Englishmen expect out of this war. From the beginning of the war until the spring of 1940, public reaction in England was characterized by bewilderment, indifference, boredom, and overconfidence. When Winston Churchill became prime minister and especially when the British armies were defeated in France, realism replaced overconfidence, and British morale rose to such a point that the British people could hear of either defeats or victories without much disturbance of their determination. In addition to military, diplomatic, and economic warfare, Germany has attempted to undermine British morale via radio propaganda but has been less successful here than in military warfare. There are signs of change in England which indicate the possibility that the British will emerge from this war with a greater understanding of democracy, for it is the experience of World War II that no class has a monopoly on courage or bravery or love for England. ✓

I

The present war is being fought on a scale the world has never before known: total war is the embodiment of a new principle which involves entire populations and the utilization of all the resources and techniques of modern society. The chief distinction between the present and previous wars is the terrific physical and psychological threat to civilians everywhere, regardless of age, sex, or class. In this new type of warfare, morale is playing a greater role than in any previous conflict; it explains, in great measure, the resistance of England to the numerically superior forces of the Axis.

II

Morale has been defined as a state of abundant psychosomatic health marked subjectively by an energetic, decisive resolution to achieve a given goal and objectively by spirited, unyielding, co-operative, or co-ordinated efforts in the direction of that goal; or, lacking proper stimulus, morale is a state of readiness for such determination and such efforts. The tonus of morale is exemplified defensively by resistance to weakening influences from within (fatigue, reluctance, anxiety, irritability, conflict, despair, confusion, frustration) and from without (obstacles, aggression, rumors of disaster).

III

An excellent system of information has been set up in Britain to acquaint the government with public opinion from day to day. The Ministry of Information has several means of studying and assessing the morale of the civilian population. There are, for instance, the reports of the regional information offices which contain information gathered from nearly everyone in any key position: social workers, clergy, trade-union leaders, among others, engaged in the day-to-day tasks of administering the life of a wartime community. The mailbag of the minister of information is another direct source. The reports contained therein are statements of what the people themselves say or think; they are an expression of the people's particular grievances.

The most systematic and scientific method possessed by this Ministry is the organization known as "War-Time Social Survey," which resembles American opinion-polling organizations. This organization, staffed mainly by university teachers, research workers, and graduates, was created by the Ministry for the purpose of studying public opinion and morale and other aspects of the impact of war conditions upon the life of the civilian population.

War-Time Social Survey employs a system of representative sampling, in order to obtain a balanced cross-section picture of the population of each area studied. It has a staff of full-time, trained interviewers. Although this organization is part of the Ministry, it is nevertheless independent in one very important respect: the reports on individual interviews are rendered anonymous by the excision of the name and address of the person interviewed as soon as the fact of interview has been verified. The information obtained by War-Time Social Survey reaches the Ministry in the form of statistical totals, averages, percentages, in which the identity of individual citizens is entirely lost.

The scientific procedures of War-Time Social Survey having been recognized, it was commissioned to undertake inquiries for other departments of the government—inquiries relating to such subjects as the distribution and rationing of food, clothing, and household necessities.

The interviewers, who are predominantly women, have shown remarkable courage under aerial bombardment. It was decided, however, that it was contrary to public policy to call citizens from their shelters for interview during the periods of air-raid warning; consequently, interviewers were invited to employ such periods in making observations and interviews in public shelters, rest centers, and (at their own discretion) in the

streets. A large volume of firsthand information has thereby been obtained concerning the behavior of the civilian population under actual bombardment.

At one period there was considerable opposition in the press, and some in Parliament, to War-Time Social Survey. This opposition was based mainly upon a misapprehension of the methods employed. The debate in the House of Commons on August 1, 1940, showed that War-Time Social Survey was confused in the minds of some members of Parliament with a private organization known as "Mass-Observation" and with private advertising surveys. After the responsible minister had explained the nature of War-Time Social Survey, opposition died down. On the other hand, there had always been support for War-Time Social Survey in liberal quarters, where, for instance, the polling of public opinion by the government was hailed as "the only development in the democratic process which has been brought about by the war."

Before the beginning of the *Blitz* (the common term for aerial bombardment) in September, 1940, War-Time Social Survey attempted to forecast the effect of intense aerial bombardment on civilian morale and did so successfully, as proved by subsequent events. The estimate of an individual's morale was based upon a series of observations and questions, the nature of which varied from time to time according to topical events but which were generally indirect methods of assessing the citizen's state of mind and intentions. Confidence in the people's morale under *Blitz* conditions was based upon such observations as the one, for instance, that courage and determination were found to be even higher in certain areas which had been under long and severe bombardment than in other areas which had been so far immune. The Survey's successful prognosis of *Blitz*-time morale gives confidence in the equally favorable forecast of morale under invasion.

IV

From the beginning of the war until the spring of 1940, public reaction in England was characterized by bewilderment, indifference, boredom, and overconfidence. England, under the enervating tutelage of Chamberlain, had failed to gear industry to defense, and, above all, it had failed to inform the people and urge them to recognize the gravity of the situation. This lack of realism may have been planned for England by the Nazi government, for there is reason to believe that the German government fed British overconfidence with spurious secret information about "unrest in Germany." If this is true, the British people were, in part,

built up for such susceptibility by the muddling appeasement policies of the Chamberlain government. The English have a respect for constituted authority and readily accept leadership of which they approve. But during the last week of the Munich crisis not only the men but those unique and tough old women who inhabit London pubs were saying: "Is it possible that Chamberlain is a traitor?" They almost whispered it, the idea was so new and so horrible. Immediately after the signing of the Munich pact, many of these same people were wildly hailing Chamberlain as the savior of peace. Both reactions were based on unreasoning emotion. This is one of the most appalling aspects of the terrible weeks London lived through.

England's former lethargy, apathy, and lack of realization of its vulnerability at the outbreak of the war must not be laid exclusively at the door of the Ministry of Information; the Ministry itself was new; its members were inexperienced; and there was no knowledge of how its various departments could be co-ordinated.

The primary reason for the nonrecognition of reality (and this is the primary reason for Britain's present plight) is that the Chamberlain government, and the Baldwin government before it, chose to be too trusting. Even after Hitler had begun to pollute the stream of European civilization Britain, through Chamberlain, tried to believe the best about him and refused to accept the worst until the cannon began to speak. Chamberlain proclaimed to a peace-loving people that "peace in our time" was to be achieved by trusting the solemn promise of a man who has become known to the world as a liar!

When in September, 1939, war was declared, Mr. Chamberlain's government was caught short. "We'll muddle through," said the minister responsible for the welfare of the civilian population. The government set about to evacuate young children, the aged, blind, infirm, and the expectant mothers from the large urban centers. It immediately became evident that if the British government had permitted social planning before the outbreak of war, as the Germans had, the evacuation would not have been attended by so many difficulties.

Even for six months after the war had begun, Londoners of all classes refused to believe that the Germans, with the possible exception of Hitler and a few of his more fanatical followers, were more violent or ruthless or unreasonable than the British. In blacked-out London, when submarines were sinking merchant ships without warning every day, Londoners argued that the Germans had been much sinned against by Britain and that official British stories of atrocities must be discounted. They strove to be

fair in judging the enemy. When Winston Churchill became prime minister and especially when the British armies were defeated in France, an entirely new attitude developed. Realism replaced overconfidence, and British morale rose to such a point that they could hear of either defeats or victories without much disturbance of their determination. The responsible authorities began to recognize that no good effect could be achieved by either overstating or understating disasters or victories: English morale was enhanced by an actual recognition of immediate, and very threatening, facts.

Churchill, the voice of England, roused his people against the threat of foreign aggression and summoned democracy to defend itself:

We shall not fail. We shall go on to the end, we shall fight in France, we shall fight on the seas and oceans, we shall fight with growing confidence and growing strength in the air, we shall defend our Island, whatever the cost may be, we shall fight on the beaches, we shall fight on the landing grounds, we shall fight in the fields and in the streets, we shall fight in the hills; we shall never surrender.

Nowhere is the British war viewpoint more clearly and candidly presented than in the addresses of the Prime Minister. A single aim is found in them: "victory at all costs, victory in spite of all terror, victory however long and hard the road may be."

The morale of the British people is indescribably high. Even the millions who, through German bombing, have lost their homes and their pitifully few worldly possessions, show no sign of weakening. Hundreds of thousands of men, women, and children in London alone spend every night in underground public shelters: subway stations, tunnels, cavernous basements. They are packed in these refuges with inadequate sanitary facilities and with enough narrow, three-tiered bunks for only part of them. But they are cheerful and uncomplaining, accepting discomfort as part of the big job to be done—defeating the Nazis. The bombing has stiffened the public morale instead of weakening it. The people go right on about their business now when a daytime raid is on, unless it is abnormally severe. Most of the people have acquired a fatalistic philosophy: The chance is infinitesimally small that any one individual will be hit—so why worry?

British labor as a whole has shown superb courage as well as endurance ever since the intensive air raids began. There have been exceptions, but they may well have been the fault of timid factory leadership which underestimated the workers' capacity to "take it." There has been no haggling, no faltering; the British workingman has accepted longer hours, harder

working conditions, separation from his family, and physical risk as great as that of the soldier. He has done it with the conviction that this is his people's war which demands a people's response if his freedom is to be preserved.

That indiscriminate air attacks cannot speedily shatter the morale of a courageous and determined people has now been proved—in China, in Spain, and in Great Britain. These raids have served to bring the war home to the British civilian as no mere reports from a distant battle front could possibly do. The humble workingman or artisan whose home has been blown to bits can scarcely fail to feel that his own stake in this conflict is a very real one indeed.

Reports indicate that the vast majority of the British people are convinced that Hitler cannot beat Britain. But they do wonder when and how victory will be achieved. For this they look to the guiding genius and inspiration of Churchill. In the face of the affection which the English people feel for Churchill there is, nonetheless, considerable discouragement over the record of his government on the home front. After more than a year of executive powers there is still evidence of complacency, and a great many important problems are not perceptibly nearer to solution. Some of these are the price-wage situation, which is characterized by a drifting financial policy; provision of adequate shelters (and cement); evacuation; fair distribution of shortening supplies; full mobilization of man-power; reallocation of contracts in order to cure the priority muddle; and the transportation problem. It appears that Britain has not yet reached the point where central planning and co-ordination—so well developed in its application to defense—can be made effective in war economics. It is even doubtful whether the real nature of the economic problem is fully understood by the authorities. People are taking this situation very calmly, but there is a tendency to accuse the rich of getting off lightly. The rich, of course, point out that they are being taxed to the bone—but by drawing on their capital they go on living at the same old rate.

The loss of Crete also caused widespread, deep disappointment among the people of Britain. They had accepted previous defeats with a good grace, as the inevitable result of Germany's great numerical superiority in men and machines and of the difficult strategic situation created by the defection of France. Until Crete the chief reaction had been one of pride in what Britain had been able to accomplish with so few tools and against such long odds. But the loss of Crete was a different matter; there was a general feeling that this ought not to have happened. The average Brit-

isher, in addition to acquiring a greatly improved knowledge of geography, has become a keen student of war. He watches every move on the map, and more often than not he forms his own judgment as to what is taking place in any given theater of war. He realized the great strategic importance of Crete, and he knew that there had been five months in which to prepare its defenses.

What happened in Crete may have been due to complacency, or to a variety of other factors. Whatever the answer may be, the maintenance of morale demands that the government make it clear that the lessons which have been learned at such great cost have been fully appreciated in the right quarters and that they will be acted upon. The British feel, however, that certain operations like dive-bombing and parachute invasion, carried out by the Germans in Crete, could not happen in Britain! The sea surrounding Britain has produced a kind of Maginot complex, not by any means confined to the man in the street. This is obviously a dangerous theory, which would be more tenable if plans for the defense of Britain took fully into account the prospects of dive-bombing and anything worse than can be imagined.

General confidence in victory has in no way been diminished, nor is there any less confidence in the abilities of service officers. But the mood after Crete became critical, and it is felt in responsible quarters that the list of "apparent" errors cannot be allowed to grow.

V

In addition to military, diplomatic, and economic warfare, Germany has attempted to undermine British morale via radio propaganda. German propaganda follows three principal methods, which in practice are inextricably interrelated: (a) the quasi-factual, (b) the ideological, and (c) the analytical.

The first method (the quasi-factual) answers the question: "Why is Britain beaten?" By means of a judicious combination of *selected facts* (Germany's strategic gains or the time lag in United States production) with *exaggerated claims* (British shipping losses), the German radio builds up a reasoned case for Britain's inevitable defeat, adding that, apart from the British public, the whole world, Americans included, recognizes this and regards Hitler's New Order as a *fait accompli*.

The second method (ideological) answers the questions: "Why is Britain's democracy not worth saving?" By attributing to "democracy" all the abuses and uncertainties of human society until the word "democratic" becomes virtually synonymous with "bad" (and, conversely, "Na-

tional Socialism" comes to mean "good"), the German radio tries to invalidate the British motive for continuing the war. Besides, it goes on, with Churchill's and Bevin's dictatorial compulsion of labor, the suppression of the *Daily Worker*, etc., British democracy is already dead, anyway.

The third method (analytical), again following the principle that to explain is to explain away, analyzes the reasons why, in spite of the arguments advanced in (a) and (b), the British do continue the war. That British morale is good is admitted as a premise. But why is it good—assuming that suicidal madness can be called good? Analysis of the cases leads invariably to the answer: "Because the public is duped by British propaganda." How and why does British propaganda do this? Comparative analysis of its output—every written or spoken word reaching the public from any British source is treated as "British propaganda"—is made to expose its inherent inconsistency; while analysis of its motives consistently reveals that the incorporeal entity—Jewish international finance, incarnate in Winston Churchill—is the master-mind behind it.

What form is this "British propaganda" said to take, whereby Churchill criminally keeps the public in a roseate dream-world out of all relation with the hard facts? Through three main forms: (1) "war aims" in the guise of hypocritical premises of a post-war socialist paradise; (2) simple lies about current events, particularly shipping losses; and (3) poisonous appeals to fear and hatred.

The campaign against British "war aims" (1) has passed its peak and is being largely supplanted by theme (3), while theme (2) remains constant—a transfer of emphasis which accords with the cardinal rule that German propaganda must be so adjusted as to countercurrent British propaganda, if possible by intelligent anticipation.

In exposing British "official lies" (2), much is done by the simple method of repetition, but it is not enough merely to assert in general that British communiqués and ministerial speeches are untrue or to contradict particular statements. It must further be shown that the actual situation today confirms past German claims and warnings and, conversely, refutes past British claims. Above all, whenever the opportunity arises of treating an "official" British statement as an admission that the government does belatedly disclose the truth of a previous German claim, this is eagerly seized on and extended by analogy to cover every governmental statement of any kind. Thus, the statement by Churchill, when he was first lord, that the Admiralty could not give reports of shipping losses which might be useful to the enemy, has been constantly exploited. So, too, was

Air Marshal Joubert's broadcast "admission" that R.A.F. pilots' reports were based on guesswork:

The British propaganda machine is cracking up. What are sensible English men and women to think of statements of the Air Ministry experts that the official communiqués on the results of German air raids are not to be taken too seriously because they are prepared in a hurry, because they are intended to mislead the enemy, and because they are phrased in relative terms?

If this is true of air raids on Britain, where listeners can check the truth for themselves, how much more, the Germans argue, must it apply to other fields, such as British raids on Germany and, especially, to admissions of shipping losses by the Admiralty. Here the listener is told that his criterion should be not Admiralty lies but the official admissions of food shortage and the evidence of his own empty stomach.

There seem to be two motivations for the intensification of the theme "British propaganda appeals to fear and hate." One is to return with interest British allegations about German propaganda, just as every British accusation against Germany is always hurled back in kind:

A prime instance of perversion occurred the other day. In one of your broadcasts, we have been referring to the dominant role that the creation of fear plays in British propaganda for home consumption. Immediately some obscure disciple of Ananias [a reference to the B.B.C. "Listening Post"] tried to contort this perfectly fair statement into meaning that Nazi propaganda used fear as its main weapon. The answer is that we have never assumed the British people to be cowards, but that with excellent reason, we have often warned them against the results of their Government's policy. Our warnings . . . were not intended to make the British people quake. They were intended to avoid the misery and suffering which must inevitably come if they were disregarded. . . . Whether this be an appeal to fear or to commonsense is a purely academic question.

German broadcasts to Britain do, in fact, appeal to fear, threatening listeners with a vague but fearful fate. Only a few of the stations go into anatomical details. Such threats almost invariably conclude by directing the listener's animosity from Hitler, who has repeatedly offered peace, against Churchill, who is alleged to be responsible for the deepening tragedy.

A second motivation for the emphasis on this aspect of "British propaganda" is the fact that it forms a convenient pattern for the German counterattacks on a British theme of which Germany is evidently afraid; for it is a first principle of the German Propaganda Ministry to react in some way or other to almost every word uttered in the B.B.C. home service. In some cases the integrity of the specific British speaker is attacked; in

others the German radio prefers to launch what is, in fact, a general propaganda counterattack as if it were a German appeal not specifically related to any British initiative.

British propaganda must never in any circumstances be allowed a free run in any field—least of all, where it is felt to be strongest. Thus, a mid-day rebroadcast of an Englishman's talk on "What Have I To Lose," addressed to workingmen, is followed up on the same evening and on subsequent days by talks accusing "British Ministers, B.B.C. announcers, leaders of the Church, Press owners, and leaders of the Trade Unions of systematically appealing to the lowest instincts of hatred and fear in continuation of the obscene pre-war stimulation of a 'war psychosis' by the international warmongers, who are now at work in the U.S.A."

VI

The fact that Englishmen are discussing "What Have I To Lose?" and "What Have I To Gain?" over the B.B.C. and in the press is an indication that this war must inevitably bring major social changes. It compels adjustments so immense in the national economy and habits of the people that it correspondingly compels profound adaptations in their thoughts. Britain has already experienced a social revolution greater than any in the last hundred years. The war has already marked the breakdown of the shallow optimism of the whole pre-war generation. After the war is over, these tendencies and tensions cannot fail to become even more marked, and some of them, e.g., the effect of war on the structure of the family, may have a permanent major effect on British social life. It is a significant index of British morale that Coventry, which has suffered almost total destruction in its older, central area, is the first British city to draw up plans for rebuilding. Its architect had the audacity to sweep away all memories of the past and with them the hampering claims of the former owners. A new Coventry is being conceived now, which is to be zoned and planned so that out of the old life a newer and more spacious kind of living can come. Thus, already, men with courage that never dies, work to wrest from misfortune itself the design of good to come.

WASHINGTON, D.C.

A NOTE ON GOVERNMENTAL RESEARCH ON ATTITUDES AND MORALE¹

EDWARD A. SHILS

ABSTRACT

The government of the United States is now conducting investigations into attitudes on a large scale. These investigations include studies of special publics, analyses of press contents, radio-listening studies, and studies of foreign broadcasts. The British government is also carrying on somewhat similar studies on a more limited scale.

Any government which seeks to be effective must have some way of discovering the preferences of the population whose behavior it seeks to influence. For a democratic government which regards preferences not merely as objects to be manipulated but as a source of guidance in the establishment of the main lines of policy and administration it is especially urgent to possess means of acquiring knowledge of the state of mind of its citizens.

The federal government is today conducting investigations into attitudes on a larger scale than ever before in its own history and probably in that of other governments as well. The procedures vary from impressionistic observation to systematic analysis executed in accordance with the requirements of quantitative social psychology and sociology. The present report presents in summary form some of the problems and procedures which are representative of the "intelligence" activities of the federal government. The intelligence work of such quasi-police agencies as the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Office of Naval Intelligence, and G-2 of the United States Army are not treated, and the work of certain important agencies has either been omitted entirely or described only in part or very generally, at the request of the agencies in question.

I. ANALYSIS OF SPECIAL AND GENERAL CIVILIAN PUBLICS

The Office of Civilian Defense, which is the major agency of the federal government charged with the maintenance of civilian morale, is not at present conducting any direct and systematic investigation of morale in particular or of attitudes in general. It has utilized the results of the

¹ A useful summary of published literature on morale is contained in Irvin L. Child, "Morale: A Bibliographical Survey," *Psychological Bulletin*, XXXVI, No. 6 (June, 1941), 393-420.

American Institute of Public Opinion polls and of the current investigation into the influence of the present war on American public opinion now being carried on by the Princeton Institute of Opinion Research under the direction of Professor Hadley Cantril. It also draws on the Office of Government Reports Press Intelligence Service for information about public and press attitudes and on the reports of its regional officials.

The Office of the Coordinator of Information which was formed for the purpose of collecting and summarizing the vast quantities of information available in the United States relevant to national defense policies (under Colonel William Donovan) is at present not conducting any firsthand investigation into the state of opinion and morale in the United States or abroad. Shortly after the organization of this agency Elmo Roper was attached to the office in an advisory capacity to deal with questions of civilian attitudes. It is believed, however, that whatever work of this kind is undertaken will be the responsibility of the Office of Civilian Defense. As regards the synthesis of existing information on morale and cognate problems, the Office of the Coordinator has considerable plans. A special section has been set up for the Coordination of Psychological Information, and it is planned that this section should bring together all the material already gathered by private and public bodies which will throw light on the morale in this country and in all foreign countries whose morale impinges on American national defense prospects. In addition to this section there is a research division staffed by historians, political scientists, and geographers and headed by Professor William L. Langer. In the course of its work on historical and political questions this division will gather data indicative of civilian morale in foreign countries.

The Office of Government Reports serves as a channel for the two-way communication between the government and the governed. It supplies information, upon request, to persons who are outside the government and who are desirous of learning about the operation of particular government agencies. It also maintains a continuous service for reporting to the president and to the appropriate agencies the state of public opinion regarding a large variety of topics. The state directors of the Office of Government Reports prepare two kinds of reports. One, the regular fortnightly report, includes, among much other information, data on attitudes toward the national defense program, prices, rents, subcontracting, selective service, labor, strikes, defense production, agricultural programs, foreign policy, etc. The other form of state directors report is the special report which is made at the request of a particular government agency interested in learning of the response to its activities or in anticipating

the future response to some measure it wishes to introduce. Special reports may also be made on the initiative of the state director.

The state directors of the Office of Government Reports do not use systematic polling techniques in establishing the distribution of opinions on either the regular list of items or on any other item which a governmental agency or the state director himself regards as significant. The procedure used might be designated as "experienced impressionism"; the interviewees are usually officials of civic, economic, and political associations, lower local and federal government officials who are in firsthand contact with the rank and file of the population, journalists, educators, and other community leaders who may be expected to be well informed on the opinions of particular segments of the population. The state directors are usually chosen from among persons who have many connections and who possess a wide background of experience in the area for which they are responsible.

The United States Army Bureau of Public Relations Research and Analysis Section is concerned with the public response to national defense activities and to the Army in particular. At present, however, almost no direct analysis of public attitudes is being done by this agency. Like other government agencies, it uses the results of polls and radio-listening surveys, which were originally made for other purposes.

Analysis of consumer responses to national defense activities and to their repercussions in the field of consumption is carried on by the section on Consumer Problems among Ethnic Minorities of the Civilian Supply Administration under the direction of Dr. Caroline F. Ware. To date, the investigations have been limited to the analysis of complaint letters. The letters are distributed by regions and are further broken down by the object of the complaint. Frequencies of complaints through time are charted. A staff of twenty-five persons is shortly to be sent into the field to establish firsthand contact with local associations and with local and state defense councils. Through these channels, information about public attitudes toward price changes, national defense, price control, etc., will be obtained. The Rent Section of the Price Division of the Civilian Supply Administration, under Karl Borders, is analyzing responses to rental situations. The local Fair Rent Committees which are projected by this section will obtain more detailed data on this problem.

The investigations undertaken in the Department of Agriculture are on a somewhat more advanced level of social science analysis. Research on morale and other attitudes is carried on in the Department by the Bureau of Agricultural Economics: Division of Surveys and Planning and

by the Division of Farm Population and Rural Welfare. In the former, under the direction of Dr. Rensis Likkert, a field staff, of between thirty and forty, interview a representative sample of farmers on their attitudes toward various aspects of the Department of Agriculture's policies, general economic problems affecting agriculture, and on important problems which are of local incidence only. Great care is taken in the construction of the schedule of questions which guides the interviewer, in the selection of the sample, and in the analysis of the data gathered in the interview. The interviewers follow from memory a carefully elaborated schedule although the farmers are left free to answer as they please, the interview taking an "open-ended" form. After leaving the interview, the interviewer scores the answers on a five- (sometimes, three-) point scale and a verbal account of the interview is written as well. Sometimes two investigators will attend one interview and then score the answers independently to check on the reliability of the scoring procedure. At the central office the written account is scored and the results compared with the schematic score. The written report is also analyzed for types of arguments or thought-sequences and the frequency of these is tabulated. Cross-tabulations are made between the attitude data and such objective data as size of farm, type of farm (i.e., major crop, area, etc.), economic level, and participation in A.A.A. programs. In the Division of Farm Population and Rural Welfare investigations which combine the techniques of the traditional community study with those of cultural anthropology and sociometry have been carried out on a number of resettlement communities. Particular attention was paid to factors associated with different types of adjustment to the new situations. More recently the Division has begun a series of agricultural morale studies using morale scales of the kind developed by Rundquist and Sletto.

The Defense Savings Bond Section of the United States Treasury Department also conducts investigations into public response, both direct and indirect. The indirect investigations are of the following character: correlations between radio listening to defense bond publicity programs (entertainments and one-minute announcements) and bond sales for specific regions and time periods. The direct investigations, though less systematic and less quantitative, are more comprehensive. In more than 150,000 American communities the Defense Bond Section has almost 500,000 outlets for the sale of defense bonds and stamps. These outlets report to the chairmen of local and state boards who in turn report to eight regional chairmen the progress of bond sales and public reactions to the bonds and to other aspects of national defense. This system of re-

porting is supplemented by the information gathered by a field staff of almost two hundred and fifty persons. In addition the Defense Savings Bond Section draws on the American Institute of Public Opinion's surveys of public attitudes toward taxes, especially toward income taxes, toward defense bonds, toward tax reform, toward increased tax burdens, etc.

The Special Defense Unit of the Department of Justice which is concerned with the detection and disclosure of various brands of antidemocratic activities and attitudes conducts studies of morale and other attitudes over the country by means of (a) analyses of indices of tension such as frequency of civil liberties violations by private and public groups, defense migration concentration, housing and employment conditions, frequency of certain kinds of violence, frequency of antidemocratic publications and organizational activities, etc., and (b) by the analyses of antidemocratic organizations, individuals, and publications. The procedures used in these studies are quantitative wherever possible and include the most recently developed categories and methods of organization and ideology analysis.

II. ANALYSIS OF PRESS CONTENTS

One of the major sections of the Office of Government Reports is its Press Intelligence Service. This section prepares daily a classified and annotated bibliography of all items—editorial and news—which bear on governmental activities. This involves the reading and clipping of about four hundred metropolitan daily newspapers and about fifty nonmetropolitan papers. A copy of this bibliography is sent every day to each government department, bureau, division, and section, and to all legislative and judicial officers. The recipients then indicate to the Office of Government Reports which particular items they are interested in examining at first hand, whereupon the clippings are sent to the office or individual making the request. If the recipient desires to keep copies of the clipping in his own files, the Office of Government Reports then prepares photostatic copies for the office or individual in question. Whenever an agency desires the inclusion into the bibliography of items not already included, this is done. In addition to this, the Office of Government Reports Press Intelligence Service prepares a *Magazine Abstract*, a regularly appearing digest of periodical articles on public affairs. This too is circulated only to government officials.

The Office of Government Reports service constitutes the basis of further analyses of press opinion carried on by a number of agencies. Of these we shall mention only two. The Treasury makes a weekly analysis of all items related to general fiscal policy and defense savings bonds

based on clippings supplied by the Office of Government Reports and its newspaper collection (one total coverage exceeds five hundred newspapers). The clippings are analyzed with reference to trends through time and in respect to regional differences. The mode of analyses is impressionistic rather than quantitative.

The Bureau of Public Relations Research and Analysis Section of the United States Army carries on extensive and systematic analysis of press reactions to a large number of items related to national defense such as "Secretary of War," "Training of Troops," "Morale of Troops," "Selective Service," "Civilian Morale," "Ordinance," "Aid to Allies," etc. The data for the analyses are based on clippings supplied by the Office of Government Reports from more than four hundred daily English-language newspapers, which make up about 75 per cent of the total national newspaper circulation, on digests of relevant items from six hundred foreign-language papers received by the Propaganda Analysis and Press Intelligence Section of the Department of Justice, and on clippings from one hundred and five small-town newspapers circulating or published in areas of troop concentration. The Research and Analysis Section conducts both special research and continuous study projects. The former are made at the request of officials of the Army or War departments. The items in each subject-matter class (editorials and news articles are treated separately) are classified on a five-point scale of favorability-unfavorability, and the frequency of major typical ideas or sequences of ideas is counted. (The criteria of favorability-unfavorability have been checked for reliability.) The continuous-study projects, operating on the items supplied from the sources already mentioned and using a large number of subject-matter categories, break the material down daily, by regions. (The regions are determined according to areas of newspaper circulation.) News items, columns, editorials, photos and photo-captions, and cartoons are analyzed separately and scored on the five-point scale of favorability-unfavorability.

Systematic press analysis is also conducted by the Propaganda Analysis and Press Intelligence Section of the Special Defense Unit (Department of Justice) and the War Communications Research Project of the Library of Congress. The former codes items appearing in the foreign-language press of the United States and in a number of representative English-language dailies according to a scheme devised by Professor Harold D. Lasswell. The selection of the items to be coded is guided by whether they contain references to the United States, Russia, Germany, Great Britain, the president, the cabinet, various social and economic systems, etc. Tables and charts of the results of this analysis are prepared. The

War Communications Research Project under the direction of Professor Lasswell uses the same coding system on representative newspapers of all major countries of the world. In addition to this form of analysis special case studies of reactions to specific crisis events in a number of foreign states are made.

III. RADIO

The most important analysis of the content of radio programs is that performed by the Monitoring Service of the Federal Communications Commission. All broadcasts originating in foreign countries and in parts of the Western Hemisphere outside the United States are transcribed and translated into English, summarized with reference to their informational content, their attitude toward America, their indication of lines of governmental policy in the country of origin, etc. Brief reports are sent on the following day to all important government officials concerned with such matters. Special studies of themes, propaganda techniques, and changes in procedure are also being made as well as continuous quantitative analysis for the ascertainment of trends. (The latter study is just now getting under way.)

The Radio Intelligence Section of the Bureau of Public Relations (War Department) records, transcribes, and digests all network and local radio broadcasts of news commentators, speakers, public discussion groups, etc., dealing with the Army and national defense. It also observes and reports on foreign-language broadcasts originating in the United States bearing on its interests.

IV. THE ARMED FORCES

As yet little systematic research seems to be under way in the assessment of attitudes in the armed forces. In the Selective Service System considerable use of psychologists is made for the provision of aptitude tests to aid in the proper allocation of personnel. No systematic personality diagnosis is made unless at the time of the medical examination the potential selectee is deemed by the examining physician to require a psychiatric examination.² At present, an interest inventory is being con-

² The role of psychiatrists in the Selective Service System and in the Navy is described in *Psychiatry: Journal of the Biology and Pathology of Interpersonal Relations*, Vol. IV, No. 2 (May, 1941) in the following articles: Harry Stack Sullivan, "Psychiatry and the National Defense," pp. 201-17; Dallas G. Sutton, "Naval Psychiatric Accomplishments in the Present Emergency," pp. 219-23; Patrick S. Madigan, "Military Psychiatry," pp. 225-29; Dexter Means Bullard, "Selective Service Psychiatry," pp. 231-39; Lauren Howe Smith, "Selective Service Psychiatry," pp. 241-49; Selective Service System, "A Seminar on Practical Psychiatric Diagnoses," pp. 256-83.

structed for use in classification, and experiments are being made with the use of an objectified word association test which may be introduced as a means of personality diagnosis.

The Morale Branch of the Army has within it a Planning and Research Division. The Research Section of this division conducts historical research and seeks to detect potential morale problems by charting for individual camps the trends in the frequency of sick rates, venereal diseases, courts martial, arrests, leaves without absence, and similar series. Of perhaps greater significance for the discovery of the morale of the soldiers are the regular reports of the morale officers of whom there are now more than five hundred. Each post now has at least one morale officer and several full or part-time aides. The morale officers use impressionistic methods buttressed by long experience with military morale problems. In assessing the state of morale, they use as indices the frequency of listlessness, lack of initiative, fighting between soldiers, sickness rates, absences without leave, complaints, prisoners in guardhouse, lack of comradeship, general military inefficiency, petty thievery, insubordination, gambling cliques, night prowling, and similar signs of dissatisfaction.

V. GOVERNMENT RESEARCH IN BRITAIN

For purposes of comparison with another democratic state, a brief description of the work of the War-Time Social Survey of the British Ministry of Information may be of interest, especially in view of the fact that the empirical social sciences are on the whole less developed in England than in the United States and because, hitherto, the British government has been somewhat less sympathetic to social science research than has been the case on this side of the ocean.

When the war broke out in September, 1939, the Ministry of Information requested the British Institute of Public Opinion to make a monthly survey of attitudes toward the war. A short time after the commencement of this service, the Ministry of Information was reorganized and the regular survey for the Ministry of the British Institute of Public Opinion was discontinued. The British Institute of Public Opinion was asked to inform the Ministry of any interesting results which might turn up and on several occasions the Institute has been given special commissions, e.g., on the number of persons wearing gas masks. Mass-Observation was also called upon twice to make surveys for the Ministry. At the same time the Ministry set up a reporting service which drew on the observations of policemen, teachers, social workers, city officials, and volunteer informants.

In April, 1940, the Ministry of Information established the War-Time Social Survey under the direction of several teachers of business administration and market research at the London School of Economics. The field staff which now totals about eighty was originally composed of market-research interviewers. Later when changes were made in interviewing techniques, social workers came to have a more prominent role in the interviewing staff. Teams of social workers and of market-research interviewers work independently on the same problems as a means of checking each other. When the survey first began, the questions were highly formalized and the answers were categorized in advance in a schematic way; with further experience, the questions were stated in a way which allowed for more freedom in response. Once gathered, the free answers are classified and analyzed quantitatively.

Interviewees are chosen from the polling lists and considerable caution is exercised to insure the representativeness of the sample for the areas under investigation. Because the rural areas are somewhat disregarded, the War-Time Social Survey does not claim that its results are valid for the entire population but only for the groups explicitly designated. No attempt is made to construct a panel of interviewees for the determination of trends. Trends in opinion as indicated by differences in response to the same question asked over a period of time is, however, a major concern of the Survey. The results of the interviews of the Survey are cross-tabulated with age, sex, occupation, social class, and income class.

In addition to the work of the Ministry of Information in the discovery of attitudes, the British Broadcasting Corporation Audience Research Department conducts a daily survey of radio audience attitudes and listening behavior. The sample varies in size from four hundred to eight hundred and is asserted to be representative of the entire population. Listeners are interrogated with regard to their attitudes toward specific programs, the extent to which they listen to the same program series, the extent to which they listen to foreign broadcasts, etc. (The services of the personnel of the British Institute of Public Opinion are used in this survey.) All information gathered is made available to the Ministry of Information. The British Broadcasting Corporation also conducts a foreign broadcast monitoring service which records, transcribes, and digests foreign broadcasts much as the Federal Communications Commission Monitoring Service does in the United States.

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

In the interest of encouraging presentation of divergent views, the editor invites comments on the articles and the book reviews appearing in the *Journal*.

OGBURN AND NIMKOFF

In my opinion your reviewer is too "rough" on the Ogburn and Nimkoff textbook.¹ I am not acquainted with either of the authors, nor have I ever used the book in a course; but the review stirred me to re-read the book more carefully (which is perhaps an acknowledgment that the review fulfilled its proper function). I cannot find substantiation for some of the criticisms aimed at the treatment (maybe this indicates that each reader brings to printed pages some of his own "meanings"). For example, the reviewer writes that the content of Parts I, II, III "is biased in that the greater part of the emphasis is placed upon the influence of geographical environment upon culture, and upon the conditioning functions of culture, heredity, and the group upon personality development and disorganization." Perhaps I don't get the full meaning; but I cannot find evidence for the first half of the charge (that the greater part of the emphasis is placed upon the influence of geographical environment upon culture), and I interpret the second half of the charge to contradict the first—i.e., I cannot see how the content is biased both by emphasis on geographic environment and at the same time by emphasis on nongeographic factors.

Some of the other criticisms seem to constitute an unnecessarily minute catalogue of disagreements, many of which would apply not merely to the book under review, but to dozens of other standard textbooks. For example, the use of the phrase "social institutions" comes in for a spanking ("as if institutions could be other than 'social'"); but many reputable textbooks are "guilty" of the same usage.²

The issue seems to center around the purposes of such a textbook. Whether an introductory textbook should be a "systematic" treatise (and seemingly there is still much honest disagreement among sociologists over various systems of "principles") or whether it should be as broad as the book under review is a question on which experts may disagree; certainly, both approaches would seem to have shortcomings for introductory courses. But I should judge that such

¹ This *Journal*, XLVII (July, 1941), 115-19.

² Dawson and Gettys, *The Main Characteristics of Social Institutions*, p. 80, and others.

a broad, general book would serve a useful function in many colleges where the sophomore introductory course is not mainly an *introduction* to theoretical analysis of society for future majors but for the majority of the students is their first and last contact with sociology. The question comes down to the place in "general education" of an elementary sociology course (and I do not mean a Freshman "social science orientation").

Lest I seem to "take a generally adverse attitude toward this ambitious and honest" review, I hasten to add that I am in agreement on many points! For example, I heartily concur with the reviewer that the pictures of dogs and men, side by side, to illustrate glandular influences (Pl. II, facing p. 206) comes "very close to leaving erroneous impressions."

SAMUEL CLAYTON NEWMAN

University of Louisville

NEWS AND NOTES

RESEARCH NEWS

The Committee for National Morale.—The second edition of *German Psychological Warfare*, prepared by L. Farago, G. W. Allport, E. G. Boring, F. L. Ruch, K. Young, *et al.*, has just been printed. Certain changes in the text have been made, and a valuable Glossary has been added. The book is obtainable through the Committee at 51 East Forty-second Street, New York City, at \$2.50 per copy.

The Committee is a nonprofit organization devoted to research bearing on both military and civilian morale. Among other projects now under way are those on German military strategy, on Russian military psychology, on religious factors in morale, and on the techniques of fifth columnists.

University of Denver.—A National Opinion Research Center has been established at the University of Denver. The Center is sponsored jointly by the university and the (Marshall) Field Foundation, Inc., of New York. The purposes of the new Center are to establish the first nonprofit, non-commercial organization to measure public opinion in the United States. The Center will make available to the university a graduate department devoted to the new science of public opinion measurement.

Harry H. Field, who has been associated with Dr. George Gallup for six years, will have active charge of the Center. Among the directors of the Center are Hadley Cantril, director of the Office of Public Opinion Research and professor of psychology at Princeton; Gordon W. Allport, associate professor of psychology at Harvard; and Samuel A. Stouffer, of the University of Chicago.

Office of Defense Health and Welfare Services.—The Office of Defense Health and Welfare Services was established by executive order of the President on September 3, 1941. Among the other duties of this office are the studying and planning of measures designed to assure adequate health and welfare to the citizens of the nation and the co-ordination of studies and surveys made by federal departments and agencies with respect to these fields.

NOTES

American Council on Public Affairs.—The American Council on Public Affairs has appointed a number of new advisory boards in connection with its enlarged publication program. The members of the advisory board on sociology are: William F. Ogburn, R. M. MacIver, Read Bain, Mark May, Harold A. Phelps, E. A. Ross, Dean Charles W. Pipkin, Bruce Melvin, Willard Waller, Abraham Epstein, and Paul Kellogg.

American Orthopsychiatric Association.—The nineteenth annual meeting of the American Orthopsychiatric Association, an organization for the study and treatment of behavior and its disorders, will be held at the Hotel Statler, Detroit, Michigan, on February 19-21, 1942. Copies of the preliminary program will be sent upon request. A registration fee will be charged for nonmembers.

American Public Welfare Association.—The Sixth Annual Round Table Conference of the American Public Welfare Association will be held in Washington, December 12-14. The headquarters of the association will be at the Mayflower Hotel.

American Sociological Society.—The American Sociological Society will hold its thirty-sixth annual meeting in New York City, December 27-29. The headquarters of the society will be at the Roosevelt Hotel.

John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation.—Among the 1941 awards of the Foundation which are of special interest to sociologists are those to Dr. Edward Prince Hutchinson, demographer of the Library of Congress, for research into the socioeconomic significance of population; and to Mr. Gustavus Myers, historian, New York City, for the preparation of a book on the sources of bigotry in the United States.

Southern Conference on Tomorrow's Children.—The Southern Conference on Tomorrow's Children was held at Nashville, Tennessee, October 30, 31, and November 1. Among the papers given was one on "Fertility Trends" by Pascal K. Whelpton, Scripps Foundation for Research in Population Problems.

Virginia State Planning Board.—John Clausen has accepted an appointment as research associate and will be engaged on the Board's population study.

University of Alabama.—Harold L. Geisert has been granted a leave of absence and is now in Washington.

Robert H. Talbert, formerly at Hollins College in Virginia, has been appointed instructor in sociology.

Howard H. Harlan, who was on leave of absence last year, has returned to the department of sociology.

Asheville College.—Joseph H. Bunzel has been appointed to give work in sociology and to co-ordinate studies with reference to the needs of the community.

Beloit College.—Lloyd V. Ballard has been granted a year's leave of absence, during which time he will serve as assistant director of the Division of Child Welfare, Wisconsin State Department of Public Welfare.

Birmingham-Southern College.—A. B. Briggs has accepted an appointment as head of the department of sociology.

Denison University.—Professor Frederick G. Detweiler will be on leave of absence during the fall semester, during which time his place will be filled by Mr. Carl A. Nissen.

Harvard University.—Carle C. Zimmerman is on leave from Harvard to serve as captain in the Infantry, United States Army. He is now motor transportation officer for the harbor defenses of Portland. He is stationed at Fort Williams, Maine.

Hobart College.—Dr. Leo Srole, assistant professor of sociology and anthropology, has been appointed acting chairman of the department of economics and sociology. He replaces Professor James Mickle Williams, who retired last year. The staff of the department include Mr. Carl Beck Taylor, Dr. Brooks Otis, and Mr. Stewart M. Jamieson.

Indiana University.—Dr. Werner S. Landecker, formerly of the University of Michigan, has been appointed instructor in sociology at Indiana University.

Dr. A. B. Hollingshead is now on a leave of absence.

Laval University (Quebec).—M. Jean-Charles Falardeau, who recently received his licentiate in philosophy and social science at Laval Univer-

sity, Quebec, has been granted a Fellowship of the Royal Society of Canada to study sociology and anthropology at the University of Chicago.

Louisiana State University.—Carl M. Rosenquist, of the University of Texas, will serve as visiting professor during the sessions 1941-42.

University of Michigan.—Richard C. Fuller taught during the summer session at Northern State Teachers' College at Marquette.

University of Mississippi.—Dr. Paul B. Foreman, head of the department of sociology, taught both terms of the summer session at the University of Florida.

New appointments in the department of sociology included Mr. S. Earl Grigsby, formerly of Cornell University, and Mr. Gilbert Avery Sanford, formerly of the University of Michigan. Both Mr. Grigsby and Mr. Sanford have the rank of assistant professor.

The staff of the department of sociology is co-operating with the Bureau of Vital Statistics of the State Board of Health in preparing a decennial audit of Mississippi vital statistics.

Mississippi State College.—Robert N. Ford has been appointed assistant professor of sociology.

University of Nebraska.—Ivan L. Little, formerly a graduate student of the University of Nebraska, and Daniel Glaser, formerly a student of the University of Chicago, have been appointed teaching assistants in the department of sociology.

New York University.—Frederic M. Thrasher has been elected a member of the Board of Directors of the Society for the Prevention of Crime in New York City.

University of Pennsylvania.—James H. S. Bossard has been elected chairman of the social science division in the graduate school.

Pennsylvania State College.—Dr. Seth W. Russell is now lieutenant in the Chaplains Corps of the United States Naval Reserve. At present he is stationed in Norfolk, Virginia.

Mr. Richard G. Davis, formerly a graduate student at Harvard University, has taken Dr. Russell's place as instructor in sociology.

Mr. Edward Abramson has been appointed a graduate assistant in charge of a half-time course load in sociology.

Sweet Briar College.—Dr. Collerohe Krassovsky will teach courses in sociology during the year 1941-42.

University of Texas.—Mr. J. A. Moore, formerly at the Texas College of Mines, has been appointed instructor in sociology.

Dr. Walter Coutu has taken the place of Professor Carl M. Rosenquist, who is on leave of absence.

PERSONAL

Dr. Dinko Tomašić has been appointed the chief aide of the Ban (viceroy and governor) of Croatia in exile. The Ban is the head of a diplomatic mission now in the United States.

BOOK REVIEWS

Kleines Lehrbuch des Positivismus: Einführung in die empiristische Wissenschaftsauffassung. By RICHARD VON MISES. The Hague: W. P. Van Stockum & Zoon; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1939. Pp. 467. \$5.50.

This first volume of the book series of the Library of Unified Science offers a systematic survey of epistemological problems from the standpoint of those contemporary trends of thought which are usually designated as "logical positivism" or "logical empiricism." The author—a distinguished mathematician formerly of the University of Berlin—is, more specifically, allied with the "moderate" wing of the "Vienna Circle," represented by such writers as Moritz Schlick and Philipp Frank, rather than with its "extreme" tendency to which—at least until recently—Rudolph Carnap and Otto Neurath were supposed to belong.

The treatise at hand surpasses in scope such preceding expositions as those of A. J. Ayer and J. R. Weinberg: it deals with logic and mathematics, the natural and the social sciences, metaphysics and axiology, and art. While the width of the expanse to be covered necessitates much cursoriness in the treatment of intricate problems, the author is very successful in the succinct presentation of the contents and wider relevance of many nuclear issues. One may especially refer to his lucid treatment of the discussion between "formalism" and "intuitionism" in mathematics of causality and probability (on which topic the author is an outstanding authority), and of the syntactic and semantic characteristics of "axiomatization." In dealing with this latter problem the author discovers as well as postulates a tendency toward the application of the Mach-Hilbert procedure in *all* sciences; and in this connection he can point to current reformulations—and current insights into the logical nature of past reformulations—of economic theory along these lines.

The attention of the social scientist is particularly drawn toward Part V of the treatise in which our domain is being discussed. Dr. von Mises concentrates his efforts here on the refutation of certain types of the "dualistic" position which asserts the existence of differences "in principle" between the natural and the social sciences. In the course of this refutation

he surveys a number of the epistemological problems arising in various branches of the social sciences. The value of this survey would have been enhanced if the author had taken into account more amply than he did the research advances of the past decades (cf. pp. 280-85). In contrast to his affirmation, it would seem quite safe to say that recent developments in economic theory have included a rather rapid movement toward a consensus on certain central problems which had stood in the center of the combat area of nineteenth-century economics. One misses, furthermore, the treatment of certain topics of great interest, such as those connected with "quantification" in the social sciences, those arising out of the multiplicity of "observational standpoints" employed, and those concerning the empiricist redefinition of certain key terms with a rather dubious past, e.g., "unconscious" (to which only a brief allusion is made on p. 266).

In the author's discussion of "logical behaviorism" (pp. 263-65) one might desire a more explicit emphasis on the distinction between (1) syntactic analyses of the current language of psychology and (2) proposals for a "reformed" language of this science. (Cf. the author's allusions to this distinction on pp. 158-59). An analysis of the first kind may, as the author maintains, yield the result that some of the current primitive terms of psychology are "introspective." Nevertheless one's postulates (of the second kind) for the language of psychology may include a demand for the elimination of such terms, perhaps in the interest of the maximization of intersubjective agreement in the ascription of psychological predicates to given time-space points. One might also prefer a sharper elaboration of the decisive distinction between (1) "physicalistic" sentences which introduce a given "psychological" term into the language and (2) "physicalistic" sentences which assert something about the conditions under which the referent of this "psychological" term will be found in a given time-space point.

The treatment of history by Dr. von Mises raises a number of significant points. First of all, the author maintains—at least by implication—the existence of some not entirely irrelevant distinctions between "history" and "social science"; but he does not indicate wherein they lie. He rejects—or at least minimizes the validity of—the often advanced thesis that there is a differential in the "generality" of the assertions of history as against social science. In doing so he enunciates the extreme thesis—often held by nonempiricists—that "the text of a historical description, in its major lines as well as in its details . . . is always based on a *theory* of the events involved . . ." (p. 246). Now the author is certainly cor-

rect in pointing out that sometimes "universal propositions" are used in the interpretation of "sources"; and that some "particular propositions" of history even imply "universal propositions" about the events they are referring to. (This is evidently the case for a "particular proposition" of history according to which a given event in a given time-point "caused" some other event.) But these arguments do not seem to suffice for the demonstration of the author's assertion that each historical description is "a *theory* of the event in question" (p. 245). In attempting to adduce additional proofs for this contention the author engages in a number of considerations which seem open to doubt. (1) It is not easily intelligible why the usually high ambiguity of historical sentences should entail—as the author seems to assert (p. 245)—the aforementioned thesis. (2) It may be granted that the acceptance of certain "universal propositions" by a historian may influence his selection of certain subject matters for study and hence the production of certain "particular propositions" about them (cf. pp. 234-35). But it does not seem to follow therefrom that the "particular propositions" finally arrived at logically imply the "universal propositions" with which the researcher started out. (3) One may agree with the author (cf. pp. 234-35) that most of the predicates which the historian ascribes to a certain space-time point are such that they can be truly ascribed to a considerable number of such points (i.e., that history usually deals with events which repeat themselves). But it does not seem to follow therefrom that all or any of these predicates are introduced into the language used by "sentences of generalized form"; nor does it follow that all or any of them occur in sentences of this latter form.² (4) Finally, Dr. von Mises refers to the fact that one indubitable proposition of history is that history has been very frequently "rewritten," "even in the absence of new source materials" (pp. 245-46). But it is difficult to see how this could serve to "prove"—as the author asserts—or for that matter disprove, his central contention concerning the syntactic ineliminability of "theoretical" components from all historical sentences. One wonders whether the author would draw similar conclusions from the past vicissitudes of epistemology which were evidently only in part related to changes in the structure of its subject matter.

Dr. von Mises' opus constitutes a significant addition to the literature of empiricism. Particularly in the social sciences, where anti-empiricist attitudes are so conspicuously represented, expositions of this level of

² Cf. R. Carnap, "Testability and Meaning," *Philosophy of Science* (1936-37), III, 420-71; IV, 1-40.

excellence may in some measure contribute to the eventual confirmation of D'Alembert's prognosis which the author accepts against all contemporary "negativism"—"La raison finira par avoir raison."

N. C. LEITES

University of Chicago

English Villagers of the Thirteenth Century. By GEORGE C. HOMANS.

Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1941. Pp. xiv+478. \$4.50.

This is a book that has been waiting a long time to be written. Its appearance at last is worth a hearty welcome. The study of the village communities of medieval England the author gives us is a little difficult to classify, not because its subject matter is esoteric, but because its appeal should be so wide. Several things, however, can be said of it right off. It is sociology of the best tradition; it will be of as much interest to historians; it is a first-rate ethnological or social-anthropological study of a peasant people, who in this case, as the author amply demonstrates, are the cultural ancestors of a large segment of American life and institutions; it is the most complete statement of the methods and point of view of the modern American followers of Pareto, which gives it considerable theoretical interest; and it is written in an English at once swift, precise, and polished.

The book draws fully from the secondary sources which have plowed the late medieval field so thoroughly, but it also makes a new use of the manorial rolls and other primary records of the feudal period. It is written thus against a thorough background of historical scholarship, even to making apt quotation of the English literature of the day. But it is more than just another description of the feudal system, and more, too, than the painstaking accounts of medieval life that have appeared in recent years, such as those of Coulton or Bennett. It is a full-fledged attempt to trace that life to its roots in the custom and organization of the villages, farms, families, and churches of the age. Medieval English community life in the open-field country, with its manors and large villages, with their division of fields, their commons, their village agricultural officers, their co-operative work patterns, and their regulation of customary rights and duties in the memorial courts, is analyzed as a living form of society and a thriving folk culture.

Homans does not neglect feudal law and ideology. He is well aware of the complications of feudal tenure and services, and he gives us a comprehensive picture of the relations of the various estates. But he makes use

of the records, particularly the manorial "customals," as case materials for the methods of agriculture, the organization of work, the customary practices and relationships of the husbandmen, and the rights and services of the villeins. All these make for an integrated community bound by customary personal ties in which we hear more of the self-regulation of the village community and its connection with its lord and its priest than we do of homage, military service, and monastic tenure. That is as it should be, of course, in an analysis of fundamental institutions; but it is of particular value for lawyers and historians to see and to derive a more precise view of those "inarticulate major premises" of custom and human relationship in social organization that lie behind the legal formulas and the political forms they seek to analyze. In this regard the discrepancy Homans describes between the legal fiction of the powers of the lord and the servile status of the villeins and the actualities of village custom goes far in illuminating other more modern developments of the law.

Of very considerable interest, too, is the connection Homans draws between medieval institutions of the village community of the open-field country and the latter-day town organization of the New England colonists in America. He traces, for example, town officers such as the fence-viewer back into such village officials as the hayward, and finds a direct descent from the medieval co-operative "love-boon" or "bene," communal work carried out, like other customary obligations, sometimes for lord or priest as well as for fellow-villagers, in the Yankee "bee." It is very heartening to find in such work as this a fusion of historical sense with sociological insight and with an appreciation of the folk-culture character of institutions.

The book is thus deserving of interest as well for the theoretical position it takes. Gone are all the academic distinctions separating the disciplines of social science. The book draws from and contributes to sociology—the over-all organization of society, its structures, its classes, and its articulation of institutions. It does as much with anthropology, with all the ethnologist's delight in the minutiae of particular custom and his sense of the whole configuration they make up. It makes a suggestive comparison of the structure of medieval agriculture with the organization of industrial mass-production today. It offers a stimulating, though not entirely new, analysis of the social role of the symbolism of the medieval church and the function of its rituals in maintaining the sentiments of village social organization. In all this, the book insists, as this reviewer has also insisted, that the study of society and of man's behavior in it is as wide as the possibilities of observing human action and hearing uttered

human attitudes. But here the insistence is not a verbal one. Homans does not argue the point; he demonstrates it. Only in the last chapters does he present the conceptual scheme that has enabled him to organize all these "areas" of observation.

Homans' conceptual scheme is that of the Paretists. The reviewer does not happen to share his complete acceptance of that scheme, and the readers of the book need not either. But the book loses nothing thereby. For Homans does not labor his scheme and he uses it properly. In fact, his use of it confirms a lesson that sociology badly needs. Whatever the scheme, as long as it is at once wide enough to embrace all human interaction and all human expression of sentiment (or "attitude" or "value" or what you will), as long as it is precise enough to test against the actual stuff of human custom, then, as in this book, the technical vocabulary the author uses matters not a whit, always provided the English in which he writes is lucid enough to let the reader see the facts to which his terms refer. And, whatever else he may have done, Homans has certainly shown an ample command of that sort of English.

CONRAD M. ARENSBERG

Brooklyn College

The Unemployed Man and His Family: The Effect of Unemployment upon the Status of the Man in Fifty-nine Families. By MIRRA KOMAROVSKY, with an Introduction by PAUL FELIX LAZARSFELD. New York: Dryden Press, Inc., 1940. Pp. xii+163. \$1.75.

This is an important monograph, both substantively and methodologically. The reviewer believes it constitutes a milestone in the development of sound sociological research.

Dr. Komarovsky's study is a project of the International Institute of Social Research and is a continuation of the *Studien über Autoität und Familie* published in 1936 by that institute under the editorship of Dr. Max Horkheimer. The specific problem was to determine the effect of unemployment of the male breadwinner on his authority in the family. The data consist of documents derived from interviews with fifty-nine families on relief in an industrial city near New York. The interviews were obtained under the pretext of an interest in problems of bringing up children during the depression. At least three members of each family were interviewed—the father, the mother, and usually the oldest child.

The most general results of the study are as follows: In only thirteen of the fifty-nine cases was there loss of authority due to unemployment.

There seem to be three patterns here: crystallization of the husband's previously inferior status, breakdown of the husband's more or less coercive control, and weakening of the husband's authority over a loving wife. From the point of view of pre-depression husband-wife relations the results are: where the wife has loved and admired the husband for his own sake, his authority is rarely diminished because of unemployment; where her attitudes toward him were only instrumental before, his authority is diminished by loss of employment in two-thirds of the cases. It is also discovered that personal deterioration in the husband because of unemployment has little effect upon his status when the wife's original attitude was one of love and admiration, but such deterioration always entails loss of authority when the wife's attitude was instrumental.

On the methodological side one of the contributions of this study is the formulation of the process called "discerning." This constitutes a systematic attempt to validate the facts and relations set forth by those interviewed. The interviewer asks for more detail on important points; he cross-checks the statements from one family member with those from another; he seeks for the "experienced interconnection" between any change in family relations and unemployment. The analyst tests the alleged causal connection by examining whether the alleged causal factor has been present at other times without producing the result, or the alleged result has existed without the alleged causal factor. The analyst also attempts to test for psychological consistency. And finally he explores possible alternative explanations and considers whether they have equal logical and psychological standing with the causal connection stated. This careful procedure of "discerning" appears to have been faithfully carried out, and the analysis is greatly strengthened thereby. Though none of the elements of this procedure are new, their combination in a systematic whole is a welcome contribution to sociological method.

A most surprising slip in a study generally so excellent is the failure to square the definition and the use of the term "authority." It is defined (p. 9) as "relative power exercised by one individual over another." But on the very next page it is said: "The deterioration of the man's authority was defined as decline in the willingness of the family to accept his control whether or not he succeeded in maintaining it through added coercion." In other words relative power exercised in terms of coercion is *not* authority. And this is actually the way the term is used throughout the study. All that needs to be changed is the original definition.

But such a minor flaw should not blind us to the great merit of this study. The author has delimited her problem carefully, come at it with

suggestive theory in mind, developed sound techniques of investigation and analysis, and reached important sociological conclusions. It is seldom we can say as much of studies in our field.

ROBERT C. ANGELL

University of Michigan

New Haven Negroes: A Social History. By ROBERT AUSTIN WARNER.
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1940. Pp. xiv+309. \$3.50.

Mr. Warner has given us an excellent study which lives up to its subtitle, "a social history." The picture, although local, is always shown against the background of the changing social, economic, and ideological forces in the national scene. Furthermore, in the choice of illustrative material, the author seems to have succeeded very well in selecting "typical" or "average" items. He has not burdened the account with detail for the sake of detail, nor has he favored the more sensational items.

New Haven Negroes opens with a discussion of "class and caste in New Haven and the economic influences for change" in the late eighteenth century and the early nineteenth century. The following chapter deals with abolitionism as an attack on caste. Abolitionism wrought some changes in the political status of Connecticut Negroes and provoked a war which led to the emancipation of the southern slaves, and yet the popular "attitude toward caste had changed hardly at all." In further historical chapters Warner traces the rise of New Haven Negro society; the time of "jubilee," i.e., emancipation; the background of the newcomers to New Haven society, newcomers from the South and from the West Indies; and the gains and losses of the transitional period, 1865-1900. The last third of the book is devoted to the recent and contemporary scene. "Negro New Haven" shows excellent insight into the structure and activities of present-day Negro society. "The Workaday World" traces the Negro's struggle to earn a living in a situation in which the odds against him are in some respects worse than they were in an earlier generation. Here, as elsewhere in the urban communities of the North, the Negro has suffered from displacement from traditional occupations, from mechanization, from labor union policy, and from competition with the European immigrant. "Only a few Negro New Haveners . . . have saved small estates. Most die penniless." The final chapter, "Twentieth-Century Opinion and Practice," is not so much a summary and evaluation as a continuation of the preceding chapter. The book ends on a note of advice to Negroes: ". . .

They must bestir themselves . . . they must think boldly and walk in the forefront of social movements. And they must join if they would share."

Strange to say, the social history of the Negro in the North has never been adequately treated. More books like *New Haven Negroes* would help to remedy this deficiency. Warner shows a good grasp of his materials and has written this work with relatively few signs of race or class bias. As a historian he has profited by training in sociology and by contact with such able students of Negro life as Hortense Powdermaker and John Dollard.

GUY B. JOHNSON

University of North Carolina

Social and Biological Aspects of Mental Disease. By BENJAMIN MALZBERG. Utica, N.Y.: State Hospitals Press, 1940. Pp. iv+360. \$2.50.

The excellent statistical studies of mental disease by Pollock and Malzberg, of the New York Department of Public Welfare, are well known by scientific workers in this field. This book stands head and shoulders above the other recently published statistical analyses of mental disease, namely, Landis and Page's *Modern Society and Mental Disease* and Dayton's *New Facts on Mental Disorder*, in terms of its careful handling of the statistics and the sober tone of its interpretations. Here Dr. Malzberg brings together some of his statistical studies, based exclusively on New York figures and previously published in various scientific journals, which show the relationship between various types of mental disease and certain individual attributes such as age, marital status, nativity, race, and birth order. In addition, he examines the probability of mental disease for different age and sex groups in the population, in relation to type of environment, the influence of economic factors upon mental health, and the results of the insulin treatment for dementia praecox patients. It is hardly necessary within the short space of this review to indicate all his carefully tabulated findings inasmuch as they have been available for some time in his previously published articles. However, two facts which his study brings out are worthy of note in terms of the practical problems involved in the treatment and care of persons with mental disease. First, mental disease is on the increase principally as a result of the increasing age of the population, which is in turn related to the improvement of physical health. Second, he finds that insulin shock therapy has brought remarkable results in the recovery and improvement of dementia praecox patients. This latter fact, if it can be substantiated by further observation and study,

interjects a hopeful note in the problem, especially as this psychosis represents the major burden in the state care of the mentally diseased. He concludes on an optimistic note by pointing out that it is now possible by preventive work to reduce those psychoses attributed to alcohol and syphilis. He also suggests that a return to a less urbanized existence would make for an improvement in mental health but does not attempt to indicate how this might be brought about.

This book should prove valuable to all interested students of the various problems which the occurrence of mental disease presents. It may serve as a stimulus to those states which are still somewhat backward in record-keeping by showing the value of careful statistical information as a prelude to analyzing, understanding, and treating the many problems associated with mental disease. Dr. Malzberg might have performed a valuable service to social science if he had brought together in a chapter the numerous hypotheses which his statistical analyses suggest. Such hypotheses relative to the potency of social factors, if stated in a fashion in which they could be given certain crucial tests which might prove or disprove them, would have been of tremendous value to students in this field and more valuable than the several vague allusions to the significance of such factors. However, it can be said without any misgivings that Dr. Malzberg has performed a valuable service to the developing field of social psychiatry by bringing his studies together in this compact volume.

H. WARREN DUNHAM

Wayne University

Skeleton of Justice. By EDITH ROPER and CLARA LEISER. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1941. Pp. 346. \$3.00.

According to her story, Edith Roper served as court correspondent for the Nazi Ministry of Justice from 1936 to 1939. Since she was one of the few correspondents who were allowed to enter any courtroom, she was given a deep insight into the mechanism of Nazi administration of criminal justice. In this book she reports on a part of her knowledge.

Roughly speaking, criminal justice in Naziland has become a political weapon which spreads terror and disgrace¹ on the morally defenseless and legally disarmed opponents of the regime. Evidence of this misuse are the

¹ The sex trials against Catholic priests were suddenly stopped when thousands of readers canceled their subscriptions of Nazi papers because they could not bear any more to read all the disgusting details. Ordinarily the Nazi courts exclude public and press at the least hint of sex matters and sex perversions.

religious, the Jewish, and the Communist show trials. Criminal justice has further ceased to be a safeguard afforded to the conquered and subdued non-Nazi masses. It has finally become a system which protects the criminal party-member as long as the faith to his party leader is unchallenged. Indeed, when a scandal cannot be hushed up any more, the incredible indulgence is reversed into an equally incredible, brutal, and undiscerning "purge." This state of anarchy which maintains at the same time a propaganda-built front of stern orderliness is elucidated by the fact that the Nazi mayor of Berlin contended in an official announcement that 36,000 people had disappeared from Berlin in one single year. A police inspector told Mrs. Roper that these 36,000 people consisted mostly of murdered persons, some suicides, and some murderers in hiding.²

The book's most suggestive chapters discuss the fact that the private morals and the personal conduct of the individual reflect the incessant pressure of a certain political philosophy. We hesitate to call it a "philosophy," since it is more of an emotional disorder which is undergoing excusing rationalizations. The Nazis' doctrine, their internal practice and international method of procedure glorify two things: success as the ultimate moral standard, and violence, ruthlessness, as the supreme and perfect method of attaining this success. Nobody will wonder that a state which praises and practices terrorism as the one great motive force breeds terrorists in its midst; and the part of the book which deals with the rapid growth of juvenile murderers in the Nazi state deserves the most attentive study of the sociologist. A "stiff," "flown" by a youthful murderer to his brother, says: "I intend to go down with colors flying . . . audacity will conquer—the world belongs to the courageous. . . . I would prefer a horrible end to a horror without end" (pp. 298–300).

It is a desperate youth, fundamentally nihilistic, without hope, destructive and autodestructive, which the Nazi state of the last eight years has succeeded in raising. Their slogan is "live dangerously," and they are determined to make life dangerous to their fellow-citizens too. I am inclined to think that the splendid military performance of the German youth must be explained to a great extent by this profound depression and te-

² These are the exact words of the police officer: "These 36,000 have disappeared without a trace. Had they died a natural death we would know about it. That's what death certificates are for. People who move or are sent to concentration camps are registered by at least three to five authorities. These 36,000 are not registered anywhere; they have simply disappeared. We have to assume that the majority were murdered, the others committed suicide and the rest are murderers themselves, in hiding somewhere" (p. 324).

dium vitae and must be regarded as a sort of self-terrorization of over-terrorized human beings.

According to a German official quoted by Mrs. Roper, there were in 1938 about twenty legal executions a day in Germany. This wave of state-imposed death has stripped the death penalty of all its deterrent force. The emptiness and futility of life in Germany has contributed to deflate the value of life, whether it is the lives of others or their own. It is a social organization in full and progressive decay, and its criminal justice must be regarded as a symptom and propelling force of this society which is falling asunder under the colors of victory and world-salvation.

HANS VON HENTIG

University of Colorado

Revolutions and Dictatorships: Essays in Contemporary History. By HANS KOHN. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1939. Pp. 437. \$3.50.

These essays written before the outbreak of the war are timely. The author saw the dynamics of the Axis partners in proper perspective: he foresaw and forewarned. The last essay, "The Totalitarian Crisis," needs no revision. Dr. Kohn's profound sympathy with the "awakening" of (semi-) colonial peoples and his journalistic experiences make him a good observer. Among other topics the volume considers the Russian Revolution, National Socialism, and the New Near East—Saudi Arabia, Palestine, and Turkey.

The strength of these essays lies in the differentiation of dictatorships according to their social setting and historical function. The rational and progressive dictatorship of Kemal Atatürk and his successor is compared by implication to Napoleon's dictatorship. It is an attempt to secularize and industrialize a "young" nation. The Bolshevik dictatorship is similarly viewed as one phase in the century-old process of Europeanization of Russia. Despite its "deadening dictatorship," Dr. Kohn finds comfort in the solution of the "national question" in the federation of Soviet Republics, the non-nationalist Soviet patriotism of a universalist and rational character.

One possible weakness of the book may result from the pervading *Geistesgeschichte*. Persons and political movements, states, and nations are all explained by a series of "principles" of history: Messianism, Titanism (with Napoleon a positive and Hitler a negative symbol). These are some of the dominating concepts which lend themselves to treatment by understanding.

This philosophy of intellectual continuity between National Socialism, on the one hand, and German Romanticism and Prussianism, e.g., bestows a certain dignity on National Socialism which it may not have. What if National Socialism represents no such thoroughgoing continuity of specific nineteenth-century ideas but is an ever changing patchwork of contradictory ideologies? Why Prussianism and Romanticism, why not Darwinism and Superman and Socialism, why not Holy Roman Empire, Marx, and Wagner all in one? Naziism seems to me rather a problem of *Kitsch*, of tripe, which may exploit and abuse anything *ad hoc*, even Liberalism and Christianity if fitting the Machiavellian propaganda.

HANS H. GERTH

University of Wisconsin

Elements of Rural Sociology. By NEWELL LEROY SIMS. 3d ed. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1940. Pp. xii+690+Index. \$3.75.

A Study of Rural Society: Its Organization and Changes. By J. H. KOLB and EDMUND DE S. BRUNNER. Rev. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1940. Pp. xviii+694+Index. \$3.75.

Young as our discipline may be when compared to the mother of the sciences, general sociology has mothered one lusty offspring, rural sociology. Already it has been suggested we have come in the course of evolution from Galpin and Gillette's first work to the second generation of rural sociologists and the textbooks they make. How lusty the infant is may be indicated by the fact that this is Sims's third revision in twelve years and Kolb and Brunner's second in five years. These revisions give the student an opportunity to check earlier positions against what one assumes are the trends in the field. In their emphasis and approach both volumes stand midway between the earlier work to which reference was made and the new formulation of the field emerging in such texts as those of Landis and T. Lynn Smith.

Both books were firmly based on the rural community and both have retained that value, with Sims emphasizing historical treatment, and Kolb and Brunner devoted as ever to their rural villages. In response to the prevailing emphasis on rural relief, rehabilitation, and disadvantaged classes, Sims has added a chapter on the subject and re-written many sections. In addition to a new chapter on rural youth, Kolb and Brunner have added materials on relief, agricultural programs, and public health and welfare. Sims is well based on sound theory, but both books have the

problem of integration with economic phases of the subject as in the discussion of tenancy.

As matters stand, both volumes have taken toll of the great mass of materials now flowing over the desks of rural sociologists. It seems hopeless, however, to expect a synthesis of all bulletins and special reports in a field so highly subsidized for research, and neither has attempted it. One always regrets to see books republished so close to decennial periods without the new census returns, but census releases never yet waited on publishers' schedules and vice versa.

It may be suggested that the basic formulations in rural sociology now stand in the position held by texts in introductory sociology some years ago. Can the writers now formulate conceptions of structures, processes, and principles comparable to those of general sociology, or must they deal more largely with social problems in the rural field? One would hesitate to advise further specialization in an already overcrowded curriculum, but both these books might be better theoretical formulations if relieved of the necessity of keeping one eye on the problems course.

Each of these volumes has earned and deserved acceptance at the hands of the teaching fraternity, for each in its own fashion is a contribution to the arsenal of teaching materials and another step in that integration of research that finally leads to the accepted formulation of new and growing disciplines.

RUPERT B. VANCE

University of North Carolina

Bilingualism and Mental Development: A Study of the Intelligence and the Social Background of Bilingual Children in New York City. By SETH ARSENIAN. ("Teachers College Contributions to Education," No. 712.) New York: Columbia University Press, 1937. Pp. 164. \$2.10.

Primarily this is a report of an investigation into the relationship between intelligence-test scores and the degree of bilingualism of Italian and Jewish school children in New York. The use of the Bilingual Schedule, developed by Hoffman in 1933, yielded a finer differentiation between the subjects than that found in most studies in this field, and the resulting "bilingual scores" permitted a more rigid statistical handling of the data. The intelligence tests used were the Spearman Visual Perception Test, Part I, and the Pintner Non-language Test. Neither of these requires the use of language, since Dr. Arsenian wished to eliminate the factor of lan-

guage ability or understanding from his experimental situation. The influence of socioeconomic status and length of residence in the United States was adequately controlled. The results of the study are summarized in the statement that "on the basis of the evidence of this research it is concluded that bilingualism does not influence—favorably or unfavorably—the mental development of bilingual children of ages 9 through 14 in the various groups studied" (p. 123).

The study was carefully conceived and executed, and the result is important. Earlier investigations—the majority of which demonstrated the inferiority of bilingual children in the usual linguistic tests of intelligence—suffered from a fundamental ambiguity of interpretation. The inferiority could be explained as due to the handicap of inadequate knowledge of the language in which the test was administered, or it might represent an actual mental retardation. Arsenian's finding that there is no demonstrable retardation when performance tests are used seems to him to eliminate the latter explanation. His position is certainly the more plausible one, but the relatively low correlations between linguistic and performance tests in a monoglot population must impose considerable caution in arguing from one type of test to the other. A significant next step in this field would seem to be a developmental study in which an attempt might be made to see how long the deleterious effect of bilingualism lasted in the case of the linguistic tests. It is important to know whether bilinguals are still at a disadvantage when they have had time to learn both their languages with some thoroughness.

In addition to describing his own investigation, Dr. Arsenian has performed the valuable service of summarizing the results of previous studies not only in the United States but in many other parts of the world as well. This is not the usual cursory survey, but a thorough, mature, and well-balanced analysis of the problems of bilingualism as they emerge from a critical analysis of the literature. It represents indispensable reading for those who wish to do further research in this field.

OTTO KLINEBERG

Columbia University

Americans in the Making. By WILLIAM CARLSON SMITH. New York: D. Appleton-Century Co., 1939. Pp. xvii+454. \$3.75.

Human migration to North America has been an object of public interest for more than a century. During the last fifty years the settlement and

adjustment of racial and ethnic groups on this continent has stimulated the development of the social sciences and the production of an extensive literature in which immigrants and their children form the central themes. In his *Americans in the Making*, Professor Smith has written one of the most readable books in this field. He has read widely, as documents and footnotes attest. Human interest and insight are enhanced by his wise selections from diaries, biographies, and autobiographies of immigrants and their children. This work demonstrates that a scientific treatise need not be uninteresting and unintelligible.

This book aims not to develop a new approach to the study of immigrant groups but to give a well-rounded presentation of the situations faced by immigrants and the agencies which participate in their adjustment and maladjustment. Much timely attention is given to the second generation. Henceforward, the second and succeeding generations seem destined to be the focus of attention in courses for which this book was written.

The role of the immigrant "colony" receives rather limited attention. The movements from the first to successive "areas of settlement" are scarcely touched in this analysis. This weakens the author's analysis of the immigrants' own institutions which are naturally set in a "colony" matrix. Thus the institutional material is not well integrated and appears to be somewhat superficial. A similar criticism might be made with respect to American agencies facilitating the immigrants' adjustment. The data on occupations which are linked so closely with the definition of social situations receive little or no attention. While the author suspects that the causes of immigration are complex, he deals with these causes topically. They are not woven into a systematic analysis of the process of mobilization as it drew into its vortex first those at the rims and later those from the more isolated interiors of Old World continents.

This book concludes with a eulogistic and anecdotal summary of some of the contributions that immigrants have made to the development of the economic and cultural life of America. Whether this contribution is more directly traceable to the dynamic opportunities of a new land of relatively open resources or to the particular heritages of older lands is left obscure in the author's treatment.

C. A. DAWSON

McGill University

The Problem of Social Change. By NEWELL LEROY SIMS. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1939. Pp. viii+477. \$3.30.

With forthright modesty, Professor Sims states in his Preface that he is not aware of any especially original contribution made by this book beyond, perhaps, the special synthesis of the materials he is discussing. The book is avowedly a text and is to be judged as such. Professor Sims has summarized and distilled a vast amount of literature bearing on the subject of social change and has grouped his materials with factors in social change (biologic, racial, and geographic determinism), the nature of social order and change, and the process of social change.

No detailed comment is possible, but some general comments may be made. First, the book is concerned chiefly with theories of social change and factors related to change and not with social change itself in particular instances. The treatment, except for a few illustrations, is not in terms of historical changes, nor is there any concern with the literature of experimental social psychology in relation to change. The effect of this is an abstractness that at times gives an impression of being rather highly "academic."

Second, the volume suffers from the condensation and oversimplification that such a cataloguing of material makes inevitable. One wonders, with textbooks of this type, if there is not an inescapable unfairness to authors whose works are drawn from. Can students obtain an adequate picture of an author's well-rounded point of view through the approach utilized here? Would it be better to read one man thoroughly than a hundred in abstract and summary? This is a pedagogical question that textbooks like this one invariably raise. If some synthesis is desirable, this book will be as useful as any other condensation of social theory, and it does have a conceptual focus—namely, social change.

Third, the author's point of view is not entirely apparent. By careful weighing and balancing he achieves a kind of neutrality that will be regarded by some as commendable, by others as somewhat confusing. One suspects that Professor Sims himself holds to some generalized theory of cyclical change, since he ends the book with a section of the authoritarian-liberal cycle. But just how he reached this position and how the reader is to weigh all the factors and considerations that have been introduced, to the end that he also may achieve a working position for himself, is not clear.

Finally, the method employed in such books inevitably places any author in a dubiously authoritarian position: he presents an epitome or a

selection of someone's thinking and he comments upon it, perhaps even calling it nonsense or absurd. But is the undergraduate student, with limited background in the literature, in a position to evaluate either the adequacy of the interpretation or the comments? To the reviewer, for example, it would seem that the discussion of cultural determinism found in this book might easily give a false conception of the topic, particularly in the discussion of invention.

The volume, in short, raises the fundamental question of textbook presentation of a wide field of social theory in summary form. What particular framework is employed for the synthesis seems somewhat secondary in view of the more basic question of whether or not even Senior students can get a comprehension of what social theorists have written without reading the theory itself.

MALCOLM M. WILLEY

University of Minnesota

Foundations of American Population Policy. By FRANK LORIMER, ELLEN WINSTON, and LOUISE K. KISER, for the COMMITTEE ON POPULATION STUDIES AND SOCIAL PLANNING OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PLANNING ASSOCIATION. New York: Harper & Bros., 1940. Pp. xiii+178. \$2.50.

This book discusses the "scientific foundations of a population policy compatible with a democratic form of government." In the face of a declining birth rate, a "stationary population at a constantly rising level of living" is the alternative preferred. To achieve the economic gain, however, there must be an increase of productivity and income in the less privileged classes, conservation of natural resources, stimulation of private enterprise, and expansion of public works and services. To remove the reproductive differential now favoring the lower social strata, advantaged individuals must be brought to desire more children, handicapped individuals fewer children. Adequate education must be carried to every community. By making contraceptive knowledge generally available, all parenthood should become voluntary. The expense of children should be reduced, where needed, by grants of cash or kind, and medical care must be provided.

The broad values underlying the authors' argument are thus economic and cultural improvement through the whole population. They believe that it is easier to accomplish this for a stationary population of the present size than for either an increasing or a decreasing population. They

admit that our expanding economic habits can be readjusted only with difficulty to this new population situation, but they regard a readjustment as inevitable, and thereafter they see a permanent gain. Their position is opposed to the recent contentions advanced by certain Swedish economists in favor of a growing population but it seems to this reviewer to be the only one that makes sense in terms of arithmetic.

There is an explicit assumption that the proposed program will be carried as far as may be within the American ideology and system of government, but no farther.

To attain a stationary population, educational and economic devices are suggested. While there is much evidence that these would reduce the birth rate of the disadvantaged classes, there is little evidence that they would increase that of the advantaged classes.

The book is apparently intended only to raise broad issues and make broad proposals. For this reason, the chief conclusions may appear to be little more than academic platitudes. Just how the advocated goals are to be realized is left vague, although it is at this point that one would expect most of the practical difficulties. Nevertheless, such discussions would seem to be an indispensable part of the evolution of an American population policy, and it is to be hoped that from them the general pattern of such a policy will gradually emerge.

T. C. McCORMICK

University of Wisconsin

Population: A Problem for Democracy. By GUNNAR MYRDAL. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1940. Pp.xiii+237. \$2.00.

This little volume is devoted to a discussion of the philosophical concepts underlying the field of population—optimum size, increasing versus decreasing population, differential fertility, etc.—rather than to the presentation of statistical facts. Since the author is most familiar with these problems as they are manifest in Sweden, much of the discussion centers about that country.

The first sections of the volume briefly review the history of population theory. The relationship of Malthus' theories to the social and economic experiences of the day is brilliantly set forth; similarly, the changing ideas of population concepts since Malthus are related to changes in the entire social structure. This presentation of the role of population theory is admirably done.

The subsequent sections of the book, which attempt to prove that a

decreasing population is detrimental to the welfare of Sweden, seem less well done. After arguing that for any given country there may be more than one population size which will afford a maximum average level of living, Dr. Myrdal tries to prove why a stationary rather than a decreasing population is preferable for Sweden (and most of the other European countries). These arguments appear plausible for a country such as Sweden today. Whether they would hold up under changed social conditions is, however, problematic.

A. J. JAFFE

Bureau of the Census

Adventuring for Democracy. By WILBUR C. PHILLIPS. New York: Social Unit Press, 1940. Pp. xli+380. \$3.00.

The story of this book is the growth of an idea—a plan for community organization in an urban environment which culminated in the so-called Social Unit in Cincinnati. The growth of the idea is the growth of the author and his wife Elsie, who start with a fresh and radical approach to the social problems revealed to Mr. Phillips in his role as newspaper reporter. Having begun as avowed Socialists, the Phillips' seem to have been drawn by their attempts at practical social reforms, away from the position of the Marxian class struggle into the struggle against the social inertia and vested interests of the current political scene.

In spite of its intriguing style one has certain questions in regard both to the several attempts to organize neighborhoods for their own advancement and to the recurrent failures to achieve permanent results. How much of this failure rested on accidental and perhaps personal factors bound to be found in any such experiment? How much of it rests upon more basic conditions in American urban culture? Can neighborhood organization of any sort be the answer to the dilemma which confronts democracy in an urban setting? This experiment is one of many—variously organized and never more than partially successful. The settlement movement in its most vital form had some of this purpose. Community councils for this avowed end dot the country. The so-called "area project" and the "Back-of-the-Yards" project in Chicago are variations of the same theme. Some of them settle down into rather stereotyped incrustated forms, some flourish for a while and then blow up in mutual recriminations. Some achieve certain results in limited ways.

So far no form of social organization has succeeded in bringing into large city communities in any permanent form the vitality of democratic control to which we nostalgically look back in the New England village.

Perhaps the answer lies elsewhere; perhaps we shall find it in some form of the social unit type. At any rate, it is one of the most persistent and most significant problems of American community life. To that problem this book makes an interesting and valuable contribution.

GRACE L. COYLE

Western Reserve University

The Patient's Dilemma. By HUGH CABOT, M.D. New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, 1940. Pp. x+284. \$2.50.

Social scientists who wish to understand the complex technical and institutional developments in health services have much to gain from this book. So have young medical men who wish to find careers that run with current social trends, rather than against them. So have those who seek practical programs. It is of considerable significance that a physician of such professional distinction as Dr. Cabot should, in the climax of his career, enter the fields of social interpretation and public policy, both through such practical plans of voluntary health insurance as he is now carrying forward in Massachusetts and through such books as *The Doctor's Bill* (Columbia University Press, 1935) and the present volume.

This book reviews "the impact of scientific discoveries on modern medical practice," the technical and the social elements in good medical care, prices versus costs of care, the professional and economic advantages of organized or group medical practice as compared with traditional practice in individual private offices, the "search for medical security," the relations of various methods of financing medical care to the maintenance of high professional standards, and the part of voluntary and of governmental agencies in shaping medical care today and in the future. Dr. Cabot is always so forthright as to provoke some disagreement, but he is clear and incisive enough to elicit understanding. Those familiar with public administration may be inclined to discount some of his suggestions regarding governmental organization in relation to medical services, but he displays, as few American physicians have, an appreciation of the major influence of general public opinion upon medical institutions and services, and of the balance of scientific, institutional, and economic factors which are shaping new medical dispensations in our time.

MICHAEL M. DAVIS

Committee on Medical Economics
New York City

Problems of Modern Society: An Introduction to the Social Sciences. By PAUL W. PAUSTIAN and J. JOHN OPPENHEIMER. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1938. Pp. xii+571. \$3.00.

Any citizen who would read this work carefully would undoubtedly learn a great deal about the world in which he lives and acquire a more balanced view of many controversial matters. On the whole, the authors have given a clear, concise, and interesting presentation of their subject matter; they have selected their quoted material intelligently and have integrated it well. They have provided as supplementary aids provocative questions and topical bibliographies for each chapter.

But the volume does not, as its subtitle claims, constitute "an introduction to the social sciences." The problems presented are not, in general or in detail, problems in any of the social sciences. In fact, the authors make no attempt, not even in their last chapter on "The Social Sciences and the Student," to differentiate a social problem from a sociological or other scientific problem or to provide a basis for differentiating the aspects of the problematical situations discussed that are of interest to the particular social sciences. Nor will study of this volume give the student even a modest body of general, systematically interrelated principles such as an introduction to the social sciences should give. To be sure, some principles are implicit in the textual materials, but they are always incidental to the main interest in the concrete staff and are never picked out and pointed up. The volume is not likely to give the student a correct orientation in the social sciences.

Unfortunately, it may in some cases accomplish another purpose which the authors (like most authors of "problems" texts) explicitly avow (p.v); it may persuade the student to "reach a considered solution" of these complex problems. The ultimate aim of all the social sciences having been thus apparently achieved, why should the student bother his head about further courses in the social sciences except as other social problems than those here considered may appear?

C. W. HART

University of Iowa

Public Policy: A Yearbook of the Graduate School of Public Administration, Harvard University, 1941. Edited by C. J. FRIEDRICH, EDWARD S. MASON, and PENDLETON HERRING. Cambridge, Mass.: Graduate School of Public Administration, 1941. Pp. viii+458. \$4.00.

The principal part of the second volume of the annual yearbook of the Graduate School of Public Administration is devoted to budgetary and fiscal problems. The range is wide—from a study of the relations between

the Bank of France and the French government to an appraisal of the purchasing procedures of American governments. There necessarily ensues a certain lack of cohesion, which is emphasized by the title of the second part—defense problems and miscellaneous. The difficulty is inherent in a publication devoted to the various special topics of a faculty and graduate student body such as the Littauer School, as contrasted with the normally more closely knit program of a research institute comprising a director and a staff. But in diversity there is interest as well as some disunity.

The common thread running through many of the essays is the relationship between public budgeting and the public economy: the place of the budget in the social structure. Contributions such as these pull budget literature out of the sometimes sterile depths into which budgeteers have occasionally wandered. Papers on budgetary symbolism, the investment budget, deficit finance, and the effect of governmental expenditures and tax withdrawals upon income distribution, 1930-39, to select those most specifically related to the major consideration, are of broad theoretical and general value.

Sandwiched between the two major divisions of the book is a brief but important contribution from Arnold Brecht—three short papers, of which two restate Dr. Brecht's analysis of the "independent" agency and the government corporation.

The valuable survey of military planning in Captain Nelson's article, "Administrative Planning for National Defense," contains many insights into problems common to military and civil administration. An assessment of the effectiveness of this military experience by one who is "in the family" would have been eagerly welcomed by the reader; Captain Nelson does not hesitate to refer to the breakdown of some planning enterprises and to the caustic conclusions of General Johnson Hagood, as well as to some notable achievements, but he concludes, too briefly, with a simple verdict of "useful."

The second volume of *Public Policy* confirms the expectations of the first. We look forward to the varied products of the Littauer workshop which will comprise the third volume in this important series.

LEONARD D. WHITE

University of Chicago

The Planning Function in Urban Government. By ROBERT A. WALKER. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1941. Pp. 375. \$3.00.

There are local planning agencies in about 1,200 American communities. In addition there are about 400 county planning commissions, a number of regional

planning agencies, and state planning boards or commissions in most of the states.

The planning movement really started in this country after the World's Fair of 1893 and progressed through three fairly distinct stages, the first being the period of the "City Beautiful" movement. It was followed by the "City Practical" idea, which gave way for the present stage where the city is being planned as a social and an economic unit.

With this history of planning, Mr. Walker found that "urban planning agencies have, in practice, fallen far short of their potential usefulness." Most of the planning commissions are made up of citizens, serving without compensation. The author's finding was that "the independent, unpaid citizen planning commission is not satisfactorily executing the planning function at the present time." On the contrary, "planning is one of the staff functions and should be attached to the executive office." Where planning has succeeded in this country its success is largely the result of the development of the planning commission as a staff agency, irrespective of its formal relationship to municipal government.

The book is based on an actual field study of some thirty-seven cities throughout the United States, visited during a period of a year. It is by far the most important critical study of the planning function in urban government that we have had.

WALTER H. BLUCHER

American Society of Planning Officials

The United States Senate: What Kind of Body? By HENRY LEE MYERS. Philadelphia: Dorrance & Co., 1939. Pp. 125. \$1.50.

Henry Lee Myers, who served as a United States senator from Montana from 1911 to 1923, uses this little volume of reminiscences as a means of airing his ethical and political views. To him the doctrines of states' rights, the separation of powers, the independence of the Senate, judicial review, and free enterprise are sacred, and the modern tendencies toward the concentration of powers in Washington, D.C., the growing ascendancy of the President over Congress, the increasing subserviency of the Senate and the Supreme Court, and the expansion of governmental functions at the expense of private industry, are greatly deplored. Senator Myers has a strong nostalgia for the good old days when senators were indirectly elected, labor unions were weak, Negroes knew their place, businessmen suffered under few governmental restraints, and congressmen were not so completely cowed by pressure groups and the President. Senator Myers denounces the congressmen who serve special interests, but in a later section he points with pride to his success in saving Montana reclamation projects. The book presents some interesting sidelights upon the United States Senate, particularly during World War I.

HAROLD F. GOSNELL

University of Chicago

Propaganda and the American Revolution, 1763-1783. By PHILIP DAVIDSON. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1941. Pp. xvi+460. \$4.00.

The basic framework of Dr. Davidson's exhaustive analysis of an immense propaganda literature is largely that of the persons and agencies involved: lawyers, preachers, pamphleteers, songsters, teachers, merchants, mechanics. This is not to say that he has been unaware of the purposes, problems, and interests of the two sides, Whigs or Patriots, Loyalists or Tories, or that he has ignored the bearings on his material of present-day studies of the technique of propaganda and its role in the social process. The sociologist will find in this admirable study the only thoroughly documented account of the status of propaganda a hundred and fifty years ago. He will note that except for the greater present awareness of its importance and new techniques for which technology and psychology are responsible, the earlier propaganda strikingly resembles that of our own time. The sociologist will also be interested in Professor Davidson's analysis of the function of propaganda in the American Revolution. The propagandists representing the provincial ruling class succeeded in identifying the interests of this minority with inchoate but rising national hopes, in articulating nebulous opinions during the early stages of the movement, in providing "the compulsive ideals which led to concrete action," and, subsequently, in discrediting the counterattacks of fumbling Tory propagandists. Professor Davidson does not attempt to measure precisely the effectiveness of patriot propaganda in relation to the effectiveness of French aid, military leadership, British mistakes, and "chance." But the student of the elements in the revolutionary process will welcome the scholarly and exhaustive documentation back of Professor Davidson's conclusion: "The national ideals of American life, slowly maturing through the colonial period, thus came clearly into the consciousness of American people through the effects of war propaganda."

MERLE CURTI

Columbia University

Organized Anti-Semitism in America: The Rise of Group Prejudice during the Decade 1930-40. By DONALD S. STRONG. Washington, D.C.: American Council on Public Affairs, 1941. Pp. 191. \$3.00.

Brief pictures of eleven anti-Semitic organizations are given in this volume; one hundred and ten others are named. The German-American Bund is covered in nineteen pages, the Silver Shirts in seventeen, the Christian Front in fourteen. The data come mainly from the McCormack Committee reports, the Dies Committee investigations, publications of the anti-Semitic organizations, and an unnamed confidential source which the reviewer happens to know is reliable. The data have the limitations which are implicit in viewing hostile organizations from the outside.

The theoretical contribution of the book is negligible, the theories of Lasswell, which are not used critically, serving to order the material. The interest in

the facts about the organizations rather than in theory is clear in the summary with which Dr. Strong closes the work.

In summary, the 121 anti-Semitic organizations that have appeared in the United States in recent years are products of the depression, the repercussion of Hitler's rise to power, the slight growth of revolutionary sentiment, and the belief that the New Deal is "Communistic." These organizations are far less formidable than they seem to be; many of them consist merely of a fanatic and a letterhead. Their members are drawn primarily from the middle-class. Though some individual wealthy persons have contributed to these organizations, the economic élite as a group has ignored their existence. The sources of funds most commonly used are dues and the sale of publications. The skill in propaganda is only moderate.

The book is to be commended for giving an ordered presentation of an important recent phase of American life about which facts are difficult to secure.

ALFRED SEVERSON

Drake University.

Problems in Prison Psychiatry. By J. G. WILSON and M. J. PESCOR. Caldwell, Idaho: Caxton Printers, Ltd., 1939. Pp. 275. \$3.00.

Here is the sound sense and straight talking of two medical men who had much experience before they became chief medical officers and psychiatrists in penal institutions. They set forth their views mainly in terms of psychiatric classifications of prisoners, giving an enlightening discussion of what they think can be accomplished with them. The figures which they give for different types and for recidivism are familiar. It is doubtful whether the 60 per cent who are not reckoned as recidivists are really reformed.

A note of pessimism creeps in as the value of imprisonment is stated in general social terms. Yes, it has its values because it promotes "a sense of social solidarity," and serves to fix in the public mind certain standards of behavior. It is worth something as a deterrent but not so much as if punishment could follow quickly on the commission of a crime. Prisoners reap some benefits through improved health, better education, and increased vocational skills, but "reformation when it occurs seems to be incidental to prison life, rather than dependent on it." The authors thoroughly believe that the enforcement of good habits during prison life falls very short of preventing a repetition of crime—"Change of character is necessary for reformation." Habits of thought are involved and these cannot be altered by prison life. Reformation must come from within and cannot be forced on anyone.

The writers question the results of psychotherapy in prison. They are much more in favor of extending probation as a method of control, together with psychiatric treatment. They believe in more thorough studies of the criminal before sentencing, so that judges might order certain types of individuals confined for long periods.

Again in this book we find great emphasis upon the "psychopathic" prisoner,

although the difficulties of classification are acknowledged. Prolonged segregation is advocated. Indeed, several types of abnormal criminals should be held over long periods for the protection of society—"approximately one-fourth of the men now in prison should remain there indefinitely."

The reviewer could dwell on other matters of interest and some statements that are debatable, but particularly for sociologists it may be said that here is an honest presentation of facts as seen by two conscientious observers. They have been engaged in no experimental methods of treatment and they offer no easy solutions of the problems of criminality.

The book can be highly recommended to prison people on account of its concrete suggestions for prison management and discipline.

There is a short introduction by Dr. W. L. Treadway, also of the United States Public Health Service, and an appendix of five pages giving landmarks and dates in the development of penal practice.

WILLIAM HEALY

Judge Baker Guidance Center

Culture Conflict and Crime: A Report of the Sub-committee on Delinquency of the Committee on Personality and Culture. By THORSTEN SELLIN. New York: Social Science Research Council, 1938. Pp. 116. \$1.00.

One of the outstanding approaches to the problem of crime causation—culture conflict—is in this little book of 116 pages subjected to a rigorous examination. After an introductory chapter on "Criminology and the Way of Science," the author sets forth "a sociological approach to the study of crime causation." Here the weakness of the legal definition of criminal behavior is analyzed and its essential irrelevance for the study of crime set forth. As a substitute the author proposes the far more inclusive concept of the "violation of conduct norms." "Conduct norms," he says, "are found wherever social groups are found, i.e. universally. They are not the creation of any *one* normative group; they are not confined within political boundaries; they are not necessarily embodied in law." Such norms should be classified according to their "resistance potentials" which are measured by the severity of the penalty visited upon their violators. These norms not only exist objectively, but they become parts of the personality pattern of the individual. The crucial question is, then: What are the personality elements which exist in the violator and do not exist in the conformist; what is there in him that overcomes the group resistance? The norm may be wholly lacking in some individuals; it has no significance in accidental violations; two conflicting norms may be present; and finally an individual feels "complete group resistance" to his behavior where he possesses only one norm of behavior for a given life-situation. A brief and penetrating analysis of the procedure of existing studies of crime causations is followed by classification of the forms of conflict of conduct norms. Here is an accurately critical discussion of researches

made on the criminology of foreign stocks in the United States, which has been our standard area of study of conflict of cultures. The book closes with a scheme of classification of possible types of studies in this field.

Despite its small bulk this work exposes clearly what seems to the reviewer to be the central problem of criminology as the science explaining "criminal" behavior. The student in this field can get here a more direct and usable approach than in many volumes of a more imposing bulk.

C. E. GEHLKE

Western Reserve University

Criminal Youth and the Borstal System. By WILLIAM HEALY and BENEDICT S. ALPER. New York: Commonwealth Fund, 1941. Pp. vii+251. \$1.50.

The reader will find this an able and comprehensive study of the famous English system for dealing with youthful offenders.

The book opens with a brief but arresting discussion of the inadequacies characteristic of the present systems for dealing with young offenders in the United States. Having set forth the problems and failures inherent in our correctional methods and institutions, the authors devote the rest of the book to a description and an evaluation of the Borstal system. On the basis of the materials presented the reader is led to conclude that the Borstal system is considerably better adapted to the successful treatment of youthful offenders than most of the current systems existing in the United States.

The book ends with a brief discussion of how the main features of the Borstal system can be incorporated into the Youth Correction Authority Act recently (1940) adopted by the American Law Institute. The authors believe that the widespread adoption of the provisions of this Act plus the establishment of the commendable features of the Borstal system would do much in creating an intelligent and adequate American system for dealing with youthful offenders.

E. D. MONACHESI

University of Minnesota

Delinquency Control. By LOWELL JUILLIARD CARR. New York: Harper & Bros., 1941. Pp. xiv+447. \$3.50.

The main thesis is that a streamlined civilization needs streamlined methods for controlling delinquency, which is the old familiar culture lag hypothesis breaking out again. The author assumes that experts can find the solutions and that the public will tolerate them. The principal contribution for sociology of delinquency is his analysis of deviant behavior and the community pressures causing it. This analysis is a unified systematic approach to the etiology of delinquency, although it sidesteps the difficult matter of demonstrable proof.

The book bears throughout the stamp of the author's own ingeniousness, not the least of which is phrasing. Special mention should be made of his Delin-

quency Prevention Rating Form, which enables interested members of a community to test the readiness of local facilities for delinquency control.

The major weakness of the book is found in its face-value acceptance of dubious estimates, results of follow-up studies, and professed functions of delinquency-control agencies. The book is written in a very newsy attention-holding style of a sociologist who was once a newspaper man. It is by far the best all-around statement of the problem of delinquency control.

WALTER C. RECKLESS

Ohio State University

Public Opinion in a Democracy: A Study in American Politics. By CHARLES W. SMITH, JR. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1939. Pp. 585. \$3.00.

Professor Smith's book is what it sets out to be, an introduction for undergraduates to the study of public opinion and its relation to the process of government. It contains the usual chapters defining public opinion and propaganda and others dealing with communication media such as newspapers and radio. In addition there are chapters customarily found only in books on political parties but which are certainly relevant to the subject with which Professor Smith deals. There are some notable chapters not usually found in books of this kind, namely, those on "Rabble Rousers," "Patriotism and Radicalism," "Sectionalism," and "Public Opinion and the Supreme Court." There are, on the other hand, some omissions which are hard to understand. I find, for example, no mention of motion pictures or commercial advertising. The underlying theoretical and psychological problems involved in any analysis of public opinion are neglected entirely or treated only superficially. But these defects are compensated for by a popular style and a fine sense of proportion which runs through the entire volume. The author is strong on description and rather weak when it comes to analysis. He does an excellent job of telling what various groups and individuals do to influence public opinion. His two concluding chapters on "Education for Citizenship" and "Democracy Challenged" should be read by everyone concerned with the future of democratic institutions in this darkling world.

PETER H. ODEGARD

Amherst College

Education for Social Understanding. By GAYNELL HAWKINS. New York: American Association for Adult Education, 1940. Pp. 207. \$1.25.

In spite of its title this little book is actually about social work and social workers. Miss Hawkins begins by saying that social work is about as cohesive as the Balkan states. Her book follows the pattern of those popular presentations of international questions by omniscient reporters who take a swing around a country and go home to write their impressions. Many of her criticisms are valid. Some of her praise is well placed. However, to a person in the field both seem to be a hit-or-miss result of casual impressions of persons, agencies, con-

ferences, and literature. At times these are colored by a very obvious and understandable irritation at social workers and at other times by an attempt to do them justice. The result of this process for a reader who is also a social worker is to remind one of the remark of a child quoted by Ludwig Lewisohn, "My father says there are lots of nice Jews."

In a period when many of her criticisms should be given serious consideration by social workers and when adult education and social work should be co-operating with mutual respect, it is unfortunate that this subject of education for social understanding could not have received a more searching and well-tempered treatment.

GRACE L. COYLE

Western Reserve University

Pascua: A Yaqui Village in Arizona. By EDWARD H. SPICER. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1940. Pp. xxx+319. \$3.50.

A group of 429 Indians, mostly Yaquis but in part Mayos and Mexican-Yaqui mixtures, living in a small village on the outskirts of Tucson, Arizona, are the human material of this book. Life in Pascua is described by Dr. Spicer in a manner which gives the reader a feeling for it, not merely a knowledge about it. Especially good are the accounts of the economic life, the kinship structure, the ceremonial sponsorship structure, and the ceremonial groups and activities. Historical background, material culture, and population statistics are described less fully but with sufficient detail to provide the necessary framework for the relationship structures.

Pascua is not, however, mere description. Prior to his research Dr. Spicer had learned that these Indians had been absorbed into the American economic structure while yet maintaining a ceremonial life imported from Mexico. The problem he formulated was that of discovering the nature of the integration of "an economic system developed in one culture with a social and ceremonial system developed in another." The conceptual scheme which appears to be the conscious theoretical framework is that of functional inconsistency or disunity as formulated by Radcliffe-Brown. The conclusions reached as the result of the study have led Dr. Spicer to make something of a restatement of Radcliffe-Brown's hypothesis. He sees resolution of the inconsistency through the withdrawal of individuals "either into the old system or out of the society" rather than through cultural change.

The study is somewhat unusual among anthropological monographs in that there is explicit acknowledgment of both a problem and a conceptual scheme. The reviewer's only criticism is that there appears to be some confusion between functional integration and integration according to what Sapir has termed a "system of unconscious meanings."

FLORENCE KLUCKHOHN

Wellesley College

A Survey of the Social Services in the Oxford District, Vol. II: *Local Administration in a Changing Area*. By the SURVEY COMMITTEE OF BARNETT HOUSE. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1940. Pp. 494. \$6.00.

The social survey as a technique of investigation has long been especially characteristic of English procedure. The present volume ably carries forward an excellent tradition. It is a detailed exposition and analysis of the social services and the problems in the fields of education, the relief of distress, health (including the physically and mentally handicapped), sanitation, public utilities, and town and country planning in the Oxford District. The latter, which we would term a metropolitan area, includes, in addition to the county borough of Oxford, sixty-six parishes and two municipal boroughs which lie within ten miles of the city and appear to be within its sphere of influence. The administration of the social services, both statutory and voluntary, in the area is the keynote of the book. National legislation under which local responsibility functions also enters the picture. The Survey provides a factual basis for promoting adjustment and for planning. It is a sound illustration of social science in practice.

MAURICE R. DAVIE

Yale University

Slava Bohu: The Story of the Dukhobors. By J. F. C. WRIGHT. New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1940. Pp. x+438. \$3.50.

Shaker Adventure: An Experiment in Contented Living. By MARGUERITE FELLOWS MELCHER. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1941. Pp. x+319. \$3.00.

The Dukhobors of Canada and the Shakers of this country are both of interest as sects truly at war with the mores. The Dukhobors were—and some of them are—utter pacifists, communists, and antinomians. The Shakers were communistic and celibate. Wright's account of the Dukhobors is detailed and lively. One gets a good impression of the stormy inner conflicts of the sect as well as of conflicts with the world. Mrs. Melcher's account is done in soft colors; a little too soft, considering that the Shakers sought to exorcise sex as well as private property.

Although both accounts are accompanied by bibliographies, neither footnotes any references to the sources used. Neither shows that its author has any fundamental conception of the nature of sects or of the important problems of human personality and social control upon which the course of such sects might throw light.

EVERETT C. HUGHES

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ABSTRACTS OF PERIODICAL LITERATURE¹

The persons who have aided in the preparation of the material for this issue are: Hubert Bonner, Everett K. Wilson, and Erich Rosenthal. The numerals and letters appearing after each abstract correspond to the items in the following scheme of classification:

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|---------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| I. THEORETICAL SOCIOLOGY | e) The State and Political Process |
| a) Sociological Theory | f) The School and Education |
| b) History of Sociology | g) Economic Institutions |
| c) Methods of Research | h) Voluntary Associations |
| d) The Teaching of Sociology | IV. POPULATION AND HUMAN ECOLOGY |
| II. SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY | a) Demography |
| a) Human Nature and Personality | b) Ecology |
| b) Collective Behavior | c) The Rural and the Urban Community |
| III. SOCIAL ORGANIZATION | V. DISORGANIZATION |
| a) The Family | a) Personal Disorganization |
| b) Ethnic and Racial Groups | b) Social Disorganization |
| c) Social Stratification | |
| d) The Church and Religion | |

418. Die Altersgliederung des männlichen Zweiges der souveränen Geschlechter Ende 1935 [The Age Composition of the Male Branch of the Royal Families by the End of 1935].—The male members of the European royal families, as defined by the *Almanach de Gotha*, amounted to 351 in 1841, increased to 430 in 1890, to 445 in 1925, and decreased to 426 in 1935. An analysis of the age composition as of 1935 shows that a low birth rate within the nobility and the exclusion of children that are born in marriages between nobles and commoners have resulted in a surplus of deaths over births. The high percentage of noblemen who are not married will make for a further decrease of the group. Among many social factors making for the decay of the nobility, the morganatic marriages between royalty and commoners are the most damaging ones. Thus by the end of 1936 the House of Romanov had fifteen male members, twelve of whom were married, eleven of them to spouses not belonging to the nobility.—Franco Savorgnan, *Allgemeines statistisches Archiv*, XXVII (1937), 16-22. (IVa.) E. R.

419. Ostpreussen und sein Wanderungsproblem [East Prussia and Its Migration Problem].—The problem of migration has always been of central importance to East Prussia. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the kings of Prussia tried to increase its population through immigration. For some time the population increase in East Prussia was twice as high as that of the Reich, but, starting in 1871, from 12,000 to 18,000 people left East Prussia annually. They migrated mostly to the new industrial Rhine and Ruhr districts. A special tabulation of internal migration shows two distinct

¹ Since the editors are trying to bring up to date the abstracting of significant articles since the termination of the *Social Science Abstracts*, occasionally there will be abstracts of articles published several years ago.

features: (1) 80 per cent of all migrants go from rural to urban areas within East Prussia and (2) 20 per cent emigrate from East Prussia into the Reich. A large percentage of those who leave East Prussia are not born there and often migrate back to their place of origin. This indicates that East Prussia has not succeeded in holding its newcomers permanently. While in former times it was unanimously held that the large East Prussian estates were the cause of the migration, it is now believed that the estates do not cause the migration and that the establishment of peasant farmsteads would not prevent emigration. It seems that religion is a factor associated with the migratory behavior of the East Prussians. While there is hardly any emigration from Catholic counties, the Protestant counties suffer heavily from migration.—E. F. Mueller, *Allgemeines statistisches Archiv*, XXVIII (1938), 436-53. (IVa, b.) E. R.

420. *Die erste Arbeitsbuchehebung vom 25. Juni 1938* [The First Tabulation of the Labor Passports on June 25, 1938].—By 1938 the results of the 1933 census were no longer valid, owing to the changes in the economic structure of the Reich. A tabulation was therefore made of the duplicates of the labor passports which are kept in the Employment Offices. Information sought included (1) the distribution of laborers and white-collar workers over twenty-seven employment categories covering about two hundred categories by sex and by age; (2) the extent of employment in trades different from the originally acquired skill; (3) the availability of the passport holders for the trade groups in which there was a considerable labor shortage: farm hands, miners, metalworkers, and building workers; (4) the distribution of workers over fifty-seven fields of economic activity; and (5) a tabulation of workers by regions. An analysis of the age composition shows that 68 per cent of the male employees are from twenty-five to fifty-four years old, while 43 per cent of the female workers are under twenty-four years of age. Nineteen per cent of all employees are white-collar workers. Twenty-two per cent of all female workers are white-collar workers, as contrasted with 17 per cent of the males. While the number of persons engaged in agriculture and truck farming declined as compared with 1933, the number of employees in the metal industries, forestry, mining, chemical industries, and building industries increased considerably. In those industries that are devoted to the production of consumption goods the number of employees varied only slightly.—Richard von Valta, *Allgemeines statistisches Archiv*, XXVIII (1938), 401-21. (IIIg.) E. R.

421. *Three Aspects of Regional Consciousness*.—Regionalism may be regarded as the expression of a tendency in European thought appearing in three forms: the rise of the political and social movement known as regionalism, the development of the regional concept as a technique in geography, and the emergence of the "regional novel." Regionalism proceeds from a reaction against centralized government; it approves cultural activities away from the capital. Only in Spain and in France has regionalism any real vitality. Spanish regionalism arises from diversified geographical, racial, and linguistic characteristics; French regionalism, from an intellectual protest against centralization. Areas like New England and the South are of a larger order of magnitude and are not comparable with European regions. The interconnection of natural resource areas and metropolitan centers, the co-ordination of hydroelectric power and organizations transcending old divisions such as the Federal Reserve Areas suggest that regionalism offers more than a possibility for the geographical basis of society. The regional concept in geography is primarily a technique for the study of geographical data. There has been a tendency for interest to turn from analytic to synthetic treatments and a growing realization that there are few "natural" regions—that almost all have been changed by human habitation. Braun considers the goal of regional geography the explanation of the transformation from *Naturlandschaft* to *Kulturlandschaft*. The awakened interest in locality is evidenced in the output of regional novels in European literature after the middle of the nineteenth century. These show absorption in a given locality, similarity in use of human material of the laboring classes, and treatment of the everyday life of the locality. This synthesis of place, people, and work is suggestive of Brunhes and Le Play.—F. W. Morgan, *Sociological Review*, XXXI (1939), 68-88. (IVa, b.) E. K. W.

422. **A Note on Method of Establishing the Connection between Economic Conditions and Crime.**—Scientific investigation has given rise to the dualistic theory attributing crime to a combination of individual predisposition and environmental influence. In the controversy between the anthropological and sociological schools of criminologists, the latter have concentrated on the economic aspects of environment. In such studies it is necessary to examine not only the rate of change in the general standard of living but also the intensity of the change in a particular class, while criminal statistics must be so constructed as to be strictly adapted to the ideally compiled economic class and must accurately record the criminality within this class. Such detail is probably impossible of achievement but suggests as close an approximation as possible. It must be recognized, too, that the same economic process (e.g., inflation) may operate in one group to inhibit, in another to stimulate, crime. The concept of criminality also presents difficulties in that even the figures on legal criminality are subject to variance, as they are derived from police records, judicial statistics, or records of persons convicted. In general, the value of a crime rate for index purposes decreases as the distance from the crime, in terms of legal procedure, increases. Criminality may be regarded in two aspects: its static and its dynamic aspect. In attempting to ascertain a causal connection from a correlation, it is necessary to determine and differentiate other factors which might have any influence on criminality during the period studied. The elimination of such factors, while giving more ground for supposing a real causal connection, does not preclude the necessity of explaining why criminality increases as a result of economic crises. Changes in the psychology and social behavior of the individual being occasioned by changes in economic conditions, and the way in which these psychological changes could in their turn lead to crime, must be indicated.—L. Radzinowicz, *Sociological Review*, XXXI (1939), 260-80. (Va, b.) E. K. W.

423. **On Terminology.**—This article proposes to illustrate differences in usage of sociological terminology and to make proposals toward eliminating variant usage. Sociologists differ as to whether the term "society" should denote persons, relationships, or both and as to what marks the boundary line between the social and the nonsocial. Dealings, mutual awareness, and willed relations have been variously regarded by sociologists as the distinctive marks of society. "Group" and "community" are likewise points of conceptual variance. "Community" may signify a territorial basis, as with Ginsberg and MacIver, common conventions and traditions, as with Cole, or an involuntary bond of physical heredity and environment, as with Ellwood. With regard to the meaning of "association" there seems to be substantial agreement that it involves voluntary, purposive co-operation. Of terms denoting relationships between persons, modes of thought, feeling, or behavior, "institution" is an ill-defined and overworked term. The various definitions suggest two questions: (1) What is the sociological connotation of the verb "to institute"? (2) What do we institute? To institute may involve customary behavior becoming (a) recognized as such, (b) recognized as licit, (c) commended by public opinion, (d) expected by public opinion, and (e) made compulsory. As to what is instituted, various definitions suggest a threefold division into (a) ideas, with accompanying emotions or established ideas; (b) behavior and actions including rites, ceremonies, etiquettes, routines, and festivals; and (c) relationships socially recognized and approved, as the family. "Society" should be kept as the most comprehensive sociological term, meaning a number of persons whose lives affect one another substantially, together with their relationships and their set modes of behavior. "Group" is preferred as a generic term qualified, as by "religious," to describe numbers particularistically bound together. "Community" is better applied in adjectival than in substantive terms and is a matter of degree rather than of kind. Groups are more or less communal, and insistence on a territorial basis is unnecessary. "Social institutions" may be defined as all recognized and approved relationships with their relevant ideas and behavior. Where past ways are followed unconsciously, the term "mere custom" is suggested. When recognition, discussion, and some sense of appropriateness come, we have to do with "social usage." When social usage becomes a mark of relationship, it passes into institutional behavior. Incomplete conceptual analysis has been in part eliminated in recent years. A remaining difficulty, that of variant usage, remains to be

corrected for the most part by American sociologists, since they form the great majority of sociologists using the language.—Henry A. Mess, *Sociological Review*, XXXII (1940), 50-63. (1a.) E. K. W.

424. **Villages, Tribal Markets, and Towns: Some Considerations concerning Urban Development in the Spanish and International Zones of Morocco.**—The Spanish Moroccan zone may be divided into three parts: (1) in the southwest are the Arabs who were originally nomadic stock-raisers; (2) in the southeast are Arab and Berber nomadic pastoralists; while (3) in the remainder are the sedentary Berbers, most of whom have always been primarily cultivators. The population is grouped by biological families (man, wife, and offspring); while clusters of joint families (the biological family, brothers, male descendants, and their families) form the villages. Trading is not done in the villages but at weekly markets near a good spring or well, near a tribal shrine, and generally within a day's return walking distance from all villages within the tribe. The market place, although in no sense a center of settlement, is a center of varied services, from legal work to cobbling, a meeting place of friends, and a news center. Of the nine towns in the area, Alcazar alone seems to have evolved in any way as a response to the needs of surrounding rural society. It seems reasonable to assume that the particular kind of native cultural conditions and especially the ephemeral weekly tribal market institution is a principal cause of the relatively small number of urban settlements of the market-town type. The recent establishment of military centers located by the Spanish near these weekly market places suggests the probable development in the direction of urbanization under the influence of the new garrison market-towns.—Walter Fogg, *Sociological Review*, XXXII (1940), 85-107. (III, IVb, c.) E. K. W.

425. **The Fertility and Mortality of the Population of Palestine.**—The average annual increase of population in Palestine was 4.8 per cent per year from 1922 to 1938 and is today the world's highest recorded increase. Discounting about half the increase as due to immigration, the rate remains extremely high. This increase is due to a high net reproduction among the Moslem community and a favorable age composition among the Jewish community. The Moslem gross reproduction rate of 3.33 is paralleled only by that of the Ukraine thirty to forty years ago. Palestine's Moslem mortality is found to be high compared today with Europe's, owing to infant mortality; but it is fairly low compared with other non-Western communities. From these two factors there results a high rate of increase. The rapid increase among the Jews is due to the age composition. Jewish fertility is comparable to that of the more prolific European and colonial countries. Also, while Jewish mortality is not unusually low, it compares favorably with the most advanced countries of the world today. The persistence of these population trends would result in a marked fall of the Jewish proportion of the population with the passage of time.—Rita Hinden, *Sociological Review*, XXXII (1940), 29-49. (IVa.) E. K. W.

CURRENT BOOKS

- AGEE, JAMES and EVANS, WALKER. *Let Us Now Praise Famous Men*. Cambridge: Riverside Press, 1941. Pp. xvi+471. \$3.50. A description of three tenant-farmers in an ultra-modern literary manner of reporting. The authors state that the volume is "intended, among other things, as a swindle, an insult, and a corrective."
- AMERICAN COUNTRY LIFE ASSOCIATION. *Building Rural Communities: Proceedings of the Twenty-third American Country Life Conference, Lafayette, Indiana, November 6-9, 1940*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1941. Pp. 171. \$2.00. Contains the papers presented at the Conference.
- ATTEBERRY, GEORGE C.; AUBLE, JOHN L.; and HUNT, ELGIN F. *Introduction to Social Science: A Survey of Social Problems*. New York: Macmillan Co., 1941. Pp. xix+668. \$3.00. The first of two volumes of an introduction to the social sciences. This text approaches the study of social science from the social-problems point of view. It is the product of the social science staffs of the Chicago junior colleges.
- BAKER, GEORGE CLAUDE, JR. *An Introduction to the History of Early New England Methodism, 1789-1839*. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1941. Pp. vii+145. \$2.50.
- BARKER, ROGER; DEMBO, TAMARA; and LEWIN, KURT. *Frustration and Regression: An Experiment with Young Children*. Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1941. Pp. xiii+314. \$1.35. A technical study in the framework of topological psychology.
- BARROS, JAYME DE. *A política exterior do Brasil (1930-1940)*. Departamento de imprensa e propaganda, 1941. Pp. 367. \$0.15. A statement of Brazilian diplomacy and foreign policy from 1930 to 1940.
- BROWN, GEORGE W. *The Economic History of Liberia*. Washington, D.C.: Associated Publishers, Inc., 1941. Pp. ix+366. \$3.00. Deals with the history, physical topography, local industry, plantation economy, financial status, and foreign influences in Liberia. Includes a lengthy appendix of historical documents.
- BROWNING, GRACE. *Rural Public Welfare*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1941. Pp. x+578. \$4.00. A volume of teaching materials of case work and community organization from rural agencies in eleven states.
- BUROS, OSCAR KRISEN (ed.). *The Second Yearbook of Research and Statistical Methodology*. Highland Park, N.J.: Gryphon Press, 1941. Pp. xx+383. A carefully chosen collection of reviews of books and articles on methodology. Covers more than works on statistics. Aims to show the developments in the field of research methodology.
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
and consumption in primitive society, feudalism, commercialism, and industrial capitalism.


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THE TRANSITION OF CIVILIZATIONS IN PRIMITIVE SOCIETY¹

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ABSTRACT

Primitive cultures are no more static than advanced civilizations. Changes occur because of loans but also through indigenous modifications with resulting transitional stages. "Transition," however, implies a certain degree of stability. Alien contacts favor but do not automatically yield alteration, for a variety of deterrents may intervene. Also, acculturation studies must not be restricted to investigation of Occidental civilizations in their impact on savages; attention must be paid also to such problems as the intercourse of Chinese and Manchu or of Arabs and Negroes. Internal changes, due mainly to individual mentalities, are demonstrable, especially in the religious sphere. Our best data, however, relate to such recorded happenings as the intensification of reindeer-breeding in Lapland and the effect of equestrianism on plains Indians. It should be noted that the introduction of such purely material features may usher in sociological and religious modifications. Differences in temperament and ability are an ever present factor; and the definition of "transition" may conveniently be made to hinge on the differing reactions of individuals to simultaneously presented alternatives—one conforming to tradition, the other to a proposed substitute.

Not so very long ago it was customary to treat the illiterate populations of the world as devoid of history (*geschichtslos*). In recent decades this static conception has been definitively shattered. Most effective in remolding the older view have been the ever increasing proofs of borrowing: primitive groups are caught in the very act of transmitting their beliefs and customs to one another; often they adopt the ways of Western societies; more rarely, but far from exceptionally, they pass on items of their traditional inventory to intruders of more complex civilization. The transfer in any of these

¹ Paper read in section on "Civilizations in Transition," Fiftieth Anniversary Symposium, University of Chicago, September 24, 1941.

cases involves readjustments that collectively constitute the phenomenon of "transition." However, it is not merely an external stimulus that brings change. Less frequently amenable to direct demonstration, yet not less real, are the modifications due to native innovators. Only the Eskimo had snowhouses, only the South American forest-dwellers converted the poisonous manioc species into a staple crop, and so with many other inventions regionally limited and rooted in local conditions. Such internal changes may result in transformations no less revolutionary than those ascribable to extraneous impulses. As the late Dr. Goldenweiser used to contend, the process of dissemination itself is not different, whether an idea pass from one tribesman to another or from one group to another; and the principle may be extended to the phenomena of transition irrespective of their ultimate source.

However, as soon as we attempt to define any particular period of transition, we confront formidable difficulties. Empirical historians must eschew the tacit teleology of a unilinear evolutionism. They do not know that Stage A is bound to yield Stage B; and not being clear as to the trend of events, they can hardly affirm that a particular happening or series of happenings inaugurated a crucial alteration. Retrospectively, we can often point out specific traits of epoch-making significance. Surely, metallurgy revolutionized history, and the domestication of sheep underlies a basic industry; but the earliest workers in copper and iron made only decorative beads, and the growth of wool started after domestication as an unforeseeable by-product. Similarly, farming has had incalculable consequences for economic developments, yet, because of soil exhaustion, incipient cultivators cannot become stabilized, nor is the scant product of their labors sufficient to increase the population beyond the density found among the more advanced hunters. As Parsons remarks, "It is as hard to 'catch' the birth of innovation through an individual as to note exactly the moment a leaf falls from its twig."²

Nevertheless, it is not necessary to throw our net so widely as to include all manner of social change. "Transition" implies a certain permanence in the civilization viewed. For our purposes, then, we may properly rule out all instances of cataclysmic destruction. When

² Elsie Clews Parsons, *Pueblo Indian Religion* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1939), p. 1118.

South American Indians were lured or crimped into rubber-collecting for the benefit of foreign entrepreneurs, their rapid deterioration into hordes of uprooted, alcohol-craving proletarians is not a fair sample of cultural transition.³ On the other hand, given the uncertainty as to origins, it is well to consider in principle all cases of change in a persistent social tradition. Analysis may then ultimately yield the conditions of significant change, i.e., of passage into something essentially distinct from the antecedents. Since radical modifications are demonstrably due to the intercourse between distinct peoples, it will be well to survey, first of all, the phenomena of contact. Second, I shall consider changes due to internal causes. Next, I shall concentrate on a few specific traits whose introduction demonstrably altered aboriginal life. And, finally, I shall discuss the resultant of such traits and individual temperament.

CONTACT PHENOMENA

One cardinal fact we must stress is that contact is indeed a frequent condition, but not a sufficient cause of significant change. To phrase the principle differently, diffusion is selective, not automatic. Few scholars have been more successful than Nordenskiöld in tracing the dissemination of traits. Yet the failure of Andean civilization to affect the sylvan tribes to the east so powerfully impressed him that he came to consider man "exceedingly conservative" in borrowing except for the department of useful plants and animals.⁴ But even this moderate statement requires some qualification. There are, it is true, spectacular instances of the amazingly rapid diffusion of such species as maize, manioc, and tobacco. But it is not difficult to find contrary examples. Why did rice fail to penetrate Oceania? Why do the contemporary Tahitians, with the example of Chinese colonists before them, disdain to raise it? Why did potato cultivation remain confined to Andean cultures in pre-Columbian times even though wild species occurred to the north? Why did the tomato, a native of South America, reach the Ijca of northern Colombia only in recent times?⁵

³ Erland Nordenskiöld, *Indianer und Weisse in Nordostbolivien* (Stuttgart, 1922), pp. 119-29; *Forschungen und Abenteuer in Südamerika* (Stuttgart, 1924), pp. 258-63.

⁴ Nordenskiöld, *Comparative Ethnographical Studies*, VIII (Göteborg, 1930), 132-42.

⁵ Gustaf Bolinder, *Die Indianer der tropischen Schneegebirge* (Stuttgart, 1925), p. 53.

Though not all such instances are explainable, a partial interpretation is suggested by Nordenskiöld himself: borrowing is not likely if the potential recipients possess an adequate counterpart. Applying this principle, we understand why the rice-growing Chinese displayed only moderate enthusiasm for the potato, which the Maori, on the other hand, found superior to their native kumara.

Second, a loan in the full sense of the term, i.e., an acquisition of techniques that henceforth make the recipient independent of the donor, is rendered unnecessary if the finished products are readily available through an established system of intertribal trading or an equivalent symbiotic arrangement. In 1541 the Apache met by the Spaniards did not need to grow maize and cotton or to manufacture earthenware in imitation of their settled neighbors, for they could obtain corn, woven blankets, and pottery in exchange for salt, buffalo hides, and dried meat. Again, in tropical South America, local specialization had developed to such a point that absolute necessities, such as cassava graters and hammocks, were often bartered in from another tribe rather than made at home.⁶

Symbiosis may be coupled with factors specifically restricting loans. In the Nilgiri Hills of Southern India four tribes are living within easy walking distance of one another and, until a century ago, in almost complete isolation from the advanced lowland civilization. The Toda are buffalo-breeders; the Badaga raise millet; the Kota serve as smiths and musicians; the food-gathering Kurumba practice magic. Reciprocal services follow the ruts of these specializations, but diffusion of traits is inhibited by the intense caste sentiment that correlates these traits with particular tribes. Thus, the mimicry, so common elsewhere, of prestige groups would be an invasion of inalienable privilege; when a few Kota ventured to wear turbans, after the fashion of the Badaga, they were at once beaten up by their outraged neighbors.⁷ Geographically, there is an ideal setup for a leveling of cultural differences, but any such process is frustrated by the regnant ideology.

⁶ Donald E. Worcester, "Early Spanish Accounts of the Apache Indians," *American Anthropologist*, XLIII (1941), 308; Walter Edmund Roth, "An Introductory Study of the Arts, Crafts, and Customs of the Guiana Indians," *38th Annual Report* (Washington: Bureau of American Ethnology, 1924), p. 635.

⁷ David G. Mandelbaum, "Culture Change among the Nilgiri Tribes," *American Anthropologist*, XLIII (1941), 19-26.

Class consciousness hinders the free spread of ideas by checking one of its most natural promoters, intermarriage; and it is equally potent when material advantages are reserved to a dominant people. In Ankole, an East African country, the subject Bairu cannot turn into independent stock-breeders so long as their Bahima overlords claim the prerogative of owning all productive cows.⁸

Finally, we may note the inhibitory effect of emotional revulsion from a novelty that, however useful, flouts accepted norms, as when Buddhistic scruples exclude the raising of silkworms. In short, the adoption of traits from an alien group does not follow at all from mere juxtaposition of two tribes.

Let us note next the indefinite variety of intergroup contacts. This requires special emphasis nowadays because some scholars seem obsessed with the notion that the peculiar case of Caucasian civilization impinging with all its momentum on aborigines represents the acculturational norm. The case is actually highly anomalous because it involves at least three factors absent from thousands of tribal contact phenomena that have occurred since the dawn of history: (1) an immeasurably superior technical equipment on the side of one of the "partners"; linked with (2) an incomparably greater number of individuals representing this culture; and (3) racial diversity. What may happen if these factors are altered appears from Dr. Lindgren's observations in Manchuria. Here two small communities of Tungus and Cossacks, respectively, were seen in interaction. There was no numerical preponderance of either, and the Russians did not represent the sophistications of Western society. The relationship, based on individual trading, displays a geniality rare indeed in the intercourse of whites and natives. There has been a mutual borrowing of material goods and techniques—even an exchange of Christian and shamanistic practices, the intercourse as a whole resting on a "solid foundation for mutual respect and interest."⁹

That the impact of industrialism on simpler social ideologies does not hinge on marked racial contrasts is clear from the antithesis of

⁸ K. Oberg, in M. Fortes and E. E. Evans-Pritchard (eds.), *African Political Systems* (London, 1940), p. 130.

⁹ Ethel John Lindgren, "An Example of Culture Contact without Conflict: Reindeer Tungus and Cossacks of Northwestern Manchuria," *American Anthropologist*, XL (1938), 605-21.

urban and rural life within Western Europe. In his responses to industrialism the Polish or Irish peasant hardly differs from the Crow or the Chinese. By a sinister "law of social dynamics" comparable to that of the dispersal of heat the age-hallowed neighborliness and familial sentiment yields to an aggressive profit quest with the emphasis on individual advancement.¹⁰ Genial Viennese *Fortwursteln* ("muddling along") recedes before Prussian efficiency.

At all events, the relations of natives with modern civilization are not even typical of the intercourse between literate and illiterate populations. A halfway adequate philosophy of acculturation must take cognizance (among others) of the following theoretically no less significant situations: the varying effects of Islam on Malays, East Africans, and Sudanese; the influence of Persia on rude Arab culture in the seventh century; the contact of Chinese with Mongols, with medieval Filipinos, with early Japanese, with Lolo; the contact of Hindu and Dravidian. To mention these possibilities is to quash the notion that the recent assimilation of Indians in the United States provides a general pattern.

A few concrete instances must suffice for illustration. The Malays who visited Arnhem Land came in small numbers, unaccompanied by women, bent solely on getting prized raw materials; they hardly indulged in miscegenation, made no permanent settlements, and promptly returned homeward. Apart from supplying metal tools and introducing dugout canoes, their influence on the Murngin remained wholly negligible.¹¹ This contrasts sharply with the influx of Arab ivory or slave traders into Zanzibar. Though here, too, the newcomers were preponderantly male and primarily interested in commerce, they commonly married native women and through their propagandist zeal achieved an incomparably greater effect on Tanganyika than the Malays did in Australia.¹² An interesting dual result of Islam in the Kano Emirate has recently come to light. Be-

¹⁰ Cf. W. I. Thomas and Florian Znaniecki, *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America* (New York, 1927), I, 96, 125, 158, 164 f., 185; Conrad Arensberg, *The Irish Countryman* (New York, 1937); Lin Yu Tang, *My Country and My People* (New York, 1938), pp. 23, 172 f., and *passim*.

¹¹ W. Lloyd Warner, *A Black Civilization* (New York and London, 1937), pp. 453-68.

¹² Hilde Thurnwald, *Die schwarze Frau im Wandel Afrikas* (Stuttgart, 1935), pp. 97 f.

tween the Mohammedanized Hausa and their pagan brethren acculturation proceeds in normal fashion, with a blending of Islamic and heathen elements. But the Hausa have never had a protracted intercourse with alien Moslems: "the essential acculturative agent has been the books in which Mohammedan teachings are contained." That is, not Arab or North African whites, but literate Negro converts "have adapted what they found in sacred texts to the native situation, retaining much of pagan culture at the same time, by fitting it into a Moslem framework."¹³

These random samples afford at least some slight conception of the diversity of the results from contact between a higher and a lower culture.

All these instances, however, are atypical if we recall that writing dates back only a few millennia and has been narrowly restricted during most of that period, both regionally and as to population within literate countries. Yet in the preceding thousands of years an indefinite number of peoples have met and in many instances profited from the encounter. In innumerable instances of this type the racial differences were absent, negligible, or at least far less than those between, say, Englishmen and Australian blackfellows; the cultural level differed slightly or not at all; the relative numbers in the populations were of comparable orders of magnitude.

To take an American instance, not long after 1700 the New Mexican Tewa were invited by the Hopi of Walpi to assist their village against the Ute. "They came, defeated the marauders, and ever since have considered themselves warrior protectors," generally standing out from their meeker neighbors by their superior dash. Linked with an equivalent economic technique, the assimilative processes were not revolutionary, but they are nonetheless interesting. The newcomers retained their speech but became bilingual. They kept their kinship terminology but completely adapted themselves to the matrilineal clan organization of the Hopi. Ceremonially, they were not unaffected, of course, but managed to preserve their individuality, spurning some Hopi features and keeping part of their heritage from their hosts' ken.¹⁴

¹³ Joseph H. Gruenberg, "Some Aspects of Negro-Mohammedan Culture-Contact among the Hausa," *American Anthropologist*, XLIII (1941), 51-61.

¹⁴ Parsons, *op. cit.*, pp. 913 ff.

The prehistoric intercourse between Tonga and Fiji presents other points of interest. Navigators from the Polynesian group were attracted by the hardwood available in the southern Fijian islands and developed regular trade relations. Because of the martial spirit of their hosts, Tongans would at times spend a few years in military training under a Fijian chief. Some received land as a reward for their services and established colonies, whence an infiltration of West Polynesian ideas.¹⁵

To take a third instance, the Buin of the Solomon Islands are a blend of Papuans with conquering Melanesian navigators. The latter introduced some novelties, such as pigs. They stratified the anciently democratic society. At first inclined to bar intermarriage, the invaders were obliged by dearth of noble women to restrict endogamy to a favored few, such as the chief's eldest son. Thus evolved the intermediate status of the half-caste. At the same time the earlier matrilineal scheme was superseded by the emphasis on paternal descent suggested by the father's superiority in rank.¹⁶

Obviously, momentous modifications may take place without spectacular disparity in level of advancement. On the other hand, the Tewa-Hopi case illustrates that nothing revolutionary is fore-ordained by the contact of alien groups. But even when the changes are minimal, we must postulate a transitional stage: before the four Nilgiri tribes mentioned above could accomplish their odd partnership there were bound to be various steps bringing the anciently divided groups into their present qualified co-operativeness. It is a pity that these steps are not directly ascertainable.

INTERNAL CHANGE

As stated at the outset, the reality of internal innovation is proved by inventions locally rooted, hence in no way traceable to a foreign origin. These achievements are the inevitable consequence of individual differences impressing themselves on the society in which they arise. That noteworthy ideas may have been repeatedly lost to simple peoples from irresponsiveness to their proclaimer is a commonplace of sociological speculation. Unfortunately we lack data on

¹⁵ Laura Thompson, *Fijian Frontier* (San Francisco, 1940), pp. 22 f.; *Southern Lau, Fiji* (an ethnography ["Bernice P. Bishop Museum," Bull. 162 (Honolulu, 1940)]), p. 29.

¹⁶ Hilde Thurnwald, *Menschen der Südsee* (Stuttgart, 1937), pp. 3 f.

the methods by which such epoch-making innovations as, say, fire-drilling, gained acceptance in early times. Many of these achievements, as already explained, must have slunk in by the back door, as it were.

Of minor variations, however, there is abundant evidence. As appears from one of our most exact studies of primitive art, the North-west Californian basket-weaver practices a thoroughly standardized craft, with predetermined materials, techniques, and designs. There are modifications, but almost invariably they must conform to the traditional pattern if they are to be accepted as valid.¹⁷ Such cramped variability Goldenweiser has termed "involution," and Parsons has furnished some striking instances from the field of Pueblo ritualism.¹⁸

In this matter, nevertheless, we must proceed with caution. What seems trivial to us in native ritual may loom as highly significant in the celebrant's consciousness. Among my Crow informants, Medicine Crow, a famous old warrior and visionary, ranked very high in public estimation. On the basis of a vision he had founded a new chapter of the tobacco society—a typical sample of involution from our standpoint, since the novelty introduced consisted in such details as substituting a crane for the traditional otter skin borne in a procession. Yet though the variation, supernaturally sanctioned as it was, adhered strictly to Crow precedent, I have heard an Indian refer rather slightly to this mere innovation. It was not the kind of thing, in other words, that was negligible. Medicine Crow happened to have had the prestige necessary for establishing his revelation among his local group, but it had not yet attained the unchallengeable sacrosanctity of more ancient equivalents avowedly resting on the same foundation. This shift impresses me as a fair sample of a transitional situation. I shall revert to this point.

The Messianic cults so frequently reported from primitive peoples illustrate both internal involution and internal mutation. In the past it has been customary to regard these movements as a reaction

¹⁷ Lila M. O'Neale, *Yurok-Karok Basket Weavers* ("University of California Publications in American Archaeology and Ethnology," Vol. XXXII, No. 1 [1932]), pp. 1-184.

¹⁸ Alexander A. Goldenweiser, "Loose Ends of Theory on the Individual Pattern, and Involution in Primitive Society," *Essays in Anthropology in Honor of Alfred Louis Kroeber* (Berkeley, 1936), p. 103; Parsons, *op. cit.*, p. 1124.

to Caucasian encroachment with its concomitant evils, and I have myself so considered them. But though some of the relevant dispensations certainly were affected by white contact and came to embody Christian elements, an aboriginal basis for many of the "prophet religions" now seems definitely established. Thus, the notion that the earth is growing old, that there will be a reunion with the dead to be achieved by dancing, that unbelievers are to receive condign punishment, all appear in northwestern America and in Paraguay with involuntal repetitiveness.¹⁹

Among these phenomena some may further be singled out as not merely aboriginal but as indubitably revolutionary in tenor. Thus, the Bantu prophets of the nineteenth century did adopt some Christian ideas, as indicated by their claim to kinship with Christ. But when in 1856 one of them decreed the destruction of all livestock as a prelude to the extermination of the whites, he was not preaching the gospel and was also running counter to the deep-rooted idolatry of cattle characteristic of East Africans. That he was obeyed is an amazing testimony to the power of his personality. Comparable cases are not lacking from North America. In defiance of all Indian tradition individual leaders convinced the tribes about the Great Lakes not only to kill all their dogs but to give up their sacred bags, hitherto their most prized possessions.²⁰

Effective change from internal causes is thus both a priori certain and in a measure demonstrable by direct evidence.

SPECIFIC AGENTS OF CHANGE

Inevitably our direct information is best on the result of modifications either wholly or in part due to Caucasian agency. What may have immediately followed the invention of the bow, for example, we do not know; and the observed failure of many peoples to exploit

¹⁹ Leslie Spier, *The Prophet Dance of the Northwest and Its Derivatives: The Source of the Ghost Dance* ("General Series in Anthropology," No. 1 [1935]); E. Adamson Hoebel, "The Comanche Sun Dance and Messianic Outbreak of 1873," *American Anthropologist*, XLIII (1941), 301 ff.; Curt Nimuendajú, "Die Sagen von der Erschaffung und Vernichtung der Welt als Grundlagen der Apapocuva-Guarani," *Zeitschrift für Ethnologie*, XLVI (1914), 287, 318-20, 327, 399.

²⁰ Joseph Shooter, *The Kafirs of Natal and the Zulu Country* (London, 1857), pp. 195-212; Edwin James, *An Indian Captivity (1789-1822): John Tanner's Narrative of His Captivity among the Ottawa and Ojibwa Indians, 1830* ("Sutro Branch, California State Library Edition" [San Francisco, 1940]), chaps. ix, xi, pp. 111 f., 141.

possibilities within their reach makes us hesitant about speculating where written evidence is unavailable. The Ifugao of Luzon prize hogs and buffalo, but as an article of food both are inconsequential compared to a lowly univalve;²¹ and throughout Melanesia the pig greatly affects social prestige without noticeably adding to mass subsistence. Such examples deter us from overemphasizing rationalistic considerations in reconstructing an undocumented past. If we are to play safe we are thus largely restricted to such instances as the reindeer husbandry of the Lapps or the introduction of horses and guns among North American Indians.

To take the former case, the domestic reindeer was not a gift of Nordic neighbors, but the Lapps did come to acquire dairying techniques on the model of cattle-breeding Scandinavians. Also the development of their new industry depended in part on the demands of southern markets, in part on the governmental regulations of the several countries that asserted sovereignty over the land, not to forget their informal relations with Finnish, Russian, Swedish, and Norwegian peasants. To these must be added the intercourse with such Lapps as either adhered to the ancient hunting and fishing economy or settled down in imitation of Nordic farmers.

In the ninth century Othere reports reindeer-breeding in Scandinavia, but as yet neither sledge-driving nor milking. Both are attested as in full swing by the sixteenth century, but apparently predominant dependence on domestic reindeer did not occur in any Lapp group until fairly recent times. For such exclusive reliance 50 head to a household are deemed insufficient, and comfort demands 200 and more. The early Swedish tax lists are very illuminating in this regard.

In 1609 the 103 Lapp taxpayers of Ume jointly owned only 946 head, yielding an average of 9, the wealthiest having no more than 28; in Lule the average was 22, with the largest herd embracing 75 animals. Correspondingly, as taxes in kind the skins of reindeer are far outnumbered by those of other species: in 1549 the Västerbotten Lapps paid 103½ marten, 1,760 squirrel, and only 75 reindeer skins. In Leem's time, i.e., in the eighteenth century, the richest natives no longer hunted, but in 1740 the Lapps of Kautokeino were still roam-

²¹ R. F. Barton, *Ifugao Economics* ("University of California Publications in American Archaeology and Ethnology," Vol. XV [1822]), p. 396.

ing around in search of food "since hardly anyone is wealthy enough to support himself and his household solely with his reindeer."²²

The transformation of reindeer-hunters and small-scale breeders into true pastoralists was bound to usher in numerous alterations in daily life and customary law. Anciently, each local group ("siddâ") had its own territory, only the less valuable game being hunted individually, while beaver, reindeer, bears, and wolves were divided among all members of the group. The spots for catching beaver were allotted, and nobody might sell or give away a beaver without the consent of the entire community, which in 1733 explicitly asserted its claim to beaver and wild reindeer. In harmony with such notions there were originally no distinctions of wealth. The growth of domestic herds introduced individual ownership, with marked differences in this respect, and the need for increased pasturage led to more and more regulated migration, to the recession of wild reindeer, to all manner of social and technical readaptations.²³

This brief statement ignores many elements in the Lapp situation. For, as stated, some Lapps retained their ancient mode of subsistence; others turned into sedentary farmers, raising fodder for a few kine, sheep, and horses, but fishing in the summertime and letting their handful of reindeer graze for months at a time with the herds of friendly reindeer nomads, who were informally regarded as of superior status.²⁴

The metamorphosis in this case was spread over centuries, yet the really vital transformation seems to have been accomplished rather rapidly. A Lapp with a few head of livestock for transport, for flesh, and for decoying their wild fellows was not noticeably ahead of his fishing congeners. It was evidently the rise of dairying and large herds that crucially turned the people into true pastoralists.

In America the introduction of the horse yielded less spectacular but nonetheless noteworthy results within a short period. The Crow of eastern Montana, who could barely have known horses in 1730,

²² Gudmund Hatt, *Notes on Reindeer Nomadism* ("Memoirs of the American Anthropological Association," Vol. VI, No. 2 [1919]), pp. 120, 122; Erik Solem, *Lappiske Rettsstudier* (Oslo, 1933), pp. 14-21, 184; P. L. Smith, *Kautokeino og Kautokeino-Lappene* (Oslo, 1938), p. 562 ff.

²³ Solem, *op. cit.*, pp. 81 f., 89, 92, 104, 185, 187 f., 201-3, 288 f.

²⁴ Smith, *op. cit.*, pp. 566-72.

had obtained large numbers of them by 1805. Says Larocque: "He is reckoned a poor man that has not 10 horses in the spring before the trade at the Missouri takes place, and many have 30 or 40, everybody rides, men, women and children." And a generation later Prince Maximilian of Wied of Neuwied found from 9,000 to 10,000 horses in a population of some 3,000.²⁵ Contrary to some fantastic recent claims, this rise of equestrianism cannot be considered equivalent to Old World pastoral economics. No Indian ever dreamed of milking mares, and very few of the tribes ever took to eating horse-flesh. As Dr. Demitri Shimkin is pointing out in an as yet unprinted study, even the indirect value of horses for a buffalo economy must not be exaggerated. In the Wind River Shoshone country, at least, there was the serious problem of pasturage for a large herd of horses in competition with the bison, and the small number of head actually owned prevented large-scale transportation of buffalo meat. Nevertheless, the total impress of the horse on aboriginal life in the plains and adjacent regions was significant. Buffalo could be surrounded or impounded with far greater effectiveness; in districts where the natives hitherto had been riveted to spots near their stored supplies, they could now transport them to a central location, travel generally grew extensive, and the association of larger bodies en route created major bands. The new beast also stimulated looting, i.e., raids and a complication of martial usage. Again, leather-working was accentuated by the increase of skins, whereas pottery fell into desuetude because of its unsuitability in an equestrian society.²⁶

Especially convincing is the co-operation of the horse and other European stimuli in remodeling life for the Western Cree, as demonstrated in a recent analysis.²⁷ In 1666-67 the ancestors of this tribe were northern Algonkian hunters and fishermen, gathering wild rice and traveling by canoes. A few years later they had already come

²⁵ L. J. Burpee (ed.), *Journal of Larocque from the Assiniboine to the Yellowstone* ("Publications of the Canadian Archives," No. 3 [Ottawa, 1910]), p. 64; Robert H. Lowie, *The Crow Indians* (New York, 1935), p. xiv.

²⁶ Julian H. Steward, *Basin-Plateau Aboriginal Sociopolitical Groups* ("Bureau of American Ethnology," Bull. 120 [1938]), pp. 200-202, 232-37. Personal communication by Dr. D. Shimkin.

²⁷ David G. Mandelbaum, *The Plains Cree* ("Anthropological Papers, American Museum of Natural History," Vol. XXXVII [1940]), pp. 163-316, esp. 169-87; "Boom Periods in the History of an Indian Tribe," *Social Forces*, XVI (1937), 117-19.

to look to white traders for part of their food supply, and the European craving for peltry soon deflected much of their energies into the search for furs. As the Cree obtained guns and other contrivances from the posts, they had to lean heavily on the trade relationship; and when urged to get ever more furs for the markets of Europe, they were able to push westward by means of their firearms, ousting earlier occupants until in proximity to the Assiniboine and the hostile Blackfoot they approached the status of plains Indians while their eastern fellows retained the woodland economy of old. The intermediate era (1740-1820) exhibits a blend of forest and prairie traits: western bands were both impounding buffalo and plying the rivers in canoes. As elsewhere, equestrianism enhanced mobility, made hunting more effective, and added a goad to warfare. In the end the Western Cree were virtually a plains people, with just a few reminiscences of their earlier state—fishing, snowshoes, birch-bark vessels, and maple-sugar gathering. Of these, the retention of snowshoes proved very helpful in winter warfare against the Blackfoot, who had to wade in snow waist deep against their nimbler foes.²⁸

Horses and firearms between them certainly wrought tremendous changes among the natives of our central states. An archaeological site in east-central North Dakota destroyed in about 1770 reveals the Cheyenne of that period as farmers dwelling in earth lodges within fortified villages and making pottery. Not more than two generations later these people had become one of the most typical of purely nomadic mounted bison-hunters.²⁹

Post-Columbian phenomena on the plains shed light on the character of "transition." Our Cheyenne tillers were probably contemporaries of fellow-tribesmen who had advanced farther west and grown proportionately estranged from the earlier horticultural life. Such differences between the local subdivisions of a people may be considered of common occurrence. Also, there are different planes of acclimatization. We have seen that by 1805 the Crow ranked as full-fledged horsemen, and the plains tribes generally made the theft

²⁸ Clark Wissler, *Material Culture of the Blackfoot Indians* ("Anthropological Papers, American Museum of Natural History," Vol. V [1910]), p. 97.

²⁹ Wm. Duncan Strong, "From History to Prehistory in the Northern Great Plains," *Essays in Historical Anthropology of North America* ("Smithsonian Miscellaneous Collections," Vol. C [1940]), pp. 370 f.

of horses a primary goal in their raids. Yet as a rule they would start on a war party afoot, preserving in this respect the ancient usage. More significant still, the horse remained of little religious importance; even though it was the constant object prayed for, we rarely, if ever, hear of a supernatural horse on a par with bear, eagle, beaver, or other animal spirits. One Crow band had a horse dance; but the celebrants derived their power from an eagle. On this religious inferiority of the horse, Dr. Mandelbaum's Cree observations corroborate my own;³⁰ and the general point is, I think, borne out by Bogoras' experiences among the Chukchi, where the comparatively recent reindeer is ritually less significant than the ancient dog.

The principle that novelties are religiously inferior holds true for weapons as well. In 1805 the Crow, obliged to obtain firearms and ammunition from the village tribes of the upper Missouri, were still poor shots with the gun.³¹ The deficiency was soon enough overcome; and, what is more, the wresting away of a gun in a hand-to-hand fight came to be recognized as an honorific exploit equivalent to the older bow-snatching. Yet in the preparations for the sacred sun dance, it was explicitly ordained to shoot a bull "without the use of a gun"; and when my informant Medicine Crow had a vision sanctioning a new chapter of the tobacco society, he was told to permit no guns in the ceremony. So the medicine-arrow bundle remained one of the holiest of Crow possessions, to which there was no parallel in the form of a firearms bundle. At least one man, to be sure, "had a gun for his medicine" and the prophet Wraps-up-his-tail in 1887 wielded a supposedly magical sword.³² There was thus no absolute rule to bar innovations from the realm of the supernatural, but such novelties did remain parvenus.

Any of the material alterations in aboriginal life may, as Maine recognized decades ago, produce far-reaching changes in ideology. The mere fact that an individual Solomon Islander becomes the commission agent for an Australian firm would seem of little moment,

³⁰ Mandelbaum, *op. cit.*, p. 195; Robert H. Lowie, *Minor Ceremonies of the Crow Indians*, XXI (1924), 329 f.

³¹ Burpee, *op. cit.*, pp. 64, 66.

³² Lowie, *The Sun Dance of the Crow Indians* ("Anthropological Papers, American Museum of Natural History," Vol. XVI [1915]), p. 26; *The Tobacco Society of the Crow Indians* ("Anthropological Papers, American Museum of Natural History," Vol. XXI, Part II [1920]), p. 117; *The Religion of the Crow Indians*, XXV (1922), 365, 369, 391.

yet in a sinister way it strikes at one of the axioms of the primitive social scheme. The man's earnings now enable him to buy food at will; hence his wife disdains to plant vegetables or to raise pigs, turning into an atypical parasite. Again, missionaries and colonial administrators clash with aboriginal notions not only when they avowedly oppose them but in the subtler manner of sapping their foundations. The very fact of, say, British sovereignty, when once asserted, undermines the authority of a hitherto supreme native chief even without the express curtailment of his primitive authority; and the native scheme of matrimonial arrangements is thrown out of gear when missionaries discourage early marriages.³³

INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES

Whether changes be internal or imposed from without, an ever present factor to be reckoned with is the variability of human beings. Even so minor a modification of ritual as that of Medicine Crow, my Crow visionary, wholly within the traditional framework as it remained, elicited at least one die-hard's deprecatory reaction. As for major upheavals—say the ghost dance of our plains Indians in 1890—we can note the entire gamut of psychic response from fervent espousal to snarling repudiation: the beckoning savior of one prospective convert is spurned by another tribesman as a sheer mountebank.³⁴

The underlying differences in temperament appear throughout the history of Caucasian intercourse with natives. The civil feuds of liberals and conservatives that rend our Pueblo societies and have led to schisms within the last generation can be traced back to at least 1700.³⁵ Mrs. Thurnwald's Melanesian material teems with striking illustrations of varying adjustment to European influences. One Buin transforms himself from an executioner into a great shaman; another reaps from the altered conditions a maximum of material gain. One chief drops the pomp of circumstance in daily relations with his henchmen; another jealously guards the traditional reserve. In their total reaction to the white man's ways some of these Melanesians achieve a fair equilibrium in reconciling themselves to innovations though avoiding a break with received attitudes; others

³³ H. Thurnwald, *Menschen der Südsee*, pp. 23-25, 37, 41, 43-47.

³⁴ Lowie, *Primitive Religion* (New York, 1924), pp. 253 f.

³⁵ Parsons, *op. cit.*, pp. 862, 1134.

grow estranged from aboriginal usage, which they treat with haughty disdain; still others cling to the old life with grim tenacity; and so on, with endless shading.³⁶

SUMMARY

The dynamic view of primitive life that has definitively superseded earlier conceptions implies an unending series of transitional stages. Changes take place unaided by extraneous influences, but oftener, or at least more often demonstrably, when diverse groups meet. But the forms of contact are so numerous and differ so essentially that generalizations must define the category to which they are applicable. Thus, a simpler people may be swamped by sheer force of superior numbers, whereas lacking such disparity they may maintain their integrity. Again, transmission may be highly selective or, as among the Nilgiri tribes, artificially confined; more frequently it is from more complex to simpler levels, but by no means rarely has borrowing taken place in the reverse direction. In any case alien contact does offer rich possibilities for the amplification, unsettling, and reintegration of culture. When changes occur, whether of domestic or foreign origin, they may produce far-reaching consequences that cannot be divined at first blush. It is a far cry from the European craze for beaver hats to the transmutation of woodland into plains Cree; nor can that development be inferred by a synthetic judgment a priori from the purveying of guns and horses to the Indian.

The very continuousness of change, along with the incalculable character of its effects, makes it impossible to define sharply when a new era has begun to dawn. Whatever may hold for a macrocosmic view, the course of events for sentient human beings may be vitally determined by fortuitous circumstances. Among these the chance distribution of individual differences at a given point may be significant. Perhaps a practical definition of transition might start from this postulate: we may term a condition "transitional" in which there are marked individual differences in attitude toward alternative fulfilments of social needs, the one conforming to tradition, the other to a proposed substitute.

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³⁶ H. Thurnwald, *Menschen der Südsee*, pp. 28, 39 f., 56 f., 74 f., 165.

THE SOCIOLOGICAL ROOTS OF SCIENCE

EDGAR ZILSEL¹

ABSTRACT

In the period from 1300 to 1600 three strata of intellectual activity must be distinguished: university scholars, humanists, and artisans. Both university scholars and humanists were rationally trained. Their methods, however, were determined by their professional conditions and differed substantially from the methods of science. Both professors and humanistic literati distinguished liberal from mechanical arts and despised manual labor, experimentation, and dissection. Craftsmen were the pioneers of causal thinking in this period. Certain groups of superior manual laborers (artist-engineers, surgeons, the makers of nautical and musical instruments, surveyors, navigators, gunners) experimented, dissected, and used quantitative methods. The measuring instruments of the navigators, surveyors, and gunners were the forerunners of the later physical instruments. The craftsmen, however, lacked methodical intellectual training. Thus the two components of the scientific method were separated by a social barrier: logical training was reserved for upper-class scholars; experimentation, causal interest, and quantitative method were left to more or less plebeian artisans. Science was born when, with the progress of technology, the experimental method eventually overcame the social prejudice against manual labor and was adopted by rationally trained scholars. This was accomplished about 1600 (Gilbert, Galileo, Bacon). At the same time the scholastic method of disputation and the humanistic ideal of individual glory were superseded by the ideals of control of nature and advancement of learning through scientific co-operation. In a somewhat different way, sociologically, modern astronomy developed. The whole process was imbedded in the advance of early capitalistic society, which weakened collective-mindedness, magical thinking, and belief in authority and which furthered worldly, causal, rational, and quantitative thinking.

Were there many separate cultures in which science has developed and others in which it is lacking, the question about the origin of science would generally be recognized as a sociological one and could be answered by singling out the common traits of the scientific in contrast to the nonscientific cultures. Historical reality, unfortunately, is different, for fully developed science appears once only, namely, in modern Western civilization. It is this fact that obscures our problem. We are only too inclined to consider ourselves and our own civilization as the natural peak of human evolution. From this presumption the belief originates that man simply became more and more intelligent until one day a few great investigators and pioneers appeared and produced science as the last stage of a one-line intellectual ascent. Thus it is not realized that human thinking has developed in many and divergent ways—among which one is the scien-

¹ This article outlines a study undertaken with the help of grants from the Committee in Aid of Displaced Foreign Scholars, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the Social Science Research Council.

tific. One forgets how amazing it is that science arose at all and especially in a certain period and under special sociological conditions.

It is not impossible, however, to study the emergence of modern science as a sociological process. Since this emergence took place in the period of early European capitalism, we shall have to review that period from the end of the Middle Ages until 1600. Certain stages of the scientific spirit, however, developed in other cultures too, e.g., in classical antiquity and, to a lesser degree, in some oriental civilizations and in the Arabic culture of the Middle Ages. Moreover, the scientific and half-scientific cultures are not independent of each other. In modern Europe the beginnings of science, particularly, have been greatly influenced by the achievements of ancient mathematicians and astronomers and medieval Arabic physicians. We shall, however, discuss not this influence but the sociological conditions which made it possible. We can, necessarily, give but a sketchy and greatly simplified analysis of this topic here. All details and much of the evidence must be left to a more extensive exposition at another place.

I

✓ Human society has not often changed so fundamentally as it did with the transition from feudalism to early capitalism. These changes are generally known. Even in a very brief exposition of the problem, however, we must mention some of them, since they form necessary conditions for the rise of science.

1. The emergence of early capitalism is connected with a change in both the setting and the bearers of culture. In the feudal society of the Middle Ages the castles of knights and rural monasteries were the centers of culture. In early capitalism culture was centered in towns. The spirit of science is worldly and not military. Obviously, therefore, it could not develop among clergymen and knights but only among townspeople.

2. The end of the Middle Ages was a period of rapidly progressing technology and technological inventions. Machines began to be used both in production of goods and in warfare. On the one hand, this set tasks for mechanics and chemistry, and, on the other, it furthered causal thinking, and, in general, weakened magical thinking.

3. In medieval society the individual was bound to the traditions of the group to which he unalterably belonged. In early capitalism economic success depended on the spirit of enterprise of the individual. In early feudalism economic competition was unknown. When it started among the craftsmen and tradesmen of the late medieval towns, their guilds tried to check it. But competition proved stronger than the guilds. It dissolved the organizations and destroyed the collective-mindedness of the Middle Ages. The merchant or craftsman of early capitalism who worked in the same way as his fathers had was outstripped by less conservative competitors. The individualism of the new society is a presupposition of scientific thinking. The scientist, too, relies, in the last resort, only on his own eyes and his own brain and is supposed to make himself independent of belief in authorities. Without criticism there is no science. The critical scientific spirit (which is entirely unknown to all societies without economic competition) is the most powerful explosive human society ever has produced. If the critical spirit expanded to the whole field of thinking and acting it would lead to anarchism and social disintegration. In ordinary life this is prevented by social instincts and social necessities. In science itself the individualistic tendencies are counterbalanced by scientific co-operation. This, however, will be discussed later.

4. Feudal society was ruled by tradition and custom, whereas early capitalism proceeded rationally. It calculated and measured, introduced bookkeeping, and used machines. The rise of economic rationality furthered development of rational scientific methods. The emergence of the quantitative method, which is virtually non-existent in medieval theories, cannot be separated from the counting and calculating spirit of capitalistic economy. The first literary exposition of the technique of double-entry bookkeeping is contained in the best textbook on mathematics of the fifteenth century, Luca Pacioli's *Summa de arithmetica* (Venice, 1494); the first application of double-entry bookkeeping to the problems of public finances and administration was made in the collected mathematical works of Simon Stevin, the pioneer of scientific mechanics (*Hypomnemata mathematica* [Leyden, 1608]), and a paper of Copernicus on monetary reform (*Monetae cudendae ratio* [composed in 1552]) is

among the earliest investigations of coinage. This cannot be mere coincidence.

The development of the most rational of sciences, mathematics, is particularly closely linked with the advance of rationality in technology and economy. The modern sign of mathematical equality was first used in an arithmetical textbook of *Recorde* that is dedicated to the "governors and the reste of the Companio of Venturers into Moscovia" with the wish for "continualle increase of commoditie by their travell" (*The Wetstone of Wille* [London, 1557]). Decimal fractions were first introduced in a mathematical pamphlet of Stevin that begins with the words: "To all astronomers, surveyors, measurers of tapestry, barrells and other things, to all mintmasters and merchants good luck!" (*De thiende* [Leyden, 1585]). Apart from infusions of Pythagorean and Platonic metaphysics, the mathematical writings of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries first deal in detail with problems of commercial arithmetic and, second, with the technological needs of military engineers, surveyors, architects, and artisans. The geometrical and arithmetical treatises of Piero de' Franceschi, Luca Pacioli, and Tartaglia in Italy, *Recorde* and Leonard Digges in England, Dürer and Stifel in Germany, are cases in point. Classical mathematical tradition (Euclid, Archimedes, Apollonius, Diophantus) could be revived in the sixteenth century because the new society had grown to demand calculation and measurement.

Even rationalization of public administration and law had its counterpart in scientific ideas. The loose state of feudalism with its vague traditional law was gradually superseded by absolute monarchies with central sovereignty and rational statute law. This political and juridical change promoted the emergence of the idea that all physical processes are governed by rational natural laws established by God. This, however, did not occur before the seventeenth century (Descartes, Huyghens, Boyle).²

II

We have mentioned a few general characteristics of early capitalistic society which form necessary conditions for the rise of the scien-

² Cf. Edgar Zilsel, "The Genesis of the Concept of Physical Law," *Philosophical Review*, LI (1942).

tific spirit. In order to understand this development sociologically, we have to distinguish three strata of intellectual activity in the period from 1300 to 1600: the universities, humanism, and labor.

At the universities theology and scholasticism still predominated. The university scholars were trained to think rationally but exercised the methods of scholastic rationalism which differ basically from the rational methods of a developed economy. Tradesmen are interested in reckoning; craftsmen and engineers in rational rules of operation, in rational investigation of causes, in rational physical laws. Schoolteachers, on the other hand, take an interest in rational distinction and classifications. The old sentence, "bene docet qui bene distinguit," is as correct as it is sociologically significant. Schoolteaching, by its sociological conditions, produces a specific kind of rationality, which appears in similar forms wherever old priests, intrusted with the task of instructing priest candidates, rationalize vague and contradictory mythological traditions of the past. Brahmins in India, Buddhist theologians in Japan, Arabic and Catholic medieval scholastics conform in their methods to an astonishing degree. Jewish Talmudists proceeded in the same way, though, not being priests by profession, they dealt with ritual and canon law rather than with proper theological questions. This school rationality has developed to a monstrous degree in Brahmanic Sankhya-philosophy (sankhya means "enumeration").

As a rule the specific scholastic methods are preserved when theologians, in the course of social development, apply themselves to secular subject matters. Thus in Indian literature Brahmins who had entered the service of princes discussed politics and erotics by meticulously distinguishing and enumerating the various possibilities of political and sexual life (Kautilya, Vatsyayana).³ In a somewhat analogous way the medieval scholastics and the European university scholars before 1600 indulged in subtle distinctions, enumerations, and disputations. Bound to authorities, they favored quotation and uttered their opinions for the most part in the form of commentaries and compilations. After the thirteenth century mundane subject matters were treated by scholars, too, and, as an exception,

³ Cf. M. Winternitz, *Geschichte der indischen Literatur* (Leipzig, 1920), III, 509 ff., 536 ff.

even experience was referred to by some of them. But when the Schoolmen were at all concerned with secular events they did not, as a rule, investigate causes and, never, physical laws. They endeavored rather to explain the ends and meanings of the phenomena. Obviously, the occult qualities and Aristotelian substantial forms of scholasticism are but rationalizations of prescientific, magic, and animistic teleology. Thus till the middle of the sixteenth century the universities were scarcely influenced by the development of contemporary technology and by humanism. Their spirit was still substantially medieval. It seems to be a general sociological phenomenon that rigidly organized schools are able to offer considerable resistance to social changes of the external world.⁴

The first representatives of secular learning appeared in the fourteenth century in Italian cities. They were not scientists but secretaries and officials of municipalities, princes, and the pope looking up with envy to the political and cultural achievements of the classical past. These learned officials who chiefly had to conduct the foreign affairs of their employers became the fathers of humanism. Their aims derive from the conditions of their profession. The more erudite and polished their writings, the more eloquent their speeches, the more prestige redounded to their employers and the more fame to themselves. They therefore chiefly strove after perfection of style and accumulation of classical knowledge. In the following centuries the Italian humanists lost in large part their official connections. Many became free *literati*, dependent on princes, noblemen, and bankers as patrons. Others were engaged as instructors to the sons of princes, and several got academic chairs and taught Latin and Greek at universities. Their aims remained unchanged, and their pride of memory and learning, their passion for fame, even increased. They acknowledged certain ancient writers as patterns of style and

⁴ Pierre Duhem has brought into prominence the fourteenth-century Ockhamists of the university of Paris (Buridan, Oresme, and others) and has attempted to vindicate for them scientific priority to Copernicus and Galileo. Though knowledge of late scholasticism has been greatly furthered by Duhem's investigation of the Paris Schoolmen, he has considerably overrated their "anticipations" of modern physical and astronomical ideas. He singles out the scarce and rather extrinsic conformities with modern natural science and omits the abundance of differences. Duhem's opinion has been uncritically adopted by many followers.

were bound to these secular authorities almost as strictly as the theologians were to their religious ones. Though humanism also proceeded rationally, its methods were as different from scholastic as from modern scientific rationality. Humanism developed the methods of scientific philology, but neglected causal research and was ignorant of physical laws and quantitative investigation. Altogether it was considerably more interested in words than in things, more in literary forms than in contents. Humanism spread over all parts of western and central Europe. Though the professional conditions and intellectual aims of the humanists outside Italy were somewhat more complex, on the whole their methods were the same.⁵

The university scholars and the humanistic literati of the Renaissance were exceedingly proud of their social rank. Both disdained uneducated people. They avoided the vernacular and wrote and spoke Latin only. Further, they were attached to the upper classes, sharing the social prejudices of the nobility and the rich merchants and bankers and despising manual labor. Both, therefore, adopted the ancient distinction between liberal and mechanical arts: only professions which do not require manual work were considered by them, their patrons, and their public to be worthy of well-bred men.

The social antithesis of mechanical and liberal arts, of hands and tongue, influenced all intellectual and professional activity in the Renaissance. The university-trained medical doctors contented themselves more or less with commenting on the medical writings of antiquity; the surgeons who did manual work such as operating and dissecting belonged with the barbers and had a social position similar

⁵ It seems to be a rather general sociological phenomenon that, where there are professional public officials, secular learning first appears in the form of humanism. In China also after the dissolution of feudalism in the period of Confucius a group of literati officials developed who were chiefly interested in perfection of style and who acknowledged certain ancient writings as literary models. In the following period admission to civil service was made dependent on examinations regarding literary style and knowledge of antiquity. In China even calligraphy belonged to the formal requirements of higher education, Chinese writing characters being more complicated than European ones. Secular scribes, proud of their profession and learning and bound to ancient models, can be found also in ancient Egypt and the neo-Parthian empire. In classical antiquity there was an abundance of rhetors, grammarians, philologists, and philosophers rather resembling the humanistic literati of the Renaissance. Yet lack of professional civil servants in the republican period prevented development of a perfect correspondence.

to that of midwives. Literati were much more highly esteemed than were artists. In the fourteenth century the latter were not separated from whitewashers and stone-dressers and, like all craftsmen, were organized in guilds. They gradually became detached from handicraft, until a separation was effected in Italy about the end of the sixteenth century. In the period of Leonardo da Vinci (about 1500) this had not yet been accomplished. This fact appears rather distinctly in the writings of contemporary artists who over and over again discussed the question as to whether painting and sculpture belong with liberal or mechanical arts. In these discussions the painters usually stressed their relations to learning (painting needs perspective and geometry) in order to gain social esteem. Technological inventors and geographical discoverers, being craftsmen and seamen, were hardly mentioned by the humanistic literati. The great majority of the humanists did not report on them at all. If they mentioned them, they did so in an exceedingly careless and inaccurate way. From the present point of view the culture of the Renaissance owes its most important achievements to the artists, the inventors, and the discoverers. Yet these men entirely recede into the background in the literature of the period.⁶

Beneath both the university scholars and the humanistic literati the artisans, the mariners, shipbuilders, carpenters, foundrymen, and miners worked in silence on the advance of technology and modern society. They had invented the mariner's compass and guns; they constructed paper mills, wire mills, and stamping mills; they created blast furnaces and in the sixteenth century introduced machines into mining. Having outgrown the constraints of guild tradition and being stimulated to inventions by economic competition, they were, no doubt, the real pioneers of empirical observation, experimentation, and causal research. They were uneducated, probably often illiterate,⁷ and, perhaps for that reason, today we do not

⁶ On the prestige of the literati, artists, inventors, and discoverers cf. Edgar Zilsel, *Die Entstehung des Geniebegriffes: Ein Beitrag zur Ideengeschichte der Antike und des Frühkapitalismus* (Tübingen, 1926), pp. 130-75, and 176 f. (statistical evidence).

⁷ Cf. the statistical data on population and number of school children in the chronicle of Giovanni Villani (X, 162 [fourteenth century, Florence]) and J. W. Adamson, "The Extent of Literacy in England in the 15th and 16th Centuries," *Library*, X (4th ser., 1930), 167.

even know their names. Among them were a few groups which needed more knowledge for their work than their colleagues did and, therefore, got a better education. Among these superior craftsmen the artists are most important. There were no sharp divisions between painters, sculptors, goldsmiths, and architects; but very often the same artist worked in several fields, since, on the whole, division of labor had developed only slightly in the Renaissance. Following from this a remarkable professional group arose during the fifteenth century. The men we have in mind may be called artist-engineers, for not only did they paint pictures, cast statues, and build cathedrals, but they also constructed lifting engines, canals and sluices, guns and fortresses. They invented new pigments, detected the geometrical laws of perspective, and constructed new measuring tools for engineering and gunnery. The first of them is Brunelleschi (1377-1446), the constructor of the cupola of the cathedral of Florence. Among his followers were Ghiberti (1377-1466), Leone Battista Alberti (1407-72), Leonardo da Vinci (1492-1519), and Vanoccio Biringucci (d. 1538) whose booklet on metallurgy is one of the first chemical treatises free of alchemistic superstition. One of the last of them is Benvenuto Cellini (1500-1571), who was a goldsmith and sculptor and also worked as military engineer of Florence. The German painter and engraver Albrecht Dürer, who wrote treatises on descriptive geometry and fortifications (1525 and 1527), belongs to this group. Many of the artist-engineers wrote—in the vernacular and for their colleagues—diaries and papers on their achievements. For the most part these papers circulated as manuscripts only. The artist-engineers got their education as apprentices in the workshops of their masters. Only Alberti had a humanistic education.

The surgeons belonged to a second group of superior artisans. Some Italian surgeons had contacts with artists, resulting from the fact that painting needs anatomical knowledge. The artificers of musical instruments were related to the artist-engineers. Cellini's father, for example, was an instrument-maker, and he himself was appointed as a pope's court musician for a time. In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries the forerunners of the modern piano were constructed by the representatives of this third group. The makers of nautical and astronomical instruments and of distance meters for

surveying and gunnery formed a fourth group. They made compasses and astrolabes, cross-staffs, and quadrants and invented the declinometer and inclinometer in the sixteenth century. Their measuring-instruments are the forerunners of the modern physical apparatus. Some of these men were retired navigators or gunners.⁸ The surveyors and the navigators, finally, were also considered as representatives of the mechanical arts. They and the map-makers are more important for the development of measurement and observation than of experimentation.

These superior craftsmen made contacts with learned astronomers, medical doctors, and humanists. They were told by their learned friends of Archimedes, Euclid, and Vitruvius; their inventive spirit, however, originated in their own professional work. The surgeons and some artists dissected, the surveyors and navigators measured, the artist-engineers and instrument-makers were perfectly used to experimentation and measurement, and their quantitative thumb rules are the forerunners of the physical laws of modern science. The occult qualities and substantial forms of the scholastics, the verbosity of the humanists were of no use to them. All these superior artisans had already developed considerable theoretical knowledge in the fields of mechanics, acoustics, chemistry, metallurgy, descriptive geometry, and anatomy. But, since they had not learned how to proceed systematically, their achievements form a collection of isolated discoveries. Leonardo, for example, deals sometimes quite wrongly with mechanical problems which, as his diaries reveal, he himself had solved correctly years before. The superior craftsmen, therefore, cannot be called scientists themselves, but they were the immediate predecessors of science. Of course, they were not regarded as respectable scholars by contemporary public opinion. The two components of scientific method were still separated before 1600—methodical training of intellect was preserved for upper-class learned people, for university scholars, and for humanists; experimentation and observation were left to more or less plebeian workers.

The separation of liberal and mechanical arts manifested itself

⁸ Cf., e.g., the *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* on the English instrument-makers, Humfrey Cole (d. 1580), William Bourne (d. 1583), and Robert Norman.

clearly in the literature of the period. Before 1550 respectable scholars did not care for the achievements of the nascent new world around them and wrote in Latin. On the other hand, after the end of the fifteenth century, a literature published by "mechanics" in Spanish, Portuguese, Italian, English, French, Dutch, and German had developed. It included numerous short treatises on navigation, vernacular mathematical textbooks, and dialogues dealing with commercial, technological, and gunnery problems (e.g., Étienne de la Roche, Tartaglia, Dürer, Ympyn), and various vernacular booklets on metallurgy, fortification, bookkeeping, descriptive geometry, compass-making, etc. In addition there were the unprinted but widely circulated papers of the Italian artist-engineers. These books were diligently read by the colleagues of their authors and by merchants. Many of these books, especially those on navigation, were frequently reprinted, but as a rule they were disregarded by respectable scholars. As long as this separation persisted, as long as scholars did not think of using the disdained methods of manual workers, science in the modern meaning of the word was impossible. About 1550, however, with the advance of technology, a few learned authors began to be interested in the mechanical arts, which had become economically so important, and composed Latin and vernacular works on the geographical discoveries, navigation and cartography, mining and metallurgy, surveying, mechanics, and gunnery.⁹ Eventually the social barrier between the two components of the scientific

⁹ Peter Martyr (1511, 1530), Peter Apian (1529), Gemma Phrysius (1530), Orontius Finaeus (1532), Nunes (1537, 1546, 1566), George Agricola (1544, 1556), Pedro de Medina (1545), Ramusio (1550), Leonard Digges (1556, 1571, 1579), Mercator (1569, 1578, 1594), Benedetti (1575), Guido Ubaldo (1577), Hakluyt (1589), Thomas Hood (1590, 1592, 1596, 1598), Robert Hues (1594), Edward Wright (1599), and others. The high percentage of English authors is striking. They seem to have been interested in the mechanical arts earlier than Continental writers (cf. Francis R. Johnson, *Astronomical Thought in Renaissance England* [Baltimore, 1937]). On the other hand, in the same period a few "mechanics" rose to a scientific level in their activities and their writings: the Dutch engraver and map-maker Abraham Ortelius (1527-98), who became geographer to Philip II of Spain and a scientific cartographer; the French barber-surgeon Ambroise Paré (1510-90), who became surgeon to Henry II of France and the founder of modern scientific surgery; the cashier and bookkeeper of the municipalities of Antwerp and Bruges, Simon Stevin (1548-1620), who became technological and mathematical instructor and adviser to Maurice of Nassau, quartermaster-general of Holland, and one of the founders of modern scientific mechanics.

method broke down, and the methods of the superior craftsmen were adopted by academically trained scholars: real science was born. This was achieved about 1600 with William Gilbert (1544-1603), Galileo (1564-1642), and Francis Bacon (1561-1626).

William Gilbert, physician to Queen Elizabeth, published the first printed book composed by an academically trained scholar which was based entirely on laboratory experiment and his own observation (*De magnete* [1600]). Gilbert used and invented physical instruments but neither employed mathematics nor investigated physical laws. Like a modern experimentalist he is critically-minded. Aristotelism, belief in authority, and humanistic verbosity were vehemently attacked by him. His scientific method derives from foundrymen, miners, and navigators with whom he had personal contacts. His experimental devices and many other details were taken over from a vernacular booklet of the compass-maker Robert Norman, a retired mariner (1581).¹⁰

Galileo's relations to technology, military engineering, and the artist-engineers are often underrated. When he studied medicine at the University of Pisa in the eighties of the sixteenth century, mathematics was not taught there. He studied mathematics privately with Ostilio Ricci, who had been a teacher at the Accademia del Disegno in Florence, a school founded about twenty years earlier for young artists and artist-engineers. Its founder was the painter Vasari. Both the foundation of this school (1562) and the origin of Galileo's mathematical education show how engineering and its methods gradually rose from the workshops of craftsmen and eventually penetrated the field of academic instruction. As a young professor at Padua (1592-1610), Galileo lectured at the university on mathematics and astronomy and privately on mechanics and engineering. At this time he established workrooms in his house, where craftsmen were his assistants. This was the first "university" laboratory in history. He started his research with studies on pumps, on the regulation of rivers, and on the construction of fortresses. His first printed publication (1606) described a measuring tool for military purposes which he had invented. All his life he liked to visit dockyards

¹⁰ Cf. Edgar Zilsel, "The Origin of William Gilbert's Scientific Method," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, II (1941), 1-32.

and to talk with the workmen. In his chief work of 1638, the *Discorsi*, the setting of the dialogue is the Arsenal of Venice. His greatest achievement—the detection of the law of falling bodies, published in the *Discorsi*—developed from a problem of contemporary gunnery, as he himself declared.¹¹ The shape of the curve of projection had often been discussed by the gunners of the period. Tartaglia had not been able to answer the question correctly. Galileo, after having dealt with the problem for forty years, found the solution by combining craftsman-like experimentation and measurement with learned mathematical analysis. The different social origin of the two components of his method—which became the method of modern science—is obvious in the *Discorsi*, since he gives the mathematical deductions in Latin and discusses the experiments in Italian. After 1610 Galileo gave up writing Latin treatises and addressed himself to nonscholars. His greatest works, consequently, are written completely or partially in Italian. A few vernacular poets were among his literary favorites. Even his literary taste reveals his predilection for the plain people. His aversion to the spirit and methods of the contemporary professors and humanists is frequently expressed in his treatises and letters.

The same opposition to both humanism and scholasticism can be found in the works of Francis Bacon. No scholar before him had attacked belief in authority and imitation of antiquity so passionately. Bacon was enthusiastic about the great navigators, the inventors, and the craftsmen of his period; their achievements, and only theirs, are set by him as models for scholars. The common belief that it is “a kind of dishonor to descend to inquiry upon matters mechanical”¹² seems “childish” to him. Induction, which is proclaimed by him as the new method of science, obviously is the method of just those manual laborers. He died from a cold which he caught when stuffing a chicken with snow. This incident also reveals how much he defied all customs of contemporary scholarship. An experiment of this kind was in his period considered worthy rather of a cook or knacker than of a former lord chancellor of England. Bacon, however, did not make any important discovery in the field

¹¹ Letter to Marsili (November 11, 1632), *Opere* (ed. nazionale), XIV, 386.

¹² *Novum Organum*, I, aph. 120.

of natural science, and his writings abound with humanistic rhetoric, scholastic survivals, and scientific mistakes. He is the first writer in the history of mankind, however, to realize fully the basic importance of methodical scientific research for the advancement of human civilization.

Bacon's real contribution to the development of science appears when he is confronted with the humanists. The humanists did not live on the returns from their writings but were dependent economically on bankers, noblemen, and princes. There was a kind of symbiosis between them and their patrons. The humanist received his living from his patron and, in return, made his patron famous by his writings. Of course, the more impressive the writings of the humanist, the more famous he became. Individual fame, therefore, was the professional ideal of the humanistic literati. They often called themselves "dispensers of glory" and quite openly declared fame to be the motive of their own and every intellectual activity. Bacon, on the contrary, was opposed to the ideal of individual glory. He substituted two new aims: "control of nature" by means of science and "advancement of learning." Progress instead of fame means the substitution of a personal ideal by an objective one. In his *Nova Atlantis* Bacon depicted an ideal state in which technological and scientific progress is reached by planned co-operation of scientists, each of whom uses and continues the investigations of his predecessors and fellow-workers. These scientists are the rulers of the New Atlantis. They form a staff of public officials organized in nine groups according to the principle of division of labor. Bacon's ideal of scientific co-operation obviously originated in the ranks of manufacturers and artisans. On the one hand, early capitalistic manual workers were quite accustomed to use the experience of their colleagues and predecessors, as is stressed by Bacon himself and occasionally mentioned by Galileo. On the other hand, division of labor had advanced in contemporary society and in the economy as a whole.

Essential to modern science is the idea that scientists must co-operate in order to bring about the progress of civilization. Neither disputing scholastics nor literati, greedy of glory, are scientists. Bacon's idea is substantially new and occurs neither in antiquity nor in the Renaissance. Somewhat similar ideas were pointed out in the

same period by Campanella and, occasionally, by Stevin and Descartes. As is generally known, Bacon's *Nova Atlantis* greatly influenced the foundation of learned societies. In 1654 the Royal Society was founded in London, in 1663 the Académie française in Paris; in 1664 the *Proceedings* of the Royal Society appeared for the first time. Since this period co-operation of scientists in scientific periodicals, societies, institutes, and organizations has steadily advanced.

On the whole, the rise of the methods of the manual workers to the ranks of academically trained scholars at the end of the sixteenth century is the decisive event in the genesis of science. The upper stratum could contribute logical training, learning, and theoretical interest; the lower stratum added causal spirit, experimentation, measurement, quantitative rules of operation, disregard of school authority, and objective co-operation.¹³

III

The indicated explanation of the development of science obviously is incomplete. Money economy and co-existent strata of skilled artisans and secular scholars are frequent phenomena in history. Why, nevertheless, did science not develop more frequently? A comparison with classical antiquity can fill at least one gap in our explanation.

Classical culture produced achievements in literature, art, and philosophy which are in no way inferior to modern ones. It produced outstanding and numerous historiographers, philologists, and grammarians. Ancient rhetoric is superior to its modern counterpart both in refinement and in the number of representatives. Ancient achievements are considerable in the fields of theoretical astronomy and

¹³ The development of modern astronomy took place in a somewhat different way. After the days of the Babylonian priests, the links connecting astronomy with priesthood, calendar-arranging, and religious feasts had never been quite interrupted. Astronomy, therefore, was linked with the idea of celestial sublimity and always belonged to the free arts. As a consequence Pythagorean and nonmechanical animistic ideas are conspicuous in Copernicus and Kepler. Practical astronomy, on the other hand, was linked with navigation, which was interested in exact star positions and measuring instruments. In the period of Newton the metaphysical and astrological spirit was definitely overcome in scientific astronomy.

mathematics, limited in the biological field, and poor in the physical sciences. Only three physical laws were correctly known to the ancient scholars: the principles of the lever and of Archimedes and the optical law of reflection. In the field of technology one difference is most striking: machines were used in antiquity in warfare, for juggleries, and for toys but were not employed in the production of goods. On the whole, ancient culture was borne by a rather small upper class living on their rents. Earning money by professional labor was always rather looked down upon in the circles determining ancient public opinion. Manual work was even less appreciated. In the same manner as in the Renaissance, painters and sculptors gradually detached from handicraft and slowly rose to social esteem. Yet their prestige never equaled that of writers and rhetors, and even in the period of Plutarch and Lucianus the greatest sculptors of antiquity would be attacked as manual workers and wage-earners. Compared with poets and philosophers, artists were rarely mentioned in literature, and engineers and technological inventors virtually never. The latter presumably (very little is known of them) were superior artisans or emancipated slaves working as foremen. In antiquity rough manual work was done by slaves.

As far as our problem is concerned, this is the decisive difference between classical and early capitalistic society. Machinery and science cannot develop in a civilization based on slave labor. Slaves generally are unskilled and cannot be intrusted with handling complex devices. Moreover, slave labor seems to be cheap enough to make introduction of machines superfluous. On the other hand, slavery makes the social contempt for manual work so strong that it cannot be overcome by the educated. For this reason ancient intellectual development could not overcome the barrier between tongue and hand. In antiquity only the least prejudiced among the scholars ventured to experiment and to dissect. Very few scholars, such as Hippocrates and his followers, Democritus, and Archimedes, investigated in the manner of modern experimental and causal science, and even Archimedes considered it necessary to apologize for constructing battering-machines. All these facts and correlations have already been pointed out several times.

It may be said that science could fully develop in modern Western civilization because European early capitalism was based on free labor. In early capitalistic society there were very few slaves, and they were not used in production but were luxury gifts in the possession of princes. Evidently lack of slave labor is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the emergence of science. No doubt further necessary conditions would be found if early capitalistic society were compared with Chinese civilization. In China, slave labor was not predominant, and money economy had existed since about 500 B.C. Also there were in China, on the one hand, highly skilled artisans and, on the other, scholar-officials, approximately corresponding to the European humanists. Yet causal, experimental, and quantitative science not bound to authorities did not arise. Why this did not happen is as little explained as why capitalism did not develop in China.

The rise of science is usually studied by historians who are primarily interested in the temporal succession of the scientific discoveries. Yet the genesis of science can be studied also as a sociological phenomenon. The occupations of the scientific authors and of their predecessors can be ascertained. The sociological function of these occupations and their professional ideals can be analyzed. The temporal succession can be interrupted and relevant sociological groups can be compared to analogous groups in other periods and other civilizations—the medieval scholastics with Indian priest-scholars, the Renaissance humanists with Chinese mandarins, the Renaissance artisans and artists with their colleagues in classical antiquity. Since, in the sociology of culture, experiments are not feasible, comparison of analogous phenomena is virtually the only way of finding and verifying causal explanations. It is strange how rarely investigations of this kind are made. As the complex intellectual constructs are usually studied historically only, so sociological research for the most part restricts itself to comparatively elementary phenomena. Yet there is no reason why the most important and interesting intellectual phenomena should not be investigated sociologically and causally. ✓

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

The sociological analysis of nascent science must be based primarily on the writings of the scientific authors from 1400 to 1650. The material is very extensive but must be used in its entirety. For the relations of science to technology, commerce, military engineering, and instrument-making the following authors are especially important: Luca Pacioli, Tartaglia, the English mathematicians Recorde and Leonard and Thomas Digges, Stevin, William Gilbert, Galileo, and Francis Bacon. Often (e.g., in Guido Ubaldo) valuable sociological material is contained in the prefaces and dedications. The vernacular writings of the craftsmen, instrument-makers, and navigators are important. The following authors may be mentioned: Ghiberti (*Commentarii* [ca. 1450]), Piero de' Franceschi (*De prospectiva pingendi* [1484]), Leonardo, Alberti, Biringuccio (*Piro-technia* [ca. 1540]), Dürer (*Underweysung der Messung* [1525], *Befestigung der stett, schloss und flecken* [1527]), William Bourne (*Inventions or Devises* [1578], *On the properties and qualities of glasses*, in I. O. Halliwell (ed.), *Rara mathematica*), Robert Norman (*The newe attractive* [1581]), William Borough (*Discourse of the variation of the compass* [1581]), Palissy (*Récepte véritable* [1560], *Discours admirable* [1580]). Strictly speaking, the works also of Tartaglia, Stevin, and Ambroise Paré belong to this group. Also many textbooks on mathematics and treatises on navigation were composed by nonscholars.

The modern literature is of secondary importance. A few works may be mentioned: extensive material on the economy and technology of the period is contained in Werner Sombart, *Modern Capitalism*. On scholasticism: M. Grabmann, *Geschichte der scholastischen Methode* (1909); George Sarton, *Introduction to the History of Science*, Vol. II. Much valuable material on late medieval physics is contained in Pierre Duhem, *Etudes sur Léonard de Vinci* (Paris, 1906) and *Les Origines de la statique* (Paris, 1905). Duhem, however, disregards the differences of the scholastic and the scientific methods and greatly overestimates the results of the Paris Ockhamites. In a special case this has been shown in B. Gunzburg, "Duhem and Jordanus Nemorarius," *Isis*, XXV (1936), 341 ff. On humanism: J. Burckhardt, *The Civilization of the Renaissance*; J. A. Symonds, *The Revival of Learning*; J. E. Sandys, *A History of Classical Scholarship*. On artist-engineers and the influence of the mechanical arts on beginning science: Julius Schlosser, "Materialien zur Quellenkunde der Kunstgeschichte," *Vienna Academy of Science (Phil.-hist. Klasse)*, Vols. CLXXVII, CLXXIX, CLXXX, CXCI; Leonard Olschki, *Geschichte der neusprachlichen wissenschaftlichen Literatur*, Vols. I and II; W. E. Houghton, "The History of Trades," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, II (1941), 33 ff.; R. K. Merton, "Science and Technology in the Seventeenth Century," *Osiris*, IV (1938), 360-630. On instrument-makers: important material is contained (but not analyzed) in Robert F. Gunther, *The Astrolabes of the World* (Oxford, 1932). Monographs:

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MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE RATES IN WISCONSIN, 1920-35¹

THOMAS C. MCCORMICK AND DOUGLAS W. OBERDORFER

ABSTRACT

Both marriage and divorce rates in Wisconsin were promptly and sharply deflected by the economic depression of the 1930's, but the deficits were soon made up. The marriage habits of rural people were less affected than those of city people. The older and wealthier rural counties resembled the cities in the behavior of their rates. Counties with heavy relief costs had lower marriage rates. Counties with the largest proportion of females gainfully employed had the highest marriage and divorce rates, and their marriage rates were more sensitive to business fluctuations. A decline in the marriage rate was responsible for at least 90 per cent of the net reduction in the general fertility rate between 1930 and 1935.

Under the influence of the great business depression of the 1930's, the crude marriage rate in Wisconsin, normally stationary or slightly rising, fell from 8.8 per 1,000 population in 1922 to a low of 6.5 in 1932, a drop of 26 per cent. In 1933 there was an upturn, and by 1935 the rate was 9.9, or within 15 per cent of the record peak reached at the end of World War I. Refined marriage rates showed the same trend. In Table 1 the Wisconsin figures may be compared with those for the United States. The state and nation followed the same pattern.² As measures of the dependence of Wisconsin marriage rates upon business conditions, simple Pearsonian correlation coefficients (r) of .70, .87, .75, and .75, respectively, were found between the former and four economic indices: bank debits in Wisconsin, gross income of Wisconsin farmers, average weekly earnings of Wisconsin industrial workers, and the United States Department of Commerce index of industrial production for the United States. Similar results elsewhere have been reported by other studies.³

¹ This is the second report on the behavior of vital statistics in Wisconsin during the depression of the 1930's. The study was made possible by grants-in-aid by the University of Wisconsin Research Committee. The first report, "Fertility Rates in Wisconsin, 1920-35," appeared in this *Journal*, XLIV, No. 3 (November, 1938), 401-7. See also Paul C. Glick, "The Effects of the Depression on Wisconsin's Birth Rates," and Douglas W. Oberdorfer, "The Effects of the Depression on Wisconsin's Marriage and Divorce Rates" (unpublished Ph.D. theses, 1938 and 1941, University of Wisconsin Library).

² Correlation coefficient, $r = .91$.

³ Previous studies in this field include: Walter F. Willcox, "A Study in Vital Statistics," *Political Science Quarterly*, VIII, 69-96; R. H. Hooker, "On the Correlation

The response of the marriage rate to changes in business conditions must have been immediate; for, when the marriage rate was lagged one year behind the economic indices, the values of the correlation coefficients dropped. However, marriage rates were more highly correlated with the economic indices themselves than with the annual percentages of change in such indices. The absolute amount of change would therefore seem to be more important than the relative amount in its effects on marriage.

The general trend of the divorce rate in Wisconsin was upward between 1922 and 1935, with a deflection during the worst depression years of 1932 and 1933, followed by a rebound in 1934. By way of compensation, the rates were considerably higher after 1933 than they had been at any previous time in the sixteen-year period. Again, Wisconsin and the United States were alike (see Table 2). Correlation coefficients (r) between divorce rates and the four economic indices mentioned above were erratic but substantial, being .80, .87, .90, and .59.

of the Marriage Rate with Trade," *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, LXIV, 485-92; G. Udny Yule, "On Changes in the Marriage and Birth Rates in England and Wales during the Past Half Century, with an Inquiry as to Their Probable Causes," *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, LXIX, 88-132; Lucien March, "Comparaison numerique de courbes statistiques," *Journal de la Société de statistique de Paris*, 1905, pp. 255, 306; W. H. Beveridge, *Unemployment: A Problem of Industry*, esp. Table IX (pp. 42-43) and Chart 11 (p. 44); Hector Denis, "Les Index numbers des phénomènes moraux," *Memoires de l'Academie royale de Belgique*, Vol. IV (2d ser., 1911); G. R. Davies, "Social Aspects of the Business Cycle," *Quarterly Journal of the University of North Dakota*, XII, 107-21; Dorothy S. Thomas, *Social Aspects of the Business Cycle* (London, 1925); W. F. Ogburn and D. S. Thomas, "The Influence of the Business Cycle on Certain Social Conditions," *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, XVIII, 324-40; Alfred Cohen, *Statistical Analysis of American Divorce* ("Columbia University Studies in History, Economics and Public Law," No. 360 [New York, 1932]); I. M. Rubinow, *Some Statistical Aspects of Marriage and Divorce* ("American Academy of Political and Social Science Pamphlet Series," No. 3); M. B. Hexter, *Social Consequences of Business Cycles* (New York, 1925); Samuel A. Stouffer and Lyle M. Spencer, "Marriage and Divorce in Recent Years," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, CLXXXVIII, 56-69; "Recent Increases in Marriage and Divorce," *American Journal of Sociology*, XLIV, 551-54; D. V. Glass, "Marriage Frequency and Economic Fluctuations in England and Wales, 1851 to 1934," chap. vi, pp. 251-82, in *Political Arithmetic: A Symposium of Population Studies*, ed. Lancelot Hogben (London, 1938); Tees-Gulden, "Divorce and Business Cycles," *American Sociological Review*, IV, 217-23.

By comparing the marriages recorded during the period 1930-35 with the number that would have taken place if the average marriage rate of 1925-29 had continued, a deficit of some four thousand

TABLE 1
CRUDE MARRIAGE RATES IN WISCONSIN AND IN THE UNITED STATES
1920-35 (WISCONSIN RATES ADJUSTED FOR ESTIMATED
OUT-OF-STATE MARRIAGES)*

YEAR	RATE PER 1,000 POPULATION		YEAR	RATE PER 1,000 POPULATION	
	Wisconsin	United States		Wisconsin	United States
1920.....	11.7	12.0	1928.....	8.0	9.9
1921.....	9.6	10.8	1929.....	8.6	10.1
1922.....	8.8	10.3	1930.....	7.2	9.2
1923.....	8.7	11.0	1931.....	7.0	8.6
1924.....	7.9	10.5	1932.....	6.5	7.9
1925.....	7.9	10.4	1933.....	7.4	8.7
1926.....	8.2	10.3	1934.....	9.4	10.3
1927.....	8.0	10.2	1935.....	9.9	10.4

* The lower rates in Wisconsin compared with the United States may be due to an underestimate of the number of out-of-state marriages in Wisconsin.

TABLE 2
CRUDE DIVORCE RATES IN WISCONSIN AND IN THE UNITED STATES, 1920-35

YEAR	RATE PER 1,000 POPULATION		YEAR	RATE PER 1,000 POPULATION	
	Wisconsin	United States		Wisconsin	United States
1920.....	1.83	1.60	1928.....	1.86	1.63
1921.....	1.56	1.47	1929.....	1.86	1.66
1922.....	1.51	1.35	1930.....	1.73	1.56
1923.....	1.57	1.48	1931.....	1.82	1.48
1924.....	1.67	1.51	1932.....	1.61	1.29
1925.....	1.72	1.53	1933.....	1.66	1.31
1926.....	1.76	1.55	1934.....	2.17	1.61
1927.....	1.68	1.62	1935.....	2.41	1.71

marriages was indicated. If we go just beyond the period covered by our study, however, we find that this shortage was completely wiped out in 1936. Although some individuals whose marriages were

prevented by the depression may still remain single, the evidence shows that the crisis had no lasting effect upon the accumulative number of marriages in Wisconsin.

Remarriages of the divorced and widowed reacted to the business cycle in much the same way as did all marriages, although the remarriage rates of the widowed showed a more consistent trend than did those of the divorced.

The influence of several factors that might modify the response of marriage and divorce rates to business changes was next investigated. These factors included percentage of the population rural, 1930; date of settlement; per capita wealth, 1930; percentage of the population eighteen to twenty years of age attending school, 1930; per capital relief cost, 1934-35; percentage of population foreign-born white, 1930; and percentage of females ten years of age and over gainfully employed, 1930. The seventy-one Wisconsin counties were divided into quartile groups with respect to each of the factors, and the marriage and divorce rates of these groups were compared.

Rural-urban differences.—In analyzing rural-urban differences, the census definition of "rural" was used after a number of substitutes for this definition were tried without improvement. The highest marriage rates, in terms of number of marriages per 1,000 total population and per 1,000 females aged fifteen to forty-four, occurred in the urban county of Milwaukee, and the lowest rates in the completely rural counties. In spite of some attempt to control age by the best method at our disposal, these results were probably due to differences in the age and sex composition of the urban and rural populations and chiefly reflect the migration of young people of marriageable age to the cities.

From the sociological and popular writings on marriage and the family, one would expect the resistance of the rural family to the business cycle to be much greater than that of the urban family. The economic importance of marriage and the family in rural life has long been emphasized. An attempt was made to test the hypothesis that the decline in the marriage rate during the lean years of the 1930's was sharper in urban areas than in rural. To do this, the mean crude marriage rate for each of the four county groupings was computed first for the predepression period 1924-29 and then

for the depression period 1930-35. It was found that in Milwaukee County the rate declined 15 per cent in the second period compared with the first; in the other urban counties it declined about 6 per cent, in the intermediate counties it increased 17 per cent, and in the strictly rural counties it increased 20 per cent. When these percentage changes were correlated with the median percentages of the population rural in the four county groups, a coefficient (r) of .97 was obtained. The rise in the marriage rate in rural areas in the depression years was, no doubt, associated with the decline in migration of many young people of marriageable age to the cities from the farms and villages. The results are therefore apparently so confused by the element of migration that we cannot know to what extent they represent differences between rural and urban family mores. It is also well known that the depression began about nine years earlier in agriculture than in urban industry, so that the rising marriage rates in rural counties may possibly have reflected a release of postponed marriages which occurred earlier in rural regions than in the cities.

For such reasons it was necessary to attack the problem of the decline in marriage rates in rural and urban areas in another way. Correlations between marriage rates and the three Wisconsin economic indices as deviations from trend were made for each of three county groupings over the period 1920-35. The mean values of the coefficients (r 's) were .74 for urban counties including Milwaukee, .69 for intermediate counties, and .27 for rural counties. When these three coefficients were in turn correlated with the percentages of the population rural in the corresponding county groups, a coefficient of $-.79$ resulted. Thus nearly two-thirds of the variance in the amount of relationship between marriage rates and economic indices from one group of counties to another was attributable to differences in the proportion of the population that was rural. This seems to indicate rather clearly that the marriage habits of rural people were much less affected by changes in business conditions than were those of urban people. It is reasonable to expect that the evidence would be still stronger if it had been possible to separate the rural population into rural nonfarm and rural farm strata.

Although divorces are much less reliably reported than marriages,

the relationship between divorce rates and the proportion of the population rural was also tested. For urban counties the average crude divorce rate for the period 1920-35 was 1.96, for intermediate counties 1.39, and for rural counties 0.98. The correlation coefficient (r) between these rates and the median percentages of the population rural was $-.63$. The coefficient was reduced to $-.36$ when the divorce rate was expressed in terms of females fifteen to forty-four years of age, suggesting that much of the difference between rural and urban divorce rates was due to inequalities of age and sex composition. Although the coefficient $-.36$ is not significantly greater than zero, it is probable that there still remained some tendency for the divorce rates of Wisconsin counties to diminish as their populations became more rural.

During the depression period as compared with the years immediately preceding, greater increases in divorce were reported in rural than in urban counties. This may mean that the spread of urban family mores to rural areas persisted during a major crisis, but again it also reflects, no doubt, the shift in the direction of rural-urban migration.

Date of settlement.—The Wisconsin counties were classified according to the approximate census date when they first showed half or more of their land in farms. The dates 1850, 1870, 1900, and 1930 were taken as midpoints of the county groupings. Judging by a correlation coefficient (r) of only .30, there was little overlapping between date of settlement and the percentage of population rural, the factor that was examined in the preceding section. The same general type of analysis was employed in the case of all factors.

The crude marriage rates increased slightly but consistently with the age of the counties, the average rates for the period 1920-35 being 12.76, 11.96, 11.60, and 10.09, respectively, for each county grouping. The correlation coefficient (r) between these rates and the median dates of settlement was $-.97$. Similarly, it was in the older counties that marriage rates declined most during the depression years, and in these counties the relationship between the fluctuations in marriage rates and business conditions was closest. There was also a decided tendency ($r = -.87$) for divorce rates to be most affected by business changes in the older counties. It appears that

the older counties in the state resembled the urban counties and the newer counties resembled the rural counties in the points tested, in spite of the low correlation coefficient between them noted above.

Per capita wealth.—The Wisconsin counties were next divided into quartile groups according to their equalized general tax valuations per capita in 1930. The four median values were \$1,200, \$1,510, \$1,770, and \$2,280. The amount of overlapping between this index of wealth and the percentage of the population rural was also slight.

The crude marriage rate showed a small but regular increase as the per capita wealth increased, the correlation between the two factors being almost perfect. The same was true of divorce rates to a lesser extent ($r = .64$). Both marriage and divorce rates were more responsive to changes in business conditions in the wealthier counties.

The wealthier counties thus behaved like the older and more urban counties. Since in each case, after allowance was made for some overlapping, we were dealing with different groupings of counties, it may be tentatively inferred that the older and wealthier rural counties in Wisconsin are usually more urbanized in respect to the traits we are studying than are the younger and poorer rural counties.

Percentage of population eighteen to twenty years of age attending school.—Stouffer and Spencer, in their paper previously cited, called attention to the possible importance of the prolongation of education as an alternative to marriage. To confirm this contention the counties having the highest percentage of youth eighteen to twenty years of age attending school should show noticeably lower marriage rates. On the contrary, during the period 1920–35, as the percentage of youths attending school increased, there was a disposition for the marriage rate in the Wisconsin counties to be higher. This complete reversal of the hypothesis, however, may be due to interfering factors such as correlation between school attendance and urbanization, although only slight overlapping was found in the classification of Wisconsin counties by reported school attendance and by percentage rural.

Per capita relief cost.—Opponents of the federal relief program have argued that the granting of relief has tended to rob its beneficiaries of all sense of economic responsibility and has encouraged them to marry and beget children at the public expense. If this were

true, those counties that expended large amounts for relief should have stationary or rising marriage rates during the time when such subsidies were being made. The analysis, however, indicates that marriage rates fell slightly as per capita relief costs increased. Again the reader must be warned that many intervening factors have not been controlled, so that no positive conclusion should be drawn. At the same time, it should be noted that the evidence does not support the argument referred to above.

Percentage of population foreign-born white.—The common assumption that high marriage rates are associated with high percentages of foreign-born was confirmed. When the marriage rate was correlated with the median percentage of foreign-born in the population of Wisconsin counties divided into four quartile groupings, the coefficient (r) was .96. No obvious difference between foreign-born and native-born was observed, however, in the response of the marriage rate to the pressures of the business cycle. Moreover, the counties with the most foreign-born did not have the lowest divorce rates. Since the foreign-born were decidedly in the minority in all counties, and the age and sex composition was uncontrolled, these negative findings are inconclusive.

Percentage of females ten years of age and over gainfully employed.—In recent years social scientists have become skeptical of the role of employment as a deterrent to marriage among women. To observe the effects of this factor on marriage and divorce rates in Wisconsin, the counties of the state were arranged in quartile groups with respect to the percentage of females ten years of age and over reported as gainfully employed by the federal census of 1930. The crude marriage rate showed a consistent tendency to rise as the proportion of females employed increased, the correlation coefficient (r) between employment and marriage being .98. As would be anticipated, the marriage rate also showed a disposition to be more responsive to the business cycle in those groups of counties where female employment was highest. The two groups of counties with the most female employment had average crude divorce rates of 1.94 and 2.01, compared with rates of 1.13 and 1.00 for the groups with the least female employment. In interpreting these results, however,

it should be noticed that the age factor was not held constant in the comparisons.

*The relation between marriage and general fertility rates.*⁴—By the method of partial correlation, an effort was made to measure the comparative importance of the rules that the marriage rate and birth control played in the decline of the birth rate during the depression-recovery period 1930–35. The data available included only the general fertility rate X_0 ,⁵ the serial years 1920–35 X_1 , the crude marriage rate X_2 , and a carefully validated index of business conditions in Wisconsin (bank debits per capita) X_3 . A straight line was fitted to the fertility rates over the decade 1920–30. The projection of this trend from 1930 to 1935 represents the level that the fertility rate presumably would have taken if there had been no economic depression in those six years. This expected level is shown in each of the accompanying figures by the line labeled “Projected fertility. The lengths of the vertical arrows show graphically the relative amounts of decline in the fertility rate from 1930 through 1935 that are mathematically attributable (1) to business conditions (Fig. 1), (2) to the marriage rate (Fig. 2), and (3) to business conditions with the effect of the marriage rate removed (Fig. 3). Next, the fertility rates were calculated from the marriage rate alone by means of a partial correlation equation for the period 1920–35.⁶ These fertility rates wholly determined by the marriage rate appear in Figure 2 as a broken line marked “Fertility due to marriage rate.” The sum of the differences between the two lines in Figure 2 represents the loss of fertility assumed to be due to a heavy decline in the marriage rate over the years 1930–35.

⁴ Adapted from Thomas C. McCormick, “The Relation between Marriage and Birth Rates in Wisconsin, 1930–1935,” *Bulletin of the Society for Social Research* (University of Chicago), December, 1938, pp. 3–4.

⁵ The ratio of births to women fifteen to forty-five years of age. This was the best index of reproductivity for which data were at hand.

$$^6 X_{02.1} = (a_{01} + b_{01}X_1) + (X_2 - a_{21} - b_{21}X_1) \frac{\Sigma(X_0 - a_{01} - b_{01}X_1)(X_2 - a_{21} - b_{21}X_1)}{\Sigma(X_2 - a_{21} - b_{21}X_1)},$$

where the subscripts have the meanings given in the text above, and the symbols are conventional (see Yule and Kendall, *An Introduction to the Theory of Statistics*, chap. xiv).

To estimate the total loss of fertility below the projected trend caused by business conditions between 1930 and 1935, the fertility rates from 1921 to 1935 were calculated from a second partial corre-




FIG. 1.—Decline in fertility attributable to business conditions




FIG. 2.—Decline in fertility attributable to marriage rate




FIG. 3.—Decline in fertility attributable to business conditions with effect of marriage rate removed.

lation equation connecting fertility rates with the economic index.⁷ This line, "Fertility due to business conditions," is drawn in Figure 1 below the line "Projected fertility." The total differences between the lines then constitute the estimate.

$$^7 X_{03.1} = (a_{01} + b_{01}X_1) + (X_3 - a_{31} - b_{31}X_1) \frac{\Sigma(X_0 - a_{01} - b_{01}X_1)(X_3 - a_{31} - b_{31}X_1)}{\Sigma(X_3 - a_{31} - b_{31}X_1)}.$$

The loss of fertility laid to the marriage rate (Fig. 2), divided by the total loss of fertility during the depression (Fig. 1), gives the percentage of the decline in the fertility rate that is associated with the decline in the marriage rate. This ratio is symbolized in formula (1):

$$P_m = \frac{\sum_{'30}^{'35} (X'_{01} - X_{02.1})}{\sum_{'30}^{'35} (X'_{01} - X_{03.1})}, \quad (1)$$

where P_m is the percentage of the net decline from trend of the fertility rate most probably connected with the marriage rate, X'_{01} is the linear trend of general fertility rates on time calculated for the pre-depression years 1920-30, $X_{02.1}$ is the general fertility rate calculated from the marriage rate with time held constant for the interval 1920-35, and $X_{03.1}$ is the general fertility rate calculated from the business index with time constant over the same years.⁸ The solution of this formula indicates that between 95 and 96 per cent of the decline from trend in the general fertility rate from 1930 through 1935 is mathematically attributable to a decline in the marriage rate.

Subtracting 95 or 96 from 100, it appears that only about 4 or 5 per cent of the fall in the birth rate accompanying the business collapse was probably due to more stringent birth control. This conclusion was further tested by means of formula (2):

$$P_o = \frac{\sum_{'30}^{'35} (X'_{01} - X_{03.12})}{\sum_{'30}^{'35} (X'_{01} - X_{03.1})}, \quad (2)$$

where $X_{03.12}$ is the general fertility rate calculated from the business index with the influence of both time and the marriage rate removed and is intended to represent the relationship between the practice of birth control and the birth rate. This formula is similar to for-

⁸ The fertility rate was lagged one year.

mula (1). It expresses the loss of fertility ascribable to business conditions *with the effect of the marriage rate removed* as a percentage of the total fertility lost during the depression (see Fig. 3). Solution of formula (2) gave between 4 and 5 per cent, a result that agrees with that of formula (1).⁹

If this method of analysis is sound, it therefore seems safe to infer that the decline in the marriage rate was responsible for not less than 90 per cent of the net reduction in the general fertility rate that occurred in Wisconsin during the first half of the 1930's.

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⁹ The almost exact agreement between the two formulas would not ordinarily be expected and is apparently a coincidence.

THE SOCIAL INTEGRATION OF SELECTED AMERICAN CITIES

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ABSTRACT

A Children's Bureau publication makes possible the study of community integration through the computation of a Welfare Effort Index for twenty-eight urban areas. These results are compared with a Crime Index computed from Federal Bureau of Investigation reports. A consistent negative relation is found for twenty of the twenty-eight cities. Further validation of the indices is obtained by comparing them, for the "consistent" cities included in his study, with Thorndike's unpublished data. Examination of his data suggests that well-integrated cities (1) have supported schools, libraries, and recreational facilities strongly, (2) are characterized by a large proportion of native whites to nonwhites, (3) have few mothers gainfully employed, and, possibly, (4) have a relatively low disparity of income between classes. Study of the "inconsistent" cities suggests two further hypotheses: (1) a race problem presents a serious bar to integration even when there is a strong welfare effort and (2) there may be a natural history of community integration as a city grows.

Few sociologists would deny that the integration of groups and societies is a fundamental phenomenon for study. One of the most important questions we can ask about a human aggregate of any kind is whether its members are closely knit together by a common outlook and common aspirations. Research into this problem is not difficult when the groups studied are small, for then one can become intimately acquainted with the members and discover what their several orientations are. But in large aggregates, like our cities, the task is baffling. There seems to be no satisfactory way of getting at questions of community loyalty directly, and very few satisfactory indices of community spirit have been suggested.

The publication by the Children's Bureau of the United States Department of Labor of a bulletin entitled *The Community Welfare Picture as Reflected in Health and Welfare Statistics in 29 Urban Areas, 1938* gives an opportunity to work in an experimental way with what may be one positive index of integration—the community welfare effort. Perhaps we may regard those cities that shoulder a larger proportion of their local welfare responsibilities, everything else equal, as better integrated than those that make less effort. There would seem to be a more vital moral order in the former than in the latter. This, of course, is a hypothesis that must be tested and verified.

The twenty urban areas whose welfare expenditures are analyzed in the bulletin range in population from 140,000 to 2,200,000. They are scattered over the United States, but the West, especially the Northwest, is

underrepresented. Six of the areas are coextensive with major cities; the others include surrounding territory. The services studied fall into six categories: family welfare and general dependency, care of children, leisure-time activities, hospital care, health service other than hospital care, and chests and councils. In all these fields the coverage was very complete, including local Work Projects Administration, National Youth Administration, and Civilian Conservation Corps wages as well as expenditures by all the usual private and public agencies. Services for non-residents were excluded. This applied particularly to hospitals and other large institutions located in the areas studied.

The two tables from which the Welfare Effort indices used in the present study were calculated were Tables 8 ("Percentage Distribution of Expenditures by Sources of Funds and by Urban Areas") and 9 ("Per Capita Expenditures by Sources of Funds and by Urban Areas"). From the former a figure for each city was obtained which we call the "Percentage Local." This is a summation of the percentages derived from local public funds, private contributions, and income from endowments. From the table of per capita expenditures was obtained a figure which we call the "Per Capita Local." It is a summation of the per capita figures for the same three sources.

Table 1 shows the Per Capita Local, the Percentage Local, and the Welfare Effort Index for twenty-eight cities. Washington, D.C., which was included in the Children's Bureau study, is omitted from ours. The fact that local public expenditures are authorized by Congress, not by a city council directly responsible to the people of the capital, makes welfare expenditures in Washington unsuitable as an index of community integration.

The Welfare Effort Index was computed for each urban area in the following manner. First, the Per Capita Local expenditure was corrected for level-of-living by using as a divisor the level-of-living index worked out by the Children's Bureau for each of the urban areas.¹ Second, the Per Capita Local expenditure was then multiplied by a fraction whose numerator was the average of the percentages of expenditures that derived from nonlocal sources for all areas and whose denominator was the percentage of expenditures deriving from nonlocal sources for the particular area. In effect this operation raised the scores of those urban areas whose Percentage Local was more than 26.8 and lowered the scores of

¹ These level-of-living indices are not given in the bulletin and were kindly supplied by the Bureau with the understanding that they would not be published.

those whose Percentage Local was less than that figure. Finally, all quotients were multiplied by 1,000 in order to give a more convenient index.

The Welfare Effort Index thus takes into account three factors: the Per Capita Local, the level-of-living, and the Percentage Local. Com-

TABLE 1
PER CAPITA LOCAL EXPENDITURES FOR WELFARE, PERCENTAGE
LOCAL, AND WELFARE EFFORT INDICES FOR
TWENTY-EIGHT URBAN AREAS, 1938

Area	Per Capita Local	Percentage Local	Welfare Effort Index
Buffalo.....	18.95	41.8	266.7
Syracuse.....	18.81	39.4	235.6
Springfield (Mass.).....	19.19	39.9	233.5
Milwaukee.....	18.75	33.2	199.5
Cincinnati.....	16.91	36.5	191.5
Baltimore.....	11.12	40.1	166.1
Richmond (Va.).....	11.41	46.4	153.6
Providence.....	13.56	29.1	148.2
Hartford.....	15.02	32.7	139.0
Indianapolis.....	12.44	25.9	132.0
Cleveland.....	13.68	20.2	131.2
Los Angeles.....	14.05	31.1	115.5
Louisville.....	8.14	31.9	111.6
Canton.....	9.12	21.9	105.0
San Francisco.....	15.24	26.2	101.7
Bridgeport.....	10.45	27.6	101.4
Dayton.....	9.46	20.2	93.2
St. Louis.....	9.24	21.9	89.9
Kansas City (Mo.).....	9.94	24.1	83.3
Columbus (Ohio).....	8.01	18.1	72.2
New Orleans.....	5.41	12.9	71.7
Grand Rapids.....	6.37	13.2	65.7
Wichita.....	7.34	24.0	65.2
Atlanta.....	6.73	18.6	63.5
Houston.....	6.21	28.3	63.5
Birmingham.....	3.45	14.1	62.8
Dallas.....	5.84	23.6	50.7
Wilkes-Barre.....	4.13	6.7	50.6
Mean, 28 areas.....	11.04	26.8	114.6

munities that have a small welfare burden must shoulder a larger percentage of it if they are to come out with an index equal to another community on the same level-of-living with a larger welfare burden. Conversely, areas with overwhelming welfare burdens do not need to shoulder so large a percentage of the burden in order to keep their index up, so long as they make a good Per Capita showing. This is illustrated by Cincinnati and Richmond. They are both on approximately the same level-of-living, but

Cincinnati achieves a higher index by virtue of its considerably higher per capita outlay, despite its lesser percentage score. The importance of level-of-living in the calculation is illustrated by the comparison between Canton and San Francisco. Although the latter outscores the former both in Per Capita Local and in Percentage Local, it receives a lower Welfare Effort Index because of its considerably higher level-of-living.

There are many possibilities for checking the validity of the Welfare Effort Index as an indicator of community integration, but few of them are very promising from a research point of view because the data are so difficult to obtain. Agreement on fundamental moral issues is an obvious indication of solidarity, but to determine its presence would require widespread programs of attitude research. Perhaps the degree of neighborliness in a community could be measured and would be symptomatic. Others have suggested that the proportion of family budgets going to primary group purposes would be significant for integration, though here the question might be raised whether this is a sound hypothesis for our large cities where even community spirit clothes itself in forms of secondary association.

Instead of trying to check the results obtained through the Welfare Effort Index by another positive indicator, we chose to determine whether they were inversely confirmed by the negative index of crime. If the members of a strongly integrated community can be expected to take seriously their responsibilities for the health and welfare of their fellow-citizens, so should the strong sense of the mores keep the citizens from committing crime. Indeed crime is generally regarded as one of the best indications of social disorganization.

In Table 2 are given the total crimes in three categories over the five-year period, 1936-40, inclusive, for the twenty-eight principal cities in the urban areas studied. The figures are from *Uniform Crime Reports* published by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The three categories—murder and nonnegligent homicide, robbery, and burglary—were used because consultation with criminologists and an examination of the F.B.I.'s own *Ten Years of Uniform Crime Reporting, 1930-1939* both seemed to point to them as the most reliable categories. The problem of how to combine the three figures for each city so as to arrive at a crime index was not easy to solve on theoretical grounds. What was actually done was to average the number of crimes per 100,000 population for cities of 100,000-250,000 and 250,000-1,000,000 for the five years in the three categories and thus arrive at the standard frequencies of 6.51 for murder, 65.58 for burglary, and 390.90 for robbery. The standard rob-

bery frequency was then divided by each of the other two and the square root of the two quotients taken. These square roots, 7.75 and 2.44, were used as factors by which to multiply the number of murders and robberies, respectively, for each city before combining them with the burglaries by

TABLE 2
NUMBER OF CRIMES IN SPECIFIED CATEGORIES, JANUARY 1, 1936
TO DECEMBER 31, 1940, AND CRIME INDICES
FOR TWENTY-EIGHT CITIES

City	Murder and Nonnegligent Homicide	Robbery	Burglary	Crime Index
Milwaukee.....	47	252	2,670	6.22
Buffalo.....	70	453	3,371	9.14
Providence.....	16	85	2,259	10.20
Syracuse.....	10	118	2,105	11.99
Wilkes-Barre.....	4	111	918	14.18
Springfield (Mass.).....	6	63	2,019	14.79
New Orleans.....	366	678	2,968	15.07
Bridgeport.....	27	129	2,026	17.35
Wichita.....	17	95	1,861	19.34
St. Louis.....	321	2,420	7,483	19.46
Grand Rapids.....	10	190	3,022	21.73
Baltimore.....	347	3,127	10,663	24.43
Dayton.....	95	558	3,419	26.15
Hartford.....	17	106	4,122	27.18
San Francisco.....	115	2,813	11,174	29.81
Canton.....	16	533	2,130	32.91
Cleveland.....	348	5,684	13,106	33.79
Kansas City (Mo.).....	199	2,495	6,462	35.32
Houston.....	340	1,486	9,865	41.80
Cincinnati.....	257	2,687	10,711	42.23
Los Angeles.....	393	8,169	42,229	43.36
Dallas.....	347	902	8,638	45.86
Indianapolis.....	178	2,379	11,353	47.90
Birmingham.....	363	835	8,158	48.54
Richmond (Va.).....	181	1,026	6,565	54.25
Columbus (Ohio).....	80	2,075	11,311	55.54
Louisville.....	202	2,017	12,600	59.83
Atlanta.....	524	2,442	13,373	77.46

summation. The effect of this complicated operation was to give the crimes in the three categories weights proportional to the squares of their frequencies. One murder equals not one burglary but 7.75 burglaries. The justifiability of this scheme of combining the three figures must be left to the reader's own judgment. The sum in each case was divided by the 1940 population in thousands to the nearest thousand.

It will be noticed that the ratios among the three types of crime vary tremendously from city to city. New Orleans has 1 murder for every 2

robberies, while Wilkes-Barre has 1 for every 28. New Orleans has 1 murder for every 8 burglaries, while Springfield has 1 for every 373. Cleveland has 1 burglary for every 2 robberies, while Springfield has 1 for every 32. It is impossible to tell without further information than is available whether any of these ratios are so out of line as to throw suspicion on the data. Since there would be no point in a police department overreporting crimes and since murder is the most difficult crime to refrain from reporting, one might hazard the guess that, of the rates cited, the only ones that might be questioned are the New Orleans robbery and burglary rates and the Cleveland robbery rate.

The simplest method of checking whether or not the Welfare Effort Index and the Crime Index are measuring, one positively and the other negatively, something fundamental in the way of a moral order is to compute a coefficient of correlation for the two series of indices. The linear coefficient of correlation obtained by the product-moment method is $r = -.393$. This is so low a coefficient as to throw considerable doubt upon the validity of the hypothesis that welfare effort and crime are good indicators of the degree of integration of large urban communities. However, the figure is sufficiently high to justify a closer examination of the data to determine whether further analysis would yield more positive results. When such an examination is made, it is found that twenty of the twenty-eight cities and urban areas are quite consistent in the sense that they either have a high Welfare Effort Index and a low Crime Index, moderate indexes in each, or a low Welfare Effort Index and a high Crime Index. This conclusion was reached by comparing the ranks for integration in terms of the two indexes. It was arbitrarily decided that a difference of nine places in ranking (which is equivalent to a third of the whole range) was the maximum which could be regarded as compatible with consistency. The eight inconsistent cities have differences in rank between the two indexes of from eleven to twenty-three places. Table 3 shows the result of classifying the cities in terms of consistency and inconsistency and then subclassifying them according to the indications of integration. It will be noted that the breaks between the three subclasses of the consistent cities are well marked.

Whatever may be the reasons for the inconsistent showing of the eight cities, there can be no doubt that there is in this table a sufficient indication of negative relationship between our two indexes to warrant further analysis. This is especially true at the extremes, where in each case there are five cities which show marked consistency. (The largest rank interval of any of these ten cities is 6.) In order to test the hypothesis further, it

TABLE 3

CLASSIFICATION OF TWENTY-EIGHT URBAN AREAS AND THEIR COR-
RESPONDING CITIES ACCORDING TO RANK ORDERS OF THEIR
WELFARE EFFORT INDICES AND THEIR CRIME INDICES

CITY	WELFARE EFFORT RANK	CRIME RANK*	MEAN RANK
"Consistent" Cities			
Well integrated:			
Buffalo.....	1	2	1.5
Milwaukee.....	4	1	2.5
Syracuse.....	2	4	3.0
Springfield (Mass.).....	3	6	4.5
Providence.....	8	3	5.5
Moderately integrated:			
Baltimore.....	6	12	9.0
Hartford.....	9	14	11.5
Bridgeport.....	16	8	12.0
Cleveland.....	11	17	14.0
St. Louis.....	18	10	14.0
Canton.....	14	16	15.0
San Francisco.....	15	15	15.0
Dayton.....	17	13	15.0
Los Angeles.....	12	21	16.5
Kansas City (Mo.).....	19	18	18.5
Poorly integrated:			
Houston.....	24.5	19	21.75
Columbus (Ohio).....	20	26	23.0
Dallas.....	27	22	24.5
Birmingham.....	26	24	25.0
Atlanta.....	24.5	28	26.25
"Inconsistent" Cities			
Crime Index shows more integration than Welfare Effort Index:			
New Orleans.....	21	7	14.0
Wichita.....	23	9	16.0
Grand Rapids.....	22	11	16.5
Wilkes-Barre.....	28	5	16.5
Welfare Effort Index shows more in- tegration than Crime Index:			
Cincinnati.....	5	20	12.5
Richmond (Va.).....	7	25	16.0
Indianapolis.....	10	23	16.5
Louisville.....	13	27	20.0

* Rank 1 means least crime.

was decided to examine the data of Thorndike's study, the chief results of which were published in *Your City*, to discover whether there was confirmation in his findings.² Though his study was in general based upon the situation at or near 1930, it was thought that the character of the cities should not change so much in eight years as to rule out the possibility of fruitful comparison. Unfortunately only twenty-two of our twenty-eight cities were included in Thorndike's study. The cities for which we can make no comparisons are Buffalo, Baltimore, Cleveland, St. Louis, San Francisco, and Los Angeles. All these are "consistent" cities.

Of the 274 items concerning 310 cities upon which Thorndike has full information, only 14 seemed to the writer to be so immediately pertinent to the question of social integration as to afford the possibility of validating our conclusions with regard to the 14 "consistent" cities included in both studies. There are 7 items which *a priori* should be positively correlated with our degrees of social integration, and 7 which should be negatively correlated therewith. Two of the negative items—that for deaths from syphilis and that for deaths from gonococcus infections—were combined, so that the table for the negative series has only six columns.

The figures in the first three columns in Table 4 were obtained, respectively, by dividing Thorndike's items 241, 242, and 244 by the population of the cities in 1930 to the nearest thousand. The figures in the fourth column were obtained by adding his items 133 and 138 and dividing by the 1930 population fifteen years of age or over to the nearest thousand. This was done on the assumption that the violations of the mores of which such deaths are supposed to be an index are not committed by children. The fifth column is a transcription of Thorndike's item 87 and the sixth, of his 89. The assumption behind the inclusion of the sales in secondhand stores as a negative index is that such sales reflect a population with high mobility and a general condition of *anomie*. As for the chain-store sales, it was thought that the less neighborhood feeling and the less attachment to local merchants, the more the chain stores would flourish.

The data in Table 4 give considerable support to our original classification of the cities. The homicide figures are not surprising when it is recalled that the cities are arranged according to two index scores, one of which was the Crime Index, of which homicide was a constituent element. A glance down the column shows that the scores tend to rise consistently, with the notable exception of that for Columbus. The trend for suicides is in the expected direction, but the variations from group to group are

² E. L. Thorndike, *Your City* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1939). Dr. Thorndike kindly made his data available through his assistant, Mrs. Lilyan Weingart.

slight, and we cannot claim therefore that this index buttresses our hypothesis that the Welfare Effort Index and the Crime Index offer a sound basis for judging social integration. The illegitimate-birth rate shows a

TABLE 4
RATES EXPECTED TO HAVE A NEGATIVE RELATION TO SOCIAL INTEGRATION
FOR FOURTEEN "CONSISTENT" CITIES GROUPED ACCORDING TO
TENTATIVE LEVELS OF SOCIAL INTEGRATION

City	Homicides per 10,000 Population	Suicides per 1,000 Population	Illegiti- mate Births per 10,000 Population	Deaths from Syphilis and Gono- coccus In- fections per 1,000 Population	Percentage Second- hand-Store Sales of Retail Sales	Percentage Chain- Store Sales of Retail Sales
Well integrated:						
Milwaukee.....	0.31	1.94	4.11	0.91	0.19	20.70
Syracuse.....	0.35	1.54	6.00	1.90	0.30	16.62
Springfield (Mass.)	0.15	1.51	0.60*	0.65	0.30	23.29
Providence.....	0.26	1.31	4.31	1.02	0.48	24.92
Mean.....	0.27	1.58	3.76	1.12	0.32	21.38
Moderately integrat- ed:						
Hartford.....	0.35	1.62	5.14	2.17	0.27	19.59
Bridgeport.....	0.29	1.92	2.27	1.65	0.12	31.50
Canton.....	1.00	1.56	4.26	1.53	0.41	22.24
Dayton.....	0.92	1.69	4.73	2.30	0.43	22.63
Kansas City (Mo.)	2.37	2.30	14.41	1.66	0.59	21.22
Mean.....	0.99	1.82	6.16	1.86	0.36	23.44
Poorly integrated:						
Houston.....	2.79	1.98	6.95	3.12	0.41	19.94
Columbus (Ohio).	0.98	1.92	7.95	1.84	0.49	26.81
Dallas.....	2.46	1.96	11.72	2.41	0.76	27.14
Birmingham.....	4.88	1.64	18.40	3.41	0.46	23.74
Atlanta.....	4.68	1.90	12.10	3.20	0.88	27.55
Mean.....	3.16	1.88	12.82	2.80	0.60	25.04

* Estimated by Thorndike.

marked tendency to rise as integration, judged by our original indexes, weakens. Deaths from syphilis and gonococcus infections show the same trend, though the results are not very regular from top to bottom. Perhaps this score is not indicative of violation of the mores so much as availability or unavailability of medical care. The writer knew no way to correct for this latter factor. It would probably be unwise, therefore, to

place much reliance on the rate as it stands as an indicator of social integration. Though the means of the rates for secondhand stores and chain stores show the expected trend, there is much variation within each of the three groups. A high proportion of secondhand-store sales, however, does appear to be a good indicator of poor integration. It should be noted that, in three of the series, the intermediate group would be little different from the well-integrated group were it not for Kansas City, which affects the mean of the former in the direction of the poorly integrated group. This perhaps indicates that this city was originally misplaced. Instead of being the lowest of the moderately integrated cities, it may deserve to be among the poorly integrated ones.

The other side of the picture is shown in Table 5. The first three columns represent, respectively, Thorndike's items 130, 140, and 106a. The last four columns were obtained, respectively, by dividing the figures in his items 53, 57, 56, and the sum of 45, 49, and 50 by the per capita sales of all retail stores (his item 60). This division gives a rough correction for differences in income among the cities, and the resulting figures are therefore properly called indices of efforts to support public services.

Births, size of family, and homeownership were thought to be an index of social integration on the theory that in communities in which life is pleasant and sociable parents will want to have children and will want to own their own homes. Schools, recreational facilities, libraries and museums, and sanitation, health, and public safety seemed to be expressive of the general welfare, so that communities that were well integrated might be expected to make greater efforts to support such services than poorly integrated ones.

If one looks at the means for the three groups of cities in the various items, one sees that the libraries and museums item is the only one which fails to show the expected trend. In it the moderately integrated cities outscore the well-integrated ones. None of the other six rates or indexes shows a regular decline from top to bottom, but all of them give an indication of relationship to our three categories of social integration.

Of the thirteen rates and indexes which it was thought should, on *a priori* grounds, be associated with degrees of social integration, twelve of them appear to be so. It is true that the relationship is not a very close one in many instances, but the tendency is there. Though two or three such indications of association might be regarded as coincidental, so many of them can hardly be explained away thus easily. In view of the unreliability of many of the data which Thorndike was forced to use and in view of the time interval between the date of his study and that of this

one, it would seem that this evidence constitutes a strong case for the validity of judging social integration by means of the Welfare Effort Index and the Crime Index.

TABLE 5

RATES AND INDICES EXPECTED TO HAVE A POSITIVE RELATION TO SOCIAL INTEGRATION FOR FOURTEEN "CONSISTENT" CITIES GROUPED ACCORDING TO TENTATIVE LEVELS OF SOCIAL INTEGRATION

CITY	BIRTHS PER 1,000 FEMALES AGED 20-44	MEDIAN SIZE OF FAMILY	PER- CENTAGE HOMES OWNED BY OC- CUPANTS	INDICES OF EFFORTS TO SUPPORT VARIOUS PUBLIC SERVICES			
				Schools	Recrea- tion	Li- braries and Mu- seums	Sanita- tion, Health, and Public Safety
Well integrated:							
Milwaukee.....	40.5	3.35	42.3	50.52	11.49	2.10	25.79
Syracuse.....	46.0	3.21	45.0	56.34	4.47	2.30	14.43
Springfield (Mass.)....	46.2	3.28	34.8	55.79	6.74	3.44	16.02
Providence.....	54.4	3.41	32.2	47.49	4.48	0.74	16.02
Mean.....	46.8	3.31	38.6	52.54	6.58	2.14	18.07
Moderately integrated:							
Hartford.....	57.6	3.30	21.9	47.88	7.24	1.62	12.95
Bridgeport.....	50.0	3.49	29.5	52.38	4.83	3.51	12.26
Canton.....	42.3	3.35	52.7	58.77	2.28	0.86	6.94
Dayton.....	40.0	3.12	47.4	46.63	3.02	4.31	11.01
Kansas City (Mo.)....	31.4	2.85	39.0	34.94	4.16	1.71	7.95
Mean.....	44.3	3.22	38.1	48.12	4.31	2.40	10.22
Poorly integrated:							
Houston.....	3.10	38.8	35.88	2.70	0.86	10.00
Columbus (Ohio).....	37.5	3.03	42.8	46.85	1.43	1.12	9.60
Dallas.....	3.10	37.3	33.38	3.71	0.44	9.41
Birmingham.....	40.0	3.27	33.6	49.30	2.19	2.19	10.79
Atlanta.....	39.9	3.17	29.0	34.15	1.29	1.29	10.34
Mean.....	39.1	3.13	36.3	40.11	2.26	1.18	10.03

In addition to throwing light on the validity of our classification of the "consistent" cities, Thorndike's study makes possible some approach to the question of the causation of social integration. Among his hundreds of items there are many that might have something to do with the relative development of social integration in urban communities. In a sense all the items already employed to check the validity of our classification are fac-

tors producing or destroying social integration, for community solidarity or its opposite tends to perpetuate itself. However, there are additional items in Thorndike's study which tend to relate themselves more or less consistently to our classification and which should therefore be examined with questions of causation in mind.

Table 6 gives a miscellaneous group of these rates. The first two columns are direct transcriptions, respectively, of Thorndike's data under items 41 and 39. The third column was obtained by dividing his item 124 by the 1930 population fifteen years of age and over to the nearest thousand. This was done to make the age groups correspond. The fourth column was suggested by the data of Thorndike's items 143, 144, and 145, but the percentages here used are not, like his, of families, but of persons.

In view of the fact that in Table 5 we did not find efforts to support libraries and museums regularly associated with social integration, it is interesting to find that there appears to be a connection therewith of circulation of library books and volumes owned by public libraries. An obvious interpretation of this situation is that well-integrated cities may not realize the importance which library facilities have had in the past in creating the sort of community they have, so that they are not now supporting them as adequately as their usefulness deserves. It will be noted from Table 6 that circulation tends to run in the neighborhood of five times the number of volumes owned by the library, but there is no way of telling whether the number of volumes is adjusted to the circulation or whether the circulation adjusts to the number of volumes made available by the city fathers.

The church-membership figures do not seem very significant for our purposes. Though the means show a trend in the direction of more integration with high church-membership, one notes that Milwaukee in the well-integrated group has a much smaller relative number of church members than Birmingham in the poorly integrated group. It may be mentioned in passing that the value of church property and the annual expenditures of religious bodies (Thorndike's items 122 and 123) showed no tendency at all to vary concomitantly with social integration.

The last column affords very striking evidence to support the proposition that the presence of diverse races weakens social integration. We should expect this on both theoretical and common-sense grounds, but it is perhaps surprising that there should be no overlapping among the three groups of cities. The foreign-born whites are left out of the calculation because they constitute a middle group which deserves to be neither in the

denominator nor in the numerator: foreign-born whites probably do not have the strong anti-Negro and anti-Oriental attitudes of the native American, nor are they, on the other hand, regarded by the native Americans as properly a separate caste.

TABLE 6

MISCELLANEOUS RATES FOR FOURTEEN "CONSISTENT" CITIES GROUPED
ACCORDING TO TENTATIVE LEVELS OF SOCIAL INTEGRATION

City	Circulation Per Capita of Library Books	Volumes Per Capita Owned by Library	Church Mem- bers Aged 13 and Over per 1,000 of Popu- lation Aged 15 and Over	Ratio of Native-born Whites to Nonwhites
Well integrated:				
Milwaukee.....	6.03	1.280	383	49.7
Syracuse.....	6.45	0.878	524	82.2
Springfield (Mass.).....	14.16	3.065	520	34.6
Providence.....	7.12	1.989	639	31.4
Mean.....	8.44	1.803	514	49.5
Moderately integrated:				
Hartford.....	9.35	1.257	556	16.8
Bridgeport.....	9.51	1.888	596	29.1
Canton.....	2.59	0.404	526	28.1
Dayton.....	7.42	1.752	418	10.1
Kansas City (Mo.).....	5.57	1.418	321	7.9
Mean.....	6.89	1.344	485	18.4
Poorly integrated:				
Houston.....	2.50	0.622	294	2.6
Columbus (Ohio).....	2.51	0.826	410	7.3
Dallas.....	3.11	0.502	305	4.7
Birmingham.....	2.93	0.624	491	1.6
Atlanta.....	3.02	0.599	310	1.9
Mean.....	2.81	0.635	453	3.6

Table 7 contains figures that bear upon matters of employment and income in our fourteen cities. The first column represents Thorndike's item 155 divided by the population and then multiplied by the males per thousand females (his item 128). The second column represents a simple summation of his items 153 and 154. The third was obtained by summing Thorndike's items 168 and 169 and dividing the total by the population. The last column was obtained by dividing the number of income tax returns over \$5,000 (his item 235) by the population and then dividing the

results by the per capita retail sales (item 60) to correct for level-of-living. This, it was thought, might give some measure of the disparity of incomes among the classes in the communities.

TABLE 7
RATES AND INDICES CONCERNING EMPLOYMENT AND INCOME FOR
FOURTEEN "CONSISTENT" CITIES GROUPED ACCORDING TO THE
TENTATIVE LEVELS OF SOCIAL INTEGRATION

City	Married Women Gainfully Employed per 1,000 Population Corrected for Sex Ratio	Percentage Males <i>plus</i> Percentage Females Aged 10-15 Gainfully Employed	No. of Male and Female Domestic Servants per 1,000 Population	Ratio of Incomes of More Than \$5,000 per 100,000 Population to Per Capita Retail Sales
Well integrated:				
Milwaukee.....	25.1	1.8	12.4	2.76
Syracuse.....	30.2	2.9	16.9	2.48
Springfield (Mass.).....	28.1	3.5	20.0	2.07
Providence.....	22.9	6.6	20.5	3.26
Mean.....	26.6	3.7	17.5	2.64
Moderately integrated:				
Hartford.....	33.0	4.5	21.4	3.10
Bridgeport.....	28.9	6.3	12.8
Canton.....	21.4	1.7	12.5	2.87
Dayton.....	36.5	2.6	18.7	2.89
Kansas City (Mo.).....	45.4	3.6	28.0	2.45
Mean.....	33.0	3.7	18.7	2.83
Poorly integrated:				
Houston.....	50.7	6.4	36.2	2.23
Columbus (Ohio).....	40.1	3.3	22.8	2.71
Dallas.....	52.8	7.2	34.1	2.98
Birmingham.....	39.6	5.2	43.2	3.34
Atlanta.....	56.4	12.0	54.8	2.80
Mean.....	49.9	6.8	38.2	2.81

There are several points to be noted in Table 7. Of the four rates, that of married women gainfully employed shows the most regular relationship to integration, for not only do the means of the three integration groups show a regular rise as integration weakens but there is a good deal of consistency within the groups. This cannot be said of the second column, dealing with percentage of children employed. There is no rise in the mean of the moderately integrated cities as compared with the well-

integrated, and there is great fluctuation within the groups. The third rate, that indicating the number of domestic servants, shows a steadier rise with lessened integration than does the second one, but not so regular a relationship as does the first one. Especially noteworthy is the small difference in the means of the well-integrated and moderately integrated cities. The fourth column is not indicative of any regular relation between this particular index of income disparity and social integration.

In interpreting this table, we will confine ourselves to the employment of married women and the relative number of domestic servants, since the other columns are not consistent enough to indicate a relationship. The two rates under discussion have a possible double relationship to social integration. High scores may point to the causal factor of family disorganization due to mothers working out, or they may be expressive of income differentials which would in themselves be a cause of antagonism between classes and of social disintegration. The facts that the fourth column gives no consistent results and that the first gives the most consistent in the whole table incline one to emphasize the family disorganization hypothesis rather than the class-differential hypothesis. The greater difference in relative number of domestic servants between the mean of the moderately integrated group and the poorly integrated than between the well-integrated and the moderately integrated may be interpreted as indicating that married women with children do not begin to be involved significantly until a relatively high rate—say 30—is reached, and that variations below that figure therefore have little effect on social integration.

There is not enough evidence in the present study to reach any definite conclusions regarding the factors which produce social integration in a city. Certain tentative hypotheses, however, do emerge. These may be stated in summary form as follows: The social integration of a city tends to be greater (1) the more the schools, libraries, and recreational facilities have been supported in the past; (2) the greater the proportion of native whites to Negroes, Orientals, and Mexicans; (3) the fewer the mothers who are gainfully employed; and, possibly, (4) the less the disparity of incomes between the various social classes.

To the extent that so far we have dealt with only the "consistent" cities, we have weighted the evidence in favor of our two original hypotheses: that the Welfare Effort Index and the Crime Index are indications of social integration. We must now turn to the eight "inconsistent" cities and see whether we can throw any light upon why they do not conform to the general pattern.

In Table 8 we have data on the four rates and indices from Thorndike's study which have shown the closest relation to social integration in the "consistent" cities, the data being given for the two "inconsistent"

TABLE 8
VARIOUS RATES RELATED TO SOCIAL INTEGRATION FOR TWO GROUPS OF
"INCONSISTENT" CITIES COMPARED WITH THE MEAN RATES OF
THREE GROUPS OF "CONSISTENT" CITIES

CITY	HOMICIDES PER 10,000 POPULATION	ILLEGITI- MATE BIRTHS PER 10,000 POPULATION	PERCENTAGE SECONDHAND- STORE SALES ARE OF RETAIL SALES	INDICES OF EFFORTS TO SUPPORT:	
				Recreation	Sanitation, Health, and Public Safety
"Inconsistent" Cities					
Crime Index shows more integration than Wel- fare Effort Index:					
New Orleans.....	2.42	14.80	1.10	3.07	22.49
Wichita.....	1.06	11.80	0.52	4.46	5.60
Grand Rapids.....	0.17	9.15	0.29	4.26	10.70
Wilkes-Barre.....	0.54	9.11	0.12	2.63	6.51
Mean of last three...	0.59	10.02	0.31	3.78	7.60
Welfare Effort Index shows more integration than Crime Index:					
Cincinnati.....	1.82	5.68	0.73	2.44	12.56
Richmond (Va.).....	1.46	19.60	0.51	2.41	11.27
Indianapolis.....	1.10	6.20	0.59	5.10	14.62
Louisville.....	1.99	6.48	0.54	4.39	17.27
Mean.....	1.57	9.49	0.59	3.59	13.93
"Consistent" Cities					
Well integrated.....	0.27	3.76	0.32	6.58	18.07
Moderately integrated...	0.99	6.16	0.36	4.31	10.22
Poorly integrated.....	3.16	12.82	0.60	2.26	10.03

groups as arranged in Table 3. The means of the three "consistent" groups are given for comparative purposes. New Orleans is separated from its proper group and not averaged with the other three because its

rates are so different as to make it obvious that it does not belong with them. Earlier in our discussion we had occasion to question two of the crime rates for New Orleans, and it now seems probable that its Crime Index is too low. If so, it perhaps does not deserve to be classified as an "inconsistent" city but rather as a "consistent" one that is moderately or poorly integrated.

Wichita, Grand Rapids, and Wilkes-Barre seem to form a fairly homogeneous group. The original inconsistency between their good showing on the Crime Index and their poor showing on the Welfare Effort Index is indicated not to have been an error, for here again they are inconsistent. Their scores on homicides and secondhand stores would seem to indicate fair to good integration, while their scores on illegitimate births, expenditures for recreation, and expenditures for sanitation, health, and public safety would indicate fair to poor integration. Perhaps a partial explanation may be found in the fact that these are three of the smallest seven cities in our study. They have perhaps had more of a primary group mode of life than our larger cities and were formerly pretty well able to take care of their problems without resort to much public or private charitable organization. When the depression impinged, they were perhaps less used to meeting such large-scale problems than were the bigger cities and were therefore slower to mobilize their efforts. If this explanation—which is highly speculative—is the answer, it merely amounts to saying that in a small, traditionally oriented city integration may be shown in unorganized help to friends and neighbors which would not register in our Welfare Effort Index.

Cincinnati, Richmond, Indianapolis, and Louisville represent the opposite situation. Their showing on the Welfare Effort Index is good, but on the Crime Index it is poor. The data in Table 8 bear out in general the original classification. These cities are evidently making real efforts to meet their problems, but the community life does not appear to be such as to prevent frequent violations of the mores.

One thing about these four cities is immediately striking. They are all near the border between the North and the South. As a result they have Negro minorities, ranging from 11 to 29 per cent of the population. A tentative explanation of the situation, therefore, might be that the well-meaning efforts of the citizens in terms of health, recreation, welfare, and the like spring from a rational desire to help their fellows but that the real line of cleavage in the community between Negroes and whites is not thereby affected and that this is a prime factor in the social disorganization. The only other cities with such large proportions of Negroes and

comparable welfare efforts are Baltimore and Cleveland, and in both these cases the same tendency to make poorer showings on the Crime Index than on the Welfare Effort Index appears.

This somewhat speculative conclusion should not be interpreted as giving grounds for ceasing the welfare efforts. Families and individuals are being benefited whether the community is being integrated or not. Furthermore, it may well be that these efforts are so recent as not yet to have had their full effect. We may have something in the way of a natural history here. One might suppose that a smaller community, traditionally oriented, would have both little crime and little welfare effort (Wichita, Grand Rapids, Wilkes-Barre). As it grows we might expect more crime, with still little welfare effort (Houston, Columbus, Dallas, Birmingham, Atlanta). Then perhaps the community tends to become aroused about the situation and exerts itself to improve matters. At first there would be much welfare effort without any appreciable diminution in crime (Cincinnati, Richmond, Indianapolis, Louisville). Finally, the welfare effort should bring dividends in the way of lowered crime rates (Buffalo, Milwaukee, Syracuse, Springfield, Providence). We must emphasize again that this hypothesis of a natural history of urban integration is at present highly tentative. There is very little evidence to substantiate it in this study. But it is a hypothesis that will repay further investigation by any who may have ideas as to how to test it.

This exploratory study has raised more questions than it has answered. No one is more aware than the writer that the sample of cities used is inadequate from a statistical standpoint. Probably nothing that has been discovered can claim to be more than a working hypothesis for further study. But perhaps enough has been accomplished to make research into the social integration of cities appear a feasible, even a profitable line of investigation. If we could obtain valid indexes of such integration, and then work back to causes, we might be in a position to suggest practical measures of immense benefit to the collective life of our cities.

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THE SAD ESTATE OF SCIENTIFIC PUBLICATION

T. SWANN HARDING

ABSTRACT

While the publications of scientists approach in number the publications of professional writers, many of the articles of the former might well remain unpublished. Excessive writing on the part of scientists results in inferior articles which are poorly written and which make no significant contribution to science. Microfilming has been suggested as a method of condensing the bulk of scientific publication, but more than this is necessary. Scientists must learn to communicate only that which is essential. The operation of a central editorial bureau which would determine which articles should be made available is suggested. This bureau would also assume responsibility for abstracts.

Scientists have alternately been accused of being quite inarticulate or of being articulate in a language that very few could understand. Certainly, from the standpoint of number of pounds printed, the scientist does about as well as any other professional man and compares favorably with the average literary writer.

It was quite some time ago that the bishop of Ripon made his famous suggestion about a scientific holiday. He advocated a ten-year cessation from research until such time as we found out what we really knew and put into practice such scientific facts and principles as were worth while. Though speaking half in jest, the bishop was about right. Indeed, it was about twelve years ago that Sir Ernest Rutherford echoed the good bishop, when he spoke at the opening of a new laboratory of physics at the University of Bristol. Sir Ernest, who was then president of the Royal Society, rather pathetically remarked:

When I look back over the thirty years or more of my connection with research I am conscious that I have always been looking for a breathing space when, for a few years, no advances of consequence would be made; when I should gain opportunity for studying in more detail, at my leisure, the ground already won. Alas, that breathing space has never come, and I am sure will never come in my time.

Alas, it did not come until after war again broke out in 1939, and this lull is certainly temporary.

Scientists have been protesting about the too prolific publication by other scientists for a long time. Today, when we are so prone to use the results of research for the destruction of human life and property rather than to prolong and enrich life, the problem of scientific publication assumes extraordinary importance.

Looking backward we find B. A. Behrend protesting the mass publication of mediocre research in *Science* for March 9, 1928, and declaring that anything good enough to hold together for just a little while—like a modern mass-production automobile—was considered worth publishing as a contribution to science. If the “discovery” of the day seemed to have news value it was hurried to print, although Darwin, for example, abstained from print for twenty years to get his work into proper shape. At that time Behrend cited enormous duplication in research. He said scientists should exercise “constant care as to whether new work is worth publishing, whether previous workers have received the credit which their work deserves, whether experiments are accurately made, and whether the theory is simplified to the point where it is something other than a cloud of symbols.” Philosophic contemplation was prescribed.

Ten years later, in 1938, Sir William Bragg, then president of the Royal Society, commented grimly upon the overproduction of scientific literature. He described the papers of scientific specialists as dull and difficult and insisted that the “proceedings” and the “transactions” of learned societies be reserved for significant contributions which warranted critical study. Sir William grievously deplored the serried ranks of scientific publications in *Nature* for March 11, 1939. He said that “the proper appreciation and application of new discoveries is being hindered at present by increasing specialization, employing a terminology and a mathematical apparatus which are intelligible only to a few specialists in some one subject.”

Somewhat more recently J. D. Bernal in his *Social Function of Science* has estimated that there are about thirty-three thousand scientific periodicals appearing in many languages. He likewise asserted that the very extent of scientific publication led to waste, unnecessary expense, confusion, failure to make complete abstracts, and the blocking of scientific progress. Moreover, this condition has come about largely in very recent times.

Benjamin Silliman, professor of chemistry and natural history at Yale, founded the *American Journal of Science and the Arts* in 1819. That journal was actually the forerunner of all the scientific journals in the United States today. It existed for one hundred and twenty years, though it finally had to limit its scope and adopt the name *American Journal of Science*. That phenomenon itself marked the beginning of a process of journalistic segregation that has continued unabated ever since.

Soon after the journal assumed its new form the doors of Johns Hopkins University were thrown open, and under Ira Remsen the university became a mecca for students of chemistry. From these students and their

professors a stream of research papers began to flow. The *American Journal of Science* soon resented this flood which threatened to occupy all its pages, and the editor began to return papers, suggesting that Remsen found a chemical journal of his own in which to print them. That Remsen did, establishing the *American Chemical Journal* in 1879 and continuing to edit it until it completed its fiftieth volume in 1915, at which time it merged with the *Journal of the American Chemical Society*. This society had been organized in 1876 but began to issue its own journal only in 1893.

Rapid proliferation of American journals in the field of chemistry has marked recent years. Today we have special journals in the fields of physical chemistry, biological chemistry, stereochemistry, organic chemistry, industrial and engineering chemistry, chemical education, agricultural chemistry, and metallurgical chemistry. Special publications also deal with chemistry in the fields of warfare, pharmacy, medicine, nutrition, and so on.

The standard chemical abstract journal, *Chemical Abstracts*, was founded in 1907. In that year it printed condensed summaries of 7,975 articles. The figure rose to 10,835 the following year, and it was 19,025 in 1913. There was a temporary drop during the first World War, but by 1923 the number was again 19,507, and in 1935 it was 42,468. It is estimated that 135,000 such summaries will appear in the abstract journal in 1985 if it survives. It has already been suggested that the journal be torn asunder and issued in specialized sections! Just now, of course, war in Europe again interrupts basic research, but what thereafter?

The torrent of publication is not limited to chemistry. The *Index Catalogue* of the Army Medical Library lists some two and a half million titles of books and journal articles that have appeared in the last sixty years. Many of these are obsolete, but the research worker, who is confronted by an increasingly vast array of published material in every field, must winnow the chaff from the wheat. There are about seven thousand medical periodicals, and students find the literature most disheartening.

Between 1913 and 1934 some 100,935 separate items were listed in the field of entomology, according to a survey of the *Zoölogical Record* and the *Review of Applied Entomology*. Many articles in the field of entomology did not appear in the official listings at all, however. Between 1864 and 1934 entomological references had accumulated at a rate of about 2,500 annually, though the figure was nearer 5,000 a year during the last two decades.

In the *Scientific Monthly* for September, 1935, two scientists attempted to define the growth curve, as they called it, of scientific literature in one

narrow specialty—that concerned with nitrogen fixation by growing plants. It was observed in 1883 that growing plants could make use of nitrogen in the air, and the literature began to develop forthwith. Some ninety papers had already appeared on the subject between 1850 and 1883. Between 1886 and 1914, however, series of papers on this subject began to appear, each from eight to ten pages in length, there often being six or seven of them under the same general title in single issues of the same journal. The production of such papers increased rapidly until the decline set in with the first World War. During the period of “prosperity” that followed that war, the upward curve of publication was found closely to follow the curve indicating the rising price of fifty representative offerings on the New York Stock Exchange!

An annual production of at least one hundred papers on this relatively minor subject was predicted to occur between 1965 and 1970, making the total number of pages for scientists to master yearly at least fifteen hundred. Of course, we were told, proper corrections would have to be applied for booms, depressions, wars, and other factors which stimulate or inhibit the production of scientific papers. This may sound comical, but actually it has a serious aspect.

Science has reached a point where the results of research cannot be published promptly or anywhere near completely. Particular articles in highly specialized journals necessarily interest relatively few of their readers. The increasing volume of scientific literature presents both a financial burden and a complex problem to the worker in research who wishes to know what has already been done in his field. If the worker makes searches or writes to some library, he gets profuse lists of references in many languages, some relevant, some irrelevant, but generally difficult to locate. The journals in which such papers appear are often obscure and few libraries have full files, for new journals constantly multiply and few libraries can afford to subscribe to all of them. The present method of scientific publication is almost wholly bad.

Such publications as science has are usually financed by scientific academies or societies or by government institutions and other organizations for promoting various specialties. In short, scientific journals are subsidized, usually by their readers who are ordinarily their contributors. A few such journals are industrial house organs which occasionally print material of value, and fewer still, published by private initiative, are self-supporting.

The editing of scientific journals is usually poor largely because the editors are generally unpaid for this extra work which they regard as a

mere distraction from their real job—research. Meanwhile, this subvention by authors produces relatively few copies of each paper, duplication is costly, and the reprint distribution system is far from satisfactory. Each journal tends to become a mere collection of scientific reports in different though perhaps fairly closely related fields. Hence the journal requires each subscriber to pay well for many reports that do not interest him in order to secure a very few that do. Reports tend also to get scattered around in a number of expensive journals in related fields the subscription rates to which often run from \$25 to \$50 annually. Consequently, it is both a tedious and an expensive job for the individual scientist to track down anything like a complete bibliography on any subject which, in turn, leads directly to costly duplication in research.

There is no effective means today upon which a scientist in one field may depend to have his attention called to progress in a related field which might be of great aid to him. The time lag is considerable between original publication and the appearance of abstracts in abstract journals. The time wasted by both scientists and librarians in collecting, handling, shelving, filing, listing, and abstracting the literature is appalling. Specifically, this means that scientific research can be undertaken with good hopes of success only where very extensive library facilities are available. No matter how good an isolated worker may be, and no matter how well equipped, he must waste a great deal of his time because he cannot keep up with the progress in his field. What is worse, as W. H. George shows in his *The Scientist in Action*, a great many of these papers so expensively published and painstakingly searched by other scientists are the veriest trash.

One outstanding paper by a major scientist breeds dozens of little parasitic papers, all equipped with cryptic mathematical formulas to fool the elect. As O. A. Stevens wrote in *Science* for November 26, 1937: "I am quite aware of the need of increased facilities for publication, but I am convinced that we have a still greater need for a wiser use of those now available."

In recent years the scientist has had rather too much freedom of the press yet has persistently clamored for more. While he was the person with the most important things to say concerning the maintenance of modern civilization, he said what he had to say so prolifically and so incomprehensibly that he confused even himself. The chief restriction on his publication was the publisher's profit, the bank balance of his technical society, or his own vanity. If an editor rejected his paper, he could publish at his own expense or start a new journal.

A circular letter sent to a hundred biologists a few years ago disclosed that all realized scientists were most unscientific when it came to the matter of publication. Short articles and brief, fragmentary notes hurry to print, whereas there is an actual paucity of definitive articles which go begging because they are said to be too long. What has been done or suggested to remedy this situation?

In April, 1938, Science Service sent out a letter announcing the establishment of the American Documentation Institute and the publication service it would maintain. It was to spare the budget but to permit publication of more articles, fuller papers, more extensive tables and illustrations. Articles could be published as usual in existing journals, but necessary deletions could be filed and indexed at the documentation institute. The bibliofilm or microfilm would be used by the institute. In *Science* for October 18, 1940, Atherton Seidell had more to say about the importance of this new reproduction method. It amounts to photographic reproduction on microfilm to effect the more economical distribution of original scientific reports, enabling research workers at small cost and little effort to collect and store copies of all reports in their specific field.

So far the method is a mere invitation to increased production of scientific and research papers without considering their quality. But Seidell had a word to say about the technical journals that become dismal cemeteries of dead papers. He saw the need for an advisory council on publication to study existing periodicals and to define more carefully the type of material each should publish. He felt that some journals should be eliminated, others changed in policy, format, frequency, or size.

Abstract journals could be largely eliminated if specialty journals stuck to particular fields of science. Today all American scientific and technical journals are simply packed and have constantly to refuse material. Again Seidell suggests condensation for ordinary print and a complete recording on the microfilm as the only effective modern improvement in the distribution of original descriptions of scientific research. But more is needed than this.

For one thing, there are insufficient summary articles or periodic surveys giving a complete review of some subject. Great gaps exist in scientific publication because the conversion of detailed facts into general principles and laws has been neglected. The neglect has been caused by the overcrowding of all scientific and technical periodicals which forces their editors to accept the briefer articles, regardless of deficiencies, and to reject definitive articles, regardless of merit, because they are relatively long.

The publication of advance summaries would be a help. But discoveries must have full exposition somewhere. A general account must be given that is intelligible to a sufficient number to insure sound general opinion. The long, rambling article the ordinary research worker uses to string out his petty findings with as much dignity as possible should and could be greatly condensed. It would rarely be necessary even to microfilm it in full. But there is urgent need for longer, more philosophic articles in the scientific literature which delineate the slow evolution of hypotheses and principles.

The scientific worker must observe, record, and disseminate. He deals with facts and also with men, and none but the scientist can rightly describe what he has done. The artificial separation of the sciences from the humanities has therefore been extremely unfortunate. International differences leading to wars are based upon such faults. Seeds of distrust are sown at educational institutions. Men in different specialties must learn to co-operate and to communicate.

They must learn also to communicate only that which is essential. It is most important of all that scientific manuscripts be winnowed at the start. So far, scientists have been much too lenient in giving approval to publications by other scientists, possibly because they expect the return favor granted in due course. It also becomes increasingly difficult, in these days of excessive specialization, for a particular worker to be an expert critic of any piece of research or of scientific manuscripts outside his own very tiny field.

In his presidential address to the American Society for Horticultural Science in 1939, Victor R. Boswell of the United States Bureau of Plant Industry, very candidly analyzed the performances and attitudes of research workers. He reminded them that considerable sums were invested in their salaries and equipment which they should repay by creditable performance. They should select and plan their projects more scientifically; they should cease diffusing their energies; they should not expect the magic of statistical analysis to convert poor data and careless laboratory work into material warranting appearance in print.

In presenting the results of his work the scientist should also use scientific care and precision. To whom will his report be of interest and value? How shall that specific audience best be approached? Who needs to know and understand what has been done and how much detail is justified? Is it necessarily beneath the dignity of a good scientific investigator to write clearly and to avoid excessive technical terminology? Too many

extremely useful and applicable findings are so deplorably presented that they reach few if any who need them.

Scientists gain nothing by showing off, and the simpler they can make their reports the better. Even their technical reports can be made very much simpler without loss of accuracy or precision. Nor is there really any valid substitute for a good working knowledge of English composition and rhetoric. Many workers make very satisfactory progress until it comes to writing up a report; then they fail miserably. To quote Dr. Boswell directly:

We have all experienced the agonies of preparing manuscripts and have seen our associates suffer with their writing. If more attention were devoted to both elementary and advanced expository writing in training technical workers, reports and manuscript work wouldn't be so painful. Inadequate training in composition and rhetoric not only wastes an untold amount of time of the technician and the typist who retypes his rewrites, but it burdens editorial offices, delays publication, wastes the time of critics, and lowers over-all efficiency. We all know of excellent technical men who complain about the slow movement of their manuscripts through the hands of critics and editors, but who would be astonished and might be offended if told the truth—that much of the delay results from the very poor preparation of their papers. We must learn to write clearly, correctly, and, if possible, easily.

The case could scarcely be stated more distinctly than this scientist has stated it. Individuals who cannot communicate clearly and easily with their fellows and who write obscurely, fumble about with their words and sentences, and very often seem to say what they do not mean to say cannot expect to inspire the confidence that a first-rate, thoroughly competent scientific research worker should. If a scientist cannot master English composition, it becomes hard to believe that he can accomplish much in the complex field of research. It is all very well to recommend the use of new, economical, mechanical means for the publication of scientific reports, but we should first devise an efficient method of deciding rationally what should be published and what should not.

Categories might be set up, as Bernal has suggested: notes, papers, longer reports or reviews of related inquiries carried on for some years by groups of scientists, and monographs. It might be well if most of our existing scientific journals were abolished, except such news journals as *Science* in the United States, *Nature* in Great Britain, and, of course, our popular science magazines.

Next, scientists should not feel compelled to publish, if they have nothing to say, in order to hold their jobs. They should be permitted

periods during which they would often do things of more importance than preparing papers or publishing. Their manuscripts, when prepared, would be sent to a single central editorial bureau. Here they would be considered by a committee of scientific experts.

This committee would be as informal as possible. Its members would be drawn from the various scientific and professional societies. Their approval of the manuscript would be arrived at scientifically, not by a process of mutual back-scratching. The paper would then be edited to get it in authoritative form. Statistical methods would be used to verify it, criticism would be made of the scientific method involved, each literature citation would be checked, and every unnecessary table and graph eliminated.

The material would next be rendered into clear English by the editors if its scientific author proved incapable of performing that duty. Then a master-copy would be made. Reproductions of this would be made by photostat and mailed to a list provided by the author. A fairly complete summary of the paper would also appear in one of the few abstract journals required by this system. Copies would later be sent to libraries and also to such individuals as requested them after having seen the abstract in print.

Photostatic or microfilm reproductions could be made cheaply and filed readily by modern business methods. Scientists could thus easily, quickly, and inexpensively assemble a complete bibliography in their specialties. They could keep thoroughly up to date with little trouble, being required neither to pay for nor search through dozens of reports in which they were not interested to find the few they desired.

The annual reports of scientific societies and institutions could be made more comprehensive and, like the current series of Department of Agriculture yearbooks, could be devoted to surveys of the status of science in particular specialties. Scientific and technical societies might also occasionally print and bind together important papers in special fields. Technical journals would then exist to serve science and not science to provide material to fill an excessive number of technical journals.

It is tremendously important that something be done soon to cope with the present disorderly flood of scientific publications; it will otherwise simply drown science out. Our very civilization depends upon free but efficient scientific endeavor. Are the suggestions made here too drastic? It does not seem so to the writer after many years' experience as an editor of scientific and technical manuscripts.

FALLS CHURCH, VIRGINIA

VARIABILITY IN THE CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR OF AMERICAN INDIANS

NORMAN S. HAYNER

ABSTRACT

Just as white communities show wide variations in the extent of social disorganization, so also do Indian. The degree of demoralization seems to be determined by the intensity and character of contacts with white civilization, on the one hand, and by the source and adequacy of sustenance, on the other. The Plains and the Pacific Northwest are used to illustrate regional differences. The former shows a lower crime rate, less drunkenness, and a greater tendency to commit "outbreaking" crimes. Although contacts with whites have in general been disastrous for Indians of the Pacific Northwest, great variability exists between specific reservations. The Colville, a low-rate jurisdiction in this region, the Yakima, a high-rate, and the Klamath, a very high-rate, are discussed in detail. The Colvilles illustrate the importance of isolation coupled with modest economic resources. The Yakimas show the effect of a longer and more intense period of contact with whites together with greater economic prosperity. The Klamaths exhibit the influence of unusual unearned wealth from valuable timber holdings accentuated by contacts with seasonal workers attracted to local logging camps and mills.

Demoralization has been the common result of the impact of civilization on primitive peoples. Diseases against which immunities have not been developed greatly reduce the native population. The old social order breaks down and the building of a new order to take its place is slow and painful. So it has been with the American Indian.

The extent and character of contacts with white civilization have an important relation to the persistence of primitive ways. Isolation encourages cultural vitality; alien stimulations facilitate tribal disorganization. Among the Hopis of the Southwest, 60 miles from a modern highway or railroad, the native culture is strong, "theft is rare, and murder is unknown." Laguna and Isleta, the two pueblos nearest Albuquerque, present the biggest law-enforcement problem to the officers of the United Pueblos Agency. Although as large as Laguna in population, Zuni Pueblo, 40 miles south of Gallup on a third-class road, had no report to the agency officers in 1937. All problems had been handled by the reservation court. Police officers have discovered that prohibition is enforced more easily and effectively in areas where Indians live apart from whites as compared with those where they are scattered among whites. The incidence of venereal disease among Indians is also higher near the population centers and lower in faraway places.

Closely related to social contacts as a factor in the criminal behavior of Indians is economic status. Quinault families that received the richest timber claims on their Washington coast reservation are today the most

poverty-stricken and demoralized. In general the wealthier the tribe, the greater the offending. Money attracts predatory whites and makes it possible to buy liquor and to wander far from the reservation in automobiles. The Osage, Klamath, and Menominee tribes rank high in both unearned wealth and undesirable behavior. The Paiutes of Nevada, on the other hand, have had to labor diligently to obtain enough income for a bare existence and have rarely come to the attention of the police.

Drunkenness and sex offenses are the Indian crimes that most frequently perplex American law-enforcement officers. Since this fact sometimes leads to a biological interpretation, it calls for critical consideration. It should be clear, of course, that most Indians are peaceful, law-abiding citizens. A very high proportion of their offenses are minor misdemeanors—vices rather than systematic professional crimes. A 1932 official report on "Law and Order on Indian Reservations of the Northwest" concludes that "among Indians drinking is associated with most infringements of the law, and that sex offending closely connected with the breakdown of family life, though neglected by the courts, constitutes the other great problem."¹

Few Indians north of Mexico had alcoholic beverages in prehistoric times. Generally speaking, the Indian of today, like many of his white associates, has not learned "to hold his liquor like a gentleman." He has not developed those traditions of moderate drinking that characterize most Italians and Greeks but too few white Americans. It should be remembered that more than half the white arrests in the United States are occasioned by intoxication and that the poor white, who is closer to the Indian economically, is more likely to come to the attention of the police for drunkenness than the wealthy "gentleman." It is also pertinent that other primitive groups have exhibited a potent reaction to alcohol. In a 1932 *Report of the Native Economic Commission*, Union of South Africa, is the statement: "It has always been a cardinal and very salutary principle of European administration that the Native must be protected from the stronger liquors."

Furthermore, the federal liquor law discriminates against the Indian as compared with his white neighbor. Since he is subject to arrest if liquor is found in his possession, he is likely to drink the bottle of whiskey or the jug of wine as quickly as possible, with devastating effect. In the words of a tribal leader: "The boys figure they can't take it away if it's inside!"

¹ "Survey of Conditions of Indians in United States," *Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Indian Affairs* (U.S. Senate), Part 26, pp. 14137-426. Although the study was made by Roy A. Brown, Mary L. Mark, Henry R. Cloud, and Lewis Meriam, for the sake of brevity it will be referred to in this paper as the Meriam Report.

In the light of these facts it is not surprising that of the 1,484 Indian law violations in federal, state, and Indian courts reported by twenty-seven officers during the calendar year 1938 to Louis C. Mueller, chief special officer, Office of Indian Affairs, more than three-fourths were violations of liquor laws or drunk and disorderly cases. The territory served by these officers includes nine-tenths of the Indian population of the United States. In a letter to the writer Mr. Mueller, who has been associated with the enforcement of law on Indian reservations for sixteen years, made the following interesting comment on the relation of liquor to Indian crime:

We are convinced that the Indian has a greater alcoholic reaction than the white race. (It may here be noted that the Finns and Irish have a greater alcoholic reaction than the Swedes or Germans.) The Indian has not, as a whole, learned temperance or moderation, and his reaction is generally a violent one. Now to break down these statements, we note that a Chippewa or an Osage does not react as violently as does a Klamath, an Apache or even a Sioux. Moreover, members of the same tribe, and for that matter, members of the same family having the same degree of Indian blood, react differently.²

It is obvious from Mr. Mueller's letter that the reaction of the Indian to alcohol varies not only in different tribes but also in different individuals from the same family. This calls for an explanation in situational rather than in racial terms. Just as white communities and individuals show wide variations in the extent of social or personal disorganization, so also do Indian. Some of these variations show similarities within a region; others are jurisdictional; still others are familial and personal. These last two are beyond the scope of this paper.³ Attention will be given here to regional and jurisdictional variability. The Plains (Montana and the Dakotas) and the Pacific Northwest (Oregon, Washington, and British Columbia) will be used to illustrate regional differences.⁴ Three reservations

² The writer is indebted to his colleagues, Jesse F. Steiner in sociology and Erna Gunther and Verne Ray in anthropology, as well as to Mr. Mueller, for critical reading of this article in its original form and for many helpful suggestions.

³ The writer is now working with Una Hayner on a study of Indian marriage and family problems.

⁴ A comparison between the criminal behavior of these regions and of the Southwest (Arizona and New Mexico) would be interesting. In spite of four hundred years of contacts with whites, many of the village dwellers and herdsmen of the Southwest retain their old traditions. The fact that Indians make up one-twelfth of the total population in Arizona and New Mexico—more than three times their proportion in the Plains region and more than five times their percentage in the Pacific Northwest—helps to explain this cultural vitality. It is significant that the 1930 census of Indian popula-

in the Pacific Northwest will be discussed in detail to show jurisdictional contrasts.

In the days before white men slaughtered the buffalo for hides, the Plains Indians were hunters. Following the bison and fighting their enemies, they roamed over wide areas of the Great Plains. The greatest prestige was gained by the warrior who performed the bravest exploits. Life was rigorous. Chiefs got up at daylight and in winter broke the ice for their baths. Everyone had to be eternally alert against attack. A man gained both honor and wealth in his tribe by stealing horses from the enemy. "Stealing livestock was an art," says the *Meriam Report*, "requiring much skill and cunning, the respect for which still lingers. Cattle stealing involves the changing of brands, at which some Indians are very skillful. It would seem from our data that this crime may in some cases be considered professional."

The old code of the buffalo hunters, with its glorification of warrior exploits, has broken down. A correlate of these declining mores is the increasing proportion of white blood. From 1890 to 1940 the proportion of mixed-bloods in the Blackfeet tribal roll increased almost ten times—from 8 to 79 per cent. As the Indian becomes more like the white biologically and, as a result, associates more freely with him, his criminal behavior tends to approximate more closely the white pattern. Out of twenty-six "slick" crimes—forgery, fraudulent checks, embezzlement, jumping hotel bills—the *Meriam Report* found that twenty-two were committed by mixed-bloods.

The rate for Indian criminality, as indicated by the *Meriam Report*, was lower in the Plains region than in the Pacific Northwest. The percentage of enrolled Indians resident on reservations in the Dakotas and Montana who appeared in court as offenders during 1929 was 2.0; in Washington and Oregon, 3.6. A difference in the character of the offenses in the two regions was also found. In the wide-open spaces offenders are "younger, more vigorous and bold, less inclined to mere drunkenness, and more likely to commit outbreaking crimes," such as grand larceny or assault, and

tion reported only slightly over 2 per cent of mixed blood for Arizona and New Mexico. The average percentage of mixed blood for all states was twenty times as high. Hostility against intermarriage has been accompanied by a tenacious holding to the mother-tongue. Seven-tenths of the Navajos were unable to speak English in 1930; four-tenths of the Keresans, a Pueblo linguistic stock; three-tenths of the Tanoans, another Pueblo stock; two-tenths of the Hopis. Unfortunately, complete data are not available from which a crime rate for the Southwest could be derived that would be comparable to those for the other two regions. With this degree of persistence in the old languages and traditions, however, a generally lower incidence of crime and demoralization is probable.

"they are not so likely to come into the courts repeatedly." The problem of the "drifter" is not serious.

Although little is left of the early religious beliefs, native games, or the old dances of the primitive Plains communities, a rugged independence and pride in solving their own problems are suggested by Mueller's experience with the Crows. It took him eleven days to set up the Court of Tribal Offenses at the Crow Reservation. Fifty of the one hundred members of the tribal council came the first day; another fifty, the second. Answers to the same questions had to be repeated. In spite of opposition from the old guard and the initial refusal of the Crows to admit that the Department of the Interior had authority to set up such an institution, the Court was finally established and is now one of the best of its kind.⁵

The Indians of the Pacific Northwest are divided into two main groups by the Cascade Mountains. To the west is a long narrow coastal strip extending from the islands and fiords of Southeastern Alaska through British Columbia and Washington into Oregon; to the east, a semiarid plateau drained in part by the Fraser and Columbia rivers.

The aboriginal culture of the coastal strip was most highly developed among the Tlingit, Haida, Tsimshian, and Kwakiutl tribes to the north, was less clear on the Washington coast, and faded out on the coast of Oregon. In contrast to the Plains emphasis on brave deeds, the major criterion for the achievement of prestige on the coast was the accumulation of wealth. There was little "brotherly love" among Indians in the vicinity of Cape Flattery, according to Dr. Erna Gunther, University of Washington anthropologist. They were always struggling for status and fearing this and that. Murder was justified on the ground of jealousy alone. Since they were very envious of a successful person, he had to be constantly on the lookout lest he be murdered. The Makah, for example, had elaborate methods of poisoning.

Contacts with whites seem to have been more disastrous for the Indians of the Northwest coast than for those in the Southwest. Smallpox and the venereal diseases, originating from these contacts, took a heavy toll. The abolition of slavery and the banning of potlatches, which had

⁵ The Crow Court was organized under the law-and-order regulations approved by the Secretary of the Interior in 1935. The purpose of this type of court is to place responsibility for reservation behavior entirely on the Indians and to take it away from the superintendent and his deputy. The court has jurisdiction over Indian misdemeanors. No professional attorneys are admitted. Experience has indicated that lawyers "bulldoze" witnesses and "really mess things up." As a matter of fact, no outsider has a right to speak in Indian court unless asked to do so by the judge. Development of this institution has created much more interest on the part of Indians in law enforcement.

been the chief means for gaining prestige, completely broke down the old system of classes. These Indians find it "not worth while" to compete with the more industrious and efficient Europeans and Orientals on the farms or in the canneries and logging camps. The disparity between sixteenth-century Spaniards and the Pueblo Indians, with their high achievements in government, art, and religion, was not so great as between eighteenth-century English and the coast Indians.

A study of the 1,495 Indian offenders received by the Oakalla Prison Farm in Burnaby, British Columbia, during a ten-year period ending in 1938, shows that the percentage of Indians incarcerated in this provincial prison was twice the percentage in the total population. Fifty-five per cent had been convicted of offenses pertaining to liquor. A detailed analysis of the Indian offenders received at Oakalla during the calendar year 1937 indicated an economic status that was not more than semiskilled and a low educational experience. Although more than four-fifths rated themselves as semiskilled in occupation—farmers, fishermen, loggers, housekeepers, seamen, and trappers in that order—one-third were illiterate and only twelve had had over six years of education.⁶

Of the sixty-two British Columbia Indians charged with murder from 1910 to 1936, only two suffered the death penalty. Due to the conflicting testimony of Indian witnesses and the reluctance on the part of juries to hold Indians responsible to the same extent as whites, it is difficult to prove capital charges against them. "Other major crimes such as robbery are comparatively infrequent and accordingly, with the exception of these cases of homicide, criminal law enforcement on Indian Reserves is concerned chiefly with the suppression of the liquor traffic. In the vicinity of cities, logging camps, canneries, and other centers of population, prostitution of Indian women is fairly common and is difficult to control as the women leave the reserves for the purpose."⁷

Although it is evident from the material presented above that there are differences in the extent and character of Indian crime between the Plains and the Pacific Northwest, greater variability exists between specific reservations in the same region. The accompanying table, which is based on data included in the *Meriam Report*, shows jurisdictional crime rates for Indians of the Dakotas, Montana, Washington, and Oregon. The crude rates are the percentages of the total number of enrolled Indians in

⁶ Based on an unpublished manuscript on crime among the Indians of British Columbia, prepared for this article by Stanley J. Bailey under the direction of Professor C. W. Topping, University of British Columbia.

⁷ Taken from a letter to the writer by A. F. MacKenzie, secretary, Department of Indian Affairs, Ottawa, October 29, 1936.

residence at their jurisdiction April 1, 1930, who appeared in a federal, state, or Indian court as offenders during the calendar year 1929. No matter how many times each Indian appeared in court he is counted but once.

Granting administrative differences among states, the contrast in rates between Standing Rock and Turtle Mountain, North Dakota, Sisseton and Rosebud, South Dakota, North Cheyenne and Flathead, Mon-

TABLE 1
JURISDICTIONAL CRIME RATES FOR INDIAN ENROLLEES

Jurisdiction	Indian Enrollees	Indian Offenders	Crude Rate	Corrected Rate*
Fort Totten, N.D.....	829	17	2.1	1.9
Turtle Mountain, N.D.....	2,154	60	2.8	2.4
Fort Berthold, N.D.....	1,374	18	1.3	1.2
Standing Rock, N.D.....	3,237	33	1.0	1.0
Sisseton, S.D.....	1,811	7	0.4	0.3
Yankton, S.D.....	1,464	28	1.9	1.7
Crow Creek, S.D.....	1,200	23	1.9	2.1
Rosebud, S.D.....	5,576	144	2.6	2.5
Pine Ridge, S.D.....	7,472	81	1.1	1.0
Cheyenne River, S.D.....	2,664	45	1.7	1.6
Fort Peck, Mont.....	2,161	64	3.0	2.9
Fort Belknap, Mont.....	1,155	34	2.9	2.6
Rocky Boy, Mont.....	402	12	3.0	2.8
Blackfeet, Mont.....	2,985	87	2.9	2.7
Flathead, Mont.....	2,164	90	4.2	3.9
Crow, Mont.....	1,720	37	2.2	2.0
North Cheyenne, Mont.....	1,390	23	1.7	1.7
Colville, Wash.....	3,529	32	0.9	0.9
Yakima, Wash.....	2,326	109	4.7	4.7
Tulalip, Wash.....	2,050	32	1.6	1.4
Taholah, Wash.....	953	14†	1.5†	1.5†
Umatilla, Ore.....	797	46	5.8	5.7
Warm Springs, Ore.....	825	37	4.5	5.1
Klamath, Ore.....	1,052	140	13.3	13.1

* Corrected for variations in the age-sex composition of the 1930 Indian population.

† Since this is based on offenders in one court only, the rate is too low.

tana, Colville and Yakima, Washington, and Warm Springs and Klamath, Oregon, is probably great enough to offset local variations in the energy and efficiency of law-enforcement officials. It would have been interesting to have studied all these contrasting jurisdictions in an effort to determine the factors associated with low and high rates. Recently it was possible for the writer to spend four weeks in the field, talking with agency officials and representative Indians in the Pacific Northwest. To illustrate variability in specific areas, special attention will be given to the contrast between the Colville and Yakima jurisdictions in eastern Washington and to the unusually high rate for the Klamath Reservation in southern Oregon.

The Colville jurisdiction, which includes the contiguous Colville and Spokane reservations, illustrates very well the importance of isolation. Although its 1,385,086 acres and 4,126 Indians (1939) make it the largest jurisdiction in the Pacific Northwest, it has never been crossed by a railroad and even at the present time is cut by no interstate highway. During the last one hundred and fifty years many culture traits from the Plains Indians have been adopted by tribes on the Columbia plateau. The Sanpoil and Nespelem, Salishan peoples who are the principal tribes on the Colville jurisdiction, being more isolated, clung to the true plateau culture, which included the ideal of pacifism. Verne F. Ray in his monograph on these tribes points out that "from earliest infancy the child was drilled in the tenets of peaceful existence with his fellows. The pugnacious man was a public enemy with whom respectable people associated as little as possible." A person lost status by engaging in brawls. To some extent this is still true.

The Nez Perces, one of the smaller tribes in this jurisdiction, show how strong antagonism to whites may accentuate isolation. Long after the death of their leader at Nespelem in 1904, the influence of Chief Joseph and his hostility to white ways persisted. More than any other group on the reservation these Nez Perce folk cling to their distinctive native costumes. They seem to be less demoralized than surrounding tribes.

The isolation of the Colvilles has been coupled with modest economic resources. During 1938, 385 families, for whom records were available at the agency, had an average income of \$431.60. This was derived mostly from livestock. Two hundred and twenty-five Indians have been employed on C.C.C.-I.D. projects—men from seventeen to seventy are eligible—and about 35 on roads activities. Much of the rugged tribal land is covered with a forest of ponderosa pine. Each year about 2 per cent of this timber is sold to the highest bidder for selective logging. The money thus acquired goes into the tribal funds.

The tremendous construction activities at Grand Coulee Dam on the southern rim of the reservation have increased the number and variety of contacts for these Indians. Since the main construction work began (July, 1934), from 150 to 200 Colvilles have held jobs for which the lowest wage is \$4.50 a day. Many receive two or three times that much. Prior to the colossal undertaking of building the world's largest dam, when 14 persons lived at this strategic site rather than 16,000, as at present, both drinking and venereal disease were uncommon among the Indians. Dr. W. S. Johnston, who was physician at the Colville Agency from 1914 to 1922, reported very little drunkenness and only three or four cases of venereal disease. Indians caught drinking were given from thirty to ninety days in

jail. Fourth of July celebrations in the village of Nespelem near the agency used to attract about 1,000 Indians and 50 whites. Now there are many more whites. Recently (June, 1940) Dr. and Mrs. Johnston camped with their trailer at the reservation hamlet known as New Keller during its Salmon Days Celebration. Drunken Indians parked all around them. Only two arrests were made on this occasion, and those were for possession. With high wages received from work on the dam, drunken driving has become a problem, but Sergeant McGinn, who is in charge of the Washington State Patrol office in this district, affirms that Indians are not worse than whites in this offense. By 1935 venereal disease cases began to come to the attention of the Indian Service nurse at Nespelem. In spite of the fact that during 1937 only 54 arrests of Colville and Spokane Indians were made by Indian police on the jurisdiction and by county and city law-enforcement officers in the surrounding circle of towns, according to the official agency report, demoralization has probably been increasing.

The Yakimas, in contrast with the Colvilles, show the effect of a longer and more intense period of contact with whites. The reservation is crossed by the main line of the Northern Pacific and by U.S. 97, the principal north-south highway east of the Cascades. The leading arterial highway between Seattle and Salt Lake City skirts its eastern boundary. The city of Yakima with 27,000 inhabitants is only a few miles away. Approximately 100,000 acres, comprising 9 per cent of the total land area in this big reservation, are irrigated. The verdure of thriving fruit orchards and the healthy growth of sugar beets and of hop and potato fields in this irrigated section remind one of fertile California valleys. White men and Japanese now own or lease much of the best land. In fact, out of a total population on the reservation of 16,000, less than 3,000 are Indians. Workers of many races and cultures—local and transient Indians, white fruit tramps, Filipinos, Japanese—help with the harvests.

The rate of 4.7 in Table 1—five times that of the Colville—is, of course, based on the 109 resident enrolled Indians who were offenders in 1929. It is interesting that the Meriam *Report* found 106 additional Indian offenders for this year who were not on the rolls of the Yakima Reservation.

About one-quarter of the Yakimas are entirely self-supporting. There are 225 farms on the reservation operated by Indians. Others that lease their land tend to "just play around." In many cases, crime seems to vary with economic prosperity. A study of the offenses of Yakima Indians by months shows the highest to be December, when money is paid them for grazing leases, then March, when spring rentals are paid for

their farm land, and, third, September, when money is earned picking hops and fall rentals are paid.⁸

From spring until fall many Yakimas are on the move. They dig clams on the ocean beaches, gather roots in the mountains, pick cherries near the Dalles and huckleberries on Mount Adams, and fish with dip nets for salmon on the Columbia. From the white point of view these trips tend to "discourage habits of settled industry and promote moral irresponsibility." To the Indian, however, these journeys are in harmony with his old culture. As in the annual long house celebrations and at the local fairs, so also at transient camps like Celilo Falls, the traditional bone-gambling game is still played, but American poker is increasingly popular. Wandering may thus be a means of losing money as well as of earning it.

The weakening of the old cultures—twelve different tribes are united in the Yakima federation—has been a gradual process involving loss of status for the Indian, deterioration of the early religions, and disorganization of the family and tribal life. The old Indian custom marriage "involved some ceremony and a public sanction of the relationship." It often lasted as long as a week. Now, in many instances, to use the words of Nealey Olney, judge of the Court of Indian Offenses, "a man simply gets in bed with a woman and they call it marriage." After a detailed study of the Yakima Reservation (pp. 14410-20) the Meriam *Report* concludes: "Drunkenness and sex irregularities are both so common that they are no disgrace to a Yakima."

Americanization has progressed further among the Klamaths than among the Yakimas. Driving south to Klamath Agency from the much more isolated, poverty-stricken, and law-abiding Warm Springs Reservation in north central Oregon, the writer was impressed by the fine cars—few of them more than a year old—and the completely American dress. There are no "long hairs," i.e., men with long braids, or any moccasins here. Visits in representative homes showed that the furniture and the table fare for many of these Indians are similar to those of middle-class whites.

The unusually high crime rate for the Klamaths may be accounted for by the large amount of valuable timber in this 50-mile-square reservation coupled with contacts provided by seasonal workers attracted to local logging camps and sawmills. Of the 5,000 people on the Klamath Reservation less than one-fourth are now Indians. These whites are not supposed to possess or transport liquor, but many do and much of it reaches the Indians. After the first timber cutting in 1910, the Indians received so much money—\$300-\$400 per month—that they did not have to work.

⁸ Based on data from an unpublished paper, "Crime among the Yakima Indians," prepared for this article by Miss Evelyn C. Wohlers of Yakima.

More leisure provided more opportunities to get into mischief. Many bought automobiles and started out. Of the 1,465 Indians enrolled under this agency many live in Oklahoma and elsewhere. Generally speaking, the older people have been able to make an adjustment, but for the younger generation it has been demoralizing. The picture is complicated by the fact that a "riffraff" element of Indians from other places, hearing about the easy money "on the Klamath," has come in. The local C.C.C.-I.D. employs only three Klamaths.

In spite of this general situation most of the Klamath Indians—the enrollees include a number of Modocs and a few Paiutes and Pit Rivers—are law-abiding citizens. A recent count shows that in 1938 and 1939 only 44 of the resident Indians accounted for 412 cases of drunkenness and disorderly conduct. Chiloquin, a small sawmill town 5 miles from the agency, and Sprague River on the eastern side of the reservation, are popular places to get drunk, but Klamath Falls, a frontier city of 18,000 inhabitants 31 miles south of the agency, is the bootlegger's paradise. From the Indian standpoint "they lay for the boys and charge double." In the words of Ben F. Mitchell, chairman of the Loan Board: "The first time an Indian is out of line into jail he goes. As soon as he pays the fine out he comes. Some have been in as many as 100 times. They help to support the city and the county."

Judge Ashurst of Klamath Falls was very frank in describing conditions: "The Indian is exploited here. He is regarded as fair meat. If the price of a dress is seven dollars, it is okay to charge fourteen. They have no heart about it at all."

The Indians recently won \$7,500,000 in a suit against the government because the latter made the mistake some years ago of selling a large tract of reservation timber to the Long-Bell Lumber Company for only \$87,000! Although the agency insists that the individual Indians buy something definite with the judgment money allowed them, it is significant that Sheriff Lowe of Klamath County noticed an increase in offending after these payments began. One Indian woman wrecked five cars in less than that many months! Following each quarterly payment, as they were formerly made, there was an increase in the jail population.

Mr. Mueller, who was for some time a law-enforcement officer on this reservation, writes that there have been sixteen murders among the Indians on the Klamath Reservation in the past ten years. This gives the Klamaths an average annual homicide rate seventeen times that of the country as a whole and six times that for the 69,294 resident enrolled Indians covered by the Meriam *Report*. It should be noted that murder or manslaughter is a common ground for commitment of Indians to penal

institutions. Aside from sex crimes, these are practically the only offenses for which Indians are sent from Alaska to the federal penitentiary at McNeil Island. The rate for the closely related crime of assault is also high for the Klamaths. In fact the Klamath rate for offenses against the person, as indicated by Meriam *Report* data, was three times as high as those for its nearest competitors—the Blackfeet and Crows of Montana.

How to explain these exceedingly high rates for murder and assault is not entirely clear. There are a number of probable factors arising out of the distinctive backgrounds of the various Indian tribes enrolled at this agency. Leslie Spier in his *Klamath Ethnography* states that "quarrels and blood feuds were quite common." Verne F. Ray, who is studying the old Modoc culture, informs the writer that murder was not much emphasized by the early tribal code. Mr. Mueller stresses the point that because the Paiutes had been constantly at war with both the Klamaths and the Pit Rivers, "the hatchet is buried in a very shallow grave with the handle conveniently uncovered." He also writes that

a long-present characteristic among certain tribes of the Northwest is the tendency to allow an insult, real or imaginary, to smolder for many years, sometimes as much as twenty, and then when the brain is excited from alcohol to recall the long-forgotten incident and make an effort to right the wrong by violence.

These influences from the past, operating in the demoralizing social and economic setting described above, offer at least a partial explanation.

In conclusion, the extent to which an aboriginal culture has disorganized seems to be in large part determined by the degree of isolation, on the one hand, and the source and adequacy of sustenance, on the other. Such distinctive customs as the horse-stealing of the Plains Indians or the pacifism of the Sanpoil tend to become less important factors for the explanation of criminal behavior as acculturation progresses. Some Indians, pauperized by too much easy money or unwisely administered relief, lack the incentive to work; others, including many boarding-school graduates, want to work but lack the opportunity. In so far as such enterprises as the C.C.C.-I.D. revive the fundamental drive to work, they contribute toward the reorganization of Indian society. A thoroughgoing solution of the Indian problem should include revival of some of the best traits in the old culture, education for young people that will enable them to compete with whites, and the development on the reservations of economic activities that will make self-support possible. Many interesting studies have been made of the old American cultures. A new field for research, equally challenging and more practical, is offered by the problems and processes of present-day Indian communities.

A RESEARCH NOTE ON THE INFLUENCE OF IMMIGRATION ON THE BIRTH RATE¹

ARNOLD M. ROSE

ABSTRACT

Migration from an area of high birth rate—rural Italy—to an area of low birth rate—urban United States—would be expected to lower the birth rate if assimilation were the only relevant influence accompanying migration. Data for a sample of 1,348 Italian families in Chicago reveal that the birth rate of married women not separated from their husbands when migrating was higher in the United States than in Italy, holding age constant. Thus the higher economic level of living and perhaps unknown psychological factors must have more than counteracted any influence of assimilation. Migration from Italy to the United States had the effect not only of increasing the number of children born but also of keeping more of them alive.

The interest that American sociologists formerly manifested in problems of immigration into the United States has been shifted in recent years to interest in problems of internal migration within the United States. Yet there is enough similarity between the two types of problems with respect to their economic and psychological effects to justify a re-examination of some phases of the older problem. Sociological theory about adjustment to a new environment has centered around the concept of assimilation. In general, the theory is that the migrants gradually abandon the ways of behaving characteristic of the culture from which they migrated and take over the culture traits predominant in their new home. Migration and adjustment to a new milieu are not, however, psychologically unitary stimuli. Not only is there the experience of breaking old bonds and building new ones but also usually of meeting with improved economic conditions, of living among persons unusually distributed as to sex and age, and of many other things. The problem of this paper is to determine the effect of migration on the birth rate of a selected group of migrants. Migration affects the birth rate not only through assimilation but also through changes in several relevant influences that accompany migration.

In an unpublished study, Klassen² compared the reproduction rates of foreign-born groups in the United States with those of the native-born in the United States and with those of the population in the European

¹ The author is grateful to Professors Samuel A. Stouffer and Louis Wirth of the University of Chicago for a critical reading of this paper.

² Peter Pierre Klassen, "Birth Rates of Foreign Nationalities in America and Abroad: A Study in Assimilation" (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Chicago, June, 1938).

countries from which the immigrants come. Except for the Irish, the Canadians, and the Russian Jews, he found few differences between the birth rate in any given foreign country and the birth rate of those persons living in the United States who were born in the given foreign country. The birth rate of the Italian immigrants to this country, which is the specific subject of this paper, was found to be only slightly lower than the birth rate in the southern rural areas of Italy, on a par with the birth rate in southern urban areas of Italy, and higher than the birth rate in the northern areas of Italy. While it is generally known that the majority of Italian immigrants came from southern Italy, they cannot be so carefully matched with their homelands as to permit a summary statement on the effect of immigration on the birth rate. Also, Klassen's data do not permit him to hold constant a number of factors other than that of rural-urban differences.

There is a body of data, however, the use of which will avoid these difficulties, since it permits the comparison of the birth rates before and after immigration of the same group of people. In 1895, Carroll D. Wright, then United States Commissioner of Labor, sent Caroline L. Hunt to collect facts from the Italian population of Chicago "in accordance with carefully prepared schedules."³ During a period of approximately one year, Miss Hunt interviewed 1,348 Italian families containing 6,773 persons, of whom 4,493 were born in Italy. These constituted about 40 per cent of the total Italian-born population of Chicago.⁴ Of this sample, Wright says:

It is believed that the data secured for the 1,348 families visited is entirely representative of the conditions existing in all Italian families of a similar character in that city. The canvass was not confined to any particular portion of the city, but represents families from all sections.⁵

These data indicate the number of children born to women by the number of years they were married, both before and after the event of migration. In all but a few cases the migration was a very important event in the lives of the migrants. They went from the villages and towns

³ The census of 1890 lists 5,685 persons of Italian birth in Chicago, and the census of 1900, 16,008 persons. Linear interpolation would suggest that there were about 10,800 individuals of Italian birth in the city when Miss Hunt began interviewing.

⁴ *Ninth Special Report of the Commissioner of Labor: The Italians in Chicago: A Social and Economic Study* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1897), p. 7.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

of Italy to Chicago. They went largely for economic reasons, although it is possible that a few migrated to avoid the Crispi political persecution around 1890. Some families migrated as a unit; in other cases husbands came first and then brought their families over after a few years. Unmarried male adults were, of course, also to be found among the migrants. Practically all the migrants came directly to the United States, but in a few cases they stopped off for a year or two in one of the western European countries.

The data on number of children born to these Italian migrants are unusually good because of certain culture patterns prevailing among the population. The well-organized institutions of family and church practically made impossible premarital and extra-marital sex relations, as well as contraception and abortion. The number of children born is thus an excellent index of the fecundity of married women.

Students of assimilation might expect that the effect of transplantation from an area of high birth rate to an area of low birth rate⁶ would be a decrease in the birth rate. Yet the facts point in the other direction. Using number of years married as an index of the age of married women, the total number of children born to these Italian women at practically any length of time married (in years) was higher than the number of children born to them in Italy for a corresponding number of years married in Italy (Table 1).⁷ Standardizing the distribution of number of years married in Italy on the distribution of total number of years married, and applying the age specific birth rates in Italy to the standardized population so as to give summary figures comparable as to age distribution, there were found to be 3.41 children born to each woman in Italy, while the total number of children born to each woman, both in Italy and in the United States, was 4.25.⁸ Since the last figure includes the number of children born both in Italy and in the United States, and since the number of children born in Italy is lower, the number of children

⁶ Klassen (*op. cit.*, pp. 20, 53, and 57) shows that while the gross reproduction rate of urban native whites in the United States was .941, in all Italy it was 1.573, and in urban Italy it was 1.228.

⁷ The only exceptions occur at under one, one, and twenty-three years married. The data for under one and twenty-three are not reliable because of the fewness of the cases.

⁸ This figure does not include the number of children born to a woman after twenty-five years of married life or for an unreported number of years (since the exact number of years is not specified so as to permit them to be held constant) or an unreported number of children per woman. These cases are few in number and cannot significantly affect the results.

TABLE 1*

NUMBER OF CHILDREN BORN TO IMMIGRANT ITALIAN WOMEN
MARRIED A SPECIFIED NUMBER OF YEARS (IN ITALY
AND IN THE UNITED STATES)

Number of Years of Mar- ried Life in Italy	Number of Women Having Spent Specified Number of Years of Mar- ried Life in Italy	Number of Chil- dren Born to These Women in Italy	Number of Chil- dren per Woman (Italy)	Total Number of Years of Married Life (Both in Italy and in the United States)	Number of Women Having Spent Specified Number of Years of Mar- ried Life in Italy and in the United States	Total Number of Chil- dren Born to These Women	Number of Chil- dren per Woman Both in Italy and in the United States	Column 8 minus Col- umn 4
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Under 1.....	3	1	0.33	Under 1.....	31	0	0.00	-0.33
1.....	52	21	0.40	1.....	30	9	0.30	-0.10
2.....	52	47	0.90	2.....	44	40	0.91	0.01
3.....	45	50	1.11	3.....	57	79	1.39	0.28
4.....	45	67	1.49	4.....	61	114	1.87	0.38
5.....	45	72	1.60	5.....	68	166	2.44	0.84
6.....	46	88	1.91	6.....	53	144	2.72	0.81
7.....	49	118	2.41	7.....	49	140	2.86	0.45
8.....	49	124	2.53	8.....	57	191	3.35	0.82
9.....	43	120	2.79	9.....	63	230	3.65	0.86
10.....	42	129	3.07	10.....	66	278	4.21	1.14
11.....	35	111	3.17	11.....	47	222	4.72	1.55
12.....	32	130	4.06	12.....	55	283	5.15	1.09
13.....	42	172	4.10	13.....	43	222	5.16	1.06
14.....	23	100	4.35	14.....	49	269	5.49	1.14
15.....	18	76	4.22	15.....	51	294	5.76	1.54
16.....	19	106	5.58	16.....	38	230	6.05	0.47
17.....	17	98	5.76	17.....	46	308	6.42	0.66
18.....	20	109	5.45	18.....	37	214	5.78	0.33
19.....	13	62	4.77	19.....	37	227	6.49	1.72
20.....	20	120	6.00	20.....	56	398	7.11	1.11
21.....	9	53	5.89	21.....	16	111	6.94	1.05
22.....	14	67	4.79	22.....	36	280	7.78	2.99
23.....	6	46	7.67	23.....	25	174	6.96	-0.71
24.....	10	60	6.00	24.....	25	164	6.56	0.56
25.....	4	21	5.25	25.....	23	153	6.65	1.40
Total (0-25)	753	2,168	2.88	Total (0-25)	1,163	4,940	4.25	1.37
Standard- ized total (0-25)†..			3.41	Standard- ized total (0-25)†..			4.25	0.84
Over 25....	46	337	7.53	Over 25....	133	920	6.92	-0.41
Not report- ed.....	53	259	4.89	Not report- ed.....	51	296	5.80	0.91
Grand to- tal.....	852	2,764	3.24	Grand to- tal.....	1,347	6,156	4.57	1.33

* Source: *Ninth Special Report of the Commissioner of Labor: The Italians in Chicago* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1897), pp. 386-91, 396-401.

† Standardized on distribution of total number of years married, both in Italy and in the United States.

born in the United States must be even higher than 4.25.⁹ Thus the figures indicate that about 25 per cent more children were born to migrating couples in the United States than if they had remained in Italy.

Before concluding that this startling figure represents the effect of migration on the birth rate, we may examine some of the other logical possibilities. First, it may be that women failed to report more of their children born in Italy, especially if they were born dead. While we cannot rule out this possibility completely, some evidence can be presented to indicate that it was not too important. This evidence has some interest for itself, aside from its value in suggesting that differential forgetting of children born in Italy and the United States is not significant. It is the death rate, or rather its converse—the survival rate¹⁰—to which we refer. It may be inferred that if women fail to report children born to them in Italy to a greater extent than those born to them in the United States (especially the children dying at birth or at an early age), they will also necessarily fail to report the deaths of these children. Thus, if we assume a greater tendency to fail to report babies born in Italy, we may expect a lower survival rate in the United States.¹¹ The facts show that this is not true on the whole, though it is true at a few of the lengths of time married (Table 2).¹² After standardizing and summarizing, the percentage surviving among children born in the United States is found to be 64.7, while the percentage surviving among children born in both coun-

⁹ This somewhat indirect way of getting at the differences in birth rate before and after migration was necessary because the number of years married in the United States is no index of the age of a woman, and it is necessary to hold constant any differences in age distribution because women are more fecund at some ages than at others.

¹⁰ We have no information as to the ages at which children died. We are therefore twisting the usual meaning of the term "survival rate." In this paper "survival rate" means the percentage of children surviving among those born to women at each length of time married in 1895. We hold constant, by means of standardization, the number of children born at each number of years married, so as to eliminate the differences of age of children in families when we compare their survival rates. Thus we assume, in our standardization, that the number of years a mother is married is an index of the average age of her children born, if they had all lived until the time of the interview.

¹¹ This deduction assumes no difference between actual age specific death rates in the two countries. If this assumption is wrong, as it probably is, it is very likely to be wrong in a direction favorable to our argument. That is, the survival rate is actually higher in the United States because of better facilities for having children and keeping them alive.

¹² To save space the numbers of years married have been combined into five-year intervals.

tries is 60.7.¹³ Since the total figure is lower than the figure for the United States, the percentage surviving among children born in Italy, at a comparable age, if we could get it directly, must be lower than the total figure. Thus, the discrepancy between the survival rates of the two countries, which is what we are actually interested in, is even greater than the above

TABLE 2*

NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE OF CHILDREN SURVIVING UP TO SPECIFIED NUMBER OF YEARS IMMIGRANT ITALIAN MOTHERS WERE MARRIED IN 1895
(IN ITALY AND IN THE UNITED STATES)

Total Number of Years of Married Life Both in Italy and in the United States	Total Number of Children Born to Immigrant Mothers of Specified Number of Years of Married Life	Total Number of These Children Surviving in 1895	Percentage Surviving	Number of Years of Married Life in the United States	Number of Children Born to Immigrant Mothers in the United States	Number of These Children Surviving in 1895	Percentage Surviving	Column 8 minus Column 4
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
0-5.....	408	296	72.5	0-5.....	745	531	71.3	- 1.2
6-10.....	983	637	64.8	6-10.....	1,301	894	68.7	0.9
11-15.....	1,290	800	62.0	11-15.....	862	541	62.8	0.8
16-20.....	1,377	803	58.3	16-20.....	277	164	59.2	0.9
21-25.....	882	463	52.5	21-25.....	68	40	58.8	6.3
Total (0-25)	4,940	2,999	60.7	Total (0-25)	3,313	2,170	65.5	4.8
Standardized total (0-25)†.....			60.7	Standardized total (0-25)†.....			64.7	4.0
Over 25....	920	417	45.3	Over 25....	16	12	75.0	29.7
Not reported.....	296	139	47.0	Not reported.....	37	21	56.8	9.8
Grand total.....	6,156	3,555	57.7	Grand total.....	3,366	2,203	65.4	7.7

* Source: *Ninth Special Report of the Commissioner of Labor: The Italians in Chicago* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1897), pp. 392-401.

† Standardized on distribution of total number of years married, both in Italy and in the United States.

figures indicate. We would not be far wrong if we concluded from the data that, at comparable ages, about 5-10 per cent more children survived in the United States than in Italy. While this fact does not eliminate the possibility that women tend to fail to report their children born

¹³ Again we ignore the few cases of children born to women married over twenty-five years or for an unreported number of years, as well as the unreported number of children, because of the impossibility of including them in the standardization. Also, again we must proceed indirectly, since the number of years married in Italy is no index of the age of the children at the time of the interview, and this factor must be held constant.

in Italy to a greater extent than their children born in the United States, since the differential in survival rate may be actually larger than our data indicate, it does reveal that this factor is not very important.

A second possibility to be considered is that the discrepancy in number of children born in Italy and the United States, while real, is not to be ascribed to the economic or psychological effects of migration but merely to the physical separation between husband and wife that migration involves for some families. It is quite a practice for husbands to precede their wives to the United States for a few years so as to accumulate enough money to bring their families over or so as otherwise to stabilize themselves economically, but the exact extent of this practice cannot be determined. If half the families did this, and the difference between the number of children born in Italy and the United States is one child per woman (which we found it to be), it would require an average separation between husband and wife of about five years for the newly married couples and much longer for couples married for greater periods to cause such a discrepancy.¹⁴ Since this seems rather high, it is probable that the economic and psychological accompaniments of migration had some influence in causing the rise in the birth rate after migration.

A third, relatively minor, possibility to consider is that girls were married at an earlier age in the United States than in Italy and that these earlier ages are the more fecund ages.¹⁵ This consideration involves the abandoning of our original assumption that the number of years married is a perfect index of age. Since the population under consideration had been in the United States a relatively short while and therefore those married in the United States could have been married only a relatively few years, even if this possibility were a fact it could not explain much of the discrepancy between the birth rate in Italy and the birth rate in the United States. A fourth possibility is that those who are planning to migrate avoid having children until they reach the United States. But this does not seem likely in view of the fact that immigration has just as great, or greater, effect on the number of children had by middle-aged women as on the number of children had by young women. Also, although the

¹⁴ This estimate of five years is the number of years of married life which is required to produce two children, one child to account for the discrepancy and twice that if we assume that one-half the families separated when they migrated.

¹⁵ We are here comparing fecundity at different ages of the woman, not total fecundity, which would probably always be greater if a woman married earlier than later. We can compare fecundity year by year, since we know the number of children by number of years of married life of the woman at the time of interview.

birth rate in the United States was higher, the birth rate in Italy was by no means low. Too, these ardent Catholics from rural Italy were not likely to restrict their birth rate voluntarily. Finally, the struggle to get ahead after arriving in the United States would seem to be just as great as the effort to migrate.

The most important point to be made in measuring the effect of migration on the birth rate is that the total population of the world would probably have been greater if there had been no migration. Migration from Italy to the United States involved an upset in the sex ratios in both countries which resulted in lower marriage rates and hence lower crude birth rates. Migration also involved a separation between husband and wife in many families, since often the husband came over to the United States first to establish himself economically. Our results, however, reveal that, on the whole, migration very probably increased the birth rate for married couples not separated.¹⁶ Certainly the assimilationist thesis cannot be maintained—that migration immediately decreased the birth rate because the migration was from a country of high birth rate to a country of low birth rate. The increase in the birth rate following migration is very probably the result of the economic and psychological concomitants of migration. It could only in very small part, if at all, be the result of an earlier age of marriage for women, a higher fecundity of the teen-age women, or a restriction on child-bearing among those who were planning to migrate. It was also determined that, on the average, 5-10 per cent more children survived to any given age in the United States than in Italy. Thus migration from Italy to the United States had the effect not only of increasing the number of children born but also of keeping more of them alive.

PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY

¹⁶ I.e., the birth rate for married couples not separating during the migration was higher after they came to the United States than it would have been had they remained in Italy.

NEWS AND NOTES

RESEARCH NOTES

Boy Scouts of America.—Ronald Lippitt has been added to the research and statistical staff headed by Charles E. Hendry. The staff is planning a field study to determine what actually goes on in the local troop setting. The study will be carried on at Springfield College, Wayne University under the direction of Fritz Redl, and at the University of Iowa under the direction of Kurt Lewin.

Institute of Social Research (Columbia University).—The staff of the Institute has begun an extensive study of the phenomenon of anti-Semitism. An introductory statement dealing with the project has been prepared and may be secured from Frederick Pollock, assistant director of the Institute.

Library of Congress.—Harold D. Lasswell continues for the second year as chief of the Experimental Division for the Study of War Time Communications. Funds for this study are supplied by a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation. Dr. Lasswell will be glad to be informed of research studies in progress in the field of crisis communication.

National Selective Service Headquarters.—An enlarged and reorganized Division of Research and Statistics in National Selective Service Headquarters has been working since early this fall on plans for collection and analysis of several series of data which will incidentally be of interest to sociologists. Detailed analysis of medical-examination records has been undertaken. Relationships between physical condition and social-economic status are to be explored with particular reference to the tentatively proposed plan to provide remedial services for needy registrants who have been rejected for service. Another proposed function of the Division is the establishment of a complete central file of individual records containing substantially all the information on each registrant's questionnaire as well as a record of his classifications and all actions taken on his case.

Dr. Kenneth H. McGill, formerly with the United States Public Health Service, is in charge of the Division with the title of Acting Assistant Chief. Section heads include Lieutenant Oliver H. Folk, Medical Statis-

tics; Lola S. Deming, Periodic Reports; Edward J. McCormick, Occupational Statistics; and Dr. Philip P. Schaffner, Individual Records.

NOTES

American Public Health Association.—The Committee on the Hygiene of Housing announces the publication of a new book, *Housing for Health*. The volume consists of a collection of papers of the Committee and presents the findings of several years of research in those aspects of housing which influence physical, mental, and social health. Copies of the volume are on sale and may be secured from the Committee, 310 Cedar Street, New Haven, Connecticut.

Association for the Study of Negro Life and History.—The Association for the Study of Negro Life and History announces that the celebration of Negro History Week will be held from February 8–15. Persons interested in securing further information on Negro History Week are asked to communicate with Carter G. Woodson, 1538 Ninth Street, N.W., Washington, D.C.

Barnard College, Columbia University.—The Public Service Fellowship, carrying a stipend of \$1,300 for a year's graduate study at any approved college or university, is to be awarded this year to a woman candidate from the South. This fellowship is administered by the faculty of Barnard College and is given to the woman who has shown the greatest promise in the field of public service. The term "public service" is broadly interpreted but does not include the ordinary fields of teaching. Applications for this fellowship must be received not later than March 1, 1942. Persons desiring further information are requested to communicate with the chairman of the award committee, Professor Willard Waller, Barnard College, Columbia University.

Bureau of Agricultural Economics.—The October issue of *Farm Population and Rural Life Activities* contains the annual report of the Division of Farm Population and Rural Welfare. This report covers the work of the Division in agricultural planning as well as numerous other special studies, including those of population and migration.

Chicago Recreation Commission.—The Seventh Annual Conference of the Chicago Recreation Commission was held at the Sherman Hotel, Chicago, on November 18, 1941. The theme of the conference was "Recreation in a Period of Social Change on the Military, Industrial, and

Home Fronts." The speakers included Judge Florence E. Allen of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Cleveland, Ohio.

Department of Agriculture, Division of Program Analysis and Development.—Ralph Danhof is now with the Division of Program Analysis and Development. In this position Mr. Danhof will make an analysis of the effectiveness of the research program of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics.

District of Columbia Sociological Society.—The officers of the District of Columbia Chapter are as follows: Percy A. Robert, Catholic University, president; John Provinse, United States Department of Agriculture, vice-president; John Holt, University of Maryland, secretary-treasurer. The Chapter meets on the third Tuesday of the month, and sociologists visiting Washington are invited to attend its meetings.

Institute for Propaganda Analysis.—The Institute for Propaganda Analysis, an organization devoted to developing a popular understanding of the methods of propagandists, has suspended publication of its monthly bulletin for the duration of the war crisis.

Michigan Sociological Society.—The annual meeting of the Michigan Sociological Society was held in East Lansing on November 14 and 15. Among other actions the Society voted to appoint a committee to co-operate with the State Defense Council in studying propaganda and morale.

The National Archives.—The National Archives has recently issued a *Select Bibliography on the History, Organization, and Activities of Archival Agencies* and a bulletin on *The Care of Records in a National Emergency*.

Office of Price Administration.—Harold F. Gosnell, of the political science faculty at the University of Chicago, has been added to the staff.

Social Science Research Council.—The Social Science Research Council announces that it is now receiving applications for Pre-doctoral Field Fellowships, Post-doctoral Research Training Fellowships, and Grants-in-Aid for Research for 1942-43. The closing date for applications for Pre-doctoral and Post-doctoral fellowships is February 1. Applications for Grants-in-Aid will be received until January 15, 1942. Persons desiring further information are asked to communicate with the Council, 230 Park Avenue, New York City.

Society for Social Research.—With the exception of the first meeting, the autumn meetings of the Society have been devoted to methodological aspects of various research problems. Papers dealing with this topic have been given by S. Kirson Weinberg, Herbert Passin, and Mary C. Herrick. The first meeting of the Society concerned itself with a discussion of the papers given at the Fiftieth Anniversary Symposia of the University of Chicago dealing with "Levels of Social Integration." Everett C. Hughes, of the Department of Sociology, and Alfred Emerson, of the Department of Zoölogy, led the discussion.

American University, Washington, D.C.—Paul Douglas, an alumnus of the sociology department of the University of Cincinnati, has been elected president of the University.

University of California.—Beginning with the 1940 session, the Ph.D. degree will now be awarded in the field of sociology. The executive committee in charge of this field of study consists of Dorothy S. Thomas, chairman, Harold E. Jones, Robert H. Lowie, Paul S. Taylor, and Robert A. Nisbet.

Catholic University of America.—Dr. Bernard Mulvaney, formerly a graduate student at the University of Illinois, has been added to the staff of the department of sociology with the rank of instructor.

University of Cincinnati.—The department of sociology expects to considerably expand its research activities, owing to the availability in the 1940 federal census of detailed materials for census tracts for Hamilton County. The department is working closely with various civic authorities in Cincinnati. Illustrating the co-operation between the department and the community in June, 1941, Owen R. Davison presented as his Master's thesis an analysis of the residents of Laurel Homes, Cincinnati's first metropolitan housing project.

College of the City of New York.—Samuel Joseph has been elected chairman of the department of sociology.

Harry Alpert has resumed his teaching duties following a year's absence spent in Chicago as a post-doctoral fellow of the Social Science Research Council.

Charles H. Page is on leave to direct graduate research on American social classes at Columbia University.

Siegfried Kraus, formerly visiting professor at the School of Social Work, Washington University, has been added to the staff of the department and is lecturing on social work and social case work.

Duke University.—The name of the sociology department has been changed to the Department of Sociology and Anthropology.

Earlham College.—David K. Bruner has been added to the staff of the department of sociology.

University of Kansas.—Marston M. McCluggage and Hilden Gibson have been promoted to the rank of assistant professors.

Howard University.—G. Franklin Edwards has been added to the staff of the department of sociology.

Louisiana State University.—Homer Hitt, formerly of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, has been added to the staff.

University of Miami.—Gildas E. Metour is now assistant professor of sociology.

Michigan State College.—Marguerite Wilks, Joel Montague, Jr., and Edwin Christ have been added to the staff as graduate assistants.

University of Minnesota.—Alan P. Bates, Paul A. Dana, and Otis D. Duncan have been added to the staff as teaching assistants. Vernon Davies and John Paschke have been appointed research assistants in rural sociology. Tybel Bloom has been appointed instructor in field work in the graduate course in social work.

University of Pennsylvania.—Arthur H. Jones, of the sociology department, spent last summer as a member of the Institute of Spanish and Portuguese conducted at Laramie, Wyoming. This Institute was under the auspices of the American Council of Learned Societies.

Stanford University.—Harvey E. Steiger has been appointed part-time instructor. During the summer session Jesse F. Steiner, of the University of Washington, will give courses in human ecology.

University of Washington.—Calvin F. Schmid has been promoted from associate professor to professor of sociology. Svend Riemer has been promoted from acting assistant professor to assistant professor. Joseph Cohen and Elton Guthrie, who have formerly been instructors, have been given the rank of assistant professor.

During the spring quarter, 1942, Howard W. Odum, of the University

of North Carolina, will give a course in contemporary society and a seminar in regional sociology.

During the summer session Edwin H. Sutherland, of Indiana University, will teach courses in the field of criminology.

Westminster College, Salt Lake City.—J. Elliott Fisher, formerly of the College of the City of New York, has been appointed as dean.

Williams College.—José Antonio Arze, professor of sociology, University of San Francisco Xavier, Sucre, Bolivia, will be a visiting professor, 1941-42.

PERSONAL

Kurt Koffka, professor of psychology at Smith College since 1932 and an authority on the Gestalt theory of psychology, died at Northampton, Massachusetts, on November 22 at the age of fifty-five. Dr. Koffka, together with Wolfgang Kohler and Max Wertheimer, was responsible for the experiments which, in the main, have been the foundations of the Gestalt theory.

Gaetano Mosca, author of a number of books in political science, including *The Elements of Political Science* and *The Ruling Class*, died in Rome on November 9 at the age of eighty-three. A Senator since 1919, Mosca was a member of the sociological and political science sections of the Accademia dei Lincei and of the Royal Academy of Turin. He was on the faculty of the University of Palermo, 1885-96, and of the University of Turin, 1896-1922. From 1924 until he retired in 1933, he taught the history of political doctrines at the University of Rome.

Harper and Brothers announce the publication of an *Introduction to the Cooperative Movement*, edited by Andrew J. Kress, associate professor of sociology, Georgetown University.

Creative Factors in Scientific Research (the third volume of the "Duke Sociological Series"), by Austin L. Porterfield, has just been issued.

Gottfried Salomon is now in this country and is available for lectures on the topics of comparative government, sociology of religion, and certain aspects of political science. Dr. Salomon can be reached at the New School for Social Research, New York City.

Columbia University Press has published *Radio's Listening Groups* by Frank Ernest Hill, American Association for Adult Education, and W. E. Williams, British Institute of Adult Education.

BOOK REVIEWS

Family and Community in Ireland. By C. M. ARENSBERG and S. T. KIMBALL. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1940. Pp. xxix+322. \$3.50.

The authors of this book leave their readers in no doubt as to what they themselves think of its position in the stream of social research. It is, they say in their Introduction, "an essay in the interconnectedness of the conditions of human social life," with the Irish material treated "merely as an instance." This problem of interconnectedness "has been largely the concern of a few theoretical sociologists and a single school of anthropologists. . . . Alert readers will detect the influence of both approaches in this book. . . . Any reader who fails to detect such influence must be singularly unalert since the book is unblushingly offered as "functionalism" pure and unashamed. Its chief importance, therefore, is methodological; it represents the most ambitious attempt yet made at a functional analysis of a social system. How successful an attempt it is will, no doubt, remain a matter of opinion. This reviewer's opinion is that it is the most significant contribution to comparative sociology since the *Andaman Islanders* and that it will in time prove to be the same sort of milestone on the way toward an understanding of human society.

The outstanding achievements of the book are four: (1) The authors have demonstrated conclusively that the functional method can be applied to literate societies. In no respect do their techniques of fact collection or fact presentation differ from those of the functional anthropologists. Hence it can no longer be maintained that functionalism, while all very well for primitive societies, will not do for "modern" societies. County Clare is a peasant society, it is true; a functional study of an industrial town or modern city has yet to be done. But the success of Arensberg and Kimball with a peasant society is the best possible proof that it will be done, unless we hold that the gap between the Andamans and Clare is smaller than the gap between Clare and Dublin or Belfast.

2. The proposition that a social system is an equilibrium of usages has never been better demonstrated. Every aspect of Irish life which the authors describe is carefully integrated into every other aspect so that the logical necessity of each usage, given every other usage, is clearly apparent. This has been achieved, doubtless, by a rather arbitrary and unac-

knowledgeed discrimination among the facts, but the result has only to be compared with, for example, Miner's *St. Denis* to see how much is gained in form and clarity by a refusal to be intimidated into trying to catalogue "all the facts."

3. Particularly pleasant and promising for the future is the use the authors make of statistical material. All the available material in census and other governmental reports has been utilized fully, not as an end in itself, but as a means of making more intelligible the total social situation. They steer an admirable middle course between the type of study which consists largely of tables and nothing else and the type of study (very prevalent among functionalists) in which there is apparently no single factor capable of being expressed in numerical terms.

4. Rather unexpectedly and without claiming at all to have done so, this book would appear to make a significant contribution to the so-called "personality and culture" field. In chapter x (much of the material of which has already appeared in Arensberg's previous book) they describe as an example of how the "old men's cliques" work the actual cliques of the hamlet of Rynamona. Though they devote only a few lines to each particular individual, from those few lines an extraordinarily clear picture of unique personalities emerges, which is all the more striking when it is realized that the picture is achieved not by any fancy psychological terminology but by the simple use of the two old-fashioned sociological concepts of "status" and "role." This aspect of the book should be particularly gratifying to those sociologists who have been viewing with alarm the delimitation of a new field within which strange frustrated and aggressive gods are worshiped. These would appear to be the chief merits of a very meritorious piece of work.

Arensberg and Kimball have failed to solve two problems which are the bugbears of functional theory. First is the purely descriptive problem. As we pointed out above, the tight functional integration of the various usages described here involves a certain selection of material. In the course of selection, certain behaviors necessarily appear more important than others—more important, that is, for the authors though not necessarily more important for the people described. The position of the priest and the church generally in Irish rural life is a case in point. Maybe the power of the church in Catholic Ireland is an Anglo-Saxon myth and the priest is in fact as unimportant as this book makes him appear. Many will doubt this, and even if it be true, the fact remains that a rearrangement of the material in this book, with the church, for example, as a focal point rather than the family farm, would give quite a different picture. This

methodological problem troubles all the functionalists, and the present authors' handling of it appears to be that of Malinowski, namely, a long succession of different books containing substantially the same facts rearranged around different focal points. It is up to the functionalists to devise a better descriptive technique than this endless series of substitutions.

Second, more clearly than most previous functional studies, this book raises the question of application. The authors appear to think that it is an account of rural Ireland which all concerned with practical affairs (Irish politicians particularly) should use as a basis for practical reforms. "It is not for foreigners, such as the authors, to offer suggestions to the Irish people and their government." Yet, "great central bureaucracies have grown up in each country, even in one so small as Ireland. If they are to be effective they must know the societies they serve," and know them in terms "of a theoretical formulation such as is here advanced." This is true and important, but one can still hear the Irish bureaucracy, like their African colleagues after reading the functionalists' analysis of African tribes, asking "so what?" Functionalists always tend to write as if their brand of social science is the easiest to apply practically to social planning and the like: the Africanists have made popular the notion of "applied anthropology," and Arensberg and Kimball, in a polite way, manage to suggest that no legislative or administrative act should be carried out in Ireland without a very close study of their findings. There is, however, a case to be made for the opposite viewpoint, that the functional approach, far from being the easiest to apply, is in fact so difficult a basis for action that if taken seriously by practical men it would completely paralyze any action whatever. What is a simple cause-and-effect relationship to naïve minds (head-hunting is the cause of murder and must therefore be suppressed, for example) becomes a multifactoral, interconnected situation to the functionalist view. And the more multifactoral, the more interconnected it appears, the more impossible it is to know where to start to do anything about it, except leave it alone. Arensberg and Kimball show clearly what a vital part was played in the Irish social equilibrium by emigration overseas. Such emigration became curtailed shortly after their study. Seeing such curtailment coming and armed with this book, what practical steps could or should the Irish bureaucracy have adopted? Or what practical steps would Arensberg and Kimball have advised if called in as expert advisers? They might have pointed out, indeed it is probable that they would, that the landless men who had formerly become New York policemen, now unable to emigrate, would

tend to become urban unemployed, and as such would supply a ripe field for I.R.A. recruiting, and that toward the end of the 1930's outbreaks of I.R.A. lawlessness would suddenly increase. Events would have proved them right, and such successful prediction would have done them and sociology much credit. But advising the building of more jails against the coming wave of terrorism or advising Scotland Yard to increase its antisabotage squads ahead of time can no more be called social control than carrying an umbrella on the advice of the forecaster can be called weather control. There is, therefore, a danger that too much functionalism, with its flair for making even the most bizarre usages necessary and inevitable, might make the administrator not a more enlightened reformer but a person who accepts the vagaries of social systems with the same fatalistic helplessness with which we all nowadays accept the vagaries of the uncontrollable, though not unpredictable, weather. There are, rather surprisingly, several printers' errors of which the most noticeable is on page 313 where a very quotable passage is spoiled by printing "with" for "without." The Index is not a good one.

C. W. M. HART

University of Toronto

From Luther to Hitler: The History of Fascist-Nazi Political Philosophy.

By WILLIAM MONTGOMERY MCGOVERN. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1941. Pp. xiv+683. \$4.00.

It has been cogently pointed out by Ashton and others that Fascism is an opportunistic reaction to an acute social crisis. Its leaders seize power without any mature or clear ideology. This is well demonstrated by the fact that Mussolini first proposed to use his Black Shirts for a communistic revolution, but his offer was refused by the timid Italian labor unionists.

After Fascist leaders have seized power, they seek to create an elaborate ideology or philosophical background for their movement in order to give it dignity and prestige. The whole history of social philosophy, from Plato to Pareto, is combed over to find doctrinal justification for Fascist principles and procedure. But this patent rationalization after the fact deceives no critical observer. Unlike Soviet Communism, Fascism had no mature ideological background, however much plausibility may be given to it by later efforts to create a fictitious theoretical paternity. However lusty the child may be, it was born out of wedlock.

Professor McGovern's otherwise excellent book falls into the same error as faithful Fascists who have been led to believe that their movement has

a distinguished theoretical past. In a backhanded and perhaps unintentional way, he confers upon Fascism and National Socialism a remote and impressive doctrinal background which it does not deserve. Though critical of this totalitarianism, the book will doubtless be hailed by Fascists and Nazis as a concession of an honorable paternity even by enemies. It will confirm their claim to a hoary and distinguished tradition. There are surely analogies between many phases of Fascist-Nazi doctrines and past social philosophies, but it would be very difficult to show that the latter had any close relationship to the genesis and formation of right-wing totalitarianism.

In the fourth part of his book, Professor McGovern, in treating specifically of Fascism and National Socialism, deals with the actual background of this brand of totalitarianism. This is the only portion of the book which justifies its subtitle, and it amply demonstrates that the only real "history of Fascist-Nazi political philosophy" is the personal history of Mussolini, Hitler, and their immediate associates. Moreover, while the book goes too far back for the real ideological history of Fascism and Nazism, it does not go back far enough to include all the rationalized and spurious background claimed by their philosophical stooges. To do so, one would need to start with Plato, if not with Joshua and the Book of Judges.

If, however, one forgets the subtitle of the book and regards it merely as a history of important phases of modern social and political philosophy, it can be commended as an admirable historical study, scholarly and thoughtful. It begins with the effect of the Reformation on political theory in stimulating secularism and nationalism and in conferring divinity on the secular state. Then it treats of the rise and decline of the doctrine of secular absolutism. Next it deals with Kant and his English disciples and with Fichte's emphasis on nationalism, linguistics, and authoritarianism. Hegel's doctrine of the absolute state is presented in critical fashion. Nationalism is handled under the heading of "Traditionalism," and Mazzini and von Treitschke are singled out for special analysis. The revolt against rationalism is treated in discussing the notions of James, Bergson, Nietzsche, McDougall, and Pareto. Social Darwinism, including eugenics and racialism, is treated in reasonable and informed fashion.

The book concludes with an excellent account of the rise, nature, and achievements of Fascism and National Socialism, stressing the eulogy of the state, the mass mind, authoritarianism, and the rule of the élite. One valuable aspect of this portion of the work is the emphasis on the important differences between Italian Fascism and National Socialism. The

latter is more complete, thoroughgoing, and logical. It stresses the nation more than the state; in other words, it glorifies the nation-state. If victorious, however, it might prove the undoing of the old-line nationalism by consolidating large areas under the dominion of a leading state. The treatment of Fascism and National Socialism, while unfriendly and critical, is reasonable and understanding. The author refuses to rant or indulge in the popular fantasy of many American foes of Fascism who are really heading us toward Fascism under the mantle of democracy, just as Huey Long once predicted.

Especially does Professor McGovern resist the current wishful thinking which represents the National Socialist regime as unpopular in Germany and likely to fall apart if its foes scowl at it hard and long enough. He shows that it has a greater degree of mass support than any extant democratic government and that it will be overthrown only if subjected to a crushing military defeat.

HARRY ELMER BARNES

Cooperstown, New York

Germany: Jekyll and Hyde. By SEBASTIAN HAFNER. Translated from the German by WILFRID DAVID. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1941. Pp. 6+318.

The doctrines of National Socialism have been said to represent the theology of the Third Reich. This book develops a negative theology not only of the Third but of any German Reich. It is an interesting document of conservative ideologies to be found inside and outside Germany among stray circles of anti-Nazi aristocrats, ousted officialdom, and political Catholics. The book does not contain new information or factual analyses of Nazism. The author rather offers a *Weltanschauung* in terms of an instinct psychology of "the German," a daemonology of "the Reich," and a nostalgic utopia of "paradise regained."

Paradise lost and paradise regained are represented by preindustrial Germany, a bundle of unambitious small states, patriarchal idylls of serene serenissimos patronizing arts and poetry, adding to the luster of civilized humanity. This paradise was destroyed by Prussia—"Germany's cancer." Bismarck's Ems telegram, "the greatest falsification in world history," is the original sin bringing about "the fall" and leading into the inferno of the Reich, a daemonic entity "from which have arisen almost all the great crises and wars of the last seventy-five years."

The Leviathan Reich gives birth to ever new satanic élites exacting sacrifices within and promoting nihilist destruction outside Germany.

This process has reached its climax today, and salvation of the German people is near at hand. It can come only from the outside, because the domination structure of Naziism is too efficient, and 60 per cent of the population are presumably loyal. The Nazis will be annihilated, the former princes will return to their pre-Bismarckian residences and little states. In addition, a Rhenish church state is proposed. Thus the author hopes to revise the "jerky failure of instinct," the "unexpected false step," and the "forgetting of the very laws of life" of which the German people have been guilty since they developed their "fatherland fixation."

We doubt whether this counter-myth of "the Reich" and this peace program of a return of the princes can inspire any armed forces or serve as a cause for effective underground work.

H. H. GERTH

University of Wisconsin

The British Common People, 1746-1938. By G. D. H. COLE and RAYMOND POSTGATE. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1939. Pp. viii+588+xxxiii. \$4.00.

Mr. Cole, a noted economist at Oxford University, and Mr. Postgate, a well-known political writer, have written an excellent social history of Great Britain during the last two hundred years. Their emphasis throughout is on the way the common people have worked and lived and on the broad social movements that attempted to improve their lot. Beginning with the social structure of eighteenth-century Britain, the authors describe the agrarian and industrial revolutions; the political changes that accompanied the emergence of new social classes; the French Revolution, Owenism, and trade-unionism; the Victorian age with its fruits of free trade; the growth of imperialism and socialism; the first World War and its aftermath; and the condition of England in 1938. Only great knowledge and enthusiasm could have produced this book and made of absorbing interest expositions of the course of wages, prices, unemployment, and strikes.

What gives significance to the book is not, however, its lucid presentation or masterly organization of materials, noteworthy as these are, but its skilful application of the "economic" interpretation of history. The authors' analysis of the economic organization, class structure, and political grouping of the different periods provides a valuable interpretative framework. A list of recommended books, a list of important dates, and a number of maps and charts add greatly to the value of the book.

Although the book appeared before the present war broke out, the

authors clearly show how the economic dependence of Great Britain on the outside world affected the entire people's view of life, explains the hold of imperialism and the difficulties of the Labour party in formulating a policy toward the Empire, and accounts for a foreign policy, that wishing to preserve peace at almost any price, sacrificed one vital interest after another but to no avail. "Who can suppose," the authors ask, "that at the end of another world war, whatever its outcome, Great Britain would still be able to govern India, or be still in receipt of tribute from nearly all the world?" (p. 549). Great as were the changes that the last war brought about, they will be greater still when the present conflict is over, not the least of which may be a catastrophic fall in the standard of living. Running a war will be seen to be a fairly simple problem compared to that of organizing a peace.

J. RUMNEY

University of Newark

The Economic Basis of Class Conflict and Other Essays in Political Economy. By LIONEL ROBBINS. New York: Macmillan Co., 1939. Pp. xiv+277. \$2.25.

This volume is a collection of previously published papers written by Professor Robbins during the last twelve years. The first paper, which gives its title to the book, seeks to analyze those conditions which give rise to conflict between classes. The second paper, "The Economics of Restrictionism," finds that under conditions of restrictionism and monopoly "conflicts of interest which, in a system of no privilege and free mobility, would at most be of short-period significance, assume bigger and more permanent proportions" (p. 44). "The 'Inevitability' of Monopoly" is a discussion of the extent to which monopoly is inherent in scientific technique or in the system of private property and comes to the conclusion that "much of the monopoly at present prevailing . . . is due to direct governmental intervention" (p. 68). The fourth paper, "The Economics of Territorial Sovereignty," examines the connection between economic welfare and size of territory and maintains that "the root of the trouble is not inequality of territory but the prevalence of discrimination" (p. 101). The next four essays consider the causes of increased protectionism and different aspects of agrarian restrictionism. In a separate section there follow three short papers devoted to problems of government expenditure and its reaction on economic activity.

The sociologist will undoubtedly turn with most interest to the first paper which was read at a symposium on "Class Conflicts and Social

Stratification" at the London Institute of Sociology in 1937. (All have now been issued in book form by the Institute.) To the author the clue to the understanding of social classes lies in an analysis of markets where "the prices of products and factors provide the immediate stimuli to action" (p. 7). "When the conditions of supply and demand are such as either to confront buyers and sellers with monopolistic organizations or to permit buyers or sellers themselves to act as groups, then the objective conditions of conflict are present" (p. 14). Professor Robbins concludes that the "objective clashes of interest which can be actually demonstrated to operate in the world of reality suggest a classification of social groups more related to the phenomena of the market and to possible limitations on industrial and international mobility than any which rest on a general division between the propertied and the propertyless" (p. 28). Valuable as this analysis is, there is no reason why Professor Robbins should not stress more than he does the division between the propertied and the propertyless, where the former group may be subsumed under the theory of monopoly and which on his own showing tends to bring about permanent conflict in a system of privilege and restricted mobility. In any case the sociologist in his criteria for social classes takes into account not only the source and size of income but also other criteria such as the exercise of authority, education and speech, mobility, and the psychological attitudes of superordination and subordination. In this connection the author is likely to make too sharp a distinction between the economic and political factors. To say, for instance, that monopoly is due to governmental action ignores the close linkage that may exist within a state between the economic and political forces. Professor Robbins regards as the leitmotiv of the analysis his exposition of the way "in which forms of organization facilitating group exclusiveness may be the cause of social disharmony" (p. v). A fuller exposition than has been given would be required.

J. RUMNEY

University of Newark

The Middle Classes in American Politics. By ARTHUR N. HOLCOMBE. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1940. Pp. vi+304. \$2.50.

Four of the author's earlier essays have been made into a book by an introduction which, by a *tour de force*, imposes upon them the theme that "a sound system of American politics requires the preservation of a preponderance of power in the hands of the middle classes." The "sound" system is one which will maintain "the essential features of the American way of life" by accomplishing "the purposes of constitutional government

as set forth in the preamble to the Federal Constitution." The composition of the middle class is constantly changing. In American politics it is "essentially a subjective phenomenon, and is radically different from the middle classes of European countries." Its members have been "the most ardent and vigorous believers in the essentials of the American way of life." This way "includes a belief in progress as well as a demand for order." (Sociologists, if not political scientists, have a name for a group to which all the virtues are attributed by one of its members!) The middle classes, we are told, are, "by their nature and situation, . . . clearly destined to be the guardians of rational ideals of justice and liberty." They "naturally find the greatest harmony between their own special interests and the general interests of the community to which they belong."

The first essay deals with the political problem involved in the transition from a predominantly agrarian to a predominantly urban community; the second traces middle-class influence in national politics and estimates its prospects for the future; the third, written as an appraisal of the work of Lord Bryce, discusses the outlook for a stable democratic republic. (Need one add that this depends on the continued ascendancy of the middle class?) The fourth essay is devoted to the essentials of a "sound political philosophy." Such a philosophy "will reject the Communist and Fascist theories which divide mankind sharply into two classes," will recognize that in modern society classes are numerous and interdependent, and will "recognize particularly the decisive political function of the middle classes in a body politic possessing a good constitution."

The proper basis for such a philosophy is a political, as opposed to an economic, interpretation of history. And, if it is not to be meaningless, we must be guided not by wishful thinking and vain hope (like Bryce) but by faith. The formulation of a suitable faith by Kant recurs three times (pp. 19, 124, 274) in the short volume: "The history of the human race, viewed as a whole, may be regarded as the realization of a hidden plan of nature, to bring about a perfect political constitution, as the only state in which all the capacities implanted in mankind can be fully developed."

In what seems at times a work of edification there are most interesting discussions of American constitutional and political development, ranging from the problems confronting Washington and Franklin to those with which the Roosevelts have had to contend. There are also brief, clear, and scholarly statements of the positions of many political theorists from Kant to Laski.

H. F. ANGUS

University of British Columbia

Karl Marx und die Wirklichkeit: Untersuchungen über den Realitätsgehalt der wissenschaftlichen Ansichten von Marx auf Grund seines "Das Kapital." By HEINZ LUNAU. Brussels: Editions de la Phalange, 1937. Pp. 96.

This essay is a laudable if confusing attempt to discover to what extent certain Marxian categories enable us to investigate real economic phenomena and processes. The author examines such terms as "commodity," "value," "exchange value," "utility," "labor," "capital," "society," and "class" and comes to the sad conclusion that Marx, "far from having a reasonable grasp of economic realities, moved solely in the realm of phantasy" (p. 91). To take a simple example, Marx speaks of society as a producing unit. But to the author this is nonsense, since apart from the fact that individuals in society work for themselves, neither common purpose nor common interests can be predicated of them. Like many metaphysicians, the author dives so deep that he comes up muddy.

J. RUMNEY

University of Newark

War and Crime. By HERMANN MANNHEIM. London: Watts & Co., 1941. Pp. xi+208. 10s. 6d.

This is an analysis and interpretation, first, of the effect of war on crime rates, second, of the more general relations between war and crime. Although the author states that the first of these is the principal problem, he devotes approximately 60 per cent of his space to the second.

In analyzing the effect of war on crime rates, principally on the basis of statistics for the first World War and scattered reports regarding the present war, he reaches the conclusion that economic crimes increase in periods of war and crimes of violence decrease. This conclusion has some basis in the statistical data, but it is by no means clear cut, for the population base changes in wartime, methods of reporting change, and the crime rates vary from one part of a war period to another and for the different groups which constitute the population. His interpretation of the statistical finding is that war is a cause of economic crimes and that it is a substitute for crimes of violence in the sense that if people get their "necessary quantum of violence by war no further violence may be needed." A more appropriate conclusion and interpretation is that war periods show a complex of inconsistent trends which have not yet been disentangled and which cannot be explained at present.

The general analysis of the relation between war and crime is based on an ethical distinction between unjust wars, which are regarded as

analogous to crimes, and just wars, which are regarded as analogous to punishments. The same general theories, reflecting Darwin, Marx, Freud, and others, have been applied at about the same time to war and to crime. An attempt to develop an integrated system of thought which will apply to both crime and war is justified for the reason that criminality is moving from the individual to the corporation and to the nation and is becoming mass behavior. On that account he argues that the notion of individual responsibility should be abandoned and that all members of a group who tolerate the executives and enjoy the advantages of the misdeeds of executives, whether in corporations or nations, should be treated as criminals. He realizes the difficulties involved in this distinction between just wars and unjust wars and expresses a desire for an international tribunal which may pronounce objectively as to the justice of wars. He expects that a strong federal union of nations may eliminate wars, but that the instinct of pugnacity will then break forth in a large number of crimes of violence.

EDWIN H. SUTHERLAND

Indiana University

Ethics and Social Policy. By WAYNE A. R. LEYS. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1941. Pp. xiii+522. \$4.00.

This interesting and significant book is conceived along original lines and competently executed. The author has set himself the task of leading students to ethical problems and principles through the discussion of current issues, in contrast with the traditional philosophical approach. As he modestly says, his presentation of ethics is not intended as a substitute for a more historical and analytical approach, but rather as an introduction to later study along more conventional systematic lines. At the same time, he has given a fair amount of discussion of ethical concepts and doctrines in terms of the great classical expositions. He has made his own position on various issues reasonably clear but states his aim as that of offering "just enough *answers* to encourage independent thinking about *questions*, since the stimulation of thought is the avowed purpose of every good Socratic midwife." To this end, every chapter is accompanied with a long list of "Exercises" as well as a fairly extensive bibliography. In general the exercises are highly thought-provoking.

In view of his avowed purpose, it would not be fair to criticize Professor Leys for failing to carry ethical analysis to new depths of philosophical profundity and precision. But though not a demerit, this feature of the book is unescapable along with its positive qualities. Two examples may be mentioned. "Economic ideals" are discussed in two chapters (iv and v)

on "Individualism" and "Socialism," respectively. The reviewer misses any serious attempt to give the meaning of economic ideals, or particularly to contrast these with ethical ideals, or to bring out the character of the ethical issues which are finally involved in economic organization, or their relation to mechanical organization problems. Again, Part III, "The Quest for Agreement with Other Men," starts off with chapters (ix and x) on "The Relativity of Morals" and "Disagreement about Means and about Ends," in which the illustrative problems involve standards of sexual morality. The author is by no means doctrinaire in his statement of the relativistic position or in advocating the judgment of types of conduct in terms of their consequences. But still, the general impression is one of a too easy exposé of and attack upon traditionalism and absolutism. Little or nothing is said either as to exactly why goodness and badness are more important in consequences than in acts, which suggests naïve instrumentalism, or about what it is that makes some consequences good and others bad. The argument rather pointedly raised the question in this reviewer's mind of the limits of rationalization, of always acting on the basis of a cold-blooded calculation of gains and losses. I cannot imagine as possible, to say nothing of desirable, the abolition of all reticence and the organization of sex relations on the basis of a market or even of diplomatic negotiations.

It seems clear, however, that if the book is used in the manner indicated by the author, with ample discussion of problems, and particularly under the leadership of a good teacher, all such issues would be raised and carried into ultimate principles as far as the group might care and be able to go. The limitations noted do not detract from its merits as a starter in ethics by the use of the Socratic method.

FRANK H. KNIGHT

University of Chicago

An Introduction to Public Opinion. By HARWOOD L. CHILDS. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1940. Pp. 151. \$1.75.

The lectures which comprise this volume were addressed to businessmen concerned with practical public relations problems. The primary aim was to provide a frame of reference and to evaluate certain institutions and practices playing an important part in the formation of public opinion. As developed, the theoretical framework is better designed to embrace the field of public relations work than to cover public opinion in its broader phases.

The author's outlook and approach is frankly normative. At the outset

he states that he is less concerned with public relations as they are than with what they ought to be. He proceeds to define public relations as "those aspects of our personal and corporate behavior having a social rather than a purely private and personal significance." The basic task of practitioners in this field is "to reconcile or adjust such relations to the broader aspects of social change in a way that will promote the public interest." The public interest is whatever public opinion says it is; hence, procedures for discovering public-opinion trends are of great importance in public relations work. One of the most interesting chapters is devoted to public-opinion polls. The chapters (four of them) dealing with propaganda are shrewd in conception and perspicacious in treatment.

That the philosophy of public relations propounded in this book is a step in advance and likely to exert a wholesome influence on those engaged in this work, probably few who read it will deny. As a theory of public opinion, however, the work is vitiated by the conventional nominalistic standpoint taken by the author and by failure adequately to bring the public into relationship with other significant aspects of society.

CARROLL D. CLARK

University of Kansas

The City: A Study on Urbanism in the United States. By STUART ALFRED QUEEN and LEWIS FRANCIS THOMAS. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1939. Pp. xv+500. \$4.00.

Like other books in which Professor Queen has had a hand this volume is newsy with small ranges of theory rising frequently above the factual plane. It gives a clear summary of the theories and researches dealing with the city during the last two decades. In keeping with the statistical trend in the social sciences the authors place emphasis on quantitative data which they have assembled and presented with clarity. Descriptive analysis also occupies an important place in this volume. This book presents to the sociological student in very readable fashion much of what he needs to know concerning the nature of the city and the research methods to be employed in extending his knowledge of urbanism in the United States.

Main topics discussed at length are the rise of cities, their habitats, their institutions and distributive pattern, their population elements, persons and their adjustment, rural-urban differences, and urban-regional planning. The life-cycles of certain cities such as St. Louis are presented briefly. The authors aimed to write their book objectively and from the point of view of natural history. Much of the book falls short of this ob-

jective. The city as a growing and changing whole playing its role of dominance in its environing region receives scant treatment. The authors fail to present the differentiated areas of the city as phases of its natural history. Social institutions are in the city, but this analysis links them ineffectively with the series of situations which have gone into their making.

Part of the problem of giving unity and direction to this book comes from a superficial use of the point of view and concepts of human ecology. Ecological sections emerge near the ends of chapters and add little where they might have added greatly to an understanding of the natural growth and structuralization of city life. Furthermore, no well-knit system of sociological ideas has been applied to the organization and explanation of the assembled data. Perhaps if the authors had come under the discipline of a more complete sociological system of reference, they would not have listed so heavily toward the social worker's type of preoccupation with urban problems, the social politician's urge to reform, and the shocked moralist's appraisal of the methods of well-publicized political bosses.

C. A. DAWSON

McGill University

Sharecroppers All. By A. F. RAPER and I. DE A. REID. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1941. Pp. x+281. \$3.00.

The prevalence of a "feudalistic" relationship in mill and store as well as on plantation is the authors' thesis and the clue to their title. "Taken broadly, a plantation is a plantation whether in the rural or urban community, whether simple and hoary as the cotton plantation or complex and shiny as the chain store." *Sharecroppers All* is a review by southern scholars of their own region. It moves beyond earlier southern studies in its emphasis upon contemporary trends and in its recognition of the national scope of many problems which center in the South. Tariffs and freight rates—those adverse regional differentials imposed from without which throttle the South—are recited as the book opens. Deep-seated mental handicaps, imposed by southerners upon themselves, are proclaimed at the close: "The South's bogeys! What have they made us do to ourselves?"

The "piling up of the surplus population in the poor-land areas," the mechanization of farms, and displacement of people in the Delta and Southwest, the injury to whites as well as blacks of economic differentials based on race, the poll-taxes, floggings, K.K.K., and shirt organizations all receive vivid and up-to-date descriptions. The authors quote with evident approval a declaration in 1937 by the Institute of Southern Re-

gional Development: "One of the most obvious reasons for the social and economic retardation of the South is the unwillingness of the white man to face the fact that his own fate and the fate of the region as a whole are inseparable from the fate of the Negro." Dr. Raper knows the human and material wreckage of the plantation system as few others know it. He, as research secretary of the Commission on Interracial Cooperation, and Dr. Reid, as member of the faculty of Atlanta University, have taken full advantage of their knowledge and positions to write a challenging analysis of their own southern people, white and black, but mainly white. The book is substantial and written for popular consumption. Familiar as much of its material is to sociologists, the freshness of its presentation and its insight into actual situations make this book of real value to all students of society. If written by northerners, *Sharecroppers All* probably would meet a pretty stiff reception in Dixie. It's a tribute to southern Americans that they can give one another—and take—such searching self-criticism.

PAUL S. TAYLOR

University of California

Urban Sociology. By EARL E. MUNTZ. New York: Macmillan Co., 1938. Pp. xvi+742. \$3.75.

Here is a compendium of facts about urban life in the broader social sense. Consequently, the author betrays little self-consciousness with respect to the specialized nature of economics, sociology, and the other social sciences. Indeed, no line is drawn when dealing with the facts of pure and applied sciences, science and philosophy, and between hopeful idealism and standardized technical procedure in social work. Without scientific or professional squeamishness, the author, relying on his own intellectual perspicacity, looked about industriously for information about city locations, factors effecting the growth of urban populations, ethnic segregation, city planning, housing and how to improve it, public safety and public health with a view to their perfectability, urban house-cleaning, noise abatement, more and better food, education in its various administrative and other aspects, better recreation under private than commercialized auspices and still better under public auspices. These are just a few of the many urban problems concerning which the author seeks to enlighten the potentially good citizen.

For those who seek such an assembling of social information—and there are many clubs, associations, and college sociology departments among the seekers—this is a noteworthy book. It is clearly written, inter-

esting, informative, catholic in spirit, optimistic, and is destined to aid in uplifting the aims of young and middle-aged irrespective of class or creed. It may even spur many to seek to become more effective specialists in the science of sociology. This volume, like all good books, will in some measure bring to an end the need for its own kind.

C. A. DAWSON

McGill University

Social Disorganization. By MABEL ELLIOTT and FRANCIS E. MERRILL. Rev. ed. New York: Harper & Bros., 1941. Pp. xv+1087. \$3.75.

In view of continuous and apparently growing social disorganization in wide ranges of current social life, the revision of the authors' earlier volume is quite timely. Those who are familiar with the earlier edition will find some noteworthy changes: the material has been brought down to date and considerably expanded, there has been some rearrangement of data, and the Appendix on "Social Disorganization in Contemporary French Thought" has been omitted. The most notable change is the expansion of various sections to take into account the dynamic changes associated with the outbreak of World War II. An entire section on "World Disorganization" has been developed to deal with materials on "Fascism and War."

The volume is of practical interest to sociologists since the materials are treated conceptually throughout. There is no "mere history" of problems, but a consistent effort is made to treat problems as aspects of broadly conceived, deeply rooted social processes. Each part in the volume begins with a chapter on the theory and application of sociological concepts to the material under consideration. But it should not be assumed that the theoretical treatment is a pedantic dry-as-dust fitting of the social data into a rigid scheme of academic thinking. In fact, the materials are so lucidly treated and are so free from purely abstract clichés that some readers may be inclined to regard them as journalistic. The style, however, has not been permitted to invalidate the sound logic with which all materials are presented.

The volume is on the whole highly readable, stimulating, and is a sociologically sound treatment of some of the most baffling and resistant social pathologies to which modern life is subject. Students will welcome it as a scholarly, well-documented, readable treatment of data into which the authors have profound insight.

PAULINE V. YOUNG

University of Southern California

Schizophrenia in Childhood. By CHARLES BRADLEY. New York: Macmillan Co., 1941. Pp. vii+152. \$2.50.

One hundred and eighteen references, principally from German, English, Italian, and French sources, make up this review of the available literature concerning schizophrenia in children. The report follows a medical textbook procedure by giving an account of the incidence, symptomatology, course, types, etiology, psychopathology, laboratory findings, diagnosis, treatment, and prognosis of schizophrenia in children. This presentation, as indicated, is developed entirely from the existing literature, although there are included brief clinical accounts of five cases of childhood schizophrenia. The confusion and disagreement which is often reflected in discussions of schizophrenia in adults is doubly manifested in reference to this disorder in childhood. There is some agreement in relation to certain symptoms which include a diminished interest in the environment, evidence of regression to previous infantile levels, alterations of motor behavior, and the presence of speech and thinking disturbances. There is no general agreement among other symptoms listed. The course of childhood schizophrenia appears to be similar to that of adults having both an acute and chronic or insidious phase. There is some opinion that these two phases might be regarded as types of childhood schizophrenia, especially in so far as there is a marked difficulty in placing such cases in the accepted diagnostic categories. Even here, the catatonic type is regarded as the most frequent among children with the paranoid type seldom appearing, as children are generally considered to be incapable of constructing complicated delusional systems. A summary chapter attempts to bring these various opinions together and to provide some workable concept of childhood schizophrenia but, naturally, with many loose ends.

The reviewer agrees with the author that the problem presents a challenge to clinical psychiatry. We need more studies comparing the behavior and personality characteristics of such abnormal children with normal, healthy children. If the etiology of schizophrenia is related to hereditary factors and constitutional characteristics in as definite a fashion as some authorities believe, why do not more of our adult schizophrenics develop their disorders in the childhood period? More careful studies of the "pre-schizophrenic personality" are very much needed.

H. WARREN DUNHAM

Wayne University

The Therapy of the Neuroses and Psychoses. By S. H. KRAINES. Philadelphia: Lea & Febiger, 1941. Pp. 512. \$5.50.

The author states his conceptions of mental disorders and his methods of treatment in the hope that physicians other than psychiatrists will be able to use the principles of therapy set forth. Case histories from the author's practice are given to illustrate his concepts of etiology and mental mechanisms and to demonstrate his technique of treatment. The book's subtitle, "A Socio-psycho-biologic Analysis and Resynthesis," indicates its conformity with the school of psychobiology.

Although the author's antagonism to psychoanalysis is clearly evident, he does utilize many Freudian concepts—"as much . . . as is of logical and practical value." This may be seen in his use of defense mechanisms such as repression, projection, identification, sublimation, conversion, and regression. But he also redefines certain concepts such as that of the unconscious. An "abstract" of Healy and Bronner and Bower's abstract of psychoanalytic literature is offered "in an effort to give a fair and unbiased presentation of the subject."

The author recognizes the importance of neuroses by devoting the major part of the book to a discussion of their treatment. This is in keeping with their much greater incidence as compared to that of the psychoses and their greater treatability. Many excellent suggestions and comments are given about the practical aspects of psychotherapy. It is unfortunate that these are scattered throughout the book and that their effectiveness is somewhat vitiated by the lack of clarity in the exposition of the conceptual framework. This confusion is partly due to an awkward style in which poor constructions and uncertain terminology obscure the meaning that one can sometimes guess was intended. There are also some misstatements of fact.

The book is not suitable in its present form as a guide for physicians in general or for younger psychiatrists in psychotherapy. Nor is it suitable as a text for medical students.

HUGH T. CARMICHAEL

University of Chicago

The American Agricultural Press, 1819-1860. By ALBERT LOWTHER DEMAREE. New York: Columbia University Press, 1941. Pp. xix+430. \$4.00.

Demaree's study represents a pioneer excursion into a territory that has never been deliberately explored—the early development of agricul-

tural journalism. During the period covered some four-fifths of the population was engaged in agriculture, and American rural life was already assuming a form and developing a character that ever since have distinguished it in significant particulars from rural life in other societies. The farm press not only reflected this process of distinctive cultural growth but became an outstanding factor in promoting it.

From a sociological standpoint, the value of the study is materially enhanced by the approach used, which goes beyond the limits of conventional historiography. The picture that emerges is that of the earlier phases of the natural history of the agricultural press as an institution.

The book is divided into three parts. The first and most important is a comprehensive treatment of materials drawn from a wide sampling of farm publications, so that their general setup and characteristic trends are typified. The problems and policies of the editors, inauguration of special features, growth of advertising, and the influence of the press on scientific farming practices and on certain rural institutions, such as the agricultural society and the fair, are effectively treated. An incidental topic of some interest to students of collective behavior is the description of the part played by these journals in social epidemics that swept the rural sections during this period, including the "silk mania," the "Berkshire fever," the "soil chemistry craze," the "California fever," and others.

The second part presents selected articles from different periodicals that reveal their flavor and indicate representative interests. The third section is devoted to what might be termed "case studies" of sixteen of the more influential journals of the period. There is a bibliography covering both primary and secondary sources and an index.

Those most likely to find this volume useful, apart from social and economic historians, are rural sociologists and students of the sociology of journalism.

CARROLL D. CLARK

University of Kansas

Sociología contemporánea. By JOSÉ MEDINA ECHAVARRIA. Mexico City: D. F. La Casa de España en México, 1940. Pp. 251.

The author is one of the most distinguished Mexican sociologists of the present day. The book is divided into eight chapters of somewhat unequal merit. The author's point of view is that sociology grows out of a concrete study of facts. He uses a chapter to present the classifications of

the field by Andreas Walther, Mannheim, and the North American research school (using Lundberg as the type). He seems to favor the Mannheim classification. The chapter on the founders of sociology emphasizes the Germans unduly. The two chapters analyzing French and German sociology are perhaps the best informed in the book. The treatment of United States, British, and Italian sociology is entirely inadequate. Pareto is given undue prominence. The author scarcely touches upon Latin-American sociology, which in some aspects is much more important than is generally recognized, even by the Latin-Americans themselves. The final chapter on sociological methodology is conventional. There is inadequate understanding of the procedures and emphases developed in this country, and we should not consider the work acceptable as a text in our schools, but it is something of an innovation in Latin-American sociology.

L. L. BERNARD

Washington University

Statistics of Jews and Jewish Organizations. By H. S. LINFIELD. New York: American Jewish Committee, 1939. Pp. 64.

This short volume describes the manner in which the United States Census has conducted its censuses of American religious bodies at various periods from 1850 to date. Special reference is made to the statistics of Jewish congregations. In addition, detailed tables presenting the results of the censuses of 1850, 1860, 1870, 1890, and 1900 are included.

In his other writings Mr. Linfield has done an admirable job of utilizing these various census data for drawing statistical pictures of the Jewish population of the United States. Nevertheless, his description of the procedures used at the various censuses makes the sociologist doubtful as to the use which can be made of these data. Certainly neither the absolute size of the Jewish population, nor its exact distribution through the country, nor its population characteristics can be determined from the published statistics. Further, it would also appear difficult to construct or analyze any time series because of the lack of comparability of the censuses.

A. J. JAFFE

Washington, D.C.

The Negro in Congress, 1870-1901. By SAMUEL DENNY SMITH. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1940. Pp. vii+160. \$2.50.

Dr. Smith, in his *The Negro in Congress*, gives a brief summary of the political careers of the twenty-two Negroes who served in Congress during the period

1870-1901. It is based upon contemporary newspapers and documents, personal interviews and correspondence, and the relevant secondary materials. The treatment is largely historical, although some analytical tables on population in the southern states, and the racial stock, education, occupation, and previous social status of the congressmen studied are given. No attempt is made to show the relationship of the materials to theories of the suffrage, representation, racial conflict, and accommodation.

The author is extremely critical of the accomplishments of the Negro congressmen. His book lacks the objectivity of the companion volume in the series by Simkins and Woody. Apparently these congressmen are judged according to a standard which insists that the Negro should "know his place." The sanest speeches were the most conciliatory and apologetic and the most highly race-conscious Negroes were held responsible for race friction.

H. F. GOSNELL

University of Chicago

Current Psychologies. By ALBERT J. LEVINE. Cambridge: Sci-art Publishers. 1940. Pp. 270. \$2.75.

This book ranks among the better current efforts to organize the differential views present in contemporary psychology. Critical discussion is given to the neurological school, the purposivist school, the *Gestalt* school, the Freudian school, and the Freudian dissentients. A clear statement of the character and assumptions of each approach is presented with critical comments by the author. The concluding chapter is devoted to an appraisal of the contributions of these various schools of psychology. In this chapter interesting treatment is given to the similarities and divergencies among these schools. Students in social psychology who are interested in securing a perspective helpful to the organization of their field will find this volume to be of assistance.

HERBERT BLUMER

University of Chicago

Land Tenures at Home and Abroad. By HENRY W. SPIEGEL. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1941. Pp. 170. \$3.00.

There is a very considerable need for short, concise summaries of the legal background of inheritance, ownership, and tenancy of land, particularly in agriculture, such as Professor Spiegel has essayed in this book. The ancient dictum that the form of a society can be reconstructed from a knowledge of its laws of land use, landed property, and inheritance, remains as true as when it was first uttered. Sociologists are no longer forced to rely entirely upon legal and economic data, like those that gave us early attempts at reconstructing the ancient sources of European civilization, as in the works of jurists like Sir Henry Maine.

Yet the sociologists' need for a knowledge of the legal expression of social structure and custom is as great as ever.

For that reason the value of Professor Spiegel's book lies in the information both new and old that he has brought together. His book reviews recent developments in the United States, in particular the growth of the problems resulting from the increase of farm tenancy, those taking place in England up to the outbreak of war, and the policies of the Nazi regime in Germany. Spiegel presents these against the legal history of each country. His review of the traditional Anglo-Saxon law of landownership in the United States is a welcome reminder to sociologists of the strength with which old patterns persist in the minds of lawyers, legislators, and the farming public.

Most interesting for American readers is his summary of changes in England and Germany. I believe it is little understood in this country how far modification of the rights of landlords has progressed in England and how little the legal picture of tenancy resembles that in the United States. Spiegel gives us in brief compass the changes that have brought security of tenure and full compensation for improvements, and have converted landlords into "trustees of publicly owned land." Much of the change Spiegel traces to the progressive difficulties of providing capital and maintaining the traditional role of the experimentally minded resident landlord. But the effects of the quest for autarchic self-sufficiency were already in evidence before the outbreak of war.

It is in his review of land tenure in Germany under the Hitler regime that Spiegel is most informative. He shows us three great regions very different in their agricultural patterns and explains their relationship to the new laws of entail attempting to bind the peasant to the soil and to confirm him in hereditary status in a hereditary caste. Some of the Nazi disdain for commercial agriculture, however, seems to run counter to the need for large-scale food-producing units of land use, and Spiegel sees in this one of the reasons the break-up of the Junkers' estates has been shelved. It is of theoretical interest that the attempt to create closed, indivisible, and inviolate inheritances in land should take place in a country where changes in possession are fewer than in any other country. The new policy is less new than it is an attempt to freeze custom into legal rule.

CONRAD G. ARENSBERG

Brooklyn College

British Labor and the War. By FREDA WUNDERLICH. New York: New School for Social Research, 1941. Pp. 80. \$0.40.

Professor Wunderlich's monograph is a substantial—if brief—contribution to the growing literature of social change in Britain since the outbreak of World

War II. *British Labor and the War* is the first analysis, published in this country outside the daily press, of the recruitment and allocation of labor in Britain which also contains specific reference to the changed status of this area in the war effort. (*Labour and the War* by John Price, a British trade-unionist, published in the "Penguin" series, has not yet been released in the United States. It covers the same subject in greater detail since many more documents were available to him than Professor Wunderlich could possibly gather from this side of the Atlantic.)

Part I, which analyzes the first eight months of the war and covers the period which Professor Wunderlich chooses to call "the period of awakening" is better than the second section which deals with specific aspects of the changed status of British labor (prevention of stoppages of work, hours of work, wages, social services, social conditions, trade-unionism and war, political attitude of labor). This is not intended as a criticism of any apparent shortcoming in the monograph so much as to point up the fact that the status of British labor varies as the exigencies of war become the more demanding. So that when Professor Wunderlich says that if the war drags on for long Britain will be forced to conscript tools and labor, we are already acquainted with the fact, on the basis of dispatches from England, that the conscription of labor has already taken place and that in addition it has been extended to include certain members of the female sex.

The importance of this study is that it outlines as concisely as can be expected at present the importance of labor in the total war effort (chapters on labor entering the new cabinet, the Enabling Act and reorganization), the value of persuasion over compulsion (chapter on the government's policy in fulfilling essential tasks), and the fact that though Great Britain may have to resort to what is commonly regarded as totalitarian methods, the end to which she directs her activity justifies the means.

Thus, a moral is implied for the administration of America's own defense program.

ERIC ESTORICK

New York University

Introductory Sociology: A Study of American Society. By W. E. GREGORY, JR., and LEE BIDGOOD. New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1939. Pp. xxvii+653. \$3.50.

New Age Sociology. By E. A. ROSS. New York: D. Appleton-Century Co., Inc., 1940. Pp. xx+597. \$3.25.

This introductory text has an intriguing Table of Contents. The book begins with a general statement on society, interaction, culture, and personality, fol-

lowed by a substantial section on the community and one on the family. While race relations and social maladjustments tend to monopolize the remainder of the book, this preliminary emphasis on the family and the community seems pedagogically sound. The book aims to provide a foundation both in factual knowledge and in sociological theory.

The theoretical materials are well integrated but fragmentary. The authors have avoided any detailed analysis of processes. Personality development receives little emphasis, as do language and communication. One might hope that a book from Alabama would illuminate stratification, but the words "caste" and "class" do not appear in the Index. However, the factual materials would be useful to orient students.

By contrast, *New Age Sociology* is written in a breezy style. The book reaffirms the author's sociological faith and attempts to apply to current social problems the analyses of his *Principles of Sociology* (1938). It bears "on the difficulties which the more intelligent element of this society may be called upon to meet and cope with" and presents nothing new of theoretical significance.

Students will be attracted by chapter headings like "The Wholesale Manufacture of Misconception" and stimulated by the arresting phraseology. The thinking of the book is centered about dichotomies, with which the book abounds: *ossification v. reconstruction, professional v. commercial, he community v. she community, talented v. numbskull*. While momentarily illuminating, dichotomies and unconventional vocabularies have doubtful value for organized science.

Brown University

OSWALD HALL

Chart for Happiness. By HORNE LL HART. New York: Macmillan Co., 1940. Pp. xi+198. \$2.00.

Professor Hart has written a book which should be of interest to sociologists, ministers, educators, and psychiatrists. In it he presents methods and data by which, he claims, happiness can be measured; he introduces the reader to the "euphorimeter."

The book has a religious tinge. Professor Hart not only measures happiness but also tells the reader how to become happy. He measures happiness, diagnoses it, and builds it. The book contains tables for scoring "at-the-moment euphorimeters," a bibliography and an index.

It seems to me that Professor Hart has published his findings prematurely. He might well have approached the complex problem of measuring a state of mind by means of other methods as well as that which he has chosen: by a more thorough analysis of the subjective aspect, for instance, by more intensive case

studies, and by a larger number of them. This procedure might have avoided the suspicion of surface research and surface therapy.

J. L. MORENO

Beacon, New York

Vectors in Group Change. By LEWIS HENRY ROHRBAUGH. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Dissertation, 1940. Pp. iii+85.

The signal impression deposited by this essay is an absence of relevant information. The author wishes "to introduce into the social and related sciences a truly scientific method." Apparently his attention has not been called to the main streams and ramifications of this endeavor as it is going on within the social disciplines.

The mislocated group-individual problem is discussed as if Mead had never lived. It is instituted as a quasi-ethical concern, goes through an elementary discussion, to emerge in a frail Cooleyian muddle which seemingly has something to do with democracy. The author draws heavily upon E. A. Singer's 1924 statement of behaviorism. *Gestalt* psychology is envisaged as "confirming" the "principles of the cooperative group process" which is assumed to sustain "superior values."

Finally into all this comes "psychological field theory," and the pages become drunk with syntax. The town of Walkton, Pennsylvania, is described in "the language of constructs," which embodies a great deal of language and several geometrical rituals.

C. WRIGHT MILLS

University of Wisconsin

Equal Educational Opportunity for Youth: A National Responsibility. By NEWTON EDWARDS. (Report to the American Youth Commission.) Washington, D.C.: American Council on Education, 1939. Pp. ix+189. \$2.00.

This is a comprehensive and graphic summary of data in support of the thesis implicit in the title, namely, that educational opportunities for youth in America are very unequally distributed among the various states and communities, and that this threat to our well-being as a democratic nation can be met only by liberal federal aid to education in the states. Scores of tables and charts are employed in the discussion of such relevant topics as geographical and group differentials in reproduction, differences in cultural resources and economic capacity, distribution of child population in relation to income, migration, and occupational trends.

BUFORD H. JUNKER

University of California

American Studies in Honor of William Kenneth Boyd. By MEMBERS OF THE AMERICANA CLUB OF DUKE UNIVERSITY, edited by DAVID KELLEY JACKSON. Durham: Duke University Press, 1940. Pp. 377. \$4.00.

Four of the eight studies probably will be widely read by scholars in the field of southern cultural history: Spengler's analysis of the ideas of Jefferson, Madison, and Adams on political economy; Sydnor's summary of state geological surveys in the Old South (which gives too little attention to the background of those who headed the surveys and to similar surveys in other parts of the nation); Thompson's sweeping generalizations on agricultural labor in the South; and Hubbell's brilliant study of the Old South's literary nationalism. On the whole, the volume is a creditable contribution, in spite of the fact that some of the essayists might have found more important subjects for the exercise of their talents. The format is attractive and the Index helpful, although brief and inadequate.

SPECIAL NOTICE

The Social Science Research Council has asked us to inform our readers that less than three hundred copies of *The Prediction of Personal Adjustment* (455 pp., \$2.00), by Paul Horst and others, remain in stock. The type is being held but will have to be broken up by March 15. It is consequently asked that persons intending to order copies do so promptly so that a decision may be made as soon as possible about the printing of an additional supply. It is particularly desired that individuals intending to use this monograph in connection with graduate courses next fall notify the Council now, without any obligation to purchase, of the approximate number of copies which will be required.

ABSTRACTS OF PERIODICAL LITERATURE^{*}

The persons who have aided in the preparation of the material for this issue are: Hubert Bonner, James Fontana, Paul Siu, and Everett K. Wilson. The numerals and letters appearing after each abstract correspond to the items in the following scheme of classification:

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|---------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| I. THEORETICAL SOCIOLOGY | e) The State and Political Process |
| a) Sociological Theory | f) The School and Education |
| b) History of Sociology | g) Economic Institutions |
| c) Methods of Research | h) Voluntary Associations |
| d) The Teaching of Sociology | IV. POPULATION AND HUMAN ECOLOGY |
| II. SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY | a) Demography |
| a) Human Nature and Personality | b) Ecology |
| b) Collective Behavior | c) The Rural and the Urban Community |
| III. SOCIAL ORGANIZATION | V. DISORGANIZATION |
| a) The Family | a) Personal Disorganization |
| b) Ethnic and Racial Groups | b) Social Disorganization |
| c) Social Stratification | |
| d) The Church and Religion | |

426. **Science and the Social Relations of Industry.**—The alleged capitalist industrial system supposes that ultimate control over policy, price strategy, and production is in the hands of entrepreneurs motivated chiefly by profitable returns from capital. The hypothesis is submitted that mechanization and science have altered the system so that the entrepreneur no longer obtains a "profit" nor does he own capital. The use of science measured in mechanization and capitalization has advanced rapidly for industry as a whole but at very different rates for different industries. The mechanization and high capital equipment due to science have three important results upon permanent industrial structure and upon society. These are an increase in the ratio of salaried staff and of brainworkers generally to wage-earning operatives; a trend toward a larger size of firms and plants; and a wider search for capital, materializing in the institution of the joint stock company. There appears to be a positive association between mechanization and predominance of joint stock companies except, perhaps, in certain branches of commerce. This association is supported by the explanation that the required large capital, more subject to risk than mortgages or commercial credit, can be obtained only from a numerous "company" of stockholders owning capital and, theoretically, controlling the administration jointly, as one person. Profits were formerly paid for risk-bearing, for capital, and for the wages of management. In the modern joint stock company the word "profit" can be used by the accountant to denote a certain surplus appearing in the company's accounts, after certain costs are subtracted from gross revenue. The assumption of the "profit motive" as guiding the economic mechanism of the distribution of resources is brought into question. Today it is not a question of where the joint stock company has invaded industry as a controlling force but rather in what in-

* Since the editors are trying to bring up to date the abstracting of significant articles since the termination of the *Social Science Abstracts*, occasionally there will be abstracts of articles published several years ago.

dustries the individual entrepreneur survives at all. The idea that control goes with risk is supported by the voting control of shareholders. But apart from debentures and preference shares, almost any arrangement may seemingly be made for giving more votes to certain classes of ordinary shares than to others and for depriving some shares of votes. Shareholders are usually too numerous or uninterested to exercise any part in control. Also the practice of spreading investments prevents the investor from taking much interest in any one company. A study by Berle and Means indicates that frequently, for lack of any coherent power among the shareholders, the administration—paid not by profit but by fees and salaries—is left in virtual control. Occasionally the joint stock company may be a legal cloak for a perfectly individual personal entrepreneur. A single man may administer a business and also own it and bear its risks as holder of all or a majority of the ordinary shares. A further stage in the evolution of forms of social organization to cope with the demands of science for larger plants under one co-ordinated plan is the creation of subsidiary companies controlled by holding companies or interlocking directorates. Probably more and more capital will be co-ordinated under single plants with no large number in control. This concentration of power reverses the automatic system of perfect competition imagined by classical economists. A study of actual policies and real people in control is needed. Industrial policy will affect consumers, workers, and shareholders. It will affect other industries, general employment, the trade-cycle, and national progress. Further concentration of power is encouraged by the often prohibitive costs of scientific equipment, while the fixed overhead costs of firms so equipped may be felt to impose such risks in the uncertainties of competitive trade that competition is called off. The main obstacle to the success of state or co-operative organization is not in the difficulty of raising capital so much as in the supply and stimulation of enterprising leadership. Public control in England is likely to come piecemeal. New developments all tend away from an economic system where terms of exchange and amounts exchanged fix themselves automatically by competition of numerous entrepreneurs. In many cases prices are now being "administered." A realistic study of industrial relations must be concerned with such practical social and political problems as the consequences of alternative means of appointing those directing and controlling policy, of sharing administrative functions among them, and of providing incentives, whether by profit, by salary with fear-of-dismissal, or by psychological motive. Economics must be supplemented by industrial sociology.—P. Sargent Florence, *Sociological Review*, XXXI (1939), 1-24. (IIIg.) E. K. W.

427. **The Adoption of Children.**—The problems of social psychology arising with the adoption of children can best be explained with reference to the whole culture in which the institution of adoption has developed. Comparative accounts show that the status, both of adoptive parents and of adopted child, varies greatly, and this may affect the nature of the problems involved. Although the British law insists that the welfare of the child shall be the primary consideration, social attitudes are such that his welfare is probably less assured than in cultures like that of India, where adoption is more common and where it involves the transfer of property rights, receiving religious as well as legal sanction. Perhaps two-thirds of the adoptions in England and Wales are still not legalized. Eighty-five per cent of those adopting children in England are married couples, while two-thirds represent childless homes. A large proportion of adopted children are illegitimate. Adoptions are increasing and may be associated with the fall in the birth rate, the changing attitude toward illegitimacy, and with the recognition that children's needs can be more satisfactorily met in private homes than in institutions. Adoptions are arranged by local authorities, by *ad hoc* societies, by children's agencies, and by private persons. A larger proportion of adopted children seem to be referred to child-guidance clinics, though this does not necessarily show that the problems are due to adoption. Predominant deliberate motives for adoption appear to be: desire of childless parents for children; the desire for companions for only children or children of a given age; the expression of pity; the desire for parenthood on the part of unmarried individuals; and financial gain. Characteristic features of these artificial family relationships are feelings of humiliation; anxiety and compensation leading to oversolicitude and management; fear of known or unknown heredity leading to rejection or idealization of the child. For the child, fantasies common in normal circumstances may be confirmed

by the fact that he has been abandoned and that this may recur. Deception is likely to increase anxiety, and some reassurance can be given if the question is frankly faced by the foster-parents with the adopted child at an early age.—S. Clement Brown, *Sociological Review*, XXXI (1939), 44-67. (IIIa.) E. K. W.

428. National Socialism and the Social Sciences.—The terms "blood" and "soil" signify an attempt to explain social phenomena by the use of concepts and categories native to the biological and physical-geographical sciences. Ties of blood and descent are regarded as the key factors. The coincidence of common language, territory, history, and tradition with German blood is not so much a fact as an aim. The lack of a common history will be made good by a common future. The biological side of the family is emphasized by the reduction of its educational functions. The National Socialist conception of history carries strong biological analogies. Concepts derived from the biological sciences include the elimination of the ideas of socially based progress; the belief that international relations can be only those of domination and subordination; the emphasis upon distinctions between young and old nations; and the general treatment of social phenomena in biological terms or not at all. Social institutions and relationships are approached mainly on the basis of analogy with nonsocial phenomena. As for the term "soil," it is the permanent external factor giving stability to the life of the nation, as blood is the internal guaranty of its permanence. Delayed industrialization and the rapid sequence of phases in the growth of political consciousness in Germany, giving rise to vigorous controversy on all social and political issues, created the need for appearing to incorporate socialist ideas in order to supersede them. But liberalism and Marxism are theories of class struggle, the removal of which requires a campaign to establish the idea of the harmony of the national community. The logical outcome of the organic conception is the petrification of the existing social hierarchy, with the necessary exception of the replacement of former republican parliamentary leaders by a new political élite. National Socialist theory bears the definite stamp of ideology in contrast to science. The nonscientific foundation is in a way emphasized. Faith is firm and certain, knowledge uncertain and fluctuating. The value of different sciences is judged according to their results in promoting the movement. The effect of present requirements of National Socialism may go to promote certain advances in the physical and chemical sciences. Biology is greatly restricted. Reference is sometimes made to "the new science of race." Psychology suffers from overemphasis on inborn qualities as determinants of the character of individuals and nations. Sociology is, perhaps, in the least desirable position. It must, by its nature, give due weight to institutions and social groups, the reality of which is now ignored or denied, e.g., classes. Sociology must aim at embracing all the springs of social action and must be able to employ specifically social concepts. The narrowing of categories of thought, arising from all that is implied by the ideas of "blood" and "soil," prevents this.—R. J. Baker, *Sociological Review*, XXXI (1939), 89-109. (Ia, b, d.) E. K. W.

429. Recent Population Changes in China.—The gross figures from the Minchengpu census and the recent enumeration under the National government of the republic give the population of China in round figures as 371,000,000 in 1910 and 433,000,000 in about 1932. Birth and death statistics estimated from sample studies give 36 and 27 per 1,000, respectively, the difference being 9 per 1,000. The higher death rate of 34 per 1,000 as computed from seven Ting-hsien rates and three Kiangyin rates is, however, considered more probable. The rate of increase as shown in the age-sex structure of the sample studies is near the stationary type of Sundburg. The proportion of women of child-bearing age in the total population does not favor population increase. A desire to increase the male heirs has practically no bearing upon the growth of population in China. The population in China, therefore, seems to have grown but little from 1909 to 1937. Moreover, this population trend seems to be a continuation of the demographic situation which already existed in the past. As the cultural conditions have been rapidly changing in the last few years, a new trend of population change is more probable than a mere continuation of the past trend.—Ch'eng-Hsin Chao, *Yenching Journal of Social Studies*, I (1938), 1-48. (IVa.) P. S.

430. Family Limitation in Poland.—One of the examined groups in an investigation on differential fertility was that of physicians. A majority of them supported the idea of family limitation in general. Medical men are not inclined to have large or even middle-sized families. The reasons for limitation of conception are combined into three groups. The first and most important includes material considerations (difficult housing conditions, low income, etc.); the second is based on care and proper education for the children; the third, on the health of the wife. One would be inclined to think that the medical profession would use up-to-date contraceptives to limit conception. This is not so. There is no contraceptive method which has no adherent in the medical profession. There is also no method whose effectiveness would be generally recognized. The opinion prevails that the influence of contraceptives upon the nervous system is detrimental. The undesirable accidental pregnancy ends often in the birth of a normal child, for a certain number of families of physicians condemn abortion on ethical grounds. But abortions are induced for the same reasons for which contraceptives are used. Therapeutic abortions are rare. Child mortality in families of physicians is low. The present families of physicians have fewer children than their parents had. The trend curve indicates the danger of the dying-out of physicians' families. In the general population of the country, fertility reaches the lowest point in the well-off and intellectual classes. The number of children in the masses is higher. But both groups prefer to have few children, or none at all, for life is easier and more comfortable without them. It is clear that contraceptives are used in all strata. In descending the social scale we find the use of more primitive and less satisfactory methods. The population also practice abortions, which are as frequent occurrences as normal delivery. All classes follow this practice. There is no uniformity of opinion in regard to mortality following abortion. Information regarding other factors influencing the trend of fertility is scanty. Physiological sterility is rare. A more important factor is sterility from a disease—chiefly gonorrhea. Alcoholism seems to foster fertility. The frequency of late marriages is constantly growing in the urban population, in both higher and lower classes. Ages of mothers at birth of first child are higher than formerly. This probably has an influence on the children born in these families.—**Marcin Kacprzak**, *Population*, II (1935-38), 24-60. (IVa.) J. F.

431. Logistic Law of Growth and Structure of Indian Population.—Whether or not the logistic curve represents the law of biological growth as claimed by Pearl, there is general agreement that the curve has been and can be employed to fit the growth curves of populations of different countries. Lotka has shown how certain other demographic characteristics of a population, which have been subject to the logistic law of growth for a considerable period of time, may be studied. In applying the logistic law to the Indian population, the trends of birth and death rates as well as of age distributions have been calculated on the basis of Lotka's deductions, and it has been well shown that they gave fairly good fits to actual happenings. This indicates that improvement in mortality conditions will lower the level of the birth-rate trends; and, if and when the factors responsible for these improvements have ceased to operate, the birth- and death-rate curves will tend to approach each other.—**Satya Swaroop and R. B. Lal**, *Population*, II (1935-38), 100-120. (IVa.) J. F.

432. A Study in the Industrial Career of Secondary-School Boys.—The aim of this study is twofold: to learn what types of occupation secondary-school boys enter and to learn the effects of continued education on the industrial career of the adolescent. Tentative conclusions are as follows. Boys who have had the advantage of a secondary-school education with its prolongation of formal education usually change their jobs less frequently than do those who leave school at fourteen. They choose their work more deliberately, having regard to prospects and to congenial employment. Their starting wages are low, but their general progress is toward better pay and security. It would seem that the secondary-school boy has learned to realize the importance of specific training and is prepared to give up a considerable amount of his scanty leisure in order to obtain it.—**Gertrude Williams**, *Sociological Review*, XXX (1938), 400-413. (III.f.) J. F.

CURRENT BOOKS

- AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR ADULT EDUCATION. *Freedom of the People*. New York: American Association for Adult Education. Pp. 19. \$0.10.
- AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR ADULT EDUCATION. *Winning the Peace*. New York: American Association for Adult Education. Pp. 19. \$0.10.
- AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF COLLEGIATE SCHOOLS OF BUSINESS. *Proceedings of the 23rd Annual Meeting*. Hanover, N.H.: Amos Tuck School, Dartmouth College, 1941. Pp. 136. \$1.25.
- AMERICAN COUNCIL ON EDUCATION. *American Isolation Reconsidered*. Washington, D.C., 1941. Pp. vii+209. \$0.50. An account of the history of America's foreign policy as it relates to isolation together with selected documents bearing upon the evolution of our position—a bibliography and guide to materials for teachers.
- ANDERSON, W. A. *Farm Women in the Home Bureau: A Study in Cortland County, New York, 1939*. (Department of Rural Sociology, mimeograph bulletin No. 3.) Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Agricultural Experiment Station, 1941. Pp. 41. Compares the characteristics of farm women who do and do not participate in the Home Bureau.
- APTEKAR, HERBERT H. *Basic Concepts in Social Case Work*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1941. Pp. ix+201. \$2.50. Analyzes the concepts of ambivalence, will, and denial, relationship, movement, projection and identification, the case-work situation, focus and level, with emphasis upon the philosophy of Otto Rank.
- BOLINGER, DWIGHT L. *What Is Freedom? For the Individual—for Society*. Norman, Okla.: Cooperative Books, 1941. Pp. 30. \$0.50.
- BREARLEY, H. C. *Southern Regional Materials in Social Science*. Nashville: Division of Surveys and Field Studies, George Peabody College for Teachers, 1941. Pp. 34. Suggestions to teachers and a guide to materials, together with a bibliography.
- BROWN, CECIL KENNETH. *Introduction to Economics*. New York: American Book Co. 1941. Pp. xiii+534. A textbook for a first course in economics by a professor of economics who believes "in freedom for the individual, in private property, and in the competitive principle as the best means of achieving a good life from the viewpoint of economic organization."
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- COMMITTEE ON MATERIALS FOR TEACHERS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, PHILLIPS BRADLEY, Chairman. *American Isolation Reconsidered*. Washington, D.C.: American Council on Education, 1941. Pp. v+208. \$0.50. A resource unit for teachers tracing the history of American neutrality and pointing out the issues involved in the decision regarding peace and war in 1812, 1914, and 1941.
- COMMITTEE ON MUNICIPAL OBLIGATIONS, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SUPERVISORS OF STATE BANKS. *Municipals*. Washington: Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., 1941. Pp. 108. \$1.00. A report of the Committee on Municipal Obligations by the National Association of Supervisors of State Banks.
- A CONFERENCE OF EXPERTS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, WORLD CITIZENS ASSOCIATION. *The World's Destiny and the United States*. Chicago: Lakeside Press, R. R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 1941. Pp. xx+309. \$0.50. The results of a conference of experts in international relations on war and post-war problems, including a discus-

- sion of the League, the framework of a new social, economic, and political order, and suggested educational and organizational methods for achieving it.
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- CROSSER, PAUL K. *Ideologies and American Labor*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1941. Pp. xvi+221. \$2.50. A historical and analytical account of the influence of the ideas of St. Thomas, Calvin, Hobbes, J. S. Mill, Marx, and Engels upon paternalistic, liberalistic, and revolutionary unionism and types of labor relations in the United States.
- CUMMINGS, RICHARD OSBORN. *The American and His Food*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1941. Pp. xlii+291. \$2.50. Discusses the changes in food habits in the United States and their social implications.
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- MOCK, JAMES R. *Censorship, 1917*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1941. Pp. ix+250. \$2.50. Discusses censorship methods in this country during the first World War.
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- MYRDAL, ALVA. *Nation and Family: The Swedish Experiment in Democratic Family and Population Policy*. New York and London: Harper & Bros., 1941. Pp. xv+441. \$4.00. A consideration of the problems of quality and quantity of population in relation to the institution of the family and to social reform.
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- RUCH, FLOYD L.; MACKENZIE, GORDON N.; and MCCLEAN, MARGARET. *People Are Important*. Chicago: Scott, Foresman & Co., 1941. Pp. 283. Designed to aid high-school students in the consideration of personal and personal-social problems. Effectively illustrated with photographs.
- SARGENT, PORTER. *Getting US into War*. Boston: Porter Sargent, 1941. Pp. 640. \$4.00. An exposé of the British Empire and of the people who want us to go to war by a man who admits he relies on scientific method and has no "opinions."
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- YBARRA, T. R. *Young Man of Caracas*. New York: Ives Washburn, Inc., 1941. Pp. xiii+324. \$3.00. An autobiographical story throwing much light on the nature of South American life and politics.
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THE RELATION BETWEEN POSITION AND STATUS IN THE ASSIMILATION OF CHINESE IN HAWAII

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ABSTRACT

The functional correspondence between position in the ecological order and status in the social order is disrupted by migration. The sequence of changes in the relationship between the position and status of migrants may be viewed as phases of the assimilative process. Among Chinese in Hawaii the main stages in this sequence have been: a plantation period, with social isolation and residential and occupational segregation; a period of urbanization, with residential segregation but expanding occupational distribution; a third period, still in process, with residential dispersion within the city, continued infiltration into all parts of the occupational structure, and increased social contacts with other groups in the interracial society. In the latest phase of the process status of the person again tends to coincide with position but in a larger, more impersonal society.

The analysis of the process of assimilation may be aided by tracing the relationship between the changing position of an immigrant group within the competitive system of a society and the status changes among members of the group within that society. In the highly traditionalized village communities from which Chinese immigrants came to Hawaii, a person's status, his social standing, and his conception of himself tended to correspond with his location in the community and his position in the village economy.¹ In fact, a person's position and his status in such a situation were so closely

¹ I am indebted to Robert E. Park for the distinctions between location, position, and status used here. For a partial treatment of his point of view, see R. E. Park, "The Concept of Position in Sociology," *Publications of the American Sociological Society*, XX (Chicago, 1926), 1-14.

interrelated that only by a process of abstraction could any distinction between the two be drawn. Change in location by migration to a new country disrupted this correspondence between position and status and provided circumstances which enable us to observe more clearly the difference between the two and to describe the re-establishment of an interlocking between them within a very different social and moral order.

When the Chinese became a migrant his economic position inevitably changed from one in the village to one in the ecological order of the frontier community to which he had migrated. He was not prepared upon arrival, however, to become a part of any common culture order there. Nor was he at first interested in the status-values given to various occupations in the new community. While he had given up his occupational position at home to seek his "fortune" abroad, his intention was ultimately to secure a new position in his native village economy and a more enviable status among his fellow-villagers. At one and the same time, therefore, he was competing, temporarily he thought, for an advantageous position in a frontier community and striving to improve permanently his status in the old world. But as the migrant changed from a sojourner to a settler, he gradually reoriented his status-seeking activities and his conception of himself. From this point of view, the extent to which the area in which the migrant seeks status becomes identical with the area in which he competes for position may serve as an index of the degree of his assimilation.

Two types of data indicate the changing position of the Chinese in Hawaii: (1) their dispersion into different occupational classes and (2) their residential dispersion after being originally segregated.

CHANGES IN OCCUPATIONAL POSITION

The first influx of Chinese into Hawaii in considerable numbers began in 1852 with their importation as contract laborers by white owners of sugar plantations. Their legal status was defined by a "master and servant act" which carried penal sanctions, and during this early period the Chinese were bound into temporary servitude for five years at three dollars a month and "keep." The position of these migrants, of course, was at the bottom of the plantation divi-

sion of labor. By the dominant whites Chinese were welcomed as utilities, as cheap and industrious instruments to perform unskilled, menial plantation labor. They were there for work, not for participation in Island society.

Newly arrived Chinese migrants did not regard this as exploitation. Instead, they thought of themselves as favored by their god of wealth. Translated into village terms, the plantation wage was fabulous. But Chinese discovered that they could make their "fortunes" faster in other ways than as indentured laborers, and as soon as possible most of them left the plantations for other occupations. Thousands went into independent agricultural ventures such as rice-farming and banana-raising, and others became the ubiquitous rural peddlers and village storekeepers. Eventually, prospects of a more lucrative future in the port city of Honolulu resulted in a process of urbanization; by 1930, 71.1 per cent of the entire Chinese population was concentrated in Honolulu alone.

The point at which a Chinese penetrated the urban occupational structure depended upon such factors as the length of time the migrant had spent in rural Hawaii before coming into the city, the amount of money he had accumulated, the skills he had acquired at home or in Hawaii, and the position which had been achieved by relatives upon whom he could depend for assistance. The first job in Honolulu for many was unskilled labor. Others became domestic servants, cooks, and waiters. As the years passed an observable movement into skilled and proprietary positions took place. In the eighties and nineties Chinese secured virtual monopoly of laundries, tailor shops, restaurants, and small trade. This dominance has subsequently been broken by the occupational climbing of other migrants, particularly Japanese, but census reports have nevertheless shown a steady improvement in the position of Chinese in Hawaii's occupational structure. By 1930, 50.1 per cent of the employed Chinese males were engaged in professional, proprietary, clerical, and skilled forms of employment. Of the 136,505 males of all races gainfully employed in the Territory only 36.6 per cent were in these occupational classes. The relative positions of Chinese males in the Island occupational structure in 1910, 1920, and 1930 are indicated by the indices in Table 1.

The occupational indices show an increasing concentration of Chinese in professional, proprietary, and clerical classes, classes which in Western urban society tend to confer highest social status. Accompanying this trend has been a decline in the proportional representation of Chinese in the lower occupational brackets, with the exception of the domestic class.²

TABLE 1
OCCUPATIONAL INDICES OF GAINFULLY EMPLOYED CHINESE
MALES, BY OCCUPATIONAL CLASSES, HAWAIIAN
ISLANDS, 1910-30*

Occupational Class	1910	1920	1930
Professional.....	36	46	100
Proprietary.....	275	308	393
Clerical.....	140	214	347
Skilled.....	83	64	47
Semiskilled.....	70	72	91
Farm.....	139	84	92
Domestic.....	257	279	414
Unskilled.....	80	80	54

*These indices are obtained by dividing the percentage of all employed Chinese males engaged in a given class of occupations by the percentage of the total employed males who are engaged in the same occupational class and multiplying the quotient by 100. An occupational index of 100, then, would mean that Chinese males had a "normal proportion" of the positions within the occupational class. An index above or below 100 represents a deviation from the "normal proportion," either in the direction of excessive concentration or of a lack of expected representation in the particular class of occupations. Cf. Andrew W. Lind, *An Island Community: Ecological Succession in Hawaii* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938), p. 251.

The total numbers of employed Chinese males for the three dates, as reported by the Census, are as follows: 1910, 13,742; 1920, 11,110; and 1930, 8,571.

A significant feature of data which show the favorable position of Chinese in preferred classes of occupations is the fact that an increasing number of Hawaiian-born Chinese have been able to establish themselves in positions of an interracial or nonracial character. Among professional men, some, such as a few physicians and dentists, have an interracial clientele, and some academic men have secured their positions on the basis of achievement, irrespective of their racial origin. Chinese have obtained a wide variety of positions

² The excessive proportion of Chinese males in the domestic class is largely accounted for by the fact that these data include only males and few males of other racial groups have entered domestic service. Also, the Census classifies all types of cooks as "servants," which means that numerous Chinese cooks in restaurants and hotels are included here in the domestic class.

in the interracial organized and operated government services. Some Chinese are employed by white-controlled business firms to work particularly among Chinese customers; others have joined with American citizens of other racial origins to organize corporations and carry on business on a nonracial basis.

Chinese migrants to Hawaii entered an ecological organization which might be called a "plantation frontier" rather than a "frontier of settlement." As McKenzie and others have pointed out,³ one of the significant differences between these two types of frontiers is that in the former the group which is financially and politically dominant is not numerically dominant. In the Hawaiian Islands the relatively small group of whites, or *haoles*,⁴ has held the financial and political control. They successfully established the large, corporate plantation system. The subsequent expansion of the economy has resulted in the opening of many new jobs, the development of secondary industries, the extension of trade and the means of transportation and communication, the growth of towns and of a small metropolitan port city, and the increase in the demand for skilled and professional services.⁵ Since the number of individuals in the dominant group has been inadequate to fill the positions which have opened in the preferred classes of occupations,⁶ it has been possible for the partially acculturated Chinese, the first laboring group imported, to rise rapidly in the occupational scale. Their Hawaiian-born and more westernized descendants have continued the trend upward. Thus the occupational situation has been more favorable for Chinese in

³ R. D. McKenzie, "The Concept of Dominance and World-Organization," *American Journal of Sociology*, XXXIII (July, 1927), 37.

⁴ The term *haoles* is applied in Hawaii to white persons of American and North European origin. Up until 1872, almost a century after white discovery of the Islands, the total number of *haole* males did not exceed 2,000 at any one time. As late as 1920, of a total population of 255,912, and of a total male population twenty-one years old and over of 90,522, the total number of *haole* males twenty-one years old and over was only about 8,500. Nearly 4,000 of these were Americans in military service quartered in Hawaii.

⁵ The best account of these changes in Hawaii is found in A. W. Lind, *An Island Community: Ecological Succession in Hawaii*.

⁶ The number of *haole* men gainfully employed in 1930, apart from those in military service, was only about 9,000, while the total number of positions in the first four classes of Table 1 was 19,440.

Hawaii than for those in the mainland United States, where the frontier was one of settlement, drawing whites until they had become the most numerous population element as well as politically and financially dominant.

RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION AND DISPERSION

Associated with changes in the economic and occupational position of Chinese in Hawaii have been changes in their residential distribution. The pattern of residential distribution which the imported migrants found upon arrival was one of segregation. Not only were they sent to the isolated plantation hinterland while the majority of whites remained in port towns, but on the plantation a rigid pattern of segregation was enforced by the management. The small white group lived by itself, the native Hawaiians were housed in one set of quarters, and the Chinese, men without families, were housed elsewhere in rudely constructed barracks. These Chinese neither resisted nor resented segregation. In fact, they preferred it. Segregated from other racial groups, the migrant was among those who shared his customs and old-world attitudes, as well as his indifference toward participating in the society of the new world.

Since most of the Chinese—over twenty thousand—now reside in Honolulu, the trends in residential distribution there are the most significant for the present analysis. Although more Chinese live in Honolulu than in San Francisco, which has the largest Chinatown in continental United States,⁷ no part of Honolulu is similar to San Francisco's Chinatown. Nevertheless, for a period of about fifty years Honolulu had its "Chinese quarter."⁸ When Chinese began to move into Honolulu from the rural districts, they sought voluntarily the segregation which had been provided for them on plantations. These Chinese retained to a large extent attitudes they had possessed on the plantations—the desire to exploit the economic re-

⁷ The 1930 Census reported that 19,334 of the 137,582 individuals in the city of Honolulu—14.1 per cent—were Chinese. Since 1890 the number of Chinese in Honolulu has steadily increased, although the proportion which Chinese have comprised of the total Honolulu population has steadily decreased. In 1884 and again in 1896, Chinese made up slightly more than 25 per cent of the city's population.

⁸ Clarence Glick, "Residential Dispersion of Urban Chinese," *Social Process in Hawaii*, II (Honolulu, 1936), 28-34.

sources as rapidly as possible, a general indifference toward participation in the interracial society, and a preference for maintaining contacts with the old-world society through association with other Chinese. All of these attitudes favored the growth and maintenance of a Chinatown in Honolulu. Guilds could be and were organized there to secure economic advantage in a given occupation by attempting to control and regulate the conditions of competition among Chinese themselves while at the same time underbidding non-Chinese competitors who maintained a higher standard of living. Other institutions could serve migrants temporarily residing in Hawaii, away from their accustomed family and clan pattern of existence.

Between 1860 and 1900 almost all of the Chinese business establishments were located in the Chinese quarter. Cooking and lodging quarters were an indispensable part of every store or shop. The first Chinese families established in Honolulu lived on the business premises. After the Chinatown fire of 1886, however, families began to move into buildings on the periphery of the Chinatown business district. When a bubonic plague was followed by a second disastrous Chinatown fire early in 1900, there was an exodus from the Chinese quarter which began an ever widening dispersion of Chinese into every part of the city. By 1920 they comprised only about half of the population of the old Chinatown, with Japanese, Hawaiians, part-Hawaiians, Filipinos, Portuguese, Koreans, Puerto Ricans, and *haoles*—all the other major groups in the Islands—composing the other half. The decline in the number and proportion of Chinese in the district has continued to the present time.⁹

While the dispersion of Chinese in Honolulu has not followed closely the pattern of formation of areas of second and third settlement, parts of Honolulu do correspond roughly with these generalized areas. Less than a mile from the old Chinese quarter, in what might be called Honolulu's area of workingmen's homes, lies one

⁹ In this connection it would be interesting to analyze the factors involved in the quite different outcome of the San Francisco Chinatown following the earthquake and fire of 1906. There the area was rebuilt on a more elaborate scale than ever before, and Chinese informants state that some 15,000 Chinese—almost all of the city's Chinese population—are crowded into about eighteen blocks near the center of the city.

small area in which 1,514 Chinese were reported as residents in 1930. The Chinese were the largest population group in this enumeration district, but they composed only 31 per cent of its total population. Almost two miles from the old Chinatown, in an area of single dwellings, is another district sometimes referred to as "Chinese Hollywood." Here, in small modern homes, live Hawaiian-born Chinese. They are of the well-educated middle class—business and professional men. Their families, as contrasted with the families of their immigrant parents, are of the small one-to-three-child size. A survey directed by A. W. Lind of the University of Hawaii in 1937 revealed, however, that less than 50 per cent of the families in this area were Chinese, that the proportion of Chinese families was smaller than in 1930, and that the next-door neighbors of Chinese families living in the area were as likely to be of some other race as Chinese.

When census data for Honolulu were regrouped into twenty-four districts, approximating natural areas as closely as possible, twenty-one contained at least two hundred Chinese residents in 1930; there were three hundred or more Chinese in two-thirds of the areas and at least five hundred in half of them. The dispersion of the Chinese had increased considerably between 1920 and 1930 and the distribution of building permits issued to Chinese for the construction of new homes since 1930 indicates that the substitution of a dispersion pattern for a segregation pattern has proceeded steadily.

REORIENTATION OF STATUS-SEEKING ACTIVITIES

Changes in status among Chinese within the Island social order have accompanied these occupational and residential changes and may be seen as interacting with them. When Chinese plantation laborers sought to advance toward their "fortune-seeking" goal by pushing into other occupations, they were regarded as failing to fill the economic role as plantation utilities for which they had been imported. Expressions of welcome changed to expressions of disappointment and hostility. In the eighties and nineties anti-Chinese antipathy became intense, and restrictions were applied both upon further immigration and upon efforts of those Chinese already in the Islands to invade the preferred occupations.

Emotional outbursts against Chinese and special legislation

against them as a class evoked a new sense of solidarity among the Chinese themselves. Institutions for counterattack arose, particularly the United Chinese Society. Through them the migrant became concerned about his status in a world larger than the family, clan, and village world from which he had come.

It must be emphasized that the Chinese migrant who came to Hawaii was not "nationality-conscious." His conceptions of himself and his status were functions of his clan membership and of the territorially limited world in which that clan had status. He became aware of such a thing as "nationality" through the categorical treatment which he received. He found himself classed with other migrants from China who at home would have been regarded as outsiders distrusted by his clan. Subsequently, the migrant found himself participating with these individuals in associations which aimed to ameliorate or counteract the anti-Chinese agitation and restrictions. Through such participation he later became interested in Chinese nationalistic organizations which began to appear in Hawaii about 1895 and have continued to function with periods of activity corresponding to crises facing the Chinese in Hawaii and crises in the political situation in China.¹⁰

Participation in these groups was the result of the migrant's changing conception of his status and at the same time further modified it. His developing concern about his national status led him also to take an interest in his status in the Hawaiian interracial society. At first this took the indirect form of striving for status in the various Chinese associations. An amazing network of almost one hundred immigrant organizations appeared in Chinatown. Most of them provided some form of social control over the migrants themselves; through their complicated interrelationships they imposed a political order upon migrants who were not yet acculturated into Island society and over whom the white-dominated government had only superficial control. Induction into these organizations, however, did more than provide a basis for control in the new world; the groups had status-giving value for the migrant. The status-giving process operated in at least three ways: The activities of the migrant

¹⁰ Clarence Glick, "Transition from Familism to Nationalism among the Chinese in Hawaii," *American Journal of Sociology*, XLIII (March, 1938), 734-43.

brought him formal, highly valued recognition from China; they brought him the more personal esteem of other members of the Chinatown community; and, finally, as these Chinese activities secured recognition from the dominant Island groups, the migrant who achieved "face" in Chinatown was raised in the esteem of the interracial society.¹¹

This form of social organization, while indicating that the participating migrants were undergoing the process of identifying themselves with a new society, was still an accommodative one. In a sense, assimilation of the migrant into a Chinatown society meant at the same time accommodation to a larger interracial society of which Chinatown was an integral but distinct part. To the extent that the migrant willingly participated in the emerging interracial society he did so in the role of a recognized member of a distinct racial and cultural group.

It is at this stage of social organization that Chinese groups and Chinatowns in continental United States seem to have crystallized. In Hawaii, however, the process has continued much further. There the point has been reached at which Chinese immigrants or their immediate descendants are having an opportunity to establish themselves as "persons" in the interracial society rather than being forced to continue their roles as representatives of a distinct group in the population. This process has been accelerated since Hawaii's annexation to the United States and particularly since World War I; annexation and the application of American exclusion acts have meant that there have been few Chinese immigrants entering the Islands during the last forty years. Those of the first generation who remain have now consciously or unwittingly become greatly acculturated to life in the Islands. Even more important, due to the greater proportional influx of Chinese women into Hawaii than into

¹¹ In the process of acquiring status in the Hawaiian-Chinese community the migrant was becoming more detached from his village world. This was particularly true of the economically successful migrant. It is paradoxical that the more strenuously he worked to secure economic advantage and the closer he came to his original goal, the more subject he became to appeals to improve his prestige in the social world around him. Hence, the very pursuance of his first goal led him into a changed direction of status-seeking.

continental United States, well over four-fifths of the Chinese are now Hawaiian-born and Hawaiian-reared individuals.¹² Chinese have been replaced by later immigrant groups as objects of such antipathies as have existed. Meanwhile, their prestige has improved locally. Many *haoles* express the opinion that the Chinese in the Islands represent one of the best examples of the "Americanization" process.

With the decline of Chinatown as a physical fact went the dissolution of Chinatown as a way of life. Most of the old Chinatown organizations which remain are on the way out or have become so changed as to be hardly recognizable as the same institutions of years ago. Few of the younger generation of Chinese are interested in securing recognition as leaders in associations founded by the immigrants or even in participating in them as members.

New institutions and interests have risen, patterned after American forms and ideals and quite definitely an integral part of the interracial society emerging in Hawaii. Even organizations composed entirely or predominantly of persons of pure Chinese ancestry parallel and are co-ordinate with organizations whose memberships are interracial or "nonracial" in composition. One prominent organization among Chinese, for example, is the Kau-Tom Post of the American Legion. Members of this group and of its women's auxiliaries work co-operatively on projects with other American Legion groups, and in 1940 a member of the Kau-Tom Post, a Chinese physician, was commander of the whole Hawaiian Department of the Legion. As a matter of fact, Chinese frequently are members simultaneously in both "Chinese" and "interracial" institutions, depending upon the nature and objectives of the organizations.

Kinship ties, the usual chance personal contacts, and the like operate in such a fashion that personally satisfying relationships for the majority of young Chinese are still maintained in primary groups with other persons of Chinese ancestry. But the interests and values of these groups are dominated by the interests and values of the interracial community, not by those of the old world or of a China-

¹² The percentage of foreign-born Chinese dropped from 84.4 in 1900 to 27.5 in 1930, and 1940 data should show a continuation of this rapid decline.

town. Thus, while the individual's status-seeking activities may be primarily directed toward securing satisfying responses from other Chinese individuals in Hawaii, this orientation is basically controlled by new-world values which he and other Chinese share with persons of other racial ancestries.

At the same time, the social situation in Hawaii has made it fairly easy for Chinese to establish primary relations with persons of other races, and there has been a considerable amount of interracial marriage. A third of the marriages of Chinese individuals between 1920 and 1930 involved non-Chinese or part-Chinese marital partners, and in the period 1930-34 more than a fourth of the Chinese men and more than a fifth of the women were marrying persons who were not "pure Chinese." Under such circumstances an increasing number of persons of full or part Chinese ancestry define their own conceptions of themselves and of their future in terms of an identification with Hawaii and American life. Although the assimilative process has not been completed, the stage is rapidly being reached where the area in which the Chinese seek status is the same as the area in which they compete for position.

The basic outlines of the changing relationship between position and status among Chinese in Hawaii appear as follows: In the early phase migrants were segregated on the plantations, relatively isolated from persons of other races and with few contacts even with other Chinese except on the same plantations; they were concentrated at the bottom of the occupational hierarchy; they were evaluated by outsiders largely as economic utilities, while they themselves were less interested in their status in the migrant area than in the local social world from which they had migrated. In the second phase urbanization resulted in the growth of a Chinatown, largely a voluntary form of segregation, which facilitated the intensification of intragroup contacts and relations; this change was accompanied occupationally by an expansion into a variety of new employments; migrants responded to hostility by becoming concerned about their "national" status and their status in the Chinatown colony. The third phase, not yet completed, has involved the gradual dispersion of the migrants and their descendants residentially into various parts

of the interracial community, with an intensification of personal contacts with individuals of other races; occupationally, there has been a continuation of the infiltration into different occupational classes, an improvement in the general economic position of the group, and an increase in the proportion of individuals engaged in interracial and nonracial positions; status-seeking has become more clearly identified with the community in which the individual seeks a livelihood, including more concern over the status implications of one's occupation and more attention to maintaining a personally satisfying status in the emergent interracial society.

BROWN UNIVERSITY

THE FERTILITY OF THE FRENCH-CANADIAN WOMEN DURING THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY

GEORGES SABAGH¹

ABSTRACT

The French-Canadian censuses of 1666, 1667, and 1681 are analyzed to throw light on the alleged phenomenal fertility of the early settlers. The crude birth rate, total fertility rate, gross reproduction rate, and fertility ratios were all exceptionally high, but marital fertility rates were approximately at the level of similar rates in several European countries during the following two centuries. This suggests that the apparent high fertility is largely attributable to the high frequency and early age of marriage.

A legend has grown up around the fertility of the French Canadians, especially the early settlers. The testimony of persons who lived in the seventeenth century in New France is replete with references to the large families. According to Mother Marie l'Incarnation: "Above all there is a great number of children . . . those who have been in this country for a long time have so many children that it is marvellous and there is a superabundance of them." Father Chrétien le Clercq said, in 1675, that "by a special blessing from God one can find, as I have observed, up to 18 and 19 children of one father and one mother."² André Talon, the famous *intendant* of New France, remarked in one of his letters: "The country is fertile; the women are pregnant every year."³ The list of commentaries on the fertility of the French Canadians could be extended considerably, but a few lines from an eloquent French-Canadian poem sum up the general tone of all of them. Baptiste Auclair, typical of the old French-Canadian *habitant*, is speaking.

¹ This article represents part of a larger study by the writer on the social background of French-Canadian population movements. The writer is greatly indebted to Dr. Dorothy S. Thomas for many helpful suggestions and also to Dr. David Glass.

² Georges Langlois, *Histoire de la population canadienne française* (Montreal: Albert Lévesque, 1934), pp. 105-7 and 109.

³ Émile Salome, *La Colonisation de la Nouvelle-France* (Paris: E. Guilmoto, 1907), p. 170.

... L'œuvre patriotique
 Jeunes gens, c'est la mienne! Un homme est éloquent
 Quand il a cinquante ans labouré la prairie,
 Et donné comme moi cent bras à la patrie.⁴

The aim of the present paper is to find some of the facts behind the legend and particularly to determine how far the average reproductive performance approached the limit suggested by the writings of contemporaries, and, if it did so, how far this phenomenon was merely a demographic technicality due to the particular composition of the population. This is not altogether an easy matter, for many of the historical writings on social and demographic conditions in New France have themselves a legendary character. Statistical sources are, however, unusually rich, and some of them have, of course, been utilized for one or another purpose by preceding investigators.⁵ First, the censuses taken periodically from 1666 until the British occupation in 1763 are available. Indeed, there were no less than thirty-seven of these nominal censuses during the French regime.⁶

In addition to these early nominal censuses, statements of the numbers of the population were given at short intervals between the census years (every two or three years). These statements of population were generally prepared by the Priests, Missionaries, *Seigneurs*, etc., but those estimated by the *Gouverneur* or *Intendant* were calculated on the previous census, the immigration, the emigration, and the natural increase.⁷

Finally, the clergy of New France kept ecclesiastical registers of baptisms, marriages, and deaths, covering, more or less completely, the period from 1621 onward.⁸

⁴ L. H. Fréchette, *La Légende d'un peuple* (Paris, 1887), quoted in Ian Forbes Fraser, *The Spirit of French Canada* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1939), p. 39.

⁵ In our research we have come in contact with the following studies bearing on the subject: Langlois, *op. cit.*; R. R. Kuczynski, *Birth Registration and Birth Statistics in Canada* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1930); A. J. Pelletier, F. D. Thompson, and A. Rochon, *The Canadian Family* ("Census Monograph," No. 7 [reprinted from *Seventh Census of Canada, 1931*, Vol. XIII (Ottawa: Dominion Bureau of Statistics, 1938)]).

⁶ *Seventh Census of Canada, 1931*, I (Ottawa: Dominion Bureau of Statistics, 1936), 36.

⁷ A. J. Pelletier, "Canadian Censuses of the Seventeenth Century," *Papers and Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association*, II (Ottawa, 1930), 34.

⁸ Kuczynski, *op. cit.*, pp. 31-40.

For the present paper only a small part of this rich source material was utilized. This part included complete transcripts of the original censuses of 1666, 1667, and 1681, as published *in extenso* by Benjamin Sulte in his *Histoire des canadiens français* (Montreal, 1882-84).⁹ These were retabulated for the age, sex, and marital-status distributions of the population in order to throw them into a form where fertility rates, more refined than those utilized previously, could be computed.

The relative reliability of the early censuses seems to be well established, as does the fact that they were "a name by name enumeration of the people, on the *de jure* principle, of a fixed date, showing age, sex, occupation, and conjugal conditions."¹⁰ Pelletier presents convincing evidence of the zeal shown by Talon, *intendant* at the time of the first census, and by Duchesneau, his successor, of the constant demands on the part of the king and of Colbert for accurate censuses and of the issuance of ordinances to the effect that the taking of a census is part of the law of the land. However, the limitations of all censuses—and particularly of those taken so long ago—must be held in mind.

Kuczynski, who made a careful analysis of early baptism registers, discussed the factors that might have introduced unreliability in the birth statistics based on these registers. He concluded that "Catholic baptisms included practically all baptisms"; that baptism of Indian adults, which might have been a disturbing factor, played no role in the earlier years; that death of infants prior to baptism was not important; in short, that, at least in the seventeenth century, "the number of registered baptisms evidently corresponded very closely with the actual number of white live born, and the registers as a whole have been well preserved."¹¹ Kuczynski did not discuss the question of illegitimacy, which might also have affected the reliability of church registers, but Langlois indicates that it was practically nonexistent in the seventeenth century, and this latter observation checks, as will be shown later, with the fact that marriage was almost universal among the younger women.¹²

⁹ IV, 52-78; V, 53-88. In Volume IV of the *Census of Canada of 1870-71* (Ottawa, 1876), the tabulations of the censuses of New France from 1666 on are given.

¹⁰ *Seventh Census of Canada, 1931*, p. 32; see also Pelletier, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

¹¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 31-40.

¹² *Op. cit.*, p. 112.

The crude birth rate at the time of the censuses of 1666, 1667, and 1681 was around 51 per 1,000 population, and the crude death rate about 9 per 1,000. Natural increase, then, was at an exceptionally high level. But the population had increased from a level of 3,215 in 1666, and 3,918 in the next year, to 9,677 by 1681. This tripling within a mere decade and a half obviously reflected also the rapid settling of the country by immigrants. The instability of the total population, plus the fact that the new recruits were selected from the younger ages, makes the use of crude rates either of births or of deaths almost meaningless.

A total fertility rate can, however, be computed and does take the factor of varying-age computation into account. However, as age-specific fertility rates could not be computed directly for New France, an indirect method was used, as indicated by D. V. Glass.¹³ Because the ten-year-age classes in the published distributions¹⁴ were too crude for this procedure, it became necessary to make the retabulation referred to above. This retabulation was done with great care, but complete accuracy cannot be guaranteed.¹⁵

Indirect standardization was applied to the quinquennial age groups of females for each census on the basis of the age-specific fertility rates for Sweden, 1776-85.¹⁶ By this method the estimated

¹³ See his *Population Policies and Movements* (Oxford, 1940), p. 387, for a description of the method of computing substitute total fertility rates and substitute gross reproduction rates.

¹⁴ Sulte, *op. cit.*

¹⁵ We had to meet certain practical difficulties in the tabulation of the census; for example, the fact that the name Claude, which occurred a number of times in the census of 1681, can represent either a man or a woman. Not in every case was the civil status definite, but all men and women living together and having children were considered as being married. Since illegitimacy was so rare, this seemed a justifiable assumption. Our tabulations were further checked, as far as possible, against the published census tables. This check could not be exact, since the census decennial classes begin with 1 and end with 0, whereas ours begin with 0 and end with 9. Discrepancies between classes were so slight as to assure us of the essential correctness of our computations except in the case of the census of 1666, where we had fifteen more women aged fifteen and over than the census did for classes aged sixteen and over.

¹⁶ R. R. Kuczynski (*Balance of Births and Deaths*, I [Washington, D.C., 1931], 124-28) gives average yearly confinements by age groups of mothers (Sweden, 1776-1922) and the women of child-bearing age according to quinquennial age groups (Sweden, 1776-1922). From them the specific fertility rates for Swedish women, 1776-85, were calculated.

total fertility for New France was 12,008 births per 1,000 women passing through the child-bearing period in 1666; 10,680 in 1667; and 9,667 in 1681. A rate of this magnitude is outside the range observed in high-fertility areas in more recent times. In the beginning of the twentieth century, for example, Bulgaria had a total fertility of about 6,600, Croatia-Slavonia of about 5,500, and Serbia of about 5,700.¹⁷

Assuming the sex ratio at birth for New France to have been 105 males per 100 females, the substitute gross reproduction rate for New France was calculated. This index was 5.9 for 1666, 5.2 for 1667, and 4.7 for 1681. In 1666, then, a French-Canadian woman, living through the child-bearing ages, fifteen to forty-nine, would on the average give birth to about 6 female babies.¹⁸ Was the decline in the gross reproduction rate from 5.9 in 1666 to 4.7 in 1681 indicative of a true decline in fertility? Some answer will be given to this question when the married fertility rate is discussed in a later section.

As a further basis of comparison, the fertility ratio was computed. This ratio relates the children under five years of age to 1,000 women from fifteen to forty-four years of age. Its limitations are due to the fact that it does not account for complete age-differential fertility and that it represents survivors of various ages up to five rather than all who were born. The fertility ratios were 1,159 for 1666, 1,126 for 1667, and 1,130 for 1681. It will be noted that the fertility ratio does not exhibit the same trend as the total fertility, which showed a constant and noticeable decline from 1666 to 1681. If we compare these ratios with the ratios of approximately 950¹⁹ computed for the United States in its early period as an independent nation, we find that the rates for New France were significantly higher. It is safe to assume that in many parts of the United States, at least in the early nineteenth century, economic conditions were similar to those prevailing in New France, yet the fertility ratios of the latter were some 20 per cent higher than those of the former.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, II, 30.

¹⁸ Our computations of the gross reproduction rate check closely with the estimate made by Dr. Kuczynski: "At the end of the second third of the seventeenth century the average number of girls born to each woman who lived through the child-bearing age—the gross reproduction rate—was 5 or 6" (*Birth Registration in Canada*, p. 204).

¹⁹ W. S. Thompson and P. K. Whelpton, *Population Trends in the United States* (New York, 1933), p. 263.

On the basis of measures commonly accepted as indicating reproductive levels, it is quite evident that the French-Canadian population of the seventeenth century was extraordinarily fertile. None of these measures, however, takes any account of variations in marital status, and marriage, after all, usually precedes the bearing of children. A final measure, the indirectly standardized marital fertility rate, was, therefore, computed. Married females were tabulated by quinquennial age groups, from fifteen to forty-nine, for the censuses of 1666, 1667, and 1681. These tabulations were also checked by comparing them with those given in the census of 1870-71. Age-specific fertility rates for married women, fifteen to forty-nine, in Sweden, 1781-90, were used for the standardizing process.²⁰ The resulting standardized married fertility rates in New France, 1666, 1667, and 1681, were 299 legitimate births per 1,000 married women in 1666, comparable rates for 1667 and 1681 being 274 and 294, respectively.

It is apparent, first, that the differential between these rates is small, and this suggests that the reproductive performance of married females was probably relatively constant during this period. However, when we refer back to the total fertility rates we find a much wider differential, with the rate in 1681 appreciably lower than the rate for 1666. What actually happened is not that the fertility declined but that the per cent married among females fifteen to forty-nine declined sharply from 88.6 per cent in 1666 to 76.6 per cent in 1681. At the same time, from 1666 to 1681, there was an increase in the proportion of married women who were in the later and less fertile part of the child-bearing period; for, whereas in 1666 and 1667 about 12 per cent of married women fifteen to forty-nine were concentrated in the ages forty to forty-nine, in 1681 the proportion was no less than 23.7 per cent. Furthermore, we know from the records that illegitimacy for the period was practically nil. Therefore,

²⁰ The number of married females aged fifteen to forty-nine for 1780 and 1790 was derived from tables in G. Sundbärg's *Bevölkerungsstatistik Schwedens* (Stockholm, 1923). Applying the number of legitimate births, 1781-90, to this total gave a married fertility rate of 236. Specific rates for quinquennial groupings of ages twenty to forty-nine were obtained from *Statistisk Årsbok för Sverige, 1934*, except for ages fifteen to nineteen, where we assumed a rate of 550. This assumed rate was not as high as that for Sweden at later periods but is higher than that observed in some other countries. If this assumed rate is too high, our standardized rate is too low and vice versa.

the decline in the percentage of those females fifteen to forty-nine who were married and who were really the only reproducers, as well as the aging of the reproductive group as a whole, must show up in a decline in the total fertility rate.

In the second place, when we compare the marital fertility rates obtained for New France in the years 1666, 1667, and 1681 with those for other countries, it is apparent that the rate for New France is quite normal. During the second part of the nineteenth century the married fertility rates for England and Wales fluctuated between 280 and 290,²¹ and for Sweden they fluctuated around 250 (it was 236 in 1781-90) in the latter half of the eighteenth century.²² Those for New France, while somewhat higher (274-99), were probably representative of the same statistical universe. This evidence, limited though it is, suggests strongly that the reproductive performance of those females who did reproduce was no greater in New France than in western Europe and probably no greater than in their country of origin, France. There is nothing mystically amazing about the high crude birth rates, the high fertility ratios, and high total fertility rates which we found for New France. What they meant, actually, is that those females who were able to reproduce married and began reproducing early in the child-bearing period.

The immediate causes of the observed high fertility, then, were unquestionably demographic. The number of marriageable women was but a fraction of the number of marriageable men, and, needless to say, the major part of this fraction did not remain unmarried long. The sex ratio (males per 100 females) of the single population over fifteen years of age was no less than 1,147 in 1666, 958 in 1667, and 343 in 1681, while the sex ratio for the same ages, irrespective of marital status, declined from 236 to 210 to 152 for the same period. The decline in both series reflects the importation of marriageable women, about 50 per cent of the 2,542 immigrants arriving between 1666 and 1680 being mostly young and marriageable adult women.²³

²¹ R. R. Kuczynski, *Measurement of Population Growth* (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, Ltd., 1935), p. 95.

²² In *Statistisk Årsbok för Sverige, 1934* (p. 44) we find the rates for ages fifteen to forty-five. This, of course, inflates the rates.

²³ Abbé Invanhoe Caron, "Origines démographiques des canadiens français," *Bulletin des recherches historiques* (Quebec), June, 1935, pp. 368-69.

The main demographic features are shown in Table 1. But these demographic factors—a favorable sex ratio and a high proportion married—are merely surface causes, for they, in turn, are the result of and reflect certain social, economic, and political conditions in New France. Analysis of these more fundamental causes is not within the scope of the present paper. Their nature may, however, be suggested briefly.

In the first place, the French Canadians came into a new physical and economic environment and therefore had to evolve social customs and institutions which, although strongly inspired from the Old World, had to be adapted to this new environment. The *habitant* felt that many children would add to his economic and strategic strength. It was still the time when children were economic assets; in New France they were also potential defenders against the Indians and the English colonists who were growing in strength and threatened to absorb New France.²⁴

In addition, the seigneurs were interested in having larger families settle on their land.²⁵ The church, both because of tradition and interest, sang the praise of large families—and sang it quite energetically. "To the inhabitant the church was everything. . . . New France was born and nurtured in an atmosphere of religious devotion."²⁶ The French government of Louis XIV, and especially of Colbert, was very much interested in developing the colony and

²⁴ "The old social structure, its sanctions and mores, was based on an independent, self-sufficient farming economy. . . . This self-sufficient economy was made possible by a family system which provided adequate *mains d'œuvres* to feed and clothe the *habitants* without the use of farm machinery. Such tools and simple equipment as were necessary were made locally. This economy and family system were structurally dependent upon a continual supply of new land upon which surplus children could be established. New France provided these conditions for over two centuries (Horace Miner, "Changes in Rural French-Canadian Culture," *American Journal of Sociology*, November, 1938, pp. 366-67 and 370).

²⁵ "The *seigneur* could not speculate in land; the custom of fixed rents forced him to grant all land at the same price. These conditions helped established families to settle their children on subsequent lands. The *seigneur* himself was impelled by his own interests to favor their expansion. . . . The more thickly populated the *seigneurie* was, the more numerous were the transfers of property and the greater the *seigneur's* income" (Sulte, *op. cit.*, II, 97).

²⁶ W. B. Munro, *Crusaders of New France* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1918), p. 225.



TABLE 1
AGE STRUCTURE BY MARITAL STATUS OF THE FEMALE POPULATION OF REPRODUCTIVE AGES
NEW FRANCE, 1666, 1667, AND 1681*

Ages	1666					1667					1681				PER CENT MARRIED TO TOTAL		
	Married	Single and Wid-owed	Nuns	Total	Married	Single and Wid-owed	Nuns	Total	Married	Single and Wid-owed	Nuns	Total	1666	1667	1681		
15-19.....	46	19	65	62	37	5	104	116	254	6	378†	70.8	59.6	39.7		
20-24.....	131	14	5	150	138	11	7	150	190	44	13	247	87.3	88.5	76.9		
25-29.....	96	4	1	101	125	8	3	136	242	12	10	264	95.0	91.9	91.7		
30-34.....	98	3	1	102	116	1	1	118	289	10	6	306†	96.1	98.3	94.8		
35-39.....	38	4	1	43	54	3	8	65	108	7	12	187	88.4	83.1	89.8		
40-44.....	32	2	1	35	44	3	1	48	212	8	7	227	91.4	91.7	93.4		
45-49.....	24	3	2	29	26	7	5	38	103	8	4	117§	82.8	68.4	89.6		
Total (15-49)	465	49	11	525	565	70	30	665	1,320	343	58	1,726	88.6	85.0	76.7		

* Source: Our tabulation of data presented in B. Sulte, *Histoire des canadiens française*, IV (Montreal, 1882-84), 52-78; V, 53-88.

† Including 2 *sauvages* (presumably converts), not otherwise classified.

‡ Including 1 not classified by marital status.

§ Including 2 not classified by marital status.

having its population increase.²⁷ This resulted in increased emigration to New France under the supervision of state or private agencies. Further, edicts were passed to encourage large families and early marriages. All these factors led to early marriages and increased marriage rates and thus paved the way for higher reproductive performance. In France similar population policies were adopted, but France was too big a laboratory for mercantilist demographic experiments. Control was much more possible in New France.

In conclusion, by obtaining various reproduction indices we have shown statistically that the high fertility in New France in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries is not a myth. We have further shown that this situation is largely a reflection of the great proportion of marriageable women who were married, and that actually marital fertility rates for New France, when corrected for the age distribution, were not much higher than marital fertility rates for other countries. We suggested that the fundamental causes of this phenomenon were to be found in the forces making for a greater number of young marriages and for larger and more stable families and in the fact that primary and co-operative socioeconomic relations were much stronger than the forces which might have tended to disrupt the institutions of marriage and the family and thus have led to low fertility.

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²⁷ In his instruction to M. de Bouteroue, going as *intendant* to New France (replacing Talon for the years 1668-70, when Talon returned to France to report to Colbert), Colbert said: "The constant aim of the *intendant's* policy must be to increase the population of the colony; he must therefore devote his whole attention to the discovery of all possible means to protect the *habitants*, to have them marry and multiply, and to attract new colonists" (Pierre Clément, *Lettres, instructions et mémoires de Colbert*, II [Paris: Imprimerie Impériale, 1865], 402; instructions dated April 5, 1668). These recommendations to increase by all means the population of New France and especially to encourage early marriages and large families were repeated by Colbert in a letter to *Intendant* Talon in 1671, his instructions to Talon in 1672, in a letter to Governor Frontenac in 1673, in a letter to *Intendant* Duchesneau in 1676 and in 1678, and to Governor Frontenac in 1679 (*ibid.*, pp. 513, 540-41, 559-60, 595, 606, 635). However, Colbert did not limit himself to giving recommendation. He adopted or had his *intendant* and governor in New France adopt positive and negative measures to increase its population, the number of marriages, and the size of families. This is exemplified by the Edict of 1666, as applicable to New France in 1669.

INTERMARRIAGE IN LOS ANGELES, 1924-33

CONSTANTINE PANUNZIO

ABSTRACT

Los Angeles in recent decades has had a large infiltration of various ethnic elements and a considerable amount of intermarriage. This study examines the intermarriages of the principal ethnic minorities, namely, the Mexicans, Japanese, Filipinos, Chinese, American Indians, and Negroes, for the decade 1924-33. The Mexicans, Filipinos, and American Indians showed a high rate of intermarriage; the Japanese, Chinese, and Negroes a low rate. The study seems to indicate that Los Angeles during the period in question had a higher rate of interracial marriage than comparable areas. This seems to be due to the presence in the community of a relatively high proportion of Mexicans, Filipinos, and American Indians, who were permitted by law to intermarry with whites. The study also shows that for the most part the sex ratio was responsible for the rate of intermarriage and the culture background determined the sources from which the mates were derived.

Los Angeles County has in recent decades become the meeting ground of considerable bodies of persons of different races and cultures. The county's total population of 2,208,492 in 1930 (the census year most significant for this study) consisted of 1,949,882, or 882 per 1,000, whites; 212,185, or 97 per 1,000, yellow-browns; and 46,425, or 21 per 1,000, Negroes. The whites included, in their order of magnitude, native-born Americans, British and Canadians, Germans, Scandinavians, Russians, Italians, Poles, French, Austrians and Hungarians, and small numbers of other nationalities. The yellow-browns comprised the Mexicans (mostly mestizos), Japanese, Filipinos, Chinese, and American Indians. The Negroes were nearly all citizens of the United States.

It is generally held that mere proximity of racial and cultural elements, such as prevails in Los Angeles County, produces intermarriage. Our hypothesis is, first, that sex distribution is a primary factor in producing or preventing intermarriage; that is, whenever a people in proximity to other peoples has an unbalanced sex ratio, they will tend to intermarry; whereas, if they have a relatively well-balanced distribution of the sexes, they will tend to marry within their own people. Second, our hypothesis is that whenever an unbalanced sex ratio does force a people to seek mates outside their own number, culture in the main determines the selection. Other

factors may affect these general tendencies: the size of the ethnic minority, the rigidity or laxity of the mores, the intensity of religious cohesion, patriotism, or other cultural traits. But in all cases the sex ratio and culture seem to remain the basic factors.

This article presents findings with respect to one part of our study, namely, the intramarriages and intermarriages of the various ethnic minorities. These include the Mexicans, Japanese, Filipinos, Chinese, American Indians, and the Negroes. Later a report will be made on the internationality marriages of the whites; and still later an account will be given of a sampling investigation of the success or failure of both the interracial and the internationality marriages.

The statistical data used are derived from marriage licenses. The territory considered is Los Angeles County, which for the sake of brevity we shall call "Los Angeles." The period covered (the decade January, 1924—December, 1933) was a time when total migration into the region was at its height, presumably bringing about intense contacts between the various ethnic elements. It was the period when immigration from abroad was reduced by the Immigration Act of 1924, thus cutting down the difference in the sex ratio and reducing the probability of intermarriage. Also, until 1933, the Filipinos were still permitted by California law to intermarry with whites, thus increasing the probability of interracial marriage.

There was a total of 170,636 marriages contracted in Los Angeles during the period 1924-33. Most of these—165,984, or 973 per 1,000—were clearly intraracial marriages, that is, marriages between whites and whites, yellow-browns and yellow-browns, Negroes and Negroes. The balance, 4,652, or 27 per 1,000, appear in the license records as interracial marriages, that is, marriages between persons belonging to different major races. We shall consider first the yellow-browns and then the Negroes.

The position of the Mexicans in Los Angeles is one which would lead to the expectation of a high rate of intermarriage on their part. First, they constitute the largest ethnic minority in the county and therefore have a larger number of contacts with other peoples. In 1930 they numbered 167,024, contributing 76 per 1,000 to the population of the county, whereas all other racial minorities numbered only 91,586, or 42 per 1,000, of the total population. Second, the

Mexicans are culturally indigenous and are deeply rooted in the economic and other aspects of community life. Third, they are not prohibited by law (as are the Japanese, the Chinese, the Negroes, and, since 1933, the Filipinos) from marrying whites; in fact, classed as whites in the United States censuses of 1910 and 1920, they could pass as whites in procuring marriage licenses. Fourth, many Mexicans are sufficiently white in appearance to pass for whites. All these factors would tend to produce a large amount of Mexican intermarriage, particularly with whites, and the records seem to indicate that to be the fact.

There were factors which, on the other hand, tended to prevent their intermarriage. First, the Mexicans in Los Angeles have a fairly equal distribution of the sexes. In 1930 they had only 114 males for every 100 females fifteen to forty-four years of age, a very low disparity for a minority people, so that there was no necessity for either males or females to seek mates outside their own people. Second, the majority of Mexicans, being mestizos (a fusion of American Indian and white blood), are deeply pigmented and are generally treated as non-whites in mating; our investigation confirms the findings of Gamio, Bogardus, and Taylor that the mores are quite rigid in forbidding the marriage of Mexicans, particularly of pronouncedly brown mestizos, with whites, especially of "Old American" stock. Third, the Mexicans are culturally highly cohesive, a cohesion which is accentuated by proximity to their mother-country. Fourth, in part for these reasons, their own mores discourage, if they do not forbid, marriage outside their own people.

The marriage licenses indicate that there was a total of 11,016 marriages with one or both mates being Mexicans. Of these marriages, 6,517, or 592 per 1,000, were clearly intramarriages, that is, marriages in which both mates were Mexicans. Those appearing in the license records as intermarriages numbered 4,499, or 408 per 1,000. These included 3,901, or 354 per 1,000, marriages with native-born whites; 437, or 40 per 1,000, with foreign-born whites; 115, or 10 per 1,000, with Central and South Americans; and 46, or 4 per 1,000, with Filipinos, American Indians, Asiatics, and one Negro.

The 3,901 marriages mentioned above as having taken place between Mexicans and native-born whites did not all actually involve

persons of the white race. Many Mexicans, legally permitted to do so, evidently described themselves as whites in applying for licenses, whereas in reality they were persons born in the United States of Mexican parentage. An examination of one-tenth of the marriages so designated, with particular reference to the birthplace and names of the mates' parents, showed that about 67 per cent of those marriages classified as being between Mexicans and native-born whites were really between Mexicans and native-born persons of Mexican extraction. Correcting the previous figures by this amount, the total number of Mexican intramarriages becomes 9,131, and the number of marriages between Mexicans and native-born whites decreases to 1,287; that is, 830 per 1,000 Mexican marriages were intramarriages and 116 per 1,000 were marriages between Mexicans and native-born whites. The remaining 54 per 1,000 remain unchanged by the correction.

The Japanese numbered 35,390 and made up 16 per 1,000 of the total population in 1930. These people, because of an acute sex disparity, have faced a difficult situation with respect to marriage throughout their residence in the United States. In 1920 there were in Los Angeles 166 Japanese males to every 100 females ages fifteen to forty-four, and in 1930 there were 125 males to every 100 females. The sex ratio was more extreme throughout California where there were 138 males to 100 females in 1930, and even more so in the entire United States, where the ratio was 143 Japanese males to 100 females. At least one-fifth of marriageable Japanese males, therefore, wishing to marry, would have found it impossible to secure Japanese mates in this country.

In the early years of the present century the "picture bride" system partly relieved the situation. Also, the enactment of the immigration law of 1924 reduced the number of Japanese males coming to Los Angeles (2,489 entered Los Angeles City in 1920-24 and 391 in 1925-30); proportionately more females, who were permitted to join relatives already domiciled here, entered; and relatively more males, including many students, returned to Japan. All these factors tended to level out the disparity of the sexes. Moreover, as time passed, the growth of a generation of American-born children of Japanese parentage further reduced the disparity. Still the Japa-

nese sex unbalance continued throughout the period covered by our study, as is seen in the ratio of 125 males for every 100 females already cited.

It would be expected, therefore, that the ratio of Japanese marrying persons of other ethnic origins would be high. As a matter of fact, the Japanese in Los Angeles scarcely intermarried at all. The reasons for this are clear. First, the American mores are fairly rigid in forbidding the marriage of Japanese with whites of any nationality. Second, the California law specifically prohibits their marrying whites. Third, the Japanese are highly loyal to the mother-country and possess a high degree of cultural cohesion, so that, even though by California law they could have married Mexicans, American Indians, or Negroes, still they would not do so.

The total number of Japanese who married in Los Angeles during the period under review was 1,163. Of these, 1,136, or 977 out of every 1,000, were among their own people. Those who intermarried numbered 27, or 23 per 1,000. Of these intermarriages, 14 were between Japanese and Chinese, who are so closely related ethnically that they scarcely constitute intermarriage in the strict sense. In 4 cases Japanese married Negroes and, in 2, Filipinos. In 7 cases they are reported to have married white Americans. For these we have no explanation, save to assume that in some remote part of the county a clerk may not have been informed of the law and granted the license. Or it may be that those reported as "white Americans" were persons of foreign extraction whom the clerk regarded as outside the proscription.

The majority, 17 out of 27, of the intermarriages were, as we would expect from the sex distribution, between Japanese males and non-Japanese females. Four of these were between Japanese males and Negro females. Since the Negroes had a surplus of females and the law permits marriage between these two races, this is readily understood. Seven Japanese males married Chinese females; this is particularly interesting, since the Chinese themselves had a shortage of females. Six Japanese males married "white American" females. These were probably American-born white females of foreign extraction, although we have occasionally encountered a "liberated" American woman of "old stock" or of English extraction married to

a Japanese. In the remaining 10 cases Japanese females married non-Japanese males: 7 marrying Chinese, 2 Filipinos, and 1 an American native-born white. These cases of Japanese females marrying non-Japanese males are especially striking, in view of the great scarcity of females among the Japanese, indicating that other factors were at work in leading these Japanese females to marry outside their own people.

The Filipinos, on the other hand, had a considerable proportion of intermarriages, especially with whites. The Filipinos in Los Angeles numbered 4,591, or 2 per 1,000, of the total population in 1930. Several factors would have worked against their intermarrying. First, the American mores are nearly as rigid in their case as they are in that of other non-whites. The marriage of a white woman, even though of the servant class, to a Filipino is strongly disapproved by Americans in the region. Second, the Filipinos themselves disapprove intermarriage with American girls. Most Filipinos are "birds of passage" in the truest sense, that is, they come to the mainland definitely planning to return to the Philippines as soon as they have accumulated a sum of money or have satisfied their desire for adventure. For this reason, to marry an American woman is to acquire an impediment, since American-Filipino marriages are subjected to social punishment in the Philippines even as they are in the United States. Third, most Filipinos are deeply pigmented and are ordinarily treated as non-whites in mating.

Despite these deterrents, however, the Filipinos furnished a larger proportion of strictly interracial marriages than any other racial minority: they had a rate of 701 per 1,000 intermarriages and 299 intramarriages. More significant still, about half of these intermarriages were with native-born whites, most of whom were taxi-dance-hall girls, while 11 marriages were with white persons of foreign birth. The marriages with non-whites included 37 unions with Negroes, nearly all of whom were born in the United States, 26 with Mexican women, 8 with American Indians, 2 with Japanese, and 1 with a Chinese. All but one of the Filipinos who intermarried were males; the one exception consisted of the marriage of a Filipino woman to a German.

This very high rate of strictly interracial marriages on the part

of the Filipinos was due, first and foremost, to their very high sex disparity. The Filipinos consisted almost wholly of young adult males. In 1920 there were in Los Angeles 242 Filipino males and only 12 females ages fifteen to forty-four, and in 1930 there were 4,107 males and 170 females. Second, their intermarriage, especially with whites, was fostered by the fact that the Filipinos are "nationals" of the United States. This probably had a considerable influence in leading the young women with whom they associated to regard them as Americans and to marry them as such. Third, up to 1933 the California law did not specifically prohibit the marriage of Filipinos with whites. Fourth, there chanced to be in Los Angeles a superabundant supply of marriageable girls available to the Filipinos. These consisted mainly of poor rural girls from the Middle West, part of the army of drifting young people characteristic of that time who had been attracted to Los Angeles by the glamour of Hollywood and who had become "stars," not in the cinema studios, but in the taxi-dance halls of the community. These young women, separated from their families and therefore beyond the enforcement reach of the mores, were attracted to the Filipino boys, perhaps because they were lonely and in need of companionship and because the Filipinos, themselves mere boys away from home and craving for fellowship, gave them a ready, simple, direct response. More tangible still, these girls, in that period of widespread unemployment, were much in need of financial support and gladly accepted it from the Filipinos, who in fact gave it to them willingly, often joyously, sometimes with a lavish hand. Cases have been known of Filipino boys spending as much as three-fourths of their earnings on their taxi-dance-hall companions for clothing, food, shelter, and other needs.

The rate of Filipino-white marriages continued to be high up to 1933. In that year California passed a law prohibiting such marriages. Although the Filipinos were "nationals" of the United States, people were so opposed to their marrying white girls that intensive agitation developed. By 1932 there was court action, based on the contention that the Filipinos were Mongolians and their marriage to whites was therefore proscribed. But in January, 1933, the California District Court of Appeals, in ordering the county of Los

Angeles to grant a marriage license to a Filipino and a white woman, handed down the decision that Filipinos were not Mongolians and that therefore the county had no legal right to deny a license. The court argued that in 1880, when the California law was passed prohibiting the marriage of whites and "Mongolians," the legislature had followed Blumenbach's classification of races, in vogue at the time, which classified the Chinese, the Tartar, and possibly the Japanese as Mongolians, but assigned the Filipinos to the "brown" race. Considerable controversy followed this decision; other cases came before the courts, one court upholding one side and another the other. Finally, on April 20, 1933, the California legislature solved the problem by passing a law which specifically proscribed the marriage of Filipinos with whites.

What has occurred since then falls outside the scope of this study. Legal marriages of Filipinos and whites have, of course, ceased to be contracted in the state. While decreased immigration and increased repatriation have partly reduced their sex disparity, Filipinos still occasionally marry whites. They go to Oregon, New Mexico, Utah, and Idaho, which do not have laws proscribing such marriages. They prefer New Mexico because that state does not even have a law proscribing Mongolian-white marriages, and because it is easily accessible to persons residing in Los Angeles.

The Chinese, like the Japanese, had a low rate of intermarriage. The Chinese in Los Angeles in 1930 numbered 3,572 and amounted to about 2 per 1,000 in the total population. Their case is similar to that of the Japanese with respect to sex ratio, there having been 836 males and 182 females in 1920 and 1,487 males and 394 females in 1930 aged fifteen to forty-four. The Chinese, a people of seasoned culture and much older as residents of the Los Angeles region, seem to have achieved a marked degree of adjustment in the matter of sex life, perhaps through extralegal relationships, prostitution, or other means. In any event, the number of marriages contracted by Chinese is small. Although there were nearly 2,000 Chinese ages fifteen to forty-four in Los Angeles in 1930, they contracted only 97 marriages during the entire decade under review. It is possible that many of them may have mated with whites and have gone to other states to legalize their unions; but general knowledge leads us to con-

clude that very few did so. Probably a greater proportion of Chinese men live alone or in twos or threes than men of any other race or nationality in the community.

Of the 97 marriages contracted by Chinese, 74 were marriages between Chinese and 23 were intermarriages. All the intermarriages but one were between Chinese males and non-Chinese females: 14 Chinese married Japanese, 5 Negroes, one a "native-born white," and 2 other yellow-browns. The one Chinese female married a Filipino. Here again we have no explanation for the native-born white. The rates for the Chinese were 763 per 1,000 intramarriages and 237 per 1,000 intermarriages.

The case of the American Indians has its own exceptional features. First, the American Indians constitute one of the smallest of the minority peoples in Los Angeles. In 1930 they numbered 997 and made up but 1 per 1,000 of the total population, as contrasted with 3 per 1,000 in California and in the nation. This small number is due to that fact that the Indians, being mainly a rural people, reside mostly outside Los Angeles County, which is largely urban. Second, the Indians, like the Negroes and unlike other minority peoples, have a surplus of females rather than males: in 1930 there were 256 males and 350 females in Los Angeles fifteen to forty-four years of age. Third, they are one of the two peoples, the other being the Mexicans, who are not prohibited by law from marrying whites. Fourth, the mores are only mildly against the marriage of Indians and whites. Fifth, Indians who possess even little means are frequently sought after by other than their own people. The Indians therefore would be expected to have and actually do have a relatively high rate of intermarriage. During 1924-33 there were in Los Angeles a total of 102 marriages involving Indians; of these 44 were between Indians and 58 were intermarriages. Of the intermarriages, 22 were with American whites, 16 with Mexicans, 12 with foreign-born whites, and 8 with Filipinos. The foreign-born whites consisted of four Canadians, two Germans, and one each from Great Britain, Norway, Italy, Portugal, Switzerland, and one was a "white" born in the Philippines. In 42 of the 58 intermarriages the Indians who married persons of other ethnic origin were females,

in 16 they were males. Their intramarriage rate was 431 per 1,000 and their intermarriage 569 per 1,000.

The Negroes numbered 46,425 in 1930 and constituted 21 per 1,000 of the total population. In their case every factor worked against intermarriage: the mores are more firmly against their marrying whites than against any other racial minority; the law proscribing their marriage with whites is the oldest (enacted in 1850); while their class and occupational status, amounting almost to a caste, subjects them to avoidance even by other minority peoples who have a marked shortage of females.

Accordingly there was a very small number of intermarriages involving Negroes. Of the total of 4,885 marriages by Negroes in Los Angeles during the period in question, nearly all (4,830, or 989 per 1,000) were unions within their own people. The balance, 55, or 11 per 1,000, were interracial marriages. Fifty-one of these were marriages between Negro females and males of other races. This was due to the pronounced surplus of Negro females, there having been only 84 males to 100 females fifteen to forty-four years of age in Los Angeles. In 37 cases Negro females married Filipinos, in 5 Chinese, in 4 Japanese, and in 4 others yellow-browns, whose specific origin we do not know, and in 1 case the mate was a Mexican. In the 4 cases in which Negro men intermarried, three married persons were recorded as native-born whites, and in the other the female was designated as a white born in the British West Indies. The three Negro males marrying the women designated as native-born whites were not themselves natives of the United States; one was born in the British West Indies, one in South America, and one in Russia. This may explain how they got by the license clerks.

Reviewing the foregoing data, five things stand out. First, the racial minorities of Los Angeles married to a very high degree within their own bounds. Intraracial marriages amounted to 988 per 1,000 and the interracial to 12 per 1,000 (including the Mexican correction mentioned above).

Second, Los Angeles probably has a higher rate of strictly interracial marriages than occurs elsewhere. Savorgnan reports for Boston in 1900 an interracial rate of 4.3 per 1,000 in 48,808 marriages.¹

¹ F. Savorgnan, *Scelta matrimoniale* ("Mate Selection") (Ferrara, 1924).

De Porte in a study of 388,970 marriages in New York State, exclusive of New York City, found a rate of a little less than 1 per 1,000. Savorgnan found for Buenos Aires in 1887 a rate of 4.1 per 1,000; and the same investigator found for the Province of Tucumán, Argentina, in 1903-7 a rate of 3.3. These data, however, contain such wide variations in time, place, types of communities represented, and definitions of what constitutes intraracial and interracial marriage that it is not scientifically safe to hazard a statistical comparison. The rate of 12 per 1,000 for Los Angeles, however, is very nearly correct.

Third, the factors which produced this higher rate of interracial marriage in Los Angeles include the following: Los Angeles had a large proportion (8 per cent) of the total population made up of Mexicans, Filipinos, and American Indians, all of whom were permitted by law and, to a lesser extent, by the mores to intermarry with whites. In addition, in the cases of the Mexicans and the Filipinos there were other conditions which fostered interracial marriage. Further, the higher rate of interracial marriage in Los Angeles has probably been due in part to the newness of the sociocultural matrix.

Fourth, the distribution of the sexes had a marked influence on the degree to which the peoples under review intermarried. This supports the first part of our hypothesis. The Mexicans and the Negroes, who had a relatively equal distribution of the sexes, had a relatively low rate of intermarriage; the American Indians, who had a moderate sex disparity, and the Filipinos and Chinese, who had a marked disparity, had a high rate of intermarriage; while the Japanese, though having a pronounced disparity, had a low rate of intermarriage, owing to the intervening factor of their ethnic cohesion.

Fifth, culture was a powerful factor in marital selection, again confirming our hypothesis. For example, over half of the Japanese who married non-Japanese formed unions with Chinese, and over half of the Chinese who married non-Chinese took their mates from the Japanese. The most striking illustration of this factor is found in the case of the Mexicans. By far the larger proportion of the Mexicans who married non-Mexicans took mates from people of Latin culture. They married 115 persons of Central and South

American birth, 96 Italians, 92 Spaniards, 26 Filipinos, and only 16 American Indians and 3 "other yellow-browns." Furthermore, as indicated above, in almost three-fourths of the marriages between Mexicans and "native-born whites," the so-called whites were of Mexican extraction and therefore possessed a background of Latin culture. In short, most Mexicans, whether marrying with their own or other people, married within their own culture.

This, of course, is not surprising to sociologists; yet it impressively illustrates the powerful influence of culture in mate-choosing. Doubly impressive is the fact that though the culture-carriers came from such widely different points as Italy, Spain, Mexico, Central and South America, and the Philippines and therefore represented varying racial or subcultural elements, still the attractive power of culture was so great as to have overcome the barriers of race, space, and national and subcultural differences and to have drawn the people into that most intimate of social interaction, the marital union. Nor does this phenomenon occur alone in the relatively small number of cases involved in this part of our study; as our next study will show, it recurs again and again in the marriages of white persons belonging to different nationalities.

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LOS ANGELES

USE OF NUPTIAL REPRODUCTION RATES IN POPULATION ANALYSIS

BERNARD D. KARPINOS

ABSTRACT

Nuptial reproduction rates introduced by Kuczynski for measuring potential reproductivity have been extensively utilized by Charles in her studies of the fertility of the population of Scotland and Canada. As computed by these authors, the "nuptial" reproduction rates differ numerically from the well-known "ordinary" reproduction rates. The authors claim, therefore, that the nuptial reproduction rates take into account the additional factor of nuptiality, which is not taken care of by the ordinary reproduction rates. As shown in this paper, however, the numerical differences between the rates seem to be due to a misstep in the procedure of computing the nuptial rates. The latter rates should give the same results as the ordinary rates. Consequently, the very contention about the additional factor of nuptiality has, apparently, no basis.

Like the well-known gross and net reproduction rates, the "nuptial" gross and net reproduction rates were also introduced by Kuczynski¹ and have been used extensively by Enid Charles² in her studies of the fertility of the population of Scotland and Canada. According to a general statement by Kuczynski, the nuptial reproduction rates differ from the "ordinary" reproduction rates in that the former rates take into account nuptiality in addition to fertility.³ Charles is more specific, as she defines the nuptial gross reproduction rate as "the number of girls who would be born on the average to each woman passing through the childbearing period if the specific fertility rates of single and married women and the marriage rate at each age for a given year were all to remain constant."⁴

Taking Denmark for illustration, Kuczynski has shown that, while the ordinary gross reproduction rate of Denmark computed without regard to specific nuptiality of 1926-30 was 1,165 (per 1,000 women), the gross re-

¹ Robert R. Kuczynski, *The Measurement of Population Growth* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1936). To distinguish between them, these rates will be referred to in this paper as "ordinary" and "nuptial" rates, respectively.

² "Differential Fertility in Scotland, 1911-1931," *Transactions of the Royal Society of Edinburgh*, Vol. LIX, Part III (1938-39); "The Nuptiality Problem with Special Reference to Canadian Marriage Statistics," *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*, Vol. VII, No. 3 (1941). Charles distinguishes nuptial gross and net reproduction rates and nuptial gross and net reproduction rates of married women.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 158.

⁴ *Transactions of the Royal Society of Edinburgh*, p. 681.

production rate computed on the basis of fertility and nuptiality of 1926-30 was 1,175.⁵ Following Kuczynski, Charles has shown analogous differences in her studies.⁶

As a matter of fact, however, no additional factors—above those assumed in computing the ordinary reproduction rates—are taken into account in deriving the nuptial reproduction rates, and the numerical differences between the nuptial and the ordinary gross reproduction rates

TABLE 1*
FERTILITY RATES BY LEGITIMACY IN DENMARK, 1926-30

AGE GROUPS	FEMALE POPULATION (F_t)	YEARLY FEMALE BIRTHS (b_t)			FERTILITY RATES		
		Illegitimate (sb_t)	Legitimate (mb_t)	Total (b_t)	Illegitimate (sb_t/F_t)	Legitimate (mb_t/F_t)	Total (b_t/F_t)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
15-19...	167,000	1,018	811	1,829	6.1	4.9	11.0
20-24...	158,400	1,538	6,746	8,284	9.7	42.6	52.3
25-29...	148,200	565	9,130	9,695	3.8	61.6	65.4
30-34...	135,500	259	6,927	7,186	1.9	51.1	53.0
35-39...	120,200	135	4,110	4,245	1.1	34.2	35.3
40-44...	111,000	45	1,576	1,621	0.4	14.2	14.6
45-49...	99,000	4	135	139	0.0	1.4	1.4
Total	939,300	3,564	29,435	32,999	$23.0 \times 5 = 115.0$	$210.0 \times 5 = 1,050.0$	$233.0 \times 5 = 1,165.0$

* Taken from Robert R. Kuczynski, *The Measurement of Population Growth* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1936), p. 157, Table 45.

found by Kuczynski and Charles are merely due to a misstep in the procedure of computing nuptial reproduction rates. To follow through the calculations, Kuczynski's original data are reproduced in Tables 1 and 2.

Little needs to be said about the ordinary gross reproduction rate (1,165) which is given in column 7, Table 1. It represents the summation of the age-specific fertility rates obtained by relating the female births of mothers of certain ages to the general⁷ female population of these ages.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 158.

⁶ Compare cols. 1 and 2 of Table 9 in the Scotland study and cols. 1 and 3 of Table 6 in the Canadian study.

⁷ The term "general" refers to the total female population, irrespective of marital status (single, married, widowed, and divorced).

Should b_t designate female births (legitimate and illegitimate births combined) of mothers aged t , and F_t denote the general female population at age t , the age-specific fertility rates at age t would be b_t/F_t , and the gross reproduction rate would be $5\sum(b_t/F_t)$.⁸ This procedure is well established.

It is quite obvious that one would obtain an identical result by relating separately the illegitimate births (${}_sb_t$) and the legitimate births (${}_mb_t$) to

TABLE 2*
GROSS REPRODUCTION RATE OF MARRIED AND UNMARRIED
FEMALES IN DENMARK, 1926-30

AGE GROUPS	FEMALE POPULATION		FERTILITY RATES		YEARS LIVED BY 1,000 FEMALES		GIRLS BORNE BY 1,000 FEMALES		
	Single (${}_sF_t$)	Married, Widowed, and Divorced (${}_mF_t$)	Illegitimate (${}_sb_t/{}_sF_t$)	Legitimate (${}_mb_t/{}_mF_t$)	In Single State	After First Wedding	Illegitimate	Legitimate	Total
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7) = (3)(5)	(8) = (4)(6)	(9) = (7) + (8)
15-19.....	164,150	2,850	6.2	284.6	4,904	96	30.4	27.4	57.8
20-24.....	113,400	45,000	13.6	149.9	3,562	1,438	48.3	215.5	263.8
25-29.....	56,750	91,450	10.0	99.8	1,885	3,115	18.8	310.9	329.7
30-34.....	33,300	102,200	7.8	67.8	1,211	3,789	9.4	256.8	266.2
35-39.....	23,800	96,400	5.7	42.6	982	4,018	5.6	171.3	176.9
40-44.....	19,850	91,150	2.3	17.3	884	4,116	2.0	71.2	73.2
45-49.....	16,100	82,900	0.2	1.6	833	4,167	0.2	6.8	7.0
Total..	427,350	511,950	14,261	20,739	114.7	1,059.9	1,174.6

* Taken from Kuczynski, *The Measurement of Population Growth*, Table 46. The rates in col. 3 were obtained by relating the illegitimate births (col. 2, Table 1) to the single women (col. 1, this table), while the rates in col. 4 were obtained by relating the legitimate births (col. 3, Table 1) to the married, widowed, and divorced women (col. 2, this table).

the general female population (F_t). In other words, $5\sum({}_sb_t/F_t)$ plus $5\sum({}_mb_t/F_t)$ is equal to $5\sum(b_t/F_t)$, since ${}_sb_t/F_t$ plus ${}_mb_t/F_t$ is equal to b_t/F_t . These calculations are shown in columns 5 and 6, Table 1. (The meaning of these separate rates, columns 5 and 6, will be explained later.)

The computation of the nuptial gross reproduction rates consists first in relating the illegitimate births (${}_sb_t$) to the single women (${}_sF_t$) and the legitimate births (${}_mb_t$) to the married, widowed, and divorced women

⁸ Age t represents here five-year age intervals taken within the child-bearing period, usually from fifteen to forty-nine years of age.

(${}_mF_t$).⁹ The respective age-specific fertility rates, i.e., ${}_sb_t/{}_sF_t$ and ${}_mb_t/{}_mF_t$, are given in columns 3 and 4 in Table 2. The second step consists in multiplying these specific fertility rates (cols. 3 and 4) by the values in columns 5 and 6, which show the number of years lived by 1,000 females in single state (col. 5) and in married state (col. 6) within each 5-year age interval. It seems to follow that the product of the rates of column 3 by the number of years lived by 1,000 women in single state (col. 5) would indicate the number of girls that would be born to 1,000 women while single (col. 7), and the products of the rates in column 4 by the values in column 6 would indicate the number of girls that would be born to these 1,000 women while married (col. 8). The combined values of columns 7 and 8 would accordingly indicate the number of girls that would be born to 1,000 women while in single or married state. The rates assume no mortality. Kuczynski thus obtained for Denmark a nuptial reproduction rate of 1,175 (col. 9).

It should be rather easily recognized by now that the difference between the ordinary gross reproduction rate and the nuptial gross reproduction rate—1,165 against 1,175—has resulted from using two different nuptiality tables in the process of computation. As seen from Table 3, columns 4 and 5, out of 1,000 females in Denmark aged fifteen to nineteen, 983 were single and 17 were married; out of 1,000 women aged twenty to twenty-four, 716 were single and 284 were married; and so on for the other age groups. The age-specific fertility rates in columns 3 and 4, Table 2, which were used in computing the nuptial gross reproduction rates were based on this distribution of females by marital status as given in columns 4 and 5, Table 3. But this distribution by marital status implies that 1,000 women would live 4,915 ($= 983 \times 5$) years as single and 85 ($= 17 \times 5$) years as married within the fifteen to nineteen age interval, and 3,580 years as single and 1,420 years as married within the twenty to twenty-four age group (cols. 6 and 7, Table 3). The values for the other age groups are likewise given in columns 6 and 7. These values differ from the corresponding values given in columns 5 and 6, Table 2, which were apparently derived on the basis of yearly marriage statistics.

Evidently Kuczynski applied fertility rates (cols. 3 and 4, Table 2) based on a nuptiality table derived from a distribution by marital status (cols. 6 and 7, Table 3) to a nuptiality table derived on the basis of yearly marriage statistics (cols. 5 and 6, Table 2) and obtained, therefore, a

⁹ It seems hardly logical to have the widowed and divorced women included here with the married women. But this is a comparatively minor point.

higher rate.¹⁰ Had the age-specific fertility rates of columns 3 and 4, Table 2, been properly derived, that is to say, had the births (cols. 2 and 3, Table 1) been related to the years of life as shown in the nuptiality table of columns 5 and 6, Table 2, the nuptial gross reproduction rate would have been the same as the ordinary gross reproduction rate. In conse-

TABLE 3
COMPUTATION OF YEARS LIVED BY 1,000 FEMALES IN SINGLE AND
MARRIED STATE, IN DENMARK
(Based on Quinquennial Age Distribution)

AGE GROUPS	FEMALE POPULATION			NUMBER PER 1,000 FEMALES		YEARS LIVED BY 1,000 FEMALES	
	Total*	Single†	Married, Widowed, and Divorced‡	Single†	Married, Widowed, and Divorced‡	Single§	Married§
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6) = (4) × 5	(7) = (5) × 5
15-19....	167,000	164,150	2,850	983	17	4,915	85
20-24....	158,400	113,400	45,000	716	284	3,580	1,420
25-29....	148,200	56,750	91,450	383	617	1,915	3,085
30-34....	135,500	33,300	102,200	246	754	1,230	3,770
35-39....	120,200	23,800	96,400	198	802	990	4,010
40-44....	111,000	19,850	91,150	179	821	895	4,105
45-49....	99,000	16,100	82,900	163	837	815	4,185
Total	939,300	427,350	511,950	14,340	20,660

* Taken from Table 1, col. 1.

† Taken from Table 2, cols. 1 and 2, respectively.

‡ Obtained by relating cols. 2 and 3 to col. 1, respectively.

§ Obtained by multiplying by 5 the values in cols. 4 and 5.

quence, not only would column 9 of Table 2 give the same result as column 7 of Table 1, but also columns 7 and 8 of Table 2 would be the same as columns 5 and 6 of Table 1, respectively. The same holds true for the nuptial net reproduction rate used by Kuczynski;¹¹ it, too, would not differ numerically from the ordinary net reproduction rate.

Since there would be no numerical differences between the rates, the

¹⁰ It seems that in most cases the opposite would be true: nuptiality tables based on single years would give lower reproduction rates than nuptiality tables based on five-year age groups. This is generally borne out by the rates given by Charles, especially in the Canadian study.

¹¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 221.

very contention that the nuptial reproduction rates show something more than the ordinary reproduction rates has no basis. This also follows logically—without statistical proofs—from the assumptions underlying the computation of ordinary reproduction rates. The underlying assumption of “holding constant the age-specific fertility rates” already involves constancy of all the factors that are responsible for making these age-specific rates (b_t/F_t) what they are. To enumerate only a few factors, this assumption implies that the urban-rural distribution of the population and their differential fertility, the socioeconomic setup of the population and the corresponding differential fertility, the marital status (or nuptiality) of the population, etc., should all remain constant. (It might be recalled that Kuczynski and Charles claim for the nuptial reproduction rates a constancy of nuptiality which is not included, supposedly, in the ordinary rates.)

These computations, however, suggest a procedure which might be profitably utilized in studies of fertility. In analyzing reproductivity of a population, one might be interested to know how many of the daughters of the 1,000 women, as shown by the gross reproduction rate, are borne by these women while in single state and how many while they are married. To answer such an inquiry, let s_yt signify the number of years lived by these 1,000 women as single within the age interval t , and let m_yt denote the corresponding number of years lived by these women as married within this age interval. Obviously, the number of years lived as single by the women of the given population aged t would be equal to $s_yt \cdot F_t$, and number of years lived by them as married would be equal to $m_yt \cdot F_t$. Assigning the illegitimate births (s_b) to the number of years in single state ($s_yt \cdot F_t$) and the legitimate births (m_b) to the number of years in married state ($m_yt \cdot F_t$), one obtains specific fertility rates per year in single state ($s_b/s_yt \cdot F_t$) and specific fertility rates per year in married state ($m_b/m_yt \cdot F_t$), respectively. Evidently the total number of daughters that would be borne by 1,000 women passing through the child-bearing period would be equal to $5\sum(s_yt \cdot s_b/s_yt \cdot F_t)$, i.e., $5\sum(s_b/F_t)$, while in single state, and it would be equal to $5\sum(m_yt \cdot m_b/m_yt \cdot F_t)$, i.e., $5\sum(m_b/F_t)$, while in married state. Such an inquiry leads then to relating the illegitimate and legitimate births separately to the general female population, as it was done in computing columns 5 and 6, Table 1. Accordingly, 1,000 women of Denmark passing through the child-bearing period would give birth to 115 daughters while in single state (col. 5) and 1,050 while married (col. 6). (The sum of the two rates makes up the gross reproduction rate.) Apparently the answer sought by Kuczynski in Table 2 (cols. 7 and 8) is

really given by him in Table 1 (cols. 5 and 6), without resorting to a nuptiality table.

To obtain the nuptial gross reproduction rate of married women of Denmark, Kuczynski divides 1,059.9 (col. 8, Table 2) by 83.7, the latter being the per cent of married women at age forty-five to forty-nine (col. 5, Table 3). Assuming that 83.7 is the right denominator and that the meaning ascribed to this rate is also correct, the numerator should have been 1,050 as given in column 6, Table 1, instead of 1,059.9, as applied.¹² No further attempt is made at the present to evaluate the meaning of these nuptial rates of married women, since this would involve an analysis of the many other rates used in measuring fertility of married women.

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¹² For a discussion of the nuptial net reproduction of married women see K. T. Lim, "A Note on the Calculation of the Net Reproduction Rate for Married Women," *Eugenics Review*, Vol. XXXI (October, 1939).

"GALLOWS HUMOR"—A SOCIOLOGICAL PHENOMENON

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ABSTRACT

Humor is both a social product and an agency with social functions. It assumes different forms in various groups and within the same group according to the changes in situations. "Gallows humor" is a type of humor that arises in a type of precarious or dangerous situation. On the basis of experiences in Czechoslovakia following the advent of Hitler it may be stated that gallows humor is an index of strength or morale on the part of oppressed peoples. The positive effect of gallows humor is manifested in the strengthening of morale. Its negative effect is revealed in its influence upon the disintegration of those toward whom it is directed.

Humor, being both a social product and an agency with social functions which influences retroactively the group in which it originated, reveals certain characteristics which are common to all social phenomena. One unmistakable sign of its "socialness" is that it assumes different forms in various social groups and within the same group, according to different situations. A more careful analysis would disclose that there is possible a sociological classification of humor—that is, a typology of several groups or categories of humor traced back to their social origins. Such classification, however, is not of immediate concern in the present article. Suffice it to say that even the popular thinking distinguishes between, for instance, the jokes of priests, doctors, soldiers, farmers, forest guardians, etc.; that there are jokes typical of young people as distinguished from the older generation; that certain types of anecdotes are more prevalent among women, others among men; or that some groups are quite renowned for their inventiveness in the realm of jokes and anecdotes while others are comparatively barren in this respect. All of which confirms the statement that humor, if it is to be properly analyzed, must be studied in terms of its social origin as well as from the viewpoint of its social function.

One special type of humor is the so-called "gallows humor" which of late has become so typical in the nations which are oppressed by their invaders. The term itself reveals its origin and meaning. However, in this paper we use it in a more general sense as referring to humor which arises in connection with a precarious or dangerous situation. There is, however, one substantial difference between the gallows humor taken literally, when somebody expects a just punishment, and the gallows humor of those who, figuratively speaking, await their "gallows" as innocent vic-

tims of the aggression of the dictators; the first is an expression of cynicism, whereas the latter is the expression of hope and wishful thinking.

The present author had the "luck" of spending nine months in Czechoslovakia after that country was invaded by the Nazis. Thus, he had an opportunity to follow the development of the different phases of the general situation as well as to note the specific function performed in it by the element of humor.

Long before the actual invasion took place, and especially after the annexation of Austria, there was a whole crop of jokes and anecdotes—partly original and partly coming from the frontiers of Germany proper—the tenor of which was ridiculing the Nazi leaders and their regime. It was the humor-for-humor phase, a sort of lighthearted bravado and defiance, which can be explained by the fact that at that time Czechoslovakia still had pledges of assistance from France and Russia in case of an unprovoked aggression, and these gave a feeling of security to her citizens. But even then almost everybody felt the atmosphere of tension and uneasiness and realized that big events were in preparation. People tried not to see the bad omens, and many of them found in anecdotes an intellectual and emotional escape from the disturbing realities. It was symptomatic that the more ominous the news coming from invaded Austria, the more numerous and pointed were these anecdotes. They became a means of social control in that they bolstered the morale of the Czech people, and, although they were so often but the expression of wishful thinking, their importance as a compensation for fear could not be overestimated. It was a manifestation of morale evident especially at the moment of general mobilization—an action which was accepted by the overwhelming majority of the population, soldiers and civilians, with a feeling of relief after the long period of anxiety about the uncertain future. Up to this moment the jokes seemed to perform primarily the function of amusing the Czech public at the expense of Hitler and his associates. From then on, when the general mobilization made it quite clear that the danger was real, the type and content of anecdotes did not change; but it was apparent that the majority of them were invented, accepted, and spread with purposeful intention. The great importance of humor as a factor in social control was realized.¹

¹ Ridicule also has been used effectively as a social sanction among the primitives. The Eskimos, for instance, use ridicule against thievery. Instead of punishing the thief, they laugh whenever his name is mentioned, which, judging from the fact that stealing is almost unknown among the Eskimos, is probably a more effective means of social control than fining or imprisoning offenders.

In one of his recent broadcasts from London, President Beneš of Czechoslovakia reassured the Czech people that things are going better because the rest of the world is beginning to ridicule nazism and its leaders, an action which should be taken as a good sign by the oppressed and as the beginning of the end by the Nazis.

Before the Munich "agreement"—that is, before the Czechoslovakian army was demobilized—jokes and anecdotes were in vogue, and, although many of them were lascivious to the point where they cannot be reproduced here, they all were surprisingly witty. There was actually an epidemic of jokes about Hitler's "plate circus" because, so the story goes, even the heaviest tanks were protected only by a thin plate instead of by thick steel and, therefore, could have been easily shot through.

After Munich, when the Czech nation was crushed and bleeding, there was no place for humor, not even for the gallows-humor type. It was a short period characterized by the attitude of "let's stick together; everybody's sacred duty is to do his best so that the nation can survive." Yet, surprisingly soon, humor was heard again, this time mixed with biting irony which revealed the intensity of disillusionment and grief caused by the indecency and treachery of those few Czechs who, seizing the opportunity to satisfy their personal ambitions, were only too eager to cooperate with and accept orders from their German master. The invectives wrapped in jokes and anecdotes were directed against the actual or supposed Czech traitors more than against the Nazis themselves. Mr. Chamberlain and his like, of course, got their portion also. Dr. Emil Hácha, president of the so-called "Second Czechoslovak Republic," was called significantly "The First President of the Second Republic of the Third Reich." His prime minister, a certain Mr. Beran, formerly known as the leader of the Czechoslovak Agrarian party and a would-be Fuehrer, was ridiculed in many different ways. One anecdote informed the Czechs that "from now on we must learn how to bleat because our leader is a Beran" (*beran* in Czech means "ram"). Gradually, an ever increasing number of the Czechs realized that an autonomous Czechoslovakia after Munich was an illusion, an impossibility both politically and economically. Above all, they were ashamed to see how, day after day and in an ever increasing measure, the old democratic traditions and the enlightened cultural policy of Masaryk's republic were ruthlessly broken and hurriedly replaced by the "New Order" of those who, accepting orders from Berlin, made it appear that the Czech people themselves were advocating this change of policy. The latter, in fact, were most bitterly opposed to these changes and were deeply ashamed of what was taking place. No wonder, then,

that when the Nazis took over all that remained of Czechoslovakia after Munich, this final annihilation was accepted by many Czechs with a sigh of relief: "At least it won't be we but the Germans who will be held responsible before the world for what is happening here."

This occurred in the middle of March, 1939. With it started what may be considered the most typical phase of the social function of gallows humor. Now, there were no more rumors and hearsays. Everybody could hear and see for himself the cold facts of reality. The country was plundered and robbed. There was hardly a single Czech family from which at least one member did not disappear into a concentration camp; and the new masters with truly superhuman cynicism began to build their New Order on foundations cemented with the suffering and blood of their helpless victims. It is, therefore, highly significant that precisely at this moment there was a pronounced revival of the gallows-humor campaign which today is going on not only in Czechoslovakia but also in all other countries subjugated by the Nazi military machine and its more devastating shadow, the Gestapo. People who live in absolute uncertainty as to their lives and property find a refuge in inventing, repeating, and spreading through the channels of whispering counterpropaganda, anecdotes and jokes about their oppressors. This is gallows humor at its best because it originates and functions among people who literally face death at any moment. Some of them even dare to collect the jokes as philatelists collect stamps. One young man whom I knew was very proud of having a collection of more than two hundred pieces which he kept safe in a jar interred in the corner of his father's garden. These people simply have to persuade themselves as well as others that their present suffering is only temporary, that it will soon be all over, that once again they will live as they used to live before they were crushed. In a word, they have to strengthen their hope because otherwise they could not bear the strains to which their nerves are exposed. Gallows humor, full of invectives and irony, is their psychological escape, and it is in this sense that I call gallows humor a psychological compensation. Its social influence is enormous. On many an occasion I have observed how one good anecdote changed completely the mood of persons who have heard it—pessimists changed into optimists. Relying on my observations, I may go so far as to say that gallows humor is an unmistakable index of good morale and of the spirit of resistance of the oppressed peoples. Its decline or disappearance reveals either indifference or a breakdown of the will to resist evil. I can remember that those who accepted the New Order as something final and unalterable refused to listen to anecdotes and usually attacked

those who repeated them in their presence with sarcastic remarks like this: "You'd better stop making fun of yourself. This is no time to live on jokes." They did not lose their ardent nationalism, but their morale disintegrated—there was no will-power left to resist.

Gallows humor works two ways: it bolsters the resistance of the victims and, at the same time, it undermines the morale of the oppressors. As long as the Nazis know that their victims ridicule them, they cannot be sure of the final victory and must, in their turn, expect the changes in the situation that might occur in the future. Again I recall with what haste and anger the Germans in Czechoslovakia washed inscriptions insulting or making fun of their Fuehrer and his regime from the walls of houses and wooden fences where they appeared overnight. A master who was sure of himself would have ignored such things as childish and would not have taken them as serious proof of disloyalty which would eventually have to be avenged by capital punishment. Thus humor proved to be a socially significant element, constructive for the oppressed and destructive for the oppressors. The Czechs knew about it and therefore did not keep gallows humor only for themselves but on every possible occasion served it also to their uninvited "protectors." Here are a few examples:

Soon after the outbreak of war, the Germans in Czechoslovakia distributed a list of events which would take place on definite dates. According to this information, England was expected to be on her knees no later than August 15, 1940. Soon after that date the Czechs replied by distributing their leaflets, which read: "Do you know why Hitler has not invaded England yet? Because the German officers could not manage to learn in time all English irregular verbs." Another version gave the following answer to the same question: "You see, Hitler had to postpone the invasion because he has not yet definite proof that the British intend to invade their own Isles as was the case when they planned to invade Norway and Denmark and later the Netherlands and Belgium." Needless to say, this made the Nazis furious, and invariably each such sign of Czech resistance was followed by new waves of mass arrests. Evidently this kind of humor was not very humorous to the Nazis. Still another explanation of the postponement of the invasion of England: "Do you know why the daylight-saving time has been exceptionally prolonged this year? Because Hitler promised that before the summer is over, he and his army will be in England."

Since the famous Bat'a shoe factory started the production of shoes with wooden soles, Czech gallows humor is convinced that the Nazi blockade of Great Britain is one hundred per cent successful: "Not one rubber

sole nor a single leather sole reaches us from Britain, and, as a consequence, British commerce is suffering tremendous losses!" To find a Czech who is truly loyal to the Germans is no easy task. According to Czech gallows humor, the Gestapo found one such specimen at long last. He was an old man walking up and down the street and speaking seriously to himself aloud: "Adolf Hitler is the greatest leader. The Germans are a noble nation. I would rather work for ten Germans than for one Czech." When the Gestapo agent asked what was his occupation, this Czech admirer of naziism reluctantly confessed that he was a gravedigger.

Various events, which usually took the form of orders either strictly forbidding something or asking for something to be unconditionally fulfilled, were always followed by jokes especially fabricated for those occasions. Naturally, listening to foreign broadcasts, especially those from London, was considered a case of high treason. One anecdote tells of a man who was dragged out of his bed by a policeman while listening to the broadcasting from London. He already sees the horrors of the concentration camp but is soon relieved when the policeman, a Czech, says: "I don't mind your listening in to London, you idiot. I do it, too. But you might at least have the sense to turn off the loudspeaker in the garden!" I suspect that this and other similar scenes really happened, especially in rural districts where people were comparatively safe and therefore were less cautious. The following anecdote contains a story which, too, might have actually happened, and on more than one occasion. A Czech guest leaving the restaurant one evening says to his friend: "Good night. Now I am going to listen to the London and Paris wireless." He is overheard by a Gestapo agent and followed to his home. However, no wireless receiver can be found. "Do you never listen to foreign broadcasts?" asks the Gestapo man suspiciously. And the reply: "Oh, yes, I just can't help it." Then the Czech kneels down and says: "That's London there." After that he puts his ear to the wall of the neighboring apartment and whispers: "That's Paris there." Whereupon the Gestapo agent hurries around to the neighboring flats, only to find in one of them a high official of the German S. S. administration, and in the other one a German officer in uniform.

The order to collect metals for the use of armament production stimulated still another group of jokes. One anecdote informed the Czech public that because the collection of metals was not successful, Baron von Neurath, the Nazi lord over subjected Czechoslovakia, ordered the confiscation of many metal statues which were to be melted and sent to Germany. There was, however, one exception in the procedure. When the Nazis confiscated the statue of Moses, Hitler sent an urgent wire that this

statue be transported to Berlin without being previously melted, for Moses was the only individual who could advise the Fuehrer how to get across the English Channel with dry feet!

In Slovakia, where people very soon lost the illusion of having an independent country under the Nazi "protection," the situation is exactly the same. Stories are about that almost everybody there is infected by the contagious disease called "Churchillism," and that the explanation of the fact that of all the leaders of the Slovak Quisling party only Sano Mach, the minister of propaganda, refuses to allow some public square in the capital city or elsewhere to bear his name is that "Sano Mach Square" would read in German "*Sano Mach Platz*," which, literally translated, means "Sano, make room"—that is, disappear!

A number of these anecdotes, like the one just quoted, illustrate the type of gallows humor based primarily on ironical playing with words. They are popular and influential. Others are the manifestation of a very determined and well-planned passive resistance. In a village the Gestapo men found a hanged hen with the following inscription fastened to her neck: "I'd rather commit suicide than lay eggs for Hitler." The story of this incident spread quickly all over the country. In my own birthplace these words written in capital letters on the wall of the cemetery appeared overnight: "Hey, you Czechs, get out of here! Don't you know that this is the German Lebensraum?"

Although our primary interest here is not in telling anecdotes, we have had to mention a few of them and to describe the circumstances in which they originated in order to illustrate the social nature and the social function of gallows humor. There are many other anecdotes in Czechoslovakia, and almost every one of them was spread in several versions, usually gradually polished and pointed. He who has had no opportunity, as a participant observer, to feel on his own skin, as it were, the beneficent influence of the gallows humor upon the mentality and emotions of people in invaded countries can hardly have an adequate idea of the importance of the social function exercised by this type of humor. In addition, I am inclined to believe that what is true about individuals is true also about whole nations—namely, that the purest type of ironical humor is born out of sad experiences accompanied by grief and sorrow. It is spontaneous and deeply felt—the very necessity of life which it helps to preserve.

In the light of data presented in this article as well as out of numerous other observations and experiences which the sociologist finds in the present world's vast laboratory, there appear these conclusions. Humor in general, and gallows humor more specifically, is a social phenomenon the

importance of which, under certain circumstances, may be tremendous. It originates in the process of social interaction and bears marks of the particular group by which it was created and accepted. Its social character is revealed by the fact that it changes its content—and sometimes also the form in which it is presented—in accordance with the character of the group and the social events to which it reacts. The specificity of the gallows-humor type lies in that it is always intentional in the very real sense of this word. Not humor-for-humor, but humor with a definite purpose—that is, to ridicule with irony, invectives, and sarcasm in order to become a means of an effective social control. This teleological character of gallows humor determines its social function, which is twofold—positive and negative. Its positive effect is manifested above all in the strengthening of the morale and the spirit of resistance of people who struggle for their individual and national survival; its negative effect (which, of course, is again something very positive from the viewpoint of the oppressed) reveals itself by its disintegrating influence among those against whom it is directed. In both instances it proves to be an extremely powerful weapon. Finally, gallows humor is a reliable index of the morale of the oppressed, whereas the reaction to it on the part of the oppressors tells a long story about the actual strength of the dictators: if they can afford to ignore it, they are strong; if they react wildly, with anger, striking their victims with severe reprisals and punishment, they are not sure of themselves, no matter how much they display their might on the surface.

WASHINGTON, D.C.

ASPECTS OF THE PRISON'S SOCIAL STRUCTURE

S. KIRSON WEINBERG

ABSTRACT

In the prison the conflicts between criminals and law-enforcing agencies persist in modified form. Though placed in a subordinate and defensive position, the inmates counter the repressive measures of the administration by condemning them and by intriguing against them. With resultant hostility intensified rather than abated, the convicts and the officials become relatively isolated and assume logically extreme positions, the members of each group responding to the other as stereotypes. These hostile and collective stereotypes are expressed in their opposing ideologies. The officials, through the "contrast-conception," depict the inmates in negative antithesis to themselves, while the prisoners contradict and nullify the ideology of the officials.

The prison is often regarded as an institution with a punitive, segregative, deterrent, or rehabilitative function.¹ It can also be considered a closed milieu with many primary features of community life. The attitudes which emerge from inmate-official and interinmate relationships are continuations of cultural conflicts antecedent to incarceration and permeate the formal discipline in the penitentiary. While many studies have concentrated upon these formal phases of prison life,² some recent inquiries have veered to its dynamic social aspects.³ This investigation, fol-

¹ This paper is based on a study of Menard Penitentiary in southern Illinois. The conclusions derived pertain mainly to state penitentiaries because of the type of offenders incarcerated, the length of the sentences, and the relative progress in penal policies and practices.

² Though the literature concerning these administrative aspects of the prison is voluminous, only some of the representative studies, particularly those of Illinois prisons, will be indicated: *Reports of the Department of Public Welfare of Illinois* (1917-39); W. B. Sanders, "The History and Administration of the State Prisons in Illinois" (Ph.D. thesis, University of Chicago, 1929); A. A. Bruce, E. W. Burgess, A. J. Harno, and J. Landesco, *The Workings of the Indeterminate Sentence Law and the Parole System in Illinois*, Part III; T. Sellin, "A Quarter Century's Progress in Penal Institutions for Adults in the United States," *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology*, XXIV, 140-60; P. Klein, *Prison Methods in New York State* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1920); F. Haynes, *The American Prison System* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1940); Illinois Prison Inquiry Commission, *The Prison System in Illinois* (1937); A. H. McCormick, *The Education of Adult Prisoners: A Survey and Program* (National Society of Penal Information, 1931).

³ J. S. Roucek, "Attitudes of the Prison Guard," *Sociology and Social Research*, XX, 145 ff.; H. Reimer, "Socialization in the Prison Society," *Proceedings of the Sixty-seventh Annual Conference of the American Prison Association*, 1937; N. S. Hayner and E. Asch, "The Prisoner Community as a Social Group," *American Sociological Review*,

lowing this latter trend, considers the results of the conflict process upon (1) the prison's informal social structure and (2) upon the opposing ideologies of the inmate and official groups.

I

The inmates and officials are two segregated strata whose relations and attitudes, like those of other castes, result from previously unresolved conflicts.⁴ Their relations are impersonal, and the individual members of the respective groups are considered as stereotypes.⁵ Modes of deference and obedience are expected by the officials, and expressions of authority are anticipated and tolerated by the inmates. Castes which are long subservient acquire inferiority feelings from traditional displays of deference, but groups in a less-resolved conflict situation, such as the prisoners, also consider the upper groups as out-groups; consequently, their respect remains superficial and external.

Before imprisonment, the criminals and law-enforcing personnel are mutually unrestrained in their hostility.⁶ When incarcerated, the criminals are placed in an obviously defensive and helpless position. They are compelled to restrain direct conflict expressions and to divert these into more subtle, less discernible channels. The prisoners' submerged hostility finds outlet in criticism and condemnation of the administration and in intensified intrigue against it.

But the administration, through repressing and countering the inmates' inimical attitudes, makes for the continuation and intensification of this conflict. For conflict met on its own level does not abate but seems to revolve in a vicious cycle. The antagonistic relationships extend the social distance between the two strata and relatively isolates them. Through isolation the members of each group assume logically extreme

IV, 362-69; "The Prison as a Community," *ibid.*, V, 577-83; D. Clemmer, "Leadership Phenomena in a Prison Community," *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology*, XXIX, 861-72; *The Prison Community* (Boston: Christopher Publishing Co., 1940); D. Rasmussen, "Prisoners' Opinions about Parole," *American Sociological Review*, V, 584-96.

⁴ See E. H. Sutherland, *Principles of Criminology* (Philadelphia: Lippincott & Co., 1940), pp. 7 and 8.

⁵ In addition to the uniforms, the numbers, and the "treat them all alike" policy, there exists the constant awareness among the members of the respective groups of their antithetical position. Though friendly conversations may go on between them, the latent knowledge of their opposing identity usually exists.

⁶ See E. H. Sutherland, "Crime and the Conflict Process," *Journal of Juvenile Research*, XIII, 38-48.

positions. Each selects and exaggerates the defects and weaknesses of the opponent and overlooks or minimizes his merits.⁷ Each abstracts certain traits and imposes them as a group stereotype upon the opposing individual members.⁸ This impedes a sympathetic understanding of the individual qua individual. In reacting to the others in terms of the stereotype, the respective members of each stratum reinforce and sustain the conflict process.

But, in condemning the other, each group seeks to sustain morale by a collective self-elevation. While this type of self-praise would be apparent among the officials who are in a dominant position, it also obtains among the inmates. The added defensiveness of the latter places more vigorous demands upon the individual members and compels them to conform to the group norms.⁹ While Hargan has shown that the inmate argot "softens an otherwise too unpleasant reality into something bearable," their vernacular also is anti-administration and through idiomatic meanings changes words to add rather than to detract from their prestige.¹⁰

Vogelin¹¹ and Copeland¹² in previous studies of conflict groups have shown that, when an upper stratum wishes to reinforce its social position and to justify its behavior with reference to the subordinate group, the "contrast-conception" arises and is diffused among the members. This "contrast-conception," as the authors point out, defines the lower group in "negative polarity" to itself. The whites of the South, as Copeland shows, regard the Negroes in direct contrast to the "character and properties of the white man." Negroes are considered "subhuman in temperament, lacking in emotional control and restraint . . . incapable of continuous affection and mental concentration," and "beyond the pale of human

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 39.

⁸ Cf. H. Blumer, "The Nature of Race Prejudice," *Social Process in Hawaii* (Hawaii: University of Hawaii, June, 1939), p. 12.

⁹ Though individual demoralization may prevail, it does not lead to collective condemnation, since the members do not accept or usually sympathize with personal feelings unless they express an anti-administration tendency.

¹⁰ J. Hargan, "The Psychology of Prison Language," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, XXX (1935-36), 361 ff. The term "convict," or in its abbreviated form "con," does not denote a mark of opprobrium among the inmates. The "real con" is a connotation of prestige.

¹¹ E. Vogelin, *Rasse und Staat* (Tübingen, 1933), Vol. II, chap. vii, discusses the conflict process between the Germans and the Jews and the ideological conceptions which the Germans have of the Jews.

¹² L. Copeland, "The Negro as a Contrast Conception," in *Race Relations and the Race Problem*, ed. E. T. Thompson (Durham: Duke University Press, 1939).

sympathy." This negative depiction makes the white group all the more impressive to itself.¹³

Both writers, however, neglect to describe the conceptions which the lower group has of the superordinate one. In the prison situation the inmates as a subordinate group oppose, negate, and even nullify the ideology and symbols used by the officials. They tend further, as has been indicated, to denounce and to deride the officials as they converse among themselves. This opposition is verbalized in their "conflict-conceptions." These "conflict-conceptions" are one of their media of contradicting the notions of the dominant officials and of justifying their behavior with reference to these persons. Also, the conceptions channelize the perspectives of the individual inmates and control their conduct and relations to the official group. Both Countering ideologies—the "contrast-conception" and the "conflict-conception"—emerge in a situation of group hostility and define and articulate the positions and attitudes of the opposing collectivities.¹⁴

II

Within the scope of these ideologies, the inmates are labeled "cons," but the guards are contemptuously referred to as "screws" or "hacks." The custodians believe and claim that they are "always right" and that the prisoners are "always wrong." The prisoners, however, state among themselves and at times to the officials that the administration is "never right" and, as Nelson has also shown, "make carping criticism" of the administration, "the order of the day."¹⁵ Prevention of escapes and the imposition of discipline are the objects of admiration among the officials and form the nucleus of many anecdotes. "Breaks," strikes, and riots are the pervasive and admired myths among the inmates.¹⁶ As guards might delight in detecting and in relating the inmates' frustrated attempts at

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 153-57.

¹⁴ The custodians and other prison officials are more than an occupational group who disperse after the day's work. In the particular prison investigated the majority of the employees came from other localities and resided either in the prison or in the adjacent town. Not completely accepted by the residents, they tended to cohere among themselves. Through this constant association in and out of prison, they acquired and disseminated the approved and disapproved forms of prison conduct and the "correct" attitudes to assume to the prisoners. Thus the sanctioned and tabooed activity were not merely imparted through formal instruction but also through informal tutelage, as anecdotes, legends, and "tips."

¹⁵ V. F. Nelson, *Prison Days and Nights* (New York: Little, Brown & Co., 1932).

¹⁶ Reimer, *op. cit.*

illicit activity, the inmates, conversely, exalt when they tell how they "put one over" on the custodians.

The officials, especially the guards, regard the convicts as "criminals after all," as "people who can't and shouldn't be trusted," and as "degenerates who must be put in their place at all times." "You can't be too easy with them," states one custodian. "You can't be too soft with them. They're on the go to put one over on you. They don't think of us when they try to get over the wall."¹⁷ "There must be something wrong with every man here," states another, "else he wouldn't be here. They're scheming all the time, soon as you give them an inch. That's because there's something wrong with every one of 'em." Convicts are considered "born bad," as mentally, emotionally, or morally deficient. Their only language, "the language they understand, is punishment." Attempts at rehabilitation usually are considered as futile. In exceptional cases, only in cases where the inmates are "not really convicts," reform does occur. Prisoners are "unfit, failures," and hard men without human feelings. They are considered calloused because they were unable "to make their way in life like honest folk." Hence when they become recalcitrant, they must "be softened and broken" to get them "back in line." They are thought of as unintelligent and lazy, and, consequently, they stall in their work at every opportunity. Further, those with abilities usually have other undesirable qualities to offset their merits.

Because they are unable to care for themselves, they must be held under leash. Because they are "wild" and uncontrollable, they require the sternest measures of discipline. Homosexuality is almost considered "natural" among inmates. As one custodian claimed, "It's in them. I couldn't believe it could happen till I saw it, and I had to give them both the hole." The "punk" and sex pervert are thus natural products of a degraded group and "prove" that the convicts are depraved and animalistic, for they resort to practices abhorred by conventional persons. Hence "to act like an inmate" denotes derogatory behavior. "To look like an inmate" indicates disagreeable appearance. Convicts in their dress, speech, and walk are "different." They are enemies of and outcasts from society. Resultantly, they diverge from noncriminal persons in all the above-mentioned characteristics.¹⁸

¹⁷ The language within quotation marks is that of the custodians or other officials.

¹⁸ It would be interesting to ascertain the collective attitudes of a more trained personnel in order to determine how they would vary from the attitudes indicated in this paper, for these officials usually view these phenomena emotionally and with distinct emphasis.

The officials, on the other hand, consider themselves honest, law-abiding men. They are the servants and the protectors of society. As home-loving individuals who are devoted to their families, they can assume responsibilities without breaking laws or getting into trouble like the inmates.¹⁹

The inmates have a definitely reverse conception of this order of things. As one typically writes: "Convicts still think pretty well of themselves in spite of their present social status. And this is as it should be, for they are in the main no different from the man on the street." From their vantage point almost all people are potentially or actually crooked. Convicts are distinguished from others because they have been detected. As Tannenbaum puts it: "If a man is not a thief, he is a fool, or a poor 'simp' like the keeper who cannot make a living at anything except torturing better people and smarter men than himself . . . the poor, ignorant, simple-minded 'screw' knows nothing but brutality, is simply a person beneath his own class worthy of nothing but contempt."²⁰ They consider officials as "economic failures" "who couldn't get a job on the outside." Consequently, they are compelled to work in the prison.²¹ The wardens and deputies are mere political appointees, "ignorant sheriffs." The doctor is a "quack," a "croaker," or from a "B school at the most." The chaplain is insincere and "full of witchcraft." Further, the custodians have either committed crimes on the outside or have resorted to sadistic practices which they regard as more cowardly and detestable than property offenses. These guards, according to the inmates, derive their greatest pleasure "from telling you what to do or turning you in." An inmate upon being reminded that his name was similar to a high official indicated that the similarity was a misfortune. Another reluctantly granted that one particular custodian might be all right, but the "only thing wrong

¹⁹ Tannenbaum states: "After all, he is a keeper, an official, a good man (at least in his own judgment) whereas the convict is a criminal. For his own clear conscience' sake the speaker must and does instinctively make a sharp distinction between himself and the man he guards. . . . It is essential because we cannot impose our wills upon equals or betters" (Frank Tannenbaum, *Wall Shadows* [New York: G. P. Putnam's, 1922]).

²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 26 and 27.

²¹ " . . . prison guards and other officials . . . know little or nothing of handling men, . . . are not even ordinarily proficient in the trades or professions they purport to follow—else they would not be holding underpaid jobs in the prison . . . the ranks of prison guards and officials are seventy-five percent filled with men who have been economic failures in the outside world" (By a Prisoner, "The Prisoner Speaks," in *Prisons of Tomorrow*, ed. E. H. Sutherland and T. Sellin [Philadelphia: Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1931]).

with him was being a screw." One tersely summarized his attitude toward the situation as follows: "Where would they be without politics? All they're interested in are elections and cuts. How about us? How about rehabilitation? It's all a phony."²²

Criticism and condemnation of the administration thus range from prison personnel to penal policy, from a contemptuous portrait of the guard to an indictment of the social order. Some more intelligent inmates may become radical, indict the whole order, and almost welcome an upheaval. Society, according to their version, is responsible for crime. Men are not born criminals but often become so through adverse circumstances. Society is blamed for the present penal system, and they are "victims of society." Society, "the true criminal," if differently arranged, would reduce crime and revise its penal practices. Further, some leaders of conventional society, the financiers, the "real crooks," are almost never arrested.

III

The truth of these mutual claims and tirades is significant in so far as it reveals and reflects the conflicting perspectives of the two groups and governs the behavior of one in respect to the other. The intense emotion with which the "negative aspects of the administration" are expressed by the inmates are, if anything, only mildly presented; for the coercive character of the group representations are so intense that at times they tend to become diluted when an inmate is released or converses with an objective outsider. No longer subject to the collective pressure of the other inmates, he may become more objective and detached from the situation.

The nature of these group representations allows some individuals to have neutral or, in some circumstances, friendly attitudes toward some officials. Similarly, officials pick favorites from among the inmates. This inevitable variation comes with individual differences. But the fact emphasized is that these representations, inherent in the prison situation, are larger than individuals, antecede them, and continue to persist despite the attitudes of certain few individuals. These representations are beyond individual power to control or modify. Rather, persons must adjust and conform to them.

²² Though some inmates may be perfectly sincere about rehabilitation, the more sophisticated inmates are primarily concerned with the reduction of their sentences. Incarceration merely interrupts their plans. Rehabilitation is a kind of a "gag." It is sometimes used as a norm for criticizing penal policies. This cynicism may also result from the disparity between the theoretical claims of rehabilitation and actual prison conditions.

The idealistic or timid guard, for example, acquires these attitudes in more or less degree or becomes a variant. He cannot be too friendly with the inmates because he may be suspected of being "queer," soft, or susceptible to collusion. Even the custodians of the newcomers ("the fish"), while somewhat exceptional, in this respect are also on the alert. This situation is more adequately understood in the light of the contriving tactics of the prisoners. Their mischief occurs in a setting where their subservience is a customary and expected social fact. Indeed, their apparent subordination and deference are so expected that some guards derive a haughty feeling of power, of dogmatism, and of intolerance. These men hate the outwardly troublesome prisoner who resists them, discuss him among themselves, and "get it in for him."²³ Though annoyance of the guards may be a mark of prestige among the inmates, the adjusted inmate aims to achieve his purposes without being detected; he resorts to mischief in, as it were, an underground fashion. Some inmates may become aware that the custodians, who are accustomed to simple situations, become confused in complex or quickly maneuvered situations. They thus plan resourceful media for outwitting the guards during critical situations. By a timely question or by having another inmate distract his attention, they have the "damage done" before the guard discovers the trouble. Some inmates also would have no scruples in betraying an official to a higher authority. Some play one official against another by telling each mutually unfavorable stories about the other. Others plan illicit activity of varied degrees of gravity. The potentiality of an escape or a betrayal by the inmates reflects in some measure the ingenious resourcefulness of the inmates and the needs of the guard to remain wary of these plots so as to be able to cope with them.²⁴

In general, the inmates acquire attitudes of condemnation and implement their contriving tactics against the administration in the process of institutionalization. This implies a dual attitude. Through an external deference, the inmates accommodate themselves to the officials, but the former group continue to harbor inner grievances as they assimilate into

²³ The officials in a certain sense are also on the defensive. They are outnumbered and realize that at any moment the inmates may become uncontrollable. In general, the administration dreads unfavorable publicity. An escape or riot is a continual source of apprehension. To avoid such circumstances, they exercise the most cautious vigilance.

²⁴ Some inmates may attempt to manipulate an official so as to have him "carry" information outside the prison and receive information from the particular inmates' associates. There is also the hazard that a prison employee may smuggle liquor or opiates into the prison.

the inmate society. These views operate as reciprocal checks and determine the likely path of adjustment for the incoming prisoner. They also mean that conformity to prison rules is no criterion of rehabilitation but is rather an index of prison adjustment. As a result, the more experienced and sophisticated criminals tend to violate the prison rules less frequently than the unknowing first offenders.²⁵

Just as the custodian cannot be too friendly to the prisoners, the convicts cannot always become too friendly with the guards. For the friendly inmate may be suspected of informing and be considered untrustworthy by the other convicts. In fact, through defection, the informer releases the fierce pressure of the group representations. The informer, however, is a necessary expedient by the administrators to assure order by anticipating plots and conspiracies. He becomes a burden and worse than useless to them, however, when his identity becomes known. He then may create certain disturbances which he is used to avoid. The inmates may plan retaliation; they may blame him for previous penalties imposed upon other inmates; they tend to distrust him in the future. Consequently, he is made miserable in many ways. He may be shunned or denounced, ostracized or framed, when feasible, beaten, and, on some serious situations, killed. Suspect for a long time, he may also become so beset with anxieties and fears in regard to reprisals from the offended inmates or their friends that mental breakdown is not improbable.²⁶

IV

This description, in general, has aimed to show that the conflict between the criminals and law-enforcing groups, although modified, persists in the prison despite the formal administrative setup. This conflict is expressed not only through their relationships but also through their reciprocal conceptions. The officials negate and derogate the inmates, while the inmates deride and condemn both the officials and the whole penal policy. These respective ideologies verbalize the opposing perspectives and atti-

²⁵ "[Even] if the new prisoner is unfortunate enough to believe that copy book maxims apply in prison, that by hard work he will improve his lot, he soon discovers that he is regarded by his fellow prisoners as one who attempts to attract the favorable attention of the guard by unfair means" (By a Prisoner, *op. cit.*, p. 140). In some instances the first offender may be deceived by other inmates and thus violate prison rules. Or he may consent to become an informer without realizing the dire consequences that await him if his activities become known by the inmates.

²⁶ An index to the mental preoccupation among criminal and convict groups with the informer is revealed by the number of synonymous words used by them to describe the latter.

tudes of the two groups. Because these attitudes are inherent in the prison situation, they can neither be controlled nor modified by any single individual of either group. In fact, the individuals who do not conform to these group representations are considered variants and subject to the controls and pressures of their respective stratum.²⁷

Methodologically, the intent of this inquiry was to indicate that this institution, like other institutions, is, in its inner dynamic sense, a configuration of social relationships and can be regarded as a dynamic social process.²⁸

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²⁷ The administrators share these notions with a varying intensity. The men who work with the mechanics, the white-collar workers, and those who are not directly responsible for penal discipline tend to feel less intensely about the matter. The deputies and guards entertain these notions with a distinct and ardent zeal.

²⁸ Cf. E. W. Burgess, "The Family as a Unity of Interacting Personalities," *Family*, VII (March, 1926), 3-9; C. H. Cooley, "Case Study of Small Institutions as a Method of Research," in *Sociological Theory and Social Research* (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1930).

OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES¹

GEORGE A. LUNDBERG

ABSTRACT

The position of certain recent publications is examined and criticized because they seem to imply (a) that under some circumstances ambiguous concepts are more useful than precise ones and (b) that operational definitions are of limited usefulness in sociology because of their dependence upon quantitative characteristics, whereas some items referred to by sociological concepts are "essentially qualitative in nature." Both assumptions are here questioned. Operational definitions, in common with any other method of increasing the precision of the meaning of a concept, undoubtedly frequently limit that meaning and so exclude some meanings which were previously attached to the term. It does not follow that the meanings so excluded are denied or debarred from study. These neglected aspects are themselves subject to precise and operational definition. Various other misunderstandings of the operational and positivistic position are discussed. The hypothesis is advanced that in sociology, as in other natural sciences, some of the opposition to the positivistic approach may be due to its apparent lack in aesthetic and literary qualities to minds conditioned by the scientific philosophy of the nineteenth century. A series of specific questions is propounded in the hope of clarifying the issues under consideration.

I

As a point of departure and as a partial justification for the present paper, I quote the following colloquy between two sociologists in a panel discussion reported some months ago in a publication of the Social Science Research Council.²

FIRST SPEAKER: My impression is that in the effort to apply theoretical interpretations to human experience, the more precise and unambiguous the terms become, the less valuable they are.

SECOND SPEAKER: I agree with that. Take, for instance, the concept of social attitude. . . .

If it is objected that I am here quoting a few sentences out of their context, I will say at the outset that my criticism is directed at the statements in their full context as represented by the whole discussion in which they occur. As for the possible objection, among others, that the authors did not actually mean to say what I take their words to mean, it is precisely the purpose of this paper to argue that a state of affairs

¹ Read, with minor changes, before a session of the Committee for Conceptual Integration of the American Sociological Society, Chicago, December 28, 1940.

² Herbert Blumer, *Critiques of Research in the Social Sciences*, Vol. I: *An Appraisal of Thomas and Znaniecki's "The Polish Peasant in Europe and America"* (New York: Social Science Research Council, 1939), p. 124.

under which such a misunderstanding among workers in the same field is possible constitutes the best justification for inquiry into the problems of definition of sociological terms.

I shall deal briefly with the case I have quoted because I want to devote my time to the more fundamental issues of which the above quotation is only an example. Suffice it to say, therefore, that I do not believe ambiguousness and lack of precision in the definition of concepts are *ever* desirable in scientific work. These qualities of concepts may have value in literature and in theology, since they enable the reader to read into words whatever meaning he wishes to find there. In the example quoted, and in the attempt to make a virtue of the present vague use of "social attitude," this literary value may indeed be what the speakers had in mind. From the scientific viewpoint, however, it is questionable whether the value of *The Polish Peasant* can, in any measure, be attributed to its ambiguity or to its lack of precision in the use of the word "attitude." I am willing to admit the value of this study *in spite of* its lack of precision in definition of this and other concepts. I do not admit, however, that such value exists because of this lack of precise definition. Because someone made a fortunate guess or obtained valuable results by extremely crude methods, it is easy to deceive ourselves into thinking that these methods have a virtue in themselves. It is unnecessary to do more than point out the fallacy in such reasoning. I am willing to admit that clever guessers should be encouraged to guess and that conditions conducive to fortunate guessing should be cultivated. I have always contended that crude methods are not to be scoffed at until more refined ones are developed and that in science, as elsewhere, half a loaf is better than complete loafing. This suggests my first query as to the reason for some of the disagreement on this subject: Are some of us primarily interested in those stages in the development of the social sciences where intuitive methods must necessarily play a large part, as compared with the partly charted areas in which refinements of methods are the chief condition of advance? If so, recognition of this possibility might resolve some of the disagreement. It would still be incumbent upon those who prefer intuitive procedures, however, to show that they are actually dealing with problems to which more objective methods are not as yet applicable. Also, and above all, I should think everyone would agree that these relatively intuitive procedures should be supplanted as fast as possible by the more objective ones. There still remains, however, the possibility of a fundamental difference in interest among different workers which may account for some of their differences in viewpoint.

II

My chief task in this paper is to examine a recent article in this *Journal*³ which attacks a number of aspects of what its author conceives to be the position of those who advocate the adoption, as rapidly as possible, of more precise and unambiguous operational definitions of the concepts of sociology. If in my remarks upon his article I misinterpret in any degree his position, this may be considered additional evidence of the desirability of a less ambiguous terminology for sociological communication than that in which current discussion is couched. At least this appears to be a legitimate conclusion unless, of course, it is assumed that I am deliberately misunderstanding the author. To protect myself further from accusations of malice and in order that the reader may judge whether my interpretations are justified,⁴ I shall quote the author's own words as far as possible and keep their context always in mind in the ensuing discussion.

Regarding the operational definition of concepts, we read:

This method, apparently, would confine the meaning of a concept to quantitative and mensurative data secured with reference to it. Prevailing concepts—or at least some of them—would be accepted; counting and measuring devices would be used in the case of each concept; the resulting information would constitute the content and the meaning of the concept.

Since some of the best illustrations of operational definitions are essentially of the character described above, we may, for our present purposes, accept this characterization. Actually, of course, quantitative and mensurative aspects of operational definitions are purely instrumental, incidental, and a matter of convenience. If anyone can present an operational definition without using such techniques, the operationist would have no objection. As I have shown elsewhere,⁵ and as will appear below, the assumption of a sharp separation between quantitative and mensurative techniques and symbols, on the one hand, and qualitative procedures, on the other, is itself an illusion. As John Dewey has said, "all comparison is of the nature of measurement."⁶ That much of the so-called "quali-

³ H. Blumer, "The Problem of the Concept in Social Psychology," *American Journal of Sociology*, XLV (March, 1940), 707-19.

⁴ All quotations are open to the objection that they do not adequately represent the true position of the author. I urge the reader, therefore, to study the full context of the works I have quoted in estimating the validity of my remarks.

⁵ *Foundations of Sociology* (New York, 1939), pp. 45 ff., 53-54, 69-70, 76, 83, 118, 131, 150, 153, 366, 459, 467, 532.

⁶ *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry* (New York, 1938), p. 202.

tative" discussion is merely informal measurement also has been pointed out by others.⁷ No one, however, will insist on formal quantitative means of achieving operational definitions if other procedures will fulfil the requirements of such definitions.⁸

Actually, the simplest form of operational definition of a word is to point to its referent while enunciating the word.⁹ Thus, we define the word "cat" to a child by pointing to a certain kind of animal or a succession of animals denoted by the word in our language. Likewise, we define the word "jump" by leaping into the air in various ways and designating each performance by repeating the word. There is nothing distinctively quantitative about such definitions. As we proceed to the definition of the more complex and "abstract" words, we become increasingly dependent upon other symbols, the meaning of which are already known.¹⁰

⁷ References to the literature will be found in my *Foundations of Sociology*.

⁸ Consider, for example, the definition of law by Justice Holmes as "the prophecies of what the courts will do in fact" (cited in H. Alpert, "Operational Definitions in Sociology," *American Sociological Review*, III [December, 1938], 859).

⁹ There is apparently here a serious misunderstanding on the part of the critics of operationism which leads them to the conclusion that "illustrations" and concrete instances are somehow not allowed in operational definitions. Thus, R. C. Angell (in an unpublished paper before the Sociological Research Association, 1938) objects to Dodd's statement that an operational definition "should state the materials and procedure to be used to obtain, or to be sure one has obtained the entity defined, just as a kitchen recipe defines a cake or a Binet manual defines a mental age." This definition, Angell says, "is itself not operational. It relies . . . upon illustration." This type of criticism mystifies me. Does he mean that the *recipe* must be given to define the definition as well as to define "cake"? In any case, how does the definition "rely" on illustration, and what is wrong with this? If I define "a pound" as the amount of weight or pressure exerted by an object on a spring balance or other scale of specified characteristics so as to cause a pointer to come to rest at a point marked "1" and at the same time illustrate this performance with a concrete performance, is this or is it not an operational definition? I regret to say, also, that other parts of Angell's paper reflect notions about what the operationists propose for which he will find no basis in the literature, notably the familiar notion that operationists propose to ignore those aspects of sociology which have not yet been reduced to operational definition.

¹⁰ All *written* and *spoken* operational definitions obviously are of this kind. This has been overlooked by some critics who seem to feel that all *verbal* definition constitutes some kind of negation of operationism. Take, for example, my statement that "I mean by the verb 'generalize' the *process of determining* from less than all the relevant data the probable prevalence in the universe of a given datum or configuration of data." This, it has been pointed out (*American Sociological Review*, June, 1940, p. 438), is not an operational definition. I was never under the illusion when I wrote it that I was actually performing the *physical operations* which I refer to by the word "process" and the subsequent words. This process obviously consists of the manipulations which my words try to designate and for which the more detailed verbal instructions may be found in a

Quantitative and mensurative symbols and forms of speech are merely among the linguistic forms that have been developed to communicate these more complicated and subtle relationships. The illusion of a sharp line between the quantitative and the qualitative results from a mystical attitude toward the nature of language, a subject to which we shall return later. In short, we may say that quantification has been found a convenient tool in the development of operational definitions. If anyone can attain the objectives sought by other means, he is welcome to do so.

The cause of the whole absurd controversy over quantitative versus qualitative procedures is strikingly revealed a little later in the paper under discussion. It says:

The operational procedure, of the form spoken of here, could be successful in meeting the problem of vague concepts in social psychology only if the problems out of which the concepts arose and the items to which they refer were themselves essentially quantitative in nature. In present-day social psychology, only by an act of faith can one declare that the empirical problems and empirical items to which its concepts refer are essentially of such a quantitative nature. However vague may be the character of concepts in social psychology, unless it be shown that their nonquantitative aspects are spurious, the "operational method" is not a means of meeting the problem considered in this paper [p. 711].

manual of statistics. The operationist merely tries to make his language denote actual operations as specifically as possible. His critics are fond of demanding an operational definition of an operational definition, etc., in order to maneuver him into their own exalted realms of more words about words about words, etc., ad infinitum. The operationist's answer should lie in the opposite direction. If he cannot make the operations clear verbally, he should perform them, as one does in teaching language to children, after which language may be used to denote operations. Perhaps the following summary by P. W. Bridgman may help to clarify the point: "If any physical situation is described only in terms of concepts which themselves are defined in terms of physical processes *actually performed*, the whole description reduces ultimately to a description of an actual physical experience, and as such must have the validity of all direct observation of physical fact, *which for our purposes is to be accepted as ultimate*. It is to be especially noticed that our concepts, being thus framed in terms of operations actually performed in physical experience, must lead, at any stage of physical inquiry, to *conclusions in which room is left for future refinements within the uncertainties and approximations of our present physical operations*" (*Scripta mathematica* [1934], II, 1). (Italics mine.) This is, of course, the usual practice in other sciences, as when a physicist defines acceleration in terms of velocity, velocity in terms of mass and time, etc. This is also an illustration of Blumer's point that "frequently, in order to understand a concept we have to master a whole system of terms and their interrelations" (unpublished paper before the Sociological Research Association, 1938). He is, of course, entirely right that the more abstract concepts are defined this way. But, obviously, such definitions are quite as dependent upon possible operational procedures, manipulative, mathematical, and logical, as any others.

It seems to me from this passage that the author accepts, unwittingly or deliberately, a postulate which is utterly incompatible with the scientific point of view as well as with any modern conceptions of the nature of language. When he raises the question as to whether the *referents* of certain symbols are *essentially quantitative in nature*, he seems to me to invoke a postulate that some of the phenomena of the universe are inherently "essentially quantitative by nature," others presumably nonquantitative, or qualitative, by nature. I have dealt elsewhere and at length with the incompatibility of such a postulate with the history, theoretical framework, and the practical operations of science. I have attacked specifically the point before a congress of scientists, mathematicians, and philosophers¹¹ as well as in several published works, and no voice has been raised in objection to my conclusion as stated above. I shall not repeat the argument here. Later in the present paper reference will be made to some of the mischief caused by the postulate in question, together with its hoary companion pieces, namely, objectivity and subjectivity, mental and physical, the apparent and the real. For the time being I may say that, to my complete satisfaction, John Dewey has recently summarized and dismissed the whole intellectual mess in the following words:

If, however, the philosophical theory of experience is brought up to date by acknowledgment of the standpoint and conclusions of scientific biology and cultural anthropology, and of the import of the experimental method in knowing, these problems, I have argued, are "solved" by recognition that they depend upon premises inherited from traditions now shown to be false. Some of the gratuitous dualisms done away with, I have argued, are those of the objective and subjective, the real and apparent, the mental and physical, scientific physical objects and objects of perception, things of experience and things-in-themselves concealed behind experience, the latter being an impenetrable veil which prevents cognitive access to the things of nature.¹²

¹¹ "The Concept of Law in the Social Sciences," *Philosophy of Science*, V (April, 1938), 189-203 (read at the Second Conference on Methods in Philosophy and Science, New York City, November 28, 1937); see also my *Foundations of Sociology*, chaps. ii and iv.

¹² *The Philosophy of John Dewey*, ed. P. A. Schilpp (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University, 1939), p. 524. Elsewhere Dewey has said: "Both the history of science and the present state of science prove that the goal of the systematic relationship of facts and conceptions to one another is dependent upon the *elimination* of the qualitative as such and upon reduction to nonqualitative formulation" (*Logic: The Theory of Inquiry*, p. 65). Note that the statement is that the *goal* is reduction to *nonqualitative* formulation. This recognizes, as I have always recognized, that in the meantime we should use qualitative categories as best we can, and that *nonqualitative* is not synonymous with *quantitative*, that is, there are other forms of nonqualitative statement such as we find in symbolic logic, topology, and some forms of geometry. See also T. W. Hutchison, *The*

In an attempt to offer some support to the postulate of some phenomena as "essentially" nonquantitative "in nature," the author under criticism says that "only by an act of faith can one declare that the empirical problems and empirical items to which its concepts refer are essentially of such a quantitative nature." Certainly, it is only by an act of faith that any postulate regarding the ultimate "nature" of things can be laid down. That is the "nature" of postulates! Upon what else than an act of faith does he suppose his postulate of the quantitative-qualitative dichotomy in nature rests? Operationists are not required to show that the so-called "nonquantitative aspects" are "spurious," because they do not accept the gratuitous problem of a quantitative-qualitative dichotomy in nature. This dichotomy is imposed by our author purely as an unspoken postulate under which he chooses to discuss his "problem." I do not deny his right to choose such a postulate or any other which may interest him. As Dewey has said, however, from the point of view of the operationist these "problems" are "solved by recognition that they depend upon premises inherited from traditions now shown to be false," according to the criteria and methods by which truth and falsity are determined in science.

III

Speaking again of the operational method of definition, our author says:

Critical consideration of this method should convince one that it does not offer a solution to the problem. It should be noted first of all that the method begins with the selection of a concept, which necessarily already has some meaning and some reference to an area of empirical experience. To limit this meaning to what is determinable quantitatively or mensuratively is essentially an act of reduction which may be at the expense of the empirical reference which the concept originally had and with which one is concerned.

We have here the familiar and correct but curious objection that the precise definition of a word, by whatever methods, necessarily limits its denotation and connotation. The objection is curious because precision consists of such limitation. While this objection is here brought against operational definitions, it obviously applies with equal validity to any

Significance and Basic Postulates of Economic Theory (New York, 1938): "Leaving out of account, then, the kind of prognoses given by propositions of pure theory, it does not seem possible to give the terms 'qualitative' and 'quantitative' as applied to prognoses any more sense than 'less accurate' or 'more accurate,' and we suggest that their replacement by these terms would be less confusing."

method of definition whatsoever which increases the precision of the meaning of a word. Whoever can show how we can define a word more precisely without limiting its (less precise) meaning will have solved the age-long quest as to how we can have our cake and eat it too. It is certainly symptomatic of the state of a great deal of present thinking in the social sciences that such a proposal should (by implication) be soberly offered. On the one hand, the stern requirements of science face us. On the other hand, there lies the happy hunting ground of literary and philosophical lore couched in a primitive, ambiguous, and inexact terminology from which, in spite of increasing pressure, we feel a certain reluctance to emerge. I predict that one of the chief problems of the Committee for Conceptual Integration will be to reconcile its members, not to mention the larger fraternity, to the limitation of the meaning of certain familiar words, which is the *sine qua non* of more precise definition.

In justice to our author it should be said that his worries on this score flow largely from his totally unwarranted assumption regarding the program of the operationists. He apparently assumes that the operationists, having defined a time-honored word of broad and varied traditional meanings, by limiting its meaning to rigorously specified empirical referents, thereupon propose to deny and ignore all other referents which this word in its traditional meanings may have had. This is a widely held misconception, and if anyone really believes that this is the program of the operationists, he is certainly not to be blamed for his opposition. Operationists have never contemplated, of course, any such action, and the literature is explicit and emphatic on this point,¹³ which, one would think, might be taken for granted. When the chemist defines water as H_2O , he commits an act which could be described in the words of our author as an "act of reduction which may be at the expense of the empirical reference which the concept originally had." This act of definition limits the referent to a rather rare liquid found perhaps chiefly in the laboratories as compared with its previous reference, namely, the vast varieties of liquids that run in ditches and through faucets throughout the land. But surely no one assumed that by defining water as H_2O (for scientific purposes) the chemists proposed to deny or ignore all these other

¹³ This point has been explicitly made in all my publications on this subject for at least ten years. See, e.g., "Is Sociology Too Scientific?" *Sociologus*, Vol. IX (September, 1933), Part IV; "The Thoughtways of Contemporary Sociology," *American Sociological Review*, I (October, 1936), 707; *Foundations of Sociology*, chap. i, and pp. 129-30.

liquids. Nor do operationists in sociology propose to deny or ignore any relevant data whatever which may be excluded by a new definition.¹⁴

Perhaps, what our author had in mind was the danger of adopting a precise and more limited definition of a common word and then failing to warn the reader of this fact, so that people may interpret research findings involving this concept as applying to phenomena which have been specifically excluded by the new definition. If so, the author should have directed his criticism at this point, which is a danger inherent in all new definitions rather than in only operational definitions. The latter have precisely the conspicuous virtue of always specifying exactly what they do and do not include.

This allegation that operational definitions tend to disregard "empirical reality" is the most puzzling of all the objections of the critics.¹⁵ The possibility of misunderstanding will be reduced if we get down to concrete cases instead of discussing the subject abstractly. I should like, therefore, to ask the following specific questions in this connection:

1. There have been given above some illustrations of operational definitions—water as H_2O , pound as a pointer reading, cake as the product of the operations indicated in a recipe, etc. Are not these definitions tested and testable by, and congruent with, empirical reality in a way that other types of definitions of these entities are not?
2. The Chapin scale purports to define a specified type of social status. In its construction hundreds of items were studied and judged as to their relevance to what in current usage is called status. The final scale specifies every factor taken into consideration and the weight given to it. Both factors and weights have been arrived at after extensive empirical study including tests of reliability and validity. Does this procedure meet the requirements of testability by empirical reality? Can one suggest from the entire literature of the subject a definition which meets the requirements more adequately?

¹⁴ The notion that the operationist in general proposes to "jettison," "abjure," or refuse to take into consideration relevant data is a straw man persistently conjured up by the critics. For a recent exhibit see R. M. MacIver, "The Imputation of Motives," *American Journal of Sociology*, XLVI (July, 1940), 6, 12. Consider such rhetorical questions as the following: "Why should it be unscientific to read the signs as carefully as possible, to develop the logic of evidence and apply it to situations even though it yields not absolute certainty but only some kind of probability?" (p. 6). There is, of course, no citation of any source which claims the specified procedure is unscientific. The implication is, however, that anyone who suggests that the concept "motive" may be of no greater use in the social than in the physical sciences thereby has become guilty of this charge, that he "abjures" important knowledge, etc. (p. 12).

¹⁵ See the specific case of the definition of "hygiene" in No. 3 of the questions below. See also the discussion of the definition of "intelligence" on a later page (pp. 736 ff.).

Does my comparison of the Chapin scores of a community with the estimates of a banker and a janitor in that community constitute the kind of demonstrable validity desired? If the above is not a way to arrive at a definition of social status, what procedure is recommended?

3. By somewhat similar methods, S. C. Dodd constructed a scale for measuring rural hygiene in Syrian villages. After extensive inquiry among health authorities and others familiar with the area and the culture to be studied, a schedule of several hundred inquiries was formulated regarding methods of detecting disease, infant hygiene, remedies used, food and cleanliness, control of insects, housing conditions, etc. This study is mentioned as an example of how the above methods by operational definition of such a concept as hygiene omits "the most vital part of the original reference" (Blumer, p. 711). Precisely what "part" is omitted and what more adequate definition or method of arriving at a definition of hygiene can be suggested?
4. What are some examples of operational definition which are not arrived at through this kind of empirical study?
5. What procedure other than that adopted by operationists will result in precise concepts?

I conclude that most controversy in the social sciences today flows from the two fundamental misunderstandings discussed above: (a) The dualistic postulate regarding the nature of phenomena which specifies quantitative versus qualitative, social and mental versus physical, and subjective versus objective is implicitly or explicitly accepted by some, rejected by others. (b) As a corollary of accepting the above postulate, those who accept it become involved in certain problems which have concerned thinkers for many centuries because only recently has the "solution" of these problems been sought in the field of linguistics and semantics.¹⁶ These problems as they are at present formulated will never be solved. They will be abandoned as meaningless.¹⁷ This is a common occurrence in the history of science. For example, Heisenberg,¹⁸ speaking for physics, has expressed the view that every fundamental advance in science involves the abandonment of hope for certain types of explanation. The solution which satisfies the rising generation appears disappointing to those whose minds are thoroughly habituated to a certain

¹⁶ See L. Bloomfield, *Linguistic Aspects of Science* ("International Encyclopedia of Unified Science," Vol. I, No. 4 [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1939]).

¹⁷ Cf. L. S. Stebbing, "Language and Misleading Questions," *Journal of Unified Science (Erkenntnis)*, VII (1939), 5-6.

¹⁸ W. Heisenberg, *Wandlungen in den Grundlagen der Naturwissenschaft* (Leipzig, 1935). See also A. V. Bushkovitch, "Some Consequences of the Positivistic Interpretation of Physics," *Philosophy of Science*, January, 1940, pp. 97-102.

type of language system, that is, the objective-subjective, mental-physical dichotomies. There are, for example, physicists in their own day of the very highest caliber who cannot adjust to the Einsteinian transformation.

One finds a similar attitude among many physicists whose careers began when the quantum theory was not yet in existence; while the younger generation which has, scientifically speaking, grown up with the new ideas, almost automatically adopts some form of positivism. . . . There are some consequences of the positivistic view . . . which . . . are undoubtedly the cause of much of the opposition to the positivistic interpretation. This is the psychological fact that in this interpretation physics, and with it all exact natural sciences, become much less attractive, or one had perhaps better say, much less satisfying esthetically, to a mind conditioned by the scientific philosophy of the nineteenth century.¹⁹

The psychological phenomenon reviewed above may be expected to remain one of the principal obstacles to the redefinition of sociological concepts and of the frame of reference of which the present meanings of these words are an integral part. Space permits only a few further examples from the article here under examination. Take the following revealing passages:

This procedure may be illustrated by the current view held by some students that "intelligence" is what intelligence tests measure. The argument is that intelligence tests do catch something that is stable, and in place of declaring that one does not know what is this stable content that is caught, one calls it "intelligence" and assigns it a numerical value. Some points should be noted about this interesting means of escaping the problem. First, the stable content that is

¹⁹ Bushkovitch, *op. cit.*, pp. 98 and 99. For an illustration of this phenomenon as regards positivism in the social sciences see a book review by P. A. Sorokin in *American Journal of Sociology*, XLV (March, 1940), 795-98, in which the book under review is found incomprehensible because, among other things, it is alleged to be inconsistent with the views of Avenarius, Gibbs, Ostwald, Pearson, Planck, Duhem, *et al.*, as to the theoretical structure of natural science. The answer has perhaps been most briefly summarized by E. T. Bell as follows: "The *fundamentals* of the science which our century inherited from its predecessors have been *modified*, now slightly, now quite perceptibly, till our outlook on the physical universe today bears but little resemblance to that of only thirty years ago. Great and striking as these advances are, there has been another, most rapidly developed since 1930, which has been slowly gathering momentum for all of 2300 years, which is of far deeper significance for 'truth'—or Pilate's query—than any of the radical advances of science of the past thirty years. Being more fundamental, more radical, and simpler than any of the spectacular advances in science, naturally this new advance has escaped the notice which its far-reaching importance merits. Yet it is of profound significance for all theorizing and truth-seeking, scientific or other" (*The Search for Truth* [New York, 1934], pp. 7 and 8).

isolated *has no nature*; that is to say that the operation by means of which one arrives at that content does nothing more than indicate that there is something that is stable. The operation as such cannot analyze or characterize that "something"; confined to such operations, that "something" neither has a nature nor could it ever secure a nature. Thus, to illustrate, "intelligence" becomes merely a numerical value. Second, not having a nature, the conceptualized item cannot be studied—*it gets its significance only through being related to other items*. [How else do *any* items get significance?]

What such a type of mathematical logic (into which the method resolves itself) could yield in the understanding of empirical life is unknown. If followed successfully, assuming that it could be followed successfully, it would result in an *exceedingly odd framework of interrelated symbols. These symbols would be nothing like concepts as we are familiar with them, as in present day social psychology*. For the symbolized item would have neither a content capable of being studied nor a nature capable of generic extension; it would never stand for a problem to be investigated nor have any evolutionary development. To apply such symbols to human conduct as it is being studied by social psychology, one would have to work through concepts such as those we now have. And once this step is taken one is thrown back to the initial problem of the concept. What this means is that the symbols arrived at by the procedure being discussed become intelligible and capable of application only through the use of another order of concepts and hence they do not displace this latter kind of concept. [Italics mine.]

Note the concern of the author with the "nature"²⁰ of the phenomena as designated by different types of symbols. The familiar word "intelligence" he finds designates something with a "nature." The expression "I.Q. 100," for example, unfortunately does not. The operation involved in determining "I.Q. 100," he finds, cannot "analyze or characterize" what is referred to. But obviously the operations involved in the construction of an intelligence test and its application do precisely this. The operations characterize (and analyze in terms of the structure of the scale) a certain behavior phenomenon as contrasted with the operations

²⁰ It is my contention that, in science at least, any talk about the "nature" of things apart from the methods of inquiry into them is absurd. The methods of inquiry are an inextricable part of the process by which we impute a "nature" to things. John Dewey has labored for forty years with the alleged philosophical difficulties of such a viewpoint, and it seems to me has completely resolved and reconciled them with the accepted theory and practice of natural science in this regard: ". . . Mr. Russell writes: 'We are told very little about the nature of things before they are inquired into.' If I have said or tried to say the tiniest bit about the 'nature of things' prior to inquiry about them, I have not only done something completely contradictory to my own position but something that seems to me inherently absurd" (*The Philosophy of John Dewey*, p. 546).

which characterize any or all other degrees of "intelligence."²¹ Why does he say that "I.Q. 100" "becomes merely a numerical value"? Do these symbols not stand for a certain "problem-solving ability" just as truly and somewhat more specifically than that other symbol, the word "intelligence"? Actually, says our author, in order to apply such an expression as "I.Q. 100" to human conduct we have to "think of it as standing for something generic, such as 'problem-solving ability'" (p. 712 n.). Now, I submit that the one expression is as directly meaningful as the other *to all people familiar with the symbolism in question*. To the professional chemist, H₂O has as direct a reference to an empirical phenomenon as has the word "water" to the rest of us. The chemist's symbols, furthermore, have a much more specific, analytical, and characterizing denotation than does the folk symbol. This holds for all scientific terminology. Scientific training consists largely in divesting ourselves of the necessity of conjuring up "mentally" a horse pulling a wagon every time we use the term "horse power." But when we do acquire scientific *Sprachgefühl*, we realize that this language has direct reference to "something stable," the "nature" of which is more adequately, analytically, and characteristically specified by the scientific symbol than by the symbol with which we used to designate a broadly similar phenomenon or event in our prescientific days.²²

I am forced to the conclusion, therefore, that the whole position so earnestly argued in the above quotation rests upon an assumption that folk language has a certain primary, intrinsic power of denoting the "nature" of things which scientific language and operationally defined concepts do not have. This conclusion is further supported by the author's statements that the proposed operational definitions "would result in an

²¹ For elaboration of this crucial point see my paper, "The Measurement of Socio-economic Status," *American Sociological Review*, V (February, 1940), 35-37.

²² A somewhat similar phenomenon is familiar to everyone who has learned a foreign language. There is a stage during which it is necessary to translate the foreign language into one's own before it has significance, whereas with real familiarity (e.g., the language we learn well in childhood) the foreign words no longer have to be translated into another language to give them significance. Something analogous to this seems to me to be involved in what H. Becker chooses to call the "esoteric," referring to quantitative and other objective procedures as a "ritual" composed of "sacred sounds," etc. (*Contemporary Social Theory* [New York, 1940], p. 17). I think this is an emotional rather than a rational objection in this case, as Mr. Becker is himself quite familiar with quantitative techniques and knows very well that in the hands of a competent practitioner there is nothing mysterious or esoteric about them. For further comments on this see my "Some Problems of Group Classification and Measurement," *American Sociological Review*, V (June, 1940), 353-54 n.

exceedingly odd framework of interrelated symbols. These symbols would be nothing like concepts as we are familiar with them, as in present-day social psychology." Alas, I fear science is precisely such an odd framework, and many new symbols and new meanings of old symbols are the lot of the social sciences as of all others. Let no man assume, either, that I am unsympathetic with the travail which such a change of language habits involves to one who, like myself, did not discover until relatively late in life that scientific advance lies in a large measure along this hard, rough road. I shall probably never acquire facility in thinking in some of the terms which are already in common use in various sociological publications, and I know and hope that some day the rising generation will leave me completely in the lurch. When that time comes, I do not propose either to accept or to deny what they say merely because I do not understand it. I hope I shall be able to keep an open mind on their work until such time, if ever, such evidence as I can understand becomes available.

All the other conclusions of the paper under review are merely further illustrations of the points discussed above. There is, for example, the familiar objection that social phenomena are "different"—that "when we observe that a person is acting aggressively, or belligerently, or respectfully, or hatefully, or jealously, or kindly, this kind of activity cannot be reduced to a physical act or translated into a space-time framework and still retain the character suggested by the adverbs employed" (p. 714). On the basis of what *except* physical acts (behavior—whether they be a clenched fist or the subtlest quiver of an eyelash, or the observer's own viscera, "consciousness," or what not—can we infer the phenomena denoted by the adverbs given? Let us go further and admit that the clenched fist indicates hatred in one culture and love in another. No behavior has any meaning except in a context. An object falls only if it moves downward relatively to a frame of reference. This frame of reference is as omnipresent in physical as in social observations or in the observer's study of his own "consciousness." I have already pointed out the absurdity of implying that operationists or the proponents of more objective methods in sociology in general propose to ignore, deny, or "abjure" phenomena of the type here illustrated, or indeed any observable social phenomena whatever.²³

²³ For a recent approach to the problem of objectively handling "similar" social behavior which, however, has different "meaning" in different cultures see C. S. Ford, "Society, Culture, and the Human Organism," *Journal of Genetic Psychology*, XX (1939), 135-79.

As stated at the outset, the sole purpose of this review is to attempt to go to the roots of a difference of viewpoint which is, I think, crucial to the future of sociology in general. To achieve this end, the issues should be defined as sharply as possible. They seem to me to resolve themselves into the following questions:

1. Are we agreed that sociology is at present handicapped by a lack of precision and objectivity in the definition of the concepts which symbolize the phenomena with which we are concerned?
2. Are we agreed that the remedying of this situation is a possible and proper object of systematic study?
3. Are we agreed that any methods of procedure which promise to contribute to the desired results should be encouraged?
4. Do the critics of operationism affirm the postulate of some phenomena as essentially quantitative or qualitative *in nature*, or will they agree that this is solely a question of the type of symbols and language with which we choose to designate phenomena? In the latter instance we may leave the question of quantification to be decided in each individual case, solely on the basis of convenience and the results it yields. The operationist regards quality and quantity merely as extreme points on a continuous scale of precision in human observation²⁴ on which he recognizes at least five gradations instead of the two represented by "quality" and "quantity." The operationist agrees that purely qualitative designations must and should be used whenever and until more precise designations are developed. This allows full freedom for experimentation with any methods which promise to arrive at more precise and objective definitions.
5. Are we agreed that more precise definitions, by whatever means, may involve limiting the empirical reference which the term had before being precisely defined; that this does not constitute a denial of the reality, interest, or importance of aspects excluded by such definition; and that such excluded aspects are themselves subject to precise definition?
6. Finally, are we agreed that proposed definitions must be experimentally tested (*a*) for reliability, through the use by different persons of the proposed categories in the classification of actual data²⁵ and (*b*) for validity, through testing in actual research?

²⁴ See S. C. Dodd, *Dimensions of Society* (New York, 1942), pp. 14 and 15 and chap. iii.

²⁵ The only system of sociological concepts that hitherto has been so tested as far as I know, is that proposed in S. C. Dodd's *Dimensions of Society*. This work will doubtless be greeted with the complaint already noted, that is, an "exceedingly odd framework of interrelated symbols . . . nothing like concepts as we are familiar with them," etc. It remains a fact that here is a classification of social situations which has been formally tested and found 97 per cent reliable. The *validity* and *utility* of that system is, as

The fact that it necessarily takes more space in a paper to discuss my disagreements than to point out my agreements should not be allowed to obscure the latter. They remain the substantial working capital of what is necessarily a co-operative enterprise. In conclusion, therefore, I should like to call attention to those substantial parts of the paper criticized which are beyond question and seem to offer ample basis for working agreement. In the first place, I have not overlooked the concessions made to the operational procedure. For example, the author states (p. 711): "As a means of course of helping to enlarge and to make more definite certain aspects of the concept, the method [operationism] may be of value." No one will disagree with him, either, when he contends for the value of developing a "rich and intimate familiarity with the kind of conduct that is being studied and in employing whatever relevant imagination observers may fortunately possess" and when he expresses the view that the process of increasing precision and validation of definitions will be a slow and arduous one. As I have often said, I do not blame the critics of operationism for their opposition if they are actually of the opinion that we propose suddenly to abandon all the processes by which man has hitherto learned what he knows. A more sympathetic study of the history of operationism and what its exponents are actually doing and trying to do would alleviate some of the current fears.²⁶ Take this example: "The answer to the problem, in my judgment, is to come not by changing the character of observation . . . but by improving the kind of observa-

stated above, something which only experience can determine. But, again, it remains a fact that, before a system can be tested by experience, it must be invented and proposed. For this reason, it seems to me a great variety of proposals should be welcomed in order to provide opportunity for comparative testing.

Another common objection to new departures in method and terminology is that it is "premature." Possibly it would be well to distinguish here between what is premature for sociologists and what is premature for sociology.

²⁶ Cf. P. W. Bridgman: "It is obvious that there are 'mental' operations inextricably mixed up with such a primarily physical thing as measuring a length, and of course there are operations which are almost entirely 'mental,' as for example counting, which the physicist, no less than the financier, could get along without" (*The Intelligent Individual and Society* [New York, 1938], p. 46). See also my "The Concept of Law in the Social Sciences," *Philosophy of Science*, V (April, 1938), 194, n. 7. Also the admirable summary by Read Bain, in Blumer, *Critiques of Research in the Social Sciences*, I, 191 ff. See also the concessions I have made in *Foundations of Sociology* (p. 81) to the criticisms of R. B. Lindsay ("A Critique of Operationalism in Physics," *Philosophy of Science*, IV [October, 1937], 456-70). A critical paper by H. Hart ("Operationism Analyzed Operationally," *Philosophy of Science*, VII [July, 1940], 288-313) should also be mentioned in this connection.

tion," etc. (p. 718). Now, it seems to me that one way of improving the kind of observation is by changing the character of observation (namely, from less to greater precision), and I am interested in operationism chiefly because it seems to represent a way of so improving observation and communication of what is observed.

Finally, I appreciate as highly as any man the importance of what Cooley called "those delicate social insights that are stored up in [folk] speech." My point has been rather that we must not retain also the superstitions which our primitive ancestors attached to this speech and that in any case these folk concepts are only the beginning of the scientific quest. Nor do I believe that the refinements of science have ever in any field destroyed, obscured, or handicapped the free play of creative or constructive imagination but rather the contrary.

BENNINGTON COLLEGE

REJOINDER

Dr. Lundberg's discussion, I feel, arises from a failure to read accurately my remarks. His misinterpretation leads him to attribute to me views which I do not hold and to raise issues with which my article is not concerned. In my article,¹ in criticizing different proposals for the clarification of concepts in social psychology, I considered as one of them the method which would "confine the meaning of a concept to quantitative and mensurative data secured with reference to it" (p. 710). I said that this view "has been presented in recent years under the heading of the method of 'operational definition.'" Apparently, what Dr. Lundberg objects to is the identification of this method as the method of *operational definition*. Since my purpose in the article was to consider proposed methods and not to discuss labels, whether the method that I was analyzing should be called the method of "operational definition" is a matter of the aptness of designation. In the light of the confusion and inconsistency among "operationists" as to the meaning of "operational definition," perhaps it was somewhat gratuitous on my part to choose this label. Particularly is this true if one accepts the broadened definition proposed by Dr. Lundberg in his discussion²—a definition which seems to make "operational" procedure synonymous with the ancient and general practice of denotation. Since my treatment, however, was restricted to a method which I carefully defined, all discussion based on the assumption that "operational definition" refers to something other than this method is irrelevant to the point of my remarks. As far as these com-

¹ "The Problem of the Concept in Social Psychology," *American Journal of Sociology*, XLV (March, 1940), 707-19.

² "Actually, the simplest form of operational definition of a word is to point to its referent while enunciating the word" (p. 730).

ments are concerned nothing would be affected by changing the label from "operational definition" to something else—even though, as Dr. Lundberg says, "some of the best definitions of operational procedure are essentially of the character described" by my statement of the method.

With reference to this method—"that which would confine the meaning of a concept to quantitative and mensurative data secured with reference to it"—Dr. Lundberg criticizes what I have written seemingly on two counts. The first of these is that my remarks presuppose separation of the world into two realms—the qualitative and the quantitative—each with its own inherent and "ultimate" nature. This is not my position; being a pragmatist in point of view, I do not subscribe to a philosophy of *Ding an sich*. By referring to the article (p. 711), the reader should see that what was stated was that one could successfully employ this method only if the method fitted the type of problem under consideration. I regard this as a matter of common sense—but the idea can be buttressed by two quotations from Dewey, upon whom Dr. Lundberg draws for much of his reference.

It is *ultimately the nature of the problem* in hand which decides what sort of comparison-measurement is required in order to obtain a determinate solution.³

It is as absurd to insist upon numerical measurement when the end to which the quantitative proposition is related as means to consequences is qualitative, as it is to be content with qualitative measurement (which is then guess work) in the case of other ends in view.⁴

In declaring that problems may be "essentially" qualitative or quantitative in nature, I do not postulate an inherent dichotomy in the world—any more than does Dewey. My statement merely means that the problems together with the data they subtend may be either qualitative or quantitative in character. This point suggests the advisability of employing methods suited to the problem. To approach all problems in social psychology with a method which would confine one to quantitative and mensurative data is not, in my judgment, a means of handling the conceptual dilemma in social psychology. This is the point at issue and not the existence of an inherent qualitative-quantitative dichotomy—a question to which Dr. Lundberg devotes needlessly so many pages of his discussion.

The second criticism which Dr. Lundberg advances centers on the statement: "To limit this meaning to what is determinable quantitatively or mensuratively is essentially an act of reduction which may be at the expense of the empirical reference which the concept originally had and with which one is concerned" (p. 710). This statement seems to me to be clear. What it implies is that to *confine* the meaning of a concept to a quantitative content, when

³ John Dewey, *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry* (New York, 1938), p. 205. (Italics mine.)

⁴ *Ibid.*

the concept refers to a qualitative problem, "may be at the expense of the empirical reference which the concept originally had." Dr. Lundberg's contention that every precision of a concept means a delimitation of its meaning is true, but it has nothing to do with the statement criticized.

Nothing is to be gained by giving further instances of misinterpretation. After all, the point in my discussion of operational procedure was simple. It is just this. Our concepts in social psychology are admittedly ambiguous and require increased clarity and preciseness in denotation. This conceptual improvement cannot be secured by a method which would *limit* the meaning of concepts to what is quantitatively and mensuratively determinable, for multitudes of our problems in social psychology are of such a nature as not to be handled by such a method. To force them into a form capable of being treated by such a method may be at the expense of significant empirical items. I believe it desirable to retain concepts, despite their ambiguity, rather than to sacrifice a significant empirical content. Precision should be sought along the line of patient and careful investigation of this empirical content instead of by ignoring it or discarding it. It is better, in my judgment, to have concepts, even though ambiguous, which have a significant empirical reference than to displace them by concepts of specious precision which lose this empirical content.

In the light of these remarks the answer to the specific questions posed by Dr. Lundberg (see p. 735) should be clear. The verifiability of a given operational definition by "empirical reality" is not the point at issue; the question is whether the definition catches the scope of "empirical reality" that is demanded by the problem with which one is dealing.

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THE ELITE AND THE ELITES

MARIAN W. BETH

ABSTRACT

Individuals of high "special personal prestige" belong to the élite of their group. Social ascendancy, however, is directed toward a position of high total social prestige. Such social prestige can be attained only when an individual holds an élite position in several élite groups that belong to élite categories. Some groups and categories are fixed (for instance, those of family and racial belongingness); others allow for horizontal and vertical social mobility. Individual efforts will, therefore, tend to make use of the freedom of changing groups, where such change is feasible. Where belonging to a group is fixed, trends for social improvement will take the form of gaining enhanced prestige for one's group and category.

Intragroup prestige is largely achievement prestige, qualified, however, by the phenomenon of transfer of intergroup prestige and intercategory prestige. This transfer is a cause of intragroup struggle and sometimes the cause of group collapse or shifting of group functions. Group struggles for prestige develop where a change in social function is accompanied by a change in group prestige, which is antagonizing to powerful groups, or where ascendant individuals strive for a promotion of their own groups. The changes in social function for a given group may, at the same time, encompass a wide range and be of a very transitory nature.

This paper seeks to establish the distinction between special and general types of prestige and that between special élites and the general élite. It also deals with the transfer of prestige and the mutual interdependence of the various patterns of social stratification. Finally, it treats some of the implications of these patterns for the governmental élite.

"Special personal prestige" is the rank of a person in a particular group. Man belongs by necessity to various categories of groups (vocational, church, race, family, educational, recreational, and other groups), and he acquires in each of these groups an intragroup special personal prestige in a way more or less independent of his position in the other groups. The individual also acquires a ranking not just within this particular subgroup (e.g., within the blacksmith group), but he is also ranked with his total group (e.g., the total occupational hierarchy). Thus each individual possesses a "general vocational prestige," a "general church prestige," and so on. These forms of prestige are then combined into a "total social prestige," which decides a person's élite position.

I

In defining and analyzing the total social prestige of an individual, the investigation must, for convenience' sake, start with the group, usually a primary or mixed primary-secondary group, which grades its members

according to group standards. This intragroup grading system often may be called figuratively an "achievement test system," in which the ratings are based on a practical knowledge of the rated individual and of the skills and achievements involved.

For convenience in exposition we shall further assume the quantifiability of the phenomena under discussion. Thus we will assume that we have established a scale from 0 to ± 100 for the normal group achievements.¹ We will further assume that individuals who belong to the upper half of the scale—grade higher than fifty—have "prestige" (in the narrow sense of the term) within the group. Those persons who belong to the upper quartile will be said to have "high prestige" and will be defined as the "group élite."

The rank which is imputed to the individual is based partly on the type of achievement and partly on the quality of the achievements of the individual within the group. Rousiers² has declared that the higher ranks in each group demand not only a better performance of the same activities which the lower ranks perform but also the performance of more complicated activities. The foreman does not merely do the job better than his men; he does a qualitatively different job. He shows the same skill in a higher degree of perfection, and he also shows other aptitudes, such as vision, co-ordination, skill in handling persons, organizational techniques, and so on. Thus the group associates with certain types of functions or positions the expectation of a certain degree of achievement and a certain quality of aptitude. When an individual does not come up to these expectations, his group rating must be adjusted.

On the one hand, resentment toward and consequent derogation of the person involved are due to the group's feeling of frustration on being deprived of an important function, the more so the more important the function involved appears to the group. To this objective frustration is added the continuous personal blocking of conventional expectations in meeting the said individual. This incongruity between (a) necessary and

¹ It is important to remember that there are groupings which appraise certain activities not only with zero but negatively. The pauper would nowadays rank zero; the English Poor Laws ranked him negatively. Certain artistic experiments (Dadaism) were ranked negatively by the rank and file of authors and critics for a certain time. Subversive activities of all kinds occupy much attention in intragroup ratings. We must distinguish them carefully from the negative appraisal of whole groups. For instance, the master-thief ranks *plus* in his group of gangsters; but society at large ranks his whole group negatively.

² Paul de Rousiers, *L'Elite dans la société moderne* (Paris, 1914), p. 26.

actual aptitudes, (*b*) supposed and realized performance, (*c*) deserved and exacted prestige gives rise to a very aggravated form of reaction. Anger and resentment are increased by constant friction. The misplaced man gets an even worse rating than he would get if he were in a category which itself had a lower rating.

But, while these negative feelings tend to lower the rank of the individual in the eyes of the public, the influence connected with his position, his connections with influential people, his success, and many other factors raise it to a certain degree. This increase of prestige, however, does not eliminate the group's hostile feelings toward them. It results in an ambivalent attitude toward the holder of the poorly performed function as well as toward the function itself.

The situation is different in the relation between groups. In this relation the special personal prestige of the person (within the group) is usually made the basis of rating. But the prestige rating used is not that of the particular concrete person but rather the rating ordinarily granted to the function he is thought to perform. Intergroup ratings do not concern themselves with failure to conform exactly to intragroup standards unless these disconformities are spectacular or advertised by the group. We may add that there may be other reasons for intergroup standards to follow intragroup standards or to deviate from them. In times of social disintegration, intergroup judgments tend to show distrust of the justice or accuracy of certain intragroup judgments; for example, post-war public opinion in central Europe refused to accept the prestige ranks of scholastic intelligence ratings. Advertising, by giving a wrong impression of the intragroup rating, may also lead intergroup judgments astray. The case is different in the arts, where the public may refuse for a long time to fall in with the standards of the group (e.g., it may rate highly what the group itself deems to be worthless).

II

Intergroup prestige rating, however, qualifies the special personal prestige rank of a person as established by intragroup rating—by a rating of a person's group as a whole. Just as the different functions included in a given group are rated according to social usefulness, productivity, fertility, and other standards, and according to the aptitudes and skills demanded of the holder, so every given group is the object of a system of rating which ranks it in comparison with groups of the same category. The individual groups select their élites independently. But only the élite members of certain groups which in themselves enjoy a high ranking

within their particular category are accorded membership in the *élite* of this category.

For example, a scavenger of grade 80 in his group and a lawyer of the same grade in his profession both belong to the *élite* of their particular group. But the lawyer also belongs to the general occupational *élite*, and the scavenger does not; the lawyer will be elected as a member of the Rotary or some other intergroup *élite* organization, while the scavenger will be silently excluded.

Many investigations have been made which help to clarify the standards which underlie the prevailing system of occupational-status ratings. The contributions of Coutu, Hartmann, and many other authors³ show that there is considerable agreement on the position of the different vocations. The various categories of groups (church, family, party, athletic, educational, wealth, race, etc.) likewise form hierarchies of groups in which the status of the component groups can be quantitatively established. Under certain circumstances persons may enjoy approximately the same status in a variety of hierarchies. Vocational prestige and wealth, or standard of living, for instance, were once in a high positive correlation in the United States. Under such circumstances and at such a time one category may be measured by means of the other, as, for instance, in Chapin's Social Status Test. But such indirect measurements or correlations must be taken for what they are worth, that is, as checks and tests, or as substitutes for direct measurements.

As previous investigations have best clarified the scale of vocational groups, we shall start our discussion of intergroup rating with the vocational category; and we shall say, therefore, that each individual who is gainfully employed has in his occupational group a "special personal occupational prestige" (pv). If pv is higher than 75, that is, if he belongs to the upper quartile of his vocation, he belongs to the vocational *élite* of his special group. His group may have a ranking of r on the intergroup scale of the vocational category; then his general occupational prestige will be $pv \cdot r$. He will be a member of the interoccupational *élite*, if $pv \cdot r$ is higher than a given magnitude (which we defined as 0.75×0.75 , or higher).

Interesting problems arise in connection with the ranking of the unemployable, the temporarily unemployed, the shirker, and the shiftless.

³ W. Coutu, "Relative Prestige of Twenty Professions," *Social Forces*, XIV (May, 1936), 522-29; G. W. Hartmann, "The Prestige of Occupations," *Personnel Journal*, XIII (October, 1934), 144-52; "Relative Social Prestige of Representative Medical Specialities," *Journal of Applied Psychology*, XX (October, 1934), 659-63.

It is part of the task of social-security legislation to maintain the vocational prestige of the temporarily unemployed man; previously he used to lose it when he had to "go on relief," and, losing his vocational prestige, he lost most of his total social prestige, as the vocational category is so highly weighted in the intercategory scale. (This category did not enjoy its present preponderance at all times, however, nor may we assume that it will always keep it.) The monetary advantages of unemployment compensation play only a secondary role for the unemployed and for society; they are the expression of the idea that unemployment does not automatically cause loss of prestige.

As the individual—apart from his achievements and prestige in his vocational group—may belong to the general vocational élite only if he belongs to a group that reaches into the upper quartile of general prestige, in the choice of the "right" vocation becomes influenced by these standards and apart from vocational aptitudes. The blind pursuit of vocations granting high prestige therefore interferes seriously with attempts to adjust vocational choices to vocational-achievement capacities. A lower standard in a high-prestige vocation may, however, be objectively more desirable for the individual, because it may result in a higher general-vocational-prestige rating, in spite of the socially unsatisfactory service rendered by the misplaced individual.

Occupational mobility, that is, the individual's vocational adjustment by change of occupations, is valued only where the initial training period is not prohibitive (among more or less unskilled occupations) and where the prestige differential among occupations is relatively high. When, for instance, an unskilled worker wants to take a semiskilled occupation, his special vocational prestige will be initially lowered. He will soon be able, however, to win sufficient skill in his new occupation to acquire mediocre prestige, while the relative difference in prestige of the higher ranking group will have great weight with him.⁴ When, however, the initial ranking of the group is high, a change of profession may easily result in a permanent loss of general prestige. If we consider, furthermore, the fact that a high group prestige is bound up with difficult skills and (often artificially prolonged) preparatory training, we see why changes in these brackets are thought to be inadvisable. That is especially true when the

⁴ When, for instance, a high-grade scavenger (*pv*, 80, 7, 10; general vocational prestige, 10.80) becomes an unskilled laborer, where he lacks practice and knowledge of the usages, his "personal vocational prestige" will drop to about *pv*, 40. But the higher grade of unskilled labor on the intervocational scale of 7, 20, makes up at once for his drop in personal vocational prestige, and leaves vast opportunities for gaining later.

vocation to be taken up has not yet acquired a defined position in the occupational hierarchy. When the film industry developed, for example, few members of élite vocations seized this opportunity for new industrial opportunities, whereas people of lower-ranking occupations grasped it quickly.

Another aspect of intergroup prestige is related to monetary rewards of group activity. As long as there are only insignificant differences in intergroup prestige, those vocations which give the greatest financial reward attract the best type of people. People in selecting their vocations under these conditions do not think of their prestige value; they think only of their financial value and of the prestige that wealth gives in their society. When, however, a group has acquired a distinctive vocational prestige, the ambitious and highly qualified type of people flock to it, irrespective of monetary rewards. All European governing élites have experienced this phenomena. The highly esteemed vocation of judge in Germany and Austria was so low salaried that it did not even pay reproduction costs on a maintenance level. The same was true of the French bureaucracy. As Taine said, under the Third Republic, just as under the *ancien régime*, the sons of the "best families" strove for prestige in serving their country in the civil service, their rewards consisting mainly in prestige and not in money. The German officer-corps had a notoriously sub-middle-class standard of life but felt richly rewarded by the high prestige ranking which its group was accorded. The same is true of the diplomatic service of all countries, America included; the salaries paid do not cover living expenses of the higher functionaries. Hitler follows well-established precedents when he pays with prestige instead of with material goods. For, once a minimum of necessities, and a very low minimum at that, is provided, prestige becomes more important "than butter."

If a vocation has gained élite prestige, the group which has already "arrived" will try to monopolize it. Efficiency rates will fall; the group will become unable to perform the difficult functions in return for which it was accorded its high rank. Unless some type of reform in time eliminates the monopolistic conditions of admission, other groups will first take over the first group's functions, later its monetary rewards, and, in the end, its prestige. In other cases the functions of an élite vocation may become socially indifferent or worthless. Yet, it may take some time before the prestige adjustment takes place, and often this will occur only after a vehement struggle. Thus for the last fifty years the farmer in Germany was an economic liability rather than an asset. Yet farming was able not only to maintain its prestige ranking but also to enhance it by

skilful propaganda and close organization, and generally by its opposition to changes in the social and vocational hierarchy.

The interplay of special and group prestige becomes visible in an interesting form where the marginal man tries to attain *élite* qualifications. Where the group ranking is very low, the marginal man will have to leave his group behind. Usually he will find that his rise is due to traits that are alien to his group. If the group's prestige approximates *élite* status, however, a class consciousness will develop that will forbid him to leave the group. Instead he will demand *élite* prestige for the group.

The generalizations concerning the prestige of occupational groups apply also to other major groups of our society. An individual has a given grade in his church group, based usually on his status in a primary group (special church index, *pc*). His general church index (*pgc*) will depend on his intrachurch group rating and on his church's interchurch group rating (*rc*). If he is a bishop with the rating 80 in the Catholic church, he will be a member of the church *élite* group; but if he happens to be a voodoo bishop of the same grade, the voodoo cult's low intergroup prestige will exclude him from the church *élite* and from all other *élites*.

Race membership shows the same differentiation in all societies. Belonging to a race *élite* may mean all types of practical monopolies. Belonging to some particular race may exclude its members even from the minimum of civil liberties and opportunities (Negroes, Jews in Germany).⁵

Athletic performances, for example, also are an important element in a person's prestige during his younger years. When he has reached an *élite* position (as member of the Oxford Eight, captain of a nationally known baseball team), this position may be maintained and transferred to a high degree into later life, when athletic prowess per se usually has less intercategory weight.

We may add family membership, education, physical attractiveness, social charm, political associations, and so on as important categories which contribute to total social prestige. In each case the special personal prestige is qualified by the group prestige.

The different intergroup general prestiges which each individual acquires culminate in his total social prestige (*P*). All the traits which an

⁵ Religious intolerance, just as racial intolerance now, meant that general religious prestige was weighted so high in intercategory ranking that members of low-ranking religious groups were excluded from *élite* position in other groups; England, for example, admitted only members of the Church of England to certain vocations. Tolerance occurred at a time when the intercategory weight of church membership had diminished. But it is important to observe that tolerance is by no means always an all-round diminution of intercategory barriers.

individual possesses contribute toward forming this prestige. Some of these factors are necessary for every member of a society. Some, like membership in clubs, participation in hobbies and humanitarian activities, are voluntarily acquired. Some are predetermined, like race, or family membership; some are flexible or semiflexible and offer an opportunity of social rise. Voluntary associations may also serve to heighten the total prestige grade reached by the more objective categories; but this adjustment is narrowly limited. However, the salient factor is to be found in the fact that the various intracategorical prestiges enter the intercategorical scale with very different weights. These weighting standards differ in time; they differ geographically within the same society; they differ with the sexes. High weighting, for example, was once attributed to church membership. This category is still fairly highly weighted in villages and towns, but not in metropolitan groups, and may be negatively valued in certain educational or political groups. Physical attractiveness is highly weighted in women; it is less highly weighted in men. The transition from the feudal to the industrial era was characterized by the diminishing weight of family membership and the increased weight of vocational prestige. Political revolutions often result in an emphasis of the category of political membership to the exclusion of all other factors. Bureaucratic organizations, like the Chinese, weight educational prestige higher than they do other categories. In observing the consequences of such categorial changes, we notice correlated or interrelated changes of all other categorial grades.

We must, however, carefully distinguish between correlations of ranks in different categories and the transfer of prestige from one category to another. Thus a criminal might be individually a desirable member of a given group until he lost his prestige in another group. When a person's political or sexual improprieties become so spectacular that his losing prestige with a given group is visible to other groups, he is also eliminated from these latter groups.

Some of these transfers are consistent with the standards of the groups between which they occur. The practice of "ennobling" descendants (as in Europe) or ancestors (as in China) is based on the assumption that the merits of the individual reflect merits of his upbringing or of his hereditary traits and that a continuance of family prominence over a given amount of time must be due to some inherited traits of adaptability or other qualities which seem desirable for the community.

A transfer of negative evaluations of behavior in nonoccupational categories is partly based in historical developments. The felon, for example,

was dishonored and therefore could not continue to be a member of an honorable group. Objectively, one may fear that patterns of life which make for criminal behavior make also for disloyalty in vocational relations. Another instance shows clearly that negative prestige may not be connected with moral disapproval. Men teachers employed in German high schools for girls refused in the late nineteenth century to work under women principals. This resulted because the negative prestige of the female sex (the negative prestige of a woman in her sex category) made it impossible for her to assume a leading position over men (the sex with the highly weighted positive sex category) even in the vocational category. It is in this light that we can understand why members of an old family may be cautious in not risking their prestige standing by financial ventures. Members of the most prestige-bearing vocations will try to keep up with the Joneses.

On the other hand, we have cases in which the transfer of prestige from one group to another results in grants of prestige which are not merited by the standards prevailing in the groups into which the transfer takes place. An immigrant of certain aptitudes, for example, will be able to render a given service approximately equal to that rendered by a native American of the same aptitude and training. Yet the native American in that particular occupation will possess higher prestige rating than the foreigner, even though their vocational skills are equal. The German Nazi revolution has shown impressively the transfer from the category of political membership to that of vocational prestige. We do not speak here of the fact that vocational élite positions become the spoils of unskilled individuals. Rather, every major business or group engaged a man whose only merit consisted in his association with the victorious party and whose business it was to transfer his special political prestige to the group with which he worked, this latter prestige becoming the nucleus of his vocational prestige. In times when political party membership is not weighted so heavily on the intercategorical scale, or when most of the vocational groups have adjusted themselves to the given political system, and when accordingly such skill is practically valueless, the employment of party politicians is less likely. Before the Nazi revolution the party system in Germany bestowed civil service positions on members of the different parties proportionately to their numerical strength in parliament and, of course, on the basis of a vocational-merit system. That meant that a nonpartisan citizen was practically excluded from the civil service and that a partisan candidate's chances grew in the same proportion as his party grew in power. Another technically unjustified transfer was the

preference of "heads of families," not because of their greater maturity, stability, or experience, but for purposes of social welfare. The transfer from physical attractions to vocational prestige, from athletic achievements to academic standing, from family membership to educational opportunities, is a recurrent feature of stabilized civilizations.

When the general total social prestige of an individual has reached a given magnitude, we say that this individual belongs to the general social *élite* (briefly designated as *élite*). Nobody can achieve this rank without belonging to some of the *élites* of those groups which have heavily weighted *élite* ratings. Only in very exceptional cases may genius-achievement in a single heavily weighted category effect admission to the *élite*. There are, however, examples of such exceptions: Lady Nelson's beauty, Napoleon's vocational genius—accentuated perhaps by the right political membership—Mme Curie's talents, admitted their possessors to the *élites* of their societies.

In describing the *élite* one must stress its statistical character. The individual members do not know one another personally. They seldom share the same interests, aims, purpose, outlook. They meet only casually. The *élite* is not a "class"; it is not even a "group." Members of the *élite* often live in isolation, devoted to their individual tasks, reluctant to organize in any way. Their ambivalent position results in a high degree of individualism (nonconformity). When members of the *élite* meet at all it is casually, in the unprofessional surroundings of "society." The isolated *élite* member is very likely to dissipate his influence and to be paralyzed by unco-ordinated influences of other *élite* members. When these are socially bound together, they provide reciprocal support and stimulation. The results of this show a sudden acceleration of cultural development, as found in the various "golden ages" of cultural history, and, at the same time, a sudden decline of the creative progress, when the integrating force, the prince, for example, disappears.

REED COLLEGE

NEWS AND NOTES

RESEARCH NEWS

Menninger Foundation.—The Menninger Foundation, Topeka, Kansas, was organized last year to provide psychiatric treatment for patients in the low-income bracket, to encourage research in psychiatric and psychological fields, and to advance psychiatric education. In addition to local officers, the following trustees have been elected: Dr. Winfred Overholser, St. Elizabeth's Hospital, Washington, D.C.; Mrs. Albert Lasker, New York City; Dr. John C. Whitehorn, Johns Hopkins University; Mrs. Lucy Stearns McLaughlin, Santa Fe, New Mexico; Dean J. Roscoe Miller, Northwestern University Medical School; Mrs. Sidney C. Borg, Jewish Board of Guardians, New York City; George E. Hite, Jr., New York City. The Foundation has secured a subsidy to carry on various researches, including a ten-year study of the use of occupational therapy in psychiatric treatment, as well as a study of the use of hypnosis in emergency psychotherapy.

University of Minnesota.—Applications for in-service fellowships in public administration for the year 1942-43 are now being received by the University of Minnesota from persons who have had not less than three years of experience in public service and who wish more training. Application must be submitted not later than April 1, 1942.

National Resources Planning Board.—A special committee entitled "A Committee on Wartime Requirements for Specialized Personnel" has been appointed as part of the National Roster of Scientific and Specialized Personnel. The membership of the Committee includes Leonard Carmichael, chairman; Edward C. Elliott, president, Purdue University; Marion B. Folsom, treasurer, Eastman Kodak Company; Guy Stanton Ford, former president, University of Minnesota; Brigadier General Lewis B. Hershey, director, Selective Service System; Edward F. McGrady, special adviser to the Secretary of War; Monseigneur John A. Ryan, National Catholic Welfare Council; John W. Studebaker, commissioner of education, Federal Security Agency; Baldwin M. Woods, University of California; Owen D. Young, honorary member, board of directors, Gen-

eral Electric Company. James C. O'Brien, executive officer of the National Roster of Scientific and Specialized Personnel, will act in a similar capacity for the work of this Committee.

United States Bureau of the Census.—The Bureau of the Census announces that, owing to the wartime emergency, the general distribution of Census publications and other releases as practiced in the past has been discontinued. Hereafter reports will be sent, when available, only in response to specific, written requests, which should briefly explain the needs of the inquirer so that substitute material may be sent if the specific material requested is not available. So that interested persons may not be completely cut off from access to the Census publications, the Bureau will continue to supply certain libraries with a complete file of Census materials.

NOTES

American Academy of Political and Social Science.—The American Academy of Political and Social Science offers student memberships for three dollars per year. The only requirement for membership is that the student indicate the name of the educational institution in which he is enrolled. Persons interested in membership in the Academy should communicate with the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 3457 Walnut Street, Philadelphia.

American Catholic Sociological Society.—The Fourth Annual Meeting of the American Catholic Sociological Society was held in New York, December 28-30. The new officers of the Society follow: president, Walter Willigan, St. John's University, Brooklyn, New York; vice-president, Helen M. Toole, College of New Rochelle, New Rochelle, New York; executive secretary, Rev. Ralph A. Gallagher, S.J., Loyola University, Chicago, Illinois; treasurer, Sister Mary Liguori, B.V.M., Mundelein College, Chicago, Illinois. Other members of the Council of the Society are: Rev. Paul Hanly Furfey, Catholic University, Washington, D.C.; Rev. Francis J. Freidel, S.M., University of Dayton, Dayton, Ohio; Frank T. Flynn, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, Indiana. The New York meetings were attended by more than three hundred persons, and the sessions were of general as well as of particular interest.

American Economic Association.—The fifty-fourth annual meeting of the American Economic Association was held in New York in conjunc-

tion with the other affiliated social science meetings. Among the sessions of special interest to sociologists was one on the "Economic Problems of American Cities," at which papers were given on the following topics: "A Survey of the Economic Problems of American Cities," Leverett S. Lyon, Association of Commerce, Chicago; "The Financial Problems of Cities," Frederick L. Bird, Dun and Bradstreet; "Economic Aspects of Blighted Areas, Zoning, and Rehabilitation Laws," Ernest M. Fisher, American Bankers Association.

American Historical Association.—The annual meeting of the American Historical Association was held in Chicago, December 27-30. The officers of the Association for the year 1942 are: Arthur Meier Schlesinger, Harvard University, president; Nellie Neilson, Mt. Holyoke College, vice-president; and William Linn Westermann, Columbia University, secretary.

American Social Hygiene Association.—National Social Hygiene Day was observed by the associate and affiliate agencies of the Association on February 4. The Twenty-ninth Annual Meeting of the Association was held in Boston on February 3.

American Sociological Society.—The Thirty-sixth Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Society was held in New York, December 27-29, 1941. Meeting in conjunction with the Sociological Society were the Rural Sociological Society, the Committee on Cultural Integration, the Sociological Research Association, and Alpha Kappa Delta, social science honor society.

The following officers were elected for the year 1942: Dwight Sander-son, Cornell University, president; Harold A. Phelps, University of Pittsburgh, first vice-president; Conrad Taeuber, Department of Agriculture, secretary-treasurer; Katharine Jocher, University of North Carolina, second vice-president. J. O. Hertzler, University of Nebraska, and Rupert Vance, University of North Carolina, were elected to the executive committee. Richard T. LaPiere, Stanford University, and T. Lynn Smith, Louisiana State University, were elected to the editorial board.

At its business meeting the Society adopted a new constitution which, among other things, provides for greater flexibility in the arrangement of sections and programs, for election of officers by mail, and for representation of regional and other affiliated societies on the executive committee.

Conference on Business Education.—The ninth annual Conference on Business Education will be held at the University of Chicago, June 26–27. The Conference will be concerned with standards of business education. Persons interested in securing further information about the program are asked to write to Frank A. Mancina, at the School of Business, University of Chicago.

Far Eastern Quarterly.—The first number of the *Far Eastern Quarterly* appeared in November of last year. The *Quarterly* is concerned with various aspects of far eastern relations and is edited by Cyrus H. Peake, of Columbia University, Hugh Borton, of Columbia University, and Earl H. Pritchard, of Wayne University. The members of the Advisory Editorial Board include representatives of various universities, as well as of the Institute of Pacific Relations and the Institute of Social Research.

Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America.—The Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America announces a conference sponsored by its Commission to Study the Bases of a Just and Durable Peace. This conference will be held at Ohio Wesleyan University, March 3–5. The chairman of the conference is John Foster Dulles.

Journal of Educational Sociology.—The December issue of the *Journal* was devoted to the topic of "The Problem of Morale in These United States." The January issue dealt with "Women in National Defense," and the February, March, and April issues will continue discussion of various aspects of defense policies.

Michigan Sociological Society.—The Fifth Annual Meeting of the Michigan Sociological Society was held at Michigan State College, November 14, 1941. Among the sessions of special interest was a round table on "The Future of Prediction in Sociology," in which the participants were Ernest W. Burgess, Howard Becker, Robert C. Angell, Duane Gibson, and Stuart Lottier.

National Citizens Committee of the White House Conference on Children in a Democracy.—The National Citizens Committee of the White House Conference on Children in a Democracy is now publishing a new bulletin, *Community Projects for Child Welfare*. The first issue of this bulletin appeared in January, 1942. Persons interested in securing further information are asked to communicate with Mrs. Betty Eckhardt May, director, 122 East Twenty-second Street, New York City.

National Conference on Family Relations.—A joint meeting of the National Conference on Family Relations and the New York State Conference on Marriage and the Family was held in New York, December 29-31. The central theme of the conference was "Family Preparedness." Ernest W. Burgess, of the University of Chicago, is the chairman of the Conference for 1942. Evelyn Millis Duvall succeeds Dr. Burgess as secretary-treasurer. The headquarters of the Conference will continue to be at 1126 East Fifty-ninth Street, Chicago.

President's Committee on Fair Employment Practices.—Elmer W. Henderson, formerly of the department of sociology of Dillard University, has been added to the staff of the Committee on Fair Employment Practices.

Sociological Research Association.—The Sociological Research Association met on New York in conjunction with the Christmas meeting of the American Sociological Society. Papers on "Problems, Techniques, and Appraisal of Community Studies" were given by C. C. Taylor and Kimball Young and on "Social Causation" by R. M. MacIver. A paper by Stuart C. Dodd on "Systematic Sociology" was discussed by Read Bain and F. Stuart Chapin.

Social Science Meetings.—During the Christmas holidays, in addition to the American Sociological Society, the following associations met in New York: Rural Sociological Society, American Catholic Society, American Association for Labor Legislation, American Association of University Teachers of Insurance, American Business Law Association, American Farm Economic Association, American Marketing Association, American Statistical Association, Econometric Society, Institute for Mathematical Statistics, Tax Institute, American Finance Association, and the National Conference on Family Living.

Southeastern Cooperative League.—The annual meeting of the Southeastern Cooperative League was held in Atlanta, Georgia, January 9-10. The theme of the meeting was "Cooperatives in a World at War."

United States Department of Justice.—Natan C. Leites, formerly of the Department of Political Science, University of Chicago, is now with the Department.

University of Chicago.—Helen Russell Wright has been appointed dean of the School of Social Service Administration, succeeding Edith Abbott, who will retire.

The Social Science Division seminar, "Race and Cultural Contacts," has been resumed this year, after having been discontinued during the past year. The members of the seminar are concentrating their attention particularly on the effect of world-conflict on the morale of ethnic groups in this country as well as throughout the globe. Persons who are interested in any papers which may be given or who are working in this field are invited to communicate with Everett C. Hughes, at the University.

University of Hawaii.—Word was received following the Japanese attack on Honolulu, on December 7, that the University has suspended operations. It is not known for how long this suspension will continue. Members of the department of sociology and anthropology, Professors Felix Kessing, Andrew Lind, Gordon Bowles, and Bernhard Hormann, are engaged in morale work.

University of Kansas City.—The Second Inter-American Institute of the University was held January 16-17. The Institute was directed by Clarence R. Senior and Lynn I. Perrigo. The program included a student section in which student organizations of various universities and colleges participated.

Morehouse College.—The Third Annual Forum Series of the department of sociology was conducted weekly, from October 8 through December 10. The speakers in the series were William Y. Bell, executive secretary, Atlanta Urban League; J. B. Blayton, department of business administration, Atlanta University; Joseph R. Murphy, Social Security Board; R. B. Eleazer, educational secretary, Southern Interracial Commission; Will Mercer Cook, department of Romance languages, Atlanta University; C. L. Harper, president, Georgia State Teachers and Educational Association; Mrs. Frances Dwyer, Fulton County Legal Aid Society; Anne Cook, Spelman College; and Judge John D. Humphries, Fulton County Superior Court.

University of Nebraska.—"Nebraska Population Changes: 1930-1940," compiled by J. O. Hertzler, is now available. This study appears in pamphlet form in the "University of Nebraska Series."

State College of Washington.—Joseph Birdsell has been appointed instructor in anthropology. He replaces Donald Collier, who has resigned.

University of Wisconsin.—Under the leadership of Max. C. Otto, chairman of the department of philosophy, on January 11 and 12, the University commemorated the birth of William James. Among the speakers at the exercises were Dickinson S. Miller, Columbia University; Norman Cameron, University of Wisconsin; Julius S. Bixler, Harvard University; and B. H. Bode, Ohio State University.

Yale University.—Albert Galloway Keller retires in June of this year, terminating fifty years at Yale in the role of student and teacher. Dr. Keller, who has been a member of the Yale faculty for more than forty years, taught his last class on January 16 and will take a leave of absence until his formal retirement. Student and colleague of William Graham Sumner, Dr. Keller has borne the title of William Graham Sumner Professor of the Science of Society since 1932. In 1927 he completed and published Sumner's unfinished work, the four volumes of the *Science of Society*.

PERSONAL

Enoch Hieronymus, community adviser emeritus at the University of Illinois, died December 18, 1941, at the age of seventy-nine. Dr. Hieronymus was a member of the faculty of the University of Illinois for twenty-seven years before his retirement in September, 1932. Previous to that time he had been president of Eureka College.

Arthur E. Holt, professor of social ethics in the Chicago Theological Seminary and Divinity School of the University of Chicago, died suddenly, on January 13, at the age of sixty-five. Dr. Holt, an ordained minister since 1904, was director of research and survey of the Chicago Congregational Union. He was the national secretary in charge of social education of the Congregational churches and the first chairman of that committee. For many years he had been a close student of the relations between Christianity and democracy and had given special attention to the problems of economic adjustment between farmers and city consumers. He was one of the leaders in the movements for the clinical training of theological students.

Elsie Clews Parsons, American anthropologist, died in New York, December 19, 1941. Dr. Parsons, author of a number of published works, was one of the first lecturers on anthropology at the New School for Social Research. She was a former president of the American Ethnological Society and the American Folklore Society. At the time of her death she was president of the American Anthropological Association.

Harper and Brothers announce the forthcoming publication of *American Family Behavior* by Jessie Bernard and *Introduction to Social Psychology* by Maurice H. Krout.

BOOK REVIEWS

A History of Chicago, Vol. II: *From Town to City, 1848-1871*. By BESSIE LOUISE PIERCE. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1940. Pp. 547+Illustrations+Maps+Appendix. \$5.00.

The first volume of Miss Pierce's study carried the story from 1673 to 1848, a feat that was possible because even in Chicago there was a period of simple patterns and small things. This second volume covers only a generation, from 1848 to 1871, but what a generation! Not only was it a time of change and expansion in the country at large but in Chicago these processes were speeded up to a tempo hardly equaled elsewhere. The plot thickened, as it were, the moment the author began to trace it beyond the earlier, formative years. Yet Professor Pierce has analyzed the whole bewildering complex in a clear, dispassionate manner and provides a thorough, comprehensive account that will in many ways prove a model for future urban historiography.

The volume opens with a description of the basic population elements in the city and proceeds to a consideration of the economic developments—trade, transportation, capital, and labor—that made possible the amazing growth of that population. The author transcends the local perspective of earlier treatments of urban history, for she presents the city in relation to its hinterland and to the nation. Thus, in "The Mold of Politics" one not only observes the evolution of city government under current economic pressures but also sees the infant metropolis take the center of the national state in the dramatic national nominations of 1860. Then follow chapters on those social and cultural developments which, for the past fifty years or so, have been termed the "new history." The inevitable social pathology, the struggle of the churches against sin on the one side and indifference on the other, and the secular striving for education and culture—all these receive due consideration. There is, finally, a discussion of the "manners and customs" of the time, which are so difficult to classify but which are cumulatively so significant in the life of any people. Bread and games meant as much to Chicago as to any ancient city.

It is hardly necessary, in considering this second volume, to review the origins of Professor Pierce's study. But it will be recalled that it was planned in advance, against the background of all the urban studies of

the Chicago social science group, as a semico-operative venture. Young assistants were placed at the author's disposal; and their aid no doubt facilitated the use of a remarkable range of sources and the production of the first two volumes within a relatively short period. But it is apparent that the major burden fell upon the author herself and that only the greatest industry could have brought the work to its present stage. Comparable studies of other urban centers may have to wait upon the slow appearance of individual monographs and an eventual synthesis of the same. It will then be interesting to contrast the results of such *laissez faire* processes in historiography with the standards already set by the planned economy of the Chicago program.

The appearance of other urban histories may also make possible a systematic comparison of various cities, a comparison that Miss Pierce naturally does not attempt but which should provide a wider perspective from which to view any given center. It is unnecessary to quibble as to whether this should be done by the historian or the sociologist; the point is that it is a task for those dealing with the past as well as with the present.

The most obvious criticism which may be raised concerning the present study is that it lacks literary appeal. The volume is well written in the sense that the style is clear and the material well organized. It has the very real virtues of "unity, emphasis, and coherence." But it lacks the local color of such a work as, let us say, Asbury's *Gangs of New York*. This is not so much a criticism of Professor Pierce's work in itself as it is of "scientific" history in general. The reviewer's inclination is to divorce historiography from the clinging literary tradition and to let it stand on all fours with the social sciences. One gathers that Miss Pierce shares this opinion. It does not reflect in any way upon popularization as a distinctive genre of historical writing but is simply a matter of specialization in both form and function. *A History of Chicago* is aimed at social scientists and critical historians rather than toward the so-called reading public.

RICHARD H. SHRYOCK

University of Pennsylvania

An Introduction to the Sociology of Law. By N. S. TIMASHEFF. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1939. Pp. xiv+418. \$4.00.

The author begins his book with a discussion of "the sociological place of law" and "law as a social phenomenon." Law as a social phenomenon is a crucial problem, especially in the United States where, until the

advent of totalitarianism, the most prolific, if not profound, writing in the field represented a crude behaviorism. Briefly, the fatal error of these latter writers consisted in their elimination of "law" as distinctive reality in any sense. Consequently, the net import of their argument could only be the theoretic impossibility of a sociology of law—"official behavior" cannot be distinguished from lay behavior; hence, legal sociology was merged indefinitely in general sociology. Timasheff avoids and controverts this basic error; but he is far from clear in his own analysis of "law." He insists frequently that "law is ethico-imperative coordination" (p. 16); that "law is a historical phenomenon, a product of cultural development" (p. 273), which implies a purely positivistic interpretation; but, elsewhere, he asserts, "the ethico-imperative coordination is created by law" (p. 15). And he discusses "the existence of legal norms" (p. 30) in a manner suggestive of metaphysical theory ("ideal reality").

Most of the book is concerned with elaborating the meaning of "ethics" and "power" to the end of discovering the nature of "law" viewed as a resultant of the above two factors. The author's range of reading is enormous, but his discussion is discursive and vacillating where what is required is argument that is sustained and pointed. Only brief reference can be made to two or three major issues. "Ethics" in Timasheff's terminology usually means "mores," but sometimes, apparently, "moral principles." The deficiency of his argument here, apart from ambiguity, can most briefly be indicated by reference to the problem of the petty offences, traditionally regarded as not involving moral principles or affective states, as well as by reference to the thousands of "laws" that the community as a whole is completely unaware of.

There is, next, Timasheff's contention that many primitive peoples are entirely without law not because of lack of "ethics" but because the necessary power centers do not develop until culture has become advanced. The problem is long standing, and little additional insight is here provided. No lengthy delving into the literature is required to reveal that "law" has four or fourteen or forty meanings; and the problem of constructing one or more relevant to a projected sociology of law is not easy. Sociology is functional in approach and its laws profess universal validity. This requires a construction of "law" that would conform to all types of social relationships. Here Timasheff seems inhibited by traditional meanings of "power"; in any event, he does not consider the diffused but effective controls associated with familial relationships and feuds, concomitant with general community support. Beyond that is the overriding question whether in the main the author has not expounded a positivistic

interpretation of "law" rather than laid the foundations for a sociology of law. Certainly there is little discussion of "law" as a system of ideas—yet it is inescapable that, without a theory of "law" as mental significances with implied postulates of human understanding and consequent rational conduct, the major problems are simply ignored.

Sociology of law is becoming increasingly important in a culture characterized by expanding government. Timasheff has made a significant contribution to the construction of a sound prolegomena. American sociologists, who, in the main, have ignored the fertile fields of law (cf., by contrast, Weber), will find this volume important and, indeed, essential reading. The detailed Bibliography is unusually helpful.

JEROME HALL

*Indiana University
School of Law*

The Cheyenne Way. By K. N. LLEWELLYN and E. ADAMSON HOEBEL.
Norman, Okla.: University of Oklahoma Press, 1941. Pp. x+360.
\$3.00.

This excellent book is a study of Cheyenne "trouble-cases," showing the methods used by these Indians, in aboriginal times, for the legal resolution of intratribal conflicts. It is more than that, for, as the authors state in the Preface, "We have aimed at the development of a social science instrument for the recording and interpretation of law-ways among primitive peoples; the Cheyenne and their Way provide the subject material." They have taken as their problem, further, to show "law-stuff . . . in its relation to social science at large."

The Cheyenne material was gathered in Montana in 1935 and 1936 from aged informants who remembered pre-reservation life. Estimates of informants' personalities and biases are given and help the reader to evaluate the data. The authors' comments and discussions of the cases are clearly separated from the Indian accounts. The senior author, a professor of jurisprudence, has a keen appreciation of the role of "law-stuff" in a social system. Sociologists and social anthropologists will find him understandable and stimulating. Hoebel, a social anthropologist, has done research into the systems of social control of two other Indian tribes and has published competent papers on his work.

The present book starts with five trouble cases which the Indians had deftly solved. Even the reader who disdains theoretical discussions will likely be so entranced by them that he will be easily carried through the next chapters of concept-defining and hypothesis-stating. Case material

again predominates in the next six chapters, the first two of which describe situations wherein the powers and *modus operandi* of the Tribal Council and the Military Societies, respectively, are displayed. Then come chapters in which the case material bears particularly, in turn, on the legal solutions of conflict situations involving "homicide and the supernatural," "Marriage and Sex," "Property and Inheritance and Informal Pressures and the Integration of the Individual." In Chapters x and xi one finds a stimulating discussion of some of the important concepts and viewpoints of those who study the legal system of our own society and its history. Here the authors discuss concepts by which the law-stuff of our society can be defined and delimited and suggest that the framework so set up may be applicable to other societies as well. Chapter xii is a résumé of the Cheyenne data in terms of these concepts. These last three chapters vindicate the suggestion made in the Preface that to view law-stuff "as a study of men in conflict, institutions in tension . . . is to see it also in its working relation to social science at large. Modern American jurisprudence can thus enrich, and be enriched by, the study of non-literate legal cultures."

The book is well written and the authors do not hesitate to use an occasional pithy colloquialism. Only rarely do they forget the value of the period and hence develop labyrinthine sentences for which they should furnish maps and miners' lamps. The case-finder at the back of the book is a helpful device and the Index is excellent. A glossary of terms, especially legal terms with which many social scientists are unfamiliar, would have been helpful, as would a bibliography. It is pleasing to see this concrete evidence of a fruitful collaboration between a student of comparative jurisprudence and a social anthropologist in a report that is obviously a solid contribution both to factual knowledge and to the molding of social theory.

J. E. WECKLER

Smithsonian Institution

Political Arithmetic. Edited by LANCELOT HOGBEN. New York: Macmillan Co., 1938. Pp. 531. \$9.00.

This book consists of a "Prolegomena" by Hogben and twelve articles by seven of his associates in the department of social biology. The "Prolegomena" is an indictment of armchair philosophizing in the absence of facts and a plea for the development of a true "science of society."

The first seven articles deal with various problems of human fertility. Kuczynski summarizes the opinions on fertility of British demographers

during 1660-1760, describes the downward trends of reproduction rates in various countries, and points out the slight effect on these trends of changes in marriage or death rates. Glass analyzes the effect of economic conditions on the marriage rate in England and Wales and shows a weakening of the former close relationship. According to Glass, Charles, and Moshinsky, the decline in fertility in the various areas of England and Wales has been associated with a narrowing of differentials in marital status and in employment of women, occupations of men, and various other factors. The decrease in size and the changes in composition (chiefly the aging) of the population of England and Wales which are likely to occur because of the decline in fertility are pointed out by Charles. She also shows recent changes in the distribution of women by prolificacy (number of births) in Australia and makes comparisons with the United States.

Chapters viii to xi relate to the recruitment of social personnel. Gray and Moshinsky show the great extent to which (1) children of high ability, whose parents are in the lower income groups, do not receive higher education, and (2) children of low ability, whose parents are in the higher income groups, do receive higher education. In addition, Glass and Gray point out that the system of university scholarships favors the boys from fee-paying schools over those from state schools. These conditions are held to be effective in impeding social mobility and promoting class stratification. According to Charles and Morgan, (1) occupations with high maximum earnings have low initial earnings, (2) the recruitment of new workers to these occupations is on the basis of the economic position of their families rather than their own ability, hence (3) the low fertility of persons in these occupations is not dysgenic.

Chapter xii, by Davis, describes the distribution of blood groups in the world and stresses the difficulty, if not impossibility, of dividing mankind into natural races.

Due to recent intensive work on prolificacy distribution, the reviewer can be particularly critical of that portion of the book. (1) Since no correction is made for incomplete birth registration in the United States (p. 240-41), the proportions of childless women shown in Table 14 are highly misleading, that for native-born white exceeding the correct figure by at least 15 per cent and that for colored by at least 40 per cent. If the author desired to use uncorrected births, only the prolificacy distribution of women with children should have been shown. (2) The fact that "all the foreign born groups have a quite abnormal age composition" (p. 242) should not affect the results given unless the number of persons in some

of the age groups was too small to yield reliable rates or unless the author omitted age standardization for these groups. The former is scarcely true. If standardization was omitted, the caution is much too mild. (3) A misprint occurs near the bottom of page 243, the percentage of childless women being "33," not "67," according to Table 14.

Several pages are devoted to the reproduction rates of areas of England and Wales, arrayed by size of rate or percentage change. In the opinion of the reviewer, the analysis would have been facilitated by arraying them according to a factor held important in affecting size or change.

Unquestionably, each chapter adds significantly to our fund of factual information regarding the problems dealt with. The data presented are worth while, and the conclusions sound. Bringing such material together in a readily accessible form is an important step toward the scientific goal for which Hogben pleads.

P. K. WHELPTON

Miami University

Science and Social Change. By JESSE THORNTON. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1939. Pp. xi+577. \$3.00.

Engines of Democracy. By ROGER BURLINGAME. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1940. Pp. xviii+606. \$3.75.

The Telephone in a Changing World. By MARION MAY DILTS. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1941. Pp. xiv+219. \$2.50.

The literature of technology and social change, interesting as it generally is, does not yet make a very close approximation to scientific standards.

Mr. Thornton has collected about fifty essays from writers of the past and present. These selections generally fall into the realm of interpretation and opinion or what wise men with scholarly social science backgrounds see when they look at the scene created by the impinging of technology and science upon society. There is no measurement and little historical description in the book. Selections of essays are usually uneven. The emphasis here is on science rather than on invention, and the economic aspects are stressed more than the political or social.

Roger Burlingame follows his book on *March of the Iron Men* published a few years ago, which took us to 1865 in American history, with *Engines of Democracy*, which carries us on from then to the present time. The latter book is a little different from the first in that inventions were so scattered in the United States before 1865 that he could treat them chronologically. In the modern period, however, the inventional development is

so great that the subject must be treated topically rather than in a single time sequence. The nature of treatment in the two books is much the same. The writer deals with different inventions such as the electric light, the radio, and the airplane by placing them in a social setting. This social setting is a series of running comments dealing with the *Zeitgeist*. The connection, however, between the mores and the invention is generally loosely stated or is left to inference. The combination, though, of accounts of dazzling inventions with free and suggestive interpretations of the mores in a journalistic style makes interesting reading. The reader gets the feeling, correctly, that the machine is a powerful force shaping American history and affecting even the very remote sections of social life. Mr. Burlingame's books are pioneer undertakings in a type of social and technological history that may very well one day be highly developed. The book yields an appreciation of the advantages of great perspectives of history and social forces, for the vision he reveals shows us forests rather than individual trees.

Miss Dilts tells us in *The Telephone in a Changing World*, a great deal about the telephone industry, its origin, the extent of use of the telephone here and abroad, what goes into its physical production, who the employees are, etc. She deals more with the telephone than with the changing world. Not much is said regarding the social effects of the telephone. Miss Dilts was an employee of the Bell Laboratories. There is very little critical treatment and nothing regarding the controversial issues centering around the telephone as an agency of communication in a competitive democracy. The influence of the telephone on modern life had been very extensive, and it is possible to conceive a study of several volumes being made on so important a subject.

WILLIAM F. OGBURN

University of Chicago

Technology and Society: The Influence of Machines in the United States.

By S. MCKEE ROSEN and LAURA ROSEN. With an Introductory Chapter by WILLIAM F. OGBURN. New York: Macmillan Co., 1941. Pp. xiv+474. \$3.00.

The impact of technology on society is of crucial importance to an understanding of the functioning of contemporary institutions and the nature of social change. Yet, until the appearance of the book under review, there was no available textbook for undergraduate students which would facilitate the introduction of such materials into the college cur-

riculum. The book is primarily a textbook rendition of the National Resources Committee Report on *Technological Trends and National Policy*, in the preparation of which one of its authors assisted, supplemented by the findings of the W.P.A. National Research Project on Reemployment Opportunities and Recent Changes in Industrial Techniques. It was written prior to the publication of the hearings and monographs of the Temporary National Economic Committee, the use of which would have enriched its content considerably.

As in the case of the government reports from which it is derived, the materials deal competently with some of the most urgent problems of our time. Among them are the consequences of invention in industry, in agriculture, and in the professions; the extent and nature of the displacement of labor through technological change; and the trends of social planning. The authors have selected their materials intelligently and have presented them cogently, but there is an inevitable devitalization of the data in the process of fitting them into textbook headings and subheadings. In the reviewer's judgment there are a surfeit of these in the text designed benevolently to guide the student, but rather impeding the movement of the book. Moreover, the schematic separation of the economic, social, and political effects of technology, by their treatment in separate parts of the book, precludes a discussion of the nature of the interrelation of these effects, which is the primary interest of the sociologist. The final chapter "Technology and the New Society" is, in general, a pallid and inconclusive anticlimax to the challenges inherent in the content of the earlier chapters.

BERNHARD J. STERN

Columbia University

An Introduction to the Social Sciences. Edited by ROBERT E. RIEGEL. 2 vols. New York: D. Appleton-Century Co., 1941. Pp. 1109. \$6.50.

The purpose of these two volumes is strictly pedagogical. The material has been contributed by eight teachers of Dartmouth College and has been used as a substitute for the heterogeneous piecemeal curriculum in the social sciences which came into being at Dartmouth, as has been the case in most institutions of higher learning, during the rise of interest in social studies. This cross-sectional, composite course is based upon three assumptions, namely, (a) that human institutions constitute the most appropriate object of study as an introduction to the social sciences, (b) that these institutions may be studied freely and "psychologically" without reference to the departmental organization of a college, and (c) that those

who teach such a course should teach throughout a term and preferably in groups sufficiently small to allow for discussion. This last point, by the way, deserves special attention. In many colleges orientation courses have been taught by a succession of different teachers, each a specialist and, consequently, each motivated in the direction of overemphasizing his special viewpoint and background. Students have a habit of calling these "vaudeville" courses, and it is my opinion that they have chosen the correct title. At Dartmouth, on the contrary, all collaborating instructors teach the entire course, which means that, if the students are expected to gain an organic point of view, it is incumbent upon teachers to demonstrate also that they are capable of the same attainment.

A sample sequence from Volume I will, perhaps, provide the reader with a key to the course as a whole. After opening with a general treatment of social institutions in relation to social change, the institutions analyzed are in order: business, the price mechanism, government control of business, money and banking, public finance, the consumer, labor, agriculture, population and race, the family, crime, government, and politics. A cursory glance at these categories will reveal at once the difficulties involved in offering a course of this type. In the first place, it is confusing to find crime listed as an institution and in the same series with the family. In the second place, it is apparent that the above sequence does not follow historical (anthropological) lines of development. From this latter point of view, it seems clear that if the student is to gain an appreciation of the social datum, he would begin by studying the family and not business organization. On the other hand, contemporary social relationships are, no doubt, conditioned by business organization in a way which is so immediately relevant that it might seem advantageous to begin here, that is, with an interest which is already alive. Certainly, if the course were being taught project-wise, as distinguished from subject-wise, no progressive educator could find fault with the above arrangement. There are problems which involve both logical and pedagogical considerations, and I mention them because it is precisely in this sphere that so many orientation courses have floundered and failed.

With respect to the treatment of the various social institutions presented, I have only praise to offer. It seems almost incredible to me that eight teachers with specialized backgrounds of scholarship should have achieved so much unity in perspective. The tone throughout is not merely liberal in the best American tradition but seems to me permeated with a free and easy spirit—a spirit so seldom found in academic writing. One has a feeling that these professors not only enjoyed writing this text but

that they are also teachers who find pleasure in exposition and lively discussion. At the same time, nothing important on the side of scholarship is sacrificed. Readings and references show a high degree of selectivity and include, I am happy to report, pamphlets as well as books.

EDUARD C. LINDEMAN

*New York School of Social Work
Columbia University*

Assimilação e populações marginais no Brasil: estudo sociológico dos imigrantes germanicos e seus descendentes ("Assimilation and Marginal People in Brazil: A Sociological Study of German Immigrants and their Descendants"). By EMILIO WILLEMS. São Paulo: Companhia editora nacional, 1940. Pp. xix+343.

This is one of the more important sociological studies published in Brazil, not only because of the information which it affords but also for the way in which this information is obtained and presented. The book is based upon five years' actual acquaintance with the subject matter under investigation. The author seeks to organize his facts within a frame of reference which makes them comparable with other facts already discovered, or discoverable, in other parts of the world and at other periods of time.

Much interesting information is afforded. German immigrants are successfully competing on the biotic level with other occupants of the new habitat, showing little difficulty in becoming acclimated, and reproducing at a remarkable rate (pp. 56 ff.). Colonists represent by no means a cultural unit. For example, in the *município* of Harmonia in the state of Santa Catharina, there are at least three distinct types: (1) individuals born in the area or settled previous to World War I (a homogeneous people, living simple lives, thinking of themselves as pioneers); (2) individuals arriving since World War I (in general, restless, revolutionary, well organized, often expressing in religious and political gatherings attitudes of superiority and opposition toward other groups of German descent); (3) quite recent immigrants of German-Russian extraction, especially from the region of the Volga, with economic and religious habits which set them apart (pp. 125-26). Most German immigrants to Brazil during the past century were illiterate peasants. Later colonists were better educated, of improved economic status, and often from the cities. At present, only approximately 10 per cent of the inhabitants of German descent are foreign-born (p. 76). In some cases spacial isolation from na-

tive Brazilians and the consequent limited means of communication have resulted in the persistence of German cultural forms, even of those which have disappeared from the rural areas of Germany (p. 214). One source of isolation among the Russo-German immigrants from the Volga has been the institution of the *mir*, which lodges ownership of land in the community. A situation thereby was created in which contact with Brazilians, especially in isolated regions, was limited at first to spokesmen of the community; and, subsequently, with the continued economic development of the areas in which these immigrants settled, the persistence of this institution has contributed to cultural conflict.

A definite conflict of loyalties exists inside the German-Brazilian group. Assimilated, or partially assimilated, *teuto-brasileiros* often resent the superior attitudes of recently arrived immigrants, whom they refer to as *alamões-batatas* ("German potatoes"), and particularly the attempt of members of the Nazi party to identify party and state and to demand loyalty to both on the part of all individuals of German descent. Nazi organizations, although themselves based upon German citizenship, have sought to enlist in their support individuals who have been Brazilian citizens for as many as three generations (pp. 155-56). One resolution of this conflict of loyalties appears in the attitude "of patriotism toward Brasil and of friendship between our country and Germany" (p. 162).

Under favorable circumstances, assimilation appears to proceed with relative ease (p. 28), even in opposition to deliberate attempts to impede it on the part of the German school, the German church (primarily the Protestant sects), and German political propaganda (p. 205). Even in rural areas (for example, the valley of the Itajai) settlers are to be found who speak German with difficulty and who are intermarrying extensively with Brazilians. Facilitating assimilation are: (1) similarity of religious belief and ritual on the part of German and Brazilian Catholics (the former marry Brazilians more freely than they marry German Protestants); (2) conflict within the German-Brazilian group; (3) increased contacts with Brazilians due to the economic development of German colonies in pioneer zones, the consequent improved means of communication, and the increasing necessity of a common language, the education of German youths in Brazilian professional schools distant from their villages of origin, the extension of Brazilian political control into German districts and the consequent settlement of Brazilian officials in these areas, the location of Brazilian professional men (especially physicians, dentists, lawyers, pharmacists, surveyors) in German colonies, the establishment of military garrisons in German settlements; and (4) deliberate Brazilianization ef-

forts on the part of individuals, religious orders, the national government, and, particularly, Portuguese-speaking schools. The German-Brazilian press has often played a significant role in this process (pp. 161-62), while attitudes of disparagement on the part of native Brazilians have impeded its operation (p. 122). The author also suggests that in some cases of intermarriage the Brazilian mixed-blood exercises a strong sexual attraction (p. 219), an observation similar to that made by Gilberto Freyre in other connections.¹

Cultural conflict often seriously modifies the relations between the generations. There are numerous instances of children born in Brazil who resent their parents' use of the German language or of parents horrified at seeing their children conversing together in Portuguese or brought to tears "because their children are now 'verlust' " (pp. 116 ff.).² In the case of the first German colonists, the problem of the first- and second-generation immigrant varies from that studied in the large cities of the United States, since the location of these colonists in more or less virgin country and their subsequent isolation has retarded assimilation (p. 114). It is in the cities and among the more recently arriving immigrants that the situation becomes more comparable to that ordinarily described by United States students of first- and second-generation immigrants.

Unfortunately, the limited opportunities which the author, at the time of writing, had had to consult the extensive literature in English upon accommodation, assimilation, and marginal peoples makes somewhat inadequate his summary of that literature in the first two chapters and the conceptual tools which he derives from it. For example, accommodation is conceived as leading always to assimilation, such forms of accommodation as caste, class, segregation, and slavery being overlooked. Assimilation and acculturation are not clearly defined, these concepts being used at times interchangeably (pp. 13-14, 15, 26, 63 ff.), while elsewhere (p. 17) attempts are made to distinguish between them. It would seem to the reviewer less confusing to say that assimilation is one phase of the acculturation process and that it involves, on the part of an individual being incorporated into a new culture, the gradual taking-over of the attitudes and sentiments shared by the people among whom he has come to live, a process which eventually involves an identification not only of these attitudes and sentiments with those of the newcomer but also of

¹ *Casa Grande e senzala* (2d. ed.; Rio de Janeiro, 1938), p. 9 *et passim*; *Sobrados e mucambos* (São Paulo, 1936), pp. 303, 324.

² From the Portuguese *luso* (Lusitanian) and the German prefix *ver*. More used is the verb *verbrasilianern*.

cultural memories. Consequently, assimilation is never entirely complete in the first generation.

One might also question whether or not the author is dealing here with a "marginal people" in the strict sense of that term. In fact, he seems to realize this when he says: "Obviously, it is not accurate to refer to the immigrant, or the child of an immigrant, as a marginal person. Such would be an oversimplification of the problem" (p. 106). Certainly there is little evidence in the book to indicate the existence of a personality type among descendants of Germans in Brazil comparable, for example, to the "marginal man" among Negroes in the United States and the West Indies.

Commendatory, it seems to the reviewer, are the author's attempts to define his terms; to treat assimilation as a process comparable to some extent to the socialization of a child when being incorporated into the society and culture of his people; to point out that, granted immigrants are in constant and relatively intimate contact with the new milieu, assimilation proceeds most rapidly when immigrants are ignored; to call attention to the significant role of initial contact; to point out that mere contact does not imply cultural transmission but that receptive attitudes and prestige play dominant roles in this connection; and to recognize by implication (pp. 37 ff.) that contact is not a unit but must be analyzed into its divergent types.

DONALD PIERSON

*Escola livre de sociologia
e politica de São Paulo*

The Unemployed Worker. By E. WIGHT BAKKE. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1940. Pp. xvi+465. \$4.00.

Citizens without Work. By E. WIGHT BAKKE. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1940. Pp. xi+311. \$3.00.

These two volumes present the results of a series of studies of unemployment carried on at the Institute of Human Relations at Yale University. The work is outstanding for its portrayal of what unemployment means to the worker: how it affects his daily life and family relations and how he adjusts to it.

The Unemployed Worker covers two topics, "The World of Labor" and "The World of Unemployed Labor." In the first the author discusses the social significance of a job and shows that the strictly economic rewards are only part of the goals and satisfactions which the worker seeks. He

also shows the worker's experiences, the limitations of the job rewards, and the worker's attitudes toward and interpretations of his daily experiences. The second topic in this volume covers the reality of unemployment and the depressing, hopeless round of job-hunting during the depression. This section gives a very real picture of the state of mind of the old employee who feels that this is just a temporary layoff and his final realization that the layoff may be permanent. Then come the successive stages of adjustment to the new way of livelihood—living on relief.

Citizens without Work deals first with the place of the unemployed worker in his community and the effect of such unemployment upon his relations with others and upon his attitudes and beliefs. The author finds a definite awareness of class distinctions but surprisingly little feeling of class antagonism or of unity among the working-class in opposition to higher groups. He did find evidence of a trend toward the "solidification" of the working-class.

The second part of this volume deals with the effect of unemployment upon the family. This is a really brilliant analysis. It presents the family as a dynamic structure in equilibrium. When the balance is disturbed by the drastic fact of unemployment, the family goes through a period of disequilibrium and intense disturbance. Then, gradually, adjustment takes place, and a new pattern of relationships as well as a way of life forms. This readjustment follows a definite cycle until the new equilibrium is reached. Significantly, the author found that the family often actually increased in stability as a result of this readjustment and that complete disintegration or even severe loss of status were infrequent occurrences.

This is the most important and effective study yet made of the unemployed. It is worthy of very careful examination not only for its conclusions but also for its methods of study and the concepts used.

BURLEIGH B. GARDNER

Chicago, Illinois

The Tragedy of German-America: The Germans in the United States of America during the Nineteenth Century—and After. By JOHN A. HAWGOOD. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1940. Pp. xviii+334. \$3.00.

Although Mr. Hawgood's book is not a product of the recent revival of interest in the immigrant and his descendants, the reader will find it pertinent to current problems of national solidarity and morale. For it tells, among other things, how at least a considerable portion of the Germans in America went sour on this country and on Germany too.

Part II, "New Germanies on American Soil," and Part III, "The Significance of the Hyphen on German-American History," are pertinent to this problem. The early "New Germanies" were somewhat utopian schemes to create in America what did not then exist in Europe—free, united communities of Germans of all countries. The founders generally considered the "united Germany" in cultural rather than in political and military terms. While many of these colonies prospered and retained their German character, they did not become German states. Germany soon forgot them; or, if not, maligned them as deserters from the fatherland. Also, since Germans settled behind the frontier rather than beyond it, their isolation was never so splendid as that of the Mormons during their first generation in Utah.

These settlers and their descendants, as well as later comers, were rebuffed by the American nativist movements of the 1850's. They were suspected of abolitionism in the South; in the North, of indifference to the Union cause in the Civil War. One gathers that they did not relish rebuff from people whom they considered their inferiors in culture and whose puritanical mores they thought barbaric and hypocritical. After 1871 the newer immigrants from the German cities considered the old German-Americans indifferent to the new Reich of Bismarck. The older settlers found their artisan compatriots of the cities arrogant and lacking in the virtues of the old Biedermeier culture to which they, the older immigrants, were devoted.

This combination of rebuffs led to the consolidation of the hyphen—to an attempt to develop a culture neither German nor American but German-American. World War I gave this new culture the *coup de grâce* by putting into uncomfortable conflict the two components which its bearers were determined to reconcile.

Sociologists should be pleased to have historians delve into the records and produce good histories, such as this, of the various national and ethnic components of our population. It gives us material very useful for understanding the people whose current behavior we observe. On the other hand, historians, including Mr. Hawgood, might learn from sociologists something about economic and graphic presentation of quantitative data and of the systematic comparisons and distinctions which have been found useful in studying the adjustments of people to new cultures and new lands.

EVERETT C. HUGHES

University of Chicago

Heredity and Environment. By R. S. WOODWORTH. New York: Social Science Research Council, 1941. Pp. 95. \$0.90.

This report was prepared in response to a request of the Committee on Social Adjustment of the Social Science Research Council for an appraisal of recent studies bearing upon "the problem of the influence of heredity and environmental factors in intelligence and achievement."

The major assumptions in the general standpoint of the bulletin, and presumably in the standpoints of the various psychological monographs reviewed, are three in number: (1) heredity and environment (neither being clearly and rigorously defined) are coacting and essential factors in the development of the individual, and there can be no question of the one being more important than the other; (2) it is a "real" and "genuine" question as to whether the differences among individuals are due to their differing heredities or to their differing environments; and (3) the relative importance of heredity and environment can be measured by freezing one factor while the other remains variable; by finding situations where one of the factors is constant, it is possible to measure the differences that appear and attribute them to the factor that varies.

Two sources of data for carrying on empirical studies from this standpoint are available: identical twins are presumably alike in heredity, hence variations in intelligence and achievement may be attributed to unlike environmental experiences; foster-children develop in environmental conditions that are, presumably, substantially like those of the other children in the family, hence their deviations from the norm of the family in which they are reared are to be attributed to hereditary factors. Research of this type has emphasized particularly the intellectual development of children chiefly because of "the relatively satisfactory measures available for the intelligence of children."

The report examines various studies of twins with some attention to the research procedures and problems. The conclusions stated are (1) that environmental differences "can produce substantial differences in intelligence" but (2) the differences among children in a community are not due to environment, because twins reared apart remain more alike than the average of the community. The review of the studies of foster-children seems to show that improved environment raises somewhat the intelligence of children. But the showing is probably spurious: when children of "poor heredity" turn out well, it does not prove the effect of environment; it simply proves that a mistake was made in thinking the heredity was poor. The bulletin makes no attempt to inquire into the

assumptions basic to such studies; the comment is kept at the level established by the procedures of isolation and investigation set by the studies themselves.

E. B. REUTER

University of Iowa

Rural Public Welfare: Selected Records with Introductory Notes and Comments. By GRACE BROWNING. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1941. Pp. 578. \$4.00.

The main title of this book is misleading, as it is mostly unannotated case records. The Introduction presents two case studies of counties, giving their general setup for public welfare work, with an introductory note on the history of rural public welfare work and its relation to local government. However, the author's use of the term "community" as synonymous with "county," as frankly stated (p. 3), is entirely unjustifiable and shows a lack of knowledge of the cultural situation which she discusses in the Introduction to Part II. She conceives the county as the community because it is the area of organization in which the county public welfare worker is interested. Social workers talk much of community organization when they mean organization related to social work. The school people fell into the same error but are getting over it. In any event, one cannot understand the social situation without a knowledge of the functional rural community, for it is within the local community that the family or individual has social status and receives approval or disapproval according to his relation to the local mores, which are different in neighboring communities and are not the same for a whole county. The author cites Terpenning on this topic but does not seem to know Kolb and Brunner's much better analysis in their *A Study of Rural Society*. Otherwise, the introductory sections are well done and give the rural social worker a valuable background, although there is a tendency to be on the defensive against the idea that a rural worker needs a rather specialized knowledge of agriculture and rural attitudes, a position common among urban schools of social work.

Part II consists of an introductory note on rural economy and rural culture as related to social case work and the records of nine cases on worker, client, and "community," picked to show "community" [county] relations. Part III has an introductory note giving a good picture of rural social resources and of the relation of governmental agencies to them, and sixteen cases to illustrate the use of these resources.

Altogether, the cases represent as many counties in eleven states, written by the local workers and edited by the author, but without any comment. The case records furnish illustrative material designed "to reflect differences in case situation or treatment plan growing out of the nature of the rural setting." They will prove most valuable perhaps to teachers who can relate the material to fundamental case-work principles. Their value to untrained or partially trained rural social workers is problematical. There are a few cases of the "what-can-anyone-do-here" type, but most of them are what might be called "success stories." The latter may be legitimate diversion for country social workers, but if they are accepted as criteria for practice without intelligent analysis the results may well be disastrous. As illustrative teaching material, however, these records must prove a boon to busy instructors, freeing them from the burden of hunting for rural case histories—good ones are rare—and so enabling them to devote more time to a critical analysis of the case-work practice involved.

What is needed in this field is a book done in collaboration by a social worker with broad rural experience and a rural sociologist.

DWIGHT SANDERSON

Cornell University

Mental Disease and Social Welfare. By HORATIO M. POLLOCK. Utica, N.Y.: State Hospital's Press, 1941. Pp. 237. \$2.00.

This book, which might well be considered as a companion volume to Benjamin Malzberg's *Social and Biological Aspects of Mental Disease*, is a compilation of various statistical studies of mental disease in New York State which have previously appeared in various scientific journals. Thus the material presented here will not be new to those who have been working and keeping abreast of studies in this area. Pollock in his research in this field has been noted for his marked scientific cautiousness in stating his findings. Like Malzberg, whom Pollock has no doubt influenced, he seldom attempts any hypothetical interpretation of his statistical data.

Chapters which deal with subjects of more than passing interest and which should be provocative of other research in this area include "The Expectation of Mental Disease," "Trends and the Outcome of General Paralysis," "The Hereditary and Environmental Factors in the Causation of Manic-Depressive Psychoses and Dementia Praecox," and "A Statistical Study of 1,140 Dementia Praecox Patients Treated with Metrazol." His life-expectancy tables to indicate the chances of mental dis-

ease at each particular age among a hundred thousand persons born alive on a certain date represent a significant contribution. His hereditary studies of dementia praecox and the manic-depressive psychosis, previously published in book form, present no startling conclusions in reference to a specific law of inheritance of mental diseases, but he does indicate that his statistical data indicate some generalized familial basis for such diseases. In addition, he emphasizes the combined effects of hereditary and environmental factors acting in subtle ways which, as yet, are very unclear. As a result of the metrazol study, he seriously questions the advisability of continuing such treatment, as he finds that successes are much more frequent with the use of insulin. In connection with general paralysis, he reports that male first admissions seem to be declining while female first admissions are rising.

The careful statistical studies reported here should serve as a stimulus for social research in this particular area. In addition, they should serve as basic data for the development of adequate treatment and welfare programs for those who are so unfortunate as to be caught in the maze of mental illness.

H. WARREN DUNHAM

Wayne University

Frustration and Regression: An Experiment with Young Children. By R. BARKER, T. DEMBO, and K. LEWIN. Iowa City, Iowa: University of Iowa Press, 1941. Pp. xv+314. Cloth, \$1.70; paper, \$1.35.

The conclusion of this research project is that frustration tends to produce regression. The research consists of elaborate analysis of experimental frustration of thirty children between two and five years of age. The procedure is original and clever and deserves admiration, but the conclusion requires some qualification and interpretation.

The authors use the term "regression" in a way so different from the more usual meanings that misunderstanding is made too easy. In this work the term means such reactions as decrease in the variety of behavior, decrease in the degree of "hierarchical organizations," decrease in "extension of area of activities and interests, including time perspective," and decrease in "weight of organizational dependence relative to simple dependence." But since some of these words are also used with special meanings, it is necessary to translate further. The essential finding seems to be that when small children are removed from toys in the midst of their play, on the average there is a tendency for some of them to be somewhat distracted for the next few minutes. On a scale measuring "constructive-

ness" of their behavior, there is a tendency for the children to score lower after frustration. But this varies in the different children, and the scores of some actually increased. One can hardly help agreeing that these frustrations have some effect on the children, but this seems to be, as far as one can judge, only slight, temporary, and harmless. From the apparent attitude of the authors toward the subject of frustration one may wonder if they are aware of the more positive and developing effects of frustration in the processes of intelligence and the organization of the self.

The methodology of the experimental and statistical parts is ingenious, but the methods of communicating the results are needlessly inefficient. One may hold a legitimate objection to the use of a familiar and fairly standard word in a sense all but unrelated to the conventional meaning, even if the authors explain what they intend to mean by it and defend it as a more valuable usage. One may also question the value of stating principles and conclusions in formulas which have neither the possibilities of being manipulated mathematically nor the probabilities of making the thought more precise or communicable. Thus it appears to be actually more laborious to read such a statement as " $si\ uni\ (W) = dep^{min}\ (s, y.)$ " than to read the translation, "the simple unity of a whole is defined as the degree of dependence of its least dependent parts." The numerous topological diagrams, also, appear to have no function either of discovering or transmitting knowledge. The function of such devices, if there is any, seems to be to dress up a little research finding in the trappings of profound science. In this book this has the unfortunate effect of distracting attention from the simple but worth-while achievements in the discovery of new knowledge and in the improvement of methods.

ROBERT E. L. FARIS

Bryn Mawr College

In Quest of Morals. By HENRY LANZ. Stanford University: Stanford University Press, 1941. Pp. xvi+226. \$3.50.

In 1936, Swedish, Norwegian, and Finnish publishers offered a prize for the best answer to the question: "Can an objective moral standard be set up for the present age; and if so, on what is it to be based?" This essay won the prize. It has already been published in Swedish and Norwegian translations.

Professor Lanz attempts to escape subjectivism by generalizing the notion of relativity beyond its role in contemporary physics. His princi-

pal argument begins with the thesis that relativity does not imply subjectivity in physics. "Modern physics seems to suggest that objectivity is a matter of transformation rather than location in space and time" (p. 25). "If certain numbers are assigned to a vector quantity in one coordinate system, we are no longer at liberty to assign any number to it in another system but find the new numbers already assigned to it by the equations of transformation" (p. 27).

The author then goes on to his second contention: "Mathematical and physical relativity is only a special case of a far more general situation which may properly be termed the general relativity of logical groups" (p. 34). This opposes the Aristotelian belief that a term like "man" has only one proper definition. "Man" is rather regarded as a logical matrix or set of many definitions (or concepts), each definition being relative to a frame of reference, but each being transformable into the other definitions because of invariant factors in the group of definitions (pp. 46-86).

Rival ethical standards, whose advantages are relative to different socioeconomic conditions, are treated as variables. Groups of such relative standards are then supposed to exhibit invariant directions. Professor Lanz reserves the term "value" for the latter and says that his distinction between relative standards and invariant values is similar to Pareto's distinction between derivations and residues (p. 159).

The book is provocative but gives no assurance that the suggested lines of research will be fruitful. The author does not pretend to have a formula for overcoming disagreements (p. 1); and his last chapter, wherein he searches for an objective standard "in our age," is much more impressionistic than his previous generalizations would lead the reader to expect. That rival ethical standards have some highly formal similarities is, of course, not a new idea. Whether Professor Lanz's formula— $a'_{\alpha\beta} = ia_{\mu\nu}$ —identifies more important formal similarities than are now recognized is a question which awaits further exposition.

WAYNE A. R. LEYS

Central Y.M.C.A. College, Chicago

The South Seas in the Modern World. By FELIX KEESING. ("Institute of Pacific Relations International Research Series.") New York: John Day Co., 1941. Pp. xv+391. \$3.50.

In *The South Seas in the Modern World*, Professor Keesing has brought together and co-ordinated the results of the numerous detailed studies

of Pacific dependencies made under the auspices of the Institute of Pacific Relations. This is the most important volume yet written on the modern peoples of the Pacific and should be of great value to all who are interested in this area, as well as indispensable reading for the next peace conference, if there is one.

When European and other powers colonized the regions of Melanesia, Micronesia, and Polynesia, they established varying political, economic, educational, and religious institutions to aid the natives to adjust themselves to civilization. Often the same island group was divided between different nations and subjected to radically different forces. It is now possible to evaluate the results of these large-scale experiments, both historically and comparatively.

Professor Keesing has restricted himself largely to a discussion of the alternatives with reference to the problems of land tenure, utilization of natural resources, direct and indirect rule, health education, mission activities, etc., but he brings out rather clearly that if there were some agreement as to the ends of colonial administration the present scientific and practical knowledge is capable of supplying efficient ways of achieving them. The principle of self-determination for the peoples of the South Seas is, apparently, a dead issue so far as this area is concerned.

The discussion of the ethnological aspects of native life is brief but excellent. Professor Keesing recognizes that the aboriginal life survives only in a few isolated areas and emphasizes the importance of the neo-native life which developed around the middle of the nineteenth century. Many currently held ideas are demolished—that of depopulation, for example—and the missions receive, possibly for the first time, an objective and on the whole favorable evaluation.

The text is kept free of charts and statistics in the interests of the average reader. The facts are present, however, in some fifteen appendixes which the expert will wish to read carefully. A Selected Bibliography of almost four hundred items, arranged both topically and regionally, directs attention to the sources and fills a long-felt need. The long-range research program of the Institute of Pacific Relations is beginning to more than justify itself, and we can look forward to the promised companion volume on the peoples of Malaysia and Southeastern Asia.

FRED EGGAN

University of Chicago

Eleven Twenty-six: A Decade of Social Science Research. Edited by LOUIS WIRTH. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1940. Pp. xv+498. \$3.50.

This substantial volume, which takes its primary title from the street number of the Social Science Research Building at the University of Chicago, is the report of meetings held at the university to celebrate the tenth anniversary of the dedication of the building. It contains addresses by President Hutchins, Henry Bruère, and Beardsley Ruml; papers by five members of the university faculty; the proceedings of five round tables; and a Bibliography of the publications of the Social Science Division of the university during the decade.

The three addresses contain a number of provocative observations and suggestions concerning factors affecting the fruitfulness and value of social science research. In the prepared papers, Professors Merriam and Wirth, writing on urbanism, have said little that is new but have called attention to considerations that do not appear to be too generally appreciated; this is particularly true of Merriam's remarks on the present and future importance of cities (pp. 31, 36-37). Redfield, in "The Folk Society and Culture," presents concepts which he and others have been using in recent studies of the impact of modern civilization upon isolated societies. No sociologist can afford to miss this paper. Ogburn's paper on "Social Trends" contains little that will be new to those who are familiar with his previous writings on the same topic. Thurstone's paper, "Factor Analysis as a Scientific Method," is important, but many sociologists will find it too mathematical for their understanding. The reaction of the present reviewer to the reports of the round tables is one of depression not un-mixed with irritation. So little consensus appears to result from such discussions that one is inclined to question their value.

FLOYD N. HOUSE

University of Virginia

Waverly: A Study in Neighborhood Conservation. By ARTHUR GOODWILLIE. Washington, D.C.: Federal Home Loan Bank Board, 1940. Pp. 97.

This pioneer study of the conservation of a neighborhood in Baltimore, prepared by Arthur Goodwillie for the Home Owners' Loan Corporation, opens up a vast field for urban research of the most fundamental nature. Approximately ten million urban homes with an aggregate value today of about forty billion dollars are located in neighborhoods that are subject to the eroding forces of blight, either in the incipient or final stages.

Most of the residences situated within the central areas of all our cities are threatened with further serious losses of value as a result of neighborhood disintegration. Millions of these structures are physically sound, but their desirability as places in which to live is being impaired and community morale is being weakened as a result of the suburban migration of the more prosperous elements and their replacement by incongruous social and economic classes. The loss to society is measured not merely by the accelerated depreciation and obsolescence of these millions of urban homes but also by the failure to use to their full capacity the schools, streets, sewers, and parks in these old areas.

The publication of this study, in which a new technique has been evolved for analyzing neighborhoods, has contributed greatly to the revitalizing of the community which is the subject of the investigation. A series of illustrative maps show the internal structure of the Waverly neighborhood with respect to the age of the buildings, land use, and condition of structures. The position of Waverly with respect to contiguous areas and the central business district is also carefully described. The report suggests methods of rehabilitation accompanied by photographs and cost estimates. There are also recommendations for the re-zoning of sections of the area.

This volume, which exhibits throughout careful scholarship and mastery of the techniques of neighborhood analysis, is indispensable to the city-planner and the student of urban growth and structure. While a survey of a single neighborhood in one city does not afford a basis for a universal generalization for all cities, it does supply a method of approach for similar studies in many other urban neighborhoods.

HOMER HOYT

Chicago Plan Commission

Occupational Mobility. By OMAR PANCOAST, JR. New York: Columbia University Press, 1941. Pp. x+155. \$1.75.

This book is a piece of intricate and difficult theoretical analysis, with a limited use of statistical data. Perhaps the most interesting fact emphasized by the statistics, though it is nothing new to the informed, is that the fluctuations of income in connection with the business cycle are greater for the classes of income which average smaller—wages *versus* salaries and salaries *versus* earnings of capital—and also entrepreneur withdrawals which, however, are not income, since they are increased by consumption of capital in a depression (and decreased by investment under prosperity). The author's theory is based on the general position

of Mr. J. M. Keynes, which is criticized only in detail. The analysis gives a general impression of competence in a field (monetary theory) where there is at present so much disagreement and confusion that no one knows where to draw the line between wisdom and nonsense. The author comes out with a hopeful faith that training workers for mobility may start a spiral of increased production. It seems doubtful whether the facts support this view to any great extent. One statement in the concluding chapter is puzzling to this reviewer: "Concentrations of wealth can still cause cyclical business fluctuations . . ." [even after occupational mobility is secured]. This implies that concentrations of wealth are the cause of business cycles or at least a sufficient cause, which can hardly be assumed without discussion.

University of Chicago

FRANK H. KNIGHT

A Socio-economic Survey of the Marshdwellers of Four Southeastern Louisiana Parishes. By EDWARD J. KAMMER. Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1941. Pp. xii+180.

The Acadian and other French who (along with some people of Italian, Spanish, and south Slavic origin) live by fishing and trapping in the Louisiana marshes are one of this country's most interesting folk. Some good fiction has been written about them as well as several specialized articles. As far as I know, the present work is the first major social survey of a part of the territory. It has the good points of a survey, to wit: a historical background, good description of the geographic features and of the population, and attention to the various institutions, taken in turn.

But it remains a little too much the survey. For the reader does not get an integrated, descriptive analysis of the social structure of any community. The chapter on religion, for instance, turns out, in fact, to be a commentary on the difficulty of establishing in these "parishes"—really counties—the usual Catholic parochial institutions. The chapter on education is a similar commentary on the slow progress of the school. The author might have done better to have analyzed the actual religious and educational activity of the people in terms of their own life and the operating social units, as an anthropologist would have done. In this perspective the difficulties of church and school would be even more clearly understood.

Perhaps the author, with this interesting and informative survey done, will be able to return to the field to do a more systematic analysis of some smaller part of marsh society.

University of Chicago

EVERETT C. HUGHES

Modern Democracy. By CARL L. BECKER. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1941. Pp. 100. \$2.00.

In these three lectures, delivered at the University of Virginia on the Page-Barbour Foundation, Mr. Becker sketches the rise of the democratic ideal as mediated by the middle class during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and enumerates some of the reasons why that ideal "has suffered an astounding decline in prestige." His thesis is that traditional democratic dogma is so "imperfectly portrayed in the course of events that its characteristic features can not easily be recognized in any democratic society today" (p. 33). Many factors have contributed to this democratic debacle—a negative freedom, the substitution of means for ends in a profit-actuated capitalistic society, the profound dislocations due to the technological revolution, and two world-wars. Mr. Becker thinks democracy is a sort of political luxury, the survival of which may entail the sacrifice of some of its freedoms and amenities to "provide for the essential material need of common men." We have no choice in the matter. Through education, the press and the radio men have become keenly aware of frustrated hopes and "the time has gone by when common men could be persuaded to believe that destitution is in accord with God's will." The basic problem of democracy then is "whether necessary social regulation of economic enterprise can be effected by the democratic method, that is to say, without a corresponding regimentation of opinion and political freedom" (p. 84). The author combines the historian's mastery of fact with the insight of the philosopher and the skill of the literary artist in the elucidation of his problem.

JOHN M. MECKLIN

Dartmouth College

The Child and His Family. By CHARLOTTE BUHLER, with the collaboration of EDELTRUD BAAR, LOTTE DANZINGER-SCHENK, GERTRUD FALK, SOPHIE GEDEON, and GERTRUD HORTNER. Translated by HENRY BEAUMONT. New York: Harper & Bros., 1939. Pp. 187+x. \$2.50.

Dr. Buhler, with the assistance of several collaborators, has given us a valuable study of the behavior of parents and children in actual family situations. Her book is based upon firsthand observation of parents and children in their own homes. It is unnecessary to remind sociologists that there have not been many such studies.

The method of the study, simple but ingenious, is a very promising one. The author has arranged for her collaborators and assistants to be

present at various hours of the day in the homes studied in order to observe the normal routines of family life. Such observations were continued through periods of from three to six months. In all, twelve observers studied thirty children in seventeen families. In some families the focus of observation was on sibling relationships; in others, on parent-child relationships.

The chief merit of the book inheres in the fact that it exemplifies an excellent means of gathering material. The handling of the material is not very impressive. The author has invented a complex method of analyzing contacts which results in a series of tables which the reviewer did not find particularly illuminating. There are, however, some excellent bits of interpretation scattered throughout the book. There are some fair case studies of parent-child and sibling relationships. It seems probable that most of the findings of the study would have to be modified considerably in order to apply them to the American scene. Credit is due to Professor Beaumont for a translation in good idiomatic English.

This is the sort of job that sociologists could and should do better than the psychologists because it deals with actual social situations. Only the sociologists have the training to invent categories which will enable us to study such situations, but the sociologists have not done it yet. It strikes the reviewer that a study of this sort, to be really successful, should either be very narrowly focused on one aspect of life or should be quite broad and inclusive. It is interesting to record that the observations underlying Dr. Buhler's study were made in Vienna in the years 1931-33.

WILLARD WALLER

Columbia University

Family Disorganization: An Introduction to a Sociological Analysis.

By ERNEST R. MOWRER. Rev. ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1939. Pp. 356+xvi. \$3.00.

Mowrer's *Family Disorganization*, a standard book which has earned for its author a secure place among the students of the family, has now been reprinted with about fifty pages of new material.

The book as a whole is worth re-reading. Its ideas are sound, its documentation excellent. The ecological analysis is still valuable, and the case of Miriam Donaven is still poignant and illuminating. The new materials are excellent. The Chicago materials show a shift of the regions of most frequent divorce to new areas of the city, thus re-enforcing earlier interpretations by showing that "as shifts occur in the location of these urbanized sections, the pattern of the divorce rates shifts accordingly."

We need a new category to designate books to which a supplement has been added. Although author and publisher do not pretend to have made extensive revisions, the use of the term "revised edition" may nevertheless prove misleading.

WILLARD WALLER

Columbia University

Robert Dale Owen: A Biography. By RICHARD WILLIAM LEOPOLD. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1940. Pp. xii+470. \$4.50.

Robert Dale Owen, eldest son of Robert Owen, now has a biography worthy of his intellectual stature, his social vision, ethical maturity, and political foresight. For Dr. Leopold's biography, originally a Harvard Ph.D. thesis, is the definitive work in its field. The recent biography by Elinor Pancoast and Enne E. Lincoln (*The Incurable Idealist: Robert Dale Owen in America*) was short and intended for the general reader. The Leopold account, on the other hand, is exhaustive. The author has examined not only the usual published sources, including Owen's published works, but has made a thorough survey of contemporary newspapers, fugitive pamphlets and leaflets, etc., and has gone thoroughly into the extant manuscript sources. The book is a first-class work of scholarship: thorough, painstakingly accurate, well written, restrained and temperate in interpretation, and well balanced. That Owen was not fully appreciated in his time stands out in nearly every chapter; but the author has perhaps been ultracautious in avoiding eulogy even when it was well merited.

Leopold divides Owen's life into three convenient periods: the reformer, the western democrat, and the intellectual. As Leopold himself says:

Fundamental to any comprehension of Owen's career is the fact that he lived not one life but three. Responding to his various environments, he was in turn a radical reformer, intent on eliminating all irrationalities and injustices in the world; an able politician, eager to promote the interests of an expanding, self-assertive West; and finally a cosmopolitan intellectual, dabbling as a free lance in the problems of the Civil War, relying upon his pen for a livelihood, but concerned primarily with the propagation of spiritualism [p. viii].

This book should interest not only students of American history but sociologists concerned with cultural change in the American scene. It is for sociologists who realize that, quite as much as mechanical inventions, the quality of men may influence the future—and, dare I say it?—for the *better* in spite of the "cake of custom," the prevalence of ignorance, and the power of entrenched privilege. Owen was more than a social reformer, political leader, and active journalist. He was an influential person. Like any man on the firing-line with the innovators, he made mistakes. But, viewing his record as a whole in the

light of history, we find that his was a good and useful life—one that might well be laid before American students in these troubled times.

NORMAN E. HIMES

Colgate University

Today's Refugees, Tomorrow's Citizens: A Story of Americanization. By GERHART SAENGER. Foreword by EDUARD C. LINDEMAN. New York: Harper & Bros., 1941. Pp. xiv+286. \$3.00.

The author of this volume came to the United States as a German exile in 1937 and is at present director of research of the Committee for Selected Social Studies, Department of Sociology, Columbia University. He has written a scholarly and readable volume on a subject of great popular as well as scientific interest. This volume should help to quite the fears of those who believe that tremendous numbers of aliens and particularly refugee aliens, have entered the country and that they are a menace from the standpoint of economic competition. The book emphasizes the point that the modern refugee, unlike the average immigrant of the past, comes from the higher social and economic levels and that he is arriving at a time when the American economy has been severely strained. Consequently the average refugee experiences a considerable decline in socioeconomic status. This *déclassé* situation, together with the problem of general cultural adjustment, or Americanization, produces difficulties from the psychological as well as economic standpoints, but in general the author is highly optimistic concerning the adjustment of the refugee, going so far as to assert that his Americanization is only "a matter of a few years." One important factor in this rapid adjustment, aside from the intelligence, skill, and adaptability of the refugee, is the elaborate program worked out by several refugee organizations.

The book covers many aspects of the subject not indicated in this brief review, uses statistics as well as case histories with a light hand, and shows a great deal of insight into the American culture which the refugee is assimilating.

EVERETT V. STONEQUIST

Skidmore College

Urban Planning and Land Policies, Vol. II. (A report to the National Resources Committee.) Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1939. Pp. 366. \$1.00.

This monograph contains in Part I the best collection of illustrative material on planned communities and neighborhoods that has yet appeared, and hence it will be an invaluable reference work for the city-planner and the student of city growth and structure. For such model real estate developments as Radburn, New Jersey, Chatham Village, Pittsburgh, and Forest Hill Gardens, New

York, there are photographs and site plans. There is an extensive bibliography referring to one hundred specific examples of planned towns or communities.

In Part II a series of statistical tables showing such pertinent facts as the ranking of cities with respect to median rentals and proportion of families residing in single-family structures is presented. There is also a summary of the physical condition of housing as revealed by the Real Property Inventory of sixty-four cities in 1934. Finally, there are charts comparing the extent of crime and delinquency in slum areas with other sections.

In the third part appear excellent discussions of the evils of premature subdivisions and of land speculation. Methods of condemnation of land for public use and the need for more extensive municipal ownership of land are carefully treated. This volume is a most useful compendium of information on subjects of vital concern to those engaged in planning the rebuilding of our urban structure.

Chicago Plan Commission

HOMER HOYT

The Family and the Law. By SARAH T. KNOX. Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1941. Pp. ix+193. \$2.00.

Miss Knox has done a piece of work that should prove very useful to social workers who have come into practice by routes other than that of professional education and who want a brief statement concerning the family situations with which social workers often have to deal. She has embraced a very wide range and naturally has attempted to give what might be characterized as a brief introduction to the subject. Where the brevity and comprehensiveness result in statements less than entirely accurate, the inaccuracies are not harmful because, in making use of the information, the material would undoubtedly be supplemented and corrected by legal counsel. An illustration of this kind of mild inaccuracy can be found in the reference to special courts (p. 23). It may be that the inaccuracy is based on the actual practice of the judges who are not infrequently quite careless in their treatment of the constitution or statute under which they are supposed to operate. For the social worker in ordinary practice such inaccuracies are unimportant. In general, the statements are correct and the whole presentation useful.

University of Chicago

S. P. BRECKINRIDGE

ABSTRACTS OF PERIODICAL LITERATURE^{*}

The persons who have aided in the preparation of the material for this issue are: Hubert Bonner, Flavio M. N. de Campos, C. A. Hanson, E. William Noland, John F. Schmidt, Lewis W. Spitz, and Everett K. Wilson. The numerals and letters appearing after each abstract correspond to the items in the following scheme of classification:

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|---------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| I. THEORETICAL SOCIOLOGY | e) The State and Political Process |
| a) Sociological Theory | f) The School and Education |
| b) History of Sociology | g) Economic Institutions |
| c) Methods of Research | h) Voluntary Associations |
| d) The Teaching of Sociology | IV. POPULATION AND HUMAN ECOLOGY |
| II. SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY | a) Demography |
| a) Human Nature and Personality | b) Ecology |
| b) Collective Behavior | c) The Rural and the Urban Community |
| III. SOCIAL ORGANIZATION | V. DISORGANIZATION |
| a) The Family | a) Personal Disorganization |
| b) Ethnic and Racial Groups | b) Social Disorganization |
| c) Social Stratification | |
| d) The Church and Religion | |

433. Die libidinöse Struktur des kriminellen Psychopathen [The Libidinal Structure of Criminal Psychopaths].—If we adhere to the psychoanalytic principle that neurosis is an expression of sexuality, then an examination of literary criminal characters, such as Don Juan, may enlighten us as to the criminal psychopath's libidinal structure. Bisexual components are universally present in criminal psychopaths. A knowledge of the fixation points is necessary for possible therapy.—Fritz Wittels, *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse*, XXIII (1937), 360-75. (IIa, Va.) J. F. S.

434. Über einige unbewusste Komponenten beim Mord [Some Unconscious Components in Murder].—Only after Freud had demonstrated that all acts which were formerly ascribed to chance are, to the contrary, strictly determined and had described the extent of the free will in his *Psychopathology of Everyday Life*, did criminology, apparently to its own benefit, ally its interests with those of medical psychology. Cases of mentally diseased murderers which have come under psychoanalytical observation generally lead to the discovery that psychotically motivated murders are equivalent to suicide, inasmuch as the murderers discover and kill in another person the forbidden and hated part of their own instincts. A schizophrenic murder constitutes a preliminary stage of swallowing the victim, an intention which is realized unconsciously. Since in the earliest phase of the ego-object relationship the victim is also the representative of the murderer, this particular element seems to give a psychotic murder the quality of a suicide. This is intimated by the case of a schizophrenic who, to escape from his own Oedipus conflicts, did not commit suicide but instead murdered his friend.—Philip R. Lehrman, *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse*, XXIII (1937), 527-35. (Va, IIa.) L. W. S.

^{*} Since the editors are trying to bring up to date the abstracting of significant articles since the termination of the *Social Science Abstracts*, occasionally there will be abstracts of articles published several years ago.

435. Note préliminaire sur les "psychonévroses de néo-responsabilité" [Preliminary Note on the "Psychoses of New Responsibility"].—The differentiation between "psychoses of responsibility" and "psychoneuroses of new responsibility" is based on studies of mental troubles in persons who had been elevated to positions of union delegates and to new responsibility during sit-down strikes. The precise definition of the term adds the prefix "neo" because it implies entirely new and unaccustomed, rather than merely greater, responsibility for the individual. This mental trouble may occur with promotion or with increased family duties and is often associated with some great social upheaval or disturbance.—Gaston Ferdière *Annales medico-psychologiques*, XV (1940), 260-64. (Va.) C. A. H.

436. Palaeophrenia: A Re-evaluation of the Concept of Schizophrenia.—A functional classificatory system of mental disorders will either discard schizophrenia as a class or will segregate sharply those entities which constitute a legitimate genus. Schizophrenics' thought-processes are similar to those of children and primitives. These processes are a regression to an earlier type of thinking, possibly that used by civilized man before he developed his present complex culture. Psychological tests of schizophrenics show impairment of conceptual thinking—a regression from abstract to concrete thought. The term "palaeophrenia" is to be used to include those cases of simple schizophrenia which give symptoms or a history of archaic thought.—Raymond L. Osborne, *Journal of Mental Science*, LXXXVI (1940), 1078-85. (IIa.) J. F. S.

437. Utilisation de l'anthropométrie militaire [Use of Military Anthropometry].—Results of anthropometry in Italy, Sweden, Poland, Germany, Switzerland, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia indicate that rigorous social conditions produce a shorter stature and a smaller thorax. Taller persons are found in regions having higher average temperature, probably because warmer regions produce more fertile growth. Caution is to be exercised in selecting groups for study because of possible migration from the original locale. Tests should include conscript groups to give a normal spread, and political groupings should be avoided as points of reference.—J. Auerhan, *Bulletin de l'Institut international de statistique*, XXVII (1935), 144-58. (Ic, IVb.) C. A. H.

438. Le Rôle de la confession et de la nationalité (langue maternelle) dans la statistique du mouvement de la population [The Role of Religion and Nationality (as Determined by the Mother-Tongue) in Statistics of the Movement of Population].—The permanent office of the International Institute of Statistics has collected statistics of the movements of populations in those countries which have organized statistical services. In 1929 the Institute published *Indications on Actual Organization of Statistics of the Civil State in Various Countries*, a monograph which gives both the administrative organization of the statistics of the movement of population and the field embraced in the study of demographic phenomena. Except for certain gaps, sex, age, and position in the family are accurately registered. However, most of the countries neglect religion and nationality in their questionnaires. Countries with populations homogeneous as to religion and nationality attach little importance to such items, but there are many countries with one nationality and several religions, or vice versa. Only fifteen countries (including the states of the German Reich) register religion, and only nine publish nationality statistics. Hungary has published both since 1925. Prussia has published both for a long time, but in her case uncertainty results from the fact that a person can declare two mother-tongues (nationalities). Countries like Switzerland and Belgium, inhabited by two or more peoples differing widely, should be interested sufficiently in the natural development of these peoples to have adequate national statistics. Since both science and administration need statistics on religion and nationality, registration of these two items is desirable in all statistics of the movement of population.—A. Kovács, *Bulletin de l'Institut international de statistique*, XXVIII (1935), 560-69. (IVa.) E. W. N.

439. **Optimismo y pesimismo [Optimism and Pessimism].**—To be an optimist or a pessimist depends not only on the individual temperament but also on the social factor, up to now neglected. There are in history periods of time in which optimism or pessimism has been dominant. As a conception of life and of behavior, they appear in history in a generic way, i.e., they include a whole class, a people, or a period. In times of decadence, anarchy, and lack of orientation, pessimism is dominant. In those times characterized by order and organization, optimism is prevalent. Optimism may be constructive or contemplative. Constructive optimism wants to make the world better. Contemplative optimism makes efforts to keep life on the same level and without improvement. Indifferent pessimism may be the total renunciation of ideals, or it may be frivolous, taking the form of a false and noisy joy. Races and peoples have a natural predisposition to take life in a certain way, but in Western civilization these two attitudes follow each other and are an essential part of their historical period.—René Barragán, *Revista mexicana de sociología*, II (1940), 45-47. (Ia.) F. M. N. de C.

440. **Ensayo sobre el alcoholismo entre las razas indígenas de Mexico [Essay on Alcoholism in the Indigenous Races of Mexico].**—Several circumstances should be considered in the study of alcoholism: (a) the influence of the physical environment such as climate, quality of the water supply, and existence of certain plants that can be utilized in the preparation of alcoholic beverages; (b) the economic influence, a standard of living that is too high, as in booms, or too low; (c) social influences, such as celebrations, feasts, religious practices, payment of salary with alcoholic beverages, lack of official control and regulation, groups occupying a subordinate social and cultural position, etc. In pre-colonial times alcoholism was not an important problem because of (a) the poor industrial equipment for the production of alcoholic drinks; (b) poor means of communication between the centers of production and the consumers; and (c) the rigorous penalties against drunkenness. In colonial times the problem of alcoholism began to increase in gravity. The circumstances that contributed to it were the following: (a) once the Indian chiefs lost their authority, the laws against drunkenness were forgotten; (b) the psychological factor created by the loss of social status; (c) poverty; (d) the development of agriculture brought about by the new technology and the resulting rise in the production of alcoholic drinks; and (e) the development of the production of alcoholic drinks by the Spaniards for the sake of economic profit. A study of the effects of alcoholism on the economy of the Indians led to the following conclusions: (a) 60 per cent of the adult Indians take alcoholic drinks; (b) drunkenness is more common in the male, than in the female Indian; (c) the Indians used to give alcoholic drinks to children; (d) the great number of religious feasts favors alcoholism among the Indians; (e) the making of alcoholic beverages in the home, the poverty, the lack of education and amusements, favor the habit of drinking; (f) the expense of alcoholic drinks amounts to more than 50 per cent of the family budget; (g) alcoholism is a factor in criminality among the Indians; (h) the economic situation of the Indians is rendered worse by local authorities by the imposition of fines on the intoxicated Indian; (i) in spite of the law, payment of part of salary in alcoholic beverages is frequently made.—Lucio Mendieta y Nuñez, *Revista mexicana de sociología*, I (1939), 77-93. (Va, b.) F. M. N. de C.

441. **Alcoholismo y delincuencia [Alcoholism and Delinquency].**—This study, based on the observations made on 28,634 men and 4,568 women arrested as delinquents in the Distrito Federal (Mexico) from 1932 to 1935, concerns itself with the relationship between the different kinds of crimes and the state of drunkenness of the delinquent. The statistical study of the data yielded the following conclusions: (a) there is a significant relationship between the grade of intoxication and the kind of crime; (b) the relationship seems to be more pronounced in women than in men; (c) intoxication is observable in crimes against persons; and (d) the crimes against property are independent of intoxication.—A. Q. Cuarón, *Revista mexicana de sociología*, II (1940), 41-53. (Va, b.) F. M. N. de C.

442. *A distribuição espacial das classes e raças na Baía [Class and Race: Spatial Distribution in Baía].*—The city of Baía is located on a plateau about three hundred feet high and crossed by several valleys formed by erosion. The physiography of the region seems to be of importance in the cultural life of Baía. In general, the class distribution of the population and, to a certain extent, the ethnic division follow closely the pattern of the landscape. Along the ridges are the main streets and the principal means of transportation. Their height, the fresh breeze off the sea, and the convenience of transportation made those ridges the residential area of the higher classes. The valleys, where the lower classes live, offer a less healthful, less convenient, and less expensive living place. The social barriers between the poor of the valleys and the rich of the ridges are great and difficult to cut across. This could be foreseen in a society with an aristocratic tradition where the superior circles, who have always considered family relations and good manners as class indexes, still have a certain contempt for manual work. Although, in general, the rather simple pattern in which the ridges and the valleys are shown as contrasting residential areas is characteristic of the whole city, it sometimes presents small variations. Segregation in economic and educational classes, with some important exceptions, follows the line of color differences of the population. The whites and the light mulattoes inhabit the more healthful and more expensive high part of the city, while the Negroes and the darker mulattoes generally dwell in the less expensive lower part of the city. Color and class tend to coincide. Such a situation seems to be due more to historical factors than to a deliberate racial segregation in order to maintain race or class distinctions. The residential pattern suggests a society of free competition and gradual development, during which the European settled in the ridges and left to the African and his descendants the less desirable areas. It should be noted, however, that in the so-called intermediate residential areas, where the houses of those who are rising from the lower classes meet the houses of the people of the higher classes, both the dark and the white part of the population meet and mingle in an intimate residential proximity. Occasionally a Negro may live in the area of the higher classes without inconvenience. On the other hand, white people of the lower classes live in the valley with the darker part of the population, partaking of the same life and of the same body of common ideas and sentiments. Although class and geographic division tend to correspond approximately to the color scheme of the population, there are some important exceptions that show class rather than caste as a basis of the social organization.—Donald Pierson, *Revista de arquivo municipal de São Paulo*, LXXIII (1941), 39-50. (IIIb, c; IVb.) F. M. N. de C.

443. *Influence des événements de guerre sur les psychopathies [The Effect of a War Situation on Psychopathic Cases].*—It would seem reasonable to assume that catastrophic occurrences, through the intensity of the emotions they excite and the psychological confusion they induce, would augment the incidence of psychoses. With a number of women patients, who respond to psychical and physical stimuli more readily, an investigation was carried on to determine (1) the percentage and nature of psychopathic cases directly resulting from war events; (2) the nature and percentage of such cases colored by the war situation; and (3) the effect of the war upon the mental state and behavior of patients previously hospitalized. Of eighty-two admissions since September 1, 1939, only one was clearly attributable to war events. This case evidenced through the shock of war a release of underlying tensions complicated by metabolic perturbations, approaching menopause, and a highly sensitive nature. In only four of these cases was there any coloring of dreams or ideas with circumstances of war. Likewise, among the thousand patients hospitalized prior to the war, scarcely twenty were observed to be temporarily excited by news of the daily war events. Agitation resulting from sirens and antiaircraft guns ceased immediately with the cause. In some cases integration of war events in the psychosis might be supposed to occur with passage of time, but a longer period than the three months of observation would be necessary to verify this. With combatants the war situation seems to act as a releasing agent rather than as basic cause. War events must fall upon a proper psychological substratum to culminate in psychosis. We may conclude that, with the civil population, war events

account for an insignificant proportion in the etiology of psychopathics. As for the reaction upon mental cases already hospitalized, with latent emotional cases there may be a rousing and disequilibrium of emotions; with emotionally unstable cases there may be increased agitation; with those extremely suggestible the war situation may color delirious ideas. With other cases, war events may at length impinge upon and be integrated in the expressions of mental aberration. In all cases, however, the war situation itself is effective only upon a substratum of psychic instability.—M. P. Chatagnon and S. Jouannais, *Annales médico-psychologiques*, XCVII (1939), 610-17. (IIa, Va.) E. K. W.

444. *Psychose de civilisation* [Psychosis of Civilization].—Contact between two civilizations may produce a conflict, the source of which lies in the divergent modes of life which press upon the individual and which he may be unable to reconcile. Such is the case of a Moroccan youth of nineteen, Mohamed, who attempted suicide. In the course of his treatment he was found to be both melancholic and desirous of transforming mankind. The crux of Mohamed's problem was revealed in the conflict between his daily life in French schools (involving contact with French classmates, the learning of religious tolerance, the freedom of European women, etc.) and the patriarchal, strictly religious, and polygamous home to which he returned each evening. To avoid such an outcome for French colonials it is recommended that only those be called for instruction in French schools who are capable of reconciling the divergent roles they may be called upon to assume by differing cultures.—A. Donnadieu, *Annales médico-psychologiques*, XCVII (1939), 30-37. (IIa, Va.) E. K. W.

445. *The Incidence of Mental Disorder*.—An estimate of the incidence of mental disorder is of importance both in itself and as a standard against which to measure the incidence in special psychiatric or social groups. Studies by Bleuler, Brugger, and others are inconclusive because of the probability of sampling errors. A first effort at such an investigation, using as subjects one hundred patients in King's College Hospital, proved unsatisfactory, since the patients were of a poor class and unintelligent and the information they provided was equivocal. It did indicate, however, a striking prevalence of minor but sometimes disabling psychiatric abnormalities. A second attempt was made through analysis of the official summary of all admissions to institutions under the Board of Control during 1932. The mental disorders revealed in this report, classified by age groups and applied to the population of England and Wales for that age in 1932, yield the incidence rate. The incidence rate in any year multiplied by the number expected to survive that year gives the number that may expect a first mental illness. These expectations are cumulative and may be summed. For a group of males or females of a given age, the number that may be expected to have had an illness requiring admission to a mental hospital may be calculated by multiplying the number of individuals by the sum of all the incidence rates for that sex for each year of age up to the given age.—Elliot Slater, *Annals of Eugenics*, VI (1934-35), 172-86. (Ic, IVa, Va.) E. K. W.

CURRENT BOOKS

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ABSTRACT

The changes during the past decade were, in the main, in the direction of evolutionary trends, but the magnitude of them was abnormal. They have been greatest in the economic and political institutions and somewhat less, but nevertheless great, in the family, village, and local community. The reasons for these exceptional changes were two crises of first magnitude—the depression of the 1930's and the beginnings of World War II. The government had enormously expanded its executive functions in part at the expense of the legislative and judicial, while the free enterprise economic system had been changed into a managed economy, with prices being fixed by the government. The economic and political systems have been united into a new politicoeconomic order, the war state.

The various contributors to this issue, devoted to the social changes of the last ten years, have shown briefly what has happened in the different segments of our changing civilization. But these segmental changes are not unrelated. What pattern do they form when seen as a common whole? To give us such perspective is the task of the social historian.

How the historian in the future will characterize this period of time in the unfolding design of social evolution is an intriguing question. Let us try to anticipate him.

He will no doubt focus as we do now, upon two significant events, namely, the prolonged depression of the 1930's and the beginnings of World War II. These two crises have affected every social institution and every social custom of our time. There are, however, other significant changes, which the historian may pass by, such, for instance, as the phenomenal spread of birth-control clinics, which may

determine the balance of power of nations or affect the probability of future world-wide wars. Nevertheless, the social historian is expected to give us some insight as to whether the events of this period are reshaping the pattern of civilization and whether they are changing the direction of its course.

THE GREAT SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS

There are five social institutions found in every society, primitive or modern. These are family, government, industry, religion, and local community. Dominance has shifted from one to another of these organizations through the long course of man's road upward. Until a century or two ago, nearly all our lives were controlled by three of these institutions: to wit, church, family, and village. Control by separate economic or governmental institutions was very much less. But with the coming of steam, large metal tools, and fast, safe ways of communication there arose a rapid development of factories with allied economic organizations and also the growth of the modern state with its centralized government holding sway over huge areas and millions of lives. So we have been seeing the tremendous development of industry and rapid expansion of government, while church, family, and local community have been losing many of their former functions.

THE RAPID GROWTH OF GOVERNMENT

The outstanding feature common both to the depression of the 1930's and to World War II has been the astounding growth of government. No wonder that the traditionalist has viewed with alarm the concentration of power. This centralization in Washington has come about not because of a particular personality but because of depressions and war; the central government is the only agency capable of dealing with such widespread crises. This is so because with a society based upon transportation and the other power inventions the family, the local community, and the church are too small to deal with crises which are so far reaching.

THE LEGISLATIVE GIVES WAY TO THE EXECUTIVE

To deal with crises of these magnitudes, it was necessary that government operate largely through its executive and administra-

tive branches rather than its judiciary or legislature. There was common agreement that if crises were to be met the problem was one of execution, which could be done only by the administration. The Supreme Court and Congress fought at times against this shift of power but were forced to yield.

Thus, administrative branches of government have also assumed legislative functions. These were quite pronounced, for instance, in the National Recovery Act of 1933, and it was for this reason the Supreme Court declared the act unconstitutional. In wartime, legislation affecting our lives more ultimately than many congressional laws is decreed by the executive, as in the case of the prohibition of the sale of automobiles by executive order, which is as far reaching as the prohibition of the sale of liquor, which was passed by legislative enactment. Congress has delegated many legislative powers; if it had not done so, the executive would have been forced to take them anyway. For the crisis had to be met with speed, and the deliberative assemblies were too slow. They also tend to be sensitive to local constituents, whereas the emergency is national.

THE EXPANSION OF THE EXECUTIVE

Furthermore, the size of the task meant a great expansion of government, as well as a centralization of power. This proliferation of executive-managerial functions was shown in the great number of commissions, boards, authorities, and offices which have been popularly designated by the various letters of the alphabet. The unemployment crisis was a lesser one than the war which followed. So the New Deal, which dealt with the former, was a preliminary training preparatory to handling the bigger task of prosecuting the war. Indeed, the indications are that the expansion of the executive branches of the government during the war will be so great that the word "total" may be used to describe the government, as is the case with other warring nations.

DEMOCRACY CHANGES

The speed required in meeting the emergency of depression and of war did not permit the democratic process to operate with as much deliberation and debate as usual. Hence in so far as the democratic

working of society rests upon deliberation, there was a sacrifice of democracy. But new democratic procedures arose which were developed to meet the deficits of congressional debate. These were quicker methods of sounding out public opinion. Such were the polls of public opinion and the frequent "trial balloons," in the form of tentative propositions, upon which reaction was noted in the daily press and in telegrams. The high levels of radiobroadcasting in dispersing information on questions calling for policies meant that there was more time for consideration of them.

The unity called for in such large collective undertakings as fighting wars and depressions affected political parties and elections—cornerstones of democracy. Elections are sometimes postponed during war, as in England recently, for elections emphasize differences, whereas in a crisis unity of action is required. There have been numerous calls for the adjournment of politics in the elections during wartime. Republicans have been taken into the cabinet by a Democratic president. The president was much less "regular" as a party man than most party leaders, and Congress saw party lines disregarded in many votes. During these crises we swapped horses in the middle of the stream only once at the beginning of the crises. The president was re-elected twice.

THE BREAKDOWN OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT

Democratic processes underwent another change in the gravitation of power from local government to national. This decline or relatively lesser growth of local government has been in process for a long time. In the 1930's even governments of wealthy cities, along with counties and states, were unable to meet the problems such as relief and education, and it was necessary to obtain help from the national government. Even in the field of the education of youth, the federal government with the Civilian Conservation Corps and the National Youth Administration has taken over educational functions that have traditionally belonged to local government. In the case of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, a definite attempt was made to strengthen the county government by the United States Department of Agriculture. But here again the driving force was the central government.

A vigorous local government capable of handling its problems may not be essential to a democratic society, but in practice the conception of democracy has rested in good part on the operation of local government. Now, the federal government, which regulates wages, sends checks to farmers, and reports in a "fireside chat" over the radio, has an intimate contact with the average citizen, who feels almost as close to the government in Washington as he does to the men in the courthouse.

IN THE SERVICE OF THE COMMON MAN

The democratic methods, then, if they have not suffered a decline, have undergone profound changes in their nature. These changes have been chiefly in structure. If democracy be viewed from the point of view of its goal of rights and opportunities to the less privileged classes, then there has been no decline in democracy. Indeed, in this direction the achievements for which democracy works have been remarkable despite the depression. What has been done for labor unions, for Negroes, for farmers, for youth, for distressed businesses, is unprecedented, a brilliant record unequaled in our history.

AGRICULTURE

Consider, for instance, the farmer. Agriculture has been sick for twenty years, due to several influences. Among these were the decline of the market because of the depression, the falling birth rate in the cities, the disorganization of foreign trade, and the increased ability of farmers to produce. The percentage of the total population that was urban in 1940 was practically the same as in 1930. The people did not migrate to the cities as in previous decades. Another reason for the plight of the farmers was technological unemployment. Science in agriculture and mechanization of farm production have made tremendous strides during the last dozen years. Mechanical power is coming now to the farms, as it did to the towns a hundred years ago. Tractors increased during the decade by 70 per cent. With machines and science, the total number of farmers produce much more now than the same number of farmers could formerly produce. The use of hybrid corn alone increased the yield by 100,000,000 bushels last year over the 1930 production. Thus there was a surplus of farm-

ers, who grew so much produce that the price fell much further than the industrial products that farmers bought. But with government aid parity of farm prices with industrial prices has been attained, and the index of farmers' income has moved up from 56 in 1933 to 120 in 1940.

LABOR

At one time there were fifteen million unemployed. How the government cared for them is well known. Labor fought a losing fight in the 1920's, but during the 1930's and 1940's union memberships increased from around three million to the unbelievable figure of ten million in 1942. Hours have been reduced to about forty and forty-two a week. Real hourly earnings rose sharply during the latter part of the 1930's, and real weekly earnings of factory workers are the highest they have ever been. Legislation has safeguarded the position of labor by laws against injunctions, by minimum wages, and by rights to join unions.

Thus the government's objective was in the historic direction in which democracy has moved. Governments were once oppressive, as in the days of monarchy, and did little for the common man. But with the democratic upsurge, the people have increasingly felt the government was their own, and during the last ten years the feeling has grown. Government became a powerful agency of service to those who needed what such extensive organization could bring.

BUSINESS

While the government endeavored to work for the interests of business, by supplying credit and stimulating purchasing power, business was not wholly pleased with the turn the government had taken. This critical attitude was due to the fact that the effort was never wholly successful until the war, that taxes and debt increased, and that the freedom of business was curtailed by regulatory legislation regarding wages, unionization of employees, hours of work, restrictions on credit institutions, taxes, and impositions of unemployment insurance.

THE ISSUE OF LIBERTY

Thus there arose the cry over loss of liberty. This concern over freedom was largely by the owners and managers of industry. The

problem of liberty was acute at various earlier times for slaves, for women, for labor, for children. Now it is acute for business. But some liberty for nearly everybody was lost too, because more organization, as in wartime, always means restrictions on personal freedom. Organization is based upon the principle that everyone must fit into his place in the common effort. If he does this, he cannot be free to do anything he wants to do. We may, of course, be willing to make such sacrifices of our freedom of movement because of the advantages which organization brings. Particularly during the war period has the high degree of organization brought a curtailment of freedom. In no other way can a war be fought, nor can we prepare for defense preceding war without a loss of freedom.

CONFLICTING IDEOLOGIES

The symbols of democracy and liberty were much to the fore during the decade. These banners were waved primarily by traditionalists, by business interests, and by internationalists who looked with apprehension on the degradation of freedom and democracy in other lands. For some time the trend has been away from the "rugged individualism" that characterized our ancestors who colonized this vast continent without the benefits or the restrictions of much governmental organization. One can hardly live in contemporary Chicago and have the kind of freedom that was Daniel Boone's as a scout in the wilds.

In so far as ideologies are the products of the social conditions of the time, then the ideology that would be expected to accompany so highly organized a society would be one of loyalty, as to the team, accompanied by a scorn of individual license. The patriotism of the present war, with its appeals of unity, is an ideology of that type, accompanied as it is by the praise of sacrifice and the contempt for hoarders and for others who fail to co-operate. We thus see in the depression and the war the contrast of the old idealisms of individualism and the new ones of service, sacrifice, and unity in the common effort of war.

THE FAMILY DURING THE STORM

We have seen that government has taken over much during the crisis of the last dozen years. How have the ancient organizations of

family, community, and church fared? They have in no way been in the driver's seat.

The head of the family was not able to take care of its members during the storm, and, when the whirlwind of wars came along, the members of the family were moved about to suit the demands of the god of war. The depression threw individuals back on the family, and those who left the cities for the country in 1932 returned to the family roof, or else they took up anew the old practice of subsistence farming. Stress and strain often crack up the new overlaid habits, and we return to earlier practices. Some making of quilts by the family was noted, and the production of soap at home was occasionally reported. But these were sporadic instances. Economic functions, even cooking, continued to leave the home; for the growth of restaurants was greater than the growth of families. Divorces increased, though perhaps not so rapidly as they would have had the decade been one of prosperity. The family was unable to meet the problem of youth. It is not known that juvenile crime increased, but in the earlier years of the depression many youth deserted their homes to become hobos and tramps. There was a youth problem with idleness and loss of incentive. It was again the federal government that stepped in with its C.C.C., N.Y.A., and grants-in-aid to schools to help out the youth severed from the family. The formation of families by marriage, which decreased during the depression, was increased by the inception of war; but later the war disrupted families by taking men away and putting women to work. If the civilian population is bombed, children will be scattered.

VILLAGE LIFE

As impending economic disaster forced individuals to seek shelter with their families, who were all too inadequately situated to care for them, so they also found refuge in the village communities. This seems strange at first; one might have guessed that the farm would have been the ultimate destination for security. But the farm population, with its high birth rate, did not grow during the decade, while the rural nonfarm (small village) population was growing 14 per cent. The growth of the urban population was less, 8 per cent. It may have been that this large growth of the rural nonfarm popula-

tion was in the neighborhood of the great cities. The villages seemed to have changed less over the years than either the farm or the city. The farms have been undergoing a veritable revolution, comparable to the effect of the industrial revolution on the handicraft industry. There is thus in the farms a potential unemployment owing to the lack of need of men, whose work in turn is being done by machinery; the farms then are not the best place of refuge. It was a surprise to many that there was so much rural relief needed. The cities, on the other hand, are the habitat of industry, which can so easily shut the doors of its factories when the blight hits them.

Though the villages of today suggest those of a hundred years ago, there have been many changes taking place owing to transportation and communication developments. Particularly is the automobile bringing a wider range of distant contacts and reducing the power of the pressure along Main Street. The radio and the moving picture are introducing the folkways of the city. The farmer and villager are becoming more like the city man. The communication inventions, which are increasing the contacts of peoples and states all over the earth, are breaking down the isolation of the farmer and the villager and making them more active participants in world-society.

WHAT IS HAPPENING TO RELIGION?

The church, too, played a minor role in the era of hard times and war. It did not have the resources to meet the burden of unemployment. Indeed, the church itself was a burden financially to those whose incomes were eliminated or reduced. Church attendance and membership declined. Religion offered solace to the spirit in the trying times, but its material aid was only slight. Discussion of religious matters declined also during the decade, as shown by the decrease in the percentage of articles on religion in the magazines, though the Bible still continued to be a best seller.

The effort to meet crises usually develops fervor. Sometimes, in such instances, the loyalty to the effective agency competes with religious devotion. The New Deal drew forth a good deal of fervor on the part of its most loyal followers. In wartime, the appeal of nationalistic ideals is most intense, and the best loyalties and self-sacrifices of which man is capable are seen in his pursuit of the higher

goals of war aims. Nationalism may not be a religion, but it serves many of the needs which religion meets.

THE COLLAPSE OF LAISSEZ FAIRE

The social forces that affected social institutions during the decade seemed to strike the economic institutions with even greater impact.

When, during the nineteenth century, economic production moved from under the control of the family out into factories, the prevailing philosophy of life became laissez faire. Under this theory business wanted no control, no aid. If it were left alone, supply would meet demand automatically. For if the demand was greater than the supply, then new productive units would arise to meet the demand because they could sell above costs and thus make a profit. If the supply exceeded the demand, then the marginal units of production, that is, those whose costs were higher than the selling price, would go out of business, leaving a supply balancing demand. The dynamic force in that system was the desire and the opportunity to make profits.

For many years the economic system has been moving away from laissez faire. The decade of depressions saw the worst breakdown the system has ever suffered. There was idle machinery and idle men, but an abundance of raw materials and banks bulging with credit. Yet laissez faire could not get the men and the machines together to feed and to clothe the population in want. Prices might have fallen low enough to entice buyers if they had been left alone long enough, but, no doubt, at the price of a terrible destruction. Instead, pressure groups crowded in as never before for the government to do something.

What did the government do? First, they supplied cheap loans with which the factories could start running. But this effort didn't work, for the people didn't have the money to buy at the prevailing prices. Then the government attempted to supply purchasing power to the unemployed, who would thus be taken care of and at the same time expand the effective demand. This may have made a few more wheels turn but not enough. Then they tried to "prime the pump" further by spending government money on public works such as new buildings, dams, and roads and thus create more demand. Perhaps

the push was not big enough. In any case, there still remained six or seven million unemployed. The government was able to make these efforts largely by borrowing.

GOVERNMENT TAKES COMMAND OVER INDUSTRY

Then came the war. The unemployed began to disappear, factories hummed, and boom times were on us. Industry was running again. How was this achieved? By the government becoming a very large buyer. The demand was enormous for the munitions of war, more than all the factories could supply. To make all this equipment, nearly all industry was involved somewhere in the process of getting the materials for war or processing them. Left alone, industry could not produce the necessary ordnance quickly enough. So the government took over the direction, which resulted in building some factories, transforming others, regulating prices, supplying money, keeping the men at work, reorganizing transportation, and controlling foreign trade and credits. These things it did by obtaining money from taxes or loans.

Thus the abandonment of *laissez faire* is about complete. Profit is still made, but the drive came from the government's demand rather than from the industrialists' desire to make a profit. Profit is restricted and in part taken away. The demand for matériel and the speed required are so great that the automatic operation of the system is not enough. Hence the government takes charge of business.

The situation is different in World War II from the first in that society is more integrated now and the war state much more highly evolved. Compare a budget of fifty-six billion now with a twelve billion budget in the last war. Government control is more nearly complete in this war.

The government runs the system much as it would run a school, a library, or a hospital. When certain services need to be supplied, either in schoolteachers or in munitions, the government simply employs the skills and pays them from the money collected from the public. Costs do not have to be less than selling price when the government supplies the services. The effort to win the war is, of course, immensely greater than it is to run the school system.

THE TRANSFORMED ECONOMIC SYSTEM

The war economy is clearly not the capitalist system of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries which the classical economists described. The balancing of supply and demand is not automatic but is achieved, if at all, by government planning and direction. Firms do not worry for fear that costs may rise above the selling price, nor do factories arise automatically to meet the large demand. They are built in a hurry by the government. The government is the banker that supplies the funds for investment, and money becomes merely a medium of exchange. The so-called captains of industry are not the money-makers but the men with managerial skill. The managers take over and operate for the government.

OWNERSHIP OF PROPERTY NOT WHAT IT USED TO BE

Property under the system is not something that belongs to the owner to do with as he pleases. Productive property becomes restricted on all sides. Its use is determined by the government not by the owner. Employees must be permitted to be members of unions and work for set wages and for a prescribed number of hours. Sums must be set aside for social security. The owner is not free to buy materials or to change any price he wishes. The ownership is still legal. The owner has the title all right, but the restrictions on its uses are so great that the conception of property is changed. The new system is a managed or planned economy, not the automatic *laissez faire* system of the capitalist era. Running the economic system becomes the major concern of government.

THE GIANT MERGER OF GOVERNMENT AND BUSINESS

The great institutions of government and industry have, then, expanded so much that they have during the war become united, merged, with government in command. Economic production is now under the control of the government as it once was under the control of the family. Observers of the last ten years have been able to witness profound changes in our social order. The economic system has been transformed, and the government has reached a peak of magnificence unequalled in modern times. Halting steps were taken in this direction during the depressions of the 1930's. But the full

merger waited upon the war which saw the old system go down and a new one arise.

WHAT OF THE FUTURE?

It may be that the historian of the future will not call these changes in the social order a new system, though we have already experienced it for a decade, and European states for an even longer period; and we know not how much longer the war will last. The historian may call it merely a war state—for the new system may not last longer than the war.

If the social order is changed back at the close of the war to the pre-New Deal economic life, the great development of government and the radical changes that have occurred in the economic system will have been merely a passing phenomenon that flared up to meet the two crises of unemployment and war and then disappeared.

If, on the other hand, after the peace there should occur severe crises requiring extensive governmental direction, and the war state is only partly demobilized, then the period under review will have left a heritage of great importance to our social system whether we like it or not. It may have then given a tremendous push in what will be the long evolution of the economic system from a *laissez faire* capitalistic one to a managed economy, directed in its significant phases by the government which will then have become the most powerful of all social institutions.

The all-important question is what will happen after the war in the changes of the boundary lines of our social institutions.

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POPULATION¹

PHILIP M. HAUSER

ABSTRACT

Between 1930 and 1940 the population growth of the nation declined markedly with the disappearance of net foreign immigration and with continued decline in natural increase. The decrease in the rate of growth of population in the South was less than that in the North or the West. The balance of age-specific birth and death rates shifted so as to fall below the critical point of population replacement. The rate of urban growth declined greatly, to a point barely exceeding that of rural growth, while the rural-farm population remained practically stationary and the rural-nonfarm population increased relatively rapidly. Metropolitan districts continued to grow more rapidly in outlying areas than in central cities. The population of the nation continued to age, declined somewhat in sex ratio, but changed very little in racial composition. The number and proportion of foreign-born white persons in the United States decreased substantially.

Many of the social changes which occurred in the United States between 1930 and 1940 were directly related to the various phases of the business cycle—particularly to the depression which characterized most of the decade. Some population phenomena were no exception in this respect, but other population changes, such as changes in regard to the sex, age, and color composition of the population of the nation as a whole, seem to be related more directly to long-time trends than to the events of the decade.

The reports of the Sixteenth Decennial Census of Population, while not yet complete, permit the measurement of many changes which have occurred since 1930. In order that the changes of the last ten years may be seen in proper perspective, they are related to long-term trends whenever possible in the materials which follow.²

GROWTH OF POPULATION

Total population.—Perhaps the most significant single population change of the past decade was the great decrease in the rate of national population growth. Between 1930 and 1940 the population of the United States increased from 122,775,000 to 131,669,000, or by 7.2 per cent. The rate of increase was less than half of that shown

¹ The writer is particularly indebted to Dr. A. J. Jaffe, of the staff of the Bureau of the Census, for assistance in the preparation of this article.

² See Chart I, p. 827.

in any previous intercensal period and contrasts sharply with the 16.1 per cent increase in population between 1920 and 1930 and the 20-35 per cent increases of the nineteenth century.³

The population of the United States, then, increased by only 8,894,000 between 1930 and 1940 as contrasted with 17,064,000 in the preceding decade. The difference between these increases represents a population greater than that of the state of Illinois. To find another decade during which the population of the country increased by as little as 9,000,000 persons, one must go back to the period 1860-70, when the total population of the nation at the beginning of the decade was only 31,443,000 and when war conditions retarded population growth.

Components of growth.—An explanation of this marked decrease in the rate of population growth is to be found in the disappearance of net foreign immigration and the further decline in natural increase. Between the 1930 and 1940 census dates, for the first time in the experience of this country, there was an excess of emigration over immigration (of about 47,000 persons). In contrast, the population of the nation absorbed 3,207,000 net foreign immigrants between 1920 and 1930 and 3,748,000 between 1910 and 1920.⁴ The drying-up of the stream of net foreign immigration is, of course, to be traced to the combined influences of our immigration quota laws, the depression, and disturbed international relations.

All the population increase between the last two censuses, then, represents natural increase—the excess of births over deaths. A measure of the decline in the rate of natural increase during the decade is afforded by analysis of the crude birth and death rates. In 1930 the crude birth rate was 20, the crude death rate 11.5, and the crude rate of natural increase 8.5.⁵ In each year of the decade the crude birth rate was below that of 1930, reaching a low of 17.4 in

³ Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *Population, First Series, United States Summary* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1941), pp. 6 ff.

⁴ Net foreign immigration figures are taken from the *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1940* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1941), p. 99.

⁵ Rates are corrected for underregistration. See Bureau of the Census release, *Population, Series P-3, No. 10*, March 15, 1941; the birth and death statistics here presented are based on the annual reports of the Bureau of the Census, Division of Vital Statistics.

1933. Although the crude death rate was below its 1930 level throughout most of the decade, the decrease was not so great as the drop in the birth rate. In consequence, the crude rate of natural increase, which reached a low of 5.8 in 1936, was below the 1930 rate for each year in the decade. In 1940 the crude birth rate was 18.8, the crude death rate 10.9, and the crude rate of natural increase only 7.9.

The decline in the rate of natural increase during the decade primarily reflects the continuation of the long-time downward trend of the birth rate, but it may also be attributable, in part, to depression decreases in fertility.⁶

Potential growth.—The net reproduction rate of the United States, as derived from the 1940 population census returns, was 96.⁷ Hence, if the age-specific fertility and mortality rates for the five-year period preceding the census persisted, and if there were no net foreign immigration, the population of the United States would in the long run (in about two generations) decrease at the rate of 4 per cent per generation. In 1930 the net reproduction rate of the nation was 111—a rate which, under the same conditions indicated above, would in the long run have resulted in an increase of 11 per cent per generation. Thus, it is clear that during the last ten years the balance of birth and death rates in this country changed so as to fall below the critical point of population replacement.

In 1940, as in 1930, the net reproduction rate in rural-farm and in rural-nonfarm areas continued to be above the population maintenance level, 144 and 114, respectively, although they decreased during the decade (by 15 and 18 points, respectively). The net reproduction rate of urban areas, which was already far below the replacement level in 1930, declined further (by 14 points) to a new low of 74. The net reproduction rate of the white population of the

⁶ The crude birth rate during the decade seems to be correlated with the business cycle, but it is not yet known whether the decrease in fertility because of the depression resulted in a decrease in fertility for the decade greater than that to be expected from the downward trend.

⁷ The net reproduction rates have been computed by the "indirect method" (see B. D. Karpinos, "The Differential True Rates of Growth of the White Population in the United States," *American Journal of Sociology*, XLIV [1938], 251-73) from the number of children under five in the census reports corrected for underenumeration.

nation fell below the point of population maintenance, from 111 in 1930 to 94 in 1940. In contrast, the net reproduction rates of the nonwhite population changed little during the decade, dropping from 110 to 107.⁸

It is to be emphasized that, although the net reproduction rate is a valuable index for summarizing fertility and mortality conditions, it is not to be interpreted as actually predicting future population growth. On the contrary, it is certain that age-specific birth and death rates will not remain unchanged and, therefore, that the net reproduction rates have little, if any, predictive value.

Regional and divisional growth.—The deceleration of population growth during the past decade did not affect all parts of the United States in the same manner. Between 1930 and 1940 the rate of population increase in the West was about half that of the preceding decade (16.7 as compared with 33.6 per cent), a decline in the rate of growth about the same as that for the nation as a whole. The rate of population increase between 1930 and 1940 in the North, however, was less than one-third that of the preceding decade (4.2 as compared with 14.7 per cent), while that in the South was more than two-thirds that of the preceding decade (10.1 as compared with 14.3 per cent).

Particularly outstanding among the rates of growth of the geographic divisions were the rate of increase of the South Atlantic states, the only division which maintained its 1920-30 rate of growth, 12.9 per cent, and the exceedingly low rate of increase of the West North Central states, 1.7 per cent—the lowest decennial rate of increase of any of the geographic divisions in the history of the nation.⁹

Although birth rates declined with some unevenness during the decade, the pattern of high fertility in the South and low fertility in

⁸ For further data on and discussion of the net reproduction rate see release of the Bureau of the Census, *Population, Series P-5, No. 13*, August 23, 1941, and A. J. Jaffe, "Population Growth and Fertility Trends in the United States," *Journal of Heredity*, XXXII, No. 12 (December, 1941), 441 ff.

⁹ *Population, First Series, United States Summary*, p. 8. Note that the "dust-bowl" states in both the North and the South lost population during the decade.

the North and West remained substantially the same as in the past,¹⁰ so that differentials among the regions and divisions in rates of growth between 1930 and 1940 and in the preceding decade are mainly attributable to changes in the pattern of internal migration.

Internal migration.—Between 1930 and 1940 the West gained approximately 1,159,000 through net internal migration, while the North and South lost, respectively, 604,000 and 555,000 persons.¹¹ This pattern of internal population movement differed considerably from that between 1920 and 1930, when the South lost 1,341,000 persons through net migration, and the West and North gained 1,292,000 and 50,000 persons, respectively.

The most striking differences among the geographic divisions in the internal movement of population between 1930 and 1940 and the preceding decade were the reversals in the direction of net movement in the East North Central, the South Atlantic, and the Mountain states. In the last ten years the East North Central states lost population through net migration as contrasted with a gain in the earlier decade, whereas the South Atlantic states and the Mountain states gained population through net migration as compared with a loss in the preceding decade.

The changes in the internal flow of population¹² contain the explanation of the differentials in regional and divisional growth outlined above. The sharp decline in the rate of growth of the North during the past decade reflects, on the one hand, the failure of migrants to move into the industrial centers which, hard hit by the depression, had large numbers of unemployed and few new job oppor-

¹⁰ See W. S. Thompson and P. K. Whelpton, *Population Trends in the United States* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1933), pp. 262 ff.; National Resources Committee, *The Problems of a Changing Population* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1938), pp. 120 ff.

¹¹ Estimates of net internal migration have been computed by "aging" the population as enumerated in 1930 and comparing survivors of the 1930 census with the population enumerated in 1940 (based on the 5 per cent sample). The same technique was used in estimating net migration between 1920 and 1930, except that the population studied was restricted to native persons. The absolute amounts of net migration, therefore, do not take into account the movements of foreign-born persons between 1920 and 1930, but this should not change the patterns of net movement shown.

¹² See Bureau of the Census releases, *Population, Series P-5a, Nos. 1-18*, April 18-May 22, 1941.

tunities, and, on the other hand, the exodus of population from the northern dust-bowl states. The relatively small decline in the rate of growth of the South is a result of a combination of factors, including not only its relatively high rate of natural increase but also the decrease in net out-migration, which can be traced to the increased industrialization of these states during the decade¹³ and to the expansion of federal governmental functions which drew population to the District of Columbia and its environs.¹⁴ The relatively high rate of growth of the West comprised mainly net migration, which accounted for 58 per cent of its decennial population increment. The flow of population to the western states is attributable to the continued industrial and commercial development of these last of the lands of the United States to be settled and to their climatic attractions.

Urban and rural growth.—In almost every decade in this nation's history the urban population has grown much faster than the rural.¹⁵ Between 1930 and 1940, however, urban growth slowed down to a point where it barely exceeded that of the rural population—7.9 as compared with 6.4 per cent. In contrast, the urban population increased more than six times as fast as the rural population between 1920 and 1930—27.3 as compared with 4.4 per cent. In 1940 the urban population comprised 74,424,000 persons, or 56.5 per cent of the total population—about the same proportion as in 1930 (56.2 per cent).

The rural population in 1940, including 57,246,000 persons, comprised 30,216,000 persons resident on farms and 27,029,000 persons resident in nonfarm areas.¹⁶ The rural-farm population constituted

¹³ See "Census of Manufactures" reports; cf. data in the release "General Statistics, for Industry Groups, for Industries, and for Geographic Divisions and States," October, 1941, p. 64, with the data in the report, *Fifteenth Census of the United States, Manufactures, 1929*, I (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1933), 17.

¹⁴ See Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *Population, First Series, District of Columbia* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1941), p. 4.

¹⁵ The Bureau of the Census defines the urban population in general as consisting of cities and other incorporated places containing 2,500 inhabitants or more. For data see *Population, First Series, United States Summary*.

¹⁶ See Bureau of the Census release, *Population, Series P-10, No. 2*, February 27, 1942.

22.9 per cent and the rural-nonfarm 20.5 per cent of the total population of the nation in 1940, as compared with 24.6 per cent and 19.3 per cent in 1930. Between 1930 and 1940 the rural-farm population remained practically stationary, showing an increase of 0.2 per cent, whereas in the preceding decade the rural-farm population decreased by 3.8 per cent. Since the relation of rural-farm to urban and to rural-nonfarm birth rates did not change sufficiently to account for this difference in rate of growth, these figures indicate that migration out of rural-farm areas declined during the decade as industrial urban centers, hard hit by the depression, were beset with increased numbers of unemployed.

Although the rural-nonfarm population decreased in rate of growth between 1930 and 1940 as compared with the preceding decade, it nevertheless increased at a much more rapid rate than the urban or rural-farm population (14.2 per cent as compared with 7.9 and 0.2 per cent). Part of this relatively high increase is probably attributable to the growth of the rural-nonfarm population within metropolitan districts.

The marked decline in the rate of urban growth, which is one of the outstanding population changes of the decade, is attributable to three main factors, all of them probably associated with the depression: (1) the decline in net internal migration from rural to urban areas, (2) the disappearance of net foreign immigration, and (3) the decline in natural increase. Analysis of the role of these factors in urban population growth during the last two decades helps to explain the sharp decline in the growth of cities.

During the last ten years the urban population increased by about 5,500,000 persons. Net migration from rural areas, it is estimated contributed 1,535,000 persons to this increase; natural increase, about 2,934,000 persons; and net foreign immigration, a negligible number. The remaining increase of about 1,000,000 persons results from the net effect of the reclassification from rural to urban, or vice versa, of places which passed above and below the 2,500 mark between 1930 and 1940. In contrast, the urban population increased by 14,800,000 persons between 1920 and 1930, of which net migration from rural areas accounted for approximately 4,100,000, natural increase for about 6,800,000, net foreign immigration for about

2,400,000, and changes in urban and rural classification for the remaining 1,500,000.¹⁷

Metropolitan districts.—There has been an increasing tendency in recent years to recognize the metropolitan district rather than the arbitrary political unit, the city, as the effective social and economic urban unit. In 1940 the 140 metropolitan districts in the United States as defined by the Bureau of the Census¹⁸ had a total population of 62,966,000 persons, or almost half the population of the country (47.8 per cent). Of the population resident in the metropolitan districts, 20,170,000, or 32 per cent of the total, lived in the outlying areas, that is, outside the central cities.

The 133 districts for which comparative figures for 1930 are available showed a population increase of 8.2 per cent during the decade—a rate of growth somewhat greater than that of the total urban population (7.9 per cent). The increase was unequally distributed, however, between the population within the central cities and the population in the outlying areas of the districts. The combined population of these 133 districts residing in the central cities showed a population increase of only 5 per cent, whereas the population of these districts residing outside the central cities increased by 15.8 per cent. These rates of differential growth well illustrate the continuation of the process of decentralization.

COMPOSITION OF THE POPULATION

The rate of population growth of the country as a whole and of its constituent areas and the various components of population growth—births, deaths, and particularly migration—have shown great changes between 1930 and 1940. The age, sex, and color composition of the population, however, since it reflects the patterns of fertility, mortality, and migration, not only of the past decade but also of the preceding years which account for most of our population, cannot be expected to have registered changes in the course of the decade as striking as those relating to population growth. Such characteristics as nativity and country of birth of the foreign-born, however, be-

¹⁷ Estimates for 1920-30 are taken from Harold F. Dorn and Frank Lorimer, "Migration, Reproduction, and Population Adjustment," *Annals of American Academy of Political and Social Science*, CLXXXVIII (November, 1936), 284.

¹⁸ See *Population, First Series, United States Summary*, pp. 4-5 and 77 ff.

cause they are largely a function of immigration, were, of course, subject to somewhat greater change than age, sex, and color.

An analysis follows of the changes which have occurred in these selected characteristics of the population of the United States as a whole for which data are now available from the 1940 population census.

Age.—The population of the United States has been consistently getting older for as long as age statistics are available. In 1800 the median age of the population was about 16.0 years; between 1930 and 1940 the median age increased by 2.6 years, rising from 26.4 to 29.0 years.¹⁹

The aging of the population is attributable to two main factors—the decrease of the birth rate and the greater average length of life resulting from the declining death rate. The stoppage of net immigration and the aging of foreign-born persons in this country from previous waves of immigration contributed to the large increase in median age during the last ten years.

The effect of decreased birth rates during the last two decades is strikingly evident in the fact that the number of persons under twenty years of age actually declined from 47,609,000 in 1930 to 45,461,000 in 1940, a decrease of 4.5 per cent. Persons of this age, in consequence, constituted only 34.5 per cent of the population in 1940, as compared with 38.8 per cent in 1930. Persons sixty-five years of age and over increased between 1930 and 1940 from 6,634,000 to 8,956,000, an increase of 35 per cent, as compared with an increase of 7.2 per cent for the population as a whole. Persons sixty-five years of age and over made up 6.8 per cent of the population in 1940, as compared with 5.4 per cent in 1930.²⁰

Sex.—In contrast with the situation in many European countries where, largely as a result of wars and emigration, the number of females exceeds the number of males, males have outnumbered the

¹⁹ See forthcoming release of the Bureau of the Census, *Population, Series P-10*.

²⁰ Preliminary analysis of the 1940 age statistics reveals that, relative to 1930, a disproportionately large number of persons were reported as sixty-five years of age and over. Although this phenomenon is undoubtedly related to the passage of the Social Security Act, providing old age assistance and pensions, it is not known at this time whether the age of older persons were overreported in 1940, underreported in 1930, or represents some combination of both.

females throughout the history of this country. The sex ratio (number of males per 100 females) reached its peak in 1910, at which time it was 106, reflecting heavy waves of foreign immigration predominantly masculine in composition. Since that time, however, the sex ratio has been steadily declining. In 1940 there were only 100.7 males in the population for every 100 females, as compared with 102.5 in 1930.²¹

Color.—There was almost no change in the color composition of the American population during the last decade. In 1940 white persons (including Mexicans) constituted 89.8 per cent of the total population, Negroes 9.8 per cent, and other races 0.4 per cent.²²

The number of white persons in the United States increased from 110,287,000 in 1930 to 118,215,000 in 1940, or by 7.2 per cent—a rate of growth identical with that of the nation as a whole.²³ The number of Negroes in the United States increased from 11,891,000 to 12,866,000, or by 8.2 per cent—a rate of growth somewhat above that of the national average.

Nativity.—Of the white population, 90.3 per cent were native and 9.7 per cent foreign-born in 1940, as compared with 87.3 per cent native and 12.7 foreign-born in 1930. The decrease in the proportion of foreign-born whites is, of course, attributable to the high median age of the foreign-born (44.4 years in 1930) and to the disappearance of net immigration, as a result of which the number of foreign-born white persons actually decreased from 13,983,000 in 1930 to 11,419,000 in 1940, or by 18.3 per cent. Between 1910 and 1930 the foreign-born whites remained about the same in number, since losses by death were compensated for by immigration. Unless net immigration is resumed, the foreign-born population, which is aging rapidly (the median age being 51 years in 1940), may be expected within a short time to succumb to the grim reaper and disappear from the national scene.²⁴

²¹ See forthcoming release of the Bureau of the Census, *Population, Series P-10*.

²² See Bureau of the Census release, *Population, Series P-10, No. 1*, February 2, 1942.

²³ The native white population increased from 96,303,000 in 1930 to 106,796,000 in 1940, or by 10.9 per cent.

²⁴ See forthcoming release of the Bureau of the Census, *Population, Series P-10*.

Place of birth of foreign-born white.—There was no great change between 1930 and 1940 in the distribution of the foreign-born white population by country of birth.²⁵ The proportion of foreign-born whites who were natives of northwestern Europe decreased somewhat, being 24.7 per cent in 1940 as compared with 26.6 per cent in 1930. The proportion of foreign-born whites from eastern and southern Europe increased slightly, being 29.5 in 1940 as compared with 26.9 per cent in 1930. The proportion of foreign-born white persons from central Europe remained about the same—30.5 in 1940 and 30.2 in 1930. These changes probably primarily reflect the fact that the earlier waves of immigration emanated from northwestern Europe and the more recent ones from southern and eastern Europe. It is to be expected that this trend will continue, because persons from northwestern Europe are older, as a group, than those from eastern and southern Europe.

Persons born in American countries outside the United States, including Mexico, formed 13.2 per cent of the total foreign-born white population in 1940, as compared with 14.5 per cent in 1930, and the proportion from Asia rose from 1 per cent in 1930 to 1.3 per cent in 1940.

SUMMARY


The results of the 1940 population census available to date have permitted the measurement of a number of population changes which occurred during the past decade. That some of these changes represent a continuation of previous trends and that some are mainly identified with the unique events of the decade, particularly with the depression, is graphically portrayed in Chart I. The more significant of the changes of the last ten years which have been noted may be summarized as follows:

1. Total population growth declined markedly during the decade with the disappearance of net foreign immigration and with further declines in natural increase.
2. The balance of age-specific birth and death rates shifted during the decade so as to fall below the critical point of population replacement.

²⁵ See forthcoming release of the Bureau of the Census, *Population, Series P-10*.

CHART I

SELECTED POPULATION TRENDS: 1850 TO 1940



3. Population in the South increased relatively rapidly as a result of the increased industrialization of this region and the severe effect of the depression on the industrial North. In the latter region the decline in population growth was greater than in either the West or the South. There was an increased exodus of population from both the northern and southern parts of the "dust bowl."

4. The rate of urban growth declined greatly to a point barely exceeding that of rural growth. The rural-farm population remained practically stationary during the decade, indicating a decline in the volume of migration from farms. The rural-nonfarm population increased relatively rapidly.

5. The population of metropolitan districts continued to grow more rapidly in outlying areas than in central cities.

6. The population of the nation continued to age, declined somewhat in sex ratio, but changed very little in racial composition.

7. The number and proportion of foreign-born white persons in the United States decreased substantially. Among the foreign-born the proportion of those who were born in northwestern Europe decreased while the proportion of those born in southern and eastern Europe increased.

World War II came too late in the decade for its repercussions to be mirrored in the 1940 population census returns. In some respects this is fortunate, because the effects of the war have not obliterated the effects of the depression, and the war effects then can be studied from the 1940 census base. These effects have already been profound and have already altered many of the changes of the past decade. It is to be hoped that data will become available in advance of the next decennial census to permit the measurement of these changes.

U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS
WASHINGTON, D.C.

URBAN COMMUNITIES

LOUIS WIRTH

ABSTRACT

The era of uninterrupted growth of cities seems to have come to an end. The rate of increase in urban population in the decade 1930-40 was the smallest in our history. There is no reason to expect a marked reversal in the operation of the basic factors that have brought this about, namely, (1) decline in net internal migration from rural areas, (2) drying-up of the stream of immigration from abroad, and (3) continued drop in rate of natural increase. National post-war economic policy is one of the possibly decisive factors in the future of cities. The urban population has aged, the sex ratio has decreased, the proportion of nonwhites has increased, and there has been a startling drop in the net reproduction rate. The centrifugal movement of population and industry toward the fringes of the city and particularly the suburbs has continued and has been accentuated, leaving the central cities of our metropolitan regions with serious problems, owing to the vacuum created at the city cores. Urban housing has been favored by publicly built or aided projects, although this effort scarcely affects the decline in private residential construction. A trend toward single-family residences in the outlying sections is observable. Urban public services suffered severely during the depression and have not yet recovered, although greater federal aid has mitigated the severity of the depression effects. Urban planning appears to be more widely accepted as a way out for cities to husband their resources, make the most of their opportunities (especially in the form of outside aid), and assure themselves of orderly development. The reconstruction of cities offers one of the greatest possibilities for absorbing the economic shock of demobilization. This calls for planning now.

The city is a favorable platform from which to view the changes that go on in society, for in the urban community virtually all the forces that affect mankind find expression, and it is from the cities that the major innovations in social life are diffused. If the pulse-beats of civilization are registered most sensitively in the cities, especially in the great cities, it must also be recognized that the state of urban life at any one moment is difficult to interpret and the changes that take place even over as short a period as a decade are so varied and complex as not to lend themselves easily to clear depiction. To cover adequately the subject of urban social change would demand dealing with the subject matters of almost all the other contributions to this *Journal*. Since this is manifestly impracticable, we shall confine ourselves to those changes which characteristically have affected cities as communities.

NUMBER AND SIZE OF CITIES

The United States Census reports 3,464 urban places in 1940 as against 3,165 in 1930. Of those communities which had 2,500 or

more population in 1930 (and which, in general, are recognized by the Census as urban), 45 either declined below this population size during the decade or lost their separate identity by being incorporated into already existing urban communities. On the other hand, 344 communities reached the urban stature, making a net increase of 299¹ for the decade.

TABLE 1*
NUMBER OF CITIES AND PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION LIVING
IN CITIES, CLASSIFIED ACCORDING TO SIZE
1940 AND 1930

CITY SIZE (1)	NUMBER OF CITIES		PER CENT OF POPULATION LIVING IN	
	1940 (2)	1930 (3)	1940 (4)	1930 (5)
1,000,000 or more.....	5	5	12.1	12.3
500,000-1,000,000.....	9	8	4.9	4.7
250,000-500,000.....	23	24	5.9	6.5
100,000-250,000.....	55	56	5.9	6.1
50,000-100,000.....	107	98	5.6	5.3
25,000-50,000.....	213	185	5.6	5.2
10,000-25,000.....	665	606	7.6	7.4
5,000-10,000.....	965	851	5.1	4.8
2,500-5,000.....	1,422	1,332	3.8	3.8
Total.....	3,464	3,165	56.5	56.2

* Adapted from U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Sixteenth Census of the United States: 1940, Population: Number of Inhabitants, United States Summary* (1st ser.; Washington: Government Printing Office, 1941), p. 17.

The mere number of communities which according to the arbitrary definition of the Census are designated as urban, however, does not truly reflect the changes in the American urban scene. A more adequate conception of what has happened to our cities during the last decade is to be gained from Table 1, showing the number of cities in each size group as contrasted with a decade ago. The change in numbers of cities of metropolitan proportions has apparently been negligible, whereas many villages have graduated into the category of small towns and towns have grown into cities of moderate size.

¹ U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Sixteenth Census of the United States: 1940, Population: Number of Inhabitants, United States Summary* (1st ser.; Washington: Government Printing Office, 1941), Table 9, p. 17.

URBAN POPULATION

A still better measure of the degree of urbanization of the United States is found in the number of urban inhabitants and their distribution in cities of various sizes. Of the 131,669,275 inhabitants of the United States, 74,423,702, or 56.5 per cent, lived in urban areas in 1940, an increase of approximately five and one-half million over 1930, when the urban population comprised 56.2 per cent of the total. There has been only slight change in the distribution of the urban population in the various size groups of cities, as indicated in columns 4 and 5 of Table 1.

One of the most outstanding changes that has taken place during the decade is the marked decline in the urban rate of growth. The urban population during the ten years 1930-40 has shown an increase of only 7.9 per cent, the smallest percentage increase in our entire national history. The striking nature of this decline may be seen by comparing it with the preceding decade's increase, which, though the next lowest (27.3 per cent), was still over three times as large as the present increase and which contrasts sharply with the opening decade of this century when the increase was still 39.3 per cent and with the record increase of 92.1 per cent in the decade 1840-50. This declining rate of urban growth is all the more outstanding when viewed in the light of the increasing rate of growth of the rural population, which rose from 3.2 per cent in the decade 1910-20 to 4.4 per cent and 6.4 per cent, respectively, in the two successive intercensal periods. Our rate of urban increase is coming to approximate that of the nation as a whole, which was 7.2 per cent in the last decade, the smallest in our history.²

Whereas the West had during the decade the largest rate of increase in the total population (16.7 per cent), the South showed the most marked tendency toward urbanization (18.5 per cent) as contrasted with an urban rate of increase of 16.2 per cent for the West and 4.0 per cent for the North.³ This appears to be due to the progressive industrialization of the South and the tendency for those in the productive age groups to remain in their native region in the face of greater opportunities at home and the relative decline in the dif-

² *Ibid.*, Table 6.

³ *Ibid.*

ferential of economic opportunities as between their own region and others.

The decline in the rate of urban growth appears to be due to the decline in net internal migration from rural areas, the virtual disappearance of net foreign migration, and the drop in the rate of natural increase.⁴ No marked reversal of these trends is expected in the near future, though the effect of war production upon the industrial pattern of the nation, after a long period of economic stagnation, is making itself felt by renewed concentration of industries in the already highly industrialized areas and is bringing unprecedentedly large industrial plants to hitherto rural districts. Whether a permanent change in the rural-urban equilibrium will result from the changes incident to the war depends in large part upon the fate of the industries that the war has brought into being, particularly upon the convertibility of the plants to peacetime production and the national economic policy to be followed after the war.⁵

Among the changing characteristics of the urban population that have taken place during the past decade, age, sex, and racial composition deserve brief mention. The urban population has aged, so that the median age has risen between 1930 and 1940 from 28.4 to 30.9 years. There was a striking increase in the proportion of old people (those over 65 years of age and, to a lesser degree, those over 45 years of age) and a noticeable decrease in the younger age groups (those under 20). There was also a decrease in the sex ratio, the number of males per hundred females having decreased in urban areas from 98.1 in 1930 to 95.8 in 1940. During the last decade the majority of the cities showed an increasing proportion of nonwhites. The southern as well as the northern cities attracted a larger proportion of the nonwhite than of the white migrants.⁶

The continued decline in the birth rate has, as already indicated,

⁴ See the article by Philip M. Hauser in this issue.

⁵ For a statement of the contingencies upon which post-war policies rest and an indication of the recognition by a governmental agency of the problems involved see National Resources Planning Board, *After Defense, What?* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1941), and National Resources Planning Board, *After the War, Full Employment* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1942).

⁶ U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Sixteenth Census of the United States: 1940 Release, Series P-5* (Washington, May 5, 10, and 19, 1941), Nos. 9, 10, and 11

significantly affected the pace of urban population growth. The urban net reproduction rate has declined from 88 in 1930 to 74 in 1940. While the population in the rural areas is still reproducing at a rate well above the replacement level, this is not sufficient to compensate for the deficit in urban areas.⁷

METROPOLITAN REGIONS

For some decades past we have been witnessing the emergence and rapid growth of a new type of urban community—the supercity, or the metropolitan region. The concentration of business and industry in the larger urban centers has been accompanied by the outward movement of residents seeking more favorable places in which to live. The desire to escape from the disadvantages, the costs, and the civic responsibilities of urban living has also been shared by industries, which, while not wishing to deprive themselves of access to urban consumer and labor markets, have sought to benefit from the lower costs, especially land and labor costs, by establishing themselves outside the limits of the central cities and beyond the reach of their regulatory powers.

Except in cases where the cities themselves comprise vast areas and thus contain within their boundaries ample undeveloped territory for residential and industrial expansion, there has taken place during the last decade a significant shift in the distribution of urban residents. In general, the cities have grown much less rapidly than the counties in which they lie. Indeed, the outward movement of the city population has reached a point where nearly one-third of the cities of 100,000 or more inhabitants in 1940 and about one-fourth of the cities in the 25,000–100,000 size group actually lost population during the last decade.⁸

The most dramatic expression of this trend is to be found in those urban complexes which the Census has designated as “Metropolitan

⁷ A. J. Jaffe, “Population Growth and Fertility Trends,” *Journal of Heredity*, XXXII (1941), 442–43. See *Census Release P-5* (August 23, 1941), No. 13. For birth and death rates on specific cities see U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Birth, Stillbirth, and Infant Mortality Statistics: 1930* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1932), pp. 49–136, and *Vital Statistics: Special Reports*, Vol. X, Tables A and B by states.

⁸ Philip M. Hauser, “How Declining Urban Growth Affects City Activities,” *Public Management*, XXII (December, 1940), 355–58.

Districts."⁹ Whereas the central cities, constituting the core of these metropolitan districts, have grown only 6.1 per cent during the last decade, the outlying areas on the periphery of the central cities have grown 16.9 per cent, as Table 2 indicates. Thus nearly one out of six Americans is a suburbanite, and there is one suburban dweller for every two inhabitants of a metropolitan city. The implications of this suburban trend for local government, the physical structure of cities, housing, industry, taxation, real estate values, and ways of living are already becoming apparent. The fact that nearly half of the nation's total population is concentrated into one hundred and

TABLE 2*
POPULATION OF METROPOLITAN DISTRICTS, 1940 AND 1930

METROPOLITAN DISTRICTS	POPULATION		INCREASE	
	1940	1930	Number	Per Cent
Total (140 districts).....	62,965,773	57,602,865	5,362,908	9.3
In central cities.....	42,796,170	40,343,442	2,452,728	6.1
Outside central cities.....	20,169,603	17,259,423	2,910,180	16.9

* U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Sixteenth Census of the United States: 1940, Population: Number of Inhabitants, United States Summary* (1st ser.; Washington: Government Printing Office, 1941), p. 71.

forty metropolitan areas is in itself impressive, indicating that, although dispersion of the population and industries from the central cities is under way, this does not spell the end of urbanization but means, rather, a new type of decentralization within more inclusive metropolitan areas.

The serious problems which the flight of industry and people into the suburban fringe creates for the central cities can be more adequately appraised if the suburban trend is seen as operating in combination with the outward movement of residential and business districts within cities themselves. The inner cores of the cities have been threatened by depopulation, blight, and decay.¹⁰

⁹ In the 1940 Census, metropolitan districts have been set up for each city of 50,000 or more (sometimes 2 or more being in one district), including generally all adjacent and contiguous territory having a population of 150 or more per square mile (U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Sixteenth Census of the United States: 1940, Population* . . . , p. 4).

¹⁰ Leo Grebler, "The Growth of Suburbs," *Federal Home Loan Bank Review*, August, 1941, pp. 373-75 and 387.

Some of the major cities of the country have been faced with the problem of maintaining urban public services such as policing, fire protection, sanitation, education, and recreation at constant or increasing costs in the face of declining income from taxation, owing to a drop in the value of taxable property and increasing tax delinquency. The efforts that have been made by the public housing agencies to check blight and to construct low-cost housing in the slum sections near the centers of cities have not been on a sufficiently large scale to reverse the trend of migration toward the fringe of the cities and have not effectively halted the obsolescence of public facilities and private structures in the inner and older built-up areas of our cities. Commendable as the efforts to rehabilitate the deteriorated areas have been, they have to a large extent been offset by the activities of the lending agencies of the federal government which have looked upon the older areas as poor risks and have favored the outward movement of new residential construction. Increasing traffic congestion at the city centers, coupled with increasing emphasis upon high-speed, through-traffic lanes to the outskirts and the suburbs, has accentuated the tendency to create residential vacuums at the hearts of cities.¹¹

URBAN HOUSING

During the past decade there has developed in the United States a widespread interest in attempts to provide improved housing facilities for the low-income groups and to rehabilitate blighted areas. The need to find useful employment for large masses of the population, to "prime the pump" of private industry, and to relieve the substandard living conditions of large portions of the population has received wider recognition during the past decade than during any period in our history. Even before new construction got under way, demolition of unfit habitations was undertaken by the emergency-relief agencies that were organized during the depression. Beginning in 1934 real property inventories to determine the state of actual housing conditions were conducted in several hundred urban areas, at first by the Civil Works Administration, the Federal Emergency Relief Administration, and the Works Progress Administration as

¹¹ See Federal Housing Administration, *The Structure and Growth of Residential Neighborhoods in American Cities* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1939).

work-relief projects. These were later extended to other cities, largely with federal aid, by local housing and planning groups. They served to substantiate the claim that one-third of our nation was ill housed and helped to lay the foundation for the action programs of such agencies as the Home Owners' Loan Corporation, which came to the rescue of those living predominantly in old neighborhoods to save their nominal equities; the Federal Housing Administration, which enabled purchasers to finance new homes and improve existing structures mainly in the outlying sections of the cities and in the suburbs; and the United States Housing Authority, which confined itself largely to building low rental housing for low-income groups in the inner zones of cities. Other federal agencies, including more recently the Defense Housing agencies, and private enterprise contributed significantly to the rehousing of a considerable proportion of the inadequately housed urban population.

While far from reaching the proportions of the housing boom of the 1920's, the urban housing of the succeeding decade, especially during the latter half, amounted to well over one-half the total of the boom period. It is especially worthy of note, however, that by far the largest share of the new housing of the 1930's consisted of single-family dwellings, as distinguished from the multi-family dwellings characteristic of the decade before.¹²

It may be inferred that the experiments with public housing during the past decade, while they have not reshaped the face of our urban communities, have at least made a notable beginning and, what is more, have set valuable precedents in public responsibility and have stimulated a popular interest in the improvement of the physical conditions of living for all our citizens. During the past decade many urban communities have established local housing authorities, and groups of private citizens have formed housing agencies which furnish information and leadership in the attempts to solve local housing problems. The housing data which the 1940 Census will make available should aid in furnishing a factual basis for a more enlightened housing program. The recent consolidation of the housing agencies of the federal government should also contribute significantly

¹² See *Monthly Labor Review*, April, 1941, pp. 1008 and 1010, for statistics on housing construction by type of housing and amounts publicly and privately financed.

to the formulation of a more integrated and effective national housing policy.

URBAN PUBLIC SERVICES

The outstanding problem which has confronted urban communities during the major part of the last decade has been that of continuing the public services such as unemployment relief, welfare, education, sanitation and public health, public safety, public utilities, maintenance of physical facilities, and recreation in the face of sharply declining urban revenues and rapidly increasing demands. By 1932 many of our cities found themselves unable to deal with these problems and virtually in a state of bankruptcy. In some public order was on the verge of serious impairment. Financial relief, at first in the form of loans and then in the form of grants, was slow in arriving from states and the federal government. Meanwhile public servants underwent the experience of payless paydays, and some essential public services were seriously impaired. Unable to borrow and to collect taxes, the cities had to appeal to the higher levels of government for rescue. But, since many of the states found themselves in a similar predicament, it remained for the federal government to intervene.

Through the emergency agencies established in rapid succession beginning in 1933 (with the Reconstruction Finance Corporation the outstanding example of an agency preceding the New Deal concerned with relief of local problems), cities were relieved of some of the financial responsibilities, particularly for the public welfare services. They were enabled to obtain credit for continuing the other essential services of government, though in a greatly reduced form. Salaries of public servants in many cases were drastically reduced, and in other instances all but the indispensable services were sharply curtailed. Emergency local taxation was resorted to wherever possible. Plans for expansion of public works and services were indefinitely postponed. The unemployed masses were given temporary employment on local public works.

As the depression continued, the improvised maintenance of the public services became for many cities a permanent arrangement, and, with few exceptions and except for brief periods of business revival, the cities have had to rely upon an increasing amount of out-

side aid up until the point of the defense revival in industry and income was reached. In the case of relief alone it is interesting to note that, whereas in 1931 the proportion contributed by local funds amounted to 28.6 per cent of the total in 120 urban areas, by 1935 this had dropped to 1.4 per cent.¹³ The establishment of the federal social security system has done much to relieve the burdens of many classes of dependents, which cities were formerly carrying, and has generally brought them to a point where their responsibility can be more nearly carried with local resources. It is to be noted, however, that with the defense boom the services which cities are called upon to render are greatly augmented, whereas the revenue from taxation lags far behind.

Of the various public services performed by governments, cities perform a large share; particularly is this true in comparison with county and state governments. This is indicated by the fact that the cities in 1940 had 932,000 public employees as against 350,000 for the counties and 557,000 for the states, with pay rolls of \$108,000,000 for cities as against \$35,200,000 for counties and \$59,500,000 for states.¹⁴ The cities are next in importance to the federal government in the size and cost of public functions. The executive functions of states have, though, expanded a good deal during the 1930's.

PLANNING

Ever since the end of the nineteenth century there has been developing a deepening interest in the improvement of the physical structure and the social life of cities. This movement, which was to some extent diverted from its main objective by the city-beautiful conception of planning, has been one of the main channels through which the problems and prospects of urban life were brought home to the local communities as questions requiring scientific analysis, technical skill, and organized community support. At no time in our history has the city-planning movement taken on greater reality and made greater progress than during the decade from 1930 to 1940.

¹³ U.S. Children's Bureau, *Trends in Different Types of Public and Private Relief in Urban Areas, 1929-35* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1937), Table 1, p. 10.

¹⁴ U.S. Bureau of the Census, "Public Employment and the War," *State and Local Government Quarterly Employment Survey*, I, No. 31A (February, 1942), 7. These figures include only regular employees and pay rolls exclusive of education.

In part this intensified interest in the improvement and reconstruction of cities was stimulated by the mass exodus of urban inhabitants to the suburban periphery and by the breakdown of normal functioning of the economic and governmental structure of cities during the great depression. Whereas in the past our cities had virtually enjoyed an uninterrupted and phenomenal growth, the decade of 1930-40 provided ample evidence of a slowing-down if not a complete cessation of population increase which, to the speculatively minded, was a cause for alarm. It was natural, therefore, that greater emphasis should be given to the conservation of such values as the cities still might have, both as workshops of men and as places of residence. An outstanding event symbolizing this renewed interest in the improvement and conservation of urban life was the organization, under the auspices of the National Resources Committee, of the Research Committee on Urbanism. The report of this Committee, entitled *Our Cities: Their Role in the National Economy*,¹⁵ together with the supplementary reports of that Committee provided the basis and an incentive for greatly increased and more effective efforts at urban planning. Largely stimulated by federal aid and counsel, effective local planning groups during the past decade have multiplied, and what otherwise might have been utopian dreams of urban improvement were actually in many cases realized because of the extensive federal works projects which provided a large labor force from the ranks of the unemployed at the expense of the federal government. This aid not only made it possible for the cities to undertake public improvements on a large scale but enabled them to maintain their physical plants without too great deterioration.

The number of urban planning agencies in 1940 came to a total of 724. While this number is somewhat less than the number reporting in 1936, the number of active, local planning agencies has increased.¹⁶ What is more important than the number of agencies, however, is the fact that planning in urban communities seems to have become

¹⁵ (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1937.) See also the supplementary reports, *Urban Government* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1938) and *Urban Planning and Land Policies* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1939).

¹⁶ National Resources Planning Board, "Survey of Local Planning Agencies, 1940" (mimeographed). See *Local Planning Activity in the United States*, by the Bureau of Urban Research of Princeton University (December, 1941), p. 7.

increasingly widely recognized as an essential public responsibility if cities are to make the most of their opportunities and resources and if they are to share in such aid as might be forthcoming through federal works programs—housing aid and other benefits which would not ordinarily be allotted to those cities which were without an orderly program of development. It is likely that the post-war readjustments in our national economy, and particularly the efforts that are now in prospect to cushion the shock of demobilization of men and war industry, will present the cities with unprecedented problems and opportunities. If the national programs now under consideration should actually be carried out, the physical reconstruction of cities and the expansion and improvement of urban public services are likely to offer the greatest possibilities of preventing mass unemployment and the stagnation of industry.¹⁷ To make such a program effective requires that our cities should now make plans which can be put into operation when the armistice comes.

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¹⁷ National Resources Planning Board, *After Defense, What?* and *After the War, Full Employment*.

RURAL LIFE

CARL C. TAYLOR

ABSTRACT

Agriculture during the 1930's was affected by the depression and by the great droughts. Many farmowners became tenants. The general trend was from some form of land-tenure status to farm wage hand, to nonfarm employment, or to unemployment.

During this same period, however, there was a tremendous increase in the farm use of electricity and in the development and adaptation of new methods of animal and agricultural production.

The increase in federal services and aids to farm and rural people made for tremendous changes in rural life. These changes were accompanied by other cultural changes which were caused in part by mechanized farming.

It would appear that there has been an increase in the economic and social stratification of the farmer, accompanied by a realization of farm people of their interrelation with the Great Society.

Four things of outstanding significance to agriculture during the past decade reflected themselves in terms of pronounced change: (1) the depression, (2) a series of almost unprecedented droughts, (3) "federal relief" of various kinds for agriculture and for rural families, and (4) preparation for national defense and war. The depression, which started in agriculture in the 1920's, reached its depths in the early thirties, and the worst droughts occurred between 1933 and 1937. A great volume of farm-relief legislation followed the depression and droughts in the first half of the decade.¹ Since 1939 defense preparations and war have reversed a number of trends induced by depression and drought.

DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGES IN AMERICAN RURAL LIFE

Rural and urban birth rates fell at about the same rate during the decade. Net reproduction rates in the farm areas were, however, about 80 per cent higher than those in cities. Thus the farm population, as in the past, contributed a disproportionate share of the total natural increase. The net cityward movement of farm population, which reached an all-time high during the period of urban prosperity

¹ Francis D. Cronin and Howard W. Beers, *Areas of Intense Drought Distress, 1930-1936* (Washington, D.C.: Works Progress Administration, January, 1937); C. Warren Thornthwaite, "Climate and Settlement in the Great Plains," in *Climate and Man; Yearbook of the United States Department of Agriculture, 1941* (Washington, D.C., 1941); R. J. Martin, "Dust Storms of 1939 in the United States," *Monthly Weather Review*, LXVII (December, 1939), 446-51.

in the middle 1920's, slowed down in the late twenties and early thirties and turned to a net farmward movement of approximately 266,000 in 1932. Farm population was relatively static from 1928 to 1931, increased between 1930 and 1935, and decreased between 1935 and 1940. It was greater in 1935 than at any time since 1917, but by 1940 it was about what it had been in 1930.

Obscured within these gross data are some puzzling and probably significant trends. During an exceedingly severe agricultural depression there was a marked increase in the number of farms as well as in the number of people on farms. Apparently many farm people, mostly youth, who in the pre-depression period would have migrated to towns and cities, chose to remain on farms even though the proportion of the total national income going to agriculture was smaller than it had been for two decades and was steadily diminishing. Furthermore, thousands of urban dwellers sought the shelter of the land rather than face the insecurity of city existence during the depths of the depression. The fact that the lands on which they stayed or to which they moved were poor, even submarginal, did not alter their apparent conviction that there was relative security in these lands. About 100,000 of the 500,000 added farms between 1930 and 1935 were in the southern Appalachians.²

The development and expansion of relief and work programs apparently served, on the other hand, to attract large numbers of farm people to small towns and cities within the rural areas, and the severe droughts drove them in great numbers not only out of the drought areas but into the towns and villages of these areas. The result was an increase in the rural nonfarm population at the expense of the rural farm population. The national population increased 7.2 per cent in the past decade, the rural nonfarm population increased 14.5 per cent, and the farm population remained about the same. Between 1930 and 1940 the total population of the five Great Plains (drought) states—North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, and Oklahoma—decreased 4.1 per cent, and the rural farm population decreased 13.8 per cent, but the rural nonfarm population decreased only 1 per cent. The rural nonfarm population increased in both North and South Dakota.

² O. E. Baker, *A Graphic Summary of the Number, Size and Type of Farm and Value of Products* (U.S. Department of Agriculture Misc. Pub. 266 [Washington, D.C., October, 1937]).

CHANGES IN THE ECONOMIC STATUS OF FARM PEOPLE

Farm prosperity, which had increased steadily between 1915 and 1920, declined steadily during the 1920's and fell precipitately during the early years of the 1930's. It recovered considerably during the latter years of the decade. Per capita farm income, one of the outstanding indices to economic status, on the basis of an index of 100 for the period 1910-14, fell to 55.6 in 1932, rose to 142.2 in 1937, fell to 114.1 in 1938, and rose to 119.3 in 1940.³

Agriculture's share of the national income followed about this same trend. It was approximately 12.5 per cent from 1910 to 1914, rose to 16.7 per cent in 1918, but had fallen to 5.3 per cent in 1932. It rose to 8.7 per cent in 1937, declined to 7.7 per cent in 1938, and stood at 7.2 per cent in 1940.⁴ Farm purchasing power, therefore, notwithstanding the fact that the volume of agricultural production remained fairly constant, was at a great disadvantage all during the past decade.

Farm mortgage debt rose to the highest point in national history in 1923, when it stood at \$10,785,621,000 and had fallen to only \$9,630,768,000 in 1930, the liquidation chiefly having been accomplished by mortgage foreclosure. This process continued during the first half of the 1930's. Many farmowners became tenants, corporate ownership of farms increased, and mortgage holdings were shifted from insurance companies and other private corporations to government agencies.⁵

Both the number and the percentage of tenant farmers increased steadily, although at varying rates, from decade to decade—from 23.6 per cent in 1880 to 42.4 per cent in 1930. Between 1930 and 1935 the rate declined to 42.1 per cent, but the number increased by 200,790. Between 1935 and 1940 the rate declined to 38.7 per cent and the number decreased by 503,884. The net decline in rate for the decade was 8.7 per cent, and the net decrease in num-

³ "Material Bearing on Parity Prices: Presentation by Howard R. Tolley, Chief of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics at a Hearing on Parity Prices and Income for Agriculture before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, U.S. Senate, July, 1941" (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Agriculture, July, 1941) (mimeographed).

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ Norman J. Wall, in "Presentation by the Bureau of Agricultural Economics before the Temporary National Economic Committee, U.S. Department of Agriculture" (Washington, D.C., April 23, 1940) (mimeographed).

bers was 303,094. In these fluctuating trends the increases are chiefly accounted for by mortgage foreclosures and increased corporate ownership and the decreases by the shift from share-cropper status to that of wage-worker. Some of those who were previously share-croppers became relief clients, some migratory laborers, and others moved entirely out of the farm population. The fact that the number of hired workers in farm employment declined from 2,850,000 in 1930 to 2,450,000 in 1940 indicates that the general trend was from share-cropper or other land-tenure status to farm wage hand, to nonfarm employment, or to unemployment.

CHANGES IN TECHNOLOGIES

American farming has for a hundred years been relatively highly mechanized. It has for more than fifty years been relatively scientific—that is, relative to agriculture in other areas of the world. This has been due to the fact that ours, for the most part, has been a large-scale agriculture and because our rural life has not been socially isolated from our total culture.

Farmers have not borrowed their technologies from urban industry but have participated widely in the general technological development of Western culture. Automobiles, trucks, tractors, and dozens of motor-driven farm implements are an index to the extent to which mechanization has advanced in agriculture. There was practically no increase during the decade in automobiles, but there was a 16 per cent increase in trucks and a 70 per cent increase in tractors. These are the major power machines. Each carries with it a great many supplementary machines and implements. The habitual use of these machines greatly alters not only the farmer's behavior but also his way of living and thinking.

The truck, when owned or hired, supplants horses and mules in road work, for hauling on the farm, and for driving stationary machinery. The automobile on the farm is used in making necessary business trips, in marketing, school transportation, quite frequently as a truck or tractor, and often as a motor to drive stationary machinery. The tractor is used for all kinds of field work, for farm and road hauling, to drive stationary grinders, threshers, shellers, pumps, saws, and even for stretching wire and pulling posts and stumps. With it goes larger and higher-g geared planting, tilling, and harvesting machinery of many kinds.

In no other area of activity is one machine put to so many uses as is the general-purpose, rubber-tired tractor on the farm. No other workman by necessity and genius is so versatile as the farmer in the use of one machine. He operates this machine skilfully, turns it to uses not intended or imagined by its inventors, and conditions, repairs, and, if necessary, practically remakes it. Because he does and must do these things, power machinery means something different to him from what it does to the technical worker in any mass-production industry.

Until electricity came to the farm on a wide front, the farm woman had no tool or implement improvements that compared with the self-binder, hay-loader, combine, tractor, and multiple plows which, one after another, had come to her husband. With electricity came the electric lights, iron, radio, washing machine, refrigerator, vacuum cleaner, range, sewing machine, churn, pump, and all the smaller electrical equipment such as toasters, percolators, roasters, waffle irons, fans, dishwashers, heating pads, and curling irons. Her husband too received many new services and implements such as electric fences, water pumps, milking machines, elevators, grinders, and the like which had previously been absent or operated by far more clumsy tools than the electric motors. Gradually but surely larger electric motors are coming to operate cotton gins, grain elevators and mills, community hatcheries and storage plants, and electric lights installed in rural schools, churches, and community halls.

In 1925 only 3.2 per cent of our farms were receiving central station electricity, in 1930 only 10.2 per cent, and in 1934 this rate was still only 10.9 per cent. In the next few years, however, rural electrification developed in the same ways that rural free delivery did in the 1890's, rural telephone service in the first decade of the present century, and good roads and automobiles during the next two decades. All these new services moved in the same fashion. Once they broke through the inertia of old customs, they developed with amazing acceleration. The percentage of all farms receiving electricity moved to 11.6 in 1935, 15.4 in 1936, 18.2 in 1937, 20.6 in 1938, 25.0 in 1939, 27.1 in 1940, and to about 34.9 in 1941.⁶

Steady and accelerated progress was made in the application of

⁶ Robert T. Beall, "Rural Electrification," in *Farmers in a Changing World: Yearbook of the United States Department of Agriculture, 1940* (Washington, D.C., 1940), p. 802.

science to agriculture between 1930 and 1940, but only a few illustrations can be cited. It is estimated that, because of the use of hybrid seed, corn production in 1938 was nearly 100,000,000 bushels greater than it would have been had open-pollinated seed been used. About 25 per cent of all corn acreage was planted with hybrid seed that year. Soybean production increased by 8,075,000 acres, or 238 per cent in the decade; and, because of the use of soybeans for oil and plastics, production will probably experience an accelerated increase in the immediate future.

Development and adoption of early maturing, drought-, frost-, and disease-resistant varieties of grains have made progress during the decade. Outstanding among these have been Thatcher wheat, which is resistant to stem rust, introduced in 1934; early maturing varieties of grain sorghum, which were developed and adopted widely in western Nebraska and South Dakota during the droughts of the 1930's; and cold-resistant varieties of flax, which make it possible to produce this much-needed crop in northern areas.

Improvements in animal production, although accomplished more slowly than improvements in crop production, have moved forward during the decade. Pronounced advancement has taken place in efficient feeding of livestock, resulting in quicker maturing and fattening of meat and greater production per cow of dairy products. Progeny-testing of dairy animals and poultry, cross-breeding of beef cattle, hogs, and sheep, and artificial insemination have been outstanding developments during the decade, all making for increased production at the hands of science. As is generally the case in nutrition improvement, the scientific use of vitamins and minerals has gone further in farm animal than in human feeding. Furthermore, the production of feed has been much better adjusted to animal than to human needs. Farmers control what their animals eat and so produce to meet their needs, whereas there are great deficits in milk, eggs, and certain leafy vegetables needed for human consumption which farmers do not produce because they do not control and cannot dictate the human consumption of these products.

Of equal or greater significance than any change in agricultural technology is what might be described as a change in agricultural production enterprises. During the decade agriculture has been slowly shifting away from the production of such surplus crops as cotton,

wheat, and tobacco toward products that have become increasingly in demand to meet domestic needs. In this process farmers have accomplished something in two significant directions. They have made these adjustments in the direction of conservation of natural resources and somewhat in the direction of meeting the nutritional needs of the American people. Between 1930 and 1940 the production of cotton, wheat, and tobacco—all export crops with failing markets—was reduced by twenty million acres, practically all of which were placed in either soil-conserving or home-consumable products.

INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES IN RURAL LIFE

The basic social institutions and social services in rural areas do not change rapidly but do reflect, to a considerable extent, the impact of changed conditions and circumstances. The free public school system is so thoroughly sanctioned in our culture that its maintenance and operation are bound to be sustained even in the face of severe depression. Because of lessened private and public income, however, the efficient operation of the rural grade and secondary schools was thrown into considerable jeopardy during the decade. Some of the poorer states (mostly rural), after having taxed themselves far above the normal for school support, were unable to maintain their schools in the early days of the depression.⁷ Many poverty-stricken farm families could not afford to purchase the clothes and books essential to school attendance. States which had previously been fearful of federal interference not only willingly accepted but pleaded for federal school aid.

The school population (ages five to seventeen, inclusive) decreased in both rural and urban areas, whereas enrolment and attendance increased in both areas.⁸ In the early part of the decade the school population in rural areas increased rapidly because of the slackening of migration of youths to cities and because of the movement of urban families to the land. Many of the children in the increased rural-youth population were neither in attendance nor enrolled in school. When migration to cities again began, the percentage of the

⁷ Advisory Committee on Education, *Report of the Committee* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, February, 1938).

⁸ David T. Blose and Henry F. Alves, *Statistics of State School Systems, 1937-38* (U.S. Office of Education, Federal Security Agency, Bull. 1940, No. 2 [Washington, D.C., 1941]), pp. 55-67.

urban-school population enrolled and the percentage in attendance increased at a more rapid rate than they did in rural areas. The percentage of the school population which was enrolled in school in rural areas therefore lagged farther behind that in cities at the end than at the beginning of the decade. The same thing was true of the percentage of enrolment that was in attendance.

Between 1926 and 1936 there was a substantial decrease in the number of rural churches, primarily in the South, whereas there was a slight increase in the number of churches in urban areas. This same trend was apparent in the number of members in rural and urban areas. Small churches in rural areas have gradually given way to larger ones, but the average number of members per church in rural areas has increased.⁹

During the early years of the depression, when farm people, distressed by lack of economic income, were losing farmownership on a wide front and were receiving assistance from new federal aid programs, the leadership of the rural church suffered in competition with the leadership of other programs. On national and state levels there was probably never a time when the church and church leadership were less a part of the programs for adjustment in rural life than during the first half of the decade 1930-40. During the latter part of the decade, however, there was considerable evidence of renewed concern of church bodies with outstanding rural problems.¹⁰

Rural health, welfare, and recreation programs during the decade distinctly reflected the farmer's economic status, on the one hand, and the federal programs of assistance, on the other. Because of the lack of farmer purchasing power, medical and dental care were at a low ebb. Relief needs could not be met by depleted local and state budgets. Commercialized recreation, in which farmers had come more and more to participate, fell off sharply. On the other side of the picture, there was considerable evidence that homemade recreation in local farm areas moved in to some extent to fill the gap. Further, elaborate programs of federal relief more than filled the gaps in the field of health and welfare.

Relief of rural poverty was taken over by such agencies as C.W.A.,

⁹ *Selected Statistics for the United States: Religious Bodies, 1936* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Commerce, 1941).

¹⁰ Releases of Information Service, Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America, 297 Fourth Avenue, New York City.

F.E.R.A., W.P.A., N.Y.A., C.C.C., and, above all, by the Farm Security Administration. Something like three and a half million rural families were assisted by one or more of these federal relief agencies during the depression. This was almost a wholly new phenomenon in American rural areas.

The general assumption that farm people were poor but not poverty-stricken, sometimes ill but for the most part well fed, well housed, and healthy, was exploded during the decade by an assembly of empirical facts which for the first time in American history made frontal attacks on rural social weak spots.¹¹

Something approaching an agricultural revolution occurred during the decade in terms of the rise of what are called the agricultural action programs. "Farm relief," which had been pleaded for and fought for by farm organizations and farm blocs during the 1920's, came in a dozen different ways in the 1930's. The lag in agricultural and rural life was attacked by federal legislation and federal programs on the fronts of soil conservation and improvement, price adjustment, credit facilities, marketing agreements and surplus marketing machinery, crop insurance, rural electrification, and by a frontal attack on rural poverty.

People in rural areas now participate in the benefits of old age assistance, aid to the blind, aid to dependent children, and other programs; but "agricultural labor" which is defined so broadly as to include many persons engaged in processing, is excluded from Federal Old Age and Survivors' Insurance and from state unemployment compensation programs.¹²

• During the early 1930's all three of the general farm organizations—the Grange, the Farmers' Union, and the Farm Bureau—lost in the number of dues-paying members. During this same period, however, the Farmers' Holiday Association, gained great strength. As the depression alleviated, the strength and influence of the Holiday Association diminished and the dues-paying membership of all three of the general farmers' organizations increased.

¹¹ See Carl C. Taylor, Helen W. Wheeler, and E. L. Kirkpatrick, *Disadvantaged Classes in American Agriculture* ("Social Research Reports," No. VIII [Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Agriculture, April, 1938]); T. J. Wooster, Jr., and Ellen Winston, *Seven Lean Years* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1939).

¹² A. J. Altmeyer, "Social Security in Relation to Agriculture and Rural Areas," *Social Security Bulletin*, III, No. 7 (July, 1940), 3-15.

With increased membership came an increase in the effectiveness of their demands for farm legislation and an increase in so-called "farm pressure group" influence. Farmers' co-operative organizations suffered losses in both membership and volume of business during the first half of the decade but gained back more during the last half of the decade than they lost during the first half.

PSYCHOLOGICAL AND CULTURAL CHANGES

Cultural trends do not travel on such short-time cycles as decades, and cultural patterns do not shift sharply in any ten-year period. It is impossible, therefore, to measure by neat statistics the rural cultural changes between 1930 and 1940. The best that be can done is to fit changes which occurred during the decade into longer-time trends and to note those events which indicate the continuance, the hastening, or the retardation of these trends.

The depression in agricultural prices during the first half of the past decade led to a great increase in the number and percentage of self-sufficing farms and drove many relatively commercialized farms back toward self-sufficiency. The Farm Security Administration, made responsible by law to "assist low income and destitute farm families," has greatly increased the self-sufficiency of some 600,000 farm families, many of whom had previously been operating as share or cash tenants or share-croppers in commercially dominated types of farming. The great increase in mechanization, on the other hand, has had a tendency to increase commercialized farming.

The capacity to farm larger acreages has increased steadily as farm technologies have changed from man-power to horse-power to motor power. Mechanization is not equally prevalent, however, in all areas of the United States or on all farms in any area. Not more than 22 per cent of all farms have tractors, but about 66 per cent of all farms of more than a hundred acres have them. The number of tractors just about doubled on this size farm in the decade, but it increased scarcely at all on the self-sufficing farms, and tractors are still not very prevalent in the old Cotton Belt, where farms are small and hand labor plentiful.

The cultural influence of mechanized farming probably is tending to introduce a degree of economic and social stratification in the farm population. Because of the necessarily greater fixed capital

and operating costs due to the purchase, maintenance, and operation of machines, financial risks and consequent speculation are increased on mechanized farms. Thus the evolution of machine-minded and money-minded farmers go hand in hand, and both tend to change the tone and texture of farming.

The evolution from folk-mindedness to scientific-mindedness is so gradual in the occupation of farming that no single invention, unless it be something comparable to the Whitney cotton gin, manifests itself in an agricultural revolution. Chemurgy has made no giant strides during the decade, and nothing more startling than the development and spread of hybrid corn and the emergent increase in the production of soybeans has occurred. Even when and where such outstanding discoveries as methods of artificial insemination or the use of plant hormones are made and their practicability tested and demonstrated in laboratories and experiment stations, adoption is relatively slow because the knowledge must filter through and become a part of the farm operator's own mind before it is functional. Except in the case of veterinary medicine and on giant factoryized farms, the farm operator does not, as in the case of industrial production, employ scientific experts. Nor does he borrow his science from or buy it in the city. Genetics, chemistry, and physics as applied to agriculture must be inculcated in agricultural folk knowledge before they are widely applied to farm production. Farm practices during the decade, as at all other periods, lagged behind agricultural scientific knowledge.

Rural life has probably moved out of isolation faster during the past decade than during any other ten-year period. The continued development of good roads, the increased number of farmer-owned automobiles, the decrease in farmer illiteracy, the increase in radios, and, above all, the heightening of farm people's consciousness of their interrelations with the Great Society have all served to socialize farm life and farmers' interests. Because of the depression, many farmers were unable to operate their automobiles or to purchase new ones, and many of them dropped their subscriptions to farm journals and to daily papers, and there was an actual decrease in the number of farm homes with telephones. The number of radios on farms, however, steadily increased, and news, music, and other broadcast programs flowed in ever increasing volume into rural areas.

The long-time, steady enlargement of the farmer's community has continued. The school community has been enlarged by the continuation of the consolidation movement, trade areas have increased in size, and a great many smaller trade centers have been abandoned. County-seat and similar-sized rural towns and cities have grown at the expense of smaller towns and villages. The town church has grown at the expense of the open-country church. The enrollment of rural youth in town high schools and colleges and their more frequent attendance at picture shows and other recreational events have meant more frequent and wider contacts. Radios, newspapers, and picture shows have greatly extended the world with which farm people are familiar.

Some countertrends in community development have occurred during the decade. The lack of money with which to purchase automobiles, license tags, and gasoline tended in many places to revive old local, rural neighborhood group activities. The promotion and conduct of a number of agricultural programs have led to the re-discovery and use of old, long-existing rural neighborhoods and communities as locality planning and action areas. There has been a revival of local folk dancing and singing in rural communities, some of which have been carried by means of the radio and other devices into urban areas. These types of neighborhood and community activity have developed some vogue in cities and may have introduced some tendency to establish or re-establish locality patterns of group behavior in urban areas. If so, it will be an example of reciprocal acculturation between rural and urban life.

There is some evidence that that one broad cultural result of the drastic experiences of the decade—depression, droughts, farm-relief and aid programs, and mechanization—was an increased tendency toward geographic, economic, and social stratification of farmers. Farms have increased in size and have become more commercialized in areas where large-scale mechanization is most feasible and have tended toward greater self-sufficiency in other areas. Corporation farms increased at one end of the scale and the number of low-income farms increased at the other. The number of tenants decreased, but the number of migratory farm laborers increased.

Not least important, even though some phases of it may prove

to be transient, is the increased role which government has come to play in the life and interest of the farmer. This is not a new trend, but it is one which seems to fluctuate with changing economic circumstances. It was accelerated in the Granger period of the 1870's, during the Farmers' Alliance and Populist periods of the late 1880's and early 1890's, and again with the McNary-Haugen farm-relief agitation of the 1920's. Farmer participation in government programs, however, has never been greater than since 1933, and farm pressure groups have probably never but twice before—during the 1870's and 1890's—exercised greater influence than during the last half of the decade 1930-40.

The farmers, general farmers' organizations, and agricultural leaders were accused during the decade of preaching an economic doctrine of scarcity because they attacked the joint problem of agricultural surpluses and low farm income. They were accused of mollycoddling the ne'er-do-wells because they promoted programs of better housing, sanitation, nutrition, and health for the lower third in agriculture. But through programs of relief and aid there has been a consistent attempt to shorten the lag between urban and rural incomes and standards of living and to bring to agriculture not only science but business organization and social services.

The Agricultural Adjustment and Domestic Allotment program and the Surplus Commodity program were launched for the direct purpose of influencing agricultural prices. Farm credit and debt adjustment programs were launched to save farmer-owned equities. The Soil Conservation program was launched to correct the wastage of a system of agriculture still dominated by pioneer impulses and to forestall such cataclysms as dust storms and devastating floods. The Farm Security program was established to assist, systematically for the first time, the lower one-third of the agricultural population. The social sciences have, during the decade, moved up beside the physical sciences in their service to agriculture.

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THE NEGRO

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ABSTRACT

The depression, the advent of the New Deal, and the war emergency profoundly affected the economic condition of the Negro population during the past decade. The depression accentuated the marginal economic status of this group and resulted in widespread unemployment and dependence upon governmental aid. The New Deal accelerated the enactment of social and labor legislation which, for the first time, effectively included large groups of the Negro population. The new status given to labor coupled with the development of industrial unions brought new strength and security to Negro workers. The war emergency has resulted in a challenge, strongly supported by the federal government, of the traditional industrial employment policy of the United States with reference to discrimination against Negro workers. The result has been some increases in employment of Negroes in new industries and in higher categories of skills. In education striking advances may be noted over the past decade, although wide differentials between Negro and white educational facilities still exist. The recent Supreme Court decisions which have stimulated southern states to provide graduate instruction for Negro students and to show concern over the equalization of Negro and white teachers' salaries are significant developments. Some improvement in Negro health has been recorded, but it has not been sufficient to offset the decline in the fertility of Negro women which has accompanied urbanization of the Negro population. In politics the Negro has gained new power as a result of the shift of the Negro population to northern areas and the increased influence of economic interests upon Negro political behavior as over against past political sentiment. It is entirely possible that the future economic, social, and political status of the Negro will be as profoundly influenced by the issue of war in the Pacific as it has been in the past by the economic fortunes of the nation.

ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

Three crises, following in rapid succession, have profoundly affected the economic conditions of the Negro population during the past decade: the depression, the advent of the New Deal, and the war emergency.

The decade of the twenties had marked the termination of the migration of a million and a half workers, bringing new voters and new residents from the plantation regions of the South to the industrial cities of the North. They were employed in unskilled labor and in domestic service, with small but not inconsiderable residues in the skilled field. When the depression came in the thirties, the Negro workers had just begun to realize the economic advantage of this migration. They were, however, still involved in the social and cultural problems incident to the transition from the South to the North and from a rural to an urban way of life. The economic gains of the migration were swiftly wiped out by the depression. The propor-

tion of unemployed Negroes was estimated in the early 1930's as being from 30 to 60 per cent greater than that for white workers. Competition between white and Negro workers became acute, as racial lines in industry were more firmly drawn in both northern and southern cities.

In 1933 there were 2,117,044 Negroes on relief. In terms of the national average this was twice as many as should have been. The number of Negroes on relief in proportion to the population was four times as large in Detroit and Pittsburgh as it should have been under an equitable distribution of available jobs and three times as large in New York, St. Louis, and Birmingham. Nearly half of the Negro working population in New York was on relief, and there were food riots in Harlem.

In agriculture, where, incidentally, the bulk of the Negro workers is still employed, a collapse of vast proportions was threatened. The slow rise of Negro farmers to ownership was abruptly halted as early as 1925. Increasingly, tenancy had become a fixed status rather than a round of the agricultural ladder. In 1935 the rate of tenancy among Negro farm operators was 77 per cent, and their earnings were the lowest of any labor group in the United States. When the impoverished tenants were denied credit, the defects of the plantation system were sharply accentuated. The pressure on the landlords was reflected downward on the Negro share-cropper in the form of coercion and positive exploitation. The decline in the system, coincident with or as a result of the mechanization of agriculture, threatened to expel a half-million more Negro workers from the soil. With no possible absorption of the labor surplus by urban industries either in the South or in the North, the situation was critical. It was reflected in the rise of mortality rates and in the increased prevalence of nutritional problems.

The second major crisis of the decade affecting the Negro population was marked by the advent of the New Deal. This implies no particular relationship to the political issues involved; it is related rather to the acceleration of social legislation which reached down deep enough to include, effectively for the first time, the Negro population. Until fairly recent times the conception of government has been the somewhat negative one of policing the country. The pov-

erty and hardships of the people were taken for granted and rationalized as more or less inevitable and foreordained.

The change in attitude has had, however, a source deeper than the admirable philosophy and social legislation of the New Deal. Although there had been over a long period occasional gestures looking to government protection against economic abuses, the active promotion of the social welfare of the people by the government began after World War I. This change of policy has obviously arisen in response to two major circumstances: (*a*) the extraordinary spectacle of the malfunctioning in our economic and social life, resulting from the uncontrolled excesses of free initiative and independent enterprise, and (*b*) the growth of humanitarian sentiment and of a social philosophy concerned with the well-being of the neglected masses of the population. The country has gradually become aware that it was reaching the limits of the open frontier; that the traditional equality of opportunity was, under the circumstances, a myth; that there were limits to economic mobility; and that, since it was less and less possible for individuals of one class to move up and into the favored positions of a higher class, attention must be turned to the improvement of the lower economic levels of the society.

The Negro population has been affected by this trend in two ways: (*a*) the extension of new programs of relief and security to the lower economic levels of the white population has served to relieve much of the tension engendered by the racial competition for work and economic security and (*b*) the Negro working population has been affected directly by the programs, even though the weight of a racial tradition has frequently operated to qualify, in some areas, the results intended.

The significant consequences of this government policy for the Negro population are: the direct provision of employment under various emergency agencies; the reorganized agricultural program which has made a direct attack upon tenancy, relieving some of the worst and most menacing features; the farm rehabilitation program which included Negro farm workers in equitable proportions; the subsistence homestead projects involving entire community settlements, of which at least thirteen were for Negroes; the Fair Labor Standards legislation following the National Recovery Acts, which for the first time made mandatory an increase in the wage level in

many of the fields in which Negroes were employed; the recognition of labor organization which freed Negro workers of the necessity for strike-breaking in order to get jobs and made more difficult or impossible the differential wages on a racial basis; the slum clearance and low-cost housing program which, in the very logic of the present pattern of city growth, reached the deteriorated Negro residence areas first; and, responding to the mood of the period, the coincident but vastly significant decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in matters affecting the citizenship rights of Negroes as well as the rights of labor.

Some examples will illustrate the effects of the new government policy. As indicated, one of the most significant recent federal labor laws affecting Negroes is the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. Based upon the 1930 census, it is estimated that three-quarters of a million Negro workers are entitled to the benefits of this law. Under this Act, for example, the railway industry raised its minimum wages from 30 to 36 cents an hour, thus improving the wages of over 100,000 Negro workers; and the committee on the tobacco industry, in December, 1941, recommended to the Wage and Hour Administration an increase of wages from 30 to 40 cents an hour. If effectively enforced, this will affect 60,000 more Negro workers, some of whom, as late as 1935, were getting as low as 16 cents an hour. In May, 1940, a federal court in Texas rendered a judgment for more than \$75,000 in favor of Negro redcaps, and a federal court in Virginia ordered back wages amounting to between \$275,000 and \$300,000 paid to 7,500 maintenance-of-way railway employees, 90 per cent of whom are Negroes.

Perhaps the greatest single employer of Negroes was the Works Progress Administration, under the sponsorship of which an average of 300,000 Negro workers were employed in 1939 at an estimated \$15,000,000 in monthly wages. Thus, more than 1,000,000 Negroes, including dependent members of these workers' families, owed their livelihood to the W.P.A. The standards for work relief were higher than the usual industrial wage of these workers.

Through direct aid and grants of loans, the Public Works Administration made available nearly 8,000 new beds for Negro patients in hospitals distributed throughout seventeen southern and border states. Under the administration of the Civilian Conservation

Corps, more than 250,000 idle young Negro men were furnished employment and given an opportunity to improve their education. Records show that these men sent \$700,000 monthly to their families. The National Youth Administration, the Social Security Administration, and the Federal Housing Authority have made no racial distinctions in their national policy, and the benefits have been by no means negligible.

The new status of labor organizations under the National Labor Relations Board and, with this, the development in industry of the industrial union in competition with the craft organization, which is, in many respects, becoming outmoded, gave the first real strength and security to Negro labor. The C.I.O. has, in keeping with its policy, tended to include Negro workers without discrimination and has reached levels of labor hitherto unprotected by organization. As a result there are over 100,000 Negro members of the C.I.O., and Negroes occupy high union offices in several of the C.I.O. international unions.

Organization has not been confined to the urban Negro entirely. Very much the same pattern has been followed by white and Negro share-croppers in Arkansas, Alabama, and Tennessee. Frankly accepting their status as share-croppers and laborers, and in the face of the constantly declining number of farmowners, they have jointly sought their security as farm laborers. The Southern Tenant Farmers Union reached a total of 10,000 white and Negro members during the past decade.

One of the most important southern industries has been iron and steel, located around Birmingham. The major attraction of the South for that industry has been low labor costs, the absence of labor organizations, and the proximity to raw materials. There are in this area 20,000 Negro coal miners, 3,500 ore miners, and some 15,000 iron and steel workers. These Negro workers have been from 40 to 80 per cent of all workers engaged in mining and iron and steel work. Over the past decade there has been an increase in membership in labor organizations in this area to about 35,000 members, of which number over 20,000 are Negroes. There are now in this area over 100 mixed unions.

The third influence affecting Negro workers during the decade has been and is the war and the total involvement of the nation in the

defense emergency. This is a crisis through which the Negro population is passing at the very present. Its consequences are profound, and its implications for the principle of democracy itself are often disturbing.

The beginning of the American program for the defense of democracy against the racially aggressive totalitarian powers brought a first challenge of the traditional occupational policies in the United States with reference to Negro workers. A sudden and drastic shift was demanded from normal production to an emergency basis geared high to the production of war materials. Attention was focused upon types of industries requiring new skill, and, as a result, old working relations were profoundly disturbed. Billions of dollars worth of defense contracts were earmarked for the manufacture of aircraft, naval vessels, machine tools, and other defense items. It was estimated by the Bureau of Labor Statistics that between April, 1940, and April, 1942, approximately 1,400,000 additional workers would be required for these industries. Shipbuilding alone would require some 323,900 additional workers; aircraft, 408,000; ordnance and machine tools, 291,000; and construction and other defense industries, 384,000.¹

It was not long, however, before it became apparent that an artificial element was restricting this all-out policy of industrial preparation for defense. The traditional racial policies in both northern and southern states were thrown into high light. In spite of the need for workers, skilled and unskilled, qualified Negro workers applying were refused employment. There was not so far as known a single Negro employed in an airplane plant above the level of menial labor. They were not in the chemical industry or in the machine-tool plants; and they were held to a minimum on the various jobs connected with the construction of the hundreds of plants and cantonments.

Nor was this discrimination limited, as numerous recent studies have shown, to defense industries. The New York State legislature appointed a committee to study the condition of the Negro urban population in the state, and in 1939 it reported "growing discrimination against the employment of Negroes in New York in any but

¹ See testimony of Sidney Hillman, associate director general, Office of Production Management, before the committee of the House of Representatives investigating national defense migration, on July 15, 1940.

menial and unskilled jobs."² The financial and mercantile enterprises employing white-collar workers would not hire Negroes for its trades and related industries. With the exception of the garment and fur trades and related industries, there were no openings for Negro labor in the vast array of factories in the city. The department stores used them only as elevator operators, cleaners, and cafeteria and kitchen workers. In Rochester, out of 35,120 employees in private firms, only 70 were Negroes. The largest firm, manufacturing photographic equipment and supplies and employing 16,351 persons, had 1 Negro porter and 19 construction workers engaged by a subsidiary corporation. The largest insurance company in the state, with more Negro policyholders than all Negro insurance companies combined, had no Negro in its employed force of over 20,000 in New York State alone.

Official pressure for the inclusion, on an equitable basis, of Negroes in the defense program produced striking and, in one sense, disconcerting evidence of the strength of the racial opposition to any such policy. The weakness of the anti-discrimination pronouncement of the National Defense Advisory Commission was revealed when the Comptroller-General ruled that there is no statutory authority for the insertion of a nondiscrimination clause in a government construction contract for the performance of public work. Finally, in 1941 the President of the United States was impelled to address a memorandum to the Office of Production Management calling for the employment of workers without discrimination on account of race, religion, or national origin.

When there was still no important indication of a disposition on the part of either industry or labor to modify their racial policies, the President found it necessary to issue an epoch-making pronouncement in the form of an executive order to all departments and agencies of the government of the United States concerned with vocational and training programs for defense production and to all contracting agencies of the government that they should take special measures to insure that programs are administered without discrimination and that in all defense contracts hereafter negotiated the provision should be included obligating the contractor not to discriminate against any worker because of race, creed, color, or na-

² "Restrictions in Employment of Negroes in New York," *Monthly Labor Review*, XLIX (August, 1939), 360.

tional origin. In the Office of Production Management a Committee on Fair Employment Practice was organized to receive and investigate complaints of discrimination and to take steps to redress valid grievances.

These measures with the increased demand for labor have had some results. Negro employment increased, and with this there has been an increase in wages. There is no evidence, however, that the fundamental occupational and racial patterns have been permanently changed; and in many cases they were not changed at all. Some employers, who have been unaffected by the President's appeal on behalf of defense production and the operating principle of democracy, have pointed out that the government itself had set a precedent in many of its departments of segregation and discrimination and has continued practices that tend to confirm this policy.

The economic vicissitudes of the Negro population during the past decade have their source in the same changes that have created other social problems.

EDUCATION

There have been, over the past decade, striking advances in American public school education. The advances for white and Negro children, however, have not been at the same rate. This differential rate can be measured by the present disproportionate distribution of Negro and white pupils in the grades. About twice as many Negro as white pupils, proportionately, in the eighteen separate school states in 1935-36 were in the first grade. In 1927-28 the proportion was one and one-third.³ Public support for Negro education has been increasing, but not so rapidly as support for white schools. The ratio of salaries of Negro teachers to salaries of white teachers has been slightly improved in most of the states with separate schools. In fourteen states having separate schools the Negro teacher received, in 1930-32, 47 cents for every dollar received by the white teacher; in 1935-36 the Negro teacher received 50 cents. In North Carolina the increase was from 56 to 67 cents; in Mississippi and Texas the relative position was worse.⁴

³ Charles H. Thompson, "The Status of Education of and for the Negro in the American Social Order," *Journal of Negro Education*, VIII, No. 3 (July, 1939), 489.

⁴ Doxie Wilkerson, *Special Problems of Negro Education* (Advisory Committee on Education Staff Study No. 12 [Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1939]), pp. 24-25.

College enrolment has increased largely as a result of the Program of the National Youth Administration. In 1940 Negro undergraduate enrolment in colleges had increased, according to a survey of ninety-seven Negro colleges by the *Journal of Negro Education*, to 37,830, which was 6 per cent over the previous year. In the present enrolment, women, with a proportion of 57 per cent, outnumber men. There is a steady increase in graduate work. In nine Negro institutions offering the Master of Arts degree there was, in 1939, an increase of 31 per cent in the enrolment over the preceding year. The number of Negro college graduates in 1940 was about twice as large as in 1930.

There have, however, been two important recent developments in Negro education. The courts, under the pressure of lawsuits instituted by Negroes or organizations interested in their welfare, have been redefining the "equal protection of the law" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court decision in the *Gaines* case held that the state must exercise its duty of providing equal accommodations "within the state."⁵ This has raised the question, far in advance of public opinion, of the admission of Negroes to existing southern universities for work on a graduate level when not provided in Negro schools. It has further stimulated, at least as a temporary expedient, five southern states to provide, hastily, graduate work for Negroes in the publicly supported colleges for Negroes.

The suits by Negro teachers for equalization of pay for white and Negro teachers which have reached the higher courts have been sustained. Action brought by a Negro teacher in Norfolk, Virginia, established the principle that discrimination in salaries solely on the ground of race is unconstitutional. Equalization in this state will be realized in 1942. Similar suits have been brought in Maryland, Florida, Kentucky, Louisiana, and Tennessee.

Another educational accomplishment has been the decline in Negro illiteracy, largely as a result of the adult education program of the government.

HEALTH

In the period from 1921-24 to 1931-33 in ten southern and northern cities, according to the Public Health Service, the Negro mortality rate declined 2.5 per cent and the white rate 7.7 per cent. In a

⁵ *Gaines v. Canada et al.*, 305 U.S. 337, 59 S. Ct. 232, 83 L. ed. 207 (1938).

study by Mary Gover of Negro mortality from 1921-33 it appears that the mortality rate for Negroes has declined for each age under thirty and the rate for whites has declined for each age under forty-five.⁶

Negro deaths from tuberculosis between 1920 and 1933 declined in general from 344 per 100,000 in the North and 229.4 in the South to 232.0 in the North and 129.6 in the South. In some areas, however, there has been a distinct upturn in the death rate for Negroes since 1929, while the decline has continued among whites. In the mortality rates for New York City, for example, the Negro rate in 1929 was 251 and the white rate 67. In 1937 the Negro rate was 300 and the white rate 45. In 1938 the Negro tuberculosis rate in forty-six cities averaged 238 per 100,000 as compared with 48 for the white population. There has been an increase in the deaths from diseases of the heart for both whites and Negroes, but the disparity between the white and Negro deaths from this disease has been reduced. The improvement in Negro health in the South since 1920 has not been sufficient to offset the decline in the fertility of Negro women. At the 1920 birth and death rates Negro females should have borne about 1,435 daughters during their lifetime. Instead it was, in 1930, 1,130. Urban residence has reduced the fertility of Negro women to something like 10 per cent less than that of native white women.⁷

POLITICS

One of the significant consequences of the shift of Negro population has been to endow the Negro, albeit imperfectly as yet, with a new political power. In one sense the status of the Negro population has been largely immobilized in the South through the lack or denial of the ballot as a democratic instrument for affecting change. The movement of a million and a half potential new voters into states of the North, without the suffrage restrictions of the southern states, has given a new importance and strength to the political and economic demands of the Negro population. Negroes have been a decisive factor in the selection of candidates and the determination of issues in at least four northern states, and they have sent representatives of their own race to the state legislatures of Michigan, Pennsyl-

⁶ *Mortality among Southern Negroes since 1920* (Public Health Bull. 235 [Washington, D.C.: U.S. Public Health Service, 1937]).

⁷ National Resources Committee, *The Problems of a Changing Population* (Washington, D.C., 1938), p. 129.

vania, New Jersey, New York, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, and Indiana, and one to the United States Congress. Professor Harold F. Gosnell, in attempting to explain the new direction of the Negro's political aspirations, suggests that present economic interests are having more influence on Negroes than past political sentiment.⁸ It has tended to bring them into the ranks of the white proletariat.

FURTHER PROSPECTS OF CHANGE

A most striking characteristic of Negro life during this period is the tempo of the change itself and the promptness of its response to new trends in the regional and national economy. In the South, in particular, there has been manifest over the past decade a disposition, stemming from economic and regional necessity, to conceive the Negro population, in the total planning for the region, as something more than a temporary and burdensome adjunct to the white population. This appears in the present movement for labor organization in the rural and urban South, particularly in the lower industrial brackets; in the general state and national planning of the agricultural program; and in the campaigns of southern origin to abolish the poll tax.

A focusing of attention upon the agricultural situation during the early 1930's revealed the startling fact that the tenancy problem, long assumed to be a racial problem, actually affected numerically more whites than Negroes. These whites over the years had acquired the status of the Negroes, and it has become increasingly obvious that the problem cannot be successfully handled except as one and indivisible. This means essentially that there can be no improvement of agriculture or tenancy without improving the status of white and Negro workers alike.

Finally, the past few months have revealed a new facet of this constantly shifting racial situation in the United States. It is entirely possible that the status of the Negro, social as well as political, will be as profoundly influenced in the very near future by the issue of war in the Pacific as it has been in the past by the economic fortunes of the nation.

FISK UNIVERSITY

⁸ *Negro Politicians* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1935), pp. 10 and 366.

THE FAMILY

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ABSTRACT

During the period 1930-40, basic family trends of preceding decades in the United States were continued, with a few notable exceptions. The marriage rate, while sagging below the average for the preceding decade, held fairly steady; the divorce rate climbed to a new high peak; and a new low point was reached for the average size of household. Of particular significance, the transfer of economic functions from family to industry continued. Government expanded greatly its responsibility for educational and protective functions previously performed by the family. However, the personality functions received added attention from education and research and were buttressed by the resistance to further transfer shown by the recreational functions.

Most of the basic family trends of the first three decades of this century continued through the fourth, despite the extraordinary situations that prevailed, namely, severe economic depression and war. The depression struck hard at family life in the early 1930's but, for the most part, succeeded in disturbing only temporarily the long-time trends. Although it is too soon to assess the impact of World War II upon the American family, the dislocations caused will probably likewise be temporary, if we may judge from the experience of World War I. During the past decade, as during preceding decades, the marriage rate held fairly steady, the divorce rate rose to new high levels, and the average household continued to shrink in size.

MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, AND FAMILY SIZE

The marriage rate is relatively stable over long periods in normal times, since it rests on the age composition of the population, which since 1890 has not changed much in the proportion of persons of marriageable ages. The marriage rate is, however, temporarily affected by war and by economic depression. Ordinarily there is some increase in marriages before a war starts, a decline during the war, and a spurt to high levels after the war.¹ As for the effect of economic depression, the marriage rate follows the business cycle so closely that the curve for the one is virtually the shadow of the other. The effect of the depression of the early 1930's is reflected in the low marriage rates for those years, the lowest figure ever recorded for the

¹ The highest marriage rate ever recorded for our nation (12.0) was for 1920, after World War I. This rate was nearly equaled in 1940.

nation as a whole (7.9) being chalked up in 1932.² Starting with 1934 there was a recovery in the marriage rate, and, although all-inclusive figures for recent years are not available, it is probable that the marriage rate for the decade as a whole has not been much below that of preceding decades. The high marriage rate (11.0) for 1937 is readily identified as a recovery of marriages postponed during the depression, while the even higher rate of 1940 (11.9) reflects a wartime situation, with men marrying either to obtain deferment in the draft or to have the security of an emotional commitment during the crisis.³

As for divorce, the dominant trend for seventy-five years, from 1867 to the present, has been a marked increase in the proportion of broken marriages in the United States.⁴ During the depression of the early 1930's the divorce rate dipped, although not to the low levels of previous decades, then rose to new high levels exceeding even the extraordinary rates of the post-war period of World War I.⁵

The steady decrease in the size of the family (household) since 1790 was continued during the last ten years. In 1790 the average number of persons per household was 5.7. A hundred years later, in 1890, it was 4.9. In 1930 it had dropped to 4.1. By 1940 it had sunk to 3.8, which is fewer than two children per household. It is estimated that this figure will be reduced to 3.1 by 1980.⁶ From the

² Marriage rates: 1930, 9.1; 1931, 8.6; 1932, 7.9; 1933, 8.7; 1934, 10.3; 1935, 10.4; 1936, 10.7; 1937, 11.2; 1938, 10.2; 1939, 10.5; 1940, 11.9 (Bureau of the Census, *Marriage and Divorce Statistics—United States: 1887-1937* ["Vital Statistics—Special Reports," IX, No. 60, 819 (Washington, D.C., June 29, 1940)]). The figures for 1937-40 are preliminary estimates supplied by Halbert L. Dunn, M.D., chief statistician for Vital Statistics, Bureau of the Census, in a memorandum to the writer dated January 23, 1942. The collecting of marriage and divorce statistics, relinquished by the Census Bureau in 1932, is being resumed with the help of standard certificates of marriage and divorce, which are being recommended to all official agencies keeping such records.

³ Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, *Statistical Bulletin: More Marriages in 1940*, December, 1940.

⁴ Divorces per 1,000 estimated total population were as follows: 1867, 0.27; 1886, 0.44; 1890, 0.5; 1917, 1.2; 1920, 1.6.

⁵ Divorce rates for the decade are as follows: 1930, 1.6; 1931, 1.5; 1932, 1.3; 1933, 1.3; 1934, 1.6; 1935, 1.7; 1936, 1.8; 1937, 1.9. The figures for 1930-32 are supplied by the Bureau of the Census; those for the other years are estimated by S. Stouffer and L. Spencer, "Recent Increases in Marriage and Divorce," *American Journal of Sociology*, XLIV, No. 4 (1939), 551-54. Data for 1938-40 not available at time of writing.

⁶ Estimates of future population by Whelpton; of families by Lorimer.

facts that the size of family has declined while the marriage rate has held even, it follows that there has been an increase in the proportion of families to population. From 1890 to 1940 the population increased 110 per cent, but the number of families increased a great deal more, 175 per cent, the number of families now being thirty-five million. There occurred also in the decade a widening of the gap between rural and urban families in family size, owing to the rapid reduction in family size in metropolitan areas.⁷ During the early years of the century, families in large cities were almost as large as rural families; but since 1930 there has been a rapid decrease in the size of family in metropolitan cities. While the average size of family in all urban places in 1940 was 3.61 persons, it was 4.01 persons in rural areas.

FAMILY FUNCTIONS

Previous studies⁸ have shown that from 1900 to 1930 the family experienced an appreciable decrease in its traditional functions, and it appears that, by and large, during the past decade the transfer of institutional functions was continued. The processing of food at home diminished, if increased consumption of food in restaurants and other eating places may be so interpreted. Despite the fact that 1929 was a boom year, the number of persons employed in eating places increased from 466,437 in 1929 to 594,648 in 1939, a gain of 27 per cent, while the population in the decennium grew only 8 per cent. The number of eating places increased by about the same proportion, rising from 134,293 in 1929 to 169,792 in 1939.⁹ Per capita production of canned vegetables increased 9.1 per cent and canned fruit 44.4 per cent in the past decade.¹⁰ This may mean that less fruit is canned at home or that more fruit is consumed, or both, but

⁷ Paul C. Glick, "Family Trends in the United States, 1790 to 1980" (paper presented to Section on the Family, American Sociological Society, December 27, 1941); Scheduled for publication, *American Sociological Review*, June, 1942.

⁸ W. F. Ogburn, "The Family and Its Functions," *Recent Social Trends in the United States*, Vol. I (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1933).

⁹ Bureau of the Census, *Retail Trade—the United States—1939 Employment, Pay Roll and Inventory* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Commerce, February 14, 1941), p. 6.

¹⁰ Information supplied by T. G. Fitzgerald, chief statistician for manufactures, Bureau of the Census. The per capita production data given above are based upon the population censuses of 1940 and 1930.

in any case the proportion of home-canned fruit to all canned fruit was apparently less in 1939 than in 1929, and this may be viewed as a relative loss of a productive function for the family. During the last decade the increase in the number of employees in cleaning and dyeing plants, while not so spectacular as in the preceding period, still was appreciable—around 40 per cent.¹¹ However, from 1929-39 the number of wage-earners in power laundries increased less than 5 per cent, which was less than the increase in population. With more than ten million families owning electric washing machines and with twenty million electric irons in homes, the function of laundering clothes seems to have resisted transfer during the past decade, and it may be that other economic functions utilizing electricity are similarly resisting transfer. In general, however, it appears that the family function of economic production was further curtailed during the past decade.

Likewise, there is evidence which suggests further diminution of family responsibility for education and protection, or at least greater sharing of these functions with outside organizations such as schools and governmental agencies. In 1930 about 29 per cent of the population of age seventeen was graduated from high school as against 46 per cent in 1938,¹² and there was likewise an increased percentage graduated from college, which suggests that the school laid greater claim to our children during the decade. Further evidence of this is found in the marked growth of the nursery-school movement, so that it appears that more parents were separated for longer periods of time from their children and had less complete control over their educational experience than before. Likewise, the greatly broadened scope of social legislation indicated below marks an increase of governmental responsibility for family welfare and the lessening of responsibility by the family for the protection of its members.

It is noteworthy, however, that the transfer of recreational func-

¹¹ Bureau of the Census, *Service Establishments—the United States—1939, Preliminary Summary* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Commerce, February 3, 1941), p. 4. From 1919 to 1920 the number of workers in cleaning and dyeing plants mounted 220 per cent, and the number of workers in power laundries increased 79 per cent, as against a population increase of only 16 per cent and an increase in the number of families of only 23 per cent.

¹² Emery M. Foster, *Statistical Summary of Education, 1937-38*, Bull. 1940, No. 2 (Washington, D.C.: Federal Security Agency, Office of Education), chap. i.

tions which occurred during the 1920's was slowed up, if not actually halted, during the 1930's. This is suggested by the data on attendance at the principal forms of commercialized recreation, which show no gains in the decade.¹³ Economic depression and war were doubtless largely responsible, but also electrical inventions have helped somewhat to retain recreation in the home. As against about twelve million American homes with radio sets in 1930, it is estimated that more than twenty-nine million were so equipped in 1941,¹⁴ a considerable gain. Television came of age in the last decade and in due time may be an important factor in promoting more recreation in the home, but its limited diffusion during the last ten years, with probably fewer than ten thousand sets now in use in the United States, makes negligible its influence during this period. The retention of recreational functions by the family is consistent with the prevailing trend to strengthen the personality functions, since companionship in our time is to a great extent a matter of enjoying leisure time together.

FAMILY WELFARE LEGISLATION AND SERVICES

There were a number of significant changes in family law during the decade, with the general tendency discernible to make marriage slightly more difficult to contract and somewhat easier to dissolve. The principal additional bar to marriage is the requirement of a certificate of premarital blood test as a condition of marriage. Up to January 1, 1941, twenty-six states had such a premarital-examination requirement, while a like number of states, although not an identical list, had laws requiring the examination of expectant mothers for syphilis.¹⁵ Legal sterilization of mental defectives and the mentally disordered in state institutions came into somewhat greater favor during the decade and is now operative in twenty-nine states, an increase of four in the last ten years.¹⁶ The number of states requiring advance notice of intention to marry increased from

¹³ For instance, estimates of weekly motion-picture attendance in 1930 ran from one hundred million upward, while in 1940 the estimated number was only eighty-five million. Major League Baseball attendance was around ten million in 1930, and the same in 1940, despite the increase in population in the decade.

¹⁴ *World Almanac* (New York: New York World-Telegram, 1941), p. 763.

¹⁵ Information supplied by American Social Hygiene Association.

¹⁶ Information furnished by Human Betterment Foundation, Pasadena, Calif.

seventeen to twenty-six: In 1930 common-law marriage was deemed valid in twenty-five jurisdictions, invalid in twenty-three, and during the past decade was further invalidated by statute in one state and by judicial decision in two others. The age for marriage was raised in six jurisdictions where the common-law age of consent formerly prevailed. Breach-of-promise suits were legal in all states in 1930, since which time eight states have abolished such causes of action.¹⁷

Grounds for divorce have been liberalized in many jurisdictions. Perhaps the most important development in this direction has been the enactment by New Mexico and Alaska of statutes permitting divorce for incompatibility, previously not permitted by any American jurisdiction. The race to obtain the divorce business led Nevada in 1934 to lower the residence requirement from three months to six weeks, with Idaho, which had previously had a one-year-residence rule following suit in 1937. A somewhat countertendency to the greater freedom of divorce was a movement to restrict awards of alimony.

Noteworthy in the past decade was the great growth in governmental effort in behalf of the family, representing further transfer of family functions of protection and economic support to the state. In 1934 the long arm of government reached out to help with the critical problem of housing and established the Federal Housing Administration, with power to insure loans on new or existing homes. Although the annual number of new single-family homes built from 1930 to 1940 was far below the annual average of 427,000 for the preceding decade, the number built in 1940 was close to this figure. Approximately 42 per cent of all privately financed single-family homes built in 1940 were financed by F.H.A. insured loans.¹⁸

The principal legislative measure of importance to the family was, however, the Social Security Act of 1935. Title V of the Act, as amended in 1939, made annual appropriations of \$5,820,000 for maternal and child health services and \$3,870,000 for services for

¹⁷ Chester G. Vernier, *American Family Laws* (5 vols. and suppl.; Stanford University: Stanford University Press, 1931-38). The latest figures carry through to January 1, 1938, beyond which no digest is available, but Professor Vernier states that legislation of 1938-40 continued the trend of the earlier years (in letter to writer dated December 11, 1941).

¹⁸ *Seventh Annual Report of the Federal Housing Administration (for the Year Ending December 31, 1940)* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1941).

crippled children, while \$1,510,000 is allotted to child welfare services. More than one-half of the 1,229 prenatal clinics under state health departments in 1939 were a result of this Act, as was the large expansion of public health nursing, especially in rural areas. The Act also provides aid to widows and dependent children under eighteen in their own homes, around 728,000 being so aided by the end of 1939.¹⁹ The old age assistance and unemployment compensation provisions of the Act are well known. These services and others contributed to the decline in infant and maternal mortality in the decade to the lowest points in our history. The infant mortality rate dropped from 65 per 1,000 live births in 1930 to 51 in 1938,²⁰ half of what it was in 1915; the maternal mortality rate, long steady, declined from 6.7 per 1,000 live births to 4.4.

There was some reduction of the employment of children under sixteen in the decade 1930-40. One factor was the depression, which meant less work for all; another was the advance in legislative child labor standards, both state and federal. The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, setting minimum wages and maximum hours for workers engaged in interstate services, contained a section curtailing "oppressive child labor" by prohibiting the shipment of goods across state lines if so produced. Labor is defined as "oppressive" if it is engaged in by children under sixteen, except in certain occupations, and by children under eighteen in occupations declared to be hazardous by the chief of the Children's Bureau. The number of children fourteen to seventeen years of age, inclusive, in the labor force in 1940²¹ was 31.8 per cent less than the number of gainful workers of the same ages in 1930, despite a slight increase in the total population of this age group in the decade. Some millions of children are still employed in agriculture, street trades, industrial home work, and other types of employment, and the present emergency is exerting pressure against child labor standards.

There were important changes also in legislation and services

¹⁹ Katharine F. Lenroot, "Child Welfare, 1930-40," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, November, 1940.

²⁰ Latest year for which final data are available at time of writing.

²¹ About two-thirds of these were actually employed (Beatrice McConnell, "The Census Counts the Child Workers of the Country," *The Child* [U.S. Department of Labor, Children's Bureau, September, 1941], p. 79).

affecting women. Before 1929 only nine states had minimum wage laws for women, whereas between 1930 and 1940 twenty-six state programs, the District of Columbia, Alaska, and Puerto Rico had such laws. As a result the Minimum Wage Division was created in the Women's Bureau in 1935. The number of states having laws governing daily or weekly hours of work for women has not changed since 1930.²² As to the employment of married women, there is no exact information available as yet, but it appears that the number of married women in the labor force has continued the gain of previous decades.²³

Religious bodies also were more active in behalf of family welfare. The Family Life Section, established in the Social Action Department of the National Catholic Welfare Conference in 1931, was given the rank of a bureau in 1941 and shifted to the Executive Department. The director of this bureau also serves as executive secretary of the National Catholic Conference on Family Life, and the two agencies work in close co-operation. The Central Conference of American Rabbis likewise during the decade set up a special Committee on Marriage and the Home, which has been active in formulating a program of guidance for the synagogues throughout the land. The Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America, representing twenty-four Protestant churches, in 1932 established a special department, with a full-time secretary, on marriage and the home and has carried forward an ever expanding program of activities in behalf of family life.

Another notable development has been the stimulated demand for legal contraception, resulting in more widespread knowledge in the use of effective methods. Polls taken during the decade show an increasingly favorable public attitude toward contraception.²⁴ During the decade there were some favorable federal-court decisions permitting the use of the mails for the transportation of contraceptive materials and information, but there were also some unfavorable state-court decisions, principally in Massachusetts and Connecticut, where it was held that even physicians may not disseminate such

²² Women's Bureau, *Accomplishments of the Women's Bureau in Recent Years* (Washington, D.C., January, 1941).

²³ Memorandum from the Women's Bureau, U.S. Department of Labor, November 27, 1941.

²⁴ *Public Opinion Quarterly*, II (1938), 390; *ibid.*, IV (1940), 349.

information. Doctors and physicians in Wisconsin, Colorado, Delaware, Idaho, Montana, and Oregon were during the decade exempted from the provisions of the law which limit the distribution of contraceptive information and materials. But, on the whole, there was little change on the legal front, the effective change occurring in public opinion and in practice. In 1930 there were 81 centers giving contraceptive advice under medical direction, 12 of these being in Los Angeles County. By January 1, 1940, the number had been increased to 549. In 1930 few of the centers were under public health auspices, whereas in 1940, 166 were so sponsored. The states of North Carolina and South Carolina and Alabama provided clinical birth control service as part of the work of the state health departments for low-income groups, and in a number of other states individual county health departments did the same.²⁵

For some time family counseling has been done by a great variety of agencies and individuals, but the past decade saw some disposition to organize this function as a separate and distinct service, the first such agencies being set up in 1930. Carden²⁶ lists twenty-six organized centers as functioning at the close of the decade, but the precarious basis of this development is suggested by the high mortality rate, twenty-one former centers now being inactive, which probably means that about one-half of the total number established in the decade have not survived. This movement is, however, an evidence of the growing realization of the importance of the personality functions in present-day family life, as is also the development of education and research described below.

EDUCATION AND RESEARCH

The 1930's were marked by an intensified interest in education for family life, both in and outside the school. Growing popular concern with family-life education is indicated by the circulation of *Parents' Magazine*, founded in 1926, which had in 1941 nearly 630,000 subscribers, an increase since 1930 of more than 500 per cent. Another index is the circulation of *Infant Care*, the most popular pamphlet published by the government. In 1930, 654,328 copies were distributed, but the number rose to 1,050,979 in 1940, a gain of about 60

²⁵ Information supplied by Birth Control Federation of America, Inc.

²⁶ Marie Carden, *Organization of Family Consultation Centers* (originally prepared as Master's thesis, Boston University, 1941). Privately distributed.

per cent. Increased interest in the family is evidenced also in the number of books published on the subject. The Library of Congress card catalogue has about 400 entries under the general head of "family." A check of the first 100 showed that 64 are dated since 1930, while only 30 were dated from 1920 to 1930, or a ratio of better than two to one in favor of the past decade.²⁷ Likewise a tally of the entries in the *Cumulative Book Index* for the period 1928-32 showed 47 books under "family" and 150 under "marriage," while the period 1938-40, only half as long, showed nearly the same number, 43 under "family"; under "marriage," 120.

A concomitant development was the growth of education for family life in the curriculums of our schools. On the college level about half of all liberal arts colleges now offer at least one course in marriage and family life, mostly in sociology and home economics departments.²⁸ The trend in the decade was also to make instruction more practical by emphasizing materials having to do with preparation for marriage. More significant was the extension of family education downward to the public schools, although the movement is slow.²⁹ Most of the courses in the junior and senior high schools are under home economics auspices. Significant innovations were courses in home economics for boys and the requirement for graduation from high school in the state of Washington of one year of home economics for all girls.³⁰ In a national survey two-thirds of the girls and 5 per cent of the boys who graduated in 1940 from 12,340 senior high schools had received some instruction in home economics.³¹ Important too was the marked expansion in the decade of the nursery-school movement under F.E.R.A. and W.P.A. leadership and the

²⁷ Data furnished by Florence S. Hellman, chief bibliographer, the Library of Congress.

²⁸ Cecil Haworth, "Education for Marriage among American Colleges," *Bulletin of the Association of American Colleges*, November, 1935. See also Joseph K. Folsom, *Youth, Family and Education* (Washington, D.C.: American Council on Education, 1941), pp. 120 ff.

²⁹ Recent evidence includes the latest yearbook of the American Association of School Administrators, *Education for Family Life* (Washington, D.C., 1941). See also the report of the Joint Committee on Curriculum Aspects of Education for Home and Family Life: Bess Goodykoontz and Beulah I. Coon, *Family Living and Our Schools* (New York: D. Appleton-Century, 1941).

³⁰ Doris S. Lewis, "Education for Family Life in Washington State," *Parent Education*, May, 1935.

³¹ *Home Economics in Public High Schools* (Washington, D.C.: Office of Education, 1941), p. 7.

federal parent-education program under the same auspices.³² In June, 1936, the earlier Smith-Hughes (1917) and Purnell (1925) acts were supplemented by the George-Deen Act authorizing an annual appropriation of \$4,000,000 for the teaching of home economics subjects, the states being required to match only 50 per cent of the federal funds, whereas the earlier act of 1917 had required a matching of dollar for dollar. The United States Office of Education has been carrying on a varied program, with particular interest attaching to four demonstration community programs in family-life education designed to demonstrate that a community may discover the needs of its own families and adequately mobilize its resources to meet them.³³

The growing awareness of the importance of the personality functions was evidenced also in family-research trends in the last decade.³⁴ These show more emphasis on the contemporary family, less on family life of the past; more stress on the human aspects, that is, the interaction of husband and wife and parents and children; less stress on the economic, legal, or cultural aspects. We had, in the decade, analyses of family processes, roles and patterns, utilizing case study, and clinical-interview methods. A second line of inquiry was concerned with the impact of our rapidly changing material culture upon family structure and functions. Lately attention has turned to prediction tests, which, based on an analysis of the factors making for success or failure in marriage, aim to determine in advance the probability of marital adjustment in a given case. The trend of research in the decade thus supports, if indeed it was not in large measure occasioned by, the increasing importance of the personality functions of the family in the face of the further transfer of traditional functions to other institutions, principally the state and industry.

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³² Doak S. Campbell, Frederick H. Bair, and Oswald L. Harvery, *Educational Activities of the Works Progress Administration*, 1939, p. 109.

³³ The communities are Wichita, Kansas; Obion County, Tennessee; Box Elder County, Utah; and Toledo, Ohio (see *School Life* [special reprint; Washington, D.C.: Office of Education, 1941]). Mention should also be made of the rural extension service in parent education of the United States Department of Agriculture.

³⁴ Cf. Ernest R. Mowrer, "Recent Trends in Family Research," *American Sociological Review*, VI (August, 1941), 499-511. Harvey J. Locke, "Tentative Knowledge about Marriage and Family Relations," *Marriage and Family Living*, Autumn, 1941, p. 76. These articles may be consulted for illustrations of the various types of research.

EDUCATION

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ABSTRACT

During the early years of the thirties educational institutions were engrossed in devising ways of economizing. However, during this same period it became evident that the number and the plight of unemployed youth demanded a new kind of attention and relief. At this juncture the federal government entered the picture and organized relief agencies, the Civilian Conservation Corps and the National Youth Administration, which provided assistance for unemployed youth. During the latter years of the decade government assistance expanded to include the building of schools and the payment of wages to teachers, etc. Within the last few years the government has gone into sponsoring a program of vocational education. The past decade has also witnessed reform in the curriculums of the elementary and secondary schools. Most of such revisions have been devoted to the field of social studies. Many of the changes in education during the past decade have resulted from the work of various committees and commissions which operated during the period.

EFFECTS OF THE DEPRESSION

During the years immediately following 1929 educational institutions were engrossed in devising ways of economizing. Expenditures for books and supplies were either drastically reduced or entirely eliminated. Percentages ranging from 10 to 25 were cut from the salaries of administrators and teachers. The length of the year for public schools was very generally shortened by a month and in some cases by several months. The hope was entertained that the financial stringency would be of short duration, and it was assumed that, if institutions made temporary curtailments of their normal operations, they could return shortly to the full program which they had carried on during the preceding era of prosperity.

As time passed and the depression continued, further steps of economy were taken. Courses which duplicated one another were combined; others for which the demand was small were dropped entirely. When vacancies occurred in the teaching staff, no new appointments were made; the sizes of classes were increased. A few institutions closed their doors or merged with their neighbors, but surprisingly little occurred in the way of entire abandonment of institutions. Small colleges, which many thought would be unable to keep alive, showed a tenacity on life which was astonishing. A number of

these institutions survived by giving up entirely the effort to pay stipulated salaries to the members of their faculties; they merely divided whatever income they received from student fees and from other sources. Some of them went so far as to draw on their supposedly permanent funds. Public schools in some cases suspended payments to teachers or gave in lieu of cash payments depreciated credit warrants.

UNEMPLOYED YOUTH

While the happenings described in the preceding paragraph were taking place within educational institutions, disturbing facts with regard to unemployment of young people obtruded themselves on the attention of the nation. A great many youth who had left schools and colleges either through graduation or through withdrawal before graduation were unable to find employment in the industrial or commercial world. Educational institutions were wholly unaccustomed to assuming any responsibility for those who had graduated or dropped out. Most of them did not change their practices under the conditions that arose. A striking example of the unpreparedness of the educational system to meet the emergency was seen when in many places graduates of public secondary schools went back to the institutions which they had earlier attended and asked to be allowed to pursue courses that they had not taken before. A few postgraduate high-school pupils were allowed to register. In many congested school systems, on the other hand, applicants were turned away because there was no space in which they could be accommodated. Colleges were also unable to meet the requests made for scholarships by students who could not afford to pay tuition fees but applied for opportunity to attend.

In addition to those who were turned away by schools and colleges there were many young people who had no desire to continue attendance at educational institutions. They drifted about in idleness or vagabonded back and forth across the country. The families and even the communities to which these wanderers belonged were helpless to provide for them. It became evident that the plight of youth demanded a new kind of attention and relief. Gradually it was recognized that there was a national youth problem.

FEDERAL AID

At this juncture the federal government stepped in and organized relief agencies, the Civilian Conservation Corps and the National Youth Administration, which provided work and wages for unemployed youth. Finally, the government also made possible through the National Youth Administration payment to students in colleges and secondary schools of small wages in return for work which could be carried on at the same time that the beneficiaries of the arrangement were pursuing their studies.

The fact that the federal government had financial resources with which to meet the needs of youth and of educational institutions expressed itself in many other ways. There were persons qualified to teach in schools who had been displaced because local school systems were unable to carry on. There were communities which had abandoned entirely the effort to provide schools. Relief funds were asked for and received in many of these cases from the federal government. Indeed, provision was made through federal subsidies for the organization of new nursery schools for the care of young children of poor families, it being the belief of relief authorities that it was more readily possible to take care of children when they were assembled in this way than to deal with them in separate homes. In the later years of the depression the federal government granted in addition to the kinds of aid thus far enumerated loan funds or direct subventions for the erection of buildings for public schools and public universities.

Before the onset of the depression educators had asked for federal aid for education. It had been pointed out in a number of reports that many communities and states are so poor that their children, future citizens of the nation, are not provided with the type of education that is essential to successful discharge of the duties of citizenship in a democracy. The demand for "equal educational opportunities" in all parts of the country which had been vigorously urged in the days before the depression was put forth with new emphasis when the depression resulted in curtailment of educational facilities. It was the hope of educators, however, that all federal money spent for the benefit of young people would be turned over directly to existing educational institutions.

The practice of paying with federal funds wages to pupils in high

schools, to students in college, and to teachers in districts unable to provide schooling served as nothing ever had served before to show that education is a national interest. Provision of employment by the federal government and payment of wages to young people who had left school and could not find jobs served as nothing ever had before to show that the care of youth outside of educational institutions is an inescapable obligation of organized society. Never again can the youth problem of the United States be thought of as trivial, temporary, or purely local. Investigations which have been made since the federal government first undertook to help young people to establish themselves in self-sustaining adulthood show that the youth problem has been maturing for long years. Subtle changes in the industrial system of the country and in the age characteristics of the population have been gradually dislocating youth, pushing them out of the status which they formerly occupied and raising materially the age at which they can become independent. The depression did not create the issue; it merely brought it to clear recognition.

OPPOSITION TO FEDERAL CONTROL

As soon as the federal government took a hand in the care of unadjusted youth it came into contact with the educational system. The American people have long been committed to the belief that the only public provision which has to be made for youth is made when schooling is provided. School administrators have shared in this belief and have developed the attitude that all public attempts to deal with young people should be under their supervision. It was inevitable, therefore, that sooner or later there should arise from school administrators pointed objection to administrative measures taken by the federal government paralleling or superseding those of the educational system. The clash of jurisdictions has become acute during recent years. School administrators no longer petition that all federal funds appropriated for the care of youth be turned over to them—they demand that this be done. It is not at all likely, however, that the demands of school administrators will be acceded to by the federal administration. Some kind of program of a federal public works is sure to be continued for a long time to supplement present-day education.

VOCATIONAL AND NONVOCATIONAL EDUCATION

One of the most vigorous educational debates of the past decade centered around the problem of the relation between vocational education and nonvocational education. In 1917 the manufacturers of the country with the co-operation of a few educators persuaded the Congress that there ought to be added to the curriculum of the secondary schools courses which would prepare skilled workers for factories. The Congress made appropriations with a view to stimulating the development of such courses and created an independent federal board to promote the spread of the vocational-education movement. The congressionally supported leaven worked slowly. By 1930 a considerable number of pupils were registered in vocational courses, but there was no really successful incorporation of these courses into the general plan of American education. The traditional subjects in the secondary-school curriculum still held preferred positions. The pupils who were most commonly advised to register in vocational courses were those who were thought by their teachers to be inferior in intelligence. There was a mutual attitude of antagonism between members of school staffs charged with the administration of vocational courses and those who conducted traditional courses.

The President of the United States, thinking to bring about a better co-ordination between vocational education and general education, transferred the independent board which had been created to promote vocational education to the jurisdiction of the United States Office of Education. This move was not effective to any great extent in combining the two types of education. The two divisions of the Office of Education remained aloof and lacking in the kind of unity that had been sought through the transfer made by the President.

In the meantime, the teachers of vocational subjects were making an effort to raise the average intelligence of the pupils in their classes and in so doing were emphasizing the more highly specialized forms of trade skills. The training of pupils in general skills received decreasing attention, and, as a result, vocational education became more and more a highly specialized branch of school work.

The defense program has given a tremendous impetus to a certain type of trade training. The demand for mechanics is so great that

short courses are being conducted not with a view to preparing individuals as all-round machinists but with a view to perfecting workers as rapidly as possible in the performance of single operations. The vocational education which is given as a part of the defense program is heavily subsidized by the federal government. Local school systems which are equipped with technical schools or shops are receiving new equipment, have the salaries of additional instructors paid, and are encouraged to operate twenty-four hours a day. Some of their effort is being turned to the training of adult workers.

The intensification of the program of vocational education has aroused many educators who are primarily concerned with what they regard as the higher forms of mental activity to conduct a campaign in favor of the literary subjects as contrasted with the vocational subjects. The controversy is being hotly waged by representatives of higher education as well as by those concerned with secondary education.

The adjustment of the school program so as to give proper place—whatever that is—to vocational education is by no means satisfactorily made. At the moment it can be said that vocational education is being accorded a far more hospitable reception than it has ever had before. A great many people who formerly were lukewarm or even antagonistic are now aligning themselves on the side of vocational education.

REVISION OF THE SCHOOL CURRICULUM

With the new emphasis on work that comes from the efforts of the federal government to provide young people with employment and the new enthusiasm for vocational education, the traditional subjects of the secondary-school curriculum are distinctly on the defensive. Another consideration which has opened up the school curriculum for reconsideration is the clear recognition that at the present time a great many young people are attending secondary schools and colleges because they have nowhere else to go. So long as privately controlled industry absorbed many youth on remunerative jobs it was common for anyone who did not have strictly intellectual interests to drop out of school and find a footing in the practical world. With the change in conditions which has been referred to in preced-

ing paragraphs it is no longer possible for most young people to complete their preparation for mature life by securing at an early age profitable employment. This fact raises at once the question: How far is the educational system responsible for meeting the interests of the multitude of young people who are now enrolled?

Advocates of change in the curriculum, in order to provide for the new enlarged population enrolled in educational institutions, point out that the courses which still constitute the core of instruction in secondary schools and colleges are those which were originally adopted when the chief purpose of these institutions was the preparation of a selected group of young people, the majority of whom were looking forward to careers in the professions. Professional and semi-professional callings are known to be overcrowded. It is calculated that more than 80 per cent of the pupils in secondary schools and a large number of college students are being directed by their studies into so-called "white-collar jobs," which now offer no prospects of employment.

Discussions of the legitimate sphere of public education are leading to a new view with regard to the high school as a unit in the educational system. The free public high school has become since its organization in the 1870's an institution very different from the secondary schools of earlier times and different from the corresponding grade of schools in other countries. It has come to be recognized during the past few years that the high schools of the country are now a part of the common-school system. The future will quite certainly see changes in instruction and organization which will bring secondary schools into fuller accord with the concept items expressed.

REFORMS IN ELEMENTARY-SCHOOL EDUCATION

The past decade has witnessed important reforms not only in the secondary schools but also in the elementary schools. The most comprehensive way of describing the changes which have taken place in elementary education is to say that formal teaching has been attacked and in some measure eliminated, and the curriculum has been greatly enriched. The beginnings of the reform which has gone on during the past ten years can be traced to earlier decades, even to the last decade of the nineteenth century. In recent years the reform has

taken on a momentum that has sometimes carried it out of bounds. There are extremists who advocate the complete abandonment of the conventional divisions of the curriculum. They would have no more courses in arithmetic, spelling, geography, or history. They would pursue such topics as arouse the interest of pupils and in so doing would fuse or unify all intellectual efforts by concentrating on projects or problems and dealing as occasion demands with such aspects of education as are commonly included in separate school subjects. The effectiveness of the movement to abolish all dividing lines between school subjects has been most marked in certain private schools and in sections of the country where in times past formal teaching was most common.

There can be no doubt that the country is passing through a period of widespread uncertainty as to methods and contents of instruction. One can be optimistic about the elimination of formalism that is thus being accomplished, but one must view with some anxiety present-day confusion. The most promising sign of the times is the very general undertaking by school systems of studies of their curriculums. In one way or another all the leading school systems of the country and many of the state departments of education are attacking the problem of curriculum revision. Committees of teachers are at work. Specialists in the supervision of the curriculum are being added to the staffs of superintendents. Consultants are being drawn from departments of education in universities and teachers' colleges to discuss with teachers and school supervisors ways of improving the contents and methods of teaching.

SOCIAL STUDIES

The field in which the most attention is being given to curriculum revision is the field of the social studies. The depression stimulated the general consideration of economic problems; the events in Europe, the defense program, and, finally, the war served to make clear the importance of cultivating in a democratic nation the highest intelligence that the schools can produce with respect to all aspects of social life. American schools have given little emphasis in the past to social studies. The only courses commonly taught that can properly be classified as belonging under this heading are history and cer-

tain sections of geography. A few courses in civics have been provided, usually in the program of the secondary school. These courses, however, have commonly dealt with the anatomy of government rather than with its functional activities.

The reasons why the social studies have been absent from school curriculums are obvious. In the first place, the systematic social sciences are themselves immature. They are of recent origin, and their methods and findings are still largely in process of formulation. In the second place, the social sciences relate so intimately to individual life that parents and boards of trustees in control of educational institutions are fearful that school courses will mislead young people rather than give proper guidance to their thinking.

The past decade has seen a number of evidences of the difficulty of introducing social studies into the school program. A commission sponsored by the American Historical Association and consisting of a number of school administrators and specialists in various social sciences failed to arrive at an agreement on the general principles which should guide schools in their teaching in this field. Four of the leading members of this commission refused to concur in the report adopted by the majority because they did not approve of the position taken in the report that the United States is moving in the direction of becoming a collectivistic society.

From time to time textbooks in history and related fields have been attacked as subversive. One such attack couched in the most sweeping terms was made by a man who had been employed by the American Association of Manufacturers to prepare a report on the contents of textbooks in the social sciences in use in schools. Other attacks sometimes directed against particular textbooks have been made by the American Legion, by the leaders of political movements, by local school systems, and by associations of parents.

There can be no doubt that the future will see in public schools much more attention to social studies than has been given to them in the past. Numerous experiments are being tried in different school systems to discover the best material and the best methods of dealing with such studies. At the same time many schools are making the effort to introduce social practices of self-government and pupil or-

ganization that are designed to cultivate social consciousness among the members of the school community.

EDUCATIONAL COMMITTEES AND COMMISSIONS

It is quite impossible in a paper of this length to enumerate all the committees and commissions which have operated during the past decade. It would, however, be a serious omission from any summary of educational doings to fail to mention several important bodies which have dealt with one or another of the problems of the educational system during this period.

Two national advisory committees on education were convened, one in 1930 by President Hoover and one in 1937 by President Roosevelt. The first was appointed by the President and the Secretary of the Interior to wrestle with the problems that were conspicuous early in the depression. The second was appointed for the specific purpose of advising the President on the problem of vocational education. Later the scope of consideration of this committee was enlarged, and it was asked to report on all aspects of education. Both committees prepared and published notable reports. The second committee issued in addition to its general report nineteen highly informing volumes on various aspects of education in the United States.

Most of the discussions carried on by these committees have been referred to in the paragraphs which constitute the early part of this paper. Both committees recommended federal subventions for public schools, expansion of federal participation in education, strengthening of state departments of education, and consolidation of the small school districts common in most of the states.

During the decade there were two White House conferences dealing with aspects of child life. One of the most important outcomes of these two conferences is an emphasis on child health. Health was by no means the only subject dealt with, but each of the conferences treated health as a matter of prime significance. The United States Public Health Service was also more active during the past decade than ever before in promoting popular interest in health. The result of the White House conferences and of the campaign carried on by the Public Health Service is that schools are doing more than they

have done in times past to cultivate health habits and promote intelligence among pupils with regard to health requirements.

In the middle of the decade the American Council on Education organized a commission known as the American Youth Commission. This Commission was made up of ten citizens not directly connected with the educational system and five educators. Its final report was adopted in September, 1941. Prior to the adoption of this report the Commission had during six years sponsored and published a series of reports which described fully all aspects of the youth problem. Its findings will supply the basis for the adjustments that are sure to be made in American schools in the near future. It recommended a public-works program to supply employment for youth when private industry is unable to do so, revision of the program of instruction in secondary schools, federal support for public schools, and correction of the deficiencies in school administration.

The National Education Association and the American Association of School Administrators appointed early in the period of the depression an emergency commission which made an effort to stem the tide of financial retrenchment that threatened the public schools of the country. Later, in 1935, a permanent commission, known as the Educational Policies Commission, took the place of the emergency commission. The Educational Policies Commission has acted as the representative of the public schools in demanding recognition of the autonomy of school administration. It has also during the past two years been very active in promoting education for democracy.

The Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching sponsored in 1931 and 1935 two international conferences which dealt with the problems of examination. These conferences, held in England, were attended by representatives of the United States and of the leading European nations.

The Progressive Education Association organized a committee early in the 1940's to bring about a readjustment of entrance requirements of colleges. This committee proposed to some two hundred institutions of higher education that they try the experiment of admitting graduates of a number of selected secondary schools without regard to the specific subjects which these graduates pursued. The

purpose was to leave the secondary schools free to reorganize their curriculums in any way that they believed would contribute most fully to the cultivation of the intellectual powers of the pupils. The experiment has been in progress long enough to permit the observation of a number of students who have completed their college studies. The reports made by those in charge of the experiment are highly favorable to the plan of admission adopted.

The National Resources Planning Board published three reports which describe the rapid development of research activities in this country. The assumption is often made by those who are connected with academic institutions that their institutions are the major centers, if not the exclusive centers, of scholarly inquiry. The reports published by the National Resources Planning Board show that the federal government and the industrial and commercial corporations of the country now depend for the determination of their policies on a volume of research which in quantity far exceeds the research carried on in academic institutions. Graduates trained in American universities are now employed in such large numbers in governmental departments, in industrial laboratories, and in bureaus of research in commercial concerns that it can be said that the methods and results of scientific research are respected and employed in all branches of American life.

The defense program created such a demand for scientifically trained research workers that on the recommendation of the Science Committee of the National Resources Planning Board an agency was organized which in co-operation with the Civil Service Commission has prepared a roster of all the individuals in the United States who are trained research workers. In the preparation of this roster the learned societies and the four national councils of scholars have co-operated. There are now some two hundred and fifty thousand names on the roster showing the extent of preparation in this nation for scientific research.

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RELIGION

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ABSTRACT

Magazine discussion of religious topics has sunk during the past decade to the lowest relative amount of the present century. As during previous recent decades, this decrease was due to declines in discussion of traditional and institutional phases, while ethical- and spiritual-life phases increased. The number of adult church members per 1,000 of adult population was nearly three million smaller in 1940 than ten years earlier. The two world-wars and other factors have brought a crisis in missions. Formation of a World Council of Churches and reunion of Methodists illustrate a trend toward mergers. The depression brought an eightfold increase in discussion of Christian ethics, and the onset of hostilities produced extensive discussion of "War and Christianity," with increasing church efforts toward a just and enduring peace. While the general public still believes in a personal God and in life after death, such beliefs have been rapidly subsiding among scientists. Beliefs of ministers and attitudes expressed in hymns have shown a marked liberal trend.

The first change to note in what has happened to religion during the last dozen years is the decline in religious interest as evidenced by articles in periodicals. Discussion of religious topics in the periodicals indexed in the *Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature* has sunk during the past decade to the lowest relative amount of the present century, as shown in Table 1. From 1905 to 1931 the rate of decline averaged about 2.1 per cent per year;¹ from 1931 to 1941 it averaged about 2.5 per cent per year.

Between the prosperity year 1929 and the depression year 1934 the relative attention devoted to religion in magazines increased 22 per cent, only to drop to a little more than half its 1934 figure when economic recovery had come. The net gain in ethical and spiritual-life phases, accompanied by a decline in traditional and institutional phases, is a striking continuation of trends observed between 1905 and 1930.²

THE CHURCH AS AN INSTITUTION

Declining church membership.—The number of members reported by churches affords one means of checking up on the healthiness of the church as a social institution. The best available information on

¹ W. F. Ogburn (ed.), *Recent Social Trends* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1933), p. 398.

² *Ibid.*, p. 413.

TABLE 1

RELIGIOUS ARTICLES IN MAGAZINES, 1919-41

Topic	ENTRIES* PER 100,000 IN <i>Readers' Guide</i>															
	1919-21	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1941†	1941 minus 1929	.99 Range‡
Grand total.....	691	752	772	776	727	852	915	734	638	640	725	621	539	526	-226	119
Religion§.....	33	75	100	73	81	83	105	64	55	54	53	65	78	71	-4	40
Christianity.....	36	49	30	51	35	55	49	42	36	44	39	37	30	42	-7	31
Subtotal.....	69	124	139	124	116	138	154	106	91	98	92	102	108	113	-11	51
The church 	107	159	131	142	101	156	163	71	109	111	151	109	96	73	-86	50
Church unity.....	35	47	59	36	40	19	26	30	18	29	54	19	14	11	-36	25
Religious education¶.....	27	32	44	31	17	28	39	31	18	17	9	19	17	43	11	29
Missions**.....	163	164	120	131	164	222	155	163	138	114	133	142	31	47	-117	48
Subtotal.....	332	402	354	340	322	425	383	295	283	271	347	289	158	174	-228	80

* Each separate article title listed was counted as one entry, even though a series of articles appearing on different dates is referred to and even when the same article is reprinted in another periodical without separate listing. No attempt was made to eliminate duplications or to weight by circulations.

† Figures for 1941 are incomplete and are subject to correction when the full cumulation is published, although the indices will probably not be appreciably altered.

‡ Any differences between indices on a given subject have a .99 chance (or better) of being significant if they exceed the figure in this column. The .99 range = 2.574

$$\sigma p_1 - p_2 = 2.574 \sqrt{\frac{p_1}{N_1} + \frac{p_2}{N_2}}$$

§ Includes "religions," and all "religious . . ." except "religious education" and "religious drama."

|| Includes "churches" and all topics beginning with "church . . ." except "church unity" and names of denominations.

¶ Includes "Sunday schools" and "religious drama."

** Includes "revivals."

TABLE 1—Continued

Topic	ENTRIES* PER 100,000 IN <i>Readers' Guide</i>														
	1919-21	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1941† minus 1929	1941 Range†
War and Christianity.....	0	6	11	11	11	13	24	16	16	13	23	46	73	65	28
Christian ethics††.....	62	17	48	98	140	124	90	87	81	71	77	60	59	59	26
Subtotal.....	62	23	59	109	151	137	114	103	97	84	100	106	132	85	38
Bible.....	49	35	42	29	22	40	62	75	46	49	46	28	28	—	28
Jesus Christ.....	28	49	41	64	28	38	73	45	39	29	40	33	16	—	27
Theology††.....	27	65	70	56	31	34	64	33	41	30	32	18	35	—	31
Future life§§.....	85	21	13	15	15	13	15	28	15	15	12	4	7	—	19
Subtotal.....	189	170	166	164	96	125	214	181	141	123	130	83	86	—	53
Prayer.....	17	9	15	15	13	8	22	26	15	20	12	9	17	8	17
Spiritual life 	22	24	39	24	29	19	28	23	11	44	44	32	38	6	24
Subtotal.....	39	33	54	39	42	27	50	49	26	64	56	41	55	14	30
Estimated total entries on all subjects in <i>Readers' Guide</i> , in hundreds.....	1,315	536	542	549	544	531	534	575	615	595	570	571	575	643

†† Includes "church and social problems," "Christian socialism," and "sociology—Christian."

§§ Includes "God" and "religion and science."

|| Includes "immortality," "heaven," "spiritualism," and "psychical research."

||| Includes "faith," "Christian life," and "mysticism."

the subject is given in Table 2. This shows that between 1930 and 1939-40 the churches sustained a loss of 27 members per 1,000 of population, which would mean a deficit of nearly three million members in 1940. These figures are based largely on *Christian Herald* surveys. The *Christian Herald* and the United States Census agreed on their 1926 figures, but in 1936 the census reported approximately

TABLE 2
FLUCTUATIONS IN CHURCH MEMBERSHIP THIRTEEN
YEARS OF AGE AND OVER IN CONTINENTAL UNITED
STATES COMPARED WITH ESTIMATED POPULATION
OF SAME AGES, 1926-40

For Fiscal Years Ending Mainly in June	Membership 13 Years of Age and Over (Thousands)*	Estimated Population 13 Years of Age and Over (Millions)†	Members per 1,000 of Esti- mated Population
1939-40.....	52,406	103.2	507
1937-38.....	52,380	101.0	519
1936.....	51,746	99.1	522
1935.....	51,023	98.0	521
1934.....	50,497	96.8	522
1933.....	49,599	95.4	521
1932.....	49,351	94.1	524
1931.....	49,108	92.9	529
1930.....	48,874	91.5	534
1926.....	45,200	85.9	527

* *Information Service*, XX (June 28, 1941), 5, supplemented by data from *Christian Herald*, June, 1932.

† Calculated from Bureau of the Census, *Press Release*, Series P-5, No. 1, January 30, 1941, p. 4.

seven million members fewer than the *Herald*. This seems to have been due to incompleteness of census returns.³ But this large error raises anew the question whether the apparent gains in church membership during decades previous to 1926 may not have been due simply to increasing completeness of returns up to 1926.

Church attendance per 1,000 of population dropped from 120 in 1930 to 108 in 1935, according to a committee of which Roger W. Babson was chairman.⁴ A Gallup poll in 1939 found that 50 per cent

³ See Benson Y. Landis, "A Note on the 1936 Census of Religious Bodies," *Information Service*, November 2, 1940, pp. 1-2.

⁴ *Advance*, July, 1936, inside front cover.

of those interviewed said they were attending church less often than their parents did, and only 18 per cent said they were attending more often than their parents did.⁵ A nation-wide survey of American women, published by the *Ladies' Home Journal* in June, 1938, found that, although 91 per cent believed in God and in a future life, only 47 per cent said that they went to church regularly, while 53 per cent said they did not.

Declining religious education.—United States Census returns show the following numbers of Sunday-school pupils per 1,000 church members: 1906, 418; 1916, 477; 1926, 385; and 1936, 329.⁶ (The incompleteness of 1936 reports probably does not affect these figures appreciably.) These data show a rise of 14.1 per cent from 1906 to 1916, preceding by ten years an increase of 14.5 per cent in total church members per capita. Church-school enrolment, however, showed a decline of 19.3 per cent from 1916 to 1926 and a further decline of 14.5 per cent from 1926 to 1936.

A movement has been growing to grant "released time" from city schools to students who wish to study religious topics. In 1941 seven states already had such laws, and similar statutes were pending in four others. Chicago adopted a plan giving high-school credits for courses in religion offered as electives under Protestant, Roman Catholic, and Jewish auspices.⁷

Increasing criticism of the church.—In 1905, according to *Recent Social Trends*, about 78 per cent of the opinions published about churches were favorable and about 22 per cent unfavorable.⁸ By 1930 this had changed so that 67 per cent of opinions were unfavorable to the church. A similar study of representative magazine articles made by the present writer in 1934 showed that about 75 per cent of opinions expressed about the church were unfavorable and only about 25 per cent favorable. That the Christian faith was holding its own was asserted by about 26 per cent of the opinions expressed in the 1934 articles, while 74 per cent asserted that Christian-

⁵ *New York Times*, March 19, 1936, p. 4G.

⁶ Bureau of the Census, *Selected Statistics: Religious Bodies, 1936* (Washington, D.C., 1941), pp. 166-67.

⁷ *Christian Century*, March 15, 1941, p. 384.

⁸ P. 403.

ity was losing ground. In 1939 a poll of representative New York City young people fifteen to thirty-four years of age made by the Y.M.C.A. found that 80 per cent were guided less by religion than were their parents.⁹ A Gallup poll in 1939 reported that 40 per cent of farmers thought that interest in religion in their communities had been decreasing in recent years, while only 27 per cent thought it had been increasing. Among city dwellers 32 per cent thought interest in religion had decreased in their communities and 42 per cent thought it had increased.¹⁰ This may possibly indicate a turn of the tide in the cities, though the figures on magazine articles certainly do not indicate it.

The ebb of interest in and the approval of organized Christianity in the United States should be viewed in the perspective of the aggressive antireligious movements which have been active during the past decade in Germany, Russia, Mexico, and other countries. The *Federal Council Bulletin* for June, 1935, said: "Not since Christianity confronted a pagan Roman Empire in the first centuries of the Christian era has it been face to face with such a widely organized and radical denial of the Christian Gospel."

The crisis in Christian missions.—Entries on "Missions" and allied topics in the *Readers' Guide* dropped from 222 per 100,000 in 1933 to 47 in 1941. Publication by the *Missionary World* ceased in 1939, but nearly half of the decrease had occurred before that date.

Causes advanced for the crisis in missions include: (1) disruption of mission activities by World War I; (2) collapse of the Interchurch World Movement in 1920 and subsequent drastic declines in contributions; (3) the increasing chasm between the liberal viewpoint embodied in *Rethinking Missions* (the report of the Appraisal Committee of the Laymen's Foreign Mission Inquiry, published in 1932) and the fundamentalist attitude of most missionaries and contributors; and (4) disruption by Japan's aggressions in Asia and by World War II.

Increasing consolidation of denominations.—At Utrecht in 1938 delegates from a hundred and thirty major denominations in twenty-one countries, having 350,000,000 members, adopted plans for a

⁹ *New York Times*, November 19, 1939.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, March 19, 1939, p. 4G.

World Council of Churches.¹¹ This council provides merely for co-operation, not for union, and it will come into active effect only to the extent that it is adopted by individual denominations; but it represents the farthest advance ever made toward the unification of Protestantism.

In 1941 a merger of eight national interchurch organizations in the United States was approved.¹² Twenty denominations, with a communicant membership of over twenty-five million, each have membership in five or more of these eight councils.

The largest interdenominational merger of the decade was that in which four previously independent branches of the Methodist church united into one body with a combined membership of nearly eight million. Steps toward union were also being taken by the Presbyterian and the Protestant Episcopal denominations in 1939.

INCREASED ETHICAL EMPHASIS

The most striking increase in religious discussion in magazines has been in the field of Christian ethics. *Readers' Guide* entries under this heading and under "Church and Social Problems," "Christian Socialism," and "Christian Sociology" increased from 17 per 100,000 in 1929 to 140 in 1932, and in 1941 they were still more than twice their 1929 level. The rise and recession of this curve is notably similar to the rise and decline in the amount of unemployment and to other indices of the economic depression.

In 1929 the heading "War and Christianity" was inserted in the *Readers' Guide* for the first time. Entries under this heading rose from 6 per 100,000 in 1929 to 73 in 1940. The rise corresponds quite closely to the intensification of the Hitler terror in the world.

Pacifist opinion seems to have been dominant among church leaders during the early part of the past decade. In 1934 *The World Tomorrow* sent out questionnaires to 100,000 clergymen of the leading Protestant denominations of America. Of the 18,635 who returned an opinion, more than 75 per cent wanted the church to oppose all

¹¹ *Newsweek*, XI (May 23, 1938), 24; *Christian Century*, LV (1938), 691.

¹² *Christian Century*, LVIII (1941), 1022-23; *Federal Council Bulletin*, January, 1942, pp. 7-8.

future wars. Inconsistently, only 54 per cent were opposed to wars of "defense."¹³

On economic issues, 18,324 clergymen thought a co-operative commonwealth more in accord with the teachings of Jesus, as against 1,035 who voted for capitalism. When the question was made more specific, however, 57 per cent of those with an opinion voted for "drastically reformed capitalism," 31 per cent voted for socialism, 1 per cent for fascism, 1 per cent for communism, and 10 per cent for "some other political system."¹⁴

Increasing attention has been given to devoting church energies toward a just and enduring peace after World War II. A committee of the Federal Council of Churches, under the chairmanship of John Foster Dulles, has been carrying forward researches and publishing pamphlet material on the subject, and an interdenominational conference to discuss the question was held in March, 1942.

That increasing social emphasis among church people has not been confined to the last two decades is indicated by Crawford's study of a century of Methodist hymns. He found that in 1836 the desire for personal salvation was presented as the dominant motive for Christian living in 23 per cent of the hymns. This percentage sank in each edition of the hymnal until it was only 7 per cent in 1935. Motives of collective interest (fellowship, missions, the Kingdom of God, etc.) were dominant in only 9 per cent of the hymns in 1836 but they rose consistently until they reached 27 per cent in 1935.¹⁵

CHANGING IDEAS AND BELIEFS

•While interest in the ethical phases of religion has shown a marked growth during the depression and war years, interest in theology has shown a sharper drop in magazine attention than the drop in any other group of topics except those dealing with organization.

The nation-wide survey of American women published by the *Ladies' Home Journal* found that 91 per cent believed in a Supreme Being with whom they felt they had personal contact in prayer and

¹³ *The World Tomorrow*, XVII (1934), 226, 229, 230.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 231.

¹⁵ Benjamin Franklin Crawford, *Religious Trends in a Century of Hymns* (Carnegie, Pa., 1938), p. 192.

that 91 per cent believed that their soul lives on when the body dies. In both of these beliefs the women under thirty years of age were 8 per cent less believing than those over forty-five.

A poll conducted in 1914 and again in 1933 by Leuba¹⁶ showed that among scientists the percentages who believed in a God to "whom one may pray in the expectation of receiving an answer more than the natural, subjective, psychological effect of prayer" were as

TABLE 3

SCIENTISTS CLASSIFIED BY SPECIALTY	LESSER SCIENTISTS		GREATER SCIENTISTS	
	1914	1933	1914	1933
Physicists.....	50	43	34	17
Biologists.....	39	31	17	12
Sociologists.....	29	30	19	13
Psychologists.....	32	13	13	12

TABLE 4

SCIENTISTS CLASSIFIED BY SPECIALTY	LESSER SCIENTISTS		GREATER SCIENTISTS	
	1914	1933	1914	1933
Physicists.....	57	46	40	20
Biologists.....	45	32	25	15
Sociologists.....	52	31	27	10
Psychologists.....	27	12	9	2

given in Table 3. Among those who believed in the "continuation of the person after death in another world" the percentages were as shown in Table 4. With practically no exception, each of the sixteen groups in Leuba's study showed a decrease in belief between 1914 and 1933.

Beliefs of Chicago ministers.—In 1933 George H. Betts and W. W. Sloan sent out a questionnaire to 1,039 Protestant ministers in Chicago.¹⁷ Table 5 shows the reactions in percentages of the half of

¹⁶ James H. Leuba, "Religious Beliefs of American Scientists," *Harper's*, CLXIX (1934), 297.

¹⁷ "Questionnaire: Ministers at Odds on Essentials of Faith," *Newsweek*, III (1934), 35.

those queried who filled in answers. Incidentally, the new World Council of Churches requires "acceptance of our Lord Jesus Christ as God and Savior" as prerequisite to membership.

Religious trends in a century of hymns.—Crawford found that hymns dealing with sin, salvation, evangelism, death, and judgment

TABLE 5

Questions	Yes	No	Not Certain
Does God know and often think about every person in the world?	87	3	10
Do those who die keep on living in another life?.....	92	3	5
Did Jesus make the world?.....	43	54	3
Are we sons of God just as much as Jesus was?.....	42	44	14
Did everything the Bible tells about really happen just the way it is told?.....	29	66	5
Did mankind develop from lower forms of life?.....	46	39	15

formed 44.4 per cent of the Methodist hymnal in 1836.¹⁸ They decreased throughout the century until, in 1935, they formed only 11.7 per cent. Hymns about the deity of Jesus remained fairly constant throughout the century, but hymns on his humanity increased from 1.9 per cent in 1836 to 8.5 per cent in 1935. A marked shift was found, throughout the century, from motives of fear to motives of love and gratitude.

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¹⁸ *Op. cit.*, pp. 177-82.

CRIME

THORSTEN SELLIN

ABSTRACT

Crime in the thirties differs somewhat from crime in the preceding decade, owing chiefly to the depression and to the elimination of prohibition. Sources of statistical data were greatly improved. Urban rates for offenses against the person were lower at the end of the decade than at the beginning. Major offenses against property showed an opposite trend. Criminal homicide rates declined. Comparison with European rates does not indicate as high rates in the United States as have been assumed, especially when Negro rates are taken into consideration. The effect of the depression on property crimes is not clear but cannot be discounted. The expansion of the federal criminal law is reflected in the increase in federal prison commitments, while commitments to state institutions declined.

INTRODUCTION

From a criminological point of view the twenties gave us a bizarre decade which will be remembered chiefly for its flamboyant beer barons and liquor-smugglers. Organized criminal activity in connection with vice, gambling, and narcotics was well known before, but its extension into the beer and liquor field as a result of our prohibition legislation gave this activity its greatest opportunity to blossom. In this expansion organized crime was aided by venal politicians and police officers who lent their assistance for considerations that unprecedented profits could make more tempting than ever and by a public attitude intolerant of an attempt to regulate personal habits. This was the decade when words and phrases like "criminal syndicate," "taking for a ride," "putting on the spot," "gunman," "racket," and "public enemy" were invented or given new meanings. Some of this wave of organized crime spilled over into the thirties. The "syndicates," sensing the approaching demise of prohibition, branched out into labor racketeering and phony protective associations in various fields of business and intrenched themselves in the already well-established numbers racket and other equally aged illegal business activities. A few misguided rascals went in for kidnapping for ransom.

All told, however, the thirties presents a pale picture in comparison with its predecessor. The depression, the rise of a public demand for better local government and better law enforcement, and the

repeal of the prohibition amendment to the Constitution combined to give our crime picture a more traditional cast.

THE NATIONAL PICTURE

It is to the statistics of offenses known to the police and of persons charged with crimes that we must go to secure some idea of the movement of criminality in the 1930's.¹ Table 1 is based on data of the former class as analyzed in *Uniform Crime Reports*. These statistics are drawn from our urban police departments, and it will be noted that for the earlier years the sample was small, though adequate enough for crude rates. The rates for murder and voluntary manslaughter showed a downward trend, and so did the rates for automobile thefts. Negligent manslaughter rates gradually rose, leveled off, and then declined. Aggravated assault rates rose to a peak

¹ The last decade saw great improvements in the sources of our statistical data concerning crime. From this point of view the 1930's may be looked on as the most fruitful ten years in our history. The *Uniform Crime Reports* of the Department of Justice were launched, and they have gradually become an indispensable tool for the research worker who wants a national picture of our criminality, albeit that this reporting system has not yet reached either the inclusiveness or the perfection that is desired (see "Ten Years of Uniform Crime Reporting, 1930-1939: A Report by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, United States Department of Justice" [Washington, D.C., November, 1939]. Pp. 163. [Mimeographed.]). The first successful attempt at securing annual national judicial criminal statistics was begun in 1932 by the Census Bureau. (An abortive effort was made by the Bureau of the Census in 1907, under the direction of John Koren, to prepare a national report on criminal court statistics; but, although considerable sums were spent, the material secured proved of such uneven value that the results were never made public, and some years later the data collected were destroyed.) This plan, which in some years has covered as many as thirty states, is still in a crude form but capable of being greatly improved. As yet it includes only details about the operations of trial courts. The juvenile court statistics of the Children's Bureau have been expanded, and improvements have also been made in the collection and analysis of the annual prison statistics gathered by the Census Bureau. The decennial census of correctional schools and jails in 1933 should also be mentioned.

The last decade has also witnessed the development of comparable and uniform annual reports by police departments in various parts of the country, and while, in spite of the concern of the International Association of Chiefs of Police in this problem, these are still all too few, the reports now available are most useful to the student. The annual criminal statistics of New York State, gathered by the State Department of Corrections, made their first appearance in 1930; and recently the state of Minnesota began the issuance of an interesting annual report through its Bureau of Criminal Apprehension. Both federal prison and federal court statistics were revamped and placed on a high level of excellence. Altogether, therefore, the student of crime is in a some-

in 1933-34 and then declined until the last two years of the decade, when a slight rise occurred. Robbery rates rose sharply in 1932 and then declined. The burglary rates rose quickly to high points in 1932-33, then declined until 1936, when a considerable rise was registered which continued until 1939. The larceny rates, after falling in

TABLE 1*
RATE PER 100,000 POPULATION OF CERTAIN MAJOR OFFENSES KNOWN
TO POLICE IN CITIES OF THE UNITED STATES, 1931-40

YEAR	CRIMINAL HOMICIDE		AGGRA- VATED AS- SAULT	ROB- BERY	BUR- GLARY	LAR- CENY	AUTO THEFT	NUMBER OF CITIES RE- PORTING	APPROX- IMATE POPUL- ATION (IN MIL- LIONS)
	Murder and Non- negligent Man- slaughter	Man- slaughter by Negli- gence							
1931....	7.0	4.3	44.1	79.3	313.5	746.8	332.0	511	16½
1932....	7.0	4.3	45.9	110.2	387.5	715.0	369.1	1,206	46
1933....	7.1	4.8	50.7	102.5	379.2	762.0	320.4	1,264	49½
1934....	6.7	5.4	49.4	81.6	334.8	771.0	287.3	1,285	57
1935....	6.0	5.3	45.7	66.4	310.0	747.0	241.8	1,423	57
1936....	6.2	5.3	46.2	55.7	311.5	716.7	213.7	1,658	60
1937....	6.1	5.7	45.5	59.8	325.4	780.0	215.6	1,809	61½
1938....	5.3	4.6	44.5	59.3	340.2	849.2	188.2	1,929	62½
1939....	5.4	4.4	46.5	55.2	349.6	899.1	178.0	2,105	64
1940....	5.4	4.4	45.8	52.5	348.4	926.3	174.6	2,001	65

* Source: *Uniform Crime Reports: Second Quarterly Bulletin* (1932); *Fourth Quarterly Bulletins* (1932-40).

1932, rose to a peak in 1934, then subsided until 1937, when they began a rise which continued to the end of the period and far ex-

what better position than he was ten years ago to analyze the numerical aspects of this problem. Yet this is no time for rejoicing. The war economy is already making itself felt, and it is to be greatly feared that, unless strong counterefforts are made, some of the advances of the 1930's will be followed by retreats and perhaps irretrievable losses in the 1940's. The monetary savings to the federal government resulting from the curtailment of the work in criminal statistics would be infinitesimal, but to social scientists and penal administrators alike the loss would be severe.

According to latest information from Washington, the new federal budget bill makes no provision either for the decennial census of institutions for juveniles, mental hospitals, and local jails or for a continuation of the collection of prison and judicial criminal statistics. Fortunately, the F.B.I. does not contemplate any curtailment of its work in collecting and publishing police statistics on crime.

ceeded the rates of the earlier years of the depression. The rates for aggravated assault, robbery, and burglary correspond fairly closely with unemployment indices for the period, but, in view of the brief time span here examined, whether or not this is an indication of any causal relationship, it is difficult to say.

Homicides.—The criminal homicide rate is generally regarded as of special interest in the evaluation of a nation's criminality. We in particular would agree on that point, since we have been accused of

TABLE 2*
DEATH RATES DUE TO HOMICIDE (NUMBER OF
DEATHS PER 100,000 ESTIMATED POPULA-
TION) IN THE UNITED STATES REGISTRATION
AREA, 1920-40

Year	Homicide	Year	Homicide
1920.....	7.1	1931.....	9.3
1921.....	8.5	1932.....	9.2
1922.....	8.3	1933.....	9.6
1923.....	8.1	1934.....	9.5
1924.....	8.4	1935.....	8.3
1925.....	8.6	1936.....	8.0
1926.....	8.8	1937.....	7.6
1927.....	8.8	1938.....	6.8
1928.....	8.8	1939.....	6.4
1929.....	8.5	1940.....	6.2
1930.....	9.0		

* Source: Bureau of the Census, *Vital Statistics—Special Reports*, Vol. IX, Nos. 56 and 57 (1940); Vol. XV, No. 6 (1941).

having the highest homicide rates among civilized peoples. Before commenting on this problem, let us look at Table 2, which might also be compared with the homicide rates in the preceding table. Deaths due to homicide do not coincide with criminal homicides, since the former include justifiable homicides which are not punishable and probably other nonpunishable offenses. On the other hand, the criminal homicide rates (Table 1) cover cities alone and include manslaughters by negligence, classified in mortality statistics as "accidental deaths." There is no space here for a more detailed analysis of the basis for the different rates. These rates parallel each other quite well for the period 1931-40 and show a remarkable decline. The rates of the last three years are probably the lowest in our history.

How do these rates compare with those of European countries? The best study of homicides in Europe has been made by a Finnish statistician, Veli Verkko,² who classifies European countries into five groups, depending on whether the criminal homicide rates are under 1 per 100,000 population, from 1 to 2, from 2 to 3, from 3 to 4, and over 4. On the basis of data from the period 1922-26, he places the Scandinavian nations, the British Isles,³ Ireland, and Iceland in Group I; France, Switzerland, Austria, Germany, Czechoslovakia, Belgium, and Holland in Group II; and all the rest in Group V, i.e., having rates above 4. This is the group into which the United States as a whole would fall. However, ours is a large continent, and if we examine Table 3 we find that our great industrial regions have homicide rates lower than those of southern and eastern Europe, that our New England area compares favorably with central Europe, that ten of our states would fall into Group II of Verkko's schedule, and one, Vermont, into Group I.

There is, of course, one problem which Europe has not had to deal with—the Negro population. Of the 8,394 deaths from homicide in the United States in 1939, 3,850 were those of whites and 4,482 those of Negroes.⁴ It has been demonstrated that only a small percentage of criminal homicides are interracial.⁵ This means that more than half of the deaths of this class are, in all likelihood, attributable to a population group composing only about 10 per cent of the population. Were national homicide rates of the whites of the United States compared with those of Europe, we would not find ourselves in a very unfavorable position.

² *Crimes of Violence against the Person as Related to the National Ethos and Other Ethnic Factors* (in Finnish [Helsinki, 1936]). Pp 385. See diagram, p. 24. See also Erik Ekkelund, "Criminal Statistics: The Volume of Crime," *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology*, XXXII (January-February, 1942), 540-47.

³ The homicide death rates (murder, infanticide, and manslaughter) of England and Wales were for males: 0.59 per 100,000 in 1921-30, 0.44 in 1931-35, and 0.41 in 1936-38. Corresponding rates for females were: 0.58, 0.51, and 0.44 (see M. Greenwood, W. J. Martin, and W. T. Russell, "Deaths by Violence, 1837-1937," *Journal Royal Statistical Society*, CIV [1941], 146-63; cf. esp. p. 162).

⁴ Bureau of the Census, *Vital Statistics—Special Reports*, Vol. XII, No. 30 (1941). There were 62 deaths of persons of "other races."

⁵ Guy B. Johnson, "The Negro and Crime," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, CCXVII (1941), 99.

We have often been told in recent years that there are 12,000 "murders" a year in the United States. This is, of course, fantastic. Table 4 may be of interest in this connection. The reason for the above claim perhaps may be due to the fact that in *Uniform Crime*

TABLE 3*

DEATHS DUE TO HOMICIDE IN CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES, 1940
RATE PER 100,000 POPULATION (1940 CENSUS) BY GEO-
GRAPHIC DIVISION AND SELECTED STATES

Area	Rate	States	Lowest Rates	States	Highest Rates
New England.....	1.5	Vt.....	0.8	La.....	12.0
Middle Atlantic.....	2.8	Neb.....	1.0	S.C.....	13.2
East north-central....	3.7	Minn.....	1.2	D.C.....	13.7
West north-central....	2.6	Iowa, Wis.....	1.3	Ky.....	14.3
South Atlantic.....	13.2	R.I., N.D., N.H....	1.4	Ala.....	16.4
East south-central....	16.0	Me., Mass.....	1.5	Tenn.....	16.6
West south-central....	9.5	Conn.....	1.8	Miss.....	17.0
Mountain.....	5.3	S.D., Kan.....	2.2	Ga.....	20.0
Pacific.....	4.5	N.J.....	2.3	Fla.....	21.6

* Sources: Bureau of the Census, *Vital Statistics—Special Reports*, Vol. XV, No. 7 (1941).

TABLE 4*

NUMBER OF DEATHS FROM HOMICIDES IN CONTI-
NENTAL UNITED STATES, 1933-40

Year	Number	Year	Number
1933.....	12,124	1937.....	9,811
1934.....	12,055	1938.....	8,799
1935.....	10,587	1939.....	8,394
1936.....	10,232	1940.....	8,208

* Source: Same as for Table 3.

Reports there have appeared "estimates" of the total number of crimes in the country. For instance, it is estimated that in 1940 there were 7,540 murders and nonnegligent manslaughters and 4,425 manslaughters by negligence—a total of 11,965.⁶ However, murder is generally defined by the law in such a manner that probably less than 4,000 such offenses occur in the United States annually. This is bad enough without exaggeration.

⁶ *Uniform Crime Reports*, IX (1940), 200.

Serious crimes against property.—In Table 5 there may be found some data on burglaries and robberies taken from police departments that possess some of the best reports in the country. The figures are crude, except for Cincinnati and Los Angeles, where population ratios are given in the police reports. All the cities represented in the table registered an increase in population during the 1930's. Only in the case of Los Angeles did burglary rates reach their peaks in the

TABLE 5*
BURGLARIES AND ROBBERIES KNOWN TO THE POLICE IN
SELECTED CITIES, 1928-40

YEAR	DETROIT		CINCINNATI		LOS ANGELES		NEW YORK CITY	
	Bur- glary	Rob- bery	Bur- glary	Rob- bery	Bur- glary	Rob- bery	Bur- glary	Rob- bery
1928.....	542	759	241.0	96.0	3,708	1,232
1929.....	1,581	2,029	399.0	143.0	2,990	1,172
1930.....	2,321	1,617	332.0	194.0	524.1	168.1	2,830	1,166
1931.....	2,285	1,588	358.7	153.6	639.1	168.9	2,678	1,434
1932.....	3,771	1,823	267.0	110.2	774.5	197.9	2,417	1,429
1933.....	4,076	1,852	281.5	74.0	730.9	177.6	2,276	1,138
1934.....	3,551	1,182	262.0	64.8	619.1	106.1	2,980	1,251
1935.....	3,003	1,013	313.7	84.2	542.2	68.7	2,614	1,184
1936.....	3,152	1,204	379.3	105.1	511.5	69.4	2,369	1,240
1937.....	4,006	1,332	549.4	138.4	517.1	100.1	3,128	1,276
1938.....	4,975	1,476	473.9	117.4	587.1	123.3	2,670	1,297
1939.....	4,823	1,421	457.2	116.6	639.5	127.0	3,178	1,427
1940.....	6,012	1,887	476.9	103.4	671.7	145.4	3,059	1,392

Source: Annual police department reports. Cincinnati and Los Angeles figures are rates per 100,000 population. The two peak years of each series have been italicized.

most severe depression years, but in Cincinnati and New York City, as well as in Los Angeles, the robbery rates were highest during the 1930-33 period. The picture is not clear in Detroit. In Cincinnati the highest burglary rate was recorded in 1937, the year of the flood. We cannot, therefore, discount the effect of the depression on these offenses, although the real facts can be secured only through local critical studies.

Other offenses.—We have no data on the crimes of less serious character known to the police. *Uniform Crime Reports*, on the basis of annual returns, tabulates, however, the rates of persons charged with such offenses (Table 6). Even if we assume that these reports

are reasonably complete, we must emphasize that they reflect law-enforcement activity and cannot be accepted as indicating trends in the types of conduct with which they deal. This does not lessen their value so long as we understand their character. Even so, it is impossible to determine how the growth of the reporting area may have affected rates that are subject to great regional variations.

TABLE 6*
RATES OF PERSONS CHARGED WITH OFFENSES, 1932-40, PER 100,000
ESTIMATED POPULATION IN CITIES OF THE UNITED STATES

Offense	1932	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940
Simple assaults.....	119.6	132.7	137.7	132.5	<i>142.9</i>	138.3	124.0	134.8	125.0
Embezzlement and fraud...	23.9	23.1	21.4	22.7	24.0	22.9	<i>24.9</i>	22.9	21.2
Stolen property.....		10.8	13.2	11.7	10.2	11.0	10.8	10.1	9.1
Forgery and counterfeiting..	12.3	8.8	9.9	10.6	9.9	11.4	<i>13.3</i>	11.8	12.1
Rape.....	5.5	5.5	6.2	6.0	6.4	6.8	6.6	7.0	6.7
Prostitution and commercial- ized vice.....		<i>139.0</i>	107.0	108.8	119.3	123.1	105.9	82.4	91.1
Other sex offenses.....		17.2	20.0	24.9	24.9	27.8	26.3	28.5	26.1
Drug-law violations.....	5.9	7.9	7.6	7.9	7.7	7.2	6.7	6.3	4.7
Concealed weapons.....	22.2	20.7	18.5	18.0	15.8	16.9	14.3	14.0	14.3
Against family and children.	41.6	39.7	58.2	56.4	57.0	<i>59.4</i>	56.0	53.6	49.9
Liquor law violations.....	<i>105.8</i>	113.8	70.3	69.9	61.4	58.4	53.4	50.5	50.7
Drunken driving.....	65.7	63.2	76.5	87.4	97.7	<i>114.8</i>	98.1	106.0	102.7
Traffic and motor vehicle vi- olations.....			4,180.7	5,266.1	5,694.3	7,730.9	7,439.4	8,004.1	9,863.5
Disorderly conduct.....		<i>644.9</i>	447.7	476.2	421.6	433.0	392.3	407.2	412.5
Drunkenness.....	831.1	1,019.6	1,490.1	1,615.8	<i>1,686.5</i>	1,666.1	1,500.8	1,513.5	1,593.7
Vagrancy.....		210.9	214.4	230.9	204.7	218.5	209.5	203.1	226.7
Gambling.....	94.2	97.0	114.5	123.4	142.1	145.5	161.0	158.7	164.3
All others.....	593.1	551.1	535.2	<i>625.8</i>	557.4	579.0	513.5	431.8	397.5
Number of cities reporting..	596	762	793	898	987	1,098	1,182	1,214	1,212
Approximate population (in millions).....	21.7	30.3	30.6	33.0	35.5	37.5	38.5	39.1	41.1

* Source: *Uniform Crime Reports*. The gaps in the tables are due to changes in method of classification. The Standard Classification of Offenses was first used in 1934 by the U.S. Bureau of Investigation. No rates were computed by the Bureau before 1932. The peaks in each series (horizontal) have been italicized.

Identification of offenders.—Criminal identification was greatly extended in the thirties. The Federal Bureau of Investigation of the United States Department of Justice increased its fingerprint record file from less than 4,000,000 cards in 1930 to nearly 22,000,000 at the end of the fiscal year 1941. To this total the greatest single contribution was made in 1941, when the Alien Registration Act brought nearly 4,300,000 cards into the file. Of those whose fingerprints were sent to the Bureau last fiscal year, 65 per cent had previously been fingerprinted, or twice the percentage of identifications made at the beginning of the last decade.⁷

⁷ "Annual Report of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Dept. of Justice, July 1, 1940, to June 30, 1941" (n.d.). (Multigraphed.)

Federal and state prisoners.—The growth of the federal criminal law in the last ten years has resulted in an increase in federal prosecutions, convictions, and imprisonments. In 1930, 9,866 persons were committed to federal prisons, reformatories, and camps, while in 1939, 11,989 were so committed, and the daily average population rose from 11,250 to 15,950. In 1930, 66,117 prisoners were received from courts by state prisons and reformatories (excluding Alabama, District of Columbia, Georgia, Idaho, and Delaware), while in 1939, 62,086 admissions were recorded (excluding Alabama and Georgia), indicating a decline in state commitments. This is understandable when one considers the fall in rates given in preceding tables.⁸

Crime and the war.—We are entering a period which criminologists are likely to watch with interest. What effect will the war in which we are engaged have upon the criminality of the nation? We may have to wait for some time to answer that question, but in the meanwhile we shall have the opportunity to gather information for later analysis. New criminal laws will spring into being, there will be great displacements in population groups, men in the ages that have the highest crime rates will be placed under military discipline, family incomes will rise as industry goes into high gear. These are but a few of the outstanding and broad events that have already begun to happen, and their importance for criminological research is self-evident. And beyond the war there lie in wait for us the tribulations of a period of demobilization and economic dislocations, the character of which can only be imagined at this time, but which are bound to offer plenty of laboratory material for the criminologist. That is a prediction which can be safely made without being accused of crystal-gazing.

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⁸ Annual reports on *Prisoners* (U.S. Bureau of the Census) for the years mentioned.

COMMUNICATIONS¹

DOUGLAS WAPLES

ABSTRACT

The most widely diffused communications have probably tended to retard rather than to accelerate social change. It would also appear that the most general effect of communications upon public opinion has been the reinforcement of already existing opinions. Recently all mediums of communication have been co-ordinated as weapons of total war. Such co-ordination is likely to produce hitherto unobtainable evidence concerning the social effects of communications and to improve present methods of analysis.

"Who communicates what to whom by what medium, under what conditions, and with what effects?" Reliable answers to this complex question at regular time intervals would greatly clarify the process of social change via communications and would simplify predictions of impending changes. Since the evidence fails to meet the question, we must restrict the topic. To this end three simpler questions are proposed: "What changes are recorded in the annual production and distribution of public communications?" "What other developments have affected the character of public communications?" and "To what extent have public communications tended to accelerate or retard other social changes?"

I. PRODUCTION AND DISTRIBUTION


Figure 1 shows changes in the annual number of copyrights. In general, the number of copyrighted items has increased since 1930 some 2 per cent for *all* printed matter and some 3 per cent for the United States output in books, magazines, pamphlets, and newspapers. The lows occur in the depression years, when publication fell off generally.² The number of different books and periodicals decreased and pamphlets increased. It is unfortunate that we cannot yet report changes in volume of production since 1937.³

¹ Hans Muller, Graduate Library School, University of Chicago, did most of the work on this article, short of writing it, and his help is gratefully acknowledged.

² See Douglas Waples, *People and Print* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938), pp. 83 ff.

³ The indispensable source of information on annual number of copies produced is the *Biennial Census of Manufacturers* (Washington: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census), which has yet to report for the years after 1937. For years prior to 1935 see Waples, *op. cit.*

Books.—Table 1 shows the relative frequency of new titles in a few selected classifications. Sociology and economics, history, science and medicine, and fine arts and music made notable gains.



* This and the following figures were drawn on semilogarithmic grids.

Games and sports and juveniles made slight gains. Fiction, philosophy and religion, travel and geography, and poetry and drama declined. The over-all increase in social science books (excepting the year 1936) is outstanding (see also Fig. 3). Much of the increase in the "All others" category is explained by new books on "technology." Figure 2 shows a curve for public library circulation which varies inversely with a curve of books sold.

Magazines.—Table 2 shows the annual circulation of eighteen magazines chosen arbitrarily to represent different subject matters, classes of readers, and price levels.

TABLE 1*
NUMBER OF NEW BOOK TITLES BY SUBJECT CATEGORIES
UNITED STATES, 1929-40

SUBJECT CATEGORY	NEW TITLES											
	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940
Fiction.....	1,340	1,348	1,272	1,384	1,317	1,356	1,362	1,327	1,355	1,217	1,133	1,221
Sociology and economics....	450	472	580	610	573	622	616	489	693	758	773	796
Fine arts and music.....	154	265	277	230	254	198	258	323	355	358	373	328
Games and sports.....	114	123	156	174	147	110	152	219	204	193	190	156
History.....	380	386	421	420	434	433	359	667	863	776	708	783
Philosophy and religion.....	1,021	1,029	1,009	940	782	765	690	701	805	879	760	880
Juvenile.....	788	771	873	579	523	466	532	701	853	895	830	852
Biography.....	667	699	699	603	506	435	471	626	596	604	557	569
Travel and geography.....	313	314	287	234	213	220	174	284	280	317	296	262
Science and medicine.....	685	607	686	619	556	578	527	662	720	716	729	724
Poetry and drama.....	1,065	1,027	1,049	831	684	785	845	679	673	698	584	671
All others.....	1,265	1,093	1,197	968	823	820	928	1,816	1,786	2,056	2,082	2,273
Total.....	8,242	8,134	8,506	7,556	6,812	6,788	6,914	8,584	9,273	9,464	9,015	9,515

* Source: *Publishers' Weekly*.

TABLE 2*
CIRCULATION OF SELECTED MAGAZINES
(By Thousands)


Magazine	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940
True Story.....	2,167	2,127	2,110	2,015	1,597	1,655	1,706	1,896	2,135	2,268	2,159	2,005
Collier's.....	1,643	1,967	2,257	2,330	2,167	2,173	2,327	2,416	2,535	2,620	2,625	2,745
Good Housekeeping.....	1,642	1,742	1,767	1,893	1,888	1,916	1,970	2,154	2,166	2,143	2,205	2,276
Street and Smith (combined titles).....	1,205	1,166	1,148	1,011	944	959	1,210	1,092	1,058	959	998	934
National Geographic.....	1,184	1,245	1,291	1,244	1,114	977	922	1,012	1,114	1,155	1,104	1,100
Capper's Farmer.....	846	879	927	995	979	934	929	1,036	1,071	1,075	1,135	1,168
Messenger of the Sacred Heart.....	333	330	329	326	313	292	264	266	261	263	256	254
Popular Science.....	325	361	361	370	336	369	405	417	423	459	455	624
Nation's Business.....	269	305	313	306	280	256	248	269	276	287	306	324
Christian Herald.....	214	219	216	220	218	190	200	201	205	224	253	253
Time.....	180	225	300	356	402	429	453	544	617	670	766	760
Harper's Magazine.....	121	121	121	119	108	100	103	102	104	102	101	110
New Yorker.....	69	76	99	121	114	115	121	128	133	135	134	144
New Republic.....	25	12	25	25	25	25	25	25	25	27	27	28
Life.....	1,006	1,892	2,382
Modern Screen.....	658	561	475	474	486	519	562	638	633
Esquire.....	138	230	426	577	568	469
Fortune.....	48	58	76	94	117	138	146	137	142

* Source: N. W. Ayer & Son, *Directory of Newspapers and Periodicals*.

Newspapers.—Financial difficulties and mergers of daily newspapers continue to diminish the total number published. The 2,042 of 1920 had shrunk to 1,878 in 1940. The loss of advertising revenue, in 1933 produced the low of 1,911 in that year. Thereafter the num-

ber rose in 1937 to 1,993, the largest number recorded since the year 1926. The year 1940 saw 115 fewer newspapers than the year 1937.

Newspaper circulation is, of course, another matter (see Fig. 4). Since 1920 the total circulation of the English-language dailies rose




from twenty-seven to forty-one millions. The increase has been steady except for a sag of some four million during the depression years 1931-35. The year 1936 topped the year 1930 by 700,000 and the following year produced an all-time peak of nearly forty-one

and a half million copies. The upswing since the war year 1939 will doubtless continue for the visible future.

In contrast to the dailies, there were as many Sunday newspapers at the end of the two decades as at the beginning. Their circulation also increased.

Figure 5 shows the production of photoplays and other films. The approaching war apparently helped the press and hurt the films (see Figs. 5, 6, 7, and 8). The Hays office estimates of attendance (Fig. 6) are probably too high, judging from Gallup's independent check, so the recent decline may be greater than the figures show.



Radio.—The number of homes with radio sets (Fig. 9) is cumulative and is interesting to compare, in the same figure, with the graph of sets sold. The number of broadcasting stations (Fig. 10) shows a slight decline during depression, a strong recovery, and a spurt thereafter—as compared with the typical curves for print and films.

Telephone and telegraph.—Figure 11 shows that the number of telephones in service did not regain the 1930 figure until 1937; since then it has continued to rise. The number of phone conversations per capita did not equal the 1929 figure until 1939. Telegrams in 1939 were still some 20 per cent below their number in 1929.

Mail.—Figure 12 shows that the volume of mail is still rising from depression and has not yet returned to the pre-depression status.

Comment.—The figures probably represent the best available data that are comparable from year to year, yet they are not directly relevant to the social aspects in which our primary interest lies. One should therefore analyze each trend line (newspaper circulation, for example) in terms of its probable relations to whatever conditions might explain or might be explained by the changes in newspaper circulation. Such analysis is omitted from this article for lack of space.⁴ Another procedure is to supplement the trend lines by reporting other developments which more clearly disclose the social implications. A third procedure is to make certain generalizations from relevant research and observation.

II. OTHER RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

*Books.*⁵—Legislation during the decade tended to help the production and distribution of books. In 1934 the publishers' fears of the censor were relieved when Judge Woolsey's opinion, in the United States District Court of Southern New York, freed James Joyce's *Ulysses* for publication in the United States.

In 1937 certain fair-trade practices were recognized by state and federal law whereby publishers might establish uniform book prices by contract over the entire country.

Since high prices are often cited as a major reason for the American book publishers' difficulties, it is noteworthy that the sales of ten-cent books are estimated at some sixty million annually. The twenty-five-cent book (pocket-book edition *et al.*) has found a good market during the decade, thanks to its promotion by the chain stores.

The book clubs are another phenomenon of the decade. Their number has mounted rapidly. At present writing one club distributes 175,000 volumes per month.

In 1939 the British Parliament exempted books from luxury taxes and provided shipping space for paper, thus recognizing books as a necessity in time of war.

⁴ The omission is not serious because (1) an equivalent is supplied, (2) the data contained in the graphs invite economic interpretations primarily, (3) the other mediums are fairly consistent with printed communications, and (4) the analysis of printed communications published in 1938 as *Social Aspects of Reading in the Depression* (also as *People and Print* [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938]) does not yet require substantial revision.

⁵ For this section the writer is largely indebted to Frederick C. Melcher, co-editor of the *Publishers' Weekly*.

*Magazines.*⁶—The magazine business, as distinguished from the magazine as a medium of communication, has, like other businesses, been affected by recent legislation.

The repeal of the prohibition amendment produced a new source of revenue for magazines. During 1940 alcoholic beverages spent \$19,533,136 for advertising. Of this sum, magazines received \$8,354,048. This amount is 5.54 per cent of the advertising receipts by all magazines and, of course, a much higher percentage for magazines accepting liquor advertisements.

Partly offsetting this gain is the regulation of financial advertising by the Securities Exchange Commission and the regulation of other advertising by specific acts, e.g., the Wheeler-Lea Act of 1938, the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, and the Wool Labeling Act of 1941. Magazine advertising was affected by the loss of some advertising and by the increased cost of advertising routine. Legislation is now pending to maintain consumer standards in chain stores, to tax advertisements, and to prescribe a general censorship of copy.⁷

The decade produced the picture magazine and the comics magazines, each of which is thriving. Advances were made in the mechanical processes of magazine printing (e.g., four colors can now be printed without a drying period).

Newspapers.—Recent changes in the newspaper are admirably reported in *The Press in the Contemporary Scene*.⁸ In general, developments since 1929 have probably burdened the newspaper as a business but increased its social importance.

Circulation and readership steadily gained. Another trend is toward more highly specialized treatment of subjects like science, labor, agriculture, international events, and public affairs. A third tendency is toward a wider variety of news. Closely related is the tendency toward fuller reporting of *news* from the "other" side of political and social issues on which the newspaper has taken a definite editorial stand.

Developments tending to aggravate the newspaper's financial

⁶ For the facts in this section thanks are due Dr. Lockley, of the Curtis Publishing Co.

⁷ *Printers' Ink Monthly*, October, 1941, pp. 32 f.

⁸ Edited by Malcolm M. Willey and Ralph D. Casey ("Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science" [Philadelphia, January, 1942]). Dr. Casey, at the writer's request, suggested the developments here mentioned.

troubles are found in recent legislation,⁹ in the unionizing of editorial and business-office employees, and in social security taxes and other new expenses. The years ahead are likely to bring additional difficulties by reducing advertising revenue from certain sources (e.g., the automobile industry) and by stiffer priority regulations.

Films.—The motion-picture industry mastered the sound film in 1932, which doubtless smoothed the depression years. The two years following were troubled in labor disputes (1933) and by the Legion of Decency and other crusaders for cleaner films (1934). Less stimulating in its box-office effects than the sound film was the natural-color film introduced in 1934.

In 1936 Germany banned many American films. In 1940 eleven nations were closed completely to American films, and revenues from Great Britain had sharply decreased. The shrinkage in gross revenue amounted to about 40 per cent. To offset this loss, great efforts were made to expand the Latin-American market. The importation of foreign films declined during the year.

In 1939 the United States Senate passed the anti-block-booking bill, thus entering a wedge between the producer and exhibitor and weakening the producers strangle hold upon the film as a medium of public communication. The bill was shelved thereafter by the so-called "consent decree" of 1940. By the terms of this decree five large producers agreed to sell pictures in blocks of five, instead of fifty as heretofore, to force no shorts or newsreels with the sale of blocks, and to allow the exhibitor to see the pictures before buying.

Also during 1940 Hollywood overcame its former timidity toward social criticism by releasing *The Grapes of Wrath*, without pulling many of Steinbeck's punches. To the industry's astonishment the picture became a "best seller." The year 1940 likewise produced far more outspoken criticism of the Nazi and communist regimes than earlier films had dared. One result was a congressional investigation, which was dropped when the United States declared war.

*Radio.*¹⁰—Technical developments in radio during the decade were numerous. Frequency modulation was launched on regular program schedules in 1941, and color television was developed.

Broadcasting, represented by N.B.C. and C.B.S., has challenged

⁹ See Frederick S. Siebert, "Legal Developments Affecting the Press," in *ibid.*

¹⁰ Thanks for criticism of these notes are due to William C. Ackerman, director of Reference Library, Columbia Broadcasting System.

the Federal Communications Commission's authority to impose its 1941 network regulations. Bills have also been introduced in the United States Senate (White, 1941) and in the House (Sanders, 1941) to define F.C.C. authority more precisely.

Following our declaration of war, broadcasting entered a new and highly critical phase. It is notable that American radio has not yet lost advertising revenue and has managed to continue its round-the-world news pickups, presentation of commentators and analysts, and other services as a news medium.

American short-wave radio has expanded both in broadcasts to Latin America and in programs beamed to Europe as counter-propaganda.

III. GENERALIZATIONS

The foregoing discussion comes painfully short of what a sociologist should expect to learn from a student of communications. He should expect to learn the relation between noteworthy social changes and the changes which public communications advocate. To what extent are changes in the content and diffusion of public communications related to changes in social organization and social institutions?

The first sentence of this article contains a short list of the questions to be answered before such relationships can be known. The relationships will remain obscure until we systematically record the facts to meet the questions. Thanks to the federal agencies now at work in the area of public communications and public opinion, more relevant data will almost certainly be recorded for the war years at least, and possibly thereafter.

Meanwhile we may conclude with a few generalizations which recent studies¹¹ have shown to be highly plausible but which strongly invite more research. Each at least represents a point-blank shot at our target.

1. Recent studies have validated methods to distinguish communications tending to initiate and accelerate particular social changes from communications tending to block such changes.¹²

¹¹ Summarized for the most part in Douglas Waples (ed.), *Print, Radio, and Film in a Democracy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942). An abstract of the volume will be found in "Print, Radio, and Film in the National Emergency," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, September, 1941, pp. 463-69.

¹² P. F. Lazarsfeld, *Radio and the Printed Page* (New York: Duell, Sloan & Pearce, 1940); also *How Voters Make Up Their Minds* (in preparation).

2. The most popular, and hence the most widely diffused, communications have tended rather to retard than to accelerate social

TABLE 3*
BOOKS, PAMPHLETS, AND MAPS PUBLISHED BY CLASS
AND NUMBER OF COPIES, 1929-39
(In Thousands)

	1939	1937	1935	1933	1931	1929
<i>Aggregate</i>	546,529	518,074	345,822	258,948	370,515	430,199
Books, total.....	182,319	197,359	140,651	110,789	154,461	214,334
Agriculture and related subjects.....	1,018	1,034	177	131	276	688
Bibles and Testaments:*†						
Whole Bibles.....	2,550					
Testaments.....	1,276					
Parts of Bibles (not whole Testaments).....	3,361	5,579	591	666	1,376	4,829
Undistributed.....	865					
Biography.....	2,384	2,754	2,575	1,449	2,175	2,714
Fiction.....	14,811	25,454	15,239	11,527	19,248	26,880
Fine arts.....	590	694	165	335	723	1,133
History.....	2,306	1,238	673	831	1,192	1,950
Juvenile.....	34,828	29,336	23,170	22,346	23,189	36,885
Law.....	2,356	2,488	1,874	1,812	1,962	2,942
Medicine.....	1,868	3,923	1,241	674	1,440	1,932
Music (musical notation).....	5,682	6,722	†	†	†	†
Poetry and drama.....	1,499	1,788	2,267	1,989	2,589	4,048
Religion and philosophy.....	6,623	6,944	6,047	6,764	11,803	12,796
Science and technology.....	3,432	2,380	1,937	1,611	1,818	2,294
Sociology and economics.....	886	1,156	1,013	1,113	620	1,052
Textbooks (for school use).....	63,274	72,771	69,180	48,070	65,292	80,189
Travel and geography.....	1,482	1,641	1,435	885	1,305	1,725
Reference.....	6,726	3,841	†	†	†	†
Miscellaneous.....	16,767	23,367	11,316	7,805	11,865	•
Bluebooks, directories, catalogues, etc.....	7,724	4,280	1,744	2,174	4,276	32,270
Not reported by class.....				599	3,300	
Pamphlets, total.....	209,901	216,847	194,609	143,487	216,054	215,865
Juvenile.....	25,333	13,528	13,823	5,324	7,692	8,273
Texts (for school use).....	57,922	57,004	35,611	14,995	24,706	39,696
All other.....	216,525	146,313	145,174	123,167	183,654	167,895
Maps, atlases, and globe covers.....	64,329	103,867	10,561	4,671	†	†

* Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *Newspapers, Periodicals, and Books* (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1941).

† Bibles and Testaments which are printed abroad for foreign distribution by American concerns are not included.

‡ No data available.

change.¹³ This assumption contradicts the positive relation which Burgess suggested in this *Journal* (XXXIV, 117-20) between the multiplication of communication facilities and the rate of other social changes.

3. The most conspicuous effect of communications upon public opinions toward controversial issues is a reinforcement of existing opinions.¹⁴ The present tendency to identify "communication" and "education" is thus a source of serious confusion. One result is a widespread and somewhat hysterical notion that propaganda is omnipotent—a notion which the press agents and public relations counsels have naturally encouraged. The most relevant and competent studies of the various mediums have, in general, minimized the social effects of propaganda, except when it coincides with strong predispositions and is made convincing by the short-run trend of current events.¹⁵ Mr. Goebbels has had both in his favor.

4. Says Pelham Barr: "The outstanding development in the last ten years (perhaps since the Russian Revolution) is the rediscovery and large-scale use of the boot and the truncheon, the torture chamber and the firing squad as the most effective mediums of public communications."¹⁶ Closely allied is the Nazi use of horror films to scare neutrals.

5. Probably the outstanding "change" in public communications is the co-ordination of all mediums as weapons of total war. The topics which deserve reporting include censorship, voluntary and otherwise; the "monitoring" and analysis of foreign short-wave broadcasts; the formulation and broadcasting of counterpropaganda to enemy states; the methodical analysis of the United States foreign-language press; and the systematic use of polling and other means of communicating public opinions to government officials. This last represents an expression of hitherto inarticulate public opinions which are bringing new influences to bear upon social change.

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¹³ Douglas Waples, Bernard Berelson, and F. R. Bradshaw, *What Reading Does to People* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1940); see also Lazarsfeld, "The Effect of Radio on Public Opinion," in *Print, Radio, and Film in a Democracy*.

¹⁴ *Print, Radio, and Film in a Democracy*.

¹⁵ *Ibid.* Especially chapters by Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and Slesinger.

¹⁶ Personal correspondence.

LOW-INCOME CLASSES

R. CLYDE WHITE

ABSTRACT

More than half of the families and single individuals in this country in the middle 1930's received incomes which, on the average, were insufficient to pay costs of living. Large families in the low-income group present a more serious social problem than small families. The present federal administration has attempted to put labor in a stronger bargaining position so that it could get a larger share of the national income, and a number of social security measures have been adopted to cushion the shock of the more common social hazards. A start has been made toward the provision of better housing for the masses. On the whole, the decade of the 1930's marks an improvement in the conditions of life of the low-income classes.

The President of the United States said in the middle 1930's that one-third of the nation was "ill-fed, ill-clothed and ill-housed." Was this a mere campaign phrase, or was there factual evidence to support it? Who are the lower-income classes? How do they spend their income? What has been done to raise their standard of living? It is the purpose of this paper to assemble some of the existing evidence necessary to answer these questions.

The National Resources Committee reported that, on the average, those with family incomes of less than \$1,250 a year and individual incomes of less than \$1,000 a year usually show an annual deficit, while those with incomes above this point break even or have a surplus.¹ In his study of the cost of living in the District of Columbia in 1916 Ogburn found that \$1,155 was the dividing-line between family deficit and surplus.² Families and individuals whose incomes are higher than those amounts, however, are by no means secure in their accustomed standard of living.

INCOME AND EXPENDITURES

The data on income and expenditures used here are taken chiefly from the reports of the National Resources Committee. It estimated that in 1935-36 the consumer units of the country consisted

¹ National Resources Committee, *Consumer Expenditures in the United States* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1939), pp. 20 and 32. Hereafter referred to as *CEUS*.

² William F. Ogburn, "Analysis of the Standard of Living in the District of Columbia in 1916," *Quarterly Publications of the American Statistical Association*, June, 1919, p. 6.

of 29,400,300 families and 10,058,000 single individuals. For its own purposes the Committee defined income as "the total net money income received during the year by all members of the economic family, plus the value of certain non-money income."³ Income from the sale of capital assets, inheritances other than cash, soldiers' bonus, and borrowings is excluded. By this definition the national income in 1935-36 was about \$60,000,000,000. Quartile and median incomes are shown in Table 1. More than half of the families and single individuals are in the lower-income class or deficit group.

TABLE 1
QUARTILE AND MEDIAN INCOMES, 1935-36

Measure	Family Income*	Single Individual Income†
First quartile.....	\$ 697.50	\$ 495.00
Median.....	1,157.50	832.50
Third quartile.....	1,782.50	1,347.50

* Computed from National Resources Committee, *Family Expenditures in the United States* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1939), Table 74, p. 25. Hereafter referred to as *FEUS*.

† Computed from National Resources Committee, *Consumer Expenditures in the United States* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1939), Table 3, p. 32.

The pattern of consumer expenditures is related to the amount of annual income. The percentage of income spent for food declines with rising income; remains fairly constant for housing; increases for clothing, automobile, recreation, and education. Proportions spent for medical care and personal care change little.⁴ Food, clothing, and shelter are primary necessities. Table 2 compares the proportions of family incomes used for these items. The lower-income classes spend large proportions of their income for food, while families with higher incomes spend proportionately more for clothing. If the mid-values of income classes are correlated with the percentage of income used for food, the coefficient is $-.848$. Using similar data for two hundred family budgets in the District of Columbia for 1916, Ogburn found a coefficient of $-.513$.⁵ In the consumer's study of 1935-36 the coef-

³ *CEUS*, p. 99.

⁴ National Resources Committee, *Federal Expenditures in the United States* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1939), Table 109, p. 38.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 5.

ficient of correlation for percentages of the budget used for food and for clothing is $-.976$. When income is too low to permit the purchase of both food and clothing, food is bought, and clothing purchases are postponed. The proportion of family expenditures going for housing and household operation changes little with rising income.

If the national income increases and the increase is distributed in the same way to the various income groups as the national income in 1935-36, how would it affect family expenditures? The National Re-

TABLE 2*
PERCENTAGE OF FAMILY INCOME USED FOR FOOD, HOUSING
HOUSEHOLD OPERATION, AND CLOTHING IN
SELECTED INCOME CLASSES

INCOME CLASS	PERCENTAGE OF EXPENDITURES FOR				
	Total	Food	Housing	House- hold Opera- tion	Clothing
\$ 500-\$ 750.....	81.4	43.8	17.7	12.0	7.9
1,250- 1,500.....	75.0	36.9	17.5	11.3	9.3
1,750- 2,000.....	71.7	33.1	17.9	11.0	9.7
2,500- 3,000.....	70.0	30.0	17.6	11.3	11.1
10,000- 15,000.....	65.7	19.9	19.7	12.5	13.6

* FEUS, Table 109, p. 38.

sources Committee made some estimates based upon this assumption. They found that an increase of \$10,000,000,000 would raise all family incomes enough to eliminate the class receiving \$250 or less a year, and, if \$20,000,000,000 were added, there would be no incomes of less than \$500. That would mean higher percentages of income spent for clothing and the secondary items of the family budget.⁶ If the increase of \$10,000,000,000 were distributed only to the lowest-income groups rather than according to the actual distribution in 1935-36, there would be no incomes of less than \$750; and, if \$20,000,000,000 were so distributed, there would be no incomes of less than \$1,250.⁷ The budgets of both families and single individuals were included in these hypothetical redistributions of income. The distribution of \$20,000,000,000 in this manner would result in the

⁶ CEUS, p. 173.

⁷ *Ibid.*

elimination of all deficit incomes. To achieve this end it is necessary to assume that the cost of living and the consumption pattern would remain constant and that provision would be made for compensation in lieu of earned income when any of the common hazards is encountered.

The size of the family influences the pattern of consumption. Large families are compelled to spend relatively more for clothing than small ones, and that necessitates reduction in other items.

TABLE 3*
PERCENTAGE OF FAMILY INCOME USED FOR SPECIFIED ITEMS
BY INCOME CLASS AND SIZE OF FAMILY

INCOME CLASS AND SIZE OF FAMILY	PERCENTAGE OF INCOME FOR				
	Food	Housing	House- hold Opera- tion	Clothing	Auto- mobile
\$750-\$1,000:					
2 persons.....	36.8	21.9	12.7	6.9	5.9
3-6 persons.....	45.3	17.2	12.1	9.4	5.1
7 or more persons...	57.6	9.9	9.1	10.6	5.0
\$2,500-\$3,000:					
2 persons.....	20.3	15.8	9.4	7.8	9.9
3-6 persons.....	26.0	14.9	9.8	9.6	8.6
7 or more persons...	33.9	11.7	8.5	10.7	7.5

* FEUS, p. 99.

Table 3 indicates the influence of size of family on expenditures for two income classes. When the size of the family increases, the percentage of income used for food and clothing goes up but decreases for shelter and automobile. However, the proportions spent for food and clothing do not increase in proportion to the size of the family. Large families on low incomes are deprived of primary necessities. The most notable deprivation appears to be housing: they live in either overcrowded dwellings or substandard dwellings or both to save rent. The higher-income class shown in Table 3 reduced the percentage used for housing as the size of the family increased; and, when the size of the family increased more than 200 per cent, the portion of income spent for food went up about 50 per cent and for clothing about the same. Because of the importance of the size of

the family, the general averages in Table 2 have diminished significance. In any plan to raise the standard of living of the lower-income classes public policy has to take into account the varying size of the consumer unit.⁸

COMMON SOCIAL HAZARDS

The common social hazards bear down with unusual force upon the lower-income classes. Chief among these hazards are illness, accident, invalidity, old age, widowhood, orphanage, and unemployment. Self-employed persons, such as farmers and small business-people, are exposed to special economic hazards consequent upon reduced demand for goods and shifts in the price level. Regressive taxation may penalize those with low incomes. When one of the hazards is encountered, it involves loss of income in whole or in part or necessitates extraordinary expenditures. Some of them involve both of these burdens. When this occurs, the physical health, morale, and working capacity or potential working capacity of the individual are threatened.

Some data exist to indicate the importance of these problems to the nation. The National Health Survey in 1935-36 showed that mean disability per year for persons on relief was 17.4 days and for nonrelief families with incomes of less than \$1,000 annual income, 10.9 days, but for families with incomes between \$2,000 and \$3,000 it was only 6.9 days.⁹ A large proportion of the 1,500,000 invalids in the country belong to the lower-income classes.¹⁰ For the lower-income classes old age has been a growing problem because of the reduced age of occupational superannuation. More than 2,000,000 persons past the age of sixty-five have qualified for old age assistance on a needs basis. How many more have inadequate means of maintaining a subsistence standard of living is not known, and the number who are supported by children or relatives who must share their poverty rather than their affluence is likewise unknown, but the numbers are large. The number of widows and children of deceased

⁸ R. E. Montgomery in his paper on "Labor" in this issue of the *Journal* states that there has been a significant rise in real wages, indicating that more income is being distributed to the lower-income classes.

⁹ *Preliminary Reports* ("Sickness and Medical Care Ser.," Bull. 9 [Washington, D.C.: U.S. Public Health Service, 1938], p. 1.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, Bull. 6, p. 6.

wage-earners, is also a serious problem. These may amount to as many as the dependent aged.

The last major hazard, unemployment, is always a current problem for large numbers of the population, but it is most important in time of business depression. The percentage of gainful workers unemployed and seeking work has varied since World War I from about 4 per cent in the middle 1920's to 34 per cent in 1932.¹¹

SOCIAL SECURITY MEASURES

It is obvious that the social hazards mentioned threaten the lower-income classes more than they do others. It was to provide the means of mitigating the effects of these hazards that Franklin D. Roosevelt early in his first administration secured the enactment of a variety of social legislation. Prior to this epoch-making legislation the chief means of protecting the lower-income classes from the common hazards consisted of local relief under the poor laws, certain poor law institutions, workmen's compensation, limited old age assistance and mother's aid, free clinics and hospitals, and aid given by private relief agencies. State participation in a general social service program was for the most part restricted to the workmen's compensation agencies and the maintenance of eleemosynary, penal, and correctional institutions. Except for a prison system, a few miscellaneous eleemosynary institutions, and workmen's compensation for federal employees, dock workers, and the workers of the District of Columbia, the federal government had no legal obligations for the social security of the nation. The initiative for social legislation after March 4, 1933, came from the federal government, but the states, following federal leadership, played an important role in the total program.

The first action of the federal government to relieve the distress of the unemployed occurred in 1932, when the "Emergency Relief and Construction Act of 1932" was approved by the President.¹² On May 12, 1933, President Roosevelt approved the "Federal Emergency Relief Act of 1933."¹³ This legislation was followed by the several work

¹¹ Social Security Board, *Social Security in America* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1937), pp. 56 and 58.

¹² *U.S. Statutes at Large* (72d Cong., 1st sess.).

¹³ *Ibid.* (73d Cong., 1st sess.).

programs. Prior to 1935 all the federal action was directed to relief of immediate distress. In the spring of 1935 the act creating the Works Progress Administration was passed. The policy of the W.P.A. was to pay going rates of wages for work done but to limit the amount which a worker could earn in a week or month to a so-called "security wage," an amount intended to be sufficient to maintain minimum subsistence.

When the President approved the Social Security Act on August 14, 1935, the federal government had taken its major step toward providing regular, permanent protection to the standard of living of the lower-income classes. This act created the categories of public assistance, certain special services, and a broad plan of social insurance. An amendment to the act in 1939 provided for survivors' insurance. The survivors include children, widows, wives, and dependent parents. The various forms of public assistance are financed jointly by the federal and the state governments, and the recipients must meet a needs test which is defined and applied by the state agencies. The special-service provisions of the act authorize the payment of certain costs of nonmaterial services. Unemployment compensation is administered by the states but with federal participation. The federal government administers the general Old Age and Survivors Insurance Title of the act and also the Railroad Retirement Act and the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act for railroad workers.

The aim of public assistance is to prevent physical suffering after the recipient has exhausted all his resources. The aim of social insurance is to provide income in lieu of wages or salary and, therefore, to prevent destitution. By supporting the purchasing power of the community, the social-insurance benefits tend to check further unemployment. The special services are intended to restore or maintain the social-economic efficiency of the individual or to prevent conditions which destroy or reduce this efficiency.

The adequacy of payments under the different assistance and insurance schemes to assure a standard of living compatible with decency and health is debatable. The workmen's compensation and unemployment compensation laws usually do not provide for allowances to dependents, except in the case of fatalities under workmen's compensation. Hence, if a worker is injured or unemployed, the ade-

quacy of the cash benefit depends upon the number of dependents he has. In other countries it is common to allow additional benefits for the wife and children of a worker who is injured or unemployed on the theory that the health and welfare of the entire family are a proper concern of the nation. Benefits under the old age and survivors' insurance scheme are not sufficient at present without other resources to meet any test of adequacy except in a small number of cases, but benefits under this scheme will improve as workers have longer periods of insured employment. Because the Railroad Retirement Act takes into account employment from 1924 onward and because the scale is higher than under the general scheme created by the Social Security Act, the benefits under this act are much more adequate. Statistics of public assistance do not indicate the adequacy of payments under any of its forms, because the amount paid is based upon some kind of a budget, deemed to be more or less adequate to maintain health, and the assistance payment may be only a small amount to supplement income from other sources. Insurance benefits may take the place of assistance payments, or they may be simply additions to the existing purchasing power of the beneficiary. The general adequacy of the benefit formulas of the several laws is not yet determined, but in the case of large families they are insufficient.

The relative importance of assistance and insurance payments in the country is shown in Table 4. The striking thing about this table is the steady growth, barring 1933 and 1934, of "social insurance and related payments." They represent a substantial permanent source of additional purchasing power for the lower-income classes.

Minimum-wage legislation is another means of putting a floor under the standard of living. Prior to the decade of the 1930's the minimum-wage laws which had been upheld by the courts concerned chiefly women and children. The courts had frowned upon general minimum-wage legislation, but in the case of *West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish* in 1937 the United States Supreme Court reversed its position and sustained the Washington law. This action stimulated state legislation. By 1940 minimum-wage laws existed in twenty-six states.¹⁴ An effort was made by the federal government to establish

¹⁴ John B. Andrews, "Labor Legislation and Administration," *Social Work Year Book* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1941), p. 297.

minimum wages under the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, but without success. But in 1938 the Fair Labor Standards Act was passed and has been in operation since then. This type of legislation regulates maximum hours of work and minimum hourly rates of pay, but it does not assure a minimum standard of living, because annual income determines this.

TABLE 4*
ANNUAL PAYMENTS FOR WORK RELIEF, DIRECT RELIEF, INSUR-
ANCE AND RELATED SERVICES, AND
VETERANS' BONUS, 1929-40
(In Millions)

Year	Work Relief	Direct Relief	Social Insur- ance and Related Payments	Veterans' Bonus
1929.....	\$ 0	\$ 60	\$ 779	\$ 0
1930.....	4	94	827	0
1931.....	59	158	920	907
1932.....	132	326	940	147
1933.....	656	580	826	54
1934.....	1,387	828	765	26
1935.....	1,329	1,099	835	19
1936.....	2,155	672	856	1,427
1937.....	1,639	837	917	128
1938.....	2,094	1,008	1,426	58
1939.....	1,870	1,070	1,505	34
1940.....	1,577	1,096	1,688	29

* *Social Security Bulletin* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, August, 1941), pp. 74-76.

One of the primary items in the consumer's budget is housing. If 2 per cent of annual income is regarded as the maximum monthly amount which a family should spend for housing, then over half the families in the country have to live in houses which rent for less than \$25 a month or carry amortization charges of not more than \$25. The government public housing program has provided an illustration of low-rent subsidized housing. By the end of 1940 this program had resulted in 118,045 dwellings finished or under construction.¹⁵ This program has been under way for six years. In 1938 about 350,000 dwelling units were constructed in the country, and of these about 3.8 per cent were in the rental range of families with incomes of

¹⁵ *Housing Yearbook 1941* (Chicago: National Association of Housing Officials, 1941) p. 226.

\$1,500 a year or less.¹⁶ Public housing is one attack on the problem of low-rent housing, but it must be supplemented with a vast program of private construction with money provided at low interest rates, perhaps 2 per cent.

It has been widely assumed that the lower-income classes have been relieved of heavy taxation. This is largely true in so far as taxes levied by local governmental units are concerned. About 90 per cent of local revenue comes from property taxes, and the lower-income classes pay very little. The states attempted to relieve real property

TABLE 5*
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF FEDERAL REVENUE
BY SOURCE IN 1930, 1935, AND 1940

YEAR	PERCENTAGE OF REVENUE FROM			
	Total	Customs	Income and Profits	Miscellaneous
1930.....	100.0	16.1	66.6	17.3
1935.....	100.0	9.5	30.4	60.1
1940.....	100.0	6.2	37.6	56.2

* *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1940* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1940), p. 167.

of some of its tax burden early in the depression, and they substituted excise and sales taxes for a large part of the lost revenue. In 1932 sales taxes accounted for 19.4 per cent of state revenues, but in 1937 this percentage had risen to 31.5. State revenues had increased from about \$2,000,000,000 to over \$4,000,000,000.¹⁷ Hence, about \$1,260,000,000 was raised from sales taxes, and this was paid by every person who purchased food, clothing, shelter, or other commodities on which the tax was levied. The lower-income classes paid their share and more. Table 5 shows the distribution of federal revenues by source. During the ten-year period total revenues increased by about \$2,000,000,000. In spite of the rise in federal income tax rates, the percentage of revenue from this source declined by half,

¹⁶ Temporary National Economic Committee (76th Cong., 3d sess.), *Toward More Housing* (Mono. No. 8 [Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1940]), pp. 24 and 25.

¹⁷ *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1940* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1940), p. 215.

whereas in 1935 and 1940 the "miscellaneous" sources produced more than three times their proportion in 1930. Miscellaneous revenue came from excise taxes, pay-roll and wage taxes, licenses to do business, numerous fees for services, and some minor taxes. The general assumption that the federal government has relieved the lower-income classes of appreciable burdens by securing a larger portion of its revenue from income and profits taxes was not a fact during the 1930's.

SUMMARY

The status and experience of the lower-income classes during the decade of 1930-40 may be summarized as follows: (1) at the middle of the decade more than half the families and single individuals received incomes which resulted in an annual consumer's deficit; (2) at the lowest point of the depression about a third of the employable population was unemployed; (3) hourly real wages in manufacturing industries increased about 19 per cent between 1935 and 1941; (4) for the first time in the history of the country the federal government took a major part in financing relief and in attempting to establish economic standards of relief which approached a subsistence level; (5) work relief and categorical assistance removed large numbers from the necessity of relief under the poor laws; (6) unemployment compensation and old age and survivors' insurance on a national scale initiated a program for preventing dependency and for supporting the purchasing power of the local community; (7) the constitutionality of general minimum-wage-and-hour legislation was established; (8) the problem of housing for the lower-income classes was attacked on a wide front, and the experiments have pointed the way toward eventual solution of the problem; (9) the growth of sales and excise taxes placed a new burden on the lower-income classes; (10) a solid floor under the standard of living eventually can be built by perfecting the social-insurance program, by more thoroughgoing efforts to solve the housing problem, and by development of means to assure a minimum annual family income.

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ABSTRACT

The most important influences upon industrial relations and labor conditions after 1930 were the great depression and changes in government policy toward labor. This article traces the history of real earnings, employment and unemployment, and hours of work after 1930; summarizes developments in government labor policy and suggests the character of the impact of these policies; and discusses the progress of unionism and developments within the organized-labor movement. After a great decline between 1929 and 1933, the purchasing power of weekly and average annual earnings turned upward, and by the early 1940's the real income of the working class as a whole seemed to have returned to the pre-depression level. Widespread unemployment and substantial reduction of standard and actual hours of work characterized the period. Government policies, expressed in statutory enactments and judicial decisions, enlarged and extended the rights of labor combinations and implemented the self-organization of the workers. Developments in the field of labor legislation and social insurance made the United States a leading, not as before a laggard, nation in these matters. The outstanding developments in the American organized-labor movement were a great growth of unionism during the years after 1935, the extension of collective bargaining to industries and trades theretofore immune to union penetration, the cleavage in the organized-labor movement, the increased importance of industrial as against craft unionism, and certain functional changes in unionism. Industrial disputes were frequent and bitter during some of the years.

Between 1930 and the formal participation, beginning late in 1941, of the United States in World War II the environmental factors of greatest importance to the American wage-earners and to the American organized-labor movement were the great depression and the changes—as expressed in both legislative enactments and judicial decisions—in government policy toward labor. A summary account of the consequences of these influences should be approached with brief reminder of the labor conditions and the character of the labor movement during the decade preceding 1930.

THE HERITAGE OF THE 1920'S

In almost every important respect the labor history of the 1920's stands out in sharp contrast to that of the years following 1930. Real earnings of the wage-earners and salaried persons in all but a few of the important categories of employment rose substantially;¹ workers able to purchase comforts and minor luxuries

¹ Cf. Paul H. Douglas, *Real Wages in the United States* (Boston, 1930), and Paul F. Brissenden, *Earnings of Factory Workers* ("Census Monograph," Vol. X [Washington, 1930]).

heretofore beyond their reach were not greatly prone to assert a right to organize and bargain through representatives of their own choosing; and employer personnel programs, predicated upon the interclass harmony hypothesis, played a larger part than ever before. In 1930 only about one nonagricultural wage-earner in every ten was a member of an independent (i.e., nonemployer-dominated) labor organization,² and trade-unionism had been unable to make headway in the great mass-production industries. With the exception of one year (1927), total trade-union membership declined during the 1920's, the estimated total for 1930 being 3,392,800 in contrast to 5,047,800 ten years earlier.³ Adverse court decisions⁴ joined with the indifference of millions of workers toward organization for self-help purposes, the structural insufficiencies of the American Federation of Labor type of unionism, and company unionism and personnel administration to stop the labor movement in its tracks. Nor was the decade one of enhanced government protection of labor. While some of the states strengthened and improved the administration of their protective legislation, the period as a whole was characterized by the absence of substantial progress in state regulation of labor conditions; and indicative of the attitude of the courts toward further extension of the police power was the decision invalidating minimum-wage legislation in 1923.⁵

WAGES, EMPLOYMENT, AND HOURS SINCE 1930

When the "permanent" prosperity of the 1920's gave way to the economic maladjustments of the 1930's, the real average annual earnings of the American wage-earners in all lines of enterprise, averaged together were at least a third greater than they had been at the turn of the century, but as business entered its downswing millions of wage-earning families suffered tragic curtailment of their

² Leo Wolman, *Ebb and Flow in Trade Unionism* (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1935), p. 116. To be exact, Professor Wolman estimated that 10.2 per cent of the nonagricultural employees were organized in 1930, as contrasted to 19.4 per cent in 1920.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 26 and 34.

⁴ Particularly in the Sherman Act cases. Cf. *Duplex Printing Co. v. Deering*, 254 U.S. 443 (1921); *Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers*, 268 U.S. 295 (1925); and *Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters Association*, 274 U.S. 37 (1927).

⁵ *Adkins v. Children's Hospital*, 261 U.S. 525.

standards of living. Between 1929 and 1933 the decline in hourly earnings kept, in the majority of employments, within the decline in the cost of living; but real weekly earnings dropped in consequence of part-time employment, and widespread unemployment reduced drastically the real income of the working class as a whole. Perhaps as much as one-third of the 1900-1930 gain in real income of the entire employed class was wiped out during the worst of the depression.⁶ After 1933 real earnings began to turn upward. By 1936 real hourly earnings in most lines of enterprise were higher than in either 1933 or 1929, and real weekly earnings were above the level of the former year; but, in consequence of the still widespread (although diminishing) unemployment, real earnings when averaged over the working class as a whole were still below those of 1929. Examination of the earnings, employment, and cost-of-living statistics since 1936 indicates, however, that average real earnings per person normally attached to industry have regained the pre-depression level. Between January, 1936, and September, 1940, the cost of living, as measured by the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, rose from 98.8 to 100.4 (1935=100),⁷ while hourly earnings advanced substantially more and fuller employment raised the earnings of the "average member" of the nation's working force.⁸ Between the autumn of 1940 and that of 1941 total factory pay rolls increased, in terms of index numbers, from 116 to 165,⁹ appreciably outdistancing the rise in the cost of living.¹⁰

⁶ These generalizations are based upon various studies and compilations of data: the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics information on earnings, the volume of employment, and the cost of living, as published in various issues of the *Monthly Labor Review*; Leo Wolman, *Wages and Hours under Codes of Fair Competition* (National Bureau of Economic Research Bull. 54 [New York, 1935]); H. A. Millis and R. E. Montgomery, *Labor's Progress and Problems* (New York, 1938), pp. 115-28; Brookings Institution, *The National Recovery Administration* (Washington, 1935); and others.

⁷ *Monthly Labor Review*, LI (December, 1940), 1556.

⁸ Division of the indices of weekly money earnings of factory workers by the index of the cost of living (both of the 1923-25 basis of 100) shows an increase in real weekly earnings from 89 in 1932 and 91 in 1933 to 116 in 1939 (*Statistical Abstract of the United States*, 1940, p. 338).

⁹ *Monthly Labor Review*, LIV (January, 1942), 252.

¹⁰ Between the outbreak of the war in Europe (late summer, 1939) and February 15, 1941, the increase in the cost of living in the larger cities of the United States was 11.8 per cent (*ibid.*, p. 143).

Unemployment was more widespread during the depression years of the early 1930's than ever before. Estimates of the American Federation of Labor and of the National Industrial Conference Board showed, respectively, that 15,653,000 and 15,439,000 persons were willing and able to work but were unable to find the opportunity to do so early in 1933. In September, 1940, the Federation estimated 8,544,000; and the Conference Board 6,696,000, persons to be unemployed. With the defense boom, employment increased rapidly and unemployment decreased; and in November, 1941, total estimated nonagricultural employment (40,711,000) was 3,183,000 greater than it had been a year earlier and 4,132,000 above the November, 1929, level.¹¹ Comparison of these figures with the 1940 census estimates of the number of persons employed or seeking employment indicates that by early 1942—although only in consequence of the pickup of employment in 1940 and 1941—unemployment had fallen almost, if not quite, to the pre-depression level.

Labor's progress in attainment of the shorter work week was, after 1930, comparable only to that of the period of World War I. In 1929, 58.6 per cent of the workers in manufactures had standard work weeks of between 44 and 54 hours, and 28.7 per cent of 54 hours or more.¹² Average full-time hours in typical industries (both manufacturing and nonmanufacturing) ranged from 44 to more than 54. The depression brought a forced experimentation with shorter hours that probably would not have been attained in many years of more normal business activity; and then, under the N.R.A. code system, 40 hours became the modal working week. These gains in an objective of organized labor that has bulked in its thinking second only to wages have for the most part been maintained. Actual hours worked averaged, during 1939 and 1940, between 39 and 40, then lengthened somewhat as the defense boom attained momentum.

GOVERNMENT POLICIES TOWARD LABOR

Government policies toward labor underwent marked change during the 1930's. These changes were of a character enlarging the privileges and extending the rights of labor combinations, on the

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 145.

¹² *Fifteenth Census of the United States*, Vol. I: *Manufactures*, p. 60.

one hand, and of establishment of direct government guaranties, on the other; and they expressed themselves in both statutory enactments and judicial decisions. In 1932, prior to the advent of the New Deal, the Norris-La Guardia Act,¹³ based upon the power of Congress to regulate the inferior federal courts and designed to achieve an enlargement of labor's permissible self-help program that the Clayton Act of 1914 had failed to achieve, was signed by the President; under its provisions so-called "yellow-dog" contracts were made unenforceable in the federal courts, the immunities from injunctions that labor had long sought were established, and the procedure of the courts in issuing injunctions in labor disputes was modified by required findings of fact so as to eliminate what had been regarded by many as gross abuse of the injunction process. As ultimately construed by the Supreme Court,¹⁴ the Norris-La Guardia immunities from injunction afforded to organized labor the freedom from judicial interference, particularly in the case of activities formerly held to interfere with interstate commerce, that the Clayton Act of 1914, as construed by the courts, had failed to provide. In its construction of the Sherman Act, also, the Supreme Court—although going to considerable length to show that it was not overruling previous decisions—in 1940 rendered a decision that in effect seemed to free organized labor from previous restrictions.¹⁵ The methods used by the union in this case were held to be irrelevant, so far as the question of interference with interstate commerce was concerned, and—of greatest importance—the Court shifted its emphasis to the restraining of competition in the market for the product as the primary test of trade-union liability.

Most important of the government policies toward labor, however, was that expressed in the National Labor Relations Act of 1935.¹⁶ This statute reiterated labor's old right—but frequently a meaningless right in view of the methods and policies to which employers might lawfully resort to negative it—to organize and bargain collectively through representatives of the workers' own choosing

¹³ 47 Stat. L. 70.

¹⁴ Cf. *Milk Drivers' Local v. Lake Valley Farm Products Inc.*, 61 Sup. Ct. 122 (1940), and *United States v. Hutcheson*, 61 Sup. Ct. 463 (1941).

¹⁵ *Apex Co. Leader, et al.*, 310 U.S. 469.

¹⁶ 49 Stat. L. 29.

and, to render the right real and dynamic, characterized as "unfair labor practices" interference, restraint, or coercion with the self-organization activities of labor on the part of employers, employer sponsorship or support of any labor organization, discrimination in hire or tenure because of union affiliation or activities, and refusal to bargain collectively. To effectuate the purposes of the Act, the administrative and quasi-judicial body, the National Labor Relations Board, was empowered to hear cases of alleged unfair labor practices and to issue (subject to court review) cease-and-desist orders, to determine the units appropriate for collective bargaining, and to assist in the self-organization of the workers by holding elections or in other ways ascertaining who were the majority choices as bargaining representatives in units appropriate for collective bargaining. The Act really became effective only when its constitutionality was sustained by the Supreme Court in 1937.¹⁷ Since that time the greater part of the operative meaning the Board has read into the broad terms of the statute has been sustained by the courts. The influence of the National Labor Relations Act in furthering labor organization and in changing the character of employment policies can hardly be overstated.

Only summary mention of the profoundly important developments in the field of social legislation and social insurance can here be made. In 1937 the Supreme Court reversed the decision of fourteen years earlier and declared that state minimum wage laws for women workers are a proper exercise of the police power;¹⁸ and in the early 1940's more than half the states had such legislation. Congress, attempting to achieve federal establishment of wage minimums in spite of the earlier invalidation of the National Industrial Recovery Act code system, in 1938 enacted the Fair Labor Standards Act,¹⁹ the wage provisions of which apply to persons employed in interstate commerce or in the production of goods for interstate commerce. The minimum hourly rate, originally 25 cents, became 30 cents after two years, and industry committees may recommend to the administrator the establishment in the particular industries

¹⁷ *National Labor Relations Board v. Jones and Laughlin*, 301 U.S. 1, and the decisions immediately following.

¹⁸ *West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish*, 300 U.S. 379.

¹⁹ 52 Stat. L. 1060.

for which they are constituted minimums higher than 30 but not above 40 cents. The statute provides that in 1945 the minimum shall become 40 cents an hour for all covered workers. Maximum hours under the Fair Labor Standards Act are now 40 a week, with overtime permitted at the time-and-a-half rate. The federal government also regulates the wages of certain groups of workers under the Public Contracts Act of 1936, the Merchant Marine Act of the same year, and the Sugar Act of 1937.

When the 1920's drew to a close, no state had compulsory unemployment insurance, and the old age pensions movement, in spite of vigorous agitation, had made comparatively little progress. During the years after 1930, however, the United States became a leading, instead of a laggard, nation in the field of social insurance. The Social Security Act of 1935,²⁰ as amended in 1939, established a 3 per cent pay-roll tax²¹ upon employers in all but a specifically exempted range of employments, with provision of a tax offset, or credit, of nine-tenths of the federal taxes when employers had paid to an approved state unemployment insurance system. As a result, all states had enacted unemployment insurance laws by the end of the 1930's.²² In attacking the problem of old age annuities, the federal government established its own system instead, as in the case of unemployment insurance, of inducing the states to do so by the tax-offset plan.²³ Pay-roll taxes which will ultimately rise to 3 per cent are imposed on both employers and employees, and benefits for which the majority of industrial wage-earners will be eligible at the age of sixty-five are dependent upon the contributions made to the

²⁰ 49 Stat. L. 620.

²¹ The 3 per cent did not become effective until 1938; during 1936 and 1937 the tax was 1 and 2 per cent, respectively.

²² Provisions with respect to employee contributions, merit rating, employer reserve funds, and other features, of course, vary among the states. The majority of the states have made their tax that of the Social Security Act (now 3 per cent of pay roll). The benefits extended to eligible unemployed workers are most frequently 50 per cent of average earnings with a maximum of \$15 a week and a minimum of half that amount.

²³ The Social Security Act also provides for grants-in-aid to the states for out-right pensions. Other provisions of the Act include aid to the states for dependent children, grants for maternal and child welfare, extensions of the scope of public health work, and grants to the states for aid to the blind.

credit of each. Dependents' and survivors' benefits are included in the Act as amended in 1939.

THE ORGANIZED-LABOR MOVEMENT

While the depression deepened, trade-union membership declined in traditional fashion.²⁴ Beginning in 1933, however, the trend reversed itself, and during the following years the organized-labor movement experienced one of the periods of greatest growth, as well as of greatest turmoil, in its history. Old organizations expanded, new ones appeared; and the great mass-production industries, immune during the 1920's to appreciable trade-union penetration, frequently found themselves forced to accept the collective-bargaining way of industrial relations. Along with the growth of unionism went the most widespread cleavage and the most bitter dissension within the ranks of organized labor in more than half a century. To an extent, also, unionism changed in functional, as well as in structural, character during these years. While not—so far as the dominant elements were concerned—permitting the traditional objectives of "business" unionism to be overshadowed by schemes for the remaking of capitalistic institutionalism, it became distinctly more militant, somewhat more politically minded, and more prone to look to the state for direct guaranties of minimum livelihood and insurance against major economic risks.

The growth of unionism.—Section 7(a) of the National Industrial Recovery Act joined, in 1933, with an enhanced disposition of millions of workers to assert a right to self-organization in reversing the 1929-33 trend of trade-union membership. The American Federation of Labor, temporarily departing to an extent from its old precept that organization of labor must be "spontaneous" and "voluntary," assumed the role of active organizer in trades and industries where little organization obtained; it charted numerous "federal" unions (i.e., directly affiliated and usually having a plant basis); and at the same time many new locals were established by the affiliated national and international unions. But the potential-

²⁴ Professor Wolman's estimates (*Ebb and Flow of Trade Unionism*, p. 16) of total trade-union membership during these years are: 1929, 3,449,600; 1930, 3,392,800; 1931, 3,358,100; 1932, 3,144,300; 1933, 2,973,000.

ties of the organization movement were held in check for a time by the policy of partitioning the newly formed unions in particular plants (the policy that shortly led to the formation of the Committee for Industrial Organization), and after two years of New Deal labor policies total membership was still substantially below the 1920 level.²⁵ During the second half of the 1930's and the early 1940's, however, trade-union membership—partly as a very consequence of the dissension within the movement—increased to approximately 10,000,000. Prodded into more vigorous efforts by the organizational activities of the C.I.O., the American Federation injected new life into its organizing campaigns, and, in spite of the business recession that began in 1937, its membership rose to 3,626,000 in 1938. Total trade-union membership that year was about 8,000,000, in contrast to the 1933 figure of less than 3,000,000.²⁶ With the revival of business in 1939, the expansion continued, and in 1940 between 8,500,000 and 9,000,000 wage-earners were affiliated with C.I.O. or A.F. of L. unions or in nonaffiliated organizations like the Railway Brotherhoods and other groups. The following year (1941) students of trade-unionism estimated the total to be about 10,000,000, of whom 4,569,056 were dues-paying members of organizations affiliated with the American Federation of Labor,²⁷ possibly 4,000,000 in the member-unions of the Congress of Industrial Organizations, and the rest in nonaffiliated organizations.

To an extent, the growth just summarized was a consequence of the expansion of unions that had long been in existence, a considerable number of which widened their structural boundaries to include semiskilled workers who had theretofore not found place in the movement; but a more important cause of the aggregate increase was the appearance during the second half of the decade of new labor organizations in theretofore little-organized segments of American industry. A second important characteristic of the growth was the in-

²⁵ Dues-paying membership of the Federation in 1935 was reported to be 3,045,347, and probably total trade-union membership fell slightly short of 4,000,000.

²⁶ National Resources Committee, *Structure of the American Economy* (Washington, 1939), Part I, p. 118.

²⁷ American Federation of Labor, *Proceedings of Sixty-first Convention* (Washington, 1941), p. 44.

crease in the numerical importance of the industrial or quasi-industrial, as compared with the craft or compound-craft, form. In 1929 only 17 per cent of all unionists were in industrial organizations, and in 1933 the percentage was 33.²⁸ While definitional questions are involved in any attempt to estimate the proportionate numerical strength of compound-craft and industrial unionism, the generalization seems to be warranted that nearly one-half of the nation's organized wage-earners were members of the latter type in the early 1940's, as compared with not much more than one-sixth in 1929.

Labor's civil war.—The problem confronting the general labor movement when the opportunity of 1933 presented itself was, patently, one of great difficulty: how to organize the workers in industries almost untouched by unionism without encroaching upon the jurisdiction of the national and international unions. Failure of the American Federation of Labor to solve this problem, more than anything else, was responsible for the splitting-asunder of the labor movement.

One faction within the Federation took the position that only by the granting of unrestricted charters in the mass-production industries could organization there be achieved. Workers in these branches of industry, they pointed out, were prone to be "plant conscious" rather than craft or trade conscious; they were unfamiliar with the ways of federated trade-unionism; and they performed their labor under technological and market conditions that rendered the policies and anatomical characteristics of the craft unions unsuited to their organizational needs. But the craft unionists, whose point of view dominated the executive council of the Federation, and who had a voting majority on the floor of the annual conventions, were reluctant to relinquish jurisdictional rights in such industries. A compromise resolution was adopted at the 1934 convention,²⁹ the language of which was construed by one faction to be a guaranty that the craft claims of existing unions in the mass industries would ultimately be guarded against encroachment, and by the other as indorsement of the policy of unrestricted industrial charters

²⁸ Wolman, *Ebb and Flow of Trade Unionism*, p. 92.

²⁹ For the text of the 1934 resolution see American Federation of Labor, *Proceedings of Fifty-fourth Convention* (Washington, 1934), pp. 581-87.

for workers in these industries. When the 1935 convention assembled, the industrial unionists were enraged because of what they characterized as a brazen flouting, during the 1934-35 period, of the spirit of the 1934 resolution. When protesting resolutions were rejected by the convention, the Committee for Industrial Organization was formed.

At the outset the Committee professed itself not to be a "dual" organization. It intended to work within the Federation, convincing the leadership and the rank and file of the correctness of its point of view as it proceeded with the task of organizing on the industrial basis. To the American Federation of Labor officials and to many of the affiliated trade-unions, however, the movement constituted dualism—for long a cardinal sin in the American labor movement—and rebellion. When the Committee refused to disband or its leaders to appear when summoned for "trial," the national unions participating in the movement were suspended, and later expelled, from the American Federation of Labor. The labor movement was split into two factions.

Developments between 1936 and the early 1940's deepened and entrenched the division in labor's ranks, in spite of considerable collaboration between C.I.O. and A.F. of L. local units on matters of mutual interest. The Committee for Industrial Organization (after 1938 the Congress of Industrial Organizations) established new unions, conducted successful organization drives and secured collective agreements in steel, motor-car production, and elsewhere, and became a permanent institution with functions paralleling those of the Federation. "Peace conferences" between representatives of the two organizations, held in 1937 and again in 1939, failed to arrive at a successful compromise formula. Each continued to "raid" the jurisdictions of the other to an extent, and six years of rivalry served to add collateral points of dispute to the one that had been chiefly responsible for the original split. A new president, less closely identified with the events precipitating the original break, assumed leadership of the C.I.O. late in 1940, and early in 1942 the heads of both national organizations joined in collaboration with the national administration for furtherance of the war effort; but no merger has taken place.

Strikes and lockouts.—The developments recorded in the preceding paragraphs were inevitably accompanied by a considerable amount of industrial strife. Organized labor's drive in 1933 and the employer counteroffensive sharply increased the number of industrial disputes that year,³⁰ in spite of the mediational and quasi-judicial activities of the National Labor Board of 1933-34. A large proportion of the strikes during the period of the N.R.A. were outgrowths of contests between trade-unions and their company-union rivals or else the result of charges of discrimination because of union activity. During the 1935-40 period the number of workers involved in strikes varied from 688,376 in 1937 to 1,170,962 in 1939.³¹ As would have been expected, the number of strikes increased as industrial activity picked up because of defense spending. In the first seven months of 1941 they were twice the number during the same period of 1940, and the number of man-days lost in consequence of them was nearly five times as great. The number of workers involved in the strikes of November, 1941, was 235,000, as compared with 62,300 during the corresponding month of 1940, while the number of man-days lost was 1,450,000 as compared with 739,800 in November, 1940.³² The main causes of the 1941 strikes were union efforts to secure greater recognition, a more secure status, and wage increases.

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³⁰ *Strikes in the United States* (United States Bureau of Labor Statistics Bull. 651 [Washington, 1935]), p. 45.

³¹ *Monthly Labor Review*, LIV (January, 1942), 83.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 82.

ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS

GARDINER C. MEANS

ABSTRACT

Major trends in economic institutions reflect the breakdown of the "laissez faire" system of policies which relied on automatic market forces to bring the economic adjustments necessary to maintain full use of resources and full employment. Steps to substitute positive controls for automatic forces have been taken pragmatically, in response to the needs growing out of specific situations and the pressures of particular groups seeking relief or security in the face of depression. Efforts to sustain wages and extend capital expenditure immediately after the 1929 collapse were isolated measures undertaken within the framework of laissez faire policies. After 1933, the federal government assumed two new, closely interwoven functions: (1) to make the economy operate and (2) to provide social security. The measures taken to rebuild financial institutions, stimulate and guide industry and agriculture, strengthen the bargaining position of labor, promote international trade, and sustain minimum levels of living constitute steps in economic planning. The war economy accentuates the forces making laissez faire unworkable and increases the trend toward economic planning.

The development of economic institutions in the United States during the 1930's has been dominated by the great depression and the clearly evident discrepancy between economic potentials and economic performance. The decade saw the intensification of conditions making ineffective the system of economic policies known as laissez faire. It saw the increasing disillusionment with that system, the pragmatic adoption of policies antithetical to it, and the breakup of laissez faire as an operating institution. War economy continues the departure from laissez faire and makes any return to that system less likely. The institutional trends of the last decade throw some light on possible post-war economic institutions, but even more

- they raise questions as to the system of policies which those institutions are likely to exemplify.

I. THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN POTENTIALS AND PERFORMANCE

The magnitude of the depression and the discrepancy between potentials and performance is indicated in the basic data of national production. Stated in 1939 dollars, total national production declined from over sixty-nine billion dollars in 1929 to forty-three billion dollars in 1932—a drop of 38 per cent.¹ After 1932, production

¹ National Resources Committee, *The Structure of the American Economy* (Washington, 1939), p. 371. Data adjusted to 1939 prices.

had increased again, to seventy-one billion dollars in 1939, the peak of peacetime production, and to eighty-six billion dollars (in 1939 dollars) under the war pressure of 1941. In the same period manpower increased and production techniques improved so that potential production increased. The National Resources Committee's estimates of potential production suggest that in 1939 reasonably full employment would have meant a national income in the vicinity of ninety-three billion dollars, or 30 per cent more than was actually produced.²

Disillusionment with laissez faire.—The great decline in business activity and in the incomes of every important economic group in the community between 1929 and 1932 intensified the growing awareness of weaknesses in the economic system. Each major economic group, most immediately conscious of its own difficulties, became a center of pressure to bring about changes in economic policies and institutions in its own favor. At first the pressures were sporadic—destruction of milk on the way to market, the forcible prevention of mortgage foreclosures, the creation of barter exchanges in the cities. Then formal demands for government action developed—the demand for a cotton program, a wheat program, a moratorium on farm, home, railroad, and industry mortgages, demands for raising tariffs, subsidizing exports, providing unemployment relief, preventing ruinous price-cutting, holding up wage rates, and supporting the undermined banks and insurance companies. Most of these and similar demands were based on the pressing needs of the moment without serious consideration of whether or not they would further undermine the workings of the laissez faire system of policies. They were pragmatic demands for pragmatic action.

At the same time there was a growing tendency to question on more systematic grounds the effectiveness of the automatic market forces on which the system of laissez faire policies relied. Some groups pointed to Russian successes in substituting planning for automatic forces; others pointed to Italian and later German successes in finding an alternative to laissez faire. Still other groups sought a democratic substitute. And popular but ill-defined alternatives, such as social credit and technocracy, received public attention.

² *Ibid.*, p. 2. Data adjusted to 1939 prices.

While this questioning of the laissez faire system undoubtedly played an important role in creating an atmosphere in which economic experimentation was feasible, the main drive for institutional change came from specific groups demanding pragmatic action. These actions, for the most part, involved the use of government power to inhibit the workings of the automatic forces of laissez faire. Whether the government could build the separate proposals into a coherent program likely to bring about effective use of resources was a problem usually outside the concern of the particular pressure groups. Yet the net impact of the separate demands was a general repudiation of the laissez faire system of policies, and the efforts to meet these demands constituted at least a temporary jettisoning of the institution of laissez faire.

A sketch of the changes in economic institutions during the past decade must focus on this most basic institutional change, the forces bringing it about, the steps by which it has been achieved, and the form it has currently taken.

II. BASIC DEVELOPMENTS IMPAIRING EFFECTIVENESS OF LAISSEZ FAIRE

The developments making for the impaired effectiveness of the institution of laissez faire have been of world-wide occurrence and stem in large measure from the efforts of individuals, enterprises, and nations to gain increased control over their respective economic environments. These developments include the creation of cartels and corporate concentration, the strengthening of labor and farm-bargaining units, and high tariffs and quotas. Each of these represents a unilateral effort to limit competition to a greater or lesser extent in the interests of a particular economic unit. And each such limitation engenders efforts toward further limitation on the part of the economic units adversely affected. In Europe this development had carried so far by the late 1920's as to make conditions ripe for the Fascist alternative to laissez faire. In the United States these basic developments inhibiting the effective working of laissez faire had already progressed a long way by 1929 and continued through the following decade.

Corporate concentration.—Although corporate concentration had progressed in considerable degree by 1929, the process was acceler-

ated in the early depression years and has probably continued during the subsequent years. According to figures published by the National Resources Committee, in 1929 approximately half the non-financial corporate assets were in the control of the two hundred largest companies. The assets of the largest corporations declined somewhat with declining business activity, but the assets of medium and small corporations fell drastically so that by 1933 two hundred big corporations controlled 57 per cent of all nonfinancial corporate assets.³ This great increase in concentration resulted partly from mergers or purchase of assets as smaller or weaker companies were taken over by the large companies. But to a greater extent it reflected the much higher depression mortality of smaller enterprises. To some extent it reflected heavy capital expansion in 1930, as some of the big companies attempted to stimulate declining business activity. The effect of the increased concentration was to give the two hundred largest corporations control of approximately one-fifth the country's national wealth and one-half the country's industrial wealth (national wealth less farm assets, government-owned wealth, residential housing, and personal belongings).⁴

No figures are available to establish whether or not concentration has increased during the years of business improvement since 1933, but such incidental evidence as is available points to a further strengthening of the relative position of larger corporations.

Labor organization.—The most phenomenal of the basic industrial developments during the decade has been the great resurgence in labor organization, as labor in less than a decade partly caught up with corporate concentration in the mass-production industries, bringing between eight and ten million workers into collective-bargaining units. This development will be discussed in a subsequent article. It should be noted here, however, that in the period from 1929 to 1933, when business activity was declining, labor organization was relatively weak and could not be considered as significantly inhibiting the operation of laissez faire policies. Only when corporate concentration had already occurred on a large scale did the counterbalancing concentration in labor bargaining-power occur in the mass-production industries.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 107.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 106.

The decline in the relative importance of agriculture.—A third factor, making laissez faire policies less effective, is the long-time trend of decline in the relative importance of agriculture in the national economy. This trend, though temporarily reversed during the deepest years of depression, when workers returned to farms or stayed on farms because of lack of industrial employment opportunities, has continued for the period as a whole. In 1930, 23.5 per cent of the gainfully occupied were engaged in agriculture, whereas by 1940 the proportion had dropped well below 20 per cent. The war program is likely to accelerate this transfer. Since agriculture has been one of the few major economic fields in which the institutional conditions presumed by the system of laissez faire policies still survived, its decreasing relative importance acted further to reduce the effectiveness of such a system.

International trade restrictions.—In the international sphere, tariff restrictions, quota restrictions, and trade controls increased during the decade, reducing the effectiveness of free markets in adjusting international trade and placing a burden on any country not meeting restriction with restriction.

In part these trade restrictions were responsible for and in part they were stimulated by the breakdown of the international gold standard and the accumulation in the United States of most of the world's monetary gold stock. This breakdown of the gold standard represents the abandonment, at least temporarily, of an institution basic to nineteenth-century laissez faire and the substitution of government controls over monetary values for automatic controls in most of the nations of the globe.

Combined effect.—These various trends of institutional change and other less important trends made automatic market forces less effective in directing the use of resources. Certain institutional developments, notably the policing of the security markets, the strengthening of food and drug regulations, and relatively minor anti-trust actions, served to increase the effectiveness of market forces. But, on balance, the underlying development throughout the decade has been a continuation of the long-run trend away from conditions in which a system of laissez faire policies could be expected to work effectively. To this have been added the effects of new policies departing from laissez faire and arising from its failure.

III. PEACETIME DEPARTURES FROM LAISSEZ FAIRE

The first major peacetime departure from laissez faire policy came shortly before the beginning of the past decade. Under the leadership of Governor Strong, Federal Reserve policy was aimed directly at stabilizing prosperity. This institutional development is significant not for its success or failure but for the indication it gives that in the highest government-banking circles there was serious doubt as to the complete effectiveness of automatic forces. The belief that prosperity could be stabilized through banking policy undoubtedly contributed materially to the myth of the "new era" which came to such a sudden end in 1929. The banking efforts to stabilize prosperity gave legitimacy to the discussion of other intervention measures with similar aims.

Putting brakes on depression.—In 1930, after a sharp decline in stock market values and some recession in business activity, a second significant step away from laissez faire was taken. Big business representatives were called to Washington and, in conference with the President, agreed to hold up wage rates and to expand their capital equipment, both measures being aimed at maintaining buying-power. There is evidence in the capital expansion of big corporations already mentioned and in the behavior of wages in the mass-production industries that this agreement was largely adhered to throughout 1930 and perhaps into 1931. Yet both measures, particularly the freezing of wage rates, ran counter to laissez faire policy and could be expected to impede the automatic correctives which were otherwise being relied upon. These two measures were similar to the efforts to stimulate buying-power which later formed part of a more comprehensive program. They were, however, isolated in an otherwise laissez faire policy and their effect was short lived.

As depression deepened, other steps away from laissez faire were taken, particularly measures to limit the destruction of business values—the very device through which automatic forces were presumed to bring correction. With increasing depression the Federal Farm Board, created in 1929, acted to remove from the market some of the surplus farm products and to minimize further decline in farm prices. In 1932, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation was created by the federal government to provide relief to banking and other

business enterprises. These measures, like those aimed at sustaining buying-power, were forerunners of similar measures taken after 1932, but they were taken with the expectation that automatic forces would carry economic activity around the corner to prosperity. The specific measures were measures of economic planning, but the psychology was the psychology of laissez faire.

Experiments in economic planning.—In 1933, the nation tacitly accepted the failure of laissez faire and placed on the federal government the direct responsibility both for making the economy run and for reducing the hardship imposed on individuals and enterprises due to the malfunctioning of the economy. Of the two new functions, the second was the more clearly understood and lent itself to a more direct approach. Specific measures of business and human relief could be undertaken. But the problem of making an economy run on some other democratic basis than laissez faire had received little thought and still less public discussion. The Russian and Fascist patterns were available but were clearly not acceptable to the American democracy. Experimentation was the natural alternative. Various measures were undertaken, some more, some less, successful. The whole period from early 1933 to 1940 must be regarded as one of trial and error, a searching and testing of measures likely to bring performance up to potentials.

While the two new functions adopted by the federal government can be sharply distinguished, the actual measures taken in most cases contributed to the carrying-out of both functions. Indeed, nearly every major element of the new program found some advocates because the measure was expected to relieve economic hardship, other advocates because it was expected to increase economic activity, and still others for both reasons. It is not possible to view the development of economic institutions after 1932 intelligently without being aware of these two new objectives which so largely conditioned the development of new economic institutions.

Rebuilding financial institutions.—Rebuilding of financial institutions was an essential step in carrying out the new functions. The more important new developments in this field were the insurance of bank deposits, the devaluation and segregation of gold, the policing of security markets already mentioned, the extension of federal credit facilities, and the institutionalization of the federal deficit.

In re-establishing the banking system after its collapse in the spring of 1933, the major new developments were the setting-up of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, insuring depositors to the extent of \$5,000 or less; the reinforcement of banking capital through purchase by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation of newly created preferred stock of individual banks; and later the granting of increased powers to the Federal Reserve Board to alter reserve requirements and in other ways limit excessive bank-credit expansion. The new powers given to the Federal Reserve Board were negative and could not insure an expansion in the monetary supply when needed. Even the restrictive controls were cumbersome. The institutional changes of the period thus gave substantial safety to the monetary supply but left the determination of its amount and composition very largely to automatic forces with crude restrictive power in the hands of the central banking authorities.

The period also saw the demonetization of gold in the United States. By executive order all gold was withdrawn from internal circulation. The nominal gold content of the dollar was reduced, and, following the practice of other countries which had demonetized gold, an exchange-stabilization fund and some degree of exchange-rate control were established. During this period the monetary effects of gold movements were largely sterilized by allowing gold to flow in or out of the country without a multiplicative effect on the money supply. Gold became a commodity capable of being exported or imported but no longer a device for balancing international trade through an automatic linking of exchange rates and the monetary supply. No clear alternative device for balancing trade has been instituted, and an unbalance has been met by almost continuous import of gold. Between the beginning of 1933 and the end of 1939, ten billion dollars of gold had been imported on balance, and by the middle of 1941 the United States held three-quarters of the world's gold stocks outside of those used in the arts.

The extension of federal credit, directly or through explicit or tacit government guaranty, progressed far beyond the limits of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and the system of Farm Credit agencies as they stood in 1933. Over three billion dollars' worth of the outstanding farm mortgages were refinanced by the Federal Land Bank

system, and other forms of farm credit were made available. Over two billion dollars in home mortgages were taken over by the newly created Home Owners' Loan Corporation. A system was set up for guaranteeing mortgages for new housing, and the Reconstruction Finance Corporation greatly extended its activities in providing industrial credit. The system of government credit agencies thus covered the whole range of farm, industry, and home credit. In the decade it had come to play a significant role. For the most part it was initially organized to facilitate economic recovery by unfreezing the capital markets which had become illiquid as a result of the great decline in values. By making credit available at relatively low rates and liquefying existing debt, it was hoped that new capital outlays would be made, particularly for industrial plant and residential housing, which would put to work unemployed labor and unemployed capital funds in addition to those made available by the government. As it developed, more emphasis was placed on the financing of new activity. By the end of the decade it represented a comprehensive and more or less loosely integrated credit system available for use in war planning and capable of being expanded or contracted in the post-war adjustments.

The institutionalization of the federal deficit took place slowly through the period. Heavy deficits were incurred in the years of declining economic activity just prior to 1933. Deficits continued of even greater magnitude in the subsequent years. But in the earlier years the standards of household economy were applied to government economy and the deficits were for the most part regarded as bad housekeeping—as a case of the federal government living beyond its operating income. Continued deficits were thought of as bad for business and undermining to credit. Gradually through the period the constructive role of government deficits came to be fairly generally recognized. It was realized that if the government collected as much in taxes as it paid out in expenses and relief it would be likely to generate no net addition to buying-power, whereas, if it paid out more than it took in as taxes and financed the difference by borrowing funds that would otherwise be idle, it put the idle funds to work and thereby generated buying-power. Thus a government deficit became one of the positive tools for fighting the depression. Tech-

nical debate centered around a deficit as a pump-priming device with the budget balanced over a period of years versus a deficit as a continuing device for offsetting excessive saving. Whatever the outcome of this debate and whether or not a continuing deficit would be the most satisfactory device for counteracting any tendency to oversave, the period has seen the shift from treating a deficit as bad housekeeping to its treatment as a positive instrument for economic planning.

Efforts to make the economy run.—The major efforts aimed most directly at increasing economic activity include deficit spending, public works, the farm program, the national recovery program, measures to strengthen the bargaining position of labor, and the stimulation of foreign trade through trade treaties.

Deficit spending between 1933 and 1939 amounted to a six-year total of over eighteen billion dollars. The deficits arose primarily from four lines of activity—the extension of federal credit, the financing of public works (including government housing), payments under the farm program, and relief payments in various forms.

The public works program, initiated in the 1933 legislation establishing the National Recovery Administration, was aimed to provide immediate markets for both industrial products and labor and to produce useful facilities which would not compete directly with private industry. It took the form mainly of building highways and other transportation facilities, schools, post offices, and other public buildings, recreation facilities, power-generating and distributing facilities, and, in the case of work relief, constructing facilities for nonprofit-making institutions. Between 1933 and 1939 five billion dollars were spent on public works through the Public Works Administration. In addition, some public works were constructed with work-relief funds. These public works expenditures not only provided markets for labor and materials but provided them in the lines where they were needed most—the construction industry.

The farm program instituted in the Agricultural Adjustment Act, passed almost simultaneously with the bill creating the N.R.A. and the P.W.A., has progressed through various transformations, but its essential objective of farm parity has remained constant. The program was initially aimed to raise farm prices by restricting farm pro-

duction to the amount of farm products which would be called for at prices which represented parity with industry. Parity was originally defined as the ratio of the price of each farm product to nonfarm prices at some earlier date, in most cases the average from 1909 to 1914. However, the concept of farm parity has never been a single concept. In particular, it has included both the idea of price parity and income parity. Initially focusing on price parity as the basic objective, the program has increasingly emphasized income parity, with price parity as one device for achieving this end. This shift in emphasis on the part of agricultural groups was to be expected where a parity price for a particular crop would mean less income to farmers than a lower price. Whether the conception of either price parity or income parity has a permanent usefulness as a guide to national policy remains to be seen.

The program of crop restriction as a device for achieving farm parity involved the contraction of farm production to a degree roughly commensurate with the already existing restriction of industrial production to be followed by an expansion of agricultural production as industrial production expanded. This course has been followed and the initial crop limitations have been lifted as industrial expansion has increased buying-power. Under the conditions of war demand, this process has gone even further, and some of the devices formerly used to limit production have been used to induce expansion of agricultural production, particularly of the crops that were expected to be most needed.

The farm program has also involved objectives other than price or income parity. Of these, the two most important have been soil conservation and improvement in the composition of agricultural production. By means of benefit payments for improved farm practice, aid in rebuilding eroded land, and other measures, important progress was made toward maintaining or increasing the productivity of the soil. By similar means some progress was made in shifting production from "surplus" crops like cotton to nonsurplus crops, and from soil-depletion to soil-building crops. The accomplishment under these programs cannot be measured in statistics but only in the increased farm welfare over a period of years.

The farm program has also involved an institutional development

of great significance, particularly with respect to the possibility of democratic planning. Each year's farm program is, in large measure, developed out of the detailed work of over three thousand county committees and additional community committees composed of local farmers working with the assistance of the various state agricultural colleges and state and federal agents in the field. Thus to an important extent the farm-program planning comes from the ground up rather than being dictated from the top down. While it would be possible to overemphasize this farmer participation in program-planning, it is important in considering recent experiments in democratic planning.

The third major element in the initial program aimed at halting depressions and making the economy run was that carried out under the N.R.A. Initiated in June, 1933, in the same piece of legislation establishing the public works program, its objectives, to be realized through the creation of industrial "codes," were less clearly envisaged than those of either the public works program or the farm program. Its adoption resulted from the pressure of various groups having different objectives and in some cases even conflicting objectives. Four major groups are worth distinguishing. First, there were business and industrial representatives who had long sought a relaxing of the antitrust laws so that businessmen could make industrial agreements to eliminate practices such as "price-chiseling" and "cut-throat" competition, which were regarded as harmful to industry. Second, there were those who sought to improve the status of workers through various devices such as the prevention of wage-cutting and most particularly through the shortening of the work-week with a consequent spreading of work. This group had been sponsoring a bill to limit the work-week rigidly throughout industry and accepted the National Recovery Act as a more flexible method of accomplishing the same objective. A third important group consisted of those who were less concerned with the problems of any particular economic group than with the problem of interrelating the interests of various groups so as to improve the working of the economy as a whole. Such coherence as developed in the programs can be attributed to an important extent to this group. Finally, and perhaps most important of all, there was a vast body of persons from all

walks of life who were demanding "positive action now." The buoyancy of the initial flight of the "blue eagle" suggests that psychologically it was more important in the national interest that positive action be taken, however bad, than that more perfect action should be taken.

The actual conduct of the N.R.A. program reflected all of the diverse pressures which had brought it into being. The pressure for "action now" was reflected in the wholesale blanketing of business under the sign of the "blue eagle," involving, on the whole, rather vague obligations. The pressure for improving labor's status through the elimination of wage-cutting and the shortening of hours was reflected in the determined efforts of the top administrators of the act, supplemented by labor organizations, to get adequate labor provisions written into the industrial codes. The pressures to escape the limitation of the antitrust restrictions were reflected in the drive of business groups, particularly the trade associations, to take over the writing and administration of the codes. It would not be much of an exaggeration to say that the administrators of the act bought the labor provisions of the codes by allowing business representatives a fairly free hand with the remaining provisions. It was an experiment in industrial self-government. The pressure for making this industrial experiment a part of an integrated national program was reflected in the drafting of the initial legislation and, though less evident in the rush of initial code-drafting, was clear in the longer process of re-writing codes—a process cut short by the action of the Supreme Court in 1935.

Though the N.R.A. was short lived, it was an important step in the trend of developing economic institutions. Not only did it serve the psychological purpose of "action now" but, as an experiment, it had great educational value, perhaps as much in showing what not to do as in showing what to do. It disclosed both potentialities and dangers in industrial self-government. To some extent this is likely to condition future institutional development.

In the period after 1935, certain of the labor aims of the N.R.A. were accomplished through other means. Most important were the strengthening of the bargaining position of labor by the establishment of minimum-wage rates and maximum hours through a newly

created wage and hour administration; by minimizing interference with labor organizations through the establishment of the Labor Relations Board, and by providing work or other relief for unemployed persons. These various developments in the field of labor are covered in a subsequent article in this issue.

Other measures besides buying-power generation, public works, and the farm and industry programs were undertaken during the period, with the primary aim of making the economy run. Of these, the most important, aside from the financial measures already considered, was the effort to expand international trade through a system of bilateral trade treaties. This trade program brought some reductions in tariffs and to that extent represented a development counter to the trend toward trade barriers and trade control. It, along with some extension of foreign credit and subsidy of farm exports, constituted part of the set of programs aimed at making the economy run.

It is not the purpose of this article to appraise the successes of these experiments. Economic activity improved during the period. By 1939, national production had recovered to a level above that of 1929. Whether the recovery was due to or in spite of these experiments in economic planning is open to debate. And, if recovery was largely due to these measures, they were by no means wholly successful since, even at the peak of production in 1939, between eight and ten million persons, or between 15 and 20 per cent of the labor force, were unemployed.

Social programs.—The first of the social programs instituted between 1933 and 1939 were largely of a stopgap character and aimed at relieving depression hardships, though some developed into continuing programs. Mortgage moratorium, relief payments, civil works expenditure, and loans to frozen businesses—all represented temporary measures providing a breathing spell in which measures to make the economy run were instituted and more carefully planned social programs were developed.

The main institutional significance of these temporary measures lies in the expansion in the scope of government responsibility which they represent. Prior to 1933, government had provided relief only

for business hardships arising from depression. In the new measures it undertook to provide human as well as business relief.

Of the continuing social programs, one of the most important is the Social Security Program. Instituted in 1935, it makes provisions for old age insurance, for unemployment insurance, and for public assistance for various dependent groups. At the end of 1939 over four million persons were receiving public assistance in one form or another, while forty-seven million persons were covered by old age insurance and thirty-two million by unemployment insurance.

Through the Social Security Program, the United States has been catching up with the level of social protection which has been developed over a much longer period in other countries. Its fairly general acceptance constitutes a recognition of the imperfect workings of automatic market forces. The terms in which the insurance arrangements are made in themselves promise permanency, while further extension and intensification of the program in the future seems more likely than curtailment.

Other continuing social programs include such activities as the resettlement and rehabilitation of individuals on farms; the retraining of industrial workers; the establishment of minimum wages; the provision of work relief; the distribution of farm surpluses to persons on relief and to school children in the form of school lunches; and the increased emphasis on education, health, and nutrition.

These social programs grow out of the failure of *laissez faire*. They reflect a recognition of the fact that poverty and insecurity are brought to many through forces outside their control and constitute an acceptance by government of a responsibility for maintaining minimum levels of living.

Expansion of old functions.—In addition to the new functions of making the economy run and providing greater social security, the federal government has extended the scope of an older type of function. In the past, government has been required to perform some functions which could not be profitably or effectively performed by private or corporate enterprise. Postal service, coast guard service, road-building and operation, are some of the more important established fields. Since 1933, other comparable activities have been added. The Tennessee Valley Authority has been created and made re-

sponsible for the integrated development of the water-power of the Tennessee Valley, a function requiring powers beyond those possessed by public utility corporations, and other water-power developments have followed a somewhat similar pattern. The Rural Electrification Administration extends power lines into farm areas which do not promise sufficient profit to induce development by profit-seeking enterprise. The United States Housing Authority was created to provide low-cost housing for rental to families with incomes so low that private enterprise could not profitably provide housing except at slum standards. All these activities represent an extension of federal functions into fields not effectively covered by profit-seeking business.

Throughout the whole development of government responsibility during the past decade, the efforts to stem the depression before 1933, the efforts to make the economy run after 1933, and the new social programs, there is a single thread that links the separate measures together. This is the substitution of economic forethought and planning for automatic forces. However successful or unsuccessful it has been, it represents a trend of institutional development of the utmost importance.

IV. WAR ECONOMY

Since 1939, the problems of a war economy have become increasingly important until today they dominate the American economy. It is too early to see with perspective the effects of this new orientation. One fact stands out clearly, however: modern war—total war—requires a high degree of economic planning. Automatic economic forces will not supply the munitions of war in the quantity required. The last year and a half have seen the forging of the instruments of wartime planning. The country's formal induction into war has destroyed the immediate possibility of "business as usual." In many ways war planning represents an extension of the planning trend of the past decade, though with a new and more explicit objective. The war is also likely to intensify the trends which have made automatic forces unreliable. The inevitable squeezing-out of many small enterprises, the placing of greater responsibility for production on very large enterprise, particularly in heavy industry, the strengthening

of labor organizations to balance the increased power of big corporate enterprise, intensified fiscal planning made necessary not by too little but by too much buying-power, increased social responsibility placed on government by war dislocation and destruction, and, above all, the necessity of deciding, industry by industry, what constitutes most effective use of resources in the light of total war—all these intensify the trends of the last decade.

After World War I the economic planning of the war was swept aside by the demand for a "return to normalcy." In looking ahead to the aftermath of the present war, should one extend the trends of the past decade or expect a repetition of the pattern following the last war? The forces making for a permanent rejection of *laissez faire* will have been strengthened, not weakened, since the last war. The experience in peacetime economic planning during the past decade and the new war-planning experience will give greater background for future peacetime planning than existed in 1919. The force of events and the prospect of closing the gap between potentials and performance both point to the continuance of the peacetime trend toward planning in place of blind automatic forces. The post-war problem would then become one of planned reconstruction and the development of democratic techniques for accomplishing that degree of economic planning essential to the maintenance of a fully functioning peacetime economy.

If this occurs, the economic historian in future years may well write of the past decade in the United States under the caption, "The Passing of *Laissez Faire*"—a period of ineffective use of national resources, of uncertainty, of growing dissatisfaction with old policies, of experimentation with new policies, some successful, some unsuccessful, of a prelude to the development and acceptance of a new system of democratic national policies more able than those of *laissez faire* to bring about effective use of resources in an economy of mass production and mass distribution.

BUREAU OF THE BUDGET (*on leave*)
WASHINGTON, D.C.

GOVERNMENT

HARVEY C. MANSFIELD

ABSTRACT

During the past decade the functions of our national government have expanded tremendously. There has been a development of the administrative state, a political response to the economic problems of a technological civilization. A new understanding of the divisions of national and state powers has been reached by the federal entry into numerous fields once thought the exclusive domain of the states. There have been important changes in the judiciary. Relatively small changes have occurred in Congress. The most striking change in the actions of this body is the practice of delegation. The executive branch of government has been consolidated into a more unified and more responsive instrument of the popular will. This has been accompanied by an increase in the participation of the electorate in national elections. The basic problem of modern democracy may be thought of as the new definition of freedom. The changes in government in the last ten years would seem to indicate that although the decade has seen a good deal of economic regulation, personal liberties have been protected and advanced.

LEVIATHAN

The most obvious change in our national government during the decade just closed is the familiar one of expansion: it has grown bigger, busier, and more all embracing in its activities. A ready, if rough, measure¹ of the magnitude of this expansion may be seen in Table 1, which gives the amounts of money spent and numbers of civilians directly employed by the federal government. Figures for earlier decades are given for comparison.

The change in spirit is also apparent, but not so susceptible of measurement.² If individual illustrations will do duty in place of

¹ Both measures are rough. The figures for civilian personnel do not include W.P.A., C.C.C., or N.Y.A. enrollees. They do include "force accounts," and so the totals expand when construction or production is undertaken directly by a governmental agency, as of dams by the T.V.A. or munitions by army arsenals, whereas they remain unchanged if the same tasks are performed for the government by contractors. Expenditures include loans and make no distinction between capital and operating items or any allowance for future repayments or recoveries. They do not include trust funds or any but the federal outlay involved in the operations of more or less self-sustaining government enterprises. Thus in 1940 only the annual postal deficit of \$40,000,000 is included to represent a business which spent over \$800,000,000 in furnishing postal service and, in addition, handled a turnover of \$1,000,000,000 in postal savings and \$2,000,000,000 in money orders. So also thirteen government-owned lending corporations, from their inception down through June 30, 1939, had expended a total of \$16,344,405,956, scarcely a tenth of which was a charge on the Treasury reflected in the table.

² A measure in dollars might be attempted by distributing federal expenditures according to purpose or function, as they are now summarized in the Budget. There has

charts, graphic examples may be found in juxtapositions of the public utterances of President Hoover and President Roosevelt on the functions of government in general and on the national obligation to the unemployed in particular; or in the policies of their respective Secretaries of the Interior toward the development of water-power re-

TABLE 1
AMOUNT OF MONEY SPENT AND NUMBER OF CIVILIANS EMPLOYED
BY FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, 1871-1941

Fiscal Year	Federal Expenditures, Excluding Debt Retirement (in Thousands of Dollars)	Percentage of Increase over Preceding Decade	Federal Civilian Employees, June 30	Percentage of Increase over Preceding Decade
1871.....	\$ 292,177	+339.3	53,900	9.5
1881.....	260,713	- 10.8	107,000	8.5
1891.....	355,373	+ 36.3	166,000	55.1
1901.....	621,599	+ 74.9	256,000	54.2
1911.....	691,202	+ 11.2	391,350	56.8
1921.....	5,115,928	+640.1	562,252	43.6
1931.....	3,651,516	- 28.6	588,296	4.6
1932.....	4,535,147	583,196
1933.....	3,803,545	572,091
1934.....	6,011,083	673,095
1935.....	7,009,875	719,440
1936.....	8,665,645	824,259
1937.....	8,442,409	841,664
1938.....	7,625,822	851,926
1939.....	9,210,092	920,310
1940.....	9,536,901	1,002,820
1941.....	12,710,000	+248.1	1,370,110	133.0

sources, or of their Secretaries of the Treasury toward income taxation in the higher brackets. Two episodes in the career of General Douglas MacArthur make a more striking contrast in the preoccupations of official policy. As chief of staff on July 28, 1932, he took personal command of troops ordered out by a bewildered and exasperated government to drive the "bonus marchers" from Wash-

been much refinement of techniques in this direction since the primitive pioneering of W. F. Willoughby in his *Financial Condition and Operations of the National Government, 1921-1930* (Baltimore, 1931). But apart from the cultural lag of vested beneficiaries of such expenditures, which prevents annual redistributions from keeping pace closely with current changes of emphasis, the difficulties of comparability in the available figures for successive years seem to put such calculations beyond the scope of this paper. Nor have the efforts at "attitude measurement" as yet produced adequate results for the present purpose.

ington. In January, 1942, he was again in the field, grimly leading an apparently forlorn stand by combined Filipino and American forces outside of Manila. Not domestic pressure groups, but the whole armed force of the totalitarian nations, challenged the basis of orderly democratic government.

But if the contrasts are sharp at short range, they shade off in historical perspective. President Hoover, too, had a humanitarian reputation, and there have been two Roosevelts. The recent growth in the federal establishment is not to be explained in terms of the growth of population, which proceeded by decennial increments declining from 30.1 per cent for the decade ending in 1880 to 15.7 per cent in 1930 and 7.2 per cent in 1940; nor is it to be explained either by reference to the fluctuations in national income, which ranged between an estimated low of \$40,000,000,000 in 1932 and a high put above \$90,000,000,000 in 1941. The expansion of government is a phenomenon common to all modern states, and the trend during the last ten years in the United States, at least until the war effort began in earnest, only followed the pace of a 50 per cent gain each ten years, set over fifty years ago. In the civilian establishment the Roosevelt administration by the end of 1941 had scarcely more than made up for the time lost during the Coolidge era.

The administrative state is, in fact, the political response to the economic problems of a technological civilization. Interdependence means organization if social goals are to be attained, and a redefinition of freedom if equality is still to be sought. In a polity of universal suffrage the equalitarian demand of common men that their basic material needs be provided for is irresistible; and democratic government consequently cannot do else than turn increasingly to the regulation of economic affairs, blundering to competence as it goes and lucky if it manages to preserve the essential personal freedoms of thought and expression that dignify human life. To this end the comfortably separated governmental organs of traditional theory are inadequate alone; they are congenial rather to the role assigned to government by the doctrine of *laissez faire*. But the forces that produced the growth of administration are traceable back of the period when *laissez faire* was the dominant fashion in thought. They proceed unabated. If during the last ten years their develop-

ment has had distinctive characteristics, these are more proximately related to the fortunes of leadership and to acceleration in the face of depression and war—acceleration that shortens the time for experiment and adjustment when dislocations are greatest. To cope with the discords that arise when peacetime production falters and to organize war production when peaceful purposes fail—these are the conditions of survival for democracy. The challenge of the task has brought forth a government that is bigger, busier, and more ambitious.

THE ELECTORATE, PARTIES, AND PRESSURE GROUPS

The constitutional and legal framework of government is set in a plastic matrix of less formal institutions, which organize and transmit political forces current among the electorate. Three developments in the activity and behavior of the electorate itself during the thirties are worth remarking. First, in presidential elections voters have turned out on a scale not previously experienced. The total popular vote cast increased successively by an average of 4,000,000 votes in 1932, 1936, and 1940, approaching 50,000,000 in the last election, almost two-fifths of the whole population. Making allowance for those under twenty-one years of age, for the 5,000,000 aliens nearly all over twenty-one, for the pariahs who reside in the District of Columbia, and for those whose migrations prevent compliance with state residence and registration requirements, the remaining percentage of voter participation has become very high indeed. The figure remains lowest in eight southern states, where the poll tax and Negro disfranchisement persist and the final election is an apathetic formality. Second, the national "landslide" tendency has become more marked; more people have their minds made up, and more of the decisive ones are made up the same way. Third, and allied to the previous statement, there is more "independent" voting. From 1928 to 1940 only ten states, eight Democratic, two Republican, and all of them small, have kept their national party allegiance unchanged in presidential elections. Either traditional ties sit more lightly, or the new voters are not tied. These trends should not discourage faith in democracy.

The major political parties concentrate their attention, through

nominations and campaigns, on filling the elective offices. Though not wholly indifferent to issues as such and quite unabashed in asserting their adherence to principles, their professional leaders possess a happy faculty of combining regularity on the main chance with volatile opportunism in respect of platforms. Pressure groups and minor parties, unable to match the methods and resources of these giant aggregations, follow balance-of-power tactics instead: they choose the lesser evils among candidates and concentrate on turning particular governmental actions in favorable directions—whether they exploit a temporary emotional issue like isolation or urge a comprehensive program of limited appeal like socialism or rest on the stabler interests of the great occupational and commodity groups.

The pressure groups refined their techniques of appeal and with radio help introduced an effective instrument of mass pressure—the co-ordinated deluge of letters and telegrams that marked the campaigns against the Holding Company Act, the Supreme Court plan, and the Reorganization bill. The main lines of the two-party system came through depression and into war unchanged, and John L. Lewis' switch from 1936 to 1940 was within the characteristic pattern of pressure-group behavior. If there was a challenge to the system, it was not the La Follettes' pale threat to repeat 1912 and 1924 but rather the movement that was stopped by the assassination of Huey Long. It was shown again, however, most dramatically in 1936, that the two-party balance depends upon keeping wider ideological differences within each party than now lie between them. No innovations in nominating and electoral methods appeared, comparable to the direct primary, short ballot, and voting-machine crusades of the previous generation. The Twentieth or "Lame Duck" Amendment to the Constitution failed to alter the counting of votes by states. Party campaign funds dropped sharply in 1932 but in 1940 reached an all-time high, being reported above \$22,000,000. Popular concern over corrupt practices was displayed in the passage of the two Hatch Acts, but their substantive effect cannot yet be appraised. Looking ahead, two other developments appear more significant in shaping the future of the party system: (1) In Willkie's nomination a combination of circumstances permitted the successful

use of the technique of mass pressure from constituents for the first time against a national convention, and professional control of the machinery was thus upset by outside amateurs. (2) Through the work-relief and social-security programs the local party machines—the main reliance for getting out the vote—have acquired since 1935 a most formidable possible competitor in the field they formerly monopolized—that of dispensing relief. This competitor has matchless resources and a far more efficient and equitable plan of operations. It is not possible to argue here the full implications of these events, but they may both point toward a further democratization of party control and toward an increasing necessity of relying upon principle rather than patronage in making a successful nation-wide appeal to the voters: this in spite of the tendency of the two-party system, already remarked, to minimize ideological differences.

In connection with popular control and independent voting, it is appropriate to note the emergence of opinion surveys and polls. A cross-section of offhand answers to abstract questions that a voter will never in fact have a chance to decide is a very different thing from a forecast as to how he will himself behave the next time he is inside a voting booth. But until congressmen learn this, it is probable the Gallup poll, which in 1936 displaced the cruder *Literary Digest* predictions, will continue to be a factor in political reckonings.

A NEW FEDERALISM

Laymen commonly think of the federal government as located in Washington, and so in a sense it is. But about five-sixths of the federal civilian establishment lives and works in "the field," that slightly condescending term used in Washington to denote the rest of the country. The relations of the rest of the country to Washington have undergone far-reaching changes in the past decade.

These changes are least marked in the field of parties and elections. The second Hatch Act, it is true, goes much beyond previous federal restrictions on the freedom of state agents to conduct and influence elections as they please. National party organizations have likewise improved upon their superiority over state organizations in gathering funds and disseminating propaganda. But elections are still state functions. National parties still approach issues of policy

as leagues of local parties united only for the sake of putting a single hopeful question to the voters in leap years. Parochialism is a hallmark of the party system. The proportion of senators, and especially congressmen, who continue to be re-elected through prosperity, depression, and war, practically without reference to the impact of national events, is probably at least half the total.

The change is most marked at the moment in connection with a few state functions directly related to the war effort—the absorption of the National Guard into the army, the direction of civilian defense activities, the police measures along the coasts and around the cantonments and factories, the rationing and price and rent controls, the employment services. These will increase as the war progresses, but they have not yet impressed deeply the whole population.

The widest changes thus far have come in the administration of grant-in-aid programs, mostly in response to the depression. Building on the modest precedent of federal-aid roads begun in 1916, these range through the field of welfare services particularly: work relief, social security, vocational education, public health, low-rent housing, rural electrification and municipal power operation, the eradication of stream pollution, a vastly extended road system. With variations in detail, the characteristic pattern of all these programs combines to a common end the legal authority and local personnel of state agencies and the financial resources and technical services of federal agencies, under standards of operation determined by the latter. Co-operation and control are at once secured by offering incentives too attractive to be refused.

A new understanding of the division of national and state powers has also been reached by an unaided federal entry into numerous fields once thought the exclusive domain of the states. In this category belong the construction of multiple-purpose dams on the Colorado, Tennessee, Columbia, and other rivers and the regulation of all water power; the regulation of collective bargaining, wages, and hours; of security markets and transactions; of agricultural production and marketing and soil conservation; and the income taxation of state officials. Of the great enterprises of the country, insurance, lumbering, mining other than coal, motion pictures, and education

remain largely unregulated by federal authority. Who can say which is immune? Against this trend must be noted a certain tolerance recently extended to state taxation and state trade barriers, but only in the absence of conflicting congressional action.

It would be strange indeed if the impact of such tremendous events had left no mark upon constitutional interpretation. The Supreme Court had earlier, in such matters as the suppression of election frauds and the meshing of state and federal criminal law-enforcement activities, sanctioned an emphasis on the co-operative possibilities of federalism. But in 1918 in the famous child labor case it had also struck down an act of Congress that used the power over interstate commerce to discourage the employment of children in factories, on the ground that this act encroached on a reserved (and unexercised) power of the states to regulate methods of production: a delegated national power could not be used within its literal terms if the purpose or result was to reach a subject matter otherwise left to the states. Shortly afterward the same answer was returned when Congress invoked the taxing power to the same end. This concept of "competitive federalism," as Professor Corwin calls it, can be traced back to the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions of 1798. It was thought to have been laid at rest by the outcome of the Civil War. But as thus revived to serve the purposes of latter-day employers it could be used to curb almost any federal power in much the same fashion that the due process clause had come to be used against the states. In fact, it had definite dialectic advantages over the due process argument as applied to acts of Congress. When the New Deal cases came to court, therefore, the competitive concept attributed to the Tenth Amendment was used to nullify the Municipal Bankruptcy Act, the Bituminous Coal Act, and the Agricultural Adjustment Act.

The reconstruction of the Court has changed all this. The child labor case was explicitly overruled when the Wages and Hours Act was sustained, and the other precedents were rendered innocuous. Further, the doctrine of *Frothingham v. Mellon*, that a federal taxpayer will not be heard to challenge the purpose of a federal expenditure, has been extended to bar also the complaint of a private utility against a grant-in-aid of the construction of a competing public

project or the complaint of a government contractor against the payment of wage scales required by the Walsh-Healey Act. And in the social security cases the Court officially blessed the co-operative principle as a guide to national-state relations.

DISTRIBUTION OF POWER

THE JUDICIARY

Similar choices between co-operation and competition are posed by the separated powers of the courts, the Congress, and the Executive. Recurrently, since *Marbury v. Madison* established the right of judicial review, an obdurate court has spoken the political convictions of a generation no longer dominant in the "political" branches of government and precipitated a new contest by reversing some hardly gained decision in Congress. Yet the Court Plank fight of 1937 was by all odds the most momentous, and in its aftermath the most conclusive, struggle of the kind since the Dred Scott decision paved the way to civil war.

On both sides the provocations to combat were extreme. In 1935 the Supreme Court stood on a pinnacle of power. Its prestige was immense and carefully nurtured by the outward trappings of priesthood. The dazzling marble building into which it had lately moved seemed to symbolize its arrival at the apex of government. Through the years it had built up a body of precedents so nicely paired in their tendencies that a judgment either way in a particular case could be authoritatively buttressed. Six of its members shared fully the prevailing outlook of the twenties. Their decisions were frequently criticized, by none more effectively than by the other three. The majority professed to have no will, though they made their policy the law. One or two of them knew a *fait accompli* when they saw it and gave just enough ground to acknowledge it in the gold clause and T.V.A. cases. But by and large the New Deal was unconstitutional, or the Constitution they knew was gone; and if that was the case, their own power would go with it too.

The President was just as provoked and just as determined. The Court blocked the way, not merely of particular laws, but of his whole approach to his duties. Whatever his vacillations in policy,

the electorate overwhelmingly indorsed him after his four years of trial and error. If he had not warned them explicitly of his intentions toward the Court, his Republican opponents surely had. The logical end of the competitive concept as applied to the separation of powers was: Who should rule? Congress was arbiter of the immediate decision, but in a democracy there could be but one ultimate answer. When the contest was on, the President made it as hard as he could for his friends to help him. The secrecy of the plan's preparation, the transparent ineptitude of its first announcement, the resentments in Congress over the President's slight regard for their prerogatives, the shrewd dispositions of the Chief Justice, the failure of active popular support to develop, and the artful manipulation of the organs of publicity—all contributed to delay the final result, but when it came, it came with a vengeance.

The drama should not obscure the significant features. It was the old Court, not the new, that by the conversion of Mr. Justice Roberts decided the labor board and social security cases and hastily reversed an unpopular decision on state minimum-wage laws. It is the new Court that has gone on to shape judicial doctrine more completely to New Deal policy, but in doing so it has shown just as much legislative will and dialectic ingenuity as its predecessor and as great a capacity for internal disagreement. It is as true as before that the Constitution is what the judges say it is; the judges only talk differently now. The turnover in membership has, indeed, been so complete and the suppression of disapproved precedents so ruthless that for the moment the Court is without respectable grounds for balking the President. On the great issues it has temporarily lost the power of choice, the principal basis of its power to govern. But there will be other presidents and other courts. It would be rash to conclude that judicial inventiveness is dead. It is enough to record that the practical meaning of co-operative separation in constitutional interpretation at present may be summed up in two phrases—the aggrandizement of national power and the concentration of that power in the Executive.

One further by-product warrants mention. By the Judiciary Act of 1937 the judicial hierarchy has been more closely integrated, and the government's power to protect its interests before the lower

courts is much more effectively safeguarded. This is a permanent gain.

CONGRESS

In spite of new times it is still the same old Congress, institutionally little changed except for the elimination of lame-duck sessions. The legislature thrives on executive indecision and weakness. On selected issues—the bonus, the World Court, the St. Lawrence treaty, and the Reorganization bill for example—Congress has been as ready as ever to assert its independence. But it shrivels in the presence of crisis, for want of any practicable means of collectively formulating a program of action or seizing the initiative. The last ten years have seemed pretty much one continuous crisis. If Congress has permanently yielded ground, it is owing to two developments permanently enlarging the stature of the presidency, to be mentioned under the next heading. For the rest, Congress continues to disregard much well-meant advice that it let details alone and confine its attention to larger matters of principle—and with very good reason. Congressmen are first of all attorneys and brokers for their constituents. To fail to pay attention to the details of this role would be to commit suicide in a vacuum.

The striking change, if any, is the practice of delegation. Some of the instances, the Recovery Act, the early relief appropriations, and the Lease-Lend Act, are breath taking. But delegation itself is nothing new, and crisis has justified extreme uses of it in times past. It is the aggregate accumulation that is impressive. Much of it inescapably accompanies the growth of administration. Refinements in the formulation of standards, procedural safeguards in its exercise, and the innovation of a congressional veto by means of the concurrent resolution go far to guarantee that it will be employed with a due sense of public responsibility. It is sometimes supposed that delegation means abdication. The record suggests, on the contrary, that congressmen have never found their official duties more exacting and time consuming than in the years since 1931.

THE EXECUTIVE

Space fails to summarize the activities of the presidency that have crowded the headlines of a decade. They have demonstrated again

how far, as Professor Corwin has lately insisted, the actual powers of the office are a function of crisis and personality. But they have not so far produced precedents that cannot be substantially matched from the administrations of Jefferson, Jackson, and Lincoln. It seems more useful here to notice two changes that promise permanent institutional accessions.

In 1940 the third-term bogey was laid to rest on the first occasion in our history when the issue was squarely presented to the electorate. There is nothing to indicate that under equally compelling circumstances a fourth or fifth term is barred. The result is not merely a return to the apparent intent of the framers of the Constitution to make George Washington eligible for the rest of his life. It is of immense practical consequence in freeing an energetic president from the creeping paralysis that has always overcome second-term administrations. Until a weak president is elected, Congress will not again occupy the strategic position it has held when it knew the incumbent would not succeed himself. For better or worse, the stakes of the presidency have been raised.

The second development is the consolidation of the executive branch into a mightier, more unified, and more responsive instrument of popular government. This movement got gradually under way during the thirties and is only partly consummated. It involves all the problems of administrative organization and procedure. The White House staff has been translated into the huge complex of the Executive Office of the President. Integration has been forced on the great departments. Budgetary and expenditure controls have been • instituted, personnel and procurement methods somewhat standardized. Executive orders define much of the framework of structure and procedure. Legislative proposals must be cleared. Litigation is controlled by a single agency. Planning arms are provided. Publications and reporting and publicity services interpret the story of administrative purpose and achievement. The movement has had to take account of many apparently contrary factors—a wholesome respect for independence in administrative adjudication, the desirability of securing the collaboration of special clienteles in formulating policy, the urgent necessity of decentralization in the field, and the provision of operating freedom for public enterprises of a busi-

ness character. It has had to contend with much public misunderstanding and congressional indifference or hostility. Another generation will labor with its continuing faults. But it is already a colossal fact. Inevitably it strengthens a president who knows how to avail himself of its resources; except in a fragmentary way, it is beyond the wit of Congress to control.

CIVIL LIBERTIES

The basic problem of modern democracy, it was suggested at the beginning, is the redefinition of freedom. Of economic regulation the decade has seen a good deal. Has that entailed also the destruction of personal liberties? The record belies at least the gloomier forebodings. The reader of Supreme Court reports will find more cases in the last ten years vindicating and enlarging the substance of the Bill of Rights than in the half-century previous, and fewer disparagements of them. Negroes have found new protections against the abuse of criminal process. A union organizer may assemble a meeting in Jersey City and an "Okie" cross over the California line. Religious fanatics may peddle their heresies. Moreover, the votes for these decisions came from the most ardent advocates of economic regulation on the Court; and when he was there, Mr. Justice McReynolds dissented. Nor is the Court the only shelter. The conduct of alien registration last year was exemplary. The Department of Justice has a civil liberties unit. The latitude of debate on vital issues during this decade of change warrants some confidence that if its foreign foes are beaten down, freedom will not perish.

YALE UNIVERSITY

CUSTOMS AND MORES

MARGARET MEAD

ABSTRACT

The last decade has been characterized by a lowered level of expectation, a devaluation of the present and the future. Equally striking has been the increasing shift to federal initiative from a previous pattern in which the initiative was taken by competing local groups. This shift is incompatible with American political character and various efforts have been made to reshift the initiative to the people. There has been a development of increasing political homogeneity and an exacerbation of group antagonisms, blurred and to some extent compensated for by the development of multiple pressure groups, formation of horizontal recombination among the locals of national organizations, etc. The atomization of knowledge, as symbolized by the quiz programs, has progressed at an accelerated pace with accompanying peril to the verbal arts. Finally, the central problem is seen to be whether or not the United States will be able to regain a sense of international initiative.

An anthropologist faced with this title might interpret it either as a scrap basket into which to put all the odds and ends of altered habits which do not fit conveniently under the traditional sociological categories or as a request to take an over-all view. I shall interpret it—with the editor's expressed permission—in the second way, and write this article as an anthropologist approaching the consideration of change in our culture, seen as a whole, but necessarily without the documentation which an anthropologist can provide in discussing change within simple cultures which have been properly studied.

CHANGE IN LEVEL OF EXPECTATION

The most striking change since 1929 is the alteration of the average man's expectation from his life, from an attitude of robust, overconfident optimism, in the face of which individual failure and individual unemployment were felt to be punishments for lack of effort, to an attitude of equally disproportionate pessimism, in which every individual's chances to succeed are felt to be narrow, constricted, and unrewarding. This all-pervasive pessimistic atmosphere can be found in the interpretation of almost every social phenomenon about which people are explicit and articulate. Although many more young people go to high school than ever before, yet the educational changes for our children are regarded with

gloom; the age of life has lengthened and the infant death rate fallen, but the health picture is presented as if it were much worse than in 1929; twenty jobs may be open in a field which did not exist in 1929, but the emphasis will be laid upon the terrible competition, not upon the creation of new jobs. The history of contracting industries is well known, while the history of expanding industries is ignored.

This general devaluation of the present and low valuation of the future has particularly affected the response to the evolutionary New Deal. Whereas a revolutionary regime begets enormous enthusiasm for an absolutely new way of life, the New Deal has been cast in terms of gradually improving conditions—conditions which, unfortunately, should never have occurred—yet which happened under the pressure of circumstances beyond our control. Unemployment, the “Dust Bowl,” the condition of the share-croppers, the steady impact of world-conditions in restricting our economy—all of these have been pictured as epidemic conditions with which the federal government grappled because it had no choice. Thus, the bulk of the country, while admitting the necessity for this move or that, and substituting a belief that “unemployment is the result of the depression” for the belief that “any man who is willing to work can find a job,” has accepted social security, the moves of the Department of Agriculture, the surplus commodities stamp plan, conservation plans, rural electrification, etc., not as advances in the direction of progress, but rather as necessary palliatives thrust upon us willy-nilly, introduced almost unwillingly by unpleasant conditions. This passive and depressed phrasing has, of course, been enormously enhanced by our international position, in which internal political strategy has made it necessary for us to see ourselves, as a nation, as always on the defensive, always responding to an unpleasant and dangerous situation defined by someone else.

It is probably impossible to overestimate the importance of this alteration in the level of expectation. Without recognizing it, our ability to interpret any statement, whether made by a welfare worker, an educator, or a big industrialist, is seriously compromised. Welfare workers point to an “increased social consciousness,” because we are not content with the conditions of the aged, or crippled

children, or the blind, of ten years ago, but the increase in social consciousness has all been on the negative side. The businessman whose profits have gone up from nothing to 6 per cent can see only that he is making *only* 6 per cent. In 1929, if we compared our high-school graduation figures with 1910, we would have boasted; now, with even more striking figures, we speak sadly of the failure of democracy. It is possible that, as soon as war production makes it possible for us to seize the initiative in international affairs, this low level of expectation, which sees everything in the present as inferior to the past and anticipates a new low in the future, may again be sharply altered. We may reasonably predict that, as soon as we achieve this initiative, our evaluation of our internal and external economic relations is likely to swing as far toward optimism as it now leans toward pessimism.¹

SHIFT TO FEDERAL INITIATIVE

Perhaps the most significant single change in governmental pattern in the last twelve years is the shift from a federal government whose role was conceived as passive, regulative, arbitrational, and remote, in time of peace, to a federal government which is continually expected to take the initiative. The contrast between the old pork-barrel days, when it was the duty of every congressman to get a better post office built for his town or a new grant of indemnity to the Indians, which would then be spent in his locality, and the present need of the Housing Authority to persuade a city to accept federal subsidies is very striking. The old phrasing assumed a Congress sitting tight on the collective resources of the nation, while in-

¹ Levels of expectation are one of the most useful cross-cultural categories, whether handled synchronically or diachronically. In some cultures the idea of change is an integral element. The Manus think of their culture as becoming more moral and more energetic; the Arapesh of their culture as maintaining an uneasy balance between an increasing paucity of great men and an increasing supply of civilizing importations; the Balinese see their culture as having been steady and timeless until the arrival of the Dutch made it "unsteady"; the Iatmul see their culture as moving from one stirring catastrophe to another; the Iroquois saw all the order in their culture as having been introduced at one time by the concerted thought of wise men whose rules had to be maintained; etc. Our culture has maintained a characteristic swing between extremes, whether one considers the swing in the arts from classic to romantic movements, in business periods of expansion and depression, in politics between reform and conservatism, or in morals between puritanism and hedonism.

dividual members conducted raids. The new phrasing assumes a federal government, called "The Administration" (in these words we epitomize the whole significant shift from legislative government by statutory law to administrative government by administrative order), which conducts raids on the local pocketbooks. This shift is so great and involves such an extreme alteration in American political habits that it is not surprising that totally disproportionate emotion has centered upon particular federally planned measures like the C.C.C., the W.P.A., etc., which represent minute expenditures in terms of the federal budget. Exponents of these useful measures see these attacks as the forces of darkness taking advantage of the war, but a neutral observer might interpret them as a last symbolic attempt to regain the sense of initiative at a time when war has forced us to delegate even more initiative to the federal government.

In implicit recognition of the serious contradictions which imputed federal initiative involves for the American political character,² there have developed all sorts of attempts at compensatory mechanisms,³ such as the Land-Use Planning Committee of the Department of Agriculture, and there is increasing federal emphasis on trying things out locally and on "the community." The federal government itself has begun to plan decentralization of federally stimulated activity. These attempts to restore initiative to apathetic constituencies can be found among the avowedly democratic thinkers of almost every type of organization, and echoes of this type of genuine compensatory mechanism are found in various widespread plans and institutions with rather different motivation, in the Town Hall of the Air, the insistent spontaneity which was part of the setting for the Willkie clubs, and in the new plan to have the people "talk to the President." What trend will win—the federal effort actually to restore the initiative to local groups, or these efforts to manipulate and control local groups by giving them a sense that they possess an initiative which they do not, in actuality, possess—

² Margaret Mead, "On Methods of Implementing a National Morale Program," *Applied Anthropology*, I, No. 1 (October-December, 1941), 20-24.

³ This concept of compensatory mechanisms, a term used by Eliot Chapple, refers to the conscious attempt to develop devices which will restore an equilibrium in the distribution of initiative.

is one of the important undetermined problems of current social change. The controversies over the Gallup poll, in which both constituents and representatives have been pictured as coerced by the poll, is an interesting example of this confusion. Defenders of the President would point out that he waited until the Gallup poll showed that he had 62 per cent of the people with him, while detractors would declare that this showed a lack of leadership; still others would declare that the poll was used to influence people unfairly; and the recent Canadian debate over a referendum to the people, which is caricatured as a Gallup poll, is another case in point.

The crux of this problem, whether the people are to feel that the initiative lies with them or whether the federal government, as represented by the executive, is to feel that the initiative lies with it, has been obscured by the symbolic issues which have been chosen—accusations of governmental spending, of government interference, etc. But the really crucial problem lies in the methods by which Americans are to regain the feeling that theirs is the initiative, in business, in the whole country, in the world. Unless this problem is solved, or unless we have a fundamental alteration in our method of child-rearing so that maturity is no longer measured by one's ability to thrust one's parents aside and go on on one's own, the discrepancy between our sense of paralyzed initiative in public affairs and our need for this initiative to solve the problem of individual social maturity will likely result in some serious social pathology, which will probably borrow one of the fascistic forms currently available.

INCREASE IN GROUP ANTAGONISMS

The two depressing attitudes—the devaluation of the present and future and the lost sense of initiative—have formed the background for an increase in antagonisms between groups of all sorts: increased Negro-white tension, attempts to legislate married women out of the economic market, discrimination against aliens, the development of sharp negative localism (such as the “anti-Okie” legislation in California), conflict between youth and age. The shift from local to federal responsibility for social security did not come rapidly enough to offset the extra strain which the depression brought on local com-

munities. The residue of this strain—expressed in devious legislation about settlement, milk-inspection regulations, or agricultural inspection laws—is likely to vex the social scene for some time to come. The need to overcome these interstate conflicts may also serve to speed up the process by which administrative agreements, such as those now in effect across state lines, cancel out settlement cases. It may even come to supersede statutory law.

One of the sharpest results of group antagonism has been the growing homogeneity within each of the two political parties. It is, I think, safe to say that the increasing predictability of election returns is due, not only to our greatly improved sampling techniques, but also to an increasing consistency with which individuals of a given occupation, residence, age, and religious and national or racial group, may be expected to take up one political position or another. The type of analysis which made it possible for sociologists to understand the election of 1928⁴ had become a campaign argument on the lips of taxi drivers by the New York mayoralty campaign of 1941. Allegiances which were measurable but inexplicit in the 1920's have become, through being made so much more articulate, even more dynamic, in the 1940's. A familiar example is the construction of panels, groups of consultants, or the awarding of degrees by the great universities in such a way as to recognize explicitly the different "pressure groups"—a woman, a Negro, someone from the labor movement, a farmer, etc. This is a clear instance where scientific discoveries, the development and exploitation of market-research methods in advertising so that appeals were directed to pressure-group membership, etc., have reacted to make these groups more articulate and to promote their institutionalization.

The enormous growth in every sort of professional, trade, and labor association is evidence again of the increased tendency to think of various aspects of individuality in terms of group affiliation. Here, again, the present trend is undecided as to whether we are moving toward multiple pressure-group membership, in which an individual takes up a series of different, possibly contradictory, positions as a member of a taxpayers' group, a parents' group, a con-

⁴ W. F. Ogburn and N. S. Talbot, "A Measurement of the Factors in the Presidential Election of 1928," *Social Forces*, VIII, No. 2 (1929), 175-83.

sumers' group, a producers' group, etc., so that the contradictions in terms of self-interest are projected out into the social-political scene; or whether, on the other hand, the country will break into groups so homogeneous and consistent that a knowledge of one social-status item—a man's income, religious affiliation, or national origin—will be sufficient to predict his behavior in every other respect. The increasing attempt to introduce local, horizontal, organizational councils, like the American Women's Association of New York City, college clubs, community welfare councils, community chests, the local defense council plans, etc., in which the organizational form is an explicit reassemblage of institutionally disparate bits, is one of the cultural inventions which may stem the extreme development of either one of these two tendencies.

Complete delocalization and multiple pressure-group membership introduce a degree of disassociation into the social personality of the individual which present-day Americans have not been reared to cope with. On the other hand, the breaking-up of society into homogeneous and completely discontinuous and nonoverlapping, socioeconomic political groups is a form alien to our political framework, and the result is cleavage which might possibly end in revolution and in a one-party system.

The success of horizontal, crosscutting, geographically localized organizational patterns in stemming these trends depends somewhat on whether the recent trend—whereby community organizations become groups of energizing, initiating leaders, rather than meeting places for compromising, bargaining representatives of opposed groups—is followed up. If this trend gains in strength, it is possible that some new form might be evolved, which would solve the question of where the initiative is to lie, whether with the people who are merely represented or with the executive who is merely coerced by events.

One other new development which serves to reduce antagonisms and narrow pressure-group loyalties is the extension of overlapping peripheral organizations, such as the "Friends of" this or that movement—organizations of people who are sympathetic to a community church without being Christians, to many of the points of view of the Quakers without being Quakers, to Soviet Russia without

being communists, to a New Germany to which no one can yet belong, etc. Related to such organizations are the attempts to crosscut age and sex dichotomies, by the development of junior chambers of commerce, junior women's clubs, Cub groups under Boy Scout leadership, women's auxiliaries in the trade-union movement, husbands' nights at women's clubs, as well as ladies' nights at men's lodges. The multiplicity of such organizational moves, springing from many different sources, has the advantage of mitigating any sharp trends in any given direction.

THE ATOMIZATION OF KNOWLEDGE

Programs like "Information Please," "Professor Quizz," the "Ask Me Another" game, developments like "Believe It or Not" and "Strange as It Seems," with the final mechanization of the idea into slot machines which automatically provide the answers to a variety of absolutely meaningless questions, have been a characteristic development of the last twelve years. From one point of view they may be regarded as the logical extension of the American emphasis upon empiricism, upon facts and figures, upon knowledge rather than understanding. Increasing emphasis upon degrees, diplomas, and certificates (dramatized most vividly, perhaps, in the National Teachers' Examination, which assumes that one standard test of learning can be used to select individuals who can teach); increasing use of scholastic achievement tests rather than the older forms of entrance examinations; the advertisers' quest for new and arresting bits of information; the boredom induced by the superficial all-inclusiveness of movie travelogues, by "digests" of important books and articles, by tabloid learning—all of these can, of course, be seen as part of the same development.

A further clue is provided by a recent study of the sources of pleasure of those who listen to Professor Quizz,⁵ where the ego pleasure is rated very high when someone better educated fails, while a comparable pleasure is derived from identifying with someone lowly, who has not the value of a college education, and who succeeds. During the depression almost all Americans suffered from ego defla-

⁵ Herta Herzog, "Professor Quizz—a Gratification Study," in Paul Lazarsfeld (ed.), *Radio and the Printed Page* (New York: Duell, Sloan & Pearce, 1941), pp. 64-93.

tion, if only by ceasing to feel themselves a part of a progressive and advancing economy. "Quizzbits" provide a symbolic and easy way of inflating the ego; any given bit may act as an inflationary device and no higher rank goes to the man who has read Shakespeare than to the man who has read Edgar A. Guest, if the problem is to quote a line from one or the other. The "quizz-bits" pattern, by atomizing all knowledge, make all knowledge appear accessible to everyone—each man can exult that he got twenty answers right, and lose all sense of qualitative inferiority in temporary quantitative victory.

Valuable as these "quizz-bits" may be, as supports for deflated egos, they combine with the increasingly attenuated use of the English language to provide a very sterile background for any sort of verbal art.

SHIFT IN INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVE

American culture has always been ambivalent in its view of our initiative-response position to the rest of the world. We have varied between the role of the political inventor and innovator and that of the literary and artistic imitator. In the 1920's we were definitely the rich new world, the richest nation in the world, free from the scars and battles of the old world, independent of its problems, scornful of its political ideologies. In this respect, too, the whole picture has shifted. Beginning with the tendency to blame all of our economic difficulties on World War I, and continuing with our sense of economic restriction due to world-wide depression, the increasing pull which European ideologies, Fascist and Communist, began to exercise for certain portions of our population, until our forced rearmament after our declaration of unwillingness to participate in the world-scene, the whole phrasing has been one in which the initiative has been wrested from us by world-events, and our catchwords have been dictated by European demagogues. Even American isolationism, the very doctrine which advocated American noninvolvement, has had recourse to the phrasing dictated by European fascism.

This bitter sense that we had lost the initiative in thought and in action, in trade and in war, has been heavily exploited by propagandists. The present administration has tried to keep in step by phrasing all our international moves as defenses and the Axis has

caricatured any aid given to Great Britain as the United States dancing to a tune played in Downing Street. Much of the antagonism to Great Britain which can be found all over the country can be explained as an irritable reaction to a sense that someone is pushing us around, combined with the unwillingness to assign the initiative role, which we feel we have lost, to the real enemy.

The social scientist assumes social responsibility when he comments upon the contemporary scene. To dodge that responsibility by explicit objectivity, when every word that has been written, no matter how objective, is bound to have some repercussions, seems to me impossible. As I see the issues before this country, expressed in cultural terms, they are the needs to regain as individuals, as local communities, as local organizations, as a federal government, and as a nation, the sense of initiative, the sense that we are in control of our own destiny, that we can decide what shape we want our society to take and what conditions are necessary in the world, so that we can pursue this goal—which means conditions under which other countries may also be free to pursue compatible but not necessarily similar goals. If we succeed in regaining such a sense of initiative, the next century will have one shape; if we fail, it will have quite a different one. The more sharply the alternative is stated, the greater the chance of meeting it squarely.

AMERICAN MUSEUM OF NATURAL HISTORY
NEW YORK CITY

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

In the interest of encouraging presentation of divergent views, the editor invites comments on the articles and the book reviews appearing in the *Journal*.

OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS

Lundberg's article in the March issue of this *Journal*¹ calls attention, by implication, to a serious omission in the development of operational theory, viz., the failure to create criteria of selection among concepts equally operational and precise. The operations urged by the operationists are of all varieties: mental as well as physical, qualitative as well as quantitative, social and cultural as well as individual, verbal as well as nonverbal. How may one select among them? If we adopt what seems to be Professor Lundberg's position, namely, that clear and precise terms are to be valued per se, we place ourselves in a realm of scientific anarchy. Choice becomes a matter of taste, with every operational anarchist sponsoring his own preferences.

Clarity cannot be the sole standard of scientific conceptualization. Other criteria must be developed. Let us admit, for example, that a concept has more worth the more easily one can establish correlations between it and other variables in which one is interested. One may establish an infinity of definitions of "gas," "pressure," and "volume," but the definitions at present in use among physicists are better than others that may be contrived, because it is possible to state, as in Boyle's law, certain relationships among these three variables. Or, let it likewise be admitted that a concept is better the more empirical data it organizes into meaningful relationships, invariant, covariant, dependent, interdependent, etc.

Are not organizing ability and utility, and even meaningfulness, as important in conceptualization as clarity? It is surprising that social scientists of pragmatic persuasion should espouse concepts and definitions of impeccable clarity but of limited utility and significance. Not just operational definitions, but operational definitions that count, should be our program.

HARRY ALPERT

College of the City of New York

¹ This *Journal*, XLVII (March, 1942), 727-45.

NEWS AND NOTES

RESEARCH NEWS

Committee on Wartime Requirements for Specialized Personnel.—The appointment of the Committee on Wartime Requirements for Specialized Personnel was announced by the National Resources Planning Board on January 2. The Committee is to function as part of the National Roster of Scientific and Specialized Personnel of which Dr. Leonard Carmichael is director. The Committee on Wartime Requirements for Specialized Personnel has been subdivided into several groups which will concentrate on the federal government, nonfederal public service, industry, selective service, education and research. Those studying problems of the federal government are Henry Reining, National Institute of Public Affairs; Mitchell Dreese, George Washington University; and Maxwell DeVoe, chief, Division of Organization and Personnel Management, United States Department of Agriculture. The group concentrating on nonfederal personnel is composed of Willard Parker, director of personnel of the state of Louisiana; Arnold S. Zander, president of American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees; and James M. Mitchell, director of Headquarters Office of the Civil Service Assembly.

Council on Human Relations.—The Council on Human Relations has been formed to study the cultural factors which are relevant to international co-operation. The Council is interested in furthering collaboration among all students of personality and culture whose collected materials, current researches, and research projects may be useful for a scientific approach to problems of international relations. In particular, the Council is interested in the immediate problems of co-operation among the allied nations and the future problems of world-reorganization, when the co-operation of all nations will be necessary.

In view of these interests, the Council is requesting that interested persons communicate with the secretary, Gregory Bateson, 15 West Seventy-seventh Street, New York City. The Council hopes to serve as a clearing house for research in this broad field by putting those who are interested in working on the same culture in touch with one another, and those who are working with comparable techniques, but on different cultures, in touch

with one another. The Council also proposes to circulate among its collaborators abstracts and bibliographies on the subjects of its interests.

Ecole Libre des Hautes Etudes.—The Ecole Libre des Hautes Etudes, the first French-speaking university in the United States, was opened in New York City in the middle of February. The faculty is composed of some sixty exiled French and Belgian professors, among whom are Henri Focillon, president of the new Ecole Libre; Paul Van Zeeland, former prime minister of Belgium, dean of the law faculty; Jacques Maritain, Gilbert Chinard, and other distinguished scholars. The new institution is sponsored by the New School for Social Research.

Roosevelt Fellowship Appointments.—The Roosevelt Fellowships, which were established last fall under the auspices of the Institute of International Education to enable United States students to study in the Latin-American countries, have now been awarded. Among the awards of interest to sociologists is one to Charles E. Dibble, instructor of anthropology at the University of Utah, who will make a linguistic and ethnological study of the Huasteca Indians under the direction of Dr. Alfonso Caso at the National University of Mexico. A fellowship was also given to Ronald L. Mallison, a graduate student at the University of Texas, who plans to study the Portuguese language at the University of Brazil and to carry on research in social anthropology. In addition to the Roosevelt Fellowships the Institute for International Education has also awarded twenty-seven fellowships in co-operation with the Office of the Co-ordinator of Inter-American Affairs. Among these awards is one to Arthur R. Stevens, which will enable him to study economics and sociology at the University of San Marcos in Lima.

Social Science Research Council.—There has recently been appointed a Committee on the Social Aspects of War with the responsibility of securing the preparation of memorandums which may serve as guides for research on selected phases of the impact of war upon American life. The members of the Committee are Leonard S. Cottrell, Jr., Cornell University; A. Irving Hallowell, University of Pennsylvania; S. A. Stouffer, University of Chicago; and Kimball Young, Queens College. Memorandums now being prepared include "Alien Minority Groups" by Louis Wirth; "Crime" by Thorsten Sellin; "The Negro" by Charles S. Johnson; "Population Changes" by Edward P. Hutchinson, Library of Congress; "Social Differentiation and National Solidarity" by R. Lauriston Sharp, Cornell

University; "Population Migration" by Conrad and Irene B. Taeuber; and "Public Opinion" by Floyd Ruch.

Memorandums in mimeographed form for ten cents a copy and a complete list of subjects may be obtained by those interested in carrying on research by writing to the Social Science Council, 230 Park Avenue, New York City.

Memorandums on other subjects are contemplated. It is planned to revise the memorandums from time to time as changes in the situation or the findings of current research indicate. The authors of the memorandums welcome suggestions and inquiries from persons undertaking studies in their fields.

NOTES

American Association of Medical Social Workers.—Effective January 12, Marian E. Russell was appointed the new executive secretary of the Association. Miss Russell comes to this post from the directorship of the Douglas Smith Fund of Chicago.

American Library Association.—The American Library Association created this last year the Committee on Aid to Libraries in War Areas, headed by John R. Russell, the librarian of the University of Rochester. The Committee is faced with numerous serious problems and hopes that American scholars and scientists will be of considerable aid in the solution of one of these problems.

One of the most difficult tasks in library reconstruction after World War I was that of completing foreign institutional sets of American scholarly, scientific, and technical periodicals. The attempt to avoid a duplication of that situation is now the concern of the Committee.

Many sets of journals will be broken by the financial inability of the institutions to renew subscriptions. As far as possible they will be completed from a stock of periodicals being purchased by the Committee. Many more will have been broken through mail difficulties and loss of shipments, while still other sets will have disappeared in the destruction of libraries. The size of the eventual demand is impossible to estimate, but requests received by the Committee already give evidence that it will be enormous.

With an imminent paper shortage, attempts are being made to collect old periodicals for pulp. Fearing this possible reduction in the already limited supply of scholarly and scientific journals, the Committee hopes to enlist the co-operation of subscribers to this *Journal* in preventing the sacrifice of this type of material to the pulp demand. It is scarcely neces-

sary to mention the appreciation of foreign institutions and scholars for this activity.

Questions concerning the project or concerning the value of particular periodicals to the project should be directed to Wayne M. Hartwell, executive assistant to the Committee on Aid to Libraries in War Areas, Rush Rhees Library, University of Rochester, Rochester, New York.

American Red Cross.—The American Red Cross has reached an understanding with the Office of Defense Health and Welfare Services of the federal government and the American Public Welfare Association governing their relationships in the use of community resources. The Red Cross has been designated as the official agency to render service to the men in the armed forces and their families. The Red Cross will also continue to operate in the fields in which it has functioned in the past. These include home service to civilians, disaster relief, nursing, first aid, water safety and accident prevention, Junior Red Cross and the volunteer special services, and its insular and foreign operations according to wartime needs.

American Sociological Society.—The following persons have been selected by the representative societies to act as members of the Executive Committee: Carl C. Taylor, District of Columbia chapter; J. O. Hertzler, Mid-West Sociological Society; C. R. Hoffer, Ohio Valley Sociological Society; Paul H. Landis, Pacific Sociological Society; E. T. Krueger, Southern Sociological Society; B. O. Williams, Rural Sociological Society. As yet no representatives have been appointed by the Eastern and Southwestern Societies. The 1942 meeting of the Society will be held in Cleveland, December 28-30, in conjunction with the other meetings of the Allied Social Science Association.

• *Association for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis.*—The annual meeting of the Association for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis, a society of psychiatrists, will be held at the Copley-Plaza Hotel in Boston on Tuesday, May 19. The morning session of the meeting will be a panel discussion on "Human Destructiveness." The afternoon meetings will consist of a number of papers, including one on "Psychoanalysis, Religion, and the World Crisis" by Dr. William V. Silverberg and one on "The Role of Unconscious Arrogance in Neurosis" by Dr. Karen Horney. Persons interested in securing further information about these meetings are asked to communicate with Dr. Frances Arkin, 572 Park Avenue, New York City.

Birth Control Federation of America.—The annual meeting of the Birth Control Federation of America was held in New York, January 28-30. Among the participants at these meetings were Pascal K. Whelpton, who spoke on "Population Forecasts and Problems in a Post-war World," Newton Edwards, who spoke on "Education for Planned Parenthood in a Democratic Society," and Henry Pratt Fairchild, who spoke on "International Migration as a Phase of the Post-war Population Problem."

Conference on Business Education.—The committee in charge of the ninth annual Conference on Business Education which will be held at the University of Chicago, June 26-27, have announced that this year the Conference will be on an invitational basis and closed to the general public. Those participating will be members of a Work Committee composed of representative educators, selected representatives of business-teaching organizations, and invited guests. Persons who are particularly interested in the problem of standards in business education and who wish to attend the Conference may make application to the Conference Committee, in care of the School of Business of the University of Chicago.

Department of National War Services, Canada.—The Dominion Bureau of Statistics under the Department of National War Services has published two detailed statistical tabulations on the results of the National Registration, August, 1940. One of these reports deals with specialized occupations of the Canadian population. The other is the general breakdown of the registration figures.

Federal Council of Churches.—Among the speakers at the National Study Conference of the Commission To Study the Bases of a Just and Durable Peace which met at Ohio Wesleyan University, March 3-5, were: John Foster Dulles, Presbyterian layman and international lawyer; Dr. Carl J. Hambro, former president of the Assembly of the League of Nations and of the Norwegian Parliament and now at Princeton; Hu Shih, Chinese ambassador to the United States; Bishop Francis J. McConnell, of New York City; Rev. William Paton, secretary of the World Council of Churches; and Dr. Leo Pasvolksky, special assistant to Secretary of State Cordell Hull.

Journal of Legal and Political Sociology.—The *Journal of Legal and Political Sociology* has recently been founded to give expression to a significant and steadily growing branch of the sociological discipline. The first issue will appear in October, 1942, and subsequent issues will appear

semiannually until a quarterly status is achieved after the war. Each issue will contain one hundred and fifty pages.

The *Journal* will co-ordinate sociological studies relating to law and politics. Being purely sociological, rather than philosophical or technical, in its point of view, it will deal with jural, legal, political, intergroupal, and international relations as functions of the total social structures and the situations in which they occur. It will contain, for example, scientific studies of the relation between legal institutions (technological, economic, religious, etc.), and of the relations between jural phenomena and other cultural manifestations (knowledge, ideology, morality, language, and art). It will give attention to the comparative typology of particular branches of problems of law in their sociological aspects; to jural, legal, and political behavior, symbols, and ideas; to the nature and social causes of change in jural and political patterns and institutions. It will expect to receive contributions from social and cultural anthropology, social psychology, criminology, economics, social history, and legal history, as well as from sociology per se.

The editor of the *Journal* is Georges Gurvitch of the New School for Social Research and the associate editor is Kingsley Davis of Pennsylvania State College. The members of the Editorial Board are Robert M. MacIver of Columbia, Bronislaw Malinowski of Yale, Karl N. Llewellyn of Columbia, Roscoe Pound of Harvard, and T. V. Smith of the University of Chicago.

A reduction of the annual subscription price will be given to all members of the American Sociological Society. All readers who are interested in subscribing or contributing should address the editor, Georges Gurvitch, 610 West One Hundred and Eleventh Street, New York City.

- *Nisei Writers and Artists Mobilization for Democracy*.—Under the leadership of Isamu Noguchi a group of Americans of Japanese extraction have organized to present to the public at large a clear and accurate picture of the American citizens of Japanese extraction and to act as an educational service to the second-generation Japanese themselves. Persons interested in securing information from this organization are asked to communicate with the chairman at 712 Montgomery Street, San Francisco, California.

Office of Facts and Figures.—Edward A. Shils, formerly of the social science staff at the University of Chicago, has been added to the staff.

Pacific Sociological Society.—The following officers have been elected for 1942 by the Pacific Sociological Society: president, Elon H. Moore, University of Oregon; vice-president for northern region, Fred R. Yoder, State College of Washington; vice-president for central region, Joel V. Berreman, Stanford University; vice-president for southern region, Ray E. Baber, Pomona College; and secretary-treasurer, Calvin F. Schmid, University of Washington. Paul H. Landis, of the State College of Washington, has been elected representative of the Pacific Sociological Society to the Executive Committee of the American Sociological Society.

The Thirteenth Annual Meeting of the Society was held at the University of Southern California at Los Angeles on December 29-30, 1941.

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.—A forthcoming issue of *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, the official organ of the International Phenomenological Society, will be devoted entirely to the work of Max Scheler. Several of the articles—including one by Howard Becker, one by Alfred Schuetz, and one by Richard Hays Williams—will be directly relevant to Scheler's sociology. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* is edited by Marvin Farber. Single copies of this special issue will be available for \$1.00 per copy and may be ordered from Richard Hays Williams, secretary-treasurer, International Phenomenological Society, University of Buffalo, Buffalo, New York.

Population Association of America.—The annual meeting of the Population Association of America will be held in Atlantic City, New Jersey, on May 1 and 2.

Society for Applied Anthropology.—The Society for Applied Anthropology has published the first number of its magazine *Applied Anthropology*. This number contains the following papers: "Organization Problems in Industry," by Eliot D. Chapple; "Native Economy and Survival in Arctic Alaska," by Froelich Rainey; "The Social Role of the Settlement House," by William F. Whyte; "On Methods of Implementing a National Morale Program," by Margaret Mead; and "Community Resettlement in a Depressed Coal Region," by F. L. W. Richardson, Jr. The editor of *Applied Anthropology* is Eliot D. Chapple and the book-review editor is Conrad M. Arensberg. Subscription to this journal is acquired through membership in the Society. Application for such membership should be sent to the treasurer, F. L. W. Richardson, Jr., Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University, Soldiers Field, Boston, Massachusetts.

Society for the Prevention of Crime.—The Society for the Prevention of Crime has begun the distribution of a Crime News and Feature Service. This Service will be furnished monthly to various newspapers and magazines throughout the country in order to popularize and disseminate scientific knowledge about crime prevention. Paul Blanshard is the executive director of the Society. Its headquarters are at 18 East Forty-eighth Street, New York City.

Among the sociologists who are serving on the National Advisory Council of the Society are: L. J. Carr, director, Michigan Child Guidance Institute; Ernest W. Burgess, University of Chicago; Walter C. Reckless, Ohio State University; Edwin H. Sutherland, Indiana University; and Norman S. Hayner, State University of Washington. Several sociologists also are members of the Editorial Board of the Crime News and Feature Service: Among these are Thorsten Sellin, University of Pennsylvania; Clifford R. Shaw, Illinois Department of Public Welfare; and Frederic M. Thrasher, New York University.

Sociology Club of Pittsburgh.—The Sociology Club of Pittsburgh was formed in January of this year to expand and improve sociology in the schools and colleges of Pittsburgh and to serve as a medium for the exchange of ideas of sociologists. The following officers were elected: chairman, E. W. Montgomery, Pennsylvania College for Women; secretary-treasurer, Verne Wright, University of Pittsburgh; program chairman, Edward B. Olds, research specialist of the Bureau of Social Research. The first three meetings of the Club will deal with the following topics: "Community Organizations in Civilian Defense," "Analysis and Criticism of Local College Curricula in Sociology," and "Survey of Social Research in the Pittsburgh Area with Suggestions on Needed Research."

Southeastern Cooperative League.—Among the new members of the Board of Directors of the Southeastern Cooperative League elected on January 10 at Atlanta are Lee M. Brooks, professor of sociology, University of North Carolina; Charles S. Johnson, department of social science, Fisk University; and C. B. Loomis, professor of sociology, Piedmont College.

Southern Sociological Society.—The seventh annual meeting of the Southern Sociological Society was held in Chattanooga, April 3 and 4. The divisional meetings included discussion of such topics as "The Changing Population Picture," "Social Welfare," "Teaching of Sociology," "Social Research," "Defense and Readjustment," and "Recreation."

United States Civil Service Commission.—James Babcock, formerly of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, has been appointed assistant to the chief of the Examination Division of the United States Civil Service Commission. Mr. Babcock is to be in charge of social-science placements.

Alderson-Broadbush College.—Eva B. Clark, who has conducted the sociology classes at the college, has resigned.

Bryn Mawr.—Ruth A. Inglis has accepted an appointment as instructor in sociology.

University of Cincinnati.—Earle Eubank is on leave of absence during the second semester. He has been named associate editor of the *Dictionary of Sociology*, now being issued by the Philosophical Library, with Henry Pratt Fairchild as editor.

The second of a series of studies concerning Cincinnati, entitled *Cincinnati Building Permits—Trends and Distribution, 1908-1938* by James A. Quinn, Earle Eubank, and Lois E. Elliott has been issued by the Bureau of Business Research, Ohio State University.

Escola livre de sociologia e politica de São Paulo.—Alfred R. Radcliffe-Brown has been at the Escola livre de sociologia e politica de São Paulo since March 15 of this year, and it is expected that he will spend a year as a member of the teaching staff. Donald Pierson participated in a conference on Negro studies which was held in Port-au-Prince in January under the auspices of the American Council of Learned Societies.

Hobart College.—The sociology and economics department now has a course leading to the Master's degree which combines graduate course-study and field research. Students will be able to apply their school training in the full-scale investigation begun by the department in November, 1941. The scope of the study is defined as "the total impact of the war upon a representative small American city, upon its social and economic organization, behavior patterns, and morale. The current data will be interpreted within the perspective of the whole social history of the community, particularly its reactions in World War I." In such an enterprise the collaboration is expected of students in anthropology, sociology, economics, political science, and social psychology. A number of new research fellowships are available for 1942-43 to majors in these fields. Inquiries may be addressed to Professor Leo Srole, director of social research, Hobart College, Geneva, New York.

Indiana University.—Edwin H. Sutherland will teach this summer at the University of Washington.

Frank L. Sweetser is on leave during the second semester and has taken a position in the Office of the Coordinator of Information. Mary Bess Owen has been appointed part time in his place.

Mrs. Frances Butts has been appointed a full-time research assistant to Professor Harvey J. Locke in connection with his study of the differential factors between divorced couples and happily married couples.

University of Hawaii.—News has been received that the University has reopened. The enrolment is less than half of what it was previously.

Louisiana State University.—T. Lynn Smith, head of the departments of sociology and rural sociology, has accepted a one-year appointment with the United States State Department as rural sociologist to Brazil. He is attached to the American embassy in Rio de Janeiro. During his one-year leave of absence from the university, E. H. Lott will serve as head of the department of sociology and Harold Hoffsommer will serve as head of the department of rural sociology.

Marietta College.—W. Bay Irvine has been appointed director of admissions at Marietta College. Dr. Irvine received his doctorate in sociology from the University of Pittsburgh.

University of Missouri.—Morris Wortman, formerly of the Washington University Clinic, has been added to the staff as instructor of courses in social work to take the place of Arthur W. Nebel. Mr. Nebel has been commissioned a first lieutenant in the army and is stationed at Fort Benning, Georgia.

Muskingum College.—Eric Dale is a member of the department of political science and sociology for the second semester. Dr. Dale received his doctorate at Bonn.

New York University.—During the spring semester the graduate division for training in public service at New York University is offering a course in the management of penal and correctional institutions. This course is under the direction of Walter Webster Argow of the sociology department, and lectures are being given by a number of authorities in the field including Austin H. McCormick, Osborne Association; Edgar Gerlach, Federal Institution, Danbury, Connecticut; Glenn Kendall, New York State Department of Correction; Lloyd Yepson, New Jersey

Department of Institutions and Agencies; Dr. V. C. Branham, Woodbourne Institution; Herbert D. Williams, Warwick State School; and Roberts Wright, American Prison Association.

Ohio Wesleyan University.—J. Milton Yinger has been appointed to the faculty to succeed Dr. Antonin J. Obrdlik, who is now in Washington.

University of Omaha.—The department of sociology of the University of Omaha is now issuing the *Bureau of Social Research Flashes* which are summaries of research projects conducted by the department under the leadership of T. Earl Sullenger, departmental chairman.

Pennsylvania State College.—Duane Ramsey, assistant professor of sociology, has been given a semester's leave of absence to work in community organization for the extension service of the college. Edward Abramson has been appointed instructor in sociology and will teach Mr. Ramsey's courses. William Josiah Goode has also been appointed instructor. George E. Simpson has been named a member of the Council of the American Folklore Society, and Kingsley Davis has been appointed associate editor of the *Journal of Legal and Political Sociology*.

University of Toledo.—Ersel LeMasters has resigned his position as assistant professor of sociology and is now affiliated with the Red Cross in Washington, D.C.

Rosemary Featherstone and Elmer Louis are new part-time teachers of sociology.

Wheaton College (Norton, Mass.).—Paul F. Cressey is now on sabbatical leave. He is making a study of recent social and economic changes in the southern Appalachian Mountains, concentrating primarily on a study of two or three mountain communities in Kentucky. He would be glad to hear from any readers of the *Journal* who have research interests or experience in this area. During his absence from Wheaton College his classes will be taught by Miss Margaret Knights, formerly of Southern Union College in Alabama.

Winona State Teachers College.—An exchange professorship, beginning in March, 1942, has been effected between Winona State Teachers College and the University of Costa Rica. Under the terms of the exchange agreement John Biesanz of Winona will teach in Costa Rica and José B. Acuna of the University of Costa Rica will teach in Winona.

Yale University.—Among the speakers at the Sociology Club this year were Walton H. Hamilton of the Yale Law School, Dr. C.-E. A. Winslow of the Yale Medical School, Bernhard J. Stern of Columbia University, and Joseph S. Roucek of Hofstra College. One meeting of the Club was devoted to a panel discussion of "Propaganda, Education, and Their Relation." The participants were Alfred McClung Lee of New York University, executive director of the Institute for Propaganda Analysis; Clyde Beals, of the Institute for Propaganda Analysis; and the following members of the Yale faculty: John S. Brubacher (education), Rev. Hugh Hartshorne (religion), Fleming James, Jr. (law), Harvey C. Mansfield (government), Donald G. Marquis (psychology), Francis W. Coker (government), William G. Fletcher (international relations), and Bronislaw Malinowski (anthropology).

James G. Leyburn's volume *The Haitian People* (Yale University Press) has been awarded the John Anisfield Prize for the best book published during the year in the field of racial relations in the contemporary world.

Raymond Kennedy is preparing a volume on the resources and peoples of the Dutch East Indies, and the Institute of Pacific Relations will soon publish a volume by Stephen W. Reed on *The Making of Modern New Guinea*.

The department of sociology will offer a new course next year on "The Peoples and Problems of the Pacific."

PERSONAL

Lawrence J. Henderson, professor of chemistry at Harvard and an authority on the sociology of Vilfredo Pareto, died February 10, at the age of 64. Professor Henderson specialized in biological chemistry and published a number of volumes in this field including *Blood: A Study in General Physiology*. For a number of years prior to his death he had been interested in Pareto and had led a seminar on this topic at Harvard. His volume on *Pareto's General Sociology: A Physiologist's Interpretation* has been widely circulated among sociologists.

Datus C. Smith, Jr., has been appointed director of the Princeton University Press effective March 2. Mr. Smith succeeds Joseph A. Brandt, who resigned last August to become president of the University of Oklahoma.

The Yale University Press announces publication of *Sun Chief: The Life History of a Hopi Indian* by Leo W. Simmons.

BOOK REVIEWS

Social and Cultural Dynamics, Vol. IV: *Basic Problems, Principles, and Methods*. By PITIRIM A. SOROKIN. New York: American Book Co., 1941. Pp. xvi+804. \$6.00.

There is now available, approximately four years after the publication of the first three volumes of Professor Sorokin's *Social and Cultural Dynamics*, the long-deferred fourth and final volume. Since the earlier volumes have been reviewed at some length in sociological and other journals¹ and are presumably somewhat familiar to American sociologists, it is the function of the present reviewer to report primarily on what the author has added to the work in his final volume. The volume title is slightly misleading; "methods" in the sense in which the term is most commonly understood are explained at some length by the author in chapter i of Volume I and are referred to at other points in the first three volumes. Volume IV is concerned with methods mainly in the sense of theoretic point of view, conceptualization, and hypotheses. In fact, the principal task undertaken by the author in Volume IV is to express sociologically, as a general theory of social and cultural change, what was set forth at length in the preceding volumes as a philosophy of history or at any rate as a depiction in broad outlines of an interpretation of the history of the Western world during the last twenty-five hundred years.

The volume is bulky and wordy; many will feel that it is quite unnecessarily so and that it could be improved by a considerable reduction in size. Sorokin indulges himself extensively here in a practice already familiar to readers of his *Contemporary Sociological Theories*—the use of a great deal of space to review the theories of other writers, toward most of which he adopts a quite cavalier attitude. He also uses the opportunity afforded by the lapse of time since the appearance of the first three volumes of this work to deal with the criticisms of those that have been published; and these criticisms he is inclined to dispose of in a similarly oracular manner. The greater part of this polemic matter could have been omitted with the effect of gaining much more favorable attention for what Sorokin really has to say in the present volume.

¹ They were reviewed in this *Journal* (XLIII, 824-32) by Robert E. Park and in *American Sociological Review* (II, 919-29) by M. R. Rogers, John Herman Randall, Jr., and Hans Speier.

What remains? First, the distinction between sensate, ideational, and idealistic cultures which was a central feature of the earlier volumes is reiterated here and buttressed by a careful reconsideration of the author's distinction between pure causal systems² and logico-meaningful cultural systems, the additional point being developed (pp. 35 ff.) that actual, empirical, sociocultural systems practically always embody a mixed type of interdependence of their elements, both meaningful and causal influences being involved. This conceptualization seems to me to be apt and useful. Whether Sorokin's elaborate attempts at the statistical verification of his categories and generalizations have any real validity is another question, but at least it will be difficult to refute his generalizations by further statistical operations; he can say with some justification that he has subjected these very broad historical generalizations to as much quantitative verification as one could very well accomplish.

It is in Parts II and III of the volume that the author turns his attention more specifically to what appears to be his major purpose, namely, the presentation of a general theory of cultural and social change. This section of the work is, like the others, unnecessarily long, and much of the author's elaboration of his theory is in the nature of reiteration and elaboration of the obvious rather than in the exhibition of evidence or statement of reasoning in support of his main propositions; nevertheless it is on the whole, in the judgment of the reviewer, a very intelligible, sensible, and tenable theory of cultural change that is set forth in these pages. Sorokin's most important propositions here are, first, that it is inherent in the nature of sociocultural systems to change as long as they are active and that the part played by external or material factors in such change, while it is a real part, is secondary; and, second, that the number of new forms which it is possible for such a system to assume in the course of its changes is, in most cases at least, limited; hence the recurrence in substance of old sociocultural forms, sooner or later, periodically or otherwise, is inevitable, if the system does not completely cease to exist. In other words, he declares for an immanent principle of social and cultural change; and he holds that such change is, in the long run and in some sense or other, rhythmic or cyclical. The rhythm of change which he believes it ultimately possible to discern in human history is, of course, as brought out in his earlier volumes, the succession of sensate, ideational, and idealistic culture types.

² The word "system" is employed by Sorokin with a meaning similar to that commonly attached to the word "complex" in the phrase "culture complex." A sociocultural system, as he uses the term, is much more than a single culture trait but less than the totality of the culture of any particular social group.

I find these ideas very suggestive and, in spite of the fact that Sorokin's *magnum opus* is not very readable, and his style is in many respects irritating, it merits careful consideration by all serious students of sociology and the philosophy of history.

FLOYD N. HOUSE

University of Virginia

The Crisis of Our Age: The Social and Cultural Outlook. By PITIRIM A. SOROKIN. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1941. Pp. 338. \$3.50.

Professor Sorokin is well known as one of our most productive and erudite sociologists. Indeed, as a result of his wide and varied personal experiences and his remarkable linguistic facility, he is probably a greater master of the literature of contemporary sociology than any other living scholar.

On the heels of a number of learned tomes he brought out his *magnum opus* in four volumes—*Social and Cultural Dynamics*. The present work is an abbreviation and clarification of his masterpiece for popular consumption. One cannot assess with accuracy the generalizations in the present volume without examining the methodology and attitudes revealed both in the *Social and Cultural Dynamics* and in all Sorokin's other books. There is obviously no possibility of so doing in this brief review.

Suffice it to say that Professor Sorokin's learning is only matched by the intensity of his personal prejudices and the subjectivity of his value-judgments. His writings, as a whole, afford the most elaborate vindication of Max Weber's contention that the interjection of value-judgments into sociology is fatal to scientific objectivity in this field.

Briefly, it is Professor Sorokin's thesis that what he calls our sensate culture, compounded of science, rationalism, skepticism, capitalism, and democracy, is breaking down, to be followed, after some decades of chaos and violence, by an ideational culture which will give us a new conception of truth and social values, freed from the mental and temporal limitations of the old order.

It has been suggested that the role of Professor Sorokin can best be understood by regarding him as the St. Augustine of contemporary sociology. There is much truth in this appraisal, and in many ways it is a tribute to Professor Sorokin's genius.

Augustine was the great mentality of the age of transition from the pagan to the Christian culture. In his day theology was the "queen of the sciences." In our day sociology can make a reasonable claim to similar pre-eminence. Augustine gathered together all the learning of his day to

condemn the City of the Devil and to portray the glories of the coming City of God. Sorokin has done a comparable feat in our time. Both agree that we should go back to the Stoics for our conceptions of the true and the beautiful and should repudiate the Epicurean philosophy, which launched our sensate tradition. Neither Augustine nor Sorokin has been overconscientious in the methods employed or in the judgments bestowed upon adversaries. Incidentally, it is interesting to note that Sorokin may have found his Orosius in Professor Crane Brinton of the Harvard history department.

HARRY ELMER BARNES

Cooperstown, New York

A Dialectic of Morals. By MORTIMER J. ADLER. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame, 1941. Pp. x+117. \$1.80.

In the first and larger part of this book the author shows by means of a colloquium between a teacher and a student how a moral skeptic may be converted from the error of his ways; that is, he is made to acknowledge that conduct may be affected by truth and error, that it is not purely a matter of individual opinion. The impression made upon the reader is that of a game in which one player makes all the moves for his opponent as well as for himself. At many points the reader will feel an urge to suggest to the student different moves which would cause the game to take a very different course, whether or not it would lead to a different conclusion. The second part, consisting of chapter vi (pp. 74-107), is much more closely reasoned. Here the author "gets down to business" on the subject of "Real vs. Apparent Goods: The Reality of Virtue." The book concludes with a short chapter entitled "From Ethics to Politics: The Common Good and Democracy," demonstrating the superiority of democracy to any other form of government. This again is directed against an error, that of *realpolitik*, treated as the analogue and consequence of moral skepticism.

The author admits that his demonstration is incomplete in several respects. Readers will differ widely in their estimation of the validity of his "dialectical" method. This reviewer is skeptical as to the reality of moral skepticism in people of "normal" mentality. It is common as an intellectual pose, and, where it goes any deeper than that, it is a consequence of the type of thinking exemplified in this book, i.e., uncritical deduction from abstract formulas which in their general meaning are ambiguous and in any definite meaning are not general. The question is whether a sort of dictionary definition of such terms as human nature, rationality, and

virtue can be treated as premises in reasoning on the analogy of the definitions of mathematical concepts, such as the plane right triangle and the square root of -1 . To this reviewer, it is clear that plausible definitions of such terms can be used to prove practically any conclusion. But in this book they seem to be used only to prove the defining propositions themselves, and no visible illumination of ethical problems results.

FRANK H. KNIGHT

University of Chicago

Social Research: A Study in Methods of Gathering Data. By GEORGE A. LUNDBERG. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1942. Pp. vii+426. \$3.25.

The second edition of *Social Research* is conceived of by its author as "primarily a textbook on practical techniques of securing basic data on sociological questions" (p. xii). Since this is the author's stated purpose, one need only mention that about one-fourth of the book—roughly the first hundred pages—is devoted to an exposition of Lundberg's ideas with respect to logic, science, the nature of knowledge, etc. Since, on most of these critical topics, the reader is referred by Lundberg to an extended statement of the latter's position as presented in his *Foundations of Sociology* and in its companion volume, Dodd's *Dimensions of Society*, one may here ignore his views on these controversial items and concern one's self solely with the chapters dealing with "practical techniques." These chapters deal successively with the sample, the schedule, the questionnaire, the measurement of attitudes, the measurement of institutional behavior, sociometric methods, field work, and social bookkeeping.

The elementary student will find the material on the schedule and the questionnaire useful. The value of the chapter on field work has been assessed by the author himself in a paragraph beginning: "The best way to learn the technique of efficient field work is to participate in an actual field project under a capable director" (p. 350). Failing that, the author recommends the study of reports of finished field investigations. The reviewer would extend this recommendation to the other practical techniques mentioned and would suggest that perhaps a similar apprenticeship and careful study are essential to their mastery by the student.

A presentation such as that given in this volume is not sufficiently detailed for the elementary student (who will certainly not learn the technique of sampling, for example, from the few formulas presented here) and is too simple and too incomplete for the advanced student.

The careful student who may be using this book as a text will certainly be confused by the author's self-contradictions. For example, on page 128 the author states that there are two methods of gathering facts, the direct and the indirect. He then goes on to discuss attitude tests and says: "Whether the latter can be classified as direct observation or not depends on whether the behaviors in question are regarded merely as first-hand observations of verbal behavior or whether they are taken as reliable indications of what the total behavior of the individual would be in a real-life situation. In the latter case these tests belong rather in the category of first-hand observations" (p. 129).

According to this confusing statement, attitude tests are firsthand observations; yet, in the first edition of *Social Research* (pp. 91-92), it seems that attitude tests, if taken in the latter sense, are representative of the indirect method. In the present work Lundberg seems to be using attitude tests in this latter sense, as indicators of an individual's total behavior, since on page 246, after discussing "the examples [of attitude tests] exhibited in this chapter," he says: "Hence we study these action patterns—the attitudes—through the observation and interpretation of language responses, not only as verbal behavior, but as indications of more complete adjustments."

If attitude tests are used in this way they are then examples of the indirect method and are open to all the strong criticisms which Lundberg makes of this method (p. 129).

Whether Lundberg's criticisms of the indirect method or whether the dichotomy between direct and indirect methods itself have any value is not the point of this lengthy digression. What is important, as this example signifies, is that this book, written by a leading operationist, is marked by much of that verbal confusion against which the author inveighs.

ETHEL SHANAS

Chicago

Social Science Principles in the Light of Scientific Method, with Particular Application to Modern Economic Thought. By JOSEPH MAYER. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1941. Pp. xxii+573. \$4.00.

The title of this substantial volume is somewhat misleading (particularly since it is long), for it will ordinarily be cited as "Social Science Principles in the Light of Scientific Method" or merely as "Social Science Principles." Actually, what Professor Mayer has written is a rather elaborate and on the whole competent critique of neoclassical economic theories. The book begins, to be sure, with an eighty-four page section on

scientific methods in social study; but the author's treatment of this theme is not particularly original or provocative, and it is not very closely related to what follows. The two hundred and fifty pages of Parts II, III, and IV contain an extended critical analysis of neoclassical economics and particularly of the concepts of value and valuation employed in that body of doctrine. Though the author's criticisms in these sections seem to the reviewer to be well grounded and pertinent, they are not overly lucid or forceful in statement, and the average sociological reader will probably not have the patience to work his way through them. In the more than two hundred pages of Parts V and VI, Dr. Mayer's attention is directed upon the relevance of neoclassical and other economic concepts to the description of contemporary economic processes and problems. These sections are both less difficult and more interesting from the standpoint of the reader who is not especially well versed in economic theory. They may be regarded as an exhibit offered in support of the contention that social science theory and inquiry should be oriented, ultimately and not too remotely, with reference to practical social problems.

It has long been the opinion of the present reviewer that no one could be very well equipped as a sociologist without some acquaintance with economic theory. If this is a valid assumption, Dr. Mayer's book must be regarded as an important contribution to the literature of our field.

FLOYD N. HOUSE

University of Virginia

Society and Medical Progress. By BERNHARD J. STERN. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1941. Pp. viii+264. \$3.00.

Dr. Stern has brought to this sociology of medicine rich and profound insight, penetrating analysis, sound judgment, and a wide knowledge (based on critical and reflective reading) of the history of the social development of medicine as an art and science. The whole is presented in finished, clear, and at times brilliant prose. It has none of the stuffiness and pedantry one finds in some sociological treatises; yet its learning cannot be gainsaid.

Dr. Stern shows by a historical analysis of the development of medicine and the allied sciences that "medicine cannot develop and never has developed in isolation, that the nature of its role and its achievements are circumscribed by the soil in which it is rooted" (p. 216). The very content of modern medicine is dependent upon the development of other sciences: the replacement of astrology by astronomy, the rise of natural philosophy and of mathematics. Botany laid the foundation for *materia medica*.

Chemistry is increasingly important in diagnosis and treatment. Physics has furnished and improved instruments (e.g., X-rays). "Medicine, clearly, is not unalloyed but is an amalgam of other sciences. Now psychology and sociology, relatively latecomers, stand on the threshold, seeking recognition as within the aegis of essential medical knowledge."

The social status of physicians is largely dependent upon the extent to which the medical profession is genuinely effective in performing its function and upon the extent to which physicians understand patients (use psychology). For a long while medical progress was held back, especially in anatomy, surgery, and obstetrics, by disdain for use of the hands, an aristocratic attitude which stems from the slave economy of the ancient world. A false antithesis between theory and practice glorified scholasticism and condemned laboratory research. Medical theory, out of contact with practice, tended to become formalistic and authoritarian. The universities, bulwarks of conservatism, tended to uphold authority rather than sympathize with the struggling emergence of the scientific method. The growth of cities, accompanied by poor sanitation and congestion in slums as well as a growing class stratification, complicated or even augmented health problems. Medicine in our time thus faces a dilemma: it has the scientific equipment for much more effective medical service to all but lacks the necessary social organization. Dr. Stern does not deal in detail with the current controversies. But he has fashioned a lens focusing the accumulated light of centuries on one of the major problems of our times. This he has done with soberness, insight, and emotional control.

The author is in dead earnest about making medical science serve *all* the people, yet he manifests a saving sense of humor. He traces the long road by which medical intervention has become a science and shows wherein we have to close remaining gaps. He speaks of the development of medical schools, of modern hospitals. The chapters on "Urbanization and Its Effects," on "Income and Health," and the last three chapters on "Medical Advances and Social Progress," "Resistances to Medical Change," and "Medical Progress and Social Change: A Summary" are among the best discussions of their type in print. They show a firm grasp of the subject, good scholarly economic and sociological analysis, and a moral courage that might well be emulated more widely. I can hear some cynics say: "What has moral courage to do with science and its advance?" There is no space to reply. But let them look at the history of science or at this book to find the answer.

The sober and prudent conclusions of this well-documented book had better be taken to heart by the high counsels in American medicine be-

fore it is too late. There would be less social friction in the future if every premedical student had to read it. The book will also be extremely useful for tutorial conferences with students in sociology; and many are the courses in which it could profitably be used as supplementary reading. Sociology as well as medicine would be further enriched if we had more books of this realistic, socially useful type. Dr. Stern has shown a high order of productive scholarship and has made it available for us in a readable, enjoyable form. That is not an easy task, and modern social science is in his debt.

NORMAN E. HIMES

Colgate University

When Peoples Meet: A Study in Race and Culture Contacts. Edited by ALAIN LOCKE and BERNHARD J. STERN. New York: Progressive Education Assoc., 1942. Pp. xii+756. \$3.50.

In this war the racial ideologies of European peoples generally—and especially of the English-speaking peoples—are on trial. Indeed, our ancient prejudices give such aid and comfort to the enemy as to be almost treasonable. It is bad enough to have given into the hands of the enemy an excellent instrument of propaganda with which to lay about among all the peoples of the earth except the few who are of impeccably pure white race. It is worse to ignore the question whether we can win the war without the full participation of all people, of whatever race or culture, whose aspirations would make of them our full allies if they could be even moderately sure that we would honestly accept them as such, now and afterwards.

With the above sentiments, the editors of this volume would certainly agree, and they would probably go further than most of us in promoting them. The more honor to them, for assembling, as they have done in this volume, significant selections from more than seventy students of standing and relating to situations of cultural and racial contact in many parts of the world and in many periods of history. No similar anthology has ever, I believe, been published. The selections are systematically arranged into fifteen chapters, each introduced by a statement written by the editors.

Having cleared my conscience with this honest tribute, I will state my objections. "Progressive education" suggests allowing the student's mind to share in the interesting game of discovery. Presented with material which will arouse his curiosity, he presumably begins to question conventional knowledge. So stimulated, he begins to ask questions and may even

become amenable to some suggestion—from those who have studied the data more than he has—of hypotheses which might put the interesting but confusing facts into some tentatively intelligible order.

The method of this book is the opposite of this. The answers to problems are given as in an old-fashioned arithmetic book, but more conveniently. For they appear first in every chapter, so that the reader may learn them before he comes to the “examples.” In the introduction to each chapter the editors tell us the truth of the matters to be discussed in such certain terms that anyone inclined to accept things on their authority would have no curiosity left.

The answer is almost given in the chapter titles, as in “Superiority Creeds and Race Thinking.” Following this particular title we at once have the idea of race settled by this statement concerning it: “Originally invented [*sic*] as a concept for scientific description of human group differences, of interest only to a narrow circle of specialists, it has by some extraordinary shift been brought over into the popular thinking even of the masses” (p. 420). We are then told that Boas, in a selection to follow, “examines and disproves” the identification of race and culture; that Toynbee “devotes passing but devastating attention to . . . some of the more popular brands of race bias” (p. 422). Another chapter is introduced by the remarkable statement that “culture conflict, although often associated with cultural differences, does not arise from differences of culture, but from the conflict of group interests. It has accordingly a political not a natural history, for it is of historical origin and manufacture [*sic*]” (p. 123). In the midst of the obscurities and manifest logical errors of these particular statements, and allowing for some demonstrable truth or even truism that may be hidden among them, one still can see the editors’ main contention. It runs throughout the book. It is the notion that on some unholy Olympus the lords of this earth have a laboratory in which they invent the ideas and ideologies of man. These they drop among mankind, who innocently and stupidly accept them to their own undoing and rush out to oppress, lynch, and vilify their brethren whom they would otherwise take to their bosoms in Christian love. A generation ago a similar explanation of religion—that it was a cabalistic invention of priests who used it to exploit their fellows—was current. It turned out to be one of the least effective of all weapons against superstition, even when supported—as it might be—with evidence of priests who did cynically exploit simple people.

The selections themselves, good as they are, might have corresponded more closely to the “progressive” method if they had been made to in-

clude more in the way of "cases," and less of general and abstract conclusions. One looks in vain for a full, human, and lively account of the more naïve reactions of people who live in contact with people of another race or culture; or of how some despised people has wormed its way into and taken root in some niche of an apparently tightly fitted social system; or of the frustrations of an "inferior" person who, getting education at the instigation of his "betters," finds them unwilling to give him the full fruits of his efforts. The ideas are there, but it is all too predigested.

EVERETT C. HUGHES

University of Chicago

The Economic History of Liberia. By GEORGE W. BROWN. Washington: Associated Publishers, Inc., 1941. Pp. ix+366. \$3.00.

Liberia has been a neglected little republic on the African west coast that ought to be of considerable interest to sociologists. It is one of the two Negro republics in a world now actively and fatalistically at war over the issues of freedom, imperialism, and the role of the darker races. The book was written originally as a thesis for the London School of Economics, and the author has lived in Liberia, where he had access to valuable source material as well as useful personal contacts.

The historical background presents the essential relationship of the Republic to the United States and its conflicting ideological problems of freedom and slavery. The development of the country is a story of the contest of two economies—the African economic system and Western capitalism. Inevitably this struggle throws into high light aspects of the African culture and the intensely interesting process of acculturation involving the Americo-Liberians, the natives, and the American and European whites in Africa. This discussion clears the ground for the basic thesis of the study, which is the economic history of this republic, and is a story of loans and concessions threatening perennially the life and independence of the country. That the Republic has survived in a difficult setting without the strong support of a mother-country is a testimonial to the hardihood if not the economic genius of the people.

Over a third of the book is historical documentation, including nearly three hundred selected bibliographical references. This does much to increase the value of a useful and scholarly text.

CHARLES S. JOHNSON

Fisk University

War and Society: Proceedings of the Institute of World Affairs, 18th Session, the Mission Inn, Riverside, California, November 8th to 13th, 1940, Vol. XVIII. RUFUS B. VON KLEINSMID and CHARLES E. MARTIN, co-editors. Published for the Institute of World Affairs by the University of Southern California at Los Angeles, California, 1940. Pp. 299. \$3.00.

This volume includes the texts of thirty-two addresses and the summary of seventeen round-table discussions organized under six general topics.

In the opening symposium the relations of war to religion, to science, and to humanity are discussed. In the section on war and the future world-economy, the inherent conflicts of free and power economies are ably expounded by Professors J. B. Condliffe, Karl Brandt, and Douglas Miller. American military and foreign policy and the Pan-American problem are dealt with from military, economic, political, and cultural points of view.

Not the least interesting section is that which deals with the impact of war upon European civilization. Moderate optimism was expressed in regard to Scandinavia, the Balkans, the Low Countries, France, Britain, and Russia. In dealing with Germany, Dr. Ralph H. Lutz emphasized the transition in its culture from the humanism of the ages of enlightenment and romanticism "when, politically powerless, Germany in her humiliation created her world-compelling thinkers and poets" (p. 124), to the materialism, socialism, nationalism, and finally totalitarianism which has developed since the mid-nineteenth century. This has brought about a situation in which "the cultural heritage of the German people hangs in the balance, and may suffer the fate of many great civilizations of the past" (p. 212). In spite of his gloomy prognostications, however, Dr. Lutz does not underestimate the contributions which Germany has made to civilization, even in more recent times.

The final section deals with problems of regionalism versus universalism, league versus federation, and national sovereignty versus international law, problems which will arise in the post-war settlement.

Many of the contributions in this volume are stimulating. All were distinctly colored by the world-scene at the time, and most of them, in the words of the director of the Institute, Professor Charles E. Martin, manifested "the firm conviction of the myth of isolation, the folly of appeasement, and the present impossibility of the peaceful co-existence of the economic and political systems of the democratic and totalitarian states" (p. 2).

This record of learned discussion at a time when, according to the editor, "the scholar must throw off his usual objectivity and detachment and join in the efforts to preserve civilization and its values, so that his days of objectivity and detachment may be resumed," constitutes a contribution to the sociology of the academic mind, as well as to certain of the roots of international policy.

QUINCY WRIGHT

University of Chicago

Japan's Expansion on the Asiatic Continent, Vol. II. By YOSHI S. KUNO. Berkeley and Los Angeles, Calif.: University of California Press. Pp. xi+416. \$4.00.

This second volume of Dr. Kuno's work, originally projected in three volumes, deals with the Tokugawa period—that long, strange period of pause, an interlude between one phase of expansionist outburst and another. It was the age of Japanese seclusion—seclusion in two respects, as Dr. Kuno points out (p. 345): seclusion of the country from the rest of the world and seclusion of the nation from the Imperial House. In light of the emperor-cult sedulously cultivated since 1868, this has peculiar interest. In Appendix X of the documentary section, no less interesting than the main body of the volume, Dr. Kuno gives a translation of the memorial of the Shogun Hyemochi to the emperor in 1864, laying down the basis for the future status of the emperor. He was to be permitted to receive feudal lords but for not more than ten days. He was to be permitted to make pilgrimages to certain shrines near Kyoto. "However, it is to be hoped that this may be conducted in a simple and informal way." It can be imagined what the emperor's position was earlier. Dr. Kuno's second volume sustains the interest and historical value of the first.

NATHANIEL PERFER

Columbia University

English Education and the Origins of Indian Nationalism. By BRUCE TIEBOUT McCULLY. New York: Columbia University Press, 1940. Pp. 418. \$4.50.

This thorough historical account of the political role of the educated class in India adds both fact and definitive analysis to the accumulated evidence that the "marginal man" turns easily to agitation against the very foreign culture and masters to whom he owes his learning and perhaps his living.

The term "educated class," the author tells us, referred only to people trained in the new schools in which both language and subject matter

were English. They were not generally people of property. People so trained lost their hereditary occupations; and if they were only partially educated, they were condemned to minor clerical work. Those with university degrees or professions could make a living well enough but they were likewise outside the old system of things. Both kinds of educated people had some benefit from their English training, but both felt frustrated at seeing the better positions in government and in the new businesses monopolized by aliens who made no pretense of considering Indians their equals.

These discontented people had a common language—English—in which to express and spread their complaints and hopes. They also had a new conception of national unity and social welfare. That their English education gave them these assets, the early nationalist leaders were quite aware. Some of them were even inclined to idealize the European culture. It seems natural enough that such people with uncertain status in both the old and the new orders, should have become the John the Baptists of Indian nationality rather than the aristocracy, the traditional scholars, or the peasant masses.

The early chapters of the book recount the beginnings and development of English education in India from 1835 to 1885. The later chapters are concerned with the growth of national doctrine and movements down to the convening of the First Indian National Congress in 1885. The brief concluding chapter raises an interesting hypothesis concerning factors which prevented the early nationalist movement of the educated classes from becoming a mass movement. It is, essentially, that the early nationalists were too much the product of their English education—that is, they were too urban, too bound to the English language, and too bourgeois to teach the masses of the peasants.

EVERETT C. HUGHES

University of Chicago

The Negro Federal Government Worker: A Study of His Classification Status in the District of Columbia, 1883-1938. By LAURENCE J. W. HAYES. ("Howard University Studies in Social Sciences," Vol. III, No. 1.) Washington: Howard University Press, 1941. Pp. 156. \$1.00.

Here are intimations of a natural history of the folkways of participation for a particular minority group in federal employment and policy making. This fact transcends the significance of the work as a timely exposé written in the historical mood. Purporting to be, in part, a recital of the "trials and tribulations . . . of Negro Federal Government workers," the study loses some of its effectiveness because of (1) the lack of data at

certain points (understandable in terms of the researcher's own trials and tribulations in getting access to necessary data) and (2) the not too expert handling and presentation of statistical materials.

In addition to presenting revealing materials, the author has plowed up materials of research interest worthy of intensive cultivation. One might spot such problems as: the mainsprings and the implications of an ethnic minority's design and claim for bureaucratic representation; the comparative force of merit and interracial politics in minority appointments; and the developing ancillary pattern as evidenced in the disproportionate number of service and unskilled callings and in the growing crop of "advisers," "consultants," and "special assistants."

HYLAN LEWIS

Talladega College

Attorney General's Survey of Release Procedures, Vol. V: *Prisons*. Edited by WAYNE L. MORSE, HOWARD B. GILL, and CHARLES V. MORRIS. Washington, D.C.: Department of Justice, 1939. Pp. 478. \$0.50.

The concluding volume of the study of release procedures is a comprehensive survey of the principal prisons of the United States, both state and federal. Jails or other institutions for misdemeanants and the several women's institutions are not included. Part I deals with the state prisons and begins with good descriptive chapters on historical backgrounds and present conditions and then proceeds with chapters upon the principal topics of prison concern, such as administration and personnel, custody, discipline, admission and classification, medical care, religion, prison industries, education, and preparation for parole. Part II deals with the federal prison system and follows the same general plan of organization.

The discussion is from the standpoint of "good administrative practice" and is moderate and restrained throughout rather than evaluative or analytical in the handling of controversial topics. With this treatment the present reviewer is in entire agreement. Public officials, prison authorities, technical staffs in prisons and reformatories, as well as teachers, students, and educated people in general will find this book worth while.

GEORGE B. VOID

University of Minnesota

Chicago: Backgrounds of Education. By JULES KARLIN. Chicago: Werkman's Book House, 1940. Pp. xii+448. \$2.50.

Here is an effort to summarize the sizable mass of research data on Chicago. Starting from a conventional definition of community, the author considers the urban way of life, the growth of Chicago, its spatial pattern and land uses, community problems, the family, school, economic organizations, government in city and region, and welfare agencies.

If the book has been written for use in local teacher-training institutions, as suggested by John A. Bartky in the Preface, its value may be limited by its conceptual nature and outline form of presentation. Neither makes for easy, smooth reading. Moreover, the school is treated as just another urban institution rather than as an integrating center for all the data surveyed. These are the points, however, with one exception, which will recommend the volume to students of urban life.

To one who has pounded Chicago's streets and pondered its problems, Karlin's synthesis of extant studies will offer little by way of new insight. And yet, the book is well worth reading, both for perspective and for detail, and its limitations are, in the main, the benchmarks of present knowledge concerning this much-studied city. Especially commendable are the numerous maps and figures, and the twenty field trips, each planned as to places, time, aims and schedule.

LLOYD ALLEN COOK

Ohio State University

Child Psychology for Professional Workers. By FLORENCE M. TEAGARDEN. New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1940. Pp. xxvi+641. \$3.25.

This text is intended primarily for social workers, teachers, and other professional workers with children and was developed from a course taught by the author for such workers. It is an encyclopedic volume, heavily documented with references to scientific studies and practical handbooks. The author also draws liberally upon her personal experiences and adds generous advice on many subjects. The defects of the book seem to be that it has no central theory to hold the discussion together and that it attempts to cover entirely too much ground. It is an accumulation of information from diverse and sometimes conflicting sources, loosely organized into chapters dealing with heredity, birth, infancy, the home, foster-homes, adoption, emotional, sexual, and intellectual development, school, behavior difficulties, diseases, and physical handicaps. With this wide spread, no one subject receives thorough treatment.

RUTH SHONLE CAVAN

Rockford, Illinois

Growth and Development of the Young Child. By WINIFRED RAND, MARY E. SWEENEY, and E. LEE VINCENT. Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders Co., 1940. Pp. x+462. \$2.75.

This third edition of a book first published ten years ago has been revised and brought up to date. The book is concerned primarily with the physical development and care of the child from the prenatal period through early childhood. The last two chapters, on the family, are the only part of the book that deals with social development. Within its field the book seems adequate for a text and is sufficiently nontechnical and pleasantly written to serve as a text in voluntary study groups for parents. Not only are the results of scientific studies given but

also sound advice on how to accomplish desired results in training children. The book is written by three staff members of the Merrill-Palmer School in Detroit.

RUTH SHONLE CAVAN

Rockford, Illinois

Symposium on the Totalitarian State: Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, Vol. LXXXII. Philadelphia, 1940. Pp. 102.

Fritz Morstein Marx and Carlton J. H. Hayes offer general surveys, C. R. Whittlesey and Moritz J. Bonn treat economic aspects of the problem, and Thomas Woody and Hans Kohn discuss ideologies and practices closely related to them. Many of those central features of the totalitarian regimes on which the qualified recent literature has reached almost a consensus are succinctly presented and often happily illustrated (cf., in this last respect particularly, the contributions of Dr. Marx and Dr. Kohn). The presentation of the ideological aspects of the regimes involved is of course a particularly difficult task: "we have enough evidence to assert that the chasm between the esoteric attitudes of the ruling groups in question and their exoteric ideologies is a very profound one; but we do not as yet possess enough reliable data to delineate the divergences involved with great specificity." A sharper emphasis on the dualism just alluded to might have been desirable in the symposium at hand. Also, the very fruitful generalizing attitude which the authors took up may have led in a number of instances to the neglect of important differentials. Thus the role of "youth" in the process of the conquest of power by the Stalinist faction in the middle twenties has presumably been incomparably smaller than the corresponding role of Italian and German youth groups (cf. a contrasting assertion on p. 95).

N. C. LEITES

University of Chicago

Community Contacts and Participation of Teachers: An Analysis of the Community Relationships of 9,122 Public School Teachers Selected as a National Sample. By FLORENCE GREENHOE. Washington, D.C.: American Council on Public Affairs, 1941. Pp. 91. Cloth, \$2.00; paper, \$1.50.

One of the studies in educational sociology made under the direction of Dr. Lloyd Allen Cook at Ohio State, this monograph is of interest in connection with the larger problem of how the American public school as an extension of the pattern of the family is affected by the relation between teacher and parent or patron. Dr. Greenhoe's tabulations of the attitudes of teachers and of various groups of lay persons are essentially focused upon the teacher's part in this kind of social relation, and her analysis employs "the sociology of the stranger" as basic to the sociology of the teacher. She is interested in the variety and range of teacher-community relations involving professional services, citizenship contacts, and especially leisure pursuits. Among the topics variously documented are: the typically limited geographical mobility of teachers; professional and

popular attitudes on what constitutes "social fitness for teaching"; specific taboos and general community controls governing teacher behavior; and the limitations on teachers as "agents of community change."

BUFORD H. JUNKER

University of California

Men against Madness. By LOWELL S. SELLING. New York: Greenberg, Publisher, Inc., 1940. Pp. xii+342. \$3.50.

This book is a rather arid presentation of the development of psychiatry from the practice of trephining by primitive man to the modern social, psychological, and medical techniques utilized today by the progressive state hospital. In this ambitious attempt Dr. Selling attempts to show how two lines of study, one represented by men like Claude Bernard and Hughlings Jackson, who studied the anatomy and physiology of the body in relation to the mind and another line as represented by Mesmer, Braid, and Freud, who placed their emphasis mainly upon the study of mental processes, converged in the contemporary practice of psychiatry. Dr. Selling's most moving chapter is on the zealous reformative work of Dorothea Dix in America and Europe.

The simplicity of language, certain slangy phrases, small tidbits of personal gossip, the optimistic tone, and the absence of any source documentation indicate clearly that this book is intended for the layman. The person with a professional interest had better rely upon the older classical work by D. H. Tuke, *Insanity—in Ancient and Modern Life*, or the more contemporary account by Albert Deutsch, *The Mentally Ill in America*.

H. WARREN DUNHAM

Wayne University

Land Economics. By RICHARD T. ELY and GEORGE S. WEHRWEIN. New York: Macmillan Co., 1940. Pp. xiii+512. \$4.00.

Land Economics, according to these pioneers in the development of the subject, embraces a broad consideration of forests, mines, water power, agricultural, recreational and urban land. Many fields of specialized knowledge relating to natural resources are ably summarized in this volume. The legal and economic principles of land ownership and utilization, the geology of mineral resources, the geography of city location, the sociological laws of city structure, and the theories of planning and social control are all concisely treated.

The reviewer can only express admiration for the wide range of material that has been woven together to form the pattern of this book. It is an invaluable reference work and a starting-point for detailed studies in the numerous specialized fields of land economics because it presents the broad underlying theories that give unity to this subject.

HOMER HOYT

Chicago Plan Commission

CURRENT BOOKS

- AMERICAN YOUTH COMMISSION. *Youth and the Future*. Washington, D.C.: American Council on Education, 1942. Pp. xix+296. \$2.50. A summary statement of problems and recommendations based on the researches conducted by the Commission. Part I, "Employment Opportunity"; Part II, "Education, Occupational Adjustment, Health Delinquency, etc."; Part III, "Responsibility for Action for Youth." Contains list of the Commission's publications.
- ANDERSON, C. ARNOLD, and RYAN, BRYCE. *War Came to the Iowa Community*. (Bull. P 36; new ser.) Ames: Iowa State College, 1942. Pp. 219-80. The mobilization of Iowa communities for war activities in 1917-18. Data from newspapers and other published sources.
- ANGYAL, ANDRAS. *Foundations for a Science of Personality*. New York: Commonwealth Fund, 1941. Pp. xii+398. \$2.25. Presents a systematic framework to the study of the organism as a whole, drawing upon psychiatry, psychology, biology, and philosophy. Addressed to all concerned with the problem of personality.
- BARDEN, JOHN GLENN. *A Suggested Program of Teacher Training for Mission Schools among the Batetela*. New York: Bureau of Publications, Teachers College, Columbia University, 1941. Pp. xi+181. The Batetela, a Bantu tribe in the Belgian Congo, and the present missionary educational program are described, and a curriculum is presented to be used in training native teachers.
- BEHRENDT, RICHARD F. *Economic Nationalism in Latin America*. ("Inter-Americana Short Papers," No. 1.) Albuquerque: School of Inter-American Affairs, University of New Mexico, 1941. Pp. 22.
- BERNARD, JESSIE. *American Family Behavior*. New York: Harper & Bros., 1942. Pp. xviii+564. Deals with the functions of the family, its inner social and psychological structure, its modes of adjustment, and its place in the social order. Intended as a textbook.
- BIRD, GEORGE L., and MERWIN, FREDERIC E. (eds.). *The Newspaper and Society*. New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1942. Pp. xviii+627. \$4.00. The selections, from a great variety of sources, are arranged topically. Each chapter has an introduction and a series of questions for student use.
- BOGARDUS, EMORY S. *Fundamentals of Social Psychology*. 3d ed. New York: D. Appleton-Century Co., 1942. Pp. xiv+538. \$3.50. An extensive revision of a well-known text.
- BOWMAN, HENRY A. *Marriage for Moderns*. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1942. Pp. ix+493. \$4.00. Intended as a text on marriage relations.
- BROUGHTON, PHILIP S. *Prostitution and the War*. New York: Public Affairs Committee, Inc., 1942. Pp. 32. \$0.10.
- BROWN, STERLING A. (ed.). *The Negro Caravan*. New York: Dryden Press, 1941. Pp. xviii+1082. \$4.25. An anthology of short stories, selections from novels, poetry, drama, folk literature, biography, and essays by Negro authors. Contains much description of Negro institutions and customs, as well as statements on Negro problems.
- CARY, M., and HAARHOFF, T. J. *Life and Thought in the Greek and Roman World*. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1940. Pp. 352. A discussion of the political and material background, social life, philosophy, science, art, literature, education, scholarship, and religion. The leading idea is that Greek and Roman cultures were really one culture.
- CHAPPLE, ELIOT DISMORE, and COON, CARLETON STEVENS. *Principles of Anthropology*. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1942. Pp. xi+718. \$3.75. Anthropology is pre-

- sented as the synthesizing science of human relations as found in all types of cultures. The point of view is essentially "functionalist." Organized into parts dealing with "Biology," "Environment and Technology," "The Development of Institutions," "Symbols." Appendixes contain extra reading assignments and a glossary.
- CLAPP, CHARLES, JR. *Drunks Are Square Pegs*. New York: Island Press, 1942. Pp. 118. \$1.50. Reflections on alcoholism based largely on autobiographic experience.
- CLARK, DEAN A., and CLARK, KATHARINE G. *Organization and Administration of Group Medical Practice*. Camden, N.J.: Haddon Craftsmen, Inc., 1941. Pp. 109. \$0.25.
- CLARKSON, JESSE D., and COCHRAN, THOMAS C. *War as a Social Institution*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1941. Pp. xvii+333. \$3.50. A symposium of the American Historical Association. Papers on the roots of war, the conduct of war, and war and society.
- COMMITTEE ON THE HYGIENE OF HOUSING, AMERICAN PUBLIC HEALTH ASSOCIATION. *Housing for Health*. Lancaster, Pa.: Science Press Printing Co., 1941. Pp. 221. \$1.00. Papers on the hygiene and on some of the social aspects of housing, together with an appendix on basic principles of healthful housing.
- COMMITTEE FOR NATIONAL MORALE. *German Psychological Warfare*. New York: Committee for National Morale, 1941. Pp. 133. A topical summary of important German literature on the various uses of psychology in warfare.
- DASS, BANESVAR (ed.). *The Social and Economic Ideas of Benoy Sarkar*. Calcutta, India: Chuckervetty Chatterjee & Co., Ltd., 1940. Pp. xix+664+vi. R. 12. A summary of the ideas of Benoy Kumar Sarkar, including his sociological contributions.
- DAY, CLIVE. *Economic Development in Europe*. New York: Macmillan Co., 1942. Pp. xxii+746. \$4.00. Traces development from the medieval economy to the present.
- DEUEL, WALLACE R. *People under Hitler: What Personal Life Is Like Where the Nazis Rule*. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1942. Pp. viii+392. \$3.50. Germany under nazism as seen through the personal life of a brilliant American newspaper correspondent who looks at the Nazi revolution and regime in the matrix of European and world-affairs.
- DICKINSON, Z. CLARK. *Labor Policy and National Defense*. (Bull. 12.) Ann Arbor: Bureau of Industrial Relations, University of Michigan, 1941. Pp. 62. \$0.75. A chapter from a forthcoming work on *Collective Wage Determination*.
- DODD, STUART CARTER. *Dimensions of Society: A Quantitative Systematics for the Social Sciences*. New York: Macmillan Co., 1942. Pp. ix+944. \$12. A volume described as a companion volume to George A. Lundberg's *Foundations of Sociology*, purporting to offer a theory applicable to all quantifiable data of the social sciences though emphasizing sociology. The theory is specified by a formula: $S = {}_s(T; I; L; P)_s^s$. It claims to be a mathematical approach to society.
- DOMINION BUREAU OF STATISTICS, DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL WAR SERVICES, CANADA. *Specialized Occupations: National Registration*, 1940. Ottawa, Can.: Published by Authority of the Hon. James G. Gardiner, M.P., Minister of National War Services, 1941. Pp. viii+73.
- DOMINION BUREAU OF STATISTICS, DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL WAR SERVICES, CANADA. *Preliminary Statistical Tabulations*. Ottawa, Can., 1941. Pp. 44. Tabulations of the data resulting from the national registration of all Canadian adults for war purposes. Tabulations on national origins, language, education, occupation, family status, etc.
- FEIBELMAN, JULIAN B. *A Social and Economic Study of the New Orleans Jewish Community*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1941. Pp. xvii+157. A survey based on house-to-house canvass with a schedule. The divisions of the book are a demographic study, an economic study, development of religious, social, and philanthropic life of the community, and a more general section on Jewish communal organization in the United States.

- GALLOWAY, GEORGE B., and ASSOCIATES. *Planning for America*. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1941. Pp. xi+713. \$3.00. A collection of papers on the background and setting of planning in America, resources planning, economic planning, social planning, area planning, and defense planning, with a cursory survey of planning prospects.
- GARDNER, MARY S. *So Build We*. New York: Macmillan Co., 1942. Pp. xi+223. \$2.25. A fictional account of the problems of a public health nurse.
- GILLIN, JOHN LEWIS, and GILLIN, JOHN PHILIP. *An Introduction to Sociology*. New York: Macmillan Co., 1942. Pp. viii+806. \$3.75. A text written by J. L. Gillen, co-author of the well-known Blackmar and Gillin text, and J. P. Gillin, who is an anthropologist by training. Considerable use is made of data from primitive peoples. The divisions are: "Natural Bases of Social Life," "Social Bases of Society," "Social Institutions," "Social Change," "Social Processes," "Social Pathology."
- GOLDMANN, FRANZ. *Prepayment Plans for Medical Care*. Camden, N.J.: Haddon Craftsmen, Inc. \$0.25. A comparative study of services and costs of five plans.
- GOODWIN, GRENVILLE. *The Social Organization of the Western Apache*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942. Pp. xx+701. \$4.50. Based on very close and fairly prolonged participant observation and information from a large number of informants. Attention to both aboriginal and present practices.
- GRAEBER, ISACQUE, and BRITT, STEUART HENDERSON. *Jews in a Gentile World; The Problem of Anti-Semitism*. New York: Macmillan Co., 1942. Pp. x+436. \$4.00. A symposium by well-known social scientists from several fields. The papers are presented under the following headings: "Race," "History, Sociology and Psychology of Anti-Semitism," "The American Scene," etc.
- GREENE, EVARTS B. *Religion and the State*. New York: New York University Press, 1941. Pp. 172. The Old World tradition of the relationship between church and state as it developed in the American colonies, as modified by American experience, together with an account of the separation of church and state and the problems this has led to.
- GURVITCH, GEORGES. *Sociology of Law*. New York: Alliance Book Corp. and the Philosophical Library, Inc., 1942. Pp. xx+309. \$3.75. The first book in English by a representative of the French school of "juridical sociologists." A preface by Roscoe Pound. The first chapter deals with the founders of sociology of law. The later chapters consider the relation of law to various kinds of social groupings.
- HAWKINS, EVERETT D. *Dismissal Compensation and the War Economy*. Washington, D.C.: Committee on Social Security of the Social Science Research Council, 1942. Pp. vi+81.
- HEISE, BRYAN. *Effects of Instruction in Cooperation on the Attitudes and Conduct of Children*. ("University of Michigan Monographs in Education," No. 2.) Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1942. Pp. ix+98. \$1.00 (cloth).
- HOLCOMBE, ARTHUR N. *Dependent Areas in the Post-War World*. Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1941. Pp. 108. \$0.50. The fourth of a series of publications on "America Looks Ahead," sponsored by the World Peace Foundation, dealing with the problem of dependent areas in world-politics and suggesting the subordination of national to international interests.
- HOLY, T. C., and WALKER, G. L. *A Study of Health and Physical Education in Columbus Public Schools*. Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University, 1942. Pp. xvi+240. \$1.50.
- JOHNSON, CLARENCE RICHARD. *Prisoners of War*. Los Angeles: University of Southern California Press, 1941. Pp. 40. Abstract of a thesis based on the author's observations of French prison camps in 1916 and 1917, on recent interviews with former prisoners of war, and on published autobiographies. Deals mainly with relations between prisoners and those in charge of them.
- KAPLAN, FLORA. *Nobel Prize Winners: Charts—Indexes—Sketches*. Chicago: Nobel Publishing Co., 1941. Pp. xvi+143. \$2.50. The story of the Nobel Prize awards arranged chronologically, by subject, by country, and by religion of recipient, giving biographies of the winners.

- KEY, V. O., JR. *Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups*. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1942. Pp. xvii+814. \$3.75. A textbook dealing with (1) more important pressure groups in the United States, (2) the party system, (3) the electorate and electoral methods, and (4) diverse political techniques.
- KLINGBERG, FRANK J. *An Appraisal of the Negro in Colonial South Carolina: A Study in Americanization*. Washington, D.C.: Associated Publishers, 1941. Pp. xii+180. \$2.00. The central theme is the development of the plantation system.
- KROUT, MAURICE H. *Introduction to Social Psychology*. New York: Harper & Bros., 1942. Pp. xv+823. A textbook centering discussion on such topics as environment, heredity, organism, group, culture, symbolism, patterning, survivals, change, conflict, leadership, and fellowship.
- KUZNETS, SIMON. *National Income and Its Composition, 1919-1938*, Vols. I and II. New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1941. Pp. xxx+387. \$5.00. A comprehensive study of the nature, size, distribution, and trends of the national income with a critical discussion of the concept, the classification of income, and the appropriate procedures for estimating it, together with a critical evaluation of and comparison with other estimates.
- LERMAN, LOUIS. *Winter Soldiers: The Story of a Conspiracy against the Schools*. New York: Committee for Defense of Public Education, 1941. Pp. 64. \$1.00. A book of cartoons.
- LIBRARY OF CONGRESS. *State Law Index: An Index to the Legislation of the States of the United States Enacted during the Biennium 1939-1940*. Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1941. Pp. vii+707. \$1.50. The eighth biennial volume of a publication covering state and territorial legislation. Especially valuable for its topical cross-indexing.
- LINK, EUGENE PERRY. *Democratic-Republican Societies, 1790-1800*. Morningside Heights, N.Y.: Columbia University Press, 1942. Pp. xii+256. \$2.75. A history of the "popular societies" which sprang up in post-revolutionary America to keep democracy alive under the new Constitution. The spread, membership, activities, and philosophy of the clubs are treated.
- LINTON, RALPH; FISHER, MARY SHATTUCK; and RYAN, W. CARSON. *Culture and Personality*. Washington, D.C.: American Council on Education, 1941. Pp. v+50. \$0.15.
- LOCKE, ALAIN, and STERN, BERNHARD J. *When Peoples Meet: A Study in Race and Culture Contacts*. New York: Progressive Education Association, 1942. Pp. xii+350. A book of readings, including selections from most of the scholars active in the field. Good topical arrangement.
- LUNDBERG, GEORGE A. *Social Research: A Study in Methods of Gathering Data*. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1942. Pp. xx+426. \$3.25. This second edition is extensively revised. Primarily a textbook on practical techniques of securing basic data on sociological questions.
- LUNG, CHIENG FU. *The Evolution of Chinese Social Thought*. Los Angeles: University of Southern California Press, 1941. Pp. 40. Deals with Taoism, Confucianism, utilitarianism, and legalism.
- MACCORMAC, JOHN. *America and World Mastery*. New York: Duell, Sloan & Pearce, 1942. Pp. 338. \$2.75. A newspaperman's account of America's foreign policy, with a plea for Anglo-American collaboration in the control of world-affairs.
- MACLEISH, ARCHIBALD; PALEY, WILLIAM S.; and MURROW, EDWARD R. *In Honor of a Man and an Ideal: Three Talks on Freedom*. New York: Columbia Broadcasting System, 1941. Pp. 35. Speeches on freedom by Archibald MacLeish, William S. Paley, and Edward R. Murrow on the occasion of Mr. Murrow's return to the United States after serving as the C.B.S. broadcaster to the United States.
- MAHLER, RAPHAEL. *Jewish Emancipation: A Selection of Documents*. (Pamphlet series, "Jews and the Post-War World," No. 1.) New York: American Jewish Committee, 386 Fourth Ave., 1941. Pp. 72. A collection of representative documents bearing upon the acquisition of civil rights by the Jews in various countries.

- MANGUS, A. R., and COTTAM, HOWARD R. *Level of Living, Social Participation, and Adjustment of Ohio Farm People*. Wooster, Ohio: Ohio Agricultural Experiment Station, 1941. Pp. 58.
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